

ANNEX H

CANADIAN PAPERS ON:

- PREVENTIVE **DIPLOMACY**, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
- NON PROLIFERATION

Prepared by Canada **as** Follow up to **the ASEAN/Senior Officials Meeting**

At the meeting of the SOM on February 1993, Canada **was tasked** with the preparation of two **working papers**, one on **Non Proliferation**, and another on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Management. It was agreed that Canada would circulate drafts of both papers to countries represented at the SOM for **comments**, and take these into account in preparing updated papers for **further** consideration by the SOM.

The **ASEAN/PMC** held in Singapore in July 1993 created a new "ASEAN Regional **Forum**", and endorsed the **work** program of the SOM. Canada has thus reviewed its initial draft in light of all comments received bearing in mind these recent institutional developments and is submitting the attached papers to all **members** of the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to **assisting** the **SOM's** consideration of the subjects of non **proliferation** and conflict prevention and management.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The International Context

In Agenda for **Peace**, the United Nations' Secretary General outlined a strategy for strengthening the UN's ability to respond more effectively to the broad range of security challenges facing the international community.

Key elements in this new approach include: a focus on early warning and preventive **diplomacy**, "peacemaking" (i.e. diplomatic efforts) designed to resolve issues which might lead to **conflict**, as well as **peacekeeping**, **peace-enforcement** and **peace building** (the economic and social reconstruction through UN coordinated efforts to rebuild countries devastated by **conflict**) to manage conflict and to restore peace and stability.

The Secretary General also places a new emphasis on the role of regional **organizations** in "participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations" and building "international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it".

The 48th Session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution which supported the key proposals made by the Secretary General. Heads of governments noted the considerable efforts undertaken by the Secretariat to strengthen its ability to initiate preventive measures and to manage an increasing number of highly

complex peacekeeping missions. Many ideas have been advanced by Member States for **further strengthening** the **United Nations** capability to **respond** to the increasing demands placed on it. Canada has been among those countries.

In the past **year**, regional organizations have also enhanced their activity in the area of conflict prevention and management. The OAS has cooperated with the UN in restoring democracy in **Haiti**, the CSCE has led many preventive missions in the trouble spots of the Former Yugoslavia and of the Former Soviet Union, and the UN is supporting the peacekeeping efforts of ECOWAS in Liberia. The countries of the Asia Pacific Region have considerably enhanced their potential to prevent **and** address conflict by the creation in Singapore in July 1993 of the **ASEAN** Regional Forum.

The Regional Context and Experience

I - Conflict Prevention

ASEAN has **set** an example of how a group of countries who share common interests can successfully establish the **economic**, social and political elements of a cooperative security regime in their area. Having reached out to its dialogue partners (PMC) as well as to the participants at its Annual Ministerial Meeting

(AMM), it now **offers** a **unique** opportunity for a **focused security dialogue** among all the countries of the Pacific Rim.

The **ASEAN-UN Workshops** held in Bangkok and Singapore in the spring of 1993 provided a most useful opportunity to consider the relationship between the global security agenda and the preoccupations of the region. Canada **presented** in Bangkok a working paper on "conflict prevention and resolution" which draws on its experience in this regard and suggests some practical steps which could be taken to enhance cooperation and confidence in the region. Those steps are:

- the development of a set of basic **principles** to ensure a common understanding and approach to regional cooperation;
- a conflict management mechanism adapted to the particular circumstances of the region (for **example**, experts or "wise men" could facilitate dialogue among parties or provide conciliation services).

Another notable example of regional preventive diplomacy is the South China **Sea** Initiative co sponsored by the Indonesian and Canadian governments. Officials of claimant countries as well as non claimant "interested States" (Canada has no government representation) participate in an unofficial capacity in seminars

on various aspects relating to the history as well as the legal technical maritime issues surrounding the dispute and address possible cooperative exploitation of resources in the South China Sea. Claimants have agreed not to enforce their claims militarily but to proceed through peaceful means. This experience reveals that it may be possible to deal with **difficult**, sensitive issues by focusing on modest efforts **which, in..** themselves, provide opportunities to build confidence and enhance transparency, thus facilitating political settlement.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in **Southeast Asia**, signed in Bali on February 24, **1976**, includes conflict prevention principles and mechanisms which could be applicable to **the** broader Asia Pacific region. For **example**, drawing on Article 2 of the Treaty, one could envisage the discussion and further elaboration, at the experts level of **principles** and **understandings** appropriate to the region. These might serve as a basis upon which to take further steps in the development of **instruments** (some of which exist in Chapter IV of the Treaty) which **could** be used by regional states in dealing with situations **of** potential or actual conflict.

Such an approach to conflict prevention and management could also include the development of modest **confidence-building measures** designed to contribute to transparency and openness between regional partners. For example, prior notification of

major military and naval exercises and exchanges of observers at such exercises could enhance regional confidence.

In this context we would want to keep in mind:

- a) a broad definition of **security** where challenges can come from both traditional and non traditional sources - i.e. mass **migration**, boundary and fisheries disputes as well as questions such as conventional arms transfers; and
- b) the linkage and complementary relationship between regional activity and that of the United Nations.

II - Peacekeeping

The United Nations has established 15 new peacekeeping missions in the past 5 years.

Peacekeeping operations have been increasingly **complex**, often incorporating considerable civilian as well as **military** staff. Not all have been equally successful. One of the most successful is undoubtedly UNTAC which was the most ambitious operation ever mounted by the UN and led to a fair election in a very difficult environment. Many countries in the region were deeply engaged in the long diplomatic process which led to the

establishment of UNTAC and of course to **UNTAC** itself. Valuable experience could thus usefully be shared within the region and with the UN. Countries of the region have also displayed leadership at the **Tokyo Conference** on the **Reconstruction** of Cambodia in the spring 1992 and will be involved the complex operation of peacebuilding which will succeed UNTAC.

Exchanges on a bilateral and multilateral basis, as well as regional **Seminars** on peacekeeping and other aspects of conflict management enable countries of the region to enhance their ability to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts mandated by the United Nations. They could also be useful in providing the UN with an Asia Pacific perspective on the implementation of **Agenda** for Peace. Issues being discussed at the UN, such as the development of common **logistics, stand by** forces or peacekeeping training could be reviewed at the regional level.

A seminar on UN enhancement, bringing together civilian and military experts could be included in a future SOM work programme. Regional non government organizations such as the **ASEAN-ISIS** could play a key role.

Canada believes that consideration of the above **subjects** at the SOM, assisted as required by **intersessional** discussion at the level of experts would provide timely and substantive guidance

for the **ministerial meetings** of the ASEAN Regional Forum and enhance the contribution of this new body to security in the Asia Pacific Region.

Canada welcomes comments from its partners in the ASEAN Regional Forum on the ideas presented in this paper.

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
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NON-PROLIFERATION

To be viable, proposals aimed at preventing proliferant behaviour in any region should be placed within the context of an overall security framework for that region. Within this framework no state should feel compelled to resort to proliferation (or maintain ambiguity with respect to its intentions or capabilities) in order to assure its security. Proliferation is a symptom of a problem; the disease must be treated and cured.

A PYRAMID OF SECURITY

In many respects, one could liken the required steps in the creation of an environment in which it would be possible to eliminate fear of proliferation from a region to a layer by layer Pyramidal structure;



This paper will examine the first two of these layers both from a generic perspective, and from the perspective of actions which could be considered by the countries participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The final layer of the Pyramid consists of steps specific to the region and/or sub-region which could be taken.

The **First Layer:** Generic

The first layer of any regional security pyramid involves the creation of a security environment containing four key

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elements. The first of these elements relates to the development of a regional attitude towards security under which the resort to the use of force as a means of resolving disputes is regarded as impossible. Intimately associated with the development of this attitude is the evolution of a habit of ongoing dialogue over both day to day relations and special issues of concern. This is the second key element.

Out of this dialogue may arise the third key element; a series of mechanisms designed to ensure the continuation and enhancement of both the attitude and the dialogue. These mechanisms would be intended to intensify the habit of dialogue and to assure that the dialogue continues even during times of stress. Finally, a series of specific tools would comprise the fourth key element. These tools would be designed to reinforce the other three elements. Such things as Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) aimed at enhancing transparency in military activities in the region would be an example of the specific tools which could be created and applied in any region.

It is important to note that the development of these key elements need not be by means of a purely sequential approach. One does not need the first to be fully functional before one can go to the second. Instead, the participants in any regional dialogue can take from each as they see fit, in order to meet their particular requirements. In the long run, however, any lasting regional security system will probably evolve to contain ideas from all four elements in some interlocking fashion which is appropriate to the region.

Several examples of the development and application of these four elements exist. The most commonly cited are in the CSCE context, where all four have been developed over a period of many years. However, examples of the application of various elements exist in many other regional contexts. India and Pakistan, for example, have developed and implemented a number of concrete CBMs between themselves. These include: prior notification of troop movements within a certain distance of the border; a commitment not to attack each other's nuclear facilities; and an agreement for regular contact by regional military commanders along the border as well as a "hotline" agreement.

Prior to the recent difficulty over the North's adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty, the two Koreas were slowly beginning to develop a dialogue. This dialogue included concrete achievements in areas of especial concern, such as the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. But it also included a recognition that a habit of discussion was the only way to gradually bridge differences in perspective and outlook. Though the dialogue appears to be suspended for the time being, it was an example of a nascent attempt to apply at least some of the four key elements. Should a shift in the attitude of one of the

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participants occur, the stage has been set for the resumption of productive discussions.

None of these elements, either by themselves or in combination, will lead to a situation where increased tension in a region is impossible. The key in any approach is a high level political commitment to make the elements work. It should also be noted that CBMs need not exclusively take the form of measures such as the notification of troop movements. The negotiation of political declarations, and a regular process of dialogue are equally important in the generation and sustenance of the required political will.

Just as the states of a region must work towards the adoption of the four key elements in a fashion appropriate to their region, so too must extra-regional states be prepared to play their part. In the particular case of non-proliferation and regional security, the extra-regional states should be prepared to forego the use of any weapons in any region in which the regional states have agreed to eschew the possession of these weapons.

In the broader sense of regional security, additional security assurances may have to be examined, if appropriate, for any region which indicates a willingness to reduce its own military forces to the lowest possible levels. As a general rule, Canada would seek to enhance the effectiveness of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, in addition to developing more specific instruments devoted to the region.

The First Layer: The ASEAN-ARF Context

The ASEAN countries are already extremely active in the development of a regional political framework within which conflict would come to be regarded as impossible. Starting with the Zone of Peace Friendship and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) of 1971, moving on through the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and up to the 1984 proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN nations have laid an exceptionally firm foundation. The recent commitment to regularize the SOM process and create the ARF are examples of the development of a regular dialogue on matters of mutual concern.

Consideration of specific military CBMs may be warranted if the states participating in the ARF believe that such measures would assist in moving this base beyond the declaratory stage. Though the ASEAN states themselves may not have problems which could be assisted through the development and application of CBMs, there may be areas on the fringes of the ASEAN region to which CBMs could usefully be applied. Such military CBMs would be unnecessary if the states of the region do not believe that there is any problem for them to address, however.

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The Second Layer: Generic

As work is being done on the construction of the first level, work could begin on the second. This would involve focusing the attention of the regional countries, and any extra-regional observers, on the relevant international instruments for the control of proliferation as these instruments relate to security in their region. Indeed, a critical determinant in assessing the eventual success of any proposed regional non-proliferation strategy is the willingness of the regional states and the extra-regional observers to adhere to the existing international non-proliferation mechanisms, and to implement them in their own countries.

These instruments are:

- the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970. The signatories which were in possession of nuclear weapons at that time pledged to refrain from their use, or the threat of their use, against those countries which were not. They also pledged to assist the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) in their use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Finally, they pledged to work towards the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. The NNWS, in return, pledged to renounce their right to possess nuclear weapons, and to accept inspections of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that this pledge was being respected;
- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which came into force in 1975. The BTWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes" as well as weapons and means of delivery. The BTWC requires its adherents to consult and cooperate in implementation. Any suspected violations are to be reported to the Security Council, which can authorize an investigation if it believes one is warranted. If the Security Council finds that a state has been endangered by a violation, the other parties are to provide assistance as requested. Subsequent Review Conferences have developed, refined and extended a number of information and data exchange measures to constitute a regime of Confidence-building Measures (CBMs), and to facilitate cooperation in peaceful areas of biological research. An Ad Hoc Group of Experts is currently evaluating potential measures for verification of the BTWC and is scheduled to complete its technical study in 1993, at which time the issue will return to the membership for follow-up;

- the Chemical **Weapons Convention (CWC)**, which was opened for **signature** in January of 1993. The CWC **requires** each of its **adherents** to **renounce** the **development**, **production**, **acquisition**, **stockpiling**, **retention** or **transfer** of **chemical weapons**. They are **also required** to **renounce** the **use** of **these weapons**, or any **preparations** for their use, and are **prohibited** from **assisting** or **encouraging** any other state to **engage** in any activity prohibited by the Treaty. Provisions **also exist** relating to the **destruction** of any existing **CW stocks**, and **CW production facilities**. The CWC **includes** an extensive **verification regime** involving both **data exchanges** and **inspections** to ensure that the **Parties** are in compliance with the **Treaty**;

- in addition to these **Agreements**, an international initiative to monitor the proliferation of conventional weapons has recently been launched. The United Nations Register on Conventional Arms was **established** by overwhelming **support** of the General Assembly in 1992. **The** Register **aims** to promote transparency in the international trade in armaments, and calls upon all **states** to provide annual information on their exports and imports of specified types of weapons. Data-submission is **voluntary**; and

- **finally**, a group of **countries** has **developed** a **set** of **guidelines** aimed at preventing the proliferation of **ballistic missiles** and at controlling the spread of **missile** related technologies. This regime is known as the Missile Technology control Regime (**MTCR**). It must be emphasised that the **MTCR guidelines** are not intended to **prevent** the legitimate trade in high technology goods, or the development of high technology industries throughout the world. **Recently**, nations which are not part of the formal group have indicated their willingness to work with the group and to abide by its Guidelines. **Several others**, from many regions and **backgrounds**, have opted to join.

Of **course**, new international **instruments** are in train. Negotiations leading to a Comprehensive Test Ban **Treaty** are about to begin. Such a **Treaty** would be an historic development in the global fight against **proliferation**.

The Second Layer: The ASEAN-ARF Context

As a signal to the international community of **the** their commitment to **non-proliferation**, the countries participating in the **ARF** may wish to **consider** steps they could take jointly on the international **stage** to **demonstrate** the importance **they attach** to **these** instrument*. (Of **course**, all **ASEAN members** are already **signatories** to the **three global instruments**.) Diplomatic **efforts** by the countries participating in the **ARF** on **behalf** of securing universal **adherence** to and the indefinite extension of the NPT in

1995, on the creation of an effective verification mechanism for the BTWC and on the rapid implementation of the CWC would be a most important factor in the success of these initiatives.

Countries participating in the ARF could demonstrate their continuing commitment to transparency as regards the sale of conventional armaments by supporting the UN Arms Register. An additional measure which could be considered would be the submission of data and background information on overall military holdings. Several countries have included this additional data in their submissions to the Register as a sign of the importance they attach to transparency generally, and to the Register in particular. In addition, countries participating in the ARF can lend further support to the UN Register by working for its expansion in 1994 to include military holdings and procurement through national production.

On the subject of Ballistic Missiles, those countries participating in the ARF which are not presently members of the MTCR could consider adopting the MTCR Guidelines to govern their increasingly important trade in high technology and aerospace goods and services. They may even wish to consider joining the MTCR which supervises and reviews these guidelines. Canada would welcome either development, and would work closely with any countries participating in the ARF which sought to explore either of these alternatives if asked to do so.

Though the ASEAN states themselves are rightly regarded as champions of non-proliferation, there are areas of concern in the Asia-Pacific region. South Asia and the Korean Peninsula are often cited in this regard. It is to be hoped that actions by the countries participating in the ARF in support of the existing international non-proliferation regimes would have a positive impact on these areas of concern throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

Additional regionally specific steps could be taken to demonstrate continuing commitment to global non-proliferation regimes and a desire to broaden their relevance in the region. This leads to the next layer of the Pyramid.

The Third Layer: Region Specific Steps

The third layer would be comprised of regional and/or sub-regional mechanisms designed to build upon the international instruments. These might include such things as special verification provisions. The types of CBMs discussed earlier in the paper could also fit into this category, if they were designed to complement and enhance the already existing verification mechanisms of international non-proliferation norms. This could be accomplished by such means as enhancing transparency on a regional basis with respect to facilities,

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goods and services covered under the international agreements.

A larger number of inspections might be agreed for the exclusive use of other countries participating in the ARF, where appropriate, and those inspections might be more intrusive than is usually the case. In addition, information exchange mechanisms amongst the ARF participants might be agreed. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, or even to necessarily endorse these two ideas, but to illustrate the types of actions that could be considered.

With respect to the proliferation of conventional armaments, the ARF countries might wish to consider the creation of a regional supplement to the UN Register. This could include agreement to provide greater detail on the data categories contained in the UN Register. Data could also be provided on the indigenous production of conventional weapons. The ARF participants could also include other weapons categories in their regional Register, such as small arms.

On the question of Ballistic Missiles, in addition to adhering to the international Guidelines, the countries in the region could take steps to prevent the uncertainties caused by the introduction of these destabilizing delivery systems to the region. Ballistic Missiles, with their extremely short flight times, their own vulnerability potentially leading to launch on warning doctrines and the fact that they cannot be recalled once fired, constitute a particularly destabilizing delivery system. A regional, or sub-regional agreement not to be the first to acquire or deploy these weapons, backed by an agreement of the extra-regional observers to respect the arrangement and not to use any ballistic missiles they might have to threaten the participating states, would be a particularly worthy example of such a regional arrangement.

CONCLUSION

A Pyramid is a structure whose various levels cannot stand without each other. Without the base, the structure is devoid of support. The base alone, however, is not enough to give the structure any form. Both must exist in order for the Pyramid to be strong, durable and commanding in appearance.

The most reasonable means of assuring success is to approach these difficult problems in a manner which recognizes the importance of progress on all levels. In this context the recognized achievements of the ASEAN process to date have laid the foundation. By building upon this already existing foundation we can achieve further progress. The agreements to regularize the SOM process and to create the ARF provide a vital opportunity for us to address these issues.