



CO-CHAIRS' SUMMARY REPORT
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM WORKSHOP SERIES
AVIATION SECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 10-11 July 2019

INTRODUCTION

1. The first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop Series on Aviation Security and Information Sharing was held from 10 to 11 July 2019 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as approved by the 24th ARF Ministerial Meeting on 7 August 2017 in Manila, the Philippines. The purpose of this first Workshop was to highlight the importance of strengthening aviation border control measures that counter terrorist threats, especially the threat of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) travel and assist participants in developing the necessary capacity and capabilities to effectively provide a secure civil aviation environment.
2. The Workshop was co-chaired by Dato' Ahmad Rozian Abd. Ghani, Director-General, ASEAN-Malaysia National Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia and Ms. Hillary Batjer Johnson, Deputy Coordinator, Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of State.
3. Representatives from ASEAN Member States (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) as well as representatives from ARF Members nations Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, The European Union, Japan, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Russia, Timor Leste, the United States and the ASEAN Secretariat participated in the Workshop. The Programme of Activities appears as **Annex 1**, and the List of Participants as **Annex 2**.

OPENING CEREMONY: CO-CHAIRS' INTRODUCTION AND WELCOMING REMARKS

4. The Co-Chairs in their welcoming remarks expressed their appreciation to the facilitators, experts and delegates from ARF Member States, including members of the Secretariat for their participation and support in this Workshop.

5. Dato' Ahmad Rozian highlighted the importance of strengthening aviation security and border control measures that counter terrorist threats, especially the threat of FTF travel, and assisting participants in developing the necessary capacity and capabilities to effectively provide a secure civil aviation environment. He continued by stressing the importance for States to work together to address the issues of battle-hardened FTFs returning home, armed with active ideological and combat exposure, expertise in explosive-handling, and links with underground networks. He further added that this Workshop is pertinent in the efforts to implement the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2396 to address the threat posed by FTFs and strengthen border security. He also hoped that the Workshop would provide the platform to find and seek ways to enhance aviation security and border control measures including the development of aviation security deterrent tools such as watchlisting, passenger data name record, passenger and cargo screening, insider risk and other aviation security procedures and screening measures

6. Ms. Batjer Johnson expressed that this Workshop, with particular focus on aviation security, is timely since terrorists are targeting global aviation and exploit commercial aviation. Ms. Batjer Johnson further added that the analysis of traveller data would enable authorities to better detect so-called "broken travel", which is the practice of using multiple and parallel routes to mask points of departure and destination. In retrospect, she said, using this would have enabled the US Government to detect all of the 19 hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attack. Hence, the basis for the US to support these series of workshops is to raise awareness on the obligation under the UNSC Resolutions 2309 and 2396 and share strategies and lessons learnt for successful implementation of these Resolutions. She then explained that the exchange of experiences and good practices can help states to facilitate the development of their own watchlist, as well as other border screening and transport security systems and efforts.

SESSION 1 – FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER (FTF) FORECAST AND ANALYSIS, KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (KST), AND RETURNEE TRAVEL PATTERNS AND AVIATION SECURITY INCIDENTS

7. H.E. Ambassador Khairi Omar, Deputy Director-General, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) moderated the session with Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of Policy Studies and National Security Studies Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and SAC Normah Ishak, Assistant Director, Special Branch Counter Terrorism Division, Royal Malaysia as the panellist.

8. Dr; Kumar made a presentation entitled "Understanding the Evolving FTF/KST threat to Aviation Security in Southeast Asia". The objective of the presentation was two-fold:

- (i) to analyse the evolving nature and ideological motivations behind transnational terrorist threats to aviation security; and
- (ii) to identify specific terrorist threats to aviation security in the current era, especially in the case of returning FTFs and KSTs”.

9. Dr. Kumar further shared some potential counter-measures such as not cutting corners on regular security screening at airports of aircrews and airline employees, gaining updated information on potential security threats, and the need for standard operating procedures (SOPs) and physical defences against external vehicle attacks on airport facades. He also touch upon the need for a collaborative multi-stakeholder approach including governments, international organizations, and national and commercial aviation authorities to tackle terrorist threats to the aviation security ecosystem.

10. SAC Normah Ishak made a presentation on “Securing Borders against Travelling Terrorists: Detection and its Challenges”. She briefed about the history and background of travelling terrorists in the Malaysian context, arrest statistics, and observations on the challenges, best practices, and recommendations for improving detection of terrorists. In addition, she emphasised that in recent years, with the collapse of the Daesh caliphate, FTFs from the conflict zones have been making their way towards the Southeast Asian region, considering it as a safe haven for them. This is due to relaxed immigration requirements, multicultural demographics that makes it easier for them to blend in, and easy access in obtaining forged identities and remittances services.

SESSION 2 – COMMON AVIATION SECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING CHALLENGES IN ASEAN AND PARTNER COUNTRIES

11. Ms. Batjer Johnson who led the session, was joined by Mr. Kelvin Lee, Assistant Director, Member and External Relations (APAC), International Air Transport Association and Mr. Bernd Kaiser, Police Advisor, German Embassy Kuala Lumpur as the panellist.

12. Mr. Lee stressed during this session that there are emerging threats to the aviation industry which should be addressed immediately. On cyber security challenges, he stated that IATA primarily focuses on preventing Electronic Intentional Unauthorized Interference (EIUI) by introducing the Aircraft Cyber Security Task Force (ACSTF) as well as hosting the Aviation Cyber Security Roundtable in Singapore in April 2019. On risks imposed by the Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) or drones, he highlighted the existence of grey areas in determining responsibilities of the stakeholders involved in the usage of RPAS and drones.

13. Mr. Kaiser explained that the German Federal Police (GFP) is a governmental body with several overseas officers in various parts of the world, and that the main mission of the GFP abroad is to avoid illegal migration, and to prevent security and safety threats against Germany and the rest of the Schengen States. As of last year, GFP had successfully stopped the movement of 34,000 suspect travellers to Germany and 26 other Schengen States. GFP liaises directly with the local authorities, international partners, and airline companies to gather necessary information prevent unauthorized travel. He further informed that Germany is in the midst of establishing the “smart border” concept in which API/PNR will be used as one of the tools for border control management. However, an API/PNR system has yet to be fully implemented in Germany.

SESSION 3 – OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, GOOD PRACTICES AND SYSTEMS IN WATCHLISTING AND PASSENGER DATA EXCHANGE (API/PNR)

14. Tengku Dato’ Sirajuzzaman moderated the session with Mr. Christopher Hornek, Passenger Data Exchange Expert, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Ms. Ruth Kiragu, Program Management Officer, Special Projects and Innovations Division, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) sharing their views regarding the topic.

15. Mr. Hornek commenced his presentation by outlining the overview of the international legal framework on the collection of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR), and briefly explained about API and PRN data collection, including the differences between and uses for the two sets of data. Mr. Hornek further shared that the UNSCR 2396 (2017) urges ICAO to establish a standard for the collection, use, processing, and protection of PNR data. He also highlighted that the Chicago Convention Annex 9 is the coherent and harmonised legal framework to regulate API and PNR transfer (ICAO Annex 9 SARPs, PNR Guidelines and PNRGOV specifications). However, Mr. Hornek lamented that there is no harmonised legal framework to overcome the possibility of conflict of laws relating to data privacy and the transfer of PNR data. Moreover, PNR is currently not mandatory under Annex 9.

16. Ms Kiragu stated that the UN recommends the collection of API / PNR data to be accompanied by a strong legal framework to ensure the data use is consistent with international obligations, including those pertaining to human rights. She also pointed out that there is currently no harmonised and coherent legal framework, whereby the matter is being addressed by the ICAO Special Task Force on PNR established recently. Ms. Kiragu further highlighted that it is important for legislation to spell out the legitimate purpose of collecting API / PNR data clearly, which is for prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes. There should also

be clarity on the type of data that could be collected, stored, and transferred. She further stated that from the human rights perspective, there is the principle of proportionality, in that data collection measures should be reasonable and appropriate under legal frameworks.

SESSION 4 – OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL GOOD PRACTICES IN WATCHLISTING AND SUSPICIOUS TRAVELLER ENCOUNTER MANAGEMENT

17. Ms. Batjer Johnson moderated the session with Mr. Ben Snyder, Bureau of Counter-terrorism, US Department of State, Mr. Greg Falcon, Program Manager, US Department of Homeland Security and Mr. Nor Hisham bin Ahmad, Chief Immigration Officer, Immigration Department of Malaysia as panellist.

18. Mr. Snyder framed the discussion around UNSC Resolution 2396, which addresses the threat posed by FTFs travel, and calls for advanced screening of travellers through watchlists, API and PNR data, biometrics, as well as greater information sharing on KSTs. Taking into account the exodus of FTFs from former Daesh-held territory, it is imperative for countries to have systems and policies in place as the FTFs leave conflict regions, before they return home or go elsewhere to engage in terrorist activities.

19. Mr. Snyder stated that the United States recently partnered with Morocco through the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) to conduct a series of regional workshops under the Terrorist Travel Initiative, which is aimed at developing a set of best practices based on collective experiences that countries can use to develop their own watchlisting or screening systems that are sustainable and supportive of human rights and the rule of law. He also discussed the multi-tiered US government watchlist systems, and the importance of using and sharing current, accurate, and complete data in a whole-of-government enterprise to screen individuals, and detect and prevent terrorist travel. In conclusion, Mr. Snyder reiterated that there is no solution in a single step or initiative, States must learn from the successes and failures of existing systems. In line with UNSC Resolution 2396, States must develop agile and adaptable systems to adjust given the evolving global terrorism landscape.

20. Mr. Falcon shared his experience on the customs and border protection perspectives and briefed on the importance of ongoing screening processes of potential travellers. He explained that authorities screen travellers who intend to enter the United States starting from the visa application process up until the moment they enter the country. Through continuous screening processes, new and useful data can be gathered from various sources and gradually added into the travellers' assessment process. He stated that there have been cases where travellers with valid visa or Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) were denied entry into the United States following a positive match between data gathered through recurrent vetting and existing terrorist

watchlists. He further stated that the United States also organises programmes overseas, whereby through the programme, officers are specially trained to interdict passengers in foreign airports through tactical screening activities. These activities would help enhance the upholding of the watchlist.

21. Mr. Nor Hisham shared his experience of being detained for three hours at the Wellington International Airport in New Zealand for having the surname 'Bin Ahmad', similar to the names of persons in the watchlist. He emphasised the need to consider distinctive backgrounds of people from different countries and setting-up unique identification keys when establishing such a terrorist database. This includes understanding commonly used names within certain countries as well as cultural differences, including among ASEAN nations. Mr. Nor Hisham underscored the importance of sharing established databases of suspected terrorists, including between the local government agencies. This would allow for better and more accurate terrorist watchlists.

SESSION 5 – PRIORITIES, GOOD PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES IN PREVENTING INSIDER THREATS AND PROMOTING A CULTURE OF SECURITY AWARENESS”

22. Mr. Riedzal Abdul Malek, Deputy Director-General, SEARCCT moderated the session with Ms. Elizabeth Neal, Lead Desk Officer, APAC Region, US Transportation Security Administration, Mr. Gil Maglaque, Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines and Mr. Abdullah Al Mahmud from Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh.

23. Mr. Maglaque began his session by providing examples of several recent terrorist activities in 2019 to illustrate the current issue of insider threats. Mr. Maglaque highlighted the challenges faced in implementing the aforementioned methods stated in the previous panel to effectively address insider threats. These challenges include issues of reconciling data privacy legislation with appropriate surveillance practices. Cross-realm transportation border control which involves cooperation between aviation and maritime enforcement may also be required to address threats which sometime originate at sea, usually through traditional fishing routes between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

24. Mr. Mahmud began his session by pointing out that numerous stakeholders at airports have access to Security Restricted Areas (SRAs) and can therefore pose a security threat due to external influences or through threats to the individual/family members. In sharing his views on priorities to prevent insider threats, he referred to several ICAO Annex-17 requirements, such as those under standards 3.4.1 and 4.2.4, which require States to ensure that persons implementing security controls are subject to background checks prior to being granted access to SRAs. In Bangladesh, a

comprehensive background check on every individual is carried out periodically every two years, covering the current and previous applicant's address for the past five years and their employment history for the past ten years. The applicant will be disqualified if found to have been convicted or involved in criminal offences such as espionage, the storage of or dealing with explosive devices, attacks against law enforcement or civil aviation facilities, and/or unlawful entry into an airport.

25. Mr. Mahmud proceeded to explain the activities of the Bangladesh Risk Advisory Group (RAG) at the airport. He said that RAG meetings take place once every three months and are held immediately after Aviation Stakeholders Convention (ASC) meetings. At the national level, the Threat and Risk Assessment Committee provides a report to the Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh (CAAB) at least every six months or more frequently, if required. In concluding his session, he urged the surveillance team to continuously focus on SRAs, while recommending for security awareness to be cultivated in the public sphere through printed and electronic media.

26. Ms. Neal started the presentation by offering a definition of the term "Security Culture" as a set of norms, beliefs, values, additives and assumptions which are inherent in the daily operations of an organisation. It is reflected by the actions and behaviour of all entities and personnel of the organisation. Effective security culture, based on recognition, is a critical core value to ensure the achievement of goals and to establish positive security practices among the organisational workforce. She explained that the development of a security culture and human capability is a priority within ICAO and it should be inherent in the working environment for all personnel to believe and focus on security. It is also fundamental for security culture to be developed across both security and non-security personnel and at all levels.

27. Ms. Neal further identified three types of insiders, namely, ignorant, complacent, and malicious insiders. The first two types are the most important to address, as even the most adept staff can be distracted by malicious insiders, simply because they do not fully understand the importance of being constantly diligent in the workplace or recognising that a fellow colleague may have malicious intent. Instilling the right attitude helps diminish complacency, however, Ms. Neal acknowledged that this was not an easy task. In conclusion, Ms. Neal stated that people are the key to success. Mechanisms need to be created to help people succeed, especially in reporting as the environment changes rapidly with evolving threats.

SESSION 6 – PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING SCREENING / INSPECTION OF LUGGAGE AND CARGO AND OTHER ELEMENTS AS REQUIRED BY UNSCR 2309

28. Tengku Dato' Sirajuzzaman moderated the session with Ms. Anisa Tating, Manager for Aviation Security Division from Malaysia Airport Holding Berhad and Mr. Ketcha Su, State Secretariat of Civil Aviation of Cambodia as panellists.

29. Ms. Anisa began her presentation by quoting statistics of the increasing number of passengers and cargo traveling by air. In 2018, 4.3 billion passengers had travelled by air. She stated that aviation is still considered a safe mode of traveling and emphasised the need for States to maintain the security of this industry. In the first part of her presentation, she briefly explained the objectives of UNSCR 2309. She highlighted that the obligations under UNSCR 2309 include recognising the importance of the global aviation system to economic development and prosperity, a stable and peaceful global environment, and that secure air services enhance transportation, connectivity, trade, political, and cultural links between States, as well as promote public confidence in the security of air transport. UNSCR 2309 also acknowledges that terrorist groups continue to view civil aviation as an attractive target with the aim of causing substantial loss of life, economic damage and disruption to connectivity between States. Ms. Anisa further stressed that the risk of terrorist attacks against civil aviation may affect all regions and States, especially a nation's image.

30. In the last part of her presentation, Ms. Anisa touched on the regional challenges faced by States, among others, training, human factors, budgetary (lack of budget), security screening, various security procedures / requirements, transit passengers, duty free items, and cargo transportation.

31. Mr. Ketcha's presentation focused on the obligations of States, in ensuring its compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The objective of his presentation was to share the practice of Cambodia's screening measures of baggage and cargo as part of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) after ICAO's audit in 2016. He shared three (3) steps taken by the Cambodian authorities to enhance effective implementation of the aviation security. Firstly, the Cambodian authority improved aviation security by incorporating the standards and recommended practices as set out in relevant international conventions into Cambodian domestic legislations. Secondly, Cambodia also reviewed the standards in Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention and the subsequently incorporated standards into its domestic regulations. Thirdly, the Cambodian authority has been monitoring the airline industry to ensure compliance with international and national requirements.

32. In conclusion, Mr. Ketcha stated that for Cambodia the new amendments made in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention and the use of new technology and equipment are its priorities. Cambodia still faces the challenges of investment cost on new technology, selection and training of security personnel, and risk assessment.

SESSION 7 – PRIORITIES, GOOD PRACTICES, AND CHALLENGES IN LANDSIDE SECURITY, INCLUDING INFORMATION SHARING, SECURITY PROCEDURES, AND PROMOTING A CULTURE OF SECURITY AWARENESS WITH AVIATION SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS

33. The last panel session was moderated by Ms. Batjer Johnson with Mr. Silvano Da Silva Ribeiro, Technical Staff of Aviation Security Division, Civil Aviation Authority of Timor Leste, and Mr. Vajira Ratnapala, First Secretary, Airline Liaison Officer – Australia Border Force from Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur as panellists.

34. Mr. Da Silva Ribeiro gave a presentation on Timor Leste’s operational aspects of its landside security services, particularly at Presidente Nicolau Lobato International Airport, Dili, Timor-Leste. Mr. Da Silva Ribeiro highlighted that the Dili Airport is well guarded by a collective team of security personnel which comprises airport security, airport police, immigration, Unido Patruofomento Fronteira (UPF) (Timor Leste’s border police), National Intelligence Agency, Customs, and Diretor Nasional Seguransa Patrimonio Publiku (DNSPP) (Timor Leste’s National Division of Public Security). Mr. Da Silva Ribeiro also highlighted that the primary focus of its airport security operations is concentrated at several areas of interest which include public and taxi vehicle parking, terminal viewing area, and commercial aviation passenger check-in area.

35. Mr. Da Silva Ribeiro informed participants that access control measures are implemented at the Dili Airport to safeguard the security areas. Besides access control measures, he highlighted Timor Leste’s information sharing initiatives such as monthly meetings between the airport security and its aviation sector stakeholders, to evaluate its current mechanism as well as to increase security awareness. Mr. Da Silva Ribeiro highlighted Timor Leste’s National Legislation on Aviation Security which provides the legal basis for establishing the appropriate authority and legal powers to implement aviation security requirements, including the development of national programmes. He pointed out that the absence of an act, particularly on unlawful interference, remains as one of the main challenges in landside security management in Timor Leste.

36. Mr. Ratnapala during his presentation discussed aviation security on landside and information sharing, specifically focusing on approaches to border management. He stated that the Australian Government introduced an approach to border management system called Advance Passenger Processing (APP). All regular passenger transport airlines operating international flights to and from Australia are required to use the APP system to report all passengers and crew. As a facilitation measure, the Australian Government introduced an electronic system for checking the validity of visa. This system allows for people to pass through the border in an efficient and quick manner. On this note, this process has evolved in the last 20 years, starting in 1994. It is a system that

was implemented on a monetary basis in 1998, became mandatory in 2003 and the enforcement regime began in 2015.

37. Mr. Ratnapala underscored the importance of accessing passenger data to ensure the validity of information received by the Australian Government. In support of the APP, Australia has legislative requirements to report on all passengers and crew arriving into the country. Airline companies are mandated to report passenger information to the Australian government in advance for both inbound and outbound flights. The airlines would need to report at least the minimum required data, which includes document type, document number, nationality code, and first four characters of the traveller's surname. Mr. Ratnapala also highlighted the benefits of APP system whereby it reduces the potential risks by checking a traveller's background information before they board a flight. Furthermore, it prevents entry of improperly documented travellers to Australia, thus reducing the cost of managing such arrivals. The system would enable authorities to facilitate other checks via Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database.

SESSION 5 – BREAKOUT GROUP SESSIONS

38. The Workshop concluded with Breakout Group Sessions consisting of participants dividing into four different groups. The break-out groups discussed two main topics, namely 1) Priorities for future ARF expert meetings, and 2) the draft ARF Principles on Aviation Security and Information Sharing. With the first topic, participants discussed and anonymously provided recommendations on the areas of focus for the second workshop in the series (for technical experts) and the successes and issues to address moving forward. For the second topic, the participants discussed the ARF principles on aviation security and information sharing, including the proposed draft ARF Statement on Aviation Partnership, currently under consideration by ARF member states.

Break-out Group 1

39. Group 1 proposed for several points to be taken into consideration when designing agendas for the upcoming workshops in the series, as follows:

- (i) To discuss stop-gap measures as a policy solution, for example to cover times where leaders are not available to sign policies on such issues. This is to ensure that aviation security is still being considered and its importance is maintained;
- (ii) To discuss the possibility of creating a list of shareable biographic and biometric data points to be accessed by States. This would include identifiable information on what could and should not be shared as well as having agreements among ARF partners;

- (iii) To discuss the possibility of conducting regular site visits. This is particularly important to gain on ground information on best practices as well as the challenges and the different ways policies are enacted in different countries. The group suggested that these site visits should include country visits, landside visits - particularly outside airports, which can serve as soft targets for attacks - as well as airport grounds and public areas;
- (iv) To discuss ways on how to mitigate expenses and reduce costs when implementing policies planned, and when developing and maintaining databases essential for aviation security; and
- (v) To discuss the possibility of having table top exercises to tie in all measures and to close the loops in all the best practices explored.

Break-out Group 2

Among the ideas discussed by Group 2 to consider for the upcoming workshops include:

- (i) To discuss the issue of critical information sharing. Participants were interested to know what the mechanisms of protocol entail and how they are practiced by different States. One suggestion is to conduct practical exercise or simulation internally, among different government agencies, while another exercise can be conducted at the bilateral or multilateral level, including airport site visits;
- (ii) To discuss on how different States develop their watchlists, particularly on guidelines of use and data retention. The group cited INTERPOL as an example to look at how the organisation is woven into the process of development of watchlists. In addition, making sure data is cleansed, enhanced, and removed as required;
- (iii) To discuss options for ongoing funding to uphold these security measures, in particular to sustain these databases, such as PNR licences;
- (iv) To further discuss on known and unknown security concerns, for example, how to identify unknowns in a database of information. An extension of this matter is how to obtain the most out of the data available, i.e. focusing on the capability of using information;
- (v) To create a resilient aviation security environment and culture. They outlined the different parties involved in aviation security, possible whole-of-government approaches and training options; and

- (vi) To consider how integrate broader issues into the discussion of aviation security and vice versa, such as land, maritime, and cyber security.

Break-out Group 3

Group 3 explored aspects necessary to discuss in the next workshops of the series as follows:

- (i) To further share information on developing framework of watchlists and threat assessments, creating common standards on aviation security (given that a country's definition may differ from another country's definition), as well as the development of a national watchlist for multiple users and purposes;
- (ii) To discuss developing the framework for use of watchlists and treatment of threats especially in advance in terms of API and PNR. Possible areas of focus for watchlist should also include national security and serious crime among others.
- (iii) To discuss avenues for better information sharing on issues of border security, civil aviation, and passenger data facilitation. This would provide for a more holistic approach in order to bring together all stakeholders; and
- (iv) To continue discussion on best practices pertaining to data analysis and technology in aviation security as well as the application of new knowledge and assessment of its effectiveness.

Break-out Group 4

Group 4 outlined the following issues as priorities for the next two workshops:

- (i) To highlight the role of private industry towards implementation of API and PNR;
- (ii) To link the security aspect of API and PNR with other vital sectors such as the economy and tourism and ensure concrete outcomes for governments follow-up on and help promote inter-agency coordination;
- (iii) To highlight data security and storage from other angles such as through a legal framework lens and discuss maintenance of systems, in particular, API and PNR cost implications.
- (iv) To establish open communication channels and maintain contacts gathered from various platforms; and

- (v) To emphasise on the need to have a culture of security i.e. establish and strengthen the link between a culture of security with threat and travel, thereby establishing common standards.

SESSION 6 – CONCLUSION AND CLOSING

40. The Workshop expressed gratitude to Malaysia and the United States in co-chairing the First in a series of ARF Workshop on Aviation Security and Information Sharing. They also thanked the Government of Malaysia for its generous hospitality and the excellent arrangements made for the Workshop.
