

ANNEX G

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**AUSTRALIAN PAPER
ON**

**PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION**

AUSTRALIAN PAPER COMMISSIONED BY THE 1993 ASEAN PMC SOM ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THE REGION. THE
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**PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR SECURITY COOPERATION
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION**

The international security system is undergoing profound change. There is now far more scope than before for cooperation in the prevention and reduction of conflict.

In the Asia Pacific region, the end of the Cold War and growing economic interdependence are heralding a new era of peace and stability. But, at the same time, the region is one of the **world's** fastest growing arms markets and there are unresolved ideological, territorial, and other **differences**.

A regional consensus on cooperative security could offer a way of avoiding conflict and reducing tension within the region. Such an approach, predicated on **regard** for security as a multi-dimensional concept, would go beyond traditional concerns with threats of an overtly military nature. It would recognise that a **state's** security can be undermined not only by military threats, but also by threats to its political **stability**, its economic well-being and social harmony, and its **environment**. It would also recognise the critical importance of political cooperation if a sense of mutual reassurance is to be developed in the region.

A cooperative security approach would also encompass some or **all** of the many proposals advanced in recent years **with** a view to consolidating international and regional security in the aftermath of the Cold War. These include non-proliferation regimes, preventive **diplomacy** in the broad sense of diplomatic, legal and other measures that build peace and prevent disputes and threats from escalating into armed conflict, and trust-building proposals designed to provide mutual reassurance to governments by promoting openness about defence matters.

This paper does not attempt to address Asia Pacific security cooperation in all its possible dimensions. Its focus is on **military** cooperation and defence issues, and specifically on ways to build trust in the sensitive area of **security** between governments in the region. **Dialogue** on security issues must figure centrally in any endeavour aimed at building trust and is an important function of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ideas put forward focus on measures involving the sharing of (limited) information, and **military-to-military** cooperation. They echo a number of themes on cooperative security outlined by Senator Evans in his book *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. The proposals are intended to lead to habits of cooperation and could serve as an **important** framework for regional security. They are couched in practical terms.

While this paper does not dwell on preventive diplomacy, nor on the traditional technical areas of arms control and disarmament policy, it should be acknowledged that there is scope in each of these areas to contribute further to regional security.

Agreements such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia already make a positive contribution to *trust-building*. Suggestions for expanded adherence to the Treaty of Amity, for the development of a nuclear weapons free zone in South East Asia (SEANWFZ) and for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) can also contribute to regional security. These are not dealt with in this paper as they are already being taken forward in other regional forums, but their importance as trust-building measures should not be overlooked.

While this paper focuses on proposals with regional application it should also be acknowledged that adherence to, and compliance with, global multilateral arms control agreements can make an important contribution to regional security and trust-building. Asia Pacific countries generally have a good record of adherence to the principal multilateral arms control treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention. Most countries of the region have also signed the Chemical Weapons Convention which opened for signature on 13 January 1993. There are other multilateral arms control agreements on which more work could be done. For example, few regional countries are party to the Inhumane Weapons Convention, and a *casc* could be made for more effective national control of the export of proliferation sensitive items.

1. The Concept of *Information Sharing and Trust-Building*

The terminology used in this paper differs from the traditional arms control language, which was largely derived in the era of Superpower confrontation. The concept of 'trust-building measures' (TBMs) rather than confidence-building measures is used to convey the idea of a less formal approach, built upon a base of personal political contacts and relationships. Trust-building measures, or trust and reassurance measures, can be broadly divided between those measures that involve some form of information exchange and those that require specific measures of constraint. In the present strategic situation in the Asia Pacific region, trust-building measures that require increased dialogue and non-threatening exchanges of information are more promising areas for policy than proposals requiring either constraint of specific arms acquisitions or of operational military deployments.

An initial focus **could be** on the political aspects of the possession of weapons. The value of **trust-building** measures lies in reducing the incentive to use weapons resulting from a lack of confidence about other parties' intentions. Traditionally, arms control and confidence-building in the European context has concentrated more on the technical character of weapons than their **political** possession and on **the** technical detail and the military dimension of security. This was particularly the case between the US and the USSR where large numbers of nuclear weapons threatened their very survival as states.

In the Asia Pacific region, however, these conditions do not apply: there is no **one** focus of threat and although there are worrying military trends - not least in the area of **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction - the region **generally** is not in any immediate danger. Outside the area of weapons of mass destruction, approaches to security in **the** region should therefore focus more on establishing the political preconditions for trust-building than **relying** heavily on **technical** military matters and intrusive inspections.

Greater dialogue and a **sense** of trust and - specifically - the exchange of information can help develop a sense of strategic confidence in the region. Non-threatening mechanisms for data exchange will not only improve trust in each other but **will** help avoid **surprise**. Military surprise is one of **the** most destabilising threats in the international security environment.

Security cooperation in our region can therefore reduce uncertainty and surprise through a process of political dialogue and information exchange.

This paper takes the view that in the Asia Pacific region while there are areas in which information-sharing is possible, there are some areas where, for some time, there will **be** security and operational limits on this. These can be identified as follows:

(a) Possible Information-Sharing Areas

- strategic dialogue, including the exchange of strategic assessments;
- strategic **policy**, military doctrine, national military aims;
- **orders-of-battle** and main characteristics of major platforms;
- acquisition plans for new weapons platforms;
- historical data on weapons acquisitions, including from local production, assembly or imports;
- data on military exercises (size and composition) and on *major* military deployments or movements;

- data that will help the monitoring of the movement of illicit drugs and of illegal movements of people, as well as transnational environmental hazards;
- oceanographic and hydrographic research, information on shipping routes and hazards, mapping and charting;
- information relevant to the management of potential conflicts over resources exploitation.

(b) Areas Where **Information-Sharing** is Unlikely

- intelligence sources and methods;
- surveillance targets;
- detailed performance characteristics of weapons **platforms**, their actual operational deployments and availability,
- detailed characteristics of weapons delivery systems (for example, tactical missiles) and their support measures (electronic, **software**);
- levels of military readiness and sustainability, including specific details of war stocks of ordnance;
- research and development in support of classified military **capabilities**, including the adaptation and modification of weapons for uniquely national requirements.

These are not exhaustive lists, but are an indication of what, in practical terms, may attract consensus and what is probably outside a regional consensus for the foreseeable future

2. **A Survey of Relevant Trust-Building Measures**

A wide range of trust-building measures is possible. As in other areas of security, however, a balance must be established between the ideal and the art of the possible. In particular, an equilibrium will have to be sought between the legitimate self-defence requirements of regional countries, the policies of arms supplier countries, and the desirability of restricting arms transfers that threaten to destabilise regional balances.

Annex 'A' lists those measures that may be considered to contribute to building confidence **generally**, with particular emphasis on measures with military and security related aspects as well as those encouraging trust and predictability.

Annex 'B' lists **some 'second track'** proposals that have been made for security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region in recent years.

These proposals are comprehensive. Many of them, however, are too ambitious at this stage in the **evolution** of security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. Instead, a graduated approach to trust-building could be considered in which priorities are **established** for what is **politically** achievable and comfortable in the Asia Pacific cultural context.

3. The Experience of the Asia Pacific Region with Security Dialogue

Some parts of the region have more experience with and are more comfortable with security dialogue than others. For instance, the ASEAN countries have established procedures and modalities for conflict avoidance - despite some unresolved territorial issues. **They** have also engaged China and Vietnam in dialogue about the South China Sea, in which claimants have **been** encouraged not to use force or threats of force as a means to settle disputes. This experience **could** be used **as** a model elsewhere in the region where there are potentially confrontational issues.

North East Asia has proved more difficult from the point of view of trust-building. In this sub-region there are deep-seated factors that put at risk the peace of the region and which have proven to be very difficult to resolve. There are also serious concerns about nuclear proliferation.

Failure to contain nuclear proliferation anywhere in the region will not serve the process of trust-building. On the **other** hand, almost universal membership of the **NPT** in the Asia Pacific region is a very important security foundation for the region. Also, the creation of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific - **SPNFZ** - and the proposal mentioned above for an adjoining **SEANWFZ** are consistent with global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The problem, however, in proposing even a small number of achievable trust-building measures for the Asia Pacific region is the enormous range of sub-regional variations that need to be encompassed. In the following section, some specific ideas for security cooperation are advanced which the ASEAN Regional Forum may wish to consider. This list **takes** into account not only the great **geographic** variations across the Asia Pacific region but also the need to ensure that as many **governments** as possible would feel comfortable with the proposals.

4. Achievable TBMs: A Graduated Approach to Trust-Building

A graduated approach to trust-building measures (TBMs) is proposed here because of the strategic complexity of the region and the fact that trust can only be built gradually. Some measures, such as those encouraging dialogue and the exchange of non-threatening information, warrant early consideration because they appear relatively achievable: these are grouped in this approach as Category 1 measures. Category 2 measures (which are for later consideration) include somewhat more complex and challenging proposals for security cooperation. We leave for much later consideration any more institutionalised structures or specific security protocols (Category 3). This is not, however, to discount particular sub-regional arms control measures (such as a SEANWFZ) entering into force at any time. Nor should the possibility be ignored that some measures now viewed as relatively difficult could become achievable sooner as circumstances change.

In this way, an agreed process of trust-building could be a useful first step for the ASEAN Regional Forum. No time-frames for the achievement of particular categories of trust-building have been suggested because the ASEAN Regional Forum will want to proceed at a pace which is comfortable to all parties.

It would be useful for the ASEAN PMC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and/or an official level Working Group to assist in the process of detailed appraisal. It might also be possible to involve regional strategic research institutes in longer term conceptual work, but practical outcomes should be the guiding principle. In this way political incentives for conflict in the Asia Pacific region can be minimised through a graduated process of trust-building and dialogue, which in turn can help create habits of security cooperation and a greater sense of regional resilience.

Category 1 TBMs

(a) Limited Exchange of Military Information

The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Ali Alatas, in an address before the National University of Singapore Society in October 1992, proposed that:

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'Greater transparency in military arrangements pertaining to the region could be effected through regular exchange of data among the major powers on their respective military budgets, doctrines and future force projections.'

Such an approach would help bring about a better understanding of each others' security problems and defence priorities. In addition to publishing data on military strategy, doctrine and defence budgets, information on current and planned force acquisitions, and military orders-of-battle could be made available. Much of this data is published, in one form or another, by agencies such as the IISS, SIPRI or Janes. It would, however, greatly contribute to trust-building if regional countries themselves were to publish authoritative data.

(b) A Regional Security Studies Centre

An associated proposal is the idea of a Regional Security Studies Centre, which could serve as the repository for government supplied information mentioned in the previous paragraph. This Centre could be based on one of the existing regional institutes of strategic and international studies, which would reduce the budgetary implications. It could receive, collate and disseminate data on regional security developments on a non-official basis to other institutes and to governments. This facility would operate in a low-key, professional way, analysing information objectively. It would be a repository for information submitted, as agreed, by regional governments. It would have a regular program of publications setting out and analysing military information - rather like the IISS's *Military Balance*. It might eventually be developed into an information base for a conflict prevention centre.

(c) A Maritime Information Data Base

Maritime issues involve the interests of countries throughout the region. Some form of maritime information data base unit could be attached to the Regional Security Studies Centre mentioned above (it need not be in the same location). This would enable regional countries to collect and collate data about maritime traffic, environmental issues, piracy and smuggling. Data relating to regional maritime environmental security might, for example, include information on the management of the shipping and storage/disposal of toxic materials.

Multinational hydrographic and oceanographic programs might be worth pursuing at a later phase of this program (Hydrographic and oceanographic resources

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in the region are limited and a multinational program that concentrates on key maritime areas where information is currently lacking would be an endeavour for the common good.)

The Australian Department of Defence has begun work on the development of an open source Strategic Maritime Information System which could provide a useful and uncontroversial start to a Maritime Information Data Base. It is expected to include:

- . maritime boundary baselines
- . extent of jurisdictional claims
- . reports of incidents at sea
- . national sea-borne trade statistics
- . open source information on shipping.

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium, which comprises the Chiefs of Naval Staff of most Western Pacific countries, already meets periodically and effectively exchanges some maritime information. The Philippines Maritime Institute and the recently established Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA) also collect maritime information. One or more of these organisations could be tasked with examining the feasibility of the proposal raised here.

(d) Strategic Planning Exchanges

Regular exchanges among defence planners and military officials already make a valuable contribution to trust-building in the Asia Pacific region. It is recognised in this context that existing bilateral military exchanges are a valuable part of the process of building trust and fostering openness. At present the ASEAN PMC, the ARF and the SOM provide venues at which ministers and senior officials can discuss security issues. The 'second track' seminars that take place throughout the region also provide an unofficial setting for think-tanks, academics and officials in their private capacity to examine regional security developments.

But there is a clear need for a multilateral forum at which military security planners can discuss their views about the changing regional security environment. A meeting of defence planners could provide an opportunity to exchange perceptions on strategic and military developments, to discuss issues of common concern, and to consider opportunities for practical cooperation, for example in relation to problems

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such as maritime pollution and piracy or in connection with out-of-area peace keeping activities.

Malaysia's Defence Minister Najib initiated the first meeting of the 'Asia Pacific Dialogue for Cooperative Peace and Security' for defence planners in Kuala Lumpur in 1993. This was a very useful initial meeting and perhaps the ARF could endorse this process and consider building on it further and encouraging further meetings.

(e) Observers at Military Exercises

One of the more straight-forward trust-building measures that could be applied is for states to invite observers from other regional defence forces to some of their major military exercises. This already happens among several countries of the regions.

The number of military exercises in the region is growing quite rapidly. Bilateral military exercises involving army, navy and air force units are now held between most ASEAN countries. There were over 72 bilateral exercises between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore alone between 1980 and 1990. And the Australian Defence Force has held more than 100 exercises with the defence forces of ASEAN countries over the same period.

Military exercises, which so far have been primarily bilateral or trilateral, provide a solid foundation for the participation by observers from other regional powers. These cooperative activities also include joint training programs, exchanges of defence personnel to attend staff colleges, and regular meetings of chiefs of staff and other high-level officers of regional defence forces. A solid basis exists therefore for participation by observers from other regional defence forces.

(f) Peace Keeping Training

One of the most effective and worthwhile forms of military cooperation is peace keeping. As a form of practical cooperation among military forces in pursuit of some peaceful objective it can make a substantial contribution to building mutual confidence and understanding. The experience of regional countries' peacekeeping forces in Cambodia is a case in point: cooperative efforts under the UN contributed in a major way to the peaceful resolution of a very serious regional security problem.

As more demands arise for peace keeping, both within our region and outside it, there is clearly scope for regional cooperation on how to approach and handle peace keeping programs. Australia has established a peace keeping training centre north of Sydney and the Australian Government welcomes regional participation in the course.

The Australian Defence Minister has also spoken about regional countries cooperating on peacekeeping, but with every country making its own decision on what it would contribute and the level of contribution. At present, this idea does not have any concrete form or shape, but it could provide a basis for cooperation in the future.

Peace keeping is likely to place increasing demands on military forces and the fact that a number of aspects of peace keeping operations have peculiar requirements suggests that cooperative training programs might be useful.

Category 2 TBMs

There are a number of more complex and structured proposals for trust-building which could be considered and which would benefit from the improved security dialogue and trust flowing from Category 1 activity. The following four ideas might be considered as indicative of appropriate Category 2 tasks.

(a) Maritime Cooperation

Developing a cooperative approach in the maritime area is clearly a strategically important issue, not least because of the crucial nature of the sea lanes passing through South East Asian waters and the South China Sea. Building on the idea of a maritime information data base, identified as a Category 1 task, a cooperative approach could be developed to assist the security of sea lines of communication by extending the cooperation that already exists in limited areas in the region in the realm of maritime safety, search-and-rescue, marine pollution control and maritime surveillance.

The issue of maritime surveillance is a sensitive one: as Singapore's Defence Minister, Dr Yeo Ning Hong, remarked in an article in the *Straits Times* on 1 July 1993, joint maritime surveillance would probably have to start off slowly and at a pace with which everyone in the region is comfortable. Establishing a data base and limited

maritime cooperation in such areas as maritime safety, search-and-rescue, marine pollution control, and hydrography and oceanography would be a necessary precursor to any eventual joint surveillance operations in non-contentious geographical areas.

It will be crucial for regional governments to be agreed about the precise aims of any attempts to develop any form of cooperative surveillance efforts. This is an area of activity that can impinge on delicate national interests. Participants would need to be convinced that the practical benefits for their security interests outweigh their sovereignty concerns and sensitivities. Surveillance cooperation is an issue that might best be left for later discussion.

(b) **A Regional Arms Register**

Perhaps a more promising area is the idea of a regional arms register. The United Nations has established a Register of Conventional Arms (see Annex 'C' for a description of the categories of armaments covered by the UN register). It is the first globally agreed confidence-building measure. The Malaysian Defence Minister has proposed the creation of a Regional Arms Register to complement the work of the UN Register. This proposal is essentially directed towards establishing understanding of regional trends and thereby encouraging governments to limit their acquisitions to what is reasonably called for by developments within the region at large.

In addition to encouraging greater regional participation in the UN Register, the ASEAN Regional Forum could consider directing officials to examine this proposal, and to investigate issues such as what weapons imports and exports such a register should cover and whether - and, if so, how - it should handle existing military equipment holdings and domestic production - two important areas that are so far not addressed by the UN Register.

The detail requested in the UN Register about the type of armament being transferred is limited. The Register is confined to deliveries of equipment, rather than agreements or contracts, and no precise information is required concerning the types or versions of systems transferred. Five of the seven categories included in the UN Register were derived from the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was concerned with military capabilities that would enable the launching of a surprise attack or large-scale offensive actions. The UN Register is to be reviewed in 1994.

The review panel will assess the value of the Register and will consider the addition of extra categories of **armaments** and the **modification** of existing categories. The ARF **could** draw on this review process for the UN Register in any consideration of a Regional Arms Register.

(c) Notification of Major Military Deployments

Prior notification of major military **deployments** could reduce **the** scope for incidents or miscalculation that could escalate into significant **security** threats. This procedure could be especially efficacious in relation to military activities in or near areas that were the focus of inter-state tensions. Examples could be the Korean peninsula, the Sino-Vietnamese border and the South China Sea. (India and Pakistan already have such a procedure in place for prior notification of troop movements within a certain distance of the border.)

The creation of a system that had broad, region-wide application could make it easier for parties with an interest in a dispute or in an area of tension to agree to such an approach. The ARF might wish to examine this issue, noting that the emphasis should be on the definition of *major* military deployments. Limitations on the deployment, or prior notification of the movement, of *individual* platforms are not likely to be acceptable. Within the limits of international law and its accepted practice, most countries will wish to exercise the right to the use of international sea and **air** space - including international **sea** lanes, and straits within national EEZs, under the UN Law of the Sea Convention.

(d) A Multilateral Agreement on the Avoidance of Naval Incidents

There are several examples of bilateral agreements to prevent incidents at sea between the former Soviet Union and Western navies. They cover incidents involving warships, military aircraft and naval auxiliaries but they exclude operations by submerged submarines. They relate only to activities on the high seas.

These bilateral precedents present difficulties for the Asia Pacific region where a multilateral agreement that applies to both local *and* external navies would seem necessary. **Specifying** the geographical scope of such an agreement, given the complex maritime geography of the Asia Pacific region and the relatively small area of uncontested high seas, would be a challenging matter.

This is an issue that regional Chiefs of Naval Staff might wish to discuss in the first instance, perhaps in the context of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and they could then commission detailed studies, if they considered that to be appropriate.

Category 3 TBMs

Some of the more ambitious ideas that have been floated for formalised TBMs might best be considered as longer term possibilities. They are predicated on a level of multilateral security cooperation that will take considerable time to develop. Ideas that have emerged in various regional security studies and second-track forums (see Annex 'B') have included:

- (a) A regional maritime safety and surveillance cooperation agreement.
- (b) An airspace surveillance and control protocol.
- (c) An institution for monitoring the introduction of new military technology into the region.
- (d) Collaborative environmental security arrangements,
- (e) The establishment of **zones** of cooperation, in contentious areas such as the South China Sea.

Each of these ideas is interesting in itself, but suggestions to move immediately towards region-wide security regimes or protocols appear to be still quite impractical. Much more detailed analysis of the concepts - and their operational and political implication - needs to be done. This is an area for long term **research** by a suitable unofficial organisation, such as CSCAP.

Conclusions

Arms control approaches to confidence-building and greater openness and transparency that have developed in Europe raise many sensitive issues in relations between other states. They cannot be applied in an indiscriminate and open-ended manner to the Asia Pacific region. The **ideas** in this paper - which are summarised in Table 1 - are designed to identify the kind of trust-building measures that might be acceptable, both culturally and politically, to governments in the region in the years ahead.

The concept of a *graduated approach to trust-building in the region* could assist the development of a regional security consensus beginning with more easily achievable, and non-threatening, TBMs. It *might* then be possible at a later date to build on the establishment of greater dialogue and information-sharing and to consider the possibility of **more** formalised

and more structured security relationships that deal with particular issues, such as maritime cooperation, that are relevant to the unique strategic characteristics of the region.

The approaches suggested in this paper for a graduated approach to trust-building can be adjusted in the light of experience. It might, for example, be appropriate to raise the issue of a regional arms register first in Category 1(a) (Limited Exchange of Military Information) before moving on to a more structured approach in Category 2. The categories can also be overlapped, such that a rolling program of TBMs might be developed according to principles established by the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Those principles might take account of the following:

- (a) TBMs are a means to an end. As such, they need a favourable strategic and political context and they need to be well timed.
- (b) The context for TBMs is critical to their success. It should be one where trust can be developed and in a geographical area where it might feasibly be built.
- (c) The notion that information-sharing helps build trust among countries should derive from careful analysis of what is needed, what is feasible, and what others in the region are ready to accept. Information-sharing is not an open-ended concept.
- (d) Increasing the level of trust between the military forces of the region reduces the prospect that misunderstandings or incidents involving the armed forces could escalate into more substantial conflicts and jeopardise peace in the region.
- (e) To be achievable, TBMs in the Asia Pacific region need to be practical and with clear terms of reference.
- (f) TBMs also need to be technically feasible and operationally sensible from a military point of view and they need to have demonstrable benefits for the security interests of participants.
- (g) The military and security officials of participating regional countries need to be closely involved from the outset: in this context, a 'bottom-up' approach to TBMs needs to work in tandem with a 'top-down' political process.
- (h) The emphasis should be on flexible, non-threatening proposals and on incrementalism, rather than on theoretical approaches to trust-building which do not take account of regional sensitivities and cultural norms. The central idea is to proceed at a pace that is comfortable for all participants

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TABLE 1: A GRADUATED APPROACH TO TBMs FOR THE NEXT DECADE

Category 1

- a) Limited Exchange of **Military Information**
- b) A Regional Security Studies Centre
- c) A Maritime Information Data Base
- d) Strategic Planning Exchanges
- e) Observers at **Military Exercises**
- f) Peace Keeping Training

Category 2

- a) Maritime Cooperation
- b) A Regional Arms Register
- c) Notification of Major **Military** Deployments
- d) A Multilateral Agreement on the Avoidance of Naval Incidents

Category 3

Consideration of more formalised trust-building measures, for **example** collaborative environmental security arrangements, the establishment of zones of cooperation in contentious geographic areas, and regional maritime safety and surveillance cooperation agreements.

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Annex 'A'

MEASURES WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE

- A. Measures with special emphasis on military and security related aspects**
- a) Information and communication of a military nature
- * Publication and exchange of information on military activities and other matters related to mutual security
 - * Publication and exchange of information on matters of arms control and disarmament
- b) Military expenditures
- * Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute or percentage terms
- c) Prior notification of military activities
- » Major military manoeuvres under agreed criteria
 - * Other military manoeuvres on a voluntary basis
 - * Major military movements
- d) Exchange and visits
- * Invitation of military observers in connection with military manoeuvres
 - * **Exchange** of military delegations
 - Scholarships in military schools for military personnel of other States
- e) Consultation
- * Establishment of consultative mechanism to promote implementation of arms control and **disarmament agreements**
- f) Military conduct
- * Provision of information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres and movements according to pre-established procedures
- g) Easing of military tensions
- * Steps conducive to easing current military tensions, particularly in situations where significant military forces confront each other
 - » Measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapons States
- h) Constraints
- Limitation or exclusion of certain military activities
 - * **Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones**, demilitarised zones, zones of peace and cooperation
- i) Verification
- * Elaboration of procedures for verification as an **integral** part of CBMs and arms control and **disarmament** agreements

- j) Crisis management
 - * Establishment of procedures for **improving** communication, for reduction of misunderstandings and for containment of conflicts, including hot lines
- k) Settlement of disputes and conflict
 - * Steps conducive to relaxation of tension and the settlement of conflicts

- B. **CBMs on openness and predictability**
- a) Widening information, fostering communication and promoting understanding on security-related issues
- b) Widening information on military potentials and capabilities
- c) Clarification and publication of defence doctrines
- d) Establishing patterns and standards of routine peace-time military conduct, thereby creating, at the same time, warning indicators
- e) Elaborating constraints concerning military options
- f) **Openness** of military budgets and the adoption of a standardised reporting format for military expenditures

Source: *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures. UN Centre for Disarmament, Report of the Secretary-General, 1982.*

Annex 'B'

REGIONAL CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Mechanisms for enhancing transparency, eg publication of white papers, capability reviews, doctrine manuals, etc.
2. A regional arms register, as proposed by the Malaysian Defence Minister, Datuk Seri Mohammed Najib Tun Razak, in April 1992.
3. Intelligence exchanges.
4. Strengthened and expanded existing bilateral cooperative arrangements.
5. Sharing of concepts and methodologies for defence planning and force structure developments.
6. Building on the ASEAN-PMC process.
7. A forum for regional defence dialogue, as also proposed by the Malaysian Defence Minister in April 1992.
8. A forum for security dialogue in Northeast Asia.
9. The establishment of zones of cooperation, eg the Timor Sea Zone of Cooperation and proposals for a South China Sea Zone of Cooperation.
10. A Regional Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime.
11. Regional Avoidance of Incidents at Sea Regimes.
12. A Regional Airspace Surveillance and Control Regime.
13. A Southwest Pacific Sovereignty Surveillance Regime, and the already agreed Regional Maritime Surveillance Communications Network.
14. A Regional Security Assessment Center in the Southwest Pacific.
15. CBMs concerning the Korean peninsula.
16. Naval arms control in the Pacific.
17. A Regional Technology Monitoring Regime.
18. The Australian chemical weapons initiative.
19. Proposals concerning economic security.
20. An Environmental Security Regime.
21. Strengthened networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 'second track' process.

Source: Ball, D, Grant, R, and Wanandi, J, (eds), *Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1993, pp.20-21.

Annex 'C'

CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS COVERED BY THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

1. Battle tanks -

Tracked *or* wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.

1. Armoured combat vehicles -

Tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantry men, or armed with integral or organic weapons of at least 12.5mm calibre or a missile launcher.

3. Large calibre artillery systems -

Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a calibre of 100mm and above.

4. Combat aircraft -

Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft, designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employed guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialised electronic warfare, suppression of air-defence or reconnaissance missions. Does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped or modified as described above.

5. Attack helicopters -

Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface, or air-to-air weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialised reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.

6. Warships -

Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tonnes or above, and **those** with a standard displacement of less than 750 metric **tonnes**, equipped for launching missiles **with** a range of at least 25km or torpedoes with similar range.

7. Missiles and missile launchers -

Guided or **unguided rockets**, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25km, and means designed or modified specifically for launching **such** missiles or **rockets**, if not covered by categories 1 to 7. For the purpose of the Register, this category also includes remotely-piloted vehicles with the characteristics outlined above; it does not include ground-to-air missiles.

Source: *The Military Balance* 1993-1994, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October 1993, p.248.