

# CBRN Capacity Building Programs







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### **Cooperative Threat Reduction**

- Evolved to combat emerging and global WMD threats
- Distinct approach to CBRN
- U.S. Department of State
- U.S. Department of Energy





# The Chemical Security Program (CSP)

CSP promotes chemical security for a safer world.



#### **Reduce chemical threats**



### **CSP** Activities

| Goals   | Activity   |
|---|--|
| Detect, Prevent, & Mitigate<br>Chemical Attacks     | <ul> <li>Chemical Detection and Forensics Training Courses</li> <li>Chemical Vendor - Law Enforcement Workshops</li> <li>Develop U.S. – Host Nation Law Enforcement Partnerships</li> <li>Chemical Risk Management Workshops</li> </ul>  |
| Secure Chemicals,<br>Infrastructure, & Expertise    | <ul> <li>Chemical Supply Chain Security Workshop</li> <li>Chemical Security Improvement Grant Competition</li> <li>Develop Chemical Inventory Management Systems</li> <li>Strengthening of Chemical Societies or Associations</li> <li>Personnel Reliability Training Courses</li> </ul> |
| Develop & Strengthen<br>Chemical Security Standards | <ul> <li>Chemical Policy and Legislation Roundtables</li> <li>Promote Voluntary Security Standards-"Know Your Customer"</li> <li>Promote adoption, implementation of international obligations<br/>(CWC and UNSCR 1540)</li> </ul>   |



# **BEP** Objectives

- Build capacity of partner states to meet national and international standards including the World Health Organization International Health Regulation (IHR) standards
- Partner with biological experts to raise awareness about dual use issues in the life sciences
- Enhance networks to improve partner nation capabilities to detect, diagnose, and report human and animal disease outbreaks
- Secure pathogens by providing assistance for laboratory biosecurity and biosafety
- Build safe laboratory capacity to prevent and respond to emerging infectious disease threats as well as a bioterrorism attack



### **BEP** Activities

- Biocontainment labs
  - Risk Assessments
  - Physical Security Upgrades
  - Inventory Management
  - SOP Development
  - Risk Assessment
  - Technical Consultation:
    - Design
    - Commissioning
    - SOPs
    - Safe and Secure Operations & Maintenance
    - Sustainability

- Biosafety and biosecurity best practices
  - Awareness Raising
  - International & In-country Training
  - Support Biosafety & Biosecurity Associations
  - Train-the-Trainers
     Programs
  - Indigenous BSS Training Capacity Building



# **PNS** Objectives

#### **Insider Threat Mitigation:**

• Develop and sustain **trustworthiness programs** (i.e. human reliability program, fitness-for-duty, etc.) to mitigate insider threats at nuclear facilities.

#### **Applied Nuclear Security Culture:**

• Strengthen **security practices and procedures** at nuclear technical organizations to prevent diversion of nuclear material.

#### **Nuclear Security Train-the-Trainer Initiatives:**

• Empower partners to **institutionalize nuclear security trainings** to respond to emerging threats.



### **PNS** Activities

| PNS Does:   | PNS Does Not:  |
|---|--|
| Focus on the human factor of nuclear security, including human reliability, insider threat, and security culture.                         | Develop physical protection systems or a design basis<br>threat, undertake programs focused on nuclear<br>safety, safeguards or IT infrastructure, emergency<br>response, or general regulatory development. |
| Promote a self-sufficient nuclear security<br>culture, ingrained in partner counties'<br>nuclear technical organizations.                 | Provide training on nuclear security culture primarily for<br>national or site response forces, border control, or PPS<br>designers and evaluators.  |
| Sponsor events which have a majority<br>focus on issues related to nuclear security<br>culture, insider threat, and human<br>reliability. | Sponsor events which have <u>a majority focus on issues</u><br>other than nuclear security culture, insider threat, and<br>human reliability.  |
| Incorporate nuclear security culture<br>considerations into university curriculum<br>for future technical experts.                        | Develop academic curriculum for guard forces, PPS<br>designers, or topics such as nuclear safety, safeguards, or<br>emergency response.  |
| Engage PNS priority countries bilaterally or regionally.  | Engage non-PNS priority countries bilaterally.   |

### Export Control and Related Border Security Program

- EXBS assistance focuses on the broad range of export controls and border security:
  - Legal and Regulatory
  - Licensing
  - Enforcement
  - Interagency Coordination
  - Government Industry Outreach
- EXBS assistance is delivered primarily through training and detection/interdiction equipment donations.

#### DOE/NNSA's Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection & Deterrence Mission, Goal, & Strategy

- **Mission**: To provide equipment, training, and technical support to international partners to enhance their ability to <u>deter</u>, <u>detect</u>, and <u>investigate</u> the illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials that could be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or radiological device
- **NSDD Strategy:** incorporates a threat-based, defense-in-depth approach to target efforts and maximize effectiveness
  - Deployment of fixed and mobile systems to close key gaps along high-risk smuggling pathways
    - Over 3100 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at over 550 sites and over 90 mobile systems deployed in 56 countries since 1998
  - Transition of long-term responsibility to partners within 3
    - Focus on training, workshops, and exercises, as well as support for maintenance, regulations development, and program management
    - Over 450 sites transitioned to partner country ownership
  - Forensics engagements to build awareness, capacity and improve technical expertise

#### DOE/NNSA's Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection & Deterrence Deployments in South East Asia



#### DOE/NNSA's Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection & Deterrence Lessons Learned

- Threat posed by nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control persists and is evolving
- Countries within South East Asia continue to detect and interdict material out of regulatory control, as well as contaminated cargo, which pose a threat to the security and safety of ASEAN citizens and the global community as a whole
- Progress in combatting nuclear smuggling will be optimized only if:
  - Detection systems are effectively integrated into national-level response plans, as well as regional and global strategy for detecting illicit trafficking
  - Bilateral and multilateral mechanisms are established to share data and other information on the detection, seizure, and investigations of material out of regulatory control
  - Nations develop regulations governing the operation and maintenance of their respective nuclear detection architecture

#### DOE/NNSA's Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection & Deterrence Point of Contact

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### Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

- Voluntary initiative
- 86 partner nations
- Capacity building activities
- Nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, response and mitigation

### **Cooperation and Coordination**

- Partner countries
- International organizations
- Donor countries
- Maximize global efforts
- Avoid duplication and redundancy

# Questions?