

OPCW and **CBRN** Risk Mitigation

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Today


- Background
- Disarmament
- Re-emergence
- Difficulties of developing and using
- Mitigating the risks of hostile use
- Support to States Parties

BACKGROUND



The Chemical Weapons Convention

"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction"






Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)



- After about two decades of negotiation, CWC opened for signature on 13 January 1993 in Paris
- Preparatory Commission set up in The Hague to prepare for Entry-into-Force
- Entry-into Force on 29 April 1997 (i.e. 180 days after the 65th State ratified the CWC)



CWC Membership



Global Statistics

Total	191
Africa	51
Asia	53
Eastern Europe	25
GRULAC	33
WEOG	29

Five states remaining:

- 1 Signatory state (signed but not ratified)
- 4 Non-Signatory states (neither signed nor acceded to the CWC)



CWC "Goals"

- To exclude completely, for the sake of all mankind, the possibility of the use of chemical weapons
- To ensure that achievements in chemistry are used exclusively for the benefit of mankind
- To promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of peaceful chemical activities



Key Prohibitions

Each State Party undertakes never to:

- Use CW
- Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain CW, or transfer directly or indirectly CWs to anyone
- Engage in any military preparations to use CW
- Assist, encourage or induce anyone, in any way, in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention
- Use of riot control agents as a method of warfare



OPCW Technical Secretariat

- Based in The Hague (Netherlands)
- 69.3 Million Euro operating budget (2015)
- Total staff of 481 in 2015 (fixed term posts)
- Director-General appointed by the States Parties
 - Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü (Turkey)
- Take direction from our 191 States Parties



Key Areas of Work

- Disarmament
- Re-emergence
 - Verification regime
 - National Implementation
 - International Co-operation*
- Assistance and Protection



CWC, OPCW, and Non-State Actors?

- CWC has no explicit reference to "anti-terrorism" or "non-state actors"
- OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency
- OPCW is an independent, autonomous organisation that operates only within its mandate
- "Full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention is in itself a contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts" (Executive Council, 2001)
- Obligations in 1540 (2004) consistent with CWC
- Relationship agreement with the United Nations (2001)

DISARMAMENT



What is a "Chemical Weapon"?

...means the following, together or separately:

- (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors,
- (b) Munitions and devices, or
- (c) Any equipment designed for use with munitions and devices in (b).





RE-EMERGENCE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (NON-PROLIFERATION)



Re-emergence by a State or Non-State actor

CWC obligations are on the State Parties, such as

disarmament

Each State Party
 shall...adopt the
 necessary measures
 to prohibit natural
 and legal persons ...
 from undertaking
 any activity
 prohibited to a State
 Party

ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Working together for a world free of chemical weapons

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How Difficult is it for a Non-State Actor to Develop and Use a CW?



Chemical Weapons





Chemical Weapons (True or False)?

- Relatively cheap compared to BRN weapons?
- Made from fairly accessible precursors or materials?
- Modest technology threshold for production?
- Highly inhumane True



Key Elements Needed for a non-State actor (NSA) to Develop and Use a Chemical Weapon

Acquire Knowledge/skill

Financial resources

Logistical resources

Acquire Equipment and technology

Acquire a CW Agent


Organizational Weaponise the

Organizational capabilities

Weaponise the CW agent




Difficulty for NSA to Acquire Knowledge/Skills, Equipment, Technology






Difficulty for a NSA to Acquire a CW Agent





Difficulty for NSA to Weaponise a Chemical





Difficultly for NSA to Develop/Use a CW (...it depends on their objective)

Low ("Easy")

Targeted Use
Create Fear and Panic
Fatalities – low/none

- quality of agents sub-optimal
- Toxic industrial chemical
- small scale attacks
- low safety requirements (production and use)

High ("Difficult")

Mass destruction
Military scale
Fatalities – 1000s

- mass production of agents; purity
- adequate stabilisation
- effective dissemination
- high safety requirements



Key Elements Needed to Develop and Use a **Chemical Weapon**

Acquire Knowledge/skill

Acquire Financial Equipment and resources technology **Acquire a CW** Logistical **Agent** resources **Organizational Weaponise the**

capabilities

CW agent



MITIGATING THE RISKS (What States Parties can do)



Suggestions to our 191 States Parties

- Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism since 2001
- States Parties strong interest to address chemical weapon use by a non-State actor
- Secretariat put forth three papers to help substantive discussions with States Parties:
 - Legal accountability under the CWC, Measures to Prevent Chemical Terrorism, Enhancing Response to Chemical Terrorism

Prevention Measures

DUAL USE CHEMICAL LIFE-CYCLE

R&D

- Ethical norms;
- inspections, etc.

Production

- Physical security
- inspections; etc..

Procurement

- Know your customer;
- black market trade, etc.

Supply Chain

- Customs, border control
- Security culture, etc.

Disposal

physical security



Prevention Measures

Overall Management and Oversight of Chemical Life Cycle:

Examples:

- Full implementation of the CWC
- Evolve the National Authority Role
- Understand risks in your State (Profile)
- National Legislation



Prevention Measures

States could Enhance International Cooperation

Examples:

- Share lessons and experiences
- Establish mechanisms to assist other States
- Cooperation amongst police agencies
- Legal cooperation sharing of information, extradition
- New technologies aiding chemical security



Response to NSA Use of a Toxic Chemical

- Different from "All Hazards" planning, e.g.
 - Need to know the chemical used in the attack (fast)
 - Short response time
 - Saving lives and securing evidence in toxic environment
- Different from Accident planning, e.g.:
 - Deliberately planned for maximum effect
 - Tension between saving lives and criminal investigation
 - Safety of first responders from additional attacks



SUPPORT TO OUR STATES PARTIES



Assistance and Protection

- State Party obligated to assist another State Party threatened or attacked by chemical weapons
 - Voluntary fund; other offers of assistance equipment, technical resources, etc.
- Secretariat supports States Parties:
 - Preparedness and response to a chemical attack
 - Protective capacity against chemical weapons
 - Coordinate emergency assistance and protection if requested by a State Party
- ➤ Coordinate with governments; field exercises, table-top exercises, facilitate lessons learned, training, workshops, databank, etc.



National Implementation

- National legislation:
 - Criminalize activities prohibited by the CWC not only chemical weapons use, but development, acquire, transfer, etc.
 - Penal legislation (e.g. prosecuting violations)
- legislative database, workshops, assistance to legal drafters, templates of legislation, checklists, etc
- Comment on draft legislation; annual meetings of National Authorities; sub-regional workshops; on-site Technical Assist Visits; Sub-regional meetings of parliamentarians



National Implementation (continued)

- Focus on Customs Authorities:
 - Enhancing their ability to monitor the transfer of chemicals
 - Improving skills and knowledge of border officials to identify specific chemicals and illegal trade
- Awareness raising for importers/exporters (e.g. chemical traders and industry)
- > Training courses and workshops for border officials, customs agencies; awareness seminars
- ➤ Encourage communications between National Authority, licensing authority, Customs Officials



International Co-operation

- Facilitate/encourage international cooperation through peaceful uses of chemistry
- Engage industry, academia, governments, scientists, etc.



Examples:

- Industry outreach programme, including a focus on chemical safety and chemical security
- Workshops for customs and border control
- ➤ Use experts in the field, promoting exchange of best practices and experiences

