

**Confidence Building,  
Communication, Conflict  
Prevention and Cooperative  
Security in East and South East Asia**

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# Security Question.

- Is your country driven primarily by:
- (i) national security interests?
- (ii) collective security interests?
- (iii) common security interests?
- (iv) cooperative security interests?
- (v) human security interests?
- What is stopping it/you from thinking more collaboratively?

# Insecurity Question

- Can you think of any action/decision/policy of your government which caused or might cause insecurity to others?
- Can you think of any action/decision/policy where you felt that some other government generated insecurity to you?

# Pre History

- In 1993 when I was Head of the Peace Research Centre at ANU –I worked with Gareth Evans, Connie Peck and others on ***Co-Operating for Peace:The Global Agenda for the 1990s and beyond.***
- This book and the thinking in DEFAT at the time ,had a major focus on cooperative security, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and the development of regional risk reduction Centres in Asia and other parts of the world.
- In 1993, all of this proved far too radical for ASEAN and the ARF and in 1994 the ARF decided to focus its attention on CBMs, Trust Building and the development of “ the ASEAN way”.
- So I’m pleased to see the ARF at last moving from CBMs to Preventive Diplomacy!
- What I want to argue,however, is unless there is an equal commitment to comprehensive , cooperative security then preventive diplomacy will always be reactive and ineffective.

# Three Stage Development

- Stage 1 Promotion of Confidence Building Measures
- Stage 2 Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms
- Stage 3 Development of Conflict Resolution mechanisms.


# Co-operative Security

- “A broad approach to security which is multi dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which above all , stresses the value of creating ‘habits of dialogue’ on a multilateral basis” Gareth Evans *Cooperating for Peace*

# Institutional Development from then to now.

- Before 1994 there was no ASEAN Regional Forum , no Defence or Foreign Minister's Meetings, no ASEAN + 3, no East Asian Summit meetings and no Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
- So the challenge was how to produce these institutions for Asia to some extent to replicate those in Europe.

**FIGURE 1: ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE**



Note 1: The other countries in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) include Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

Note 2: The Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Source: Adapted from earlier editions of the CRSO.



# Dramatic Institutional Growth

- The Early days of the ARF focused on short, medium and long term regional military threats .
- The rising power of both China and India.
- Territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and in North East Asia.
- Arms Racing in the Region/WMDs/SEANWFZ.
- But the day to day work turned to low lying fruit, maritime CSBMs, MAPs, etc and then after 9/11 whole range of new security threats.

# What does ASEAN and the ARF want?

- **“We commit to moving the ARF at a pace comfortable to all participants in its evolution from its stage of confidence building measures to the development of preventive diplomacy, while bearing in mind the ultimate stage where we can elaborate approaches to conflict resolution”** ARF Vision Statement 23 July 2009 Phuket Thailand.
- Gospel of non interference unhelpful to cooperative security.

# Important to Imbed PD and CR into a commitment to Cooperative Security

- Many of the current bilateral conflicts between China and Japan, Japan and Korea, Thailand and Cambodia , Russia and Japan flow –among other things- from a failure to think of alternative cooperative security paradigms.
- The whole point of multilateral machinery is to advance a view of security which links national security to the security of others including one's potential enemy.

# Triple Vulnerability

- Each state in ASEAN, like every human being, faces a triple vulnerability. First, there is the vulnerability of ensuring growth and development in an increasingly insecure world. If the political economy of any state party is fragile then the region is rendered somewhat vulnerable. Second there is the “psychological vulnerability” which flows from the fact that each state in ASEAN could potentially harm the other. Most ARF time has been directed towards addressing this vulnerability. The third vulnerability is a “moral vulnerability”. This is the vulnerability that flows from the recognition that your own state can harm others too. I would like to suggest that the principle way in which each ASEAN state can deal with all these vulnerabilities, simultaneously, is by making a commitment to ensure the welfare of all the states in the region-especially to those that intentionally or unintentionally might wish to harm you.

**We need a cooperative security paradigm to deal with issues like this: Sino-Japanese views of each other.  
(August 12, 2013 Japan-China Public Opinion Poll)**

- 90.1% of Japanese polled on Sino Japan relations had negative impressions of China.
- 92.8% of Chinese polled had negative views of Japan.
  
- **CHINESE:**
- **77.6% Japan initiated the territorial dispute over Diaoyu-Senkaku islands**
- **63.8% Japan lack of proper apology, shows no remorse for war aggression**
- **43.4% Japan is trying to contain China's rise to power ( Military and Economic)**
  
- **JAPANESE:**
- **53.2% Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute**
- **48.9% Don't want to be criticized for history issue**
- **48.1% China is selfish in trying to secure natural and energy resources**

# Real Tension Points

- Stalling growth
- Rising Inequality-e.g Urban/Rural China
- Climate Change-Natural Disasters-Water based conflict
- Environmental Unsustainability
- Limited Commitment to Human and Cooperative Security. Too much emphasis on National Security-Upsurge of populist nationalism.
- Unresolved tensions in region. Spratly/Nansha, Thai/Cambodia,Nth/Sth Korea, Senkaku/Diaoyutai,Kurils, Dokdo-Takeshima.


# Advance national interests through cooperative security?

- How do we define and understand security in relational as opposed to agentic-oppositional terms?
- How do we become habituated to collaborative problem solving at the national and regional levels
- What superordinate goals/issues might enable us to transcend national interests and advance collective responsibilities?

# Normative and Material Arguments for Cooperative Security


- There are many normative arguments for stimulating habits of dialogue, building mutuality across boundaries of difference, resolving conflicts peacefully and non-violently and focusing on conflict prevention rather than conflict management/resolution.
- But I want to make some material ones as well. I want us to focus on the costs of containing violence and the benefits of peace.






**STATE OF PEACE**

- Very high
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Very low
- Not included



# Global Corruption Index 2012



# Global Cost of Violence Containment

Economic impact of violence in 2013 was estimated to be **US\$9.8 trillion** or **11.3% of Gross World Product**

*The Institute for Economics and Peace defines violence containment spending as economic activity that is related to the consequences or prevention of violence where the violence is directed against people or property.*

# Global Cost of Violence in 2013

- This amount is equivalent to around **US\$1,350 per person**
- Compared to estimates for 2012, it represents an **increase of direct costs of US\$179 billion or a 3.8 percent rise** in violence containment costs globally.
- The increase in the global economic impact of violence **equates to 0.4 percent of global GDP.**




# Global Cost of Violence in 2013 – broken down

Violence Type	Total Direct Cost (\$ Billion)
Military expenditure	\$ 2,535
Homicides	\$ 720
Internal Security	\$ 625
Violent crime	\$ 325
Private Security	\$ 315
Incarceration	\$ 185
GDP losses from conflict	\$ 130
Deaths from Internal conflict	\$ 30
Fear	\$ 25
Terrorism	\$ 10
UN Peacekeeping	\$ 5
IDPs and Refugees	\$ 2
Deaths from External conflict	\$ 1
<b><i>Total (direct only)</i></b>	<b><i>\$4,908</i></b>
<b><i>Total (including 1 for 1 peace multiplier)</i></b>	<b><i>\$9,816</i></b>

***One of the large areas of increase is related to Chinese Military expenditure***

# Global Inequality in Peace



560 million people live in the eleven least peaceful countries

500 MILLION PEOPLE LIVE IN COUNTRIES AT RISK OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT


200 MILLION OF THEM LIVE BELOW THE POVERTY LINE

# 10 Most Unpeaceful Countries


- 153 ↑1 Russia
- 154 ↑3 Pakistan
- 155 ↑1 Democratic Republic of the Congo
- 156 ↓3 Central African Republic
- 157 ↑1 Sudan
- 158 ↑2 Somalia
- 159 Iraq
- 160 ↓16 South Sudan
- 161 ↑1 Afghanistan
- 162 ↓1 Syria




# Deterioration in Peace by Indicator – 2008 - 2014




# Weapons Imports Change – (2008 – 2014)




# ...driven by aircraft transfers




## 10 countries with the biggest Violence Containment expenditure in \$ Millions (PPP)



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


## Cost of Violence Containment as %age of total Health Care




# Cost of Violence Containment In \$ Millions (PPP)N.E Asia 3.7% of Gross World Product

## Cost of Violence Containment in \$ Millions (PPP)




# Violence Containment Cost per Person US\$ 2013





# Violence Containment as % of Total Health Care-North East Asia



# Global Monetary Value of Peace

## *The value of peace to the global economy*

- Assuming the world could be 25% less violent, the total additional or redirected economic activity last year would equal an:

***additional US\$2.45 trillion in 2014***


- What could this activity finance?
  - ✓ Millennium Development Goals US\$60B p.a.
  - ✓ EU climate change programme €48B p.a.
  - ✓ The entire cost of the United Nations US 5,152 B
  - ✓ Repay Greece, Portugal and Ireland's debt US\$700B
  - ✓ One trillion dollars remaining

# Cooperation drives growth and security

- The GFC drove economic collaboration but this is not the same as intentional non crisis driven co-operation aimed at solving the social, economic and political problems confronting the Asia Pacific and the world.
- We can only avoid rivalry by strengthening national, regional and global institutions and by reducing horizontal and vertical inequality in each state in the Asia Pacific region.

# The Pillars of Peace

*The attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain a peaceful society*



# Solutions

- Make Cooperative Security the top priority for the region.
- Promote sustainable growth at lower levels to protect eco systems
- Reduce MILEX
- Focus on reducing inequalities-expanding public goods-plus higher levels of political participation.