



ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK

2019



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FOREWORD



As the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Chairmanship once again returns to its birthplace, Thailand is determined to carry forward the ARF's work in 2019 by building upon the meaningful contributions of the ARF in the past 25 years and looking to the future.

The ARF has been an important ASEAN-led mechanism, providing a platform for constructive dialogue on political and security issues with a focus on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. In the past few years, the region has witnessed a rapidly changing geo-political landscape and faced numerous longstanding and emerging security challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime, natural disaster as well as maritime and cybersecurity. ARF Participants, therefore, have worked together closely to collectively address these challenges through effective, practical and win-win cooperation.

In the pursuit of these goals, we need to ensure the promotion of sustainable security in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF should also be anchored on regionally and internationally recognised norms and principles, including the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), while reaffirming ASEAN centrality in its undertakings. This is in order to promote stability and prosperity in the region that is sustainable.

In light of the above, it is my great pleasure to present you with the twentieth edition of the ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The publication is a compilation of voluntary contributions from ARF Participants. It is a testament to the ARF Participants' commitment to deepening trust and fostering cooperation through greater transparency and information sharing, which are key building blocks for the promotion of peace and security in the region.

I wish to thank all ARF Participants who have contributed to this year's ASO and hope that the valuable information and perspectives shared by each ARF Participant will contribute to attaining our shared goals.



Don Pramudwinai

Chairman of the 26th ASEAN Regional Forum

Minister of Foreign Affairs

of the Kingdom of Thailand

Bangkok, Thailand 2 August 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year sees the twentieth edition of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Annual Security Outlook (ASO), counting back to its first publication in the year 2000. Over the years, the Outlook has increasingly benefitted from more in-depth information and wide-ranging perspectives provided by ARF Participants. This year, the number of submissions has reached 22, the highest in terms of contributors. This is a reflection of how the ARF Participants have made use of the Outlook to help build trust, enhance confidence, and increase transparency on defense and security policies.

The 2019 ARF ASO submissions have shared their perspectives on the current state of the regional and geo-political security environment in the Asia-Pacific and situations around the world as well as the roles of Participants at national, regional and international levels, in maintaining and promoting regional peace, security, stability and prosperity. While traditional security challenges continue to be addressed, the general assessment demonstrates that the rise of non-traditional security threats and the increasingly cross-border nature of transnational crime makes enhanced cooperation amongst countries in the region increasingly indispensable.

Given the recent terrorist attacks in a number of countries, terrorism and violent extremism have galvanised regional and international efforts to address these threats in a more comprehensive manner. On maritime security and cooperation, much emphasis has been placed on maritime connectivity as well as safe and secure sea lines of communication. Addressing the issue of marine environment has been seen as important to sustainable growth and security. On non-proliferation and disarmament, commitments to upholding and implementing relevant regional and international instruments have been reaffirmed. On disaster relief, the need for closer cooperation to develop capacities for swift response during crises, humanitarian assistance and post-disaster recovery was stressed, as well as enhancing civil-military coordination on this matter. On ICTs security, the increasingly

complex and sophisticated challenges and the need to enhance capacities in the region in response to challenges related to ICTs security was emphasised.

Acknowledging the interlinkages between the ARF and other ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), reinforcing efforts and synchronising activities undertaken by the ARF and these various fora were also suggested.

In overall, the ASO recognised and reaffirmed the ARF as a key inclusive platform for constructive dialogue in addressing pressing issues of common concern, and practical cooperation among Participants that should contribute to maintaining peace and ensuring sustainable security in the Asia-Pacific region.

AUSTRALIA

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

Australia continues its efforts to support an open, inclusive and stable Indo-Pacific, which is critical to the ongoing development and prosperity of our region. The regional strategic outlook poses a range of challenges, including: shifting power dynamics and increased strategic and economic competition for influence in the region; territorial disputes; nuclear and missile proliferation; terrorism and returning foreign fighters; malicious cyber activity; and the impact of transnational crime. Technological change, challenges to globalisation and international rules and norms, and climate change also require regional responses.

Australia's approach to these challenges is to apply appropriate domestic policy settings, pursue strong bilateral cooperation with regional countries, and uphold our commitment to working cooperatively through regional and international forums in accordance with international law.

It is in this context that the Australian Government published its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which outlines Australia's intention to step up efforts to work with partners in support of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific. ASEAN has bolstered regional security and prosperity for more than 50 years and continues to be a key partner for Australia.

Australia is committed to the central role of ASEAN in regional architecture, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN and the ASEAN-centred institutions sit at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, geographically, diplomatically and strategically. Through the ARF and other groupings, in particular the East Asia Summit (EAS), we pursue a regional agenda that seeks to promote cooperation on strategic, political and economic issues, reinforce international law, and ensure that all regional countries, large and small, have a voice on regional issues. With its well-established program of activities focused on confidence building measures and

a growing preventive diplomacy agenda, the ARF can help manage tensions, set norms of acceptable behaviour, and bolster regional resilience.

The 15 initiatives announced at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in 2018, as well as additional commitments announced by Prime Minister Morrison in November 2018 at the ASEAN-Australia Informal Breakfast in Singapore, re-affirmed Australia's commitment to ASEAN and reinforced our Strategic Partnership. Our engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led frameworks is focused on building trust, transparency and habits of cooperation across Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. We aim to remain a leading economic, development and strategic partner for ASEAN and its members. We will continue to work with our partners through the EAS, ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) to promote peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

Korean Peninsula

The DPRK conducted short-range ballistic missile tests on 4 and 9 May, its first since November 2017. While the DPRK's own moratorium announced in April 2018 applies only to nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, we call on the DPRK to avoid provocations that could increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Credible reports have consistently indicated that the DPRK is continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile activities. Dialogue is the only path to denuclearisation and peace on the Korean Peninsula. We commend the United States' commitment to pursue ongoing talks with the DPRK, and the ROK's commitment to inter-Korean engagement. Australia calls on the DPRK to make a similar commitment.

The DPRK will continue to pose a serious threat to international security until it takes concrete steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation. Australia, working with partners, is committed to maintaining economic and diplomatic pressure on the DPRK until it makes this choice. The DPRK continues to contravene and defy unanimously

adopted UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Australia is fully implementing and enforcing UNSC resolutions, including through monitoring and deterring ship-to-ship transfers that may breach UNSC sanctions. We encourage other countries to join us in implementing and enforcing all UNSC sanctions on the DPRK.

South China Sea

Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Australia does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, but we have a crucial interest in the stability of this international waterway and the laws and norms that govern it. The Indo-Pacific region's rising prosperity has been built on stability derived from consistent adherence to rules and norms. International rules and norms are coming under increasing pressure in the maritime domain. It is in the interests of all states to ensure these rules and norms are protected.

Australia supports the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the bedrock legal instrument that governs conduct above and below the waters in our region. Australia opposes the use of intimidation, aggression or coercion to advance any country's territorial claims or unilaterally alter the status quo. To this end, we acknowledge movement towards a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. It is important that such a Code of Conduct does not prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of any states under international law (especially UNCLOS), reinforces existing inclusive regional architecture, and strengthens states' commitments to cease destabilising actions, including militarisation.

Middle East

Australia has an interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East and is concerned by heightened tensions in the region. Despite its territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria, Da'esh remains a threat – as evidenced by continuing insurgency attacks in the region. Achieving an inclusive political settlement in Syria and addressing the dire humanitarian

situation there remain a major focus for the international community. Australia continues to support the development of the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces to help ensure that security gains are cemented, while encouraging reform and equitable governance. The terrible conflict in Yemen continues to be intractable and dangerous, and Libya remains unstable.

The Middle East and North Africa continue to face significant political and security challenges. We share with the United States and broader international community many concerns about problematic Iranian behaviour, including missile development, regional interference and support for armed groups. Australia continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal as a valuable non-proliferation mechanism and will continue to urge Iran to exercise restraint and comply with its commitments. Australia remains committed to a two-state solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and continues to call on both sides to take courageous steps to return to negotiations towards this goal.

On 19 June 2019, the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard, released the report on her investigation into the killing of Saudi journalist Mr Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018. Ms Callamard found that Mr Khashoggi's killing 'constituted an extrajudicial killing for which the State of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is responsible'. While we continue to strongly urge Saudi authorities to demonstrate a strong and credible response to the murder, we remain concerned about Saudi Arabia's lack of cooperation with the investigation and the abuse of diplomatic immunity during the commission and cover-up of the crime. Other human rights defenders, women's rights activists, journalists and religious figures have been arrested and arbitrarily detained in Saudi Arabia for exercising their rights and freedoms, which greatly concerns Australia.

MH17

Australia remains steadfast in its commitment to pursuing accountability for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. We welcome the Joint Investigation Team (JIT's) announcement on 19 June 2019 of the prosecution of four suspects in relation to their alleged roles in the downing. The JIT is comprised of the independent investigative authorities of Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine. These prosecutions send a powerful message that the international community will not tolerate such egregious crimes. We expect all countries, including the Russian Federation, to comply fully with UNSC Resolution 2166 (2014) which calls on all states to cooperate with efforts to establish truth, justice and accountability.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2016 Defence White Paper underpin Australia's national security and defence policy. These White Papers articulate a wide range of opportunities and challenges Australia faces, such as rising prosperity in the Indo Pacific and technological advances on the one hand and greater uncertainty and complexity on the other. If current trends persist, the region is set to become more competitive, more contested and less stable. No long-term foreign policy objective is more important to Australia than ensuring our region evolves peacefully and without erosion of the fundamental principles on which the Indo-Pacific's prosperity and cooperative relations are based.

In seeking a secure and prosperous region, Australia places high priority on our multilateral and bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia and the wider region. Australia is boosting its security and defence cooperation with various partners in the Indo-Pacific, including through increased training, exercises and capacity building. Australia is also enhancing cooperation on regional and global security challenges, such as terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organised crime and cyber security.

b. Data contributions to ARF Arms Register

Australia's 2017-18 fiscal year military expenditure, as provided to the UN in accordance with the UN Standardised Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures Guidelines under the UNGA Resolution 35/142B, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Australia actively contributes to and supports regional and multilateral efforts to meet the challenge of countering terrorism and violent extremism in our region, including through the ARF.

From 2015-2019, Australia served with Malaysia as co-lead of the Counter-Radicalisation priority area of the ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan. We continue to partner with the South East Asian Network of Civil Society Organisations, and work to develop civil society organisations' capacity to partner more effectively with regional governments and the private sector on countering violent extremism (CVE).

Australia works closely with our ARF partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms, and offers practical assistance where possible. We continue to support the Philippines' humanitarian response, recovery and reconstruction in Marawi City, as well as its peace building efforts in the Southern Philippines. Australia has also assisted Sri Lanka following the 21 April 2019 terror attacks by providing police resources and support.

ASEAN and Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism, in March 2018 (the MOU), to provide a platform to strengthen practical regional cooperation to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The MOU gives effect to the 2016 ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism.

Australia's Prime Minister proposed that G20 leaders in Osaka make a strong statement outlining their commitment to prevent terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of the Internet. This built on other international efforts, such as the Christchurch Call led by New Zealand Prime Minister Ardern and French President Macron in Paris on 15 May 2019. This activity recalls the 2017 Hamburg G20 Leaders' CT Statement, which called on governments and industry to work together to step-up efforts to deny terrorists the opportunity to use social media to further violent extremism.

As Co-Chairs of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) CVE Working Group, Australia and Indonesia have hosted a range of activities to share best practice and develop capacity of GCTF members and other stakeholders to counter violent extremism. Australia hosted a GCTF CVE workshop in Melbourne in December 2018, which emphasised the importance of stakeholders incorporating gender perspectives into CVE efforts, and the challenges posed by women and children returning from conflict zones.

Australia is active in the UN and regional forums to strengthen regional counter-terrorism capabilities. We support implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), and encourage regional efforts to implement national action plans on PVE, in line with national priorities. As members of the Global Coalition against Da'esh, the GCTF and the Financial Action Task Force, we contribute to efforts to disrupt and degrade ISIL's activities, including foreign terrorist fighter travel, financing and messaging.

Australia works with international and regional partners to enhance legal and policy frameworks, to support the effective implementation of laws, and to strengthen criminal justice processes for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism.

ii. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Australia considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Australia is working closely with ARF partners to implement the 2010 NPT

Action Plan, as the 2018 2020 coordinator of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and through engagement with the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network. As the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) nears, marking the 50th anniversary of this landmark treaty, it is crucial that all States Parties engage constructively to strengthen the review process and work towards a positive outcome. Through the NPDI and other forums, Australia is working hard to ensure NPT States Parties can work past known differences and focus on the vital ongoing role of the NPT in preventing a global nuclear arms race and containing nuclear weapons proliferation. The 2019 ASEAN-Australia Forum reaffirmed regional support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Both sides welcomed the efforts of relevant countries to engage in dialogue with DPRK, and its stated commitment to complete denuclearisation and pledge to refrain from further nuclear and missile tests. The Forum reiterated its commitment to the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

Australia actively works to promote universal adherence to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Australia engages with ARF partners to strengthen the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the region and globally, including as permanent Chair of the Australia Group strategic export control regime. Through its roles as chair of the UN Disarmament Commission in 2018, a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and president of the Conference on Disarmament in 2020, Australia is committed to a sustained and progressive approach to disarmament and non-proliferation.

iii. Transnational Crime

a. People Smuggling and Human Trafficking

Australia continues to play a leading role in our region to manage irregular migration and combat people smuggling and human trafficking. At the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime Ministerial Conference, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia in August 2018, members agreed to enhance cooperation, improve information and policy sharing, promote regular migration pathways,

and counter criminal networks. The 2018 Bali Declaration also supports closer engagement with civil society and other regional consultative processes on migration. Endorsing the Government and Business Forum (GABF) as a permanent track of the Bali Process recognises that governments alone cannot eradicate human trafficking and modern slavery. The Ministerial Meeting also endorsed the 'AAA' recommendations to: acknowledge the scale of modern slavery; take action to address the problem; and advance the sustainability and effectiveness of the GABF.

Australia's generous humanitarian resettlement program, together with its border protection policies, aim to provide safe and legal migration pathways to those in need, and to discourage people from falling prey to people smugglers. In 2019-20, Australia will accept up to 18,750 refugees under its humanitarian resettlement program. Over recent years, Australia has also welcomed an additional 12,000 people displaced by the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, while providing substantial humanitarian assistance to Iraq, Syria and neighbouring countries. Over the next ten years, the ASEAN-Australia Counter-Trafficking program, announced at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in March 2018, will invest A\$80 million towards protecting the human rights of trafficking victims. This investment will work with, and through, various ASEAN bodies to ensure ASEAN Member states have effective justice systems that provide for the just punishment of traffickers.

Australia is also involved in international efforts to combat modern slavery by promoting more coordinated action under the Alliance 8.7 – a coalition of governments, UN agencies, businesses and civil society. Australia is also co-convenor of the Liechtenstein Financial Sector Commission, which aims to strengthen the role of the financial sector in ending modern slavery and human trafficking.

b. Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime

Transnational, serious and organised crime (TSOC) is a pervasive threat to the sovereignty of nations and the security of the region. TSOC undermines institutions, distorts the regional economy and results in lost tax revenue. By fuelling corruption, poor governance and lack of transparency, TSOC adds to business costs and reduces business

certainty – key barriers to attracting investment. Ultimately, it attacks the welfare of individuals through health impacts, environmental degradation, violence and child exploitation. Australia works at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels to strengthen our collective capacity to respond to TSOC. Australia's Attorney-General's Department, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Department of Home Affairs, including its operational arm, the Australian Border Force, work to enhance information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation through the region, and deliver a broad range of training and capacity building programs.

Australia's efforts span disruption, prevention, investigation, prosecution and asset recovery stages of TSOC cooperation. In May 2018, the Australian Government appointed the first Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator, AFP Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent OAM, to lead and strengthen Australia's effort to combat TSOC, with a focus on strategy, policy and capability. Additionally, the AFP's international relationships form an integral component of Australia's efforts to strengthen engagement with regional and international partners to address shared security challenges and enhance regional security and stability.

c. Illicit drugs

Despite intense law enforcement efforts, illicit drugs remain among the highest-value criminal commodities produced and trafficked in the Indo-Pacific region, and cause major public health, social and criminal justice challenges. Australia works closely with law and border enforcement partners in the region to counter narcotics trafficking, including through cooperative transnational investigations, exchanges of information and capacity building activities. Australia is a strong supporter of multilateral efforts to combat cross-border trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursors regionally and globally, including by supporting international mechanisms such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board. As part of efforts to address the global challenge posed by illicit drugs, Australia put forward a resolution to the 62nd Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 2019, raising awareness of the threat posed by synthetic drugs and calling for additional steps to foster regional and international efforts related to border management capacity building and forensic capacity building.

Crystal methamphetamine ('ice') and its chemical precursors continue to pose a significant health and security threat to Australia and across the Indo-Pacific. The Australian Government is implementing its national strategy to reduce the harm caused by ice in Australia, including initiatives to strengthen law enforcement and border security cooperation with international partners to disrupt the supply of methamphetamine in the region. Other narcotics, including opiates, cocaine and synthetic drugs, such as new psychoactive substances, are also of significant regional concern. Australia will continue to engage with regional partners to address the shared transnational challenge of illicit drugs.

d. Cyber issues

Cyberspace, and the risks and opportunities it presents, are increasingly central to the security and economic prosperity of the region. The number, type and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia and the region are increasing and the global nature of the Internet means we cannot respond to these threats within our borders alone. Coordinated international responses are needed to effectively shape behaviour and governance of cyberspace and respond to the opportunities and challenges it presents, including partnerships between governments and collaboration with the private sector. Given the transformational nature of new technologies, including 5G, security considerations must be central to their design as states develop these technologies and networks. Australia is always ready to discuss emerging technology considerations with other nations.

Australia is an active and constructive member of the ARF Intersessional Meeting on ICT Security and the open-ended Study Group on Confidence Building Measures. Both forums play an important role in enhancing strategic awareness and discussion on cyber issues in our region. There is a need for measures between states to address misperception, prevent miscalculation, and facilitate de-escalation. We are helping to build regional mechanisms for effective incident response, crisis management and risk reduction through initiatives such as the ARF Cyber Points of Contact Directory. In 2018, Australia co-sponsored with Singapore an EAS Leaders' Statement on Deepening Cooperation in the Security of ICTs and of the Digital Economy.

All countries have a duty to ensure their activities online are consistent with their international obligations. Australia is committed to defending a rules-based order online, just as we do offline. Australia advocates for a framework of peace and stability in cyberspace, underpinned by four key principles:

- that existing international law applies to cyberspace;
- agreed norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace complement international law and promote predictability and stability;
- confidence building measures that prevent misunderstandings are increasingly important; and
- targeted capacity building ensures all countries can respond to the challenges and embrace the opportunities of increased connectivity.

Australia is investing over A\$48 million in cyber security capacity building, including through Australia's Cyber Cooperation Program, which improves cyber capacity in the Indo-Pacific region. The Program has been expanded from A\$4 million to A\$34 million out to 2023. Key areas of focus for the Program include enhancing regional capacity to combat cybercrime, increasing capability to respond to cyber incidents, reducing the risk of conflict between states and promoting best practice in the use of technology for development, consistent with Australia's commitment to an open, free and secure Internet.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Australia has responded rapidly and effectively to humanitarian crises in 2018-19. To date we have committed more than A\$200 million in response to crises in Laos, Myanmar, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Vanuatu, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. We have augmented this support through deployment of Australian civilian experts to a range of humanitarian organisations in the region, including the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA).

Australia is also providing A\$5.7 million over three years (A\$1.9 million per year; 2016-19) to the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to support the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2020, Australia will also co-host, with UNISDR, the Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction to bring countries in our region together to take shared responsibility and make actionable commitments towards implementation of the Sendai framework. Strengthening Australia's engagement in responding to post-disaster stabilisation and recovery of countries, including through civil-military coordination with Defence, remains a key priority. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade staff supported military exercises in 2018 with a humanitarian and stabilisation component in the ASEAN region, including through the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus Expert Working Group's Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Exercise in Malaysia. Australia was also pleased to co-sponsor with China an ARF Statement on Disaster Management Cooperation in 2018.

Regional cooperation and preparedness remain essential to ensuring coordinated international assistance that effectively augments nationally-led responses. Australia has continued its support for the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit, a regional resource on arrangements for sending and receiving international disaster assistance. In May 2018, Australia hosted the EAS International Disaster Response Workshop to improve regional disaster response coordination and capacity through the EAS. The workshop also supported the AHA Centre objectives of operationalising the "One ASEAN, One Response" by testing application of the Toolkit in a disaster scenario in a non-ASEAN EAS country. Australia also supported the AHA Centre during the Sulawesi response through the movement of AHA Centre humanitarian supplies from Malaysia to Indonesia during the crisis.

Australia continues to provide technical assistance in disaster preparedness through the deployment of Australian disaster management specialists to government and humanitarian agencies in the region, including to the AHA Centre, where Australia deployed a civil military coordinator with the Australia Assists Program.

v. Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Australia is committed to comprehensive maritime security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. We work closely with regional partners and through international forums to enhance maritime security and promote habits of cooperation in the region's maritime zones.

These challenges are transnational in nature, and include terrorism, natural disasters and extreme weather events, illegal fishing, piracy, the smuggling of drugs, people and goods, and the security implications of climate change. They cannot be solved unilaterally, and require multilateral cooperation and collaboration.

Australia is committed to progressing initiatives that build maritime security capacity and counter maritime threats in the Indo-Pacific. Commitments announced by Prime Minister Morrison at the ASEAN-Australia Informal Breakfast Summit in November 2018 are designed to ramp up Australia's contribution to regional maritime security. These initiatives will focus on supporting regional civil maritime organisations, maritime domain awareness, countering illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, and support for a rules-based maritime order.

Australia is pleased to partner with Vietnam and the European Union (EU) on the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS), as part of our co-chairmanship of the ARF maritime work stream for 2018-2020. Together, we have set an ambitious program of activities and objectives, and in 2018-19 we have successfully co-chaired several workshops. Together with China and Thailand, we delivered a workshop on Regional Climate Change and Coastal Disaster Management. With our ISM-MS co-chair Vietnam, we delivered two workshops: one on Implementing UNCLOS to address Emerging Maritime Issues; and again with the EU, a workshop on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies. These workshops served to promote regional stability and security by highlighting the importance of implementation and adherence to international law. Australia is pleased to support the ARF's central role in addressing regional maritime challenges and is proud to be an active contributor to its maritime security agenda.

Australia acknowledges the important work of international organisations including the International Maritime Organisation, UNODC and the Food and Agriculture Organisation in responding to maritime security challenges, and resolves to continue to work with them and ARF partners to find solutions.

Regional efforts have been effective in reducing the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Indo-Pacific. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, of which Australia has been a member since 2013, has supported this work. As a member of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) Australia will support regional civil maritime security by promoting greater agency-to-agency cooperation and promoting information sharing to achieve mutual outcomes. Australia looks forward to hosting HACGAM in 2020.

The vastness of the maritime domain in the Pacific presents unique law enforcement and security challenges. As part of the Pacific Step Up, Australia is assisting regional states to manage their maritime domains through enhanced capacity building and cooperation, and to complement the activities of other partners in the region. From late 2018, under the Pacific Maritime Security Program, Australia is replacing existing patrol boats with 19 Guardian-class patrol boats. Australia also provides region-wide contracted civilian aerial surveillance, including through the provision of two King Air aircraft (based in Samoa and Vanuatu), which are coordinated by the Forum Fisheries Agency.

vi. Space Security

Outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive as more states turn to space-enabled capabilities to deliver economic prosperity and other social benefits. Australia continues to work within the ARF to build norms of responsible behaviour in outer space and establish practical transparency and confidence building measures that enhance space security for all. Australia values regional consultation on these matters and has participated in the three ARF Space Security Workshops held to date.

IV. Role of the ARF

Australia is committed to continuing its long history of engagement with ASEAN regional security architecture, including the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM-Plus. We see the ARF as an important forum for frank dialogue and practical cooperation and have a busy ARF agenda. We are particularly active as co-chair of the ISM-MS and of other cooperative activities, including workshops, which seek to build confidence in this domain. Our defence engagement in the ARF supports integrated approaches to complex security challenges including maritime security, counter terrorism, counter-proliferation and humanitarian and disaster relief. The participation of defence subject matter experts also promotes alignment with defence-led cooperation under the ADMM-Plus.

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region is characterised by its diversity in its geographical, political and socio-economic aspects. The region, with nearly two-thirds or 60 percent of the world population, has been the most dynamic global economy, which according to the Asian Development Bank in 2017, accounted for a global GDP share of over 42 percent.

Alongside the diversity in the Asia-Pacific and the current world economy, the ongoing changes in the geopolitical and geo-economic landscapes have brought a wide range of security challenges. The evolving regional architecture, and new power dynamics require all countries to maintain a delicate balance of protecting national interests while ensuring international peace and stability.

While lingering traditional security issues remain, the region has also seen growing non-traditional security challenges that are increasingly complex which cut across different sectors, and threaten progress, as well as the well-being and livelihood of its people. Underlying this, technological advancements and rapid information flows especially through social media, and influences from non-state actors, have contributed to the evolving and emerging security issues in the cyberspace.

There is a growing concern on the global reach of terrorism and the spread of violent and extremist influence in societies. Since the defeat of ISIS, the movement and returning of fighters to their countries of origin, the spread of its radical ideological narratives and influence on terrorist-linked groups and sympathisers have made Southeast Asia vulnerable. This is seen with the Marawi Siege in 2017 and Triple Surabaya Bombing in 2018, as well as arrests of radicals in countries over the years within the region. These events serve as a reminder that terrorists groups and individuals continue to pose a threat to the region's peace and stability. The recent trends of attacks by groups or individuals as seen also in New Zealand and

Sri Lanka in 2019, many under the guise of religion and nationalism, reaffirmed the importance to deepen understanding and closer cooperation among security law enforcements but also with the community as a whole.

Natural disasters have been a recurrent challenge in the Asia Pacific region as it experiences more disasters from floods, severe storms, droughts, tsunamis to earthquakes in comparison to any other region. The UN Global Humanitarian Overview 2019 highlighted that from 2014-2017, the region experienced 55 earthquakes, 217 storms and cyclones and 236 cases of severe flooding. Extreme weather patterns coupled with increased population densities and urbanisation have escalated the severity of disasters. These disasters have affected 650 million people and resulted in the loss of nearly 33,000 lives. These unforeseen disasters have severe socio-economic impacts and may have destabilising effects to the affected countries and its neighbours. This has called for improvements in national disaster-response capabilities and for stronger regional coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

At the same time, there have been significant positive momentum in the Korean Peninsula with the two Summits between US and DPRK as well as closer interactions between the ROK and DPRK. This highlights the importance of stable relations between countries for the maintenance of peace and security in the regional environment. In support of the diplomatic efforts in the Peninsula, the region is carefully and closely observing that this would bring about a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Peninsula.

The fluidity of existing security issues and the diversity of the region reiterate the need for multilateral approaches to address challenges affecting the region. The momentum towards cooperation between and among countries in various multilateral mechanisms and levels of participations have continued to endure in the region. This has been reflected by efforts and

initiatives in countering terrorism and maritime security in ASEAN-led mechanisms including the ADMM, ADMM-Plus and ARF as well as coordinated ASEAN management and disaster response. The impacts of non-traditional and traditional security challenges alike also underscore the need for holistic approach with wider involvements from all sectors and levels of society.

Brunei Darussalam values the open and outward looking regional security architecture as it brings regional and international friends and partners to build confidence, deepen understanding and address common security challenges. ASEAN-related platforms in particular are key to Brunei Darussalam as this accords ASEAN member states to contribute in shaping the region's future.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Overview of national security and defence policy

In support of the national development agenda in the National Vision 2035, Brunei Darussalam places importance on a whole of nation approach in providing assurances to the well-being of its people and the interests of the nation. The National Vision 2035 laid out three goals for Brunei Darussalam. Firstly, to be known for its educated, highly skilled and accomplished people and secondly, a country that has high quality of life of among the top 10 in the world. Lastly, a dynamic and sustainable economy with income per capita among the world top 10's.

In line with this, Brunei Darussalam's defence policy has remained consistent in ensuring its efforts are comprehensive, robust and integrated to protect and promote the nation's peace and stability. Brunei's defence strategy supports the national development agenda towards achieving one of the nation's objectives of upholding sovereignty and stability. This underlines three core priorities: deterrence and response, defence diplomacy and holistic defence.

In this regard, Brunei Darussalam continues to develop a strong and credible armed forces, in providing military capabilities with high levels of readiness and preparedness to meet various security challenges. As well as this, Brunei Darussalam is committed in maintaining strong bilateral and multilateral engagements with defence establishments and armed forces around the world. The holistic defence involves coordination and collaboration among local agencies to support each other's capabilities in the maintenance of peace and security and thus, contribute towards providing a positive enabling environment for the nation's political economic progress and development.

Defence expenditure

For the fiscal year 2019/2020, the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam's defence budget is BND \$589,870,450.00 (approximately USD \$440,201,828 @1.34), which is an increase of about 6 percent from the previous financial year.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Brunei Darussalam remains steadfast and is cognisant on the importance of cooperation and engagements in the region to protect its interests and play its part as a responsible member of the international community. Its participation in various multilateral regional platforms including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus as well as the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Meetings presents opportunities for Brunei Darussalam to continue to engage constructively in dialogue and work together on common security challenges.

The ADMM and ADMM-Plus have provided added value to strengthen Brunei Darussalam's defence and military capacity and capability development. With a view to contribute to regional security, Brunei Darussalam initiated three proposals of cooperation during its ADMM Chairmanship in 2013 which have progressed at various stages.

One of which is the ADMM Logistics Support Framework (LSF) which intends to strengthen logistics cooperation that will enable the military forces in the ASEAN region to address non-traditional security challenges, to include but not limited to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Search and Rescue (SAR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and anti-piracy in a coordinated and effective manner. Upon the validation and verification of LSF in a Table-Top Exercise (TTX) by all ASEAN member

states in January 2016, the LSF was endorsed by the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM). In moving forward, Brunei Darussalam looks to the possibility of integrating the framework into the work on ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (AMRG).

In recognising the importance of developing an ASEAN early warning system to prevent the occurrence and/or escalation of conflicts, the ADMM has adopted the concept of establishing and maintaining the ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI). ADI sets to provide a permanent, rapid, reliable and confidential means by which any two ASEAN Defence Ministers may communicate with each other at mutual decisions in handling incidences or emergency situations. This platform of communications aims at preventing or defusing misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and therefore prevent escalation and promote quick response cooperation in emergency situations.

The ADI is launched in phases. The first phase, which is in the form of IP-based mechanism, was launched on 24 October 2017, after the ADMM-Plus Meeting in Clark, Pampanga, Philippines. An ADI Exercise was conducted on 21 February 2019 that tested the functionality of the system successfully and operationalise the SOP itself. The second phase is currently under deliberation among the ASEAN member states that would be co-chaired together by Brunei Darussalam and Philippines. In addition to this, the concept paper to expand the initiative to Plus countries has been agreed by the ADSOM in April 2019. This is anticipated to further promote open communications amongst the member states, and enhance regional and wider confidence and security building measure.

Underlying the practical cooperation, Brunei Darussalam views interactions among its defence and military officials as an important aspect to ensure enduring relations among ASEAN's future leaders. The essence of the ASEAN Defence Interaction Programme is in building trust and understanding and develop mutual respect and instill the habit of mutual cooperation. Thus far, Brunei Darussalam initiated one activity under the programme in 2013 and another was taken up in 2018 by Malaysia.

Within the ADMM-Plus, Brunei Darussalam is strongly encouraged by the progress of the seven ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups in the areas of HADR, Military Medicine, Maritime Security, Counter Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Mine Action and Cyber Security. Brunei Darussalam is fully committed and fully supportive of ADMM-Plus endeavours and has worked alongside with the Plus partners. This includes hosting the inaugural multinational ADMM-Plus HADR and MM Exercise in 2013 together with China, Vietnam, Singapore and Japan. Brunei Darussalam also co-chaired of the EWG on Maritime Security with New Zealand from 2014 to 2017 that culminated to the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise that took place in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, and a Maritime Security Field Training Exercise in New Zealand. In looking forward to the next new cycle of co-chairmanship of EWGs (2020-2023), Brunei Darussalam will work close with Australia as co-chairs of the EWG on Military Medicine.

The work of the EWGs have garnered understanding, promoted capacity building and interoperability in all Member States. More importantly, these have contributed towards deeper trust and fostering stronger military-to-military relations among the armed forces of the ADMM-Plus. Further to this, the practical cooperation in the EWGs contributes to ASEAN's collective response to addressing nontraditional security challenges. In particular to HADR, there have been increasing integration of HADR in the broader ASEAN disaster response mechanism with efforts for closer coordination between military and civilian responders.

Brunei Darussalam also continues to support and participate in the various initiatives related to regional defence cooperation including in the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) and the ASEAN Military Medicine Centre.

Peacekeeping and peace monitoring initiatives

Brunei Darussalam also remains committed in participating in peacekeeping and peace support operations. Since 2008, the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) has been involved in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in

which 226 RBAF personnel have been deployed to UNIFIL, embedded under the Malaysian Armed Forces. The first contingent of the RBAF in 2008 comprised five (05) personnel and has increased over the years totaling to thirty (30) personnel in 2018. Throughout the eleven years of RBAF's involvement in the UNIFIL, there has been six female members of the RBAF that served in the peacekeeping operation.

It has also deployed personnel for the International Monitoring Team (IMT) since 2004 and in 2017-2018 peacekeeping mission, there were eight (08) RBAF personnel and one (01) Royal Brunei Police Force. Further to this, Brunei also contributes to the Mindanao peace process as a member of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) alongside Turkey and Norway since 2014. Currently, two (02) RBAF officers are serving in the IDB.

At the operational theatre level, such initiatives provide exposure and knowledge in operation in conflict environments for the personnel involved. The interactions and engagements of RBAF with its foreign counterparts and organisations further contribute to Brunei Darussalam's defence diplomacy. At the same time, these initiatives showcase the RBAF image as a professional force that is able to contribute meaningfully and for Brunei Darussalam, this reflects as significant support towards regional and global efforts to bring about peace and stability.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Brunei Darussalam actively supports humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts around the region. The RBAF provided assistance during the aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and Typhoon Haiyan in Tacloban, Philippines in 2013. Apart from that, RBAF also delivered assistance to Nepal, where it sent one (01) RBAF medical officer, four (04) RBAF paramedics and three (03) Gurkha Reserve Unit personnel to join the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel under RHCC for "Operation Kukri" in support of the HADR efforts after a magnitude of 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck in April 2015.

The rapid response is a result of the maturity of the RBAF in providing assistance in areas hit by natural disasters. RBAF's relief efforts were greatly aided by interoperability, a key component that continues to be emphasised in many of the military cooperation undertaken by Brunei Darussalam with its counterparts whether it is bilateral or multilateral level.

Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Brunei Darussalam supports disarmament efforts and the non-proliferation of all types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) at both the regional and global level. Brunei Darussalam is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is also party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Brunei Darussalam has been working closely with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and co-hosted two national-level workshops. The workshop conducted in 2018 raised national awareness on the Convention itself and in March 2019, another workshop focused on national legal aspects on the implementation of the CWC. The workshops provided technical assistance with the central objective of working towards implementing the CWC more effectively.

Counter-Terrorism

<u>Promoting a People-Centred Approach to</u> Counter-Terrorism

Relevant authorities in Brunei have also emphasizing efforts in educating the general public on issues related to counter-terrorism through its security awareness campaign throughout the nation as well to Brunei community abroad. This campaign aims at creating awareness on issues related to the country's security including the dangers of extremist ideologies and propaganda. The awareness campaign also call on communities to act on their instincts to help prevent atrocities taking place in Brunei. The campaign also highlight the issues/matters faced by the relevant agencies involved and spread the word on how the public can contact the relevant hotline numbers or email to lodge complains on matters of concern.

Brunei Internal Security Department (BISD) has always been ready to provide security awareness talks to various schools, the general public, as well as Government agencies upon request or invitation. The Community Outreach Programme (COP) was first formally established in 2011 in response to the Ministry of Education's invitation for BISD to join the 'Forum Sinar', a security awareness programme dedicated to Year 7 students which runs over a period of five months each year. BISD has been participating in the forum ever since.

With the establishment of COP and BISD's Hotline 133, the response received from the general public has increased significantly which can be shown through numerous invitations to participate in various community outreach programmes organized by other government departments such as the Information Department through programmes namely 'Program Awasi Anak Kitani' and 'Program Perkampungan Sivik Ijazah' for higher institution students studying in Brunei as well as invitations by other government departments as to provide security security awareness talks during orientation of newly hired civil servants. Such invitations received are not limited to other government departments but also from the private sector. BISD welcomes various invitations to organize roadshows and exhibitions as such invitations provide a good opportunity for BISD to engage and strengthen the existing bond with the general public in order to further spread the importance of security awareness. To date, BISD has participated in an average of 70 talks, briefings, exhibitions and roadshows each year.

BISD also conducts security briefings to the local communities in the rural areas which is attended by head of villages and villagers to raise their security awareness and also remind them of their responsibility in reporting suspicious activities.

BISD has not limited its outreach only within Brunei but also has taken the initiative to touch base with Bruneian students in various countries such as the United Kingdom, Cairo, Egypt, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Australia while travelling there on an official visit.

Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes

Brunei is a signatory to various regional and international conventions and resolutions pertaining to counter-terrorism primarily through the platforms of United Nations (UN) and ASEAN. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) which Brunei ratified in 2011 serves as the cornerstone in enhancing the region's capacity to confront terrorism in all its forms and manifestation and to deepen counter-terrorism cooperation among member states. Brunei also adopted the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism during the First ASEAN-Australia Biennial Summit which was held in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic in 2016 as well as other declarations such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism. At the international level, Brunei has complied with all UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and supported other declarations on terrorism.

Brunei also participates in several regional and international conferences and meetings which serve as valuable platforms to gain and exchange information, expertise, knowledge and good practices, and to build relationships with foreign counterparts. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), the South East Asian Regional Commonwealth Security Conference (SEARCSC), the Regional Meeting Of Heads Of Intelligence And Security Services Concerning ISIL (Da'esh) And Al-Qaida Influences In Southeast Asia, The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

In 2014, Brunei organised the 14th ASEAN SOMTC and its Related Meetings in which counter-terrorism was identified as one of the priority areas to be tackled by the ASEAN community. The first-ever combined ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise was also jointly co-organised by Brunei, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in Brunei and Singapore in May 2016.

Brunei regularly attends international meetings and conferences organised by INTERPOL and ASEANAPOL in which The Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF) is the designated INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) for the country. RBPF also holds regular bilateral meetings with its strategic counterparts in the region to enhance its police-to-police connections.

Brunei's security and intelligence agencies have also built strategic networking with their respective counterparts both in Southeast Asia and internationally through which regular bilateral intelligence exchanges on security matters including terrorism are made.

Cooperative Counter-Terror Action on Border Security

Brunei participated in the coordinated simultaneous operation, Operation MAHARLIKA, involving the national authorities of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, to perform counter-terrorism activities in the BIMP East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) region in 2017.

Measures Against Terrorist Financing

Brunei implements UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism including Resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities who constitute a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities and Resolution 1373 (2001) through the Anti-Terrorism (Terrorist Financing) Regulations 2013 which took effect from 8 December 2012.

The Financial Intelligence Unit, Autoriti Monetari Brunei Darussalam (AMBD), undertakes various functions in coordinating and monitoring the interagency efforts towards combating money laundering, terrorism financing and other related financial crimes including working closely with the relevant agencies by providing recommendations or guidance to supervisory authorities, enforcement agencies, reporting institutions on AML/CFT initiatives.

IV. Role of the ARF

The ARF as the first Asia-Pacific wide forum on peace and security issues continues to be an important security dialogue for the region. In line with its stated goals for confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, the ARF complements the work undertaken by the East Asia Summit and the ADMM-Plus. Alongside the official ARF processes, the ARF has also recognised the value of informal layer of exchanges through the ARF-Experts Eminent Persons (ARF EEPs) system that brings together recognised professionals and experts on specific domain issues. It has been envisaged for the EEPs to provide innovative ideas and recommendations on its three stated goals.

Further to this, the ARF-related platforms in the defence sectoral have given way to deepen understanding on the different perspectives on regional security concerns of its members. Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD) and ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) have long provided an avenue for defence and military officials to establish networks, build confidence and promote mutual trust among one another. The ARF Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM) has been valuable in promoting military education best practices and exchanges of research on security issues.

These various levels of engagements within the ARF underscore the inclusiveness and ongoing efforts in fostering dialogue and consultations. Brunei Darussalam remains committed to the ARF processes in promoting mutual understanding and working together to address the wide range of regional security challenges. In an ever increasingly uncertain regional security environment, engagements through dialogue, collaboration and cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels are a necessity in order to manage future risks in a comprehensive manner.

CAMBODIA

Assessment of the Regional Security Environment

Most recently, the countries in the region are witnessing the Major power strategy shift in the Asia-Pacific namely the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", "Belt and Road Initiative", and "India's Act East Policy", which are all announced to ensure peace, stability and cooperation in the region. However, it is plainly obvious that local politics and the shift in relative strengths of global or regional powers are in fact changing the rules of the international order previously entrenched.

The influence of defense-security issues on international relations has been on the rise. The new revolution in military affairs has been greatly changing the defense and military strategies of all countries. The military power competition around the world could possibly lead to the risk of arms races, especially at sea, and in space. Many major powers have adjusted their military strategies, increased their defense budgets, speeded up the armed forces modernization, and developed advanced weapons and equipment, and military technologies. These developments have affected not only the relations among major powers but also the national defense strategy of all countries.

Against this backdrop, the Asia-Pacific region is making progress in confidence-building through common security cooperation both at bilateral and multilateral level such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, East Asia Summit... etc.

II. Cambodia's National Security and Defense Policy

In response to the evolving national, regional, and global security environment, Cambodia's security and defense strategy have been continuously redefined and amended. The focal points which Cambodia has been looking at based on policies and guidance provided by the DWP 2006 and the DSR 2013 include: strengthening border security; increasing United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) capabilities; maritime security; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR); and international cooperation amongst others.

The Ministry of National Defense of Cambodia is currently in the process of developing a new strategic document known as the Defense White Paper 2020 (DWP 2020). This upcoming defense policy document is going to reflect on the importance of safeguarding peace, protecting national interests, and strengthening international cooperation/engagement as the strategic objectives. Cambodia's defense intends are to promote a stable and rules-based order approach by focusing on five key defense priorities which consist of border defense; internal security; military reform; international cooperation and engagement; and military professionalism. The DWP 2020 will set out a carefully planned structural reform and capability acquisition programs that is nested within the needs of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces in the next foreseen 10 years.

III. Cambodia's Contributions to Regional Security

Counter-Terrorism (CT)

Cambodia has clearly shown its commitment to joining the world to combat international terrorism. Cambodia has been strengthening and improving RCAF's capability in preventing deterring and fighting against terrorism to maintain peace, stability, security and promote cooperation in the region and the world. However, Cambodia would have shared the concern over the new trend of ISIS after its deterioration in the Middle East. The most recent coordinated terror attacks in Sri Lanka have proceed the alarm for other nations in the region, whose security for the soft targets is insufficient or vulnerable.

In respond to the above-mentioned perspectives, Cambodia has opted international cooperation as a priority and active participation from relevant inter-ministries and institutions for timely deterrence, prevention and recovery. The National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) is the top institution for command and control in the fight against terrorism and its secretariat is to serve as a coordination mechanism in compliance with the Counter-Terrorism Planning Book and Cambodia's Counter-Terrorism law, which was signed and come into force on 20 July 2007. In addition, Cambodia has active cooperation with several partner countries in Counter-Radicalization efforts.

ii. Non-Proliferation, Counter Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The Kingdom of Cambodia has committed to a range of capability for non-proliferation regime based on national laws, regional and international agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to respond the illicit trafficking of the WMD materials. Cambodia has been actively engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials.

At the national level, significant legal frameworks were passed and have been implemented, including: Law on the Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition, Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Radiological Biological and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, and Sub Decree on Chemical Substances involved in the Production of CBRN Weapons.

To support the global movement on WMD, Cambodia followed a number of international agreements such as: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, United Nation Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, Nuclear Supplier Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons...etc.

The Kingdom of Cambodia recognizes the importance of developing an integrated and comprehensive approach to mitigate CBRN

risks and works with international partners to coordinate efforts to reduce the dangers by developing framework in accordance with a prevention, detection, preparedness and response. The National CBRN Action Plan (NAP) covers a wide range of CBRN activities and is tailored to addressing the CBRN hazards – whether natural, accidental or criminal in origin – of greatest relevance to the country. This approach ensures the NAP is fully in line with such initiatives of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the activities of the United Nation Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540, the World Health Organization (WHO) Protocol for assessing national surveillance and response capacities for the International Health Regulations (IHR), as well as work by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs Organization (WCO). The NAP has been prepared by the National CBRN Team, combining the views of key national authorities and stakeholders, and expresses the strategic priorities of the country. It has been compiled in consultation with United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) within the framework of the European Union CBRN Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative over a series of workshops hosted by the Cambodian National CBRN Team and attended by UNICRI experts.

The National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Radiological Biological and Nuclear Weapons (NACW) serves for disarmament and non-proliferation. NACW has a mission to control and prohibit the proliferation of CBRN weapons, and to serve as the national focal point responsible for liaising with international organizations and state parties to relevant conventions and also the NACW disseminates information, educates and raises awareness on relevant national laws.

iii. Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asian Region including Cambodia, transnational crime is a common concern and complicated challenge. Up to date, the trend of transnational crime has not been decreased. Although cooperative effort has been made between countries in the region to suppress and to prevent transnational crime, activity of this crime is still

constantly developing across the countries' borders through well-structured and organized networks of those criminals. Moreover, due to the evolution of globalization and regional integration where the national borders are broader, there are more flow of humans, flow of financial, and technologies crossing from one country to another country are more convenient. Additionally, the fast development of information and modern technologies are the factors that make it easy for the transnational criminals to conduct illegal activities.

Measures and cooperation to suppress the Transnational Crime:

Cybercrime:

- Expand cooperation with all ASEAN members to comprehensively understand the risk and dig out the source of cybercrime in order to take measure.
- Expand the capacity of IT technical experts to timely prevent cyber attack.
- If necessary, one special center should be established in the region in order to distribute and share cyber intelligence to fight cyber crime.
- Because Cambodia has not yet adopted the Law on Cyber Crime, recently the royal Government of Cambodia is conducting the study on positive and negative impacts in order to draft cyber Law in response to development of this issue. This law is very crucial in addition to the existing measure (Anti-Cyber Crime Department police).

b. Illegal Arms Smuggling:

- Expand cooperation with all relevant institutions to strictly enforce on tracking system of all flows of goods' categories in all targeted areas, and gateways in both local and along the border with neighboring countries.
- Increase cooperation in the region to reciprocally provide information related to the case or individual suspected of arms and ammunition smuggling.
- Increase the efficiency of law enforcement on illegal arms smuggling, explosives storage and punishing the criminals.
- In recent year, there is an emerging issue related to the use of toy pistol. Toy pistole has been improvised to be highly capable pistole

and 3D printed weapons that poses a threat to the national security. The competent authority should has effective measure to monitor this issue because some people have use this kind of weapon as an equipment to commit crimes, for instance ,on 24 February, 2019, CNN has reported that two gunmen used toy pistol to highjack Biman Bangladesh Airline BG 147 While the airplane was on its way from Dhaka to Dubai. One of the gunmen was shot and killed by the special force Bangladesh.

C. **Drug trafficking:**

- Develop capacity of checking and monitoring of custom officials and competent authorities, and modern equipment for scanning improvised illicit substances should be fully equipped especially in specific areas such as airport, seaport, and check-point along the
- Implementation of law and punishment of criminal should be strictly enforced in every country.
- Raise awareness and educate population especially youths about the risk and harmful effect of drug addiction.

d. **Human Trafficking:**

- Raise awareness and educate population to understand the law and relevant regulations on labor law locally and internationally, immigration law, and migration risk in order to defend themselves from getting cheated by the broker.
- Firmly enforce the implementation of Immigration Law to all relevant implementing authority and strengthen the law efficiency to strictly punish the criminals in accordance with the law.
- Another additional measure is adoption of sub-decree on the process and strictly procedures for Marriage between a Cambodian Citizen and a Foreign Nation (Sub-decree No, 183/2008).

In conclusion, to successfully combat transnational crime, the effective and speedy information sharing between counterparts, institutions and relevant countries is important factor.

- To improve Human resource in respective countries for security related build up personnel to carryout counter transitional crimes task.
- Frequently meeting to enforce the mechanism.

iv. Humanitarian Assistant and Disaster Relief (HADR)

Non-traditional threats both man-made and natural disasters have been increasingly prevalent to our global environment. As far as natural disasters are concerned, relentless typhoons, cyclone, landslides, and massive earthquakes in our region have increased in frequency at an alarming rate possibly due to the impact of climate change. For the heavily-impacted countries and region, the damage caused by these man-made and natural disasters often outweigh the abilities of governments to quickly respond and assist.

The Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia has been working tirelessly with its ASEAN member states, civil societies, and none governmental organizations to establish and ratify new concepts, procedures, guidelines, and regulations on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation emergency responses. Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie (RCG) have been implementing exercise activities on disaster relief operations with ASEAN as well as foreign partners in line with the ASEAN charter and other existing mechanisms; and is committed to support all defense cooperative activities conduct in the framework of ASEAN. These activities are the integral part in turning vision into reality through forming partnership and collaborative engagement.

Therefore, disaster preparedness and readiness is the key element to the strategic blueprint for the ASEAN Community to hedge against this uncertainty as well as the key element to promote a successful outcome and turning vision into reality. Cambodia believes that through continued effort to strengthen relationship and closer cooperation while implementing more frequent pragmatic defense cooperative activities among the ASEAN militaries will, undoubtedly, build trust, confidence, professionalism and partnership, In addition, our ASEAN militaries will possess the capabilities, skill

sets, and intellectual knowledge to respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of our capabilities, skill sets, intellectual knowledge, and work closely with friends, and strategic partners.

To contribute to national, regional, and the world security, the Royal Cambodian Government, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie have carried out a lot of measures to counter both traditional and nontraditional threats as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations through the implementation of national legislation, and national policy such as Law on Disaster Management, as well as through the establishment of National Committee for Disaster Management (NCDM). Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie will increase its participation in both bilateral and multilateral defense cooperative activities; particularly in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HA/DR).

v. Maritime Security

Regionally, Maritime developments have been highly regarded as ASEAN's growth center, fishery, forest, oils and natural gas, and mineral resources. Along with these developments, ASEAN faces a variety of challenges to include piracy, sea robberies, IUU Fishing, transactional crime, human and drug trafficking, smuggling, terrorism, environmental destruction, climate change, and other nontraditional threats. Cambodia has actively taken part in a number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, Cambodia is a party to the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, a party to the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 1970 and a signatory to the 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1983.

In response to maritime threats, The Royal Cambodian Government established the National Committee for Maritime Security (NCMS), which put into place overarching constitutional provisions, national strategy, and vision for Maritime Security. NCMS is a national inter-agency mechanism responsible for leading two primary missions: (1) defending the country's maritime sovereignty and

(2) managing cohesive maritime law enforcement for the Kingdom of Cambodia. Identifying that Maritime Security requires operations from all agencies of the government beyond defense, NCMS facilitates and provides cohesions for national cooperation strategically and tactically. NCMS organizes a small-scale national maritime exercise named MOHAROUM-EL every 2 years since 2017, aimed at strengthening collaboration and inter-agencies skills. In response to maritime security threats The 2nd MOHAROUM-EL 19 was conducted on April 2019. Furthermore, Cambodia has participated in almost all forms of maritime security for aincluding ARF, AMF, EAMF, ACGF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, ACDFIM, WPNS and ANCM, etc. Cambodia is also one of the founders and active members of the Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Interoperability Initiatives (GOTI), a sub-regional organization.

The Royal Cambodia Navy (RCN) plays a pivotal role in protection Cambodia's maritime coastline, islands and territorial waters, monitoring the security of its main deep-water ports and major waterways. Moreover, the RCN has been carrying out its international missions under the framework of ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) and spirit of ADMM, as a compass and an integrated approach in maintaining peace security and stability in the region and the world. As a result, The RCN has been enhancing its capabilities internally and internationally through exercising, training, experiencing and joining patrol best practices in order to upgrade human resources capability for interoperability and harmony. Especially, in the international fleet review on the auspicious accession of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the ASEAN in the year 2017 hosted by Kingdom of Thailand. Recently, in 2018 the RCN has participated in ASEAN-CHINA Maritime Exercise (ACMEX) with the aim of strengthening confidence and interoperability between the navies of ASEAN and China in jointly maintaining maritime security. Not only ASEAN-CHINA Maritime Exercise (ACMEX), the RCN will be participating in ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX) to enhancing share awareness and interoperability in the maritime domain which will be happening soon this year. In 2019 for upcoming special event the RCN will be hosting the Chairmanship of the 13th ASEAN Navy Chief Meeting (ANCM 13th) in the theme of "Enhancing Cooperation for Sustainable Security at Sea".

Cambodia has developed maritime security policy and Cambodia has taken part in number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, the NCMS and RCN expresses its fullest commitment and support to any efforts or initiatives with the objectives to promote cooperation within ASEAN Community and maintaining regional maritime peace, security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development to the region.

IV. Role of ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a first region wide Asia-Pacific multilateral forum for official consultations on peace and security issues. An outgrowth of the annual ARF activities, with the participation from 10 ASEAN member states plus 17 dialogues partners, the ARF provides a setting for discussion and diplomacy and the development of cooperative responses to regional Security issues. The principle and modalities of dialogue and cooperation fostered by the ARF, such as mutual respect, dialogue on an equal footing, non-interference in each other's internal affairs together with the cooperative security concept, are increasingly accepted by country in the region.

The uniqueness of the ARF is that the forum serves as an effective platform where regular collaboration and meeting between military and civil elements in the region take place. The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a an active and responsible ARF member, Cambodia is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules based regional order, while upholding the central role of ASEAN in any ASEAN-led forums, Cambodia will also continue to make valuable contribution to the forum through its continuous active participation, contributing ideas and initiatives in many ARF activities, including co-charing various ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting with other ARF member states.

CANADA

After 42 years as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, and as a founding member of the ARF, Canada is firmly committed to the principle of ASEAN centrality and working to support ASEAN-led fora in the years ahead. As a Pacific country, Canada is deeply committed to the region's security, prosperity, and peaceful development. Canada's active engagement within the ARF is central to Canada's efforts in the region.

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Greater economic integration in the Indo-Pacific region is creating prosperity and new opportunities for development, but also competition and uncertainty with respect to international norms underpinning the rules based international order and the architecture that will support peace and prosperity well into the 21st century.

The Indo-Pacific region--with a strong ASEAN at its core—, is important to Canada; we are a maritime nation that depends on and contributes to a free and open region that allows for peaceful interactions and trade with our Asian partners. Canada's economic and people-to-people ties with Asia run deep, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) now in force and a potential Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement currently under exploratory discussions will strengthen those ties and make our societies stronger. As such, it is in our collective interest to ensure the safety, security and the free flow of lawful commerce in the maritime domain. Canada places great importance on respect for international law and internationally accepted rules, standards and norms of behaviour including those outlined in UNCLOS. Canada's recognizes the need to bolster regional connectivity through infrastructure development and supports efforts to boost connectivity in a way that is transparent, makes use of responsible debt financing practices, respects the environment and ensures respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and rule of law.

Korean Peninsula

Canada firmly believes that North Korea must avoid any further provocations that could undermine ongoing diplomatic engagement and undermine military confidence building measures on the Peninsula. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs remain one of the most critical threats to regional and international peace and security. North Korea's resumption of ballistic missile testing in early May 2019, after a hiatus of almost 18 months, was an unwelcome and concerning development, and contrary to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

Canada is gravely concerned that North Korea has yet to take any actions which would materially degrade the capabilities of its WMD programs despite its stated intention to denuclearize. As evidenced in part by North Korea's recent ballistic missile testing, North Korea is continuing to advance the capabilities of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Given the significant implications of this threat for all ARF members, Canada believes that this issue should be a central focus of the ARF's work, including at all relevant intersessional meetings.

Furthermore, Canada firmly believes that dialogue and diplomacy represent the only path to security, stability and economic prosperity for the North Korean people. The international community needs to increase its efforts to ensure effective implementation of the UNSC's sanctions regime against North Korea, in order to support diplomacy. Canada is committed to working with ARF members and the broader international community to ensure effective and coordinated implementation of sanctions against North Korea.

In support of this objective, Canada is participating in a multinational effort to curb sanctions evasion activities at sea, particularly illegal ship-to-ship transfers, with the deployment of Canadian Armed Forces ships, aircraft and personnel. Canada continues to underline that these measures will remain in place until North Korea completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantles all of its WMD and ballistic missile programs.

Canada has also imposed comprehensive autonomous sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act, which includes a ban on all trade with North Korea, with limited humanitarian exemptions.

Canada calls on North Korea to resume adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, respect its comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and continue on the path of dialogue and diplomacy toward an enduring peace.

A strong and visible presence in the United Nations Command (UNC) is an important multinational component of Canada's commitment to security on the Korean peninsula and the region. In mid-2018, Canada increased its contribution to the UNC, including the UNC's first non-U.S. deputy commander. Canada's decision to augment its UNC contribution supports Canada's foreign policy priority of supporting diplomacy and peaceful outcomes on the Korean peninsula.

As an active member of the UNC, Canada plays a key role in supervising and maintaining the Armistice, which helps reduce the risk of unintended escalation on the Korean Peninsula. This decision is also aligned with Canada's defence policy, 'Strong, Secure, Engaged', which reaffirms Canada's commitment to sustained participation in the Asia-Pacific security architecture, to effectively address regional security challenges through consistent engagement and strong partnerships. It is also a demonstration of Canada's resolve in standing with key Canadian allies and partners, including the Republic of Korea, as Canada does in North America and Europe.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Terrorism and violent extremism affect all of us, as demonstrated by the recent attacks in New Zealand and Sri Lanka. Violent extremism is a global and a collective challenge that requires a whole of society effort to prevent and counter, including the direct engagement of civil society.

Canada believes that effective and sustainable counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism measures require a global approach, combining domestic and international efforts. These efforts must be guided by the principles of respect for human rights and the rule of law, and be driven by partnerships. Such approaches should also be evidence-based and build on local strengths and capabilities to foster resilience to violent extremism among those affected.

Canada continues to support the Global Coalition against Da'esh in its military and civilian-led efforts. While the Coalition has succeeded in forcing Da'esh to retreat from its territory in Iraq and Syria, Da'esh has resumed its insurgent attacks.

In addition, the return flow of Southeast Asian terrorists who travelled to fight in the Middle East is reinvigorating regional violent extremist groups and is a concern for all ARF members. Canada will continue to work with ARF members to address the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, including supporting regional and national efforts to manage returns of skilled combatants and key operators. Canada will also continue to build on its partnerships domestically and internationally to address the underlying conditions conducive to violent extremism and terrorism which are essential for effective combat efforts.

South China Sea

With an estimated one third of the world's trade passing through the South China Sea annually, tensions there have the potential to have disruptive effects on the global economy and undermine regional peace and security. Canada opposes the use of coercion or threats of force and is of the view that all claimants must refrain from land reclamation, militarization and other actions that escalate regional tensions. Canada supports lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and overflight,

and the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states exercised in accordance with international law. Canada is also concerned that tensions have impeded regional cooperation in protection of the marine environment in the South China Sea.

Canada continues to urge that China and ASEAN members make concerted efforts to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Canada recognizes efforts made by ASEAN members and China to develop a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Canada is of the view that such a future Code should be in the spirit of what was agreed to in the DOC and be binding, consistent with international law, and should not prejudice the rights of third parties. Despite diplomatic negotiations on a COC, Canada noted a deterioration of the security situation in recent years, caused by increasing militarization of disputed features in the Spratlys and the Paracels. Canada urges all sides to take steps to de-escalate by removing military assets from disputed features and engaging in good-faith negotiations with a view to managing or resolving disputes in accordance with international law.

Canada's position on various aspects of South China Sea issues can be found in Canada's July 21, 2016 statement on the South China Sea Arbitration (available on-line at https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2016/07/canadian-statement-on-south-china-sea-arbitration.html), in the September 2016 G7 Foreign Ministers Statement on Recent Developments in Asia, and in the Joint Communiqué from the April 2019 G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting. (Available on-line at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/g7_-_foreign_ministers_communique_cle8245be.pdf)

II. National Security and Defence Policy

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Canada is committed to strengthening peace and security and to enhancing our defence relations and engagement in the Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. In June 2017, the Government of Canada released its new defence policy, 'Strong, Secure, Engaged'. Through this policy, the Government of Canada

clearly directs the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to deepen engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and ASEAN. In particular, 'Strong, Secure, Engaged' directs DND and CAF to have a more consistent and predictable presence in the region, including through increased participation in ARF events, and to seek membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting – Plus (ADMM+).

This direction is consistent with the steps Canada has taken in the last few years to increase its regional engagement, including Canada's increased contributions to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, through United Nations Command, and our consistent participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts across the region. Canada has also taken concrete steps to strengthen its defence relations and cooperation with our partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including through an expanded network of Canadian Defence Attaches, a more enduring regional naval presence, and regional military contributions, including through Operation NEON, Canada's efforts to monitor North Korean sanctions evasion activities. Canada has also increased its participation in regional military exercises and high-level defence forums, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, Fullerton Forum, and ASEAN Regional Forum.

Canada's defence policy also reaffirms our commitment to capacity building projects and mutual education, training and assistance. The Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) supports cooperative training and military professional development projects across the region that enhance interoperability, expand and reinforce Canadian bilateral defence relations, and promote Canadian democratic principles, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In 2017-18, DND contributed approximately CAD\$1.82 million in support of MTCP activities in Asia-Pacific and trained 265 personnel. Looking ahead, DND will continue using MTCP to build and reinforce partnerships with Asia-Pacific countries and to support Canada's engagement objectives across the region.

In 2018, Canada released its National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence, which focuses on civilian-led, evidence-based efforts that respect human rights, emphasizes the importance of inclusion and diversity, and builds on local strengths and capabilities to foster community resilience. It is being implemented by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence and other government departments and agencies at various levels across Canada. Canada also believes that incorporating gender-based analysis into this effort is critical both for understanding and addressing the threat of violent extremism, and continues to advocate for the integration of gender considerations into all CT and CVE efforts. Internationally, Canada supports the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the complementary work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which Canada will co-chair with Morocco beginning in late September. We also coordinate CT efforts with our partners in the G7, the Global Coalition to Counter Da'esh and the Five Eyes group. In addition, the Government of Canada is working to counter online terrorist and violent extremist activity and content as a domestic and international priority.

Recognizing that Canadians continue to embrace the many advantages that cyberspace offers, Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides a new roadmap to comprehensively address cyber security risks and tackle cybercrime. It also provides the basis as for our engagement with international partners on shared cyber security concerns. The development and implementation of multilateral initiatives aimed at fighting cybercrime help to ensure that the internet remains free and open. In this regard, Canada greatly values its participation in the Cybercrime Convention (Budapest Convention) since joining it in 2015, and encourages States which have not yet ratified it to consider doing so.

b. **Data contribution to ARF Arms** Register

In keeping with the important advances in promoting transparency in conventional arms, including through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), and the instrument of Standardized Reporting on Military Matters, which includes transparency on military expenditures, Canada supports the sharing of information about national security and defence programs and policies. Canada's 2018 UNROCA report covering imports and exports of small arms, light weapons and conventional arms, as well as military holdings can be found here: https://www.unroca.org/canada/ report/2018

In Canada's 2017-2018 fiscal year, a total of CAD\$29,205.7 million in defence related expenditures incurred in Canadian federal government departments, including the Department of National Defence.

Detailed information on Canada's military expenditure return is available below. Figures are reported in millions of Canadian dollars (\$CAD).

Table 1. Canada's military expenditure in millions of Canadian dollars (\$CAD)

Resource costs / Force groups	(1) Strategic forces	(2) Land forces	(3) Naval forces	(4) Air forces	(5) Other military forces (a)	(6) Central support administrati on and command	(7) UN peace- keeping (e)	(8) Military assistance and cooperation	(9) Emergency aid to civilians m	(10) Undistribut ed	(11) Total military expenditures
1. Personnel (g)	0.00	4,748.90	1,898.30	2,608.90	721.30	5,346.80	0.30	1.70	0.00	0.00	15,322.20
1.1 Conscripts	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1.2 Active military personnel	0.00	3,150.40	1,131.20	1,823.00	477.30	2,400.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	9,042.70
1.3 Reserves	0.00	335.30	79.30	89.00	25.80	240.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	769.50
1.4 Civilian personnel	0.00	293.00	337.30	132.70	71.20	1,891.20	0.00	1.70	0.00	0.00	2,727.10
1.5 Military pensions	0.00	970.20	348.50	501.00	147.00	755.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,782.90
2. Operations and Maintenance	0.00	1,760.60	1,448.20	2,387.00	469.60	3,320.80	1.30	14.00	0.00	0.00	9,401.50
2.1 Materials for current use (h)	0.00	633.40	478.80	581.30	159.50	269.30	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	2120.70
2.2 Maintenance and repair (r)	0.00	215.00	131.70	934.10	3.30	230.20	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	1515.40
2.3 Purchased services ()	0.00	004.90	696.70	728.10	242.00	1180.70	0.00	2.50	0.00	0.00	3515.10
2.4 Other	0.00	240.30	143.00	143.50	64.20	1040.00	0.20	11.50	0.00	0.00	2249.30
3. Procurement and construction (Investments) (k)	0.00	1303.00	1137.50	672.90	70.70	1150.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	00,0	4334.60
3.1 Procurement	0.00	1104.40	1025.10	571.90	62.90	805.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3570.10
3.1.1 Aircraft and engines	0.00	0.00	0.00	447.00	0.00	14.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	461.60
3.1.2 Missiles, including Conventional warheads	0.00	0.00	22.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	22.90
3.1.3 Nuclear warheads and bombs	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.4 Ships and boats	0.00	0.00	888.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	888.90
3.1.5 Armoured vehicles	0.00	779.90	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	779.90
3.1.6 Artillery	0.00	2.90	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00		0.00	0.00	290
3.1.7 Other ordnance and ground force weapons	0.00	28.20	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00		0.00	0.00	28.20
3.1.8 Ammunition	0.00	128.30	38.00	47.10	34.80		0.00		0.00	0.00	249.00
3.1.9 Electronics and communications	0.00	70.30	10.30	36.20	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	379.50
3.1.10 Non-armoured vehicles	0.00	38.80	0.00	8.30	10.00		0.00		0.00	-	55.10
3.1.11 Other	0.00	58.00	63.90	33.30	18.10		0.00	0.00	0.00		702.10
3.2 Construction	0.00	198.60	112.40	101.00	7.90		0.00	0.00	0.00		784.50
3.2.1 Air bases, airfields	0.00	0.00	0.00	79.60	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	98.40
3.2.2 Naval bases and facilities	0.00	0.00	112.40	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	138.10
3.2.3 Electronics facilities	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	63 90
3.2.4 Personnel facilities	0.00	1.40	0.00	2.10	0.00		0.00		0.00		85.10
3.2.5 Training facilities	0.00	22.10	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	32 20
3.2.6 Other	0.00	175.10	0.00	10.30	7.80		0.00		0.00		350.80
4. Research and development	0.00	1.00	0.90	0.20	7.70		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	147.40
4.1 Basic and applied research	0.00	0.20	0.70	0.10	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00		5.70
4.2 Development, testing and evaluation	0.00	0.80	0.20	0.10	7.70		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	141.70
5. Total (1+2+3+4)	0.00	7813.50	4482.90	5667.00	1269.30	9955.70	1.60	15.70	0.00	0.00	29205.70

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

a. Counterterrorism

The global terrorist threat is diverse and complex. It demands a comprehensive and coordinated international response based on common goals, values and institutions. It also demands a response that is consistent with international legal obligations, including international human rights and humanitarian law. Canada's multi-pronged approach to counter violent extremism and terrorism includes diplomacy, intelligence, security and law enforcement, customs and immigration, transportation, justice and finance expertise.

Canada is of the view that global counter-terrorism efforts must put more emphasis on preventing and countering the spread of violent extremism, rather than only reacting to the actions of terrorists. Canada supports the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism both domestically and internationally.

In June 2017, Canada launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre). As a centre of excellence, the Canada Centre provides national policy leadership, supports local level initiatives, and coordinates action-oriented research on countering radicalization to violence. Its mandate is to support the prevention of radicalization to violence of all kinds, regardless of where it originates. To support

this work, the Canada Centre is engaging broadly with communities, municipalities, provinces, law enforcement, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders across Canada to: develop relationships built on trust; increase the overall understanding of radicalization to violence; encourage open and transparent discussions; and inform programming, research and policy priorities.

The security of the Asia-Pacific region is inextricably linked to that of ARF partner countries; Canada is committed to working with those partners to counter terrorist activity. Southeast Asia therefore continues to be a priority region for Canada's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP). Since 2005, the CTCBP has supported counter-terrorism capacity building projects in Southeast Asia totalling close to CAD\$29 million.

CTCBP programming has focused on regional efforts throughout Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on advancing regional security cooperation amongst ASEAN member states. CTCBP efforts throughout this region advance: maritime, land border, and aviation security; countering the financing of terrorism; counterterrorism legislation and judicial support; countering violent extremism (CVE) and foreign terrorist fighters; and strengthening law enforcement and intelligence agencies ability to more effectively address terrorist threats.

For example, the CTCBP is funding the UNODC to develop legislation to combat the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and enhance national counter-terrorism legislation to conform to international human rights principles, norms and standards. This work also supports the implementation of UNSCR 2178 on fighting terrorism.

Multilaterally, the CTCBP also has a number of initiatives that include INTERPOL Special Notices training, as well as investigation, forensic collection skills building, and identifying and tracking foreign fighters moving to/from conflict areas. As a key example, CTCBP's support to INTERPOL's Project Sunbird II enhances enforcement agencies across ASEAN through targeted border and counterterrorism training. The training culminates in a live 10-day 'Operation Sunbird' exercise, involving all ASEAN members. The 2017 and 2018

Operations resulted in over eight million searches that derived multiple hits on INTERPOL global databases leading to numerous arrests. Approximately 90% of participants involved in Operation Sunbird activities indicated that their knowledge and capacity has improved to better counter terrorism and organized crime in the region as a result of their participation.

Recognizing the terrorist threats posed in the maritime domain, the CTCBP is also supporting maritime-focused counter-terrorism efforts in four ARF member states: Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Implemented by INTERPOL, these regional efforts target national law enforcement agencies in charge of port and maritime security in order to strengthen institutional capacity to combat terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, and reduce the vulnerability of ships and port facilities to security risks.

In the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, Canada, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is working with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the institute for Legal Support and Technical Assistance (ILSTA), UNODC and the World Bank to strengthen legislative frameworks' supervisory capacity of financial sector supervisors and increase the capacity of law enforcement agents in the areas of money laundering and terrorism financing investigation, prosecution, and conviction.

Aviation security also remains a priority for Canada given the direct air links to the region. Through the CTCBP, Canada continues to supports global aviation projects with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). These efforts are enhancing air cargo security, improving airport screening methods, and facilitating targeted training of airport officials and regulators on countering terrorism in civil aviation.

Noting the importance of combatting violent extremism, the CTCBP is also supporting CVE efforts at the regional, national, and local levels throughout Southeast Asia. These efforts include examining the push and pull factors affecting at risk refugee communities towards violent extremist groups, such as Islamic State, advancing countries' capacity to prevent radicalisation in prisons, and enhancing evidenced-based policy-making and strategy formulation in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

Many of the CTCBP funded efforts, particularly those implemented by RCMP, are delivered at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). This unique regional training hub supports ARF member states to collaborate and develop skills to effectively counter terrorist threats throughout the region, and beyond.

In addition to supporting the ARF, Canada works actively within a number of international fora addressing new and emerging challenges and developing best practices and international standards to combat terrorism. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC); the G7; the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), where Canada will continue to co-chair with Algeria the Capacity-building in the West Africa Region Working Group until September 2019; the Organization of American States (OAS), where Canada chaired the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism from 2014-2015; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the United Nations.

b. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD)

Canada's approach to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament is grounded in its steadfast commitment to the rules-based international order. of which United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are integral parts. Canada actively engages with ARF partners on these issues through the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ISM NPD) and supports the goals as outlined in the Work Plan of the ISM NPD. Canada looks forward to a renewed focus on the Work Plan at the 12th ISM NPD given its importance in advancing the goals of the ISM, including confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. Canada also participates actively in Track 1.5 meetings such as the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue and the Shangri-La Dialogue, which provide opportunities for policy makers to hear from and exchange views informally with academics and civil society with a view to developing new approaches to regional security issues.

Canada is a strong proponent of UNSCR 1540 and its successor resolutions, and actively engages in efforts to promote its universal implementation, particularly through the 31-member Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). During its Presidency of the G7 and Global Partnership in 2018, Canada worked to foster greater dialogue between WMD policy and programming experts, including by holding the first ever GP Working Group meetings featuring sessions with the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group and the Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Canada has submitted multiple national reports and implementation action plans, and is actively working to address identified weaknesses in 1540 assistance mechanisms. Canada continues to take measures to meet all its 1540 obligations, including through improvements to its legislative and regulatory frameworks, physical security measures, border controls and law enforcement, and national export and transshipment controls.

Similarly, Canada continues to strongly support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an important and complementary tool for addressing WMD proliferation challenges and for assisting in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and other relevant resolutions.

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada announced a contribution of CAD\$42 million to improve nuclear and radiological security world-wide. That investment is supporting efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material, the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, enhancements to the physical security of nuclear facilities, improving transportation security, and other multilateral initiatives. That same year, Canada announced CAD\$20 million in programming to support 15 countries to fulfill their commitments under the Global Health and Security Agenda (GHSA). ASEAN member states are benefiting from both these initiatives.

Canada is pleased to have been the inaugural chair of the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG), which aims to implement nuclear security commitments, identify ways of addressing new and emerging threats, and maintain momentum on enhancing global nuclear security. The NSCG currently includes a number of ASEAN members, including

the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. Hungary succeeded Jordan as the Convener in September 2018. The NSCG continues to welcome new members to the Contact Group to enhance geographic representation, including in the Southeast Asian region.

Canada supports a pragmatic and inclusive step-by-step process towards non-proliferation and disarmament, including efforts to promote transparency and verifiability, reporting, risk reduction, and confidence building measures (CBMs). Current Canadian efforts are centred on advancing the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), on developing measures for disarmament verification through the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and contributing to a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In pursuit of these priorities, Canada's feminist foreign policy recognises that maintaining international peace and security requires an inclusive approach that considers the perspectives of all persons and that gender balance and gender considerations have a positive impact on the achievement of the shared goals of the NPT and across the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

Canada continues to advocate for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/259, Canada chaired the High-Level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group, which concluded its work in June 2018 with the adoption of a consensus report containing recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. As evidenced in near-universal support expressed by the 2018 UN General Assembly resolution, and in the joint statement by the P5 nuclear weapons states, an FMCT remains a widely shared international priority which could contribute significantly to confidence building and enhanced regional and international security.

Canada considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. As we approach the 2020 NPT Review Conference and the NPT's Golden Anniversary, Canada remains committed to reinforcing and strengthening this important treaty, and its review process, in collaboration with ARF partners Australia, Japan, the Philippines and other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI).

Canada is an active State Party to all major international NACD treaties, will accede to the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019, and will work with ARF partners through the annual ARF Intersessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ISM NPD), and other forums, to promote the universalisation and full and effective implementation of such treaties and instruments. These include: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other arrangements such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Canada also continues to advocate for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and for the completion of its verification system. Its entry into force requires ratification by eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, namely: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. Canada is a significant contributing State to the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS).

Acknowledging the role of nuclear energy to meet the increasing energy demands of states, Canada supports the peaceful uses of nuclear power in a safe and secure manner, notably through full cooperation with the IAEA. Canada strongly believes that implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol constitute the current safeguards verification standard. Through signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, ARF members and Dialogue Partners can support transparency and confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. Canada has consistently supported efforts to

assist states to build capacity to fully implement the Additional Protocol and believes that the ARF can also work to promote its universal implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Finally, Canada supports the contribution of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) to regional security and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, such as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), and welcomes efforts aimed at securing the signatures of P5 States to its Protocol.

The Weapons Threat Reduction Program is Canada's flagship contribution to the G7-led, 31-member Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) – launched under Canadian leadership at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. To date, Canada has contributed over CAD\$1.4 billion to help prevent terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring or developing weapons and materials of mass destruction.

In the past decade, Canada's Weapons Threat Reduction Program has collaborated closely with the ASEAN Secretariat and member states, including through the delivery of over CAD\$37.8 million in assistance to ASEAN partners to build capacity to address such threats.

This cooperation includes:

- enhanced physical security of nuclear and radiological facilities in ASEAN countries;
- regional training on radiological source security;
- supporting the region implement its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540;
- strengthening laboratory and response capacity,
 biosecurity and biosafety, and disease
 surveillance and regional interconnectivity; and
- support for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Container Control Programme in Malaysia.

In addition, Canadian-trained responders were actively involved in Malaysia's response both to an incident involving theft of radioactive materials and in the airport sweep at Kuala Lumpur international airport, where traces of a chemical weapon were detected.

c. Transnational Crime

Canada is committed to working with Asia-Pacific partners, including through the ARF, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOM-TC), and the Bali Process, to counter threats to governance and stability arising from the activities of transnational crime groups in the region, including cybercrime. Frequently linked to organized crimes are trafficking networks, including trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and/or firearms, migrant smuggling, money laundering, and wildlife trafficking, which underscore the transnational dimension of these challenges.

Migrant Smuggling is a particular area of concern. Through the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program, Canada works with regional partners to address this issue, often in coordination with global organizations including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and INTERPOL, and has a funding envelope of CAD\$8.5 million per year to deliver capacity-building support. The majority of this support has focused on strengthening the capacity of authorities to prevent, deter and respond to human smuggling networks in Southeast Asia. This includes assisting countries in the region to strengthen border security through enhancing the capacity of front line officials to identify fraudulent travel documentation, as well as improve regional collaboration on border management and human smuggling investigations.

Canada is also a regular contributor to the annual International Narcotics Control Board Conference on Precursor Chemicals and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). This conference is focused on practical measures countries can take to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals and trafficking of NPS. The Conference is held annually in Thailand, which recognizes the specific challenges faced by the region with respect to NPS trafficking and precursor diversion.

d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The increasing intensity and frequency of natural disasters underscores the importance of strengthening practical cooperation among Asia-Pacific partners on disaster preparedness and response. Canada continues to be an active contributor to humanitarian relief efforts in the region, by providing timely, effective, coordinated and needs-based assistance, and working closely with partners in the region to enhance cooperation, coordination, and awareness. Ongoing discussions on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) issues can serve to improve the delivery of such capabilities in the future, particularly in a region which will likely see ARF members respond to the same disaster.

Reiterating the importance of enhancing response mechanisms through close collaboration and exchange of best practices, Canada is co-chairing the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ARF ISM-DR), together with Lao PDR and China, until 2021. At the 19th ARF ISM-DR, hosted by Lao PDR, Canada reiterated the importance of finding synergies between the numerous disaster relief initiatives in the region, presented on Canada's approach to civil-military coordination in humanitarian operations and underlined the importance of adopting a gender-sensitive approach in all aspects of disaster management, from preparedness through responses and recovery. Likewise, Canada repeatedly encouraged all ARF members to adopt a more proactive approach to collaboration, communications, planning and execution for the effective and strategic delivery of disaster relief assistance. Canada also observed the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) held in Indonesia in 2018.

Moreover, Canada is pleased to be a member of the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia-Pacific and considers that the Group represents a valuable forum to share best practices on civilian-military cooperation in disaster response and to improve predictability and interoperability in the region. Canada looks forward to the next RCG meeting, to be held in Thailand in the second half of 2019.

Disaster risk reduction is also an important component of Canada's development efforts and we strongly support disaster risk reduction measures that aim to enhance resilience to all hazards and reduce vulnerability of individuals, communities and countries; Canada advocates for the integration of risk considerations into long-term sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies as well.

Canada recognizes the leadership that countries in the region are demonstrating in undertaking significant disaster risk reduction efforts. These efforts are enhancing preparedness and strengthening capacity to respond when disasters strike. Canada supports the ASEAN's efforts to provide a forum for the advancement of regional initiatives aimed at reducing the impact of natural hazards on populations in the area.

With the number of engagements related to disaster response in the region, Canada looks forward to working with ARF partners to better assess opportunities for synergies between the ARF and other mechanisms, including the RCG, EAS, and ADMM+, that strengthen ASEAN capabilities and advance local approaches to disaster response and risk reduction.

e. Maritime Security

Canada strongly supports continued ARF engagement on maritime security, including with respect to countering WMD proliferation and illicit trafficking. ARF cooperation on maritime security issues will continue to support the region's security and prosperity objectives by ensuring the efficient and secure movement of goods and people through strategic corridors.

Since the identification of maritime security as one of ARF's four key areas, ARF members, including Canada, have developed projects focused on enhanced information sharing and best practices, CBMs based on international and regional legal frameworks, and capacity building support to regional maritime law enforcement agencies. Canada regularly participates in the US-hosted multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises that take place biennially. Canada will assume a substantial leadership role this year, as it did during the last two iterations (2014 and 2016) of the exercise.

Canada views the Western Pacific Naval Symposium's (WPNS) "Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea" (CUES) as a means by which navies may develop mutually rewarding international cooperation and transparency, and provide leadership and broad-based involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea. Canada was pleased to be involved in the development of this code.

Operation ARTEMIS is Canada's contribution to Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), a multinational effort to combat terrorism in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. It demonstrates Canada's solidarity with partners and allies that are working for peace and security in the maritime environment of the greater Middle East region. Canada took command of CTF 150 in December 2018 and was replaced by Pakistan in April 2019. Under Canadian leadership and with Australia's support, CTF 150 conducted drug seizures in the Arabian Sea totaling 33,000 kg of illicit drugs.

More broadly, Canada is committed to working with international organizations to meet the security challenges of a complex maritime environment and recognizes the importance of broadening international consensus when addressing these challenges. Canada is actively engaged in a number of international forums, including the International Maritime Organization and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum – which bring together experts from maritime safety and security agencies in Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States. The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum fosters multilateral cooperation and best practices through information sharing on matters related to fisheries enforcement, maritime security, illegal migration, illegal drug trafficking and combined operations.

Civil society and Track II initiatives can also make a useful contribution to developing informed options for regional partners in areas such as regional connectivity and preparedness to address incidents at sea. Canada will continue to support initiatives to organize workshops and seminars in ARF countries on these themes, and will encourage civil society, academics and others to contribute to the discussion by submitting constructive, original and non-zero-sum proposals that can advance solutions for peaceful resolution.

As mentioned under the Terrorism section above, Canada, through the CTCBP, is also supporting maritime counter-terrorism efforts in four ARF member states (Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam). This regional maritime security project targets national law enforcement agencies in charge of port and maritime security in order to strengthen institutional capacity to combat terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, and reduce the vulnerability of ships and port facilities to security risks.

f. Cyberspace Security (ICT)

The ARF region is susceptible to cyber threats emanating from both state and non-state actors however the risk of misunderstanding, escalation and conflict emanating for malicious state behaviour remains a concern. Certain states actively pursue their interests in cyberspace through the theft of intellectual property and sensitive information, the compromise of systems and critical infrastructure, the theft of money and other nefarious means. Some states are also pursuing military cyber capabilities, as well as seeking to censor, control and partition the Internet under the pretext of cyber security. Misuse of cyberspace by criminals also remains a concern.

The ARF first addressed cyber-security issues in 2006 and has been steadily increasing its engagement ever since. The establishment of an Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) in 2016 was undertaken to support the process specifically on ICT (cyber) issues. The ARF has also put in place an Open Ended Study Group (OESG) on CBMs to Reduce the Risk of Conflict Stemming from the Use of ICTs. The ARF's work on cyber CBMs, including the Establishment of ARF Points of Contact Directory of Security of and in the Use of ICTs, and the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Consultations Mechanism [Co-led by Singapore and the EU] has been particularly useful.

Canada is continuously working with friends and partners, including the ARF and its participating countries, to enhance cyber security by identifying cyber threats and vulnerabilities, and by preparing to respond to a broad range of cyber incidents.

Canada believes that peace and stability in cyberspace is grounded on the acceptance of the applicability of existing international law, the adoption of norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, and the implementation of CBMs. Canada welcomes the efforts undertaken by the ARF to develop and implement CBMs that will enhance transparency and dialogue while reducing the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation and conflict in cyberspace.

Internationally, Canada collaborates with close allies and a wider coalition of countries that share our vision for a free, open and secure cyberspace that in order to promote can be a vehicle for political, social and economic development, and to counter efforts of repressive regimes to control the Internet and its content.

Canada has also supported regional capacity-building efforts aimed at bolstering the ability of states to respond to and mitigate cyber threats. For instance, Canada is contributing CAD\$ 1.1 million to an INTERPOL-led initiative to enhance cyber security in Southeast Asia by equipping and training ASEAN countries with forensic tools and skills to investigate cyber-attacks and related crimes.

Canada and Singapore will also co-host a workshop in June 2019, to share lessons learned and best practices on the development of national cybersecurity strategies. The workshop will be undertaken in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS) to foster cooperation and the sharing of best practices between the ARF and America's regions.

Canada is committed to continuing the collaboration developed within the ARF to support regional confidence-building and help support collective efforts to maintain a free, open, and secure cyberspace.

g. Women Peace and Security and Peace and Stabilization Operations Program in Asia

Canada's second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) for the period 2017-2022 is reflective of its Feminist Foreign Policy and guides the government in advancing gender equality and protecting and promoting the human rights of women and girls in fragile and conflict-affected states through our development assistance, humanitarian action and peace and security efforts. The Action Plan involves nine federal partners and comes with detailed, publicly available implementation plans that form the basis for annual progress reporting. The first progress report was tabled in the House of Commons in September 2018. The Action Plan was informed by the expertise of civil society and establishes an Advisory group comprised of civil society, Indigenous representatives and government experts to guide the government in the implementation of the Plan.

In the ARF, Canada proposes a statement on WPS which will work to ensure that the ARF continues to effectively carry out its preventive diplomacy goals, by recognizing the different and at times disproportionate impact that conflict and insecurity have on women and girls. Elsewhere, Canada advocates for the advancement of the WPS agenda in numerous multilateral organisations in which we participate, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, G7, Commonwealth and La Francophonie, and in our bilateral efforts. Examples of Canada's leadership on advancing the WPS agenda globally include:

- The creation of an Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security to provide advice on the effective implementation of Canada's National Action Plan on WPS.
- The G7 WPS Partnerships Initiative adopted by G7 Foreign Ministers in April 2018, under Canada's presidency.
- The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations launched in 2017 to increase the meaningful participation of women in UN peace operations.
- Co-chairing the WPS Focal Points Network with Uruguay in 2020, the 20th anniversary of SCR 1325, which will include hosting an international meeting with National Focal Points and other key WPS stakeholders in Ottawa in the spring of 2020.

Canada's Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs) is designed to prevent and respond to conflict and crisis abroad. PSOP's approach to stabilization includes targeted efforts to anticipate, prevent and respond to violent conflict and promote long-term stability. PSOPs provides a strong Canadian voice through policy leadership and advocacy, coordinates a whole-of-government response to various conflicts and crises, and provides visible and concrete assistance through targeted programming and expert deployments. PSOPs current engagement in Southeast Asia totals over CAD\$10 million and focuses on peace and stability programming to protect and promote human rights, implement peace agreements, and advance the role of women and youth in the participation and promotion of peace and security.

For example, through UNDP, Canada is supporting small grants to women's organizations in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines

and Sri Lanka to support women peacebuilders, increasing dialogue at the community level to resolve conflicts and to shift the narrative of women as victims to agents of change. In Afghanistan, more than 50 youth groups were created to sensitizing their communities on women's political participation and they actively engaged the Provincial Peace Councils in di cussions on Women Peace and Security.

IV. Role of ARF

a. National Contributions to the ARF:

The ARF is a key security forum within the Asia-Pacific region and an important component of Canada's engagement in the regions security dialogue. Canada will continue to engage constructively with our partners to build capacity and ensure that the ARF continues to contribute to security and stability in the region as per the action lines of the 2010 Hanoi Plan of Action and the principles of the 2009 ARF Vision Statement.

Canada has expanded its diplomatic presence across the region and since 2015 has a resident diplomatic presence in all 10 ASEAN member states. Canada's appointment of its first dedicated ASEAN Ambassador in 2016, as well as the expansion of its mission to ASEAN the year before, further demonstrate strong commitment to ASEAN and engagement with the ARF and our partners in the region.

In the 2018-2019 inter-sessional year, Canada continued to participate in and make significant contributions in a wide range of ARF events and regional security and disaster relief programs. Canada actively engaged in the Intersessional Support Group (ISG) meeting on CBMs and Preventative Diplomacy and Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD) held in Seoul, Korea, and the Senior Officials Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. Canada participated actively in all Inter-Sessional Meetings and co-chaired the 18th ARF Intersessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) held in Vientiane, Lao PDR on 3 April 2019. Canada also participated in the ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Notably, Canada co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Principles of Building Security in the Use of ICTs in the National Context held in Singapore on 25-26 June 2019. Furthermore, Canadian Expert and Eminent Persons (EEPs) participated actively in the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP) Meeting and the associated Expert Working Group meetings. Canada appointed two new EEPs in 2019.

b. The Future of the ARF:

The regularity of exchange facilitated through the ARF will be increasingly important to sustaining an atmosphere of cooperation in a region of global strategic importance. In this respect, Canada encourages a pragmatic and cooperative approach to the ARF's work, one that will amplify the constructive role played by the ARF in the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture.

Like many of ARF partners, Canada believes that it will be important to build on the ARF's existing work in order to bring greater focus to addressing the region's security challenges. The development of a dedicated ISM on cyber security is a positive development that reflects the ARF's ongoing evolution. In that spirit, Canada also supports streamlining the agenda of the ISG to ensure more time is spent on substance by senior officials rather than procedural matters in order to reinvigorate the ARF framework.

As a mature organization and in the spirit of preventive diplomacy, the ARF can continue to provide a forum for active discussion of issues and perspectives without jeopardizing the activities and exchanges that members support. The ARF has been most successful in bringing together policy practitioners and experts to address specialized security issues that require interagency cooperation across borders. Its inclusive membership highlights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and the interconnected nature of the global security environment. As such, future activities should take heed of other relevant regional and global efforts.

The ARF's success as a convener of security dialogue and cooperation among interagency communities of practitioners, experts and policy makers, is complementary to the roles of newer bodies like the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+). These forums offer positive opportunities for complementary regional dialogue and cooperation, in keeping with the spirit of ASEAN-centrality, which Canada continues to support. In order for Canada to better contribute to advancing common approaches to shared policy concerns, Canada remains keenly interested in joining the East Asia Summit. Canada also continues to explore ways to increase its contributions to regional defence and security, including seeking an Observer Status in the ADMM+ Expert Working Groups on maritime security and HADR. In the longer term, Canada remains interested in an eventual membership in the ADMM+ itself.

Since its inception in 1994, the ARF has become a cornerstone of a burgeoning security community that works together to protect the region's vitality and continued economic growth. In line with the consistent efforts of other ARF members, Canada is committed to playing a positive and constructive role in the continuing evolution of the ARF.

CHINA

I. Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2018, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained overall stability, with frequent interactions among countries, increasing political mutual trust and sustained growth of friendly relations. Hotspot issues such as the Korean Peninsula issue are basically under control, and the situation in the South China Sea is trending toward stability. Significant achievements have been made in economic and social development. Regional cooperation has deepened, sub-regional cooperation has been booming, and various kinds of free trade arrangements have steadily moved forward. Asia has become an important force for maintaining world peace and stability and an important engine driving global growth.

On the other hand, the destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the regional situation remain acute. Unilateralism, protectionism and de-globalization continue to spread. Issues such as the Korean Peninsula and Rakhine State of Myanmar escalate from time to time. Certain countries stir up troubles in the South China Sea. Non-traditional security issues such as terrorism and natural disasters still abound. Maintaining regional peace, stability, development and prosperity remains an arduous task that requires joint efforts of all parties.

II. China's National Defense Policy and MultilateralMilitary Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region

National defense policy and vision on security

China pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. It never seeks hegemony or military expansion, nor does it participate in any form of arms races. The objectives and tasks of China's national defense are to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests,

maintaining social harmony and stability, advance the modernization of its national defense and armed forces, and maintain world peace and stability.

China follows an overall outlook on national security, which means national security is not just traditional security, but a combination of traditional and non-traditional security; national security is not just external security, but a combination of external and internal security; national security is not just self-security, but a combination of one's own security and common security; national security is not just security itself, but a combination of security and development.

ii. Military spending, budget and composition of the armed forces

China adheres to the principle of meeting the needs for both development and security and pursuing both national prosperity and a stronger military. It seeks coordinated development of national defense and national economy. Guided by a frugal approach in military development, China decides on the appropriate scale and structure of its defense expenditure in light of the level of its economic development and defense needs, and manages and utilizes the defense funds in accordance with law. Its defense budget is incorporated into the national budget, and is reviewed and released by the National People's Congress.

For 2019, China has a defense budget of 1.189876 trillion RMB yuan, with an increase lower than that in 2018. Its defense spending is mainly for military personnel, training and maintenance, and procurement. In terms of its share in GDP, share in the national fiscal spending and the per capital volume, China's defense spending is lower than that of other major countries in the world.

iii. Military diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region

As a staunch force for maintaining world peace, the Chinese military has advanced all-round international cooperation in the new era. In 2018, the Chinese military established an all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-tiered framework for military diplomacy. It held a series of joint naval exercises with Russia, and participated in Russia's "Vostok-2018" strategic exercises. The mil-to-mil relations with the United States remained generally stable. China has established consultation mechanisms on defense security with 17 neighboring countries, conducted joint exercises and training in counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, rescue and military technology and tactics, and deepened practical exchanges in frontier and coastal defense, college education, medical services, equipment technology and other fields. Its defense cooperation has been elevated to higher levels.

China has worked to deepen and enrich the defense and security cooperation under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), set up the Beijing Xiangshan Forum as an exchange platform, and promoted the establishment of a coordination mechanism for counter-terrorism cooperation among the militaries of China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. China has actively participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue and the Western Pacific Naval Forum, held the China-ASEAN informal meetings among the defense ministers on a regular basis, and played an active role in building the regional security architecture.

III. China's Efforts to Promote Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2018, China has continued to participate deeply in regional security cooperation, actively responded to traditional and non-traditional security challenges, and made unremitting efforts for peace, stability, development and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Relations with other major countries in the region

China - US relations

Since 2018, China and the United States have maintained exchanges at the high and other levels. In December, President Xi Jinping had dinner and met with President Donald Trump upon invitation

in Buenos Aires, Argentina. They had an in-depth exchange of views on China-US relations and international issues of mutual interest. The two countries made new progress in exchanges and cooperation in law enforcement, drug control, culture, and at the sub-national level, and maintained communication on major regional and international issues such as the Korean Peninsula, the Iranian nuclear issue, the Middle East and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the United States has taken a series of moves that harm China's interests in economy and trade, on issues related to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, maritime issues, mil-to-mil ties, cybersecurity, human rights and religious affairs. China has responded resolutely and firmly and effectively safeguarded its sovereignty, security and development interests.

China and the United States continued their communication on Asia-Pacific affairs through bilateral and multilateral channels, and carried out dialogue and cooperation under such regional multilateral frameworks as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ARF, including co-sponsoring seminars on sustainable fishery, food security and preventive diplomacy to support the capacity-building of regional countries.

China-Russia relations

Being each other's biggest neighbors, China and Russia are comprehensive strategic partners of coordination, and regard their relations as a priority on the diplomatic agenda. China-Russia relations have sustained a momentum of high-level development with productive cooperation in many fields.

In 2018, President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin met four times. During President Putin's state visit to China in June, the two heads of state signed and issued the Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. President Xi Jinping went to Russia in September to attend the Fourth Eastern Economic Forum. The two Presidents agreed that no matter how the international situation may evolve, China and Russia will remain firm in growing their relations and maintaining global peace and stability. The two sides will continue to have close strategic coordination, render each other strong support and safeguard the common interests of

the two countries and the international community. The two countries will strengthen the synergy and cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and translate their high-level political ties into more deliverables of practical cooperation. The two countries will carry out closer coordination in international affairs, uphold the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind, promote a new type of international relations, and advance the political settlement of hotspot issues.

China and Russia have maintained good cooperation in Asia-Pacific affairs. The two sides are committed to upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and widely-accepted norms governing international relations. They both oppose unilateralism and protectionism, and have maintained close communication within the multilateral frameworks of the SCO, APEC, the EAS and the ARF. The two sides are committed to promoting an outlook of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and making joint contributions to promoting peace, stability, development and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

China-Japan relations

The year 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the People's Republic of China and Japan. Through joint efforts of both sides, bilateral relations have returned to normal and continued to improve and grow.

In May 2018, President Xi Jinping talked with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the phone for the first time upon request, and met with him three times during the year. In the same month, Premier Li Keqiang went to Japan for the Seventh Trilateral Summit Meeting among China, Japan and the ROK, and paid an official visit, the first by Chinese Premier in eight years. In September 2018, Yang Jiechi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, held the fifth round of China-Japan High-level Political Dialogue with head of Japan's National Security Council Shotaro Yachi. In April 2018, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an official visit to Japan and resumed the China-Japan High-level Economic Dialogue after an eight-year hiatus. In October 2018, Prime Minister Abe paid an official visit to China, the first by Japanese Prime Minister in seven years.

During Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Japan, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on the air-sea liaison mechanism between the defense departments, which was officially launched in June 2018 and held its first annual meeting in Beijing in December 2018. In April 2018, a delegation of middle-ranking officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) visited Japan and the mechanism of mutual visits between young military officers of the two countries was restarted.

China-Japan economic and trade cooperation has steadily grown. Japan is China's second largest trading partner and China is Japan's top trading partner. In 2018, bilateral trade reached US\$327.66 billion, up by 8.1% year-on-year. Personnel interflow continued to expand and 254 pairs of sister-city relationships have been forged.

China-India relations

Since 2018, China-India relations have shown a sound momentum of development with smooth progress in their exchanges and cooperation at various levels and in many fields.

In April 2018, President Xi Jinping had an informal meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan and held meetings with him during the SCO Summit in Qingdao in June 2018, the BRICS leaders' meeting in Johannesburg in July 2018 and the G20 summit in Buenos Aires in November 2018. Practical cooperation in various fields has been deepened and people-to-people exchanges have achieved good results. The two countries have maintained communication and coordination within the multilateral frameworks of the UN, BRICS, the G20, the SCO and the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism.

ii. Regional cooperation

China-ASEAN cooperation

China regards ASEAN as a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy. China firmly supports ASEAN community building, supports ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation and supports ASEAN in playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs.

The year 2018 marked the 15th anniversary of the establishment of China-ASEAN strategic partnership and the China-ASEAN Year of Innovation. Relations between the two sides have maintained a momentum of healthy and steady development. In April 2018, Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore who is the rotating chair of ASEAN sent separate congratulatory messages to the opening ceremony of the China-ASEAN Year of Innovation. In May 2018, Premier Li Kegiang visited the ASEAN Secretariat for the first time. In October 2018, Premier Li Kegiang and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore exchanged messages of congratulations on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of China-ASEAN strategic partnership. In November 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 21st China-ASEAN Summit in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership in Singapore. At the summit, Premier Li Kegiang reviewed the fruitful cooperation between China and ASEAN, and proposed to enhance the synergy between the BRI and the ASEAN Vision 2025, explore new mechanisms for China-ASEAN cooperation in scientific and technological innovation, and set up the China-ASEAN Young Leaders Scholarship. The summit issued the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 and the Joint Statement on China-ASEAN Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation, and declared the year 2019 as the China-ASEAN Year of Media Exchanges. Leaders of China and ASEAN countries agreed to complete the first reading of the single draft negotiating text of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in 2019.

In 2018, two-way trade reached US\$587.87 billion, up by 14.2% year-on-year. Cooperation in various fields made steady progress. The 15th China-ASEAN Expo, the 11th China-ASEAN Education Exchange Week, and meetings of heads of customs authorities, chief procurators, heads of intellectual property protection departments, ministers of art and culture, ministers of economy and trade, and ministers of transportation were held.

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation

ASEAN Plus Three has been the main channel of East Asian cooperation. Since 2018, thanks to the efforts of all parties, APT cooperation has secured new progress. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) completed its first periodic

review, and the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) started its capital increase. The parties agreed to complete the final stage negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as quickly as possible, promote CMIM, and increase the use of local currencies. The parties agreed to expand cooperation under the "China-Japan-ROK+X", and in smart cities, innovation and e-commerce, strengthen connectivity, and bolster cooperation in finance, education, culture, agriculture, poverty alleviation, the environment and health. Faced with the uncertainties in the international situation, the parties agreed on the need to work together to meet challenges, promote multilateralism and the rules-based free trade system, and safeguard regional peace and stability.

In November 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 21st APT Leaders' Meeting held in Singapore. He proposed that 10+3 countries make solid efforts to advance the building of the East Asian Economic Community, accelerate the development of the free trade area, strengthen financial security, expand cooperation on innovation, promote inclusive development, and enhance cultural ties. His remarks were widely supported and echoed by the leaders of other participating countries.

China has actively promoted practical cooperation in various fields within the APT framework. It has held a wide range of activities, including the APT Village Leaders Exchange Program, the APT Training Program on Understanding China, the Annual Meeting of Deans and Directors of Diplomatic Training Institutions of APT, the APT Workshop on Cooperation for Cultural Human Resource Development, the Roundtable Meeting on APT Food Security Cooperation Strategy, the East Asia Modern Agricultural Workshop and the APT Media Cooperation Forum.

China-Japan-ROK cooperation

In 2018, China, Japan and the ROK convened a new round of ministerial meetings concerning the environment, culture, agriculture, central bank, intellectual property rights, water resources, education, information and communication, transportation and logistics, sports, health and customs, held the 13th and 14th rounds of negotiations on the China-Japan-ROK FTA and

held the International Symposium on China-Japan-ROK Security Cooperation, High-level Dialogue on the Arctic Affairs, the Trilateral Youth Summit, the Industrial Expo, the Cultural Content Industry Forum and other activities. Xi'an in China, Tokyo's Toshima District in Japan, and Incheon Metropolitan City in the ROK were selected as Culture Cities of East Asia 2019.

On May 9, 2018, Premier Li Kegiang attended the 7th China-Japan-ROK Leaders' Meeting in Tokyo, Japan. The leaders of the three countries reached consensus on enhancing political mutual trust, safeguaring free trade, strengthening economic openness and integration, building a "China-Japan-ROK+X" cooperation model, and expanding cultural exchanges to inject new impetus into East Asian cooperation. The meeting issued the Joint Declaration of the 7th China-Japan-ROK Leaders' Meeting and the Joint Statement on the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit by the Leaders of Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

The East Asia Summit is a "leaders-led strategic forum". In November 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 13th East Asia Summit in Singapore, where he underscored the need for all parties to uphold multilateralism, safeguard free trade, accelerate the process of regional economic integration, promote regional sustainable development cooperation and carry out dialogue and cooperation on political and security affairs. The meeting adopted the outcome documents including the East Asian Summit Leaders' Statement on ASEAN Smart Cities co-sponsored by China and Singapore.

China has actively participated in EAS cooperation in key areas. In 2018, China hosted such events as the Marine Microplastics Symposium, the Seminar on Connectivity of Ships, Ports and People, the Fourth Renewable Energy Forum, the Training Program on Capacity Building of Ship Traffic Management System Operators, the Seminar on Environment and Resources Management, the Expert Seminar and Training Program on Strengthening Cooperation in Cancer Prevention and Control Capacity Building, the Workshop on the Exchange of Experience in Maritime Search and Rescue, and the International

Conference on Special Food Cooperation and the second Track-Two Seminar on Regional Security Architecture. China also funded the Seventh Earthquake Emergency Exercise of the United Nations International Search and Rescue Advisory Group held in the Philippines.

The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)

The LMC framework aims to, by deepening the good-neighborly relations and practical cooperation among the six countries, promote sub-regional economic and social development, narrow the development gap among countries in the region, develop the LMC Economic Development Belt, build a community with a shared future for the Lancang-Mekong nations, facilitate the building of the ASEAN Community and regional integration, and contribute to South-South cooperation and implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since the first Leaders' Meeting in 2016, Lancang-Mekong cooperation has grown rapidly and achieved remarkable results, bringing tangible benefits to the people in the sub-region.

On January 10, 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 2nd Leaders' Meeting held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He proposed focusing cooperation on water resources, productivity, agriculture, human resources and medical and health care to steer the LMC from a phase of nurturing to one of further growth. The leaders of the six countries agreed to form a "3+5+X" cooperation framework and expand cooperation in customs, health, youth and other fields. The meeting issued the *Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation* (2018-2022) and the Phnom Penh Declaration.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The year 2018 marked the 17th anniversary of the establishment of the SCO. With the joint efforts of all member countries, the SCO has maintained a momentum of healthy and steady development. New achievements have been made in cooperation in the political, security, economic and cultural fields, and the international status and influence of the SCO have continued to rise.

In June 2018, the 18th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO was successfully held in Qingdao, China, and the Meeting was chaired by President Xi Jinping. This is the first summit of the SCO since India and Pakistan became its members. Leaders of the participating countries signed, witnessed or adopted 23 important cooperation documents, such as the Qingdao Declaration, the Press Communique, the Joint Statement of the Heads of Member States of the SCO on Promoting Trade Facilitation and a five-year plan for the implementation of the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.

In October 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended the 17th Meeting of the SCO Heads of Government Council held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The meeting approved such documents as the 2019-2020 Plan of Practical Measures (Roadmap) for Cooperation among Research Institutions of the SCO Member States, the Draft Program of Cooperation Between the SCO Member States on Food Security and the Memorandum of Technical Cooperation Between Authorized Competent Departments on Joint Prevention and Control of Transboundary Animal Epidemics.

In 2018, the SCO also held meetings of national security advisors, presidents of supreme courts, procurators-general, and ministers of foreign affairs, national defense, justice, economy and trade, agriculture, science and technology, tourism and culture, as well as the SCO Forum, the political parties forum, the women's forum and the first media summit. All these have deepened and expanded cooperation in various fields. China has actively participated in and promoted new progress in cooperation in various fields.

iii. Non-Traditional Security Cooperation Cooperation on disaster relief

Since 2018, the Chinese government has continued to actively promote cooperation on disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region with an open and cooperative attitude. China held the Workshop Marking the 10th Anniversary of Wenchuan Earthquake, the 2nd ARF Workshop on Urban Emergency Response, the China-ASEAN Seminar on Disaster Risk Reduction and the ARF Senior Training Course on Urban Search and Rescue, and participated in the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief, the China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation on Disaster Management and the SCO Preparatory

Meeting of Joint Exercise on Urban Earthquake Search and Rescue to promote mutual understanding and cooperation on disaster relief among regional countries and enhance regional disaster relief capacity. China also helped with the relief work after the dam collapse in Attapeu of the Laos and the earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi of Indonesia. The Chinese government sent rescue teams and provided relief supplies, making positive contributions to disaster response in the two countries.

Counter-terrorism cooperation

Since 2018, China has actively participated in counter-terrorism cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and contributed to the positive progress in the regional fight against terrorism. China held the 2nd China-Russia vice-ministerial consultation on counter-terrorism and security affairs, the 4th China-Japan counter-terrorism consultation and the 8th meeting of the India-China joint working group on counter-terrorism to continuously deepen exchanges and cooperation on counter-terrorism with relevant countries. China signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Fighting Terrorism with Cambodia, held the Sixth China-Myanmar Ministerial Meeting on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation and signed the minutes of the meeting and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperating in Anti-terrorism Efforts. Through group exchanges, intelligence and information sharing and the verification of leads on terrorism-related cases, China has actively carried out bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the counter-terrorism departments of relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific region, effectively prevented and combated regional terrorist activities and contributed positively to regional security and stability.

Cooperation in combating transnational crimes

It is the common need, shared view and unshirkable responsibility of all countries to strengthen international cooperation in preventing and combating transnational crimes.

The Chinese government attaches high importance to combating transnational crimes, and is among the first to sign and accede to the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)* and the *United Nations Convention*

against Corruption. China has earnestly fulfilled its relevant international obligations and taken a series of measures in legislation, administration and judiciary. China is actively involved in international cooperation, and maintains sound cooperation with the UN and other international and regional organizations, and has carried out judicial and law enforcement cooperation with relevant countries. It has established long-term dialogue mechanisms for judicial cooperation with relevant countries with longstanding good cooperation in information sharing, technical exchanges and individual case handling. By February 2019, China had signed 55 extradition treaties and 64 agreements on judicial assistance in criminal matters with other countries.

In October 2018, the Sixth China-Vietnam Public Security Ministerial Meeting on Cooperation against Crime was held in Beijing. The two sides signed the minutes of the meeting. China attended the Ninth ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar and signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons with Thailand. China has assisted Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Timor-Leste with police equipment and supplies worth over 20 million yuan. It has organized 57 training activities for Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines, and has trained nearly 1,000 people under 57 training programs for Laos, Myanmar and the Philippines. China has cooperated with ASEAN countries in fighting transnational crimes such as P2P fund-raising fraud, internet gambling and telecommunications fraud, and intensified cooperation with ASEAN countries on major cases involving hacker attacks, drug control and smuggling. In 2018, 1,431 transnational criminal suspects were repatriated.

Cooperation on outer space security

China has all along called for peaceful use of outer space, opposed weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and championed a common effort by the international community to safeguard enduring peace and security in outer space.

China and Russia, together with other countries, have been pushing for negotiations by the international community to conclude an international

legal instrument on arms control in outer space, and proposed a draft treaty of the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects, which has received wide support. With the joint efforts of China, Russia and other countries, the United Nations established the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 2018. The Group met and held in-depth, substantive discussions on the key elements of the relevant international legal instrument, providing a good basis for further promoting the international process of arms control in outer space.

As a major country in space activities, China has, in pursuing its own space programs, shouldered its responsibilities as a space country, earnestly fulfilled its international obligations and constructively participated in the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Meanwhile, China has actively promoted international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space. It has signed more than 100 space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding with nearly 40 countries and international organizations including those in the Asia-Pacific region, provided satellite launch services for over 10 countries, and promoted international application of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. In 2018, China and the United Nations jointly held a ceremony in Vienna, inviting countries to participate in the Chinese space station cooperation, which officially launched the process of international cooperation on the Chinese space station.

China and ASEAN countries have conducted sound cooperation on outer space issues, including jointly holding several ASEAN Regional Forum workshops on outer space security. China hopes that all parties will strengthen coordination and cooperation under this framework and jointly make positive contributions to maintaining security in outer space and sustainable development.

Cooperation on cybersecurity

China has been a builder and upholder of and contributor to the cyberspace, and stands for a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative and orderly cyberspace. China has been strengthening cooperation on cyberspace with other countries in line with the principles of peace, sovereignty, co-governance and universal benefits.

Since 2018, China has enhanced its dialogue mechanisms with Asia-Pacific countries on cuber affairs and maintained dialogue with regional countries in the field of cuber affairs. China hosted the Fifth World Internet Conference in November 2018, and side events on "International Cooperation in Countering Cyber-terrorism", "Cybersecurity" and "Norms in Cyberspace: Practices and Explorations" were held to promote joint efforts for peace and stability in cyberspace. China and the United States have maintained communication on cubersecurity issues under the frameworks of the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue and the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue. China has maintained communication and cooperation with Russia and the EU to jointly promote regional cybersecurity cooperation. China participated in the meeting of the SCO Expert Group on International Information Security and the fourth meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Information Security in the Use of ICTs to promote practical cooperation on cybersecurity with the SCO and BRICS countries. China has actively participated in ARF cybersecurity cooperation and put forward the Cybersecurity Emergency Response Capacity Building and Information Sharing Initiative.

China has actively participated in the meeting of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) Working Group on International Law in Cyberspace, and has promoted a bigger role for Asian and African countries in the formulation of international conventions against cybercrimes and the development of international law governing cyberspace. China has supported the AALCO Secretariat in holding a side event on cybercrimes during the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. China attended the 38th ASEANAPOL Conference and initiated joint action with ASEAN to combat telecommunications fraud and internet fraud. During the meeting, the Three-year Plan of Action for Jointly Combating Telecommunications and Internet Fraud by the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China and ASEANAPOL Member States was deliberated and adopted.

Cooperation on maritime security

Since 2018, China has actively participated in regional cooperation on maritime security. It has signed the China-Japan Maritime Search and

Rescue (SAR) Agreement and the Guidelines on Maritime Search and Rescue Cooperation Between China Maritime Search and Rescue Center and Japan Coast Guard. China and ASEAN countries have fully and effectively implemented the *Declaration on the* Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, actively promoted consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and carried out practical maritime cooperation. The second meeting of the Joint Commission on Maritime Cooperation was held with the Philippine Maritime Police, and deepened practical cooperation with Cambodia and Laos on maritime search and rescue through the China-Cambodia maritime emergency rescue hotline and the China-Laos maritime emergency rescue hotline. China hosted the Experts' Meeting of the 19th North Pacific Coast Guard Agency Forum, the 10th China International Rescue and Salvage Conference, the East Asia Summit Workshop on the Exchange of Experience in Maritime Search and Rescue, the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Ferry Safety, and co-hosted the 12th Meeting on China-ASEAN Maritime Consultation Mechanism, participated in the Malacca-Singapore Strait Marine Oil Spill Emergency Training. In addition, China carried out humanitarian rescue for Vietnamese fishermen in Xisha, participated in the search and rescue operations for Philippine fishermen in distress, the emergency management of the capsized Malaysian sand dredger "Rongchang 8" and the salvage of missing Chinese tourists in Phuket, Thailand.

China has continued to actively implement the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, and supported the capacity building and development of the Information Sharing Center under the agreement, and participated in the 12th annual meeting of the Governing Council of the Center and was elected Vice-Chair of the Governing Council. As of April 2019, China had dispatched over 100 vessels under 32 missions which involved 26,000 servicemen on regular escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the coast of Somalia, protecting, rescuing and escorting 6,600-plus Chinese and foreign vessels, and assisting over 70 ships in distress.

Cooperation on non-proliferation and disarmament

China has actively promoted exchanges and cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries on non-proliferation and disarmament for the improvement of the regional non-proliferation architecture. China supports and takes an active part in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and calls for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China attaches great importance to the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT) and has actively participated in its review process. In April 2018, China attended the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the tenth 2020 NPT Review Conference in Geneva, and worked actively for progress in the treaty review.

China has worked actively for strengthening the cooperation mechanism among the five nuclear countries. In July 2018, China took over the role as mechanism coordinator and actively carried out work. During the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2018, China coordinated the heads of delegation of the five nuclear countries for consultations and exchanges on nuclear policies, and for dialogue sessions with Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). On January 30, 2019, the Beijing Conference of the Five Nuclear Powers was successfully held. With China's facilitating efforts, the five nuclear countries expressed readiness to resume consultations with ASEAN countries on the protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), and agreed that China act as the lead party to have contacts with ASEAN. Without prejudice to previous consensus, China is ready to continue to assist ASEAN and other four nuclear countries in resolving their differences on reservations to jointly push for early signing of the protocol by the five nuclear countries.

China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, supports the continuous strengthening of the effectiveness, authority and universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and attaches importance to and supports international exchanges and

cooperation under the framework of the conventions. In September 2018, China and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) jointly organized a training course on chemical weapons assistance and protection in Beijing to assist countries in the Asia-Pacific region for enhanced compliance capabilities, playing its constructive role for promoting the universality and effectiveness of the Convention.

In 2018, China donated US\$50,000 to the United Nations Asia-Pacific Disarmament Center to support its work. In April, the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Consultation was held with India and Pakistan. China also held the Third Nuclear Safety Dialogue, Consultation on Biochemical Compliance and the Third Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Non-Proliferation with the United States.

IV. China's Observations on the Future Development of the ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF is an influential and quite inclusive official platform for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Forum. Over the past 25 years, the Forum adhered to the effective principles of ASEAN centrality, seeking consensus through consultation, and accommodating the comfort levels of all parties. The Forum has steadily promoted dialogue and cooperation, its influence has grown stronger and it has played an important role in maintaining regional peace and stability. Going forward, China believes that the ARF should adhere to the following directions:

i. Keep to its original purpose and stay focused on deepening mutual trust. Our regional situation is undergoing complex shifts, big-power rivalry is resurging, political mutual trust remains to be strengthened, and hotspot issues and non-traditional security challenges keep flaring up. All parties need to bear in mind the founding mission of the Forum, place confidence-building measures on top of the agenda, and pursue preventive diplomacy in a gradual manner on the basis of the consensus among all parties to foster a good environment for regional development.

- differences and properly handle disagreements. Members of the Forum are different in historical and cultural traditions, political and social systems, and are in different stages of development. Parties need to respect each other, adhere to the principles of consensus building through consultation and accommodating the comfort levels of all parties, strengthen dialogue and communication, and manage differences in a responsible manner to prevent them from affecting the atmosphere of cooperation or harming the common interests of countries in the region.
- stability. Facing both vestiges of the Cold War and traditional and non-traditional security threats, our region is also experiencing new problems and challenges brought by the new scientific and technological revolution. All parties need to free their minds, embrace innovative ideas and explore a security architecture that is future-oriented, reflects the reality of the region and meets the wish of our peoples so as to contribute to the lasting peace and long-term development of the region.

As a founding member of the ARF, China has all along been an active supporter and participant of all ARF activities. Since 2018, China has proposed the issuance of the ARF Statement on Disaster Management Cooperation and worked for the adoption of the *Initiative of Promoting the Awareness* of Emergency Response to Cybersecurity and Information Sharing by the Forum, and hosted multiple projects, including the Senior Training Course on Urban Search and Rescue Capacity Building, the Second Workshop on Urban Emergency Response, the Seminar on Regional Climate Change and Coastal Disaster Mitigation, and the "Preventive Diplomacy: New Ideas and New Approaches" Seminar, playing an active role in promoting the development of the Forum and dialogue and cooperation among all parties.

Going forward, China stands ready to work with other members to use the 25th anniversary as an opportunity to deepen mutual trust, build up consensus and bolster cooperation to enhance the influence the Forum, and inject greater impetus in regional peace and stability.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) supports ASEAN's leading role and efforts for ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific region is now in the limelight of the world for its geopolitical position and ever-growing opportunities of enormous development.

Countries in the region, while constantly cultivating their capabilities in political, economic, cultural and other areas, are increasing mutual understanding and cooperation through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other regional organizations, thus promoting common interests and development.

Nonetheless, the region still faces the problems of prolonged conflicts, and this has an adverse effect on achieving unity and cooperative relations among the countries in the region and stabilization of the regional situation.

Confrontations in pursuit of hegemony and sphere of influence in the region are particularly leading to the situation which endangers regional peace and security, a prerequisite for development and prosperity.

Incessant increase in armaments, frequent military drills, open interference in internal affairs of other countries are arousing apprehensions and concerns of the regional countries.

In February this year, the United States and the Russian Federation suspended their respective obligations undertaken under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As a result, this disarmament treaty which has existed for over 30 years is doomed to abrogation and there is a potential risk of a new nuclear arms race looming on the horizon.

Japan's imprudent action is another source of apprehension and concern of the neighboring and other regional countries, because it is increasing military expenditure every year and rushing into a military power, overreaching the self-defensive capability restricted by its "peace constitution."

The prevailing situation in the region substantiates that a powerful national strength based on self-sufficiency and self-defense is indeed the fundamental guarantee for independent development and peaceful prosperity of the country.

Strong national power serves to defend dignity, safeguard peace and guarantee development of the country.

The state and people that pave their own way by themselves with confidence in their own strength can advance straightforward along the road they have chosen, without any vacillation in the face of all kinds of trials and difficulties.

II. SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND DPRK'S POLICY ON SECURITY AND REUNIFICATION

Situation on the Korean Peninsula and Security Policy of the DPRK

Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, has made a clear analysis of the situation on the Korean peninsula and articulated the external policies of the government of the DPRK in his policy speech delivered at the First Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly.

The current situation on the Korean peninsula is at the crossroads of discerning whether it would move to a lasting peace on the basis of the hard-won trend of détente or go back to the touch-and-go crisis where fire and nukes might be exchanged.

Being fearful of its mainland security in the face of the rapidly developing nuclear armed forces of the DPRK, the U.S. came to the negotiating table last year. But, it is only obsessed with creating a condition for realizing its ambition of disarming the DPRK first and overthrowing its system thereafter, while toying with a package of improved relations and peace on one hand and resorting desperately to the economic sanctions on the other.

As has been widely known to the world, the DPRK's build-up of nuclear armed forces is a self-defensive measure taken to cope with the extremely hostile policy of the U.S. which has threatened and blackmailed with nukes the sovereignty and right to existence of the DPRK for over half a century.

The American obstinate demand for "abandoning nukes first," which runs counter to our fundamental interests, far from the efforts to remove the root causes that compelled us to possess nuclear weapons, gives us a strong doubt as to whether the U.S. is genuinely willing to settle the issues.

The June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement, which was adopted at the first-ever DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks held in Singapore in June 2018 amid worldwide attention, is a historic declaration proclaiming to the world that the two countries which has been in hostile relations through centuries would write a new history of relationship, and therefore, it has enjoyed full support and approval from the peace-loving international community.

The DPRK took the important and meaningful initiatives including the discontinuation of nuclear test and test-fire of intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby taking the first step towards confidence building, a main key to removing hostile relations.

The DPRK also took the broad-minded measure of repatriating the remains of U.S. soldiers at the personal request of the U.S. President, thus having demonstrated its will to implement in good faith the June 12 Joint Statement, a milestone for establishing new bilateral relations.

However, the second DPRK-U.S. summit talks held in Hanoi last February gave rise to strong doubts as to whether the steps we took out of our strategic decision and courageous determination were really appropriate.

At the second summit talks, we expressed our willingness to set up the requisite stage and course - one needed to go through for the implementation of the June 12 DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement - in a way of dovetailing with the interests of both sides and to take further serious and trustworthy steps, and we looked forward to a response from the U.S.

The U.S., however, was not prepared to resolve issues together with the DPRK, but only insisted on a totally unrealistic approach.

The U.S. continues to turn its face away from withdrawing its hostile policy, the fundamentals for establishing new bilateral relations, and it is miscalculating that if it puts maximum pressure upon the DPRK, the latter might be subdued.

The United States becomes more undisguised in its hostile moves, going against the spirit of the June 12 Joint Statement, such as conducting a test for simulated interception of the DPRK's intercontinental ballistic missile and resuming military exercises which the U.S. President personally committed to suspension.

It is an absurd and dangerous move that the U.S. is further increasing hostility toward the DPRK day after day while calling for settlement of issues through dialogue.

The more undisguised the U.S. policy hostile to the DPRK becomes, the tougher the DPRK's reaction will be.

We highly value the settlement of issues through dialogue and negotiation, but we are not interested in the U.S.-style dialogue whereby it is only forcing its terms unilaterally.

Given the deep-rooted animosity between the DPRK and the United States, it is imperative that both sides turn down their respective arguments and seek a constructive solution that meets each other's interests if the June 12 Joint Statement is to be implemented.

To this end, the U.S. needs to put aside the current method of calculation and approach the DPRK with a new method of calculation.

The DPRK will not make the slightest concession nor compromise over the issues relating to its fundamental interests.

Peace and security on the Korean peninsula will entirely depend on the future American attitude, and the DPRK will be prepared to deal with any kind of circumstances.

National Reunification Policy of the DPRK

The Korean peninsula is a base of life and a place of happiness for the Korean nation.

It is the unanimous desire of the Korean nation to completely remove the danger of war on the Korean peninsula and live in harmony by our nation itself in a peaceful and reunified country.

2018 was a vibrant year which witnessed a dramatic change unprecedented in the history of national division spanning over 70 years.

It is unprecedented that the inter-Korean summit meetings and talks were held three times in a year amid great expectations and attention of the peoples at home and abroad, and this demonstrated to the world that the north-south relations have entered a completely new stage.

The Panmunjom Declaration, the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the north-south agreement in the military field, all of which reflect the firm resolve and the will to usher in an era of peace without war any more on the Korean peninsula, are indeed of great significance, as they are de facto non-aggression declarations in which the north and the south of Korea have committed themselves to terminating fratricidal war based on force of arms.

The north and the south took the meaningful first step towards common prosperity of the nation by undertaking cooperation projects in various fields including railways, road, forestry and public health while demonstrating resolve in overcoming manifold obstacles and difficulties.

The eye-catching changes made last year in inter-Korean relations convinced all fellow countrymen that when the north and the south join their minds and efforts as one nation, they can turn the Korean peninsula into the true home of the nation, which is the most peaceful and will prosper forever.

It is the consistent will of the DPRK to eradicate the source of hostile military relations between the north and the south and turn the Korean peninsula into a lasting and durable peace zone.

Since the north and the south committed themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity, the joint military exercises with foreign forces, a source of the aggravated situation on the Korean peninsula, should no longer be permitted and the introduction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside be completely terminated.

In defiance of all these, however, the U.S. resumed the joint military drill with south Korea under the name of "Dong Maeng (Alliance)" in March 2019, running counter to the north-south agreement in the military field.

The U.S., insisting that inter-Korean relations should not go ahead of the DPRK-U.S. relations, openly forces the south Korean authorities into "speed adjustment" and attempts to subordinate the implementation of inter-Korean agreements to its anti-DPRK sanctions and pressure policy.

As a result, we are faced with a critical situation in which it should be decided whether to ease the tension on the Korean peninsula and sustain the atmosphere of improved inter-Korean relations or to return the situation to the past when the tension was spiralling to a catastrophe with the looming danger of war.

Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, stated in his historic policy speech that the DPRK cannot look on with folded arms the current situation which causes serious concern over the destiny and future of the nation and the peace and security in the region, but it will take proactive measures without delay to address it in line with the unanimous aspirations and desire of all compatriots.

To this end, it is necessary before anything else to take a proper stand and attitude for invariably maintaining and thoroughly implementing the inter-Korean declarations encapsulating the unanimous will of the nation, whatever the difficulties and obstacles we may encounter.

It is the strong determination of the DPRK to turn the inter-Korean relations into a lasting and durable one of reconciliation and cooperation and write a new history of peaceful and prosperous nation as desired by all compatriots.

If the south Korean authorities truly hope for improvement of relations, peace and reunification, they should fulfil their responsibility assumed before the nation by way of implementing the north-south declarations in good faith.

It is imperative to smash the underhand moves of the anti-reunification and anti-peace hostile forces at home and abroad if the atmosphere of improved inter-Korean relations is to be kept up.

All compatriots in the north, south and abroad should, with a sense of full responsibility for the destiny and future of the nation, resolutely check and foil the moves of the U.S. and south Korean conservative forces that are challenging the historic trend towards improved inter-Korean relations and peaceful reunification.

The DPRK will never tolerate the interference and intervention of outside forces who attempt to subordinate the inter-Korean relations to their tastes and interests and stand in the way of national reconciliation, unity and reunification.

The DPRK will as ever continue to keep solemnly to its heart the aspirations and desires of the nation and make sincere and persevering efforts to ensure sustainable development of north-south relations and achieve peaceful reunification of the country.

III. Role of ARF

The ARF is now achieving an array of successes in consolidating the regional peace and security by simultaneously promoting confidence-building among its member states and preventive diplomacy through dialogue and negotiation.

A peaceful environment is very much precious to the DPRK which sets it out as a central task to solidify the material foundations for socialist construction by concentrating all of its national resources on economic construction. The DPRK and the regional countries have common interests in the issues of peace and security of the Korean peninsula as well as the region.

We appreciate that the ARF participants including the ASEAN maintain principled positions of supporting diplomatic efforts for achieving peace and security on the Korean peninsula by means of dialogue and negotiation. This constitutes an inspiration to our just foreign policy and consistent efforts.

We proposed to establish a dialogue partnership with ASEAN in order to further strengthen our relations with the latter, and this is now in working-level progress.

We are taking an active part in the ARF activities out of our invariable position of attaching importance to ASEAN and our peace-safeguarding determination, and we will further strive to ensure that the ARF fulfills its mission as a good dialogue forum for promoting regional peace and security.

The government of the DPRK will further develop and strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation with all countries that respect its sovereignty and are friendly to it, and work closely with the ARF member states to build a lasting and durable peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

EUROPEAN UNION

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

 General observations of contemporary regional security environment according to each country's security perspective

EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on global challenges, from crisis management to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance. The EU's actions are framed by the core tenets of the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and now the 2018 EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Enhanced EU Security Cooperation and Council Conclusions on Security and Defence Cooperation. The EU aims to contribute to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, development of international law and promotion of peaceful solutions to conflicts.

In recognition of the overall importance of Asian security to European and Global security and stability, and the need for a coordinated approach to the challenges common to Asia and Europe, the EU Foreign Ministers adopted conclusions in May 2018 to underline the EU's commitment to strengthen its security cooperation in and with Asia. Those who believe in a multilateral global order have an interest and a duty to join forces. Europe and Asia, together, can be the engine of a more cooperative approach to world politics. The EU continues its engagement with its current strategic partners in Asia (China, India, Japan, South Korea) while deepening co-operation with other partners, including ASEAN and its member states. In addition, the EU seeks to build on existing and future partnerships by establishing tailor-made security cooperation with individual Asian countries, regional platforms and organisations such as ASEAN (including ADMM+). Initially, the EU will develop tailor-made security and defence cooperation with five Asian countries: India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia to be followed at a later stage by the EU's other partner countries in Asia. Existing and future security dialogues will be complemented with concrete activities, such as training, targeted capacity building, confidence building and technical assistance. The priority areas for this enhanced security cooperation are: maritime security, cyber security, counter terrorism and cooperation on peacekeeping/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions including on UN peacekeeping. During the last EU-Japan Summit in April 2019 a commitment was taken to step up dialogue and cooperation on security and defence. Security and defence issues also featured prominently in the EU-India Foreign Ministers' meeting in June 2018 while the EU's Joint Committees with Indonesia, Republic of Korea and Vietnam all placed a strong emphasis on the need to step up cooperation in this area.

On the basis of its own experience, the EU is a natural supporter of efforts aiming at building a robust multilateral and rules-based cooperative security order in Asia. Since its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012 the EU has intensified its engagement with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); EU leaders have attended key high-level multilateral meetings on security in the region, from the Shangri-La Dialogue on Security in Asia to the annual ARF Ministerial Meetings.

EU relations with ASEAN have acquired a new quality and depth. In August 2018, the High Representative attended the annual ASEAN-EU Post-Ministerial Conference with ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore as well as the 24th ASEAN Regional Forum. The informal EU-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting – the first since 2014 – took place in Brussels in October 2018, demonstrating strong common interest in deepening EU-ASEAN cooperation and building on increasingly successful economic relations towards a reinforced partnership encompassing a broad agenda on connectivity and security. There was a broad concurrence of views notably on the importance of effective, rules-based

multilateralism. Both sides agreed in principle at the January 2019 ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting to upgrade relations to a strategic partnership subject to details and timing to be worked out. They also agreed to deepen cooperation including in the security field. The EU began preparations to apply for observer status in certain ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus Expert Working Groups. A military advisor will be deployed soon to the ASEAN Delegation in Jakarta, an initiative which could be followed for other EU Delegations in Asia at a later stage. In 2018 the EU organised the 4th EU-ASEAN Seminar on Security and Defence together with the Indonesian National Defence University in coordination with the EU Security and Defence College (ESDC). Held in Jakarta, this was the first such seminar to be hosted in an ASEAN member state.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Overview of national security and defence policy

 Identify and briefly discuss national security and defence orientation, doctrine, and/or strategy

In 2018, the implementation of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy in the area of security and defence continued to be a priority. In November 2016, the EU Member States had agreed to a new level of ambition in the area of security and defence derived from the Global Strategy. Main work strands address enhanced cooperation in developing defence capabilities and civilian crisis management capacity, reinforced EU crisis management structures and instruments, and further development of international partnerships.

The new EU level of ambition in security and defence is driving EU capability development, based on a review of the priority areas for civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and of required defence capabilities and priorities. Defence cooperation and strengthening civilian CSDP will be of key importance to fulfilling this ambition. In November 2018, welcoming the substantive progress made over the past two years, the EU agreed to address Europe's current and future security needs by enhancing its capacity to act as a security provider and its strategic autonomy.

In 2018 the EU agreed a policy (Council Conclusions) on Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia which emphasises the role of the EU as a global security partner and recognises the increasing importance of Asian security for European interests. The Conclusions identify the following as key areas for deeper security engagement: maritime security, cyber security, counter terrorism, hybrid threats, conflict prevention, the proliferation of Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear weapons, and the development of regional cooperative orders.

In December 2017, the EU formally established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), following the joint notification signed by 25 Member States who thus undertook a set of more binding commitments between one another in the security field. As a measure that will contribute to fulfilling the EU's level of ambition, including with a view to the most demanding missions and operations, PESCO aims to assist the participating Member States to develop new capabilities and thus the EU's capacity to act as a security provider, contribute to the protection of EU citizens, maximise the effectiveness of defence spending and enhance operational availability. In 2018 34 PESCO projects were then launched. The EU also agreed to establish a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff. The MPCC improves the EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more coherent manner.

Progress was also made in developing the European Defence Fund aimed at helping EU Member States reduce duplication in spending and ensuring better value for money. The Fund coordinates, supplements and amplifies national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. In addition, as part of the security and defence agenda, progress has been made on military mobility within and beyond the EU.

On 19 November 2018, the EU Member States agreed on the establishment of a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) compact which set the strategic guidelines for the strengthening of civilian CSDP and which contain 22 political commitments by the Council and the member states. The aim is to strengthen the EU's capacity to deploy civilian crisis management missions.

The objectives of these missions are to reinforce the police, the rule of law and civil administration in fragile and conflict settings. Strengthening civilian CSDP contributes to the EU's wider response to tackle security challenges. The EU Member States also committed themselves to enhance the civilian CSDP's responsiveness through the ability to launch a new mission of up to 200 personnel in any area of operation within 30 days after a Council decision, with all the necessary equipment provided by a strategic warehouse and utilising the multi-layered responsiveness capacity.

With regard to EU-NATO cooperation, as a follow-up to the Warsaw Joint Declaration, implementation of the 74 common actions continues in full swing. EU-NATO cooperation continues to take place in accordance with the key guiding principles as reaffirmed by the EU Council: openness and transparency in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, inclusiveness and reciprocity without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State.

2018 has confirmed the mutual commitment of the EU and UN to cooperation on peacekeeping and crisis management; eight priority areas were jointly defined for reinforcing this strategic partnership in the three coming years. New priority areas include Women, Peace and Security, conflict prevention and transitions. On the ground, cooperation between UN and EU missions and operations has continued, notably in the Central African Republic, Somalia, Mali (including on the G5 Sahel Joint Force), Libya, Iraq and the Western Balkans. Progress can be noted in terms of more effective cooperation thanks to more systematic exchanges of information, increasingly clearly delineated roles, and with the rolling out of an in initiative on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD). EU and UN missions and operations have also increased cooperation on logistics and support, with the finalisation of local technical agreements and MoUs.

As set out in the EU Global Strategy, none of these situations or conflicts can be solved by the EU alone. For that reason, these missions have incorporated third countries from the earliest stage. Eighteen non-EU countries are now able join EU operations for peace and security, thanks to the permanent

Framework Participation Agreements they have signed and ratified. These include a number with ARF members (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States). For that reason as well, the EU will continue to promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, and invest in cooperative relationships to spur shared global responsibilities.

Internationally, the EU used its diplomatic and economic influence to press for political solutions to conflicts in Syria, Libya and Ukraine.

In regard to Syria, remained fully committed to achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict. It reaffirmed support for the political talks in Geneva and to save lives thanks to its humanitarian aid. The European Union and the United Nations co-chaired the third Brussels Conference on "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" on 12-14 March 2019. The conference reaffirmed the international community's support for UN-led efforts towards achieving sustainable peace in Syria. It succeeded in mobilising aid for the Syrian people and for neighbouring countries and communities hosting Syrian refugees.

Concerning Iran, the EU will continue its work on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Other priorities include taking forward the EU's work in Libya. Building on an already active role in Africa the EU will continue strengthening peace and resilience including through CSDP missions and operations. The EU continues to develop strong working partnerships in Central and South-East Asia. The EU is actively involved in regional diplomacy on consensus building for peace in Afghanistan through its Special Envoy for Afghanistan. In particular, the EU engages in bilateral dialogue with Afghanistan's neighbours - China, India, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries - and with international stakeholders, including Russia and the US.

Moreover, over the last years the EU has develop a holistic approach in the external dimension of migration, fully embedding migration within our overall relations with third countries, and based on the principles of partnership and shared responsibility. The EU's main priority has been and remains to save lives and provide protection to those in need thereof, ensuring legal pathways in order to reduce irregular and dangerous journeys, while also enabling migrants and refugees to stay closer to home and helping the development of third countries in order to address in the long term the root causes of migration. This approach has proved to bring results. There is progress on strengthening cooperation with third countries on migration, in a tailor-made fashion, and there has been increasing political engagement from partners.

Cooperation over migration management both at bilateral level, as well as at regional level has sharply increased and shows positive achievements. The 2018 Valletta Senior Officials Meeting took place on 14-15 November in Addis Ababa, three years after the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration in Malta. Seventy-five countries from Africa and Europe together with 27 delegations from UN Agencies, African Regional Economic Communities, and civil society organisations remain engaged. A significant evolution since the Valletta Summit has been the enhanced role of African Union institutions, now fully committed to the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP). The regional dialogues on migration – the Khartoum and Rabat Processes – have been instrumental in achieving progress under the JVAP by ensuring regional ownership. Progress is also being made on establishing the Continent-to-Continent Dialogue on Migration. In line with selected Valletta priorities, the EU and AU agreed to focus the dialogue during 2019 on remittances and diaspora investment; information and intelligence sharing to strengthen the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants; and sustainable reintegration of migrants for 2019.

The EU continued to work intensively to foster the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Throughout 2019, attention will focus on addressing the following political stability and security factors: supporting work on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through facilitation of the Dialogue between the two sides, aiming for a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement so that Belgrade and Pristina can advance on their respective European paths.

Ultimately, the EU's biggest added value is its wide range of tools – political, economic, security and humanitarian – to tackle important foreign policy challenges. In a world where security challenges are quickly evolving and becoming ever more complex, the EU's approach to external action adds particular value by addressing all dimensions of a crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation. The EU Global Strategy acknowledges this dimension by putting forward a concept of "integrated approach" whereby the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts. The EU's approach to global challenges, working closely with international and regional partners brings collective efforts and can deliver results in fields such as climate change, sustainable development, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management and relief. As part of this comprehensive approach, joint conflict and crisis analysis will continue to support the formulation and review of the EU strategic approach to conflict-affected and fragile contexts. The EU will continue to implement its commitment to establishing and promoting the use of mediation as a 'tool of first response' to emerging and ongoing crisis situations. In this regard, the EU continues to support specific peace processes for example in Libya, Syria, Colombia, Myanmar and the Philippines.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Participation in cooperative arrangements in/germane to Asia-Pacific

 Identify and briefly discuss national cum regional responses to the following security issues as per their enclosed sub-categories. If necessary include additional categories and discuss responses.

i. Counterterrorism

The fight against terrorism continued to take centre stage in the work of the EU during the year. Counterterrorism is a priority for the EU and ASEAN member states and needs to be approached strategically from a civilian and criminal justice

perspective with emphasis on human rights and the rule of law. It forms one of the priority areas in the EU's strategy for enhanced security cooperation in and with Asia.

The EU's key objectives at global level remain to deepen the international consensus and to enhance international efforts to combat terrorism. Therefore, the strategic and policy continuum between the EU's internal and external security has been further reinforced to enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism actions across the board. In line with the 2017 EU Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism, priority is given to: 1) enhancing cooperation between Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations and EU Justice and Home Affairs Agencies in respect of the collection, analysis and exchange of information, and further exploring how to enhance linkages between military and law enforcement actors for counter-terrorism purposes, 2) strengthening international cooperation in counter-terrorism and the prevention and countering of violent extremism with partner countries in the Western Balkans, the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey, the Gulf, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa; 3) strengthening international cooperation with key strategic partners, including the United States, Canada and Australia; and with key regional and multilateral partners as the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Financial Action Task Force and other regional organisations where relevant including ASEAN, the OSCE, the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States, and 4) expanding and strengthening the network of counter-terrorism experts in EU Delegations.

At a global level, the EU maintains a strong focus on the Syria/Iraq-related Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) phenomenon, their possible return to their regions of origin, and the possible spread of ISIL/Da'esh in the ASEAN region as well as beyond. Both ASEAN and the EU share this concern, which reaffirms the EU's commitment to intensify cooperation with ASEAN member states and within the framework of the ARF in combating terrorism.

The EU actively promotes a criminal law approach in counter-terrorism, based on respect for the rule of law and human rights. The EU promotes law enforcement and judicial cooperation, addresses the conditions conducive to terrorism, and strives to block terrorist financing and counter-radicalisation as well as recruitment for extremists and terrorists.

The terrorist threat is now more diffuse, helped by globally accessible internet propaganda and the FTF and returnee FTF phenomena. The EU encourages stronger cooperation with ASEAN partners: countering radicalisation and violent extremism are priority areas that feature in the new EU-ASEAN Plan of Action (2018-2022) and in the ASEAN-EU Work Plan to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2018-2021). Our policy dialogue in this area continues to address issues of common concern such as violent extremism and foreign terrorist fighters as well as exploring venues for further cooperation, including in the UN Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) frameworks. The EU has placed counter-terrorism and security experts in its Delegations in Central Asia (based in Bishkek) and South-East Asia (based in Jakarta).

Last, but not least, the EU remains actively involved in the region through capacity building efforts. The EU is involved in political dialogues on counter-terrorism with ASEAN and security dialogues with ASEAN-partner Indonesia; the EU, inter alia, holds regular consultations with ASEAN partners on counter-terrorism and transnational crime.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Actions taken in adherence to ARF Statements e.g.:

- Supporting National Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
 - Identify/discuss actions and measures each country has taken, is taking, and/or will be taking in fulfilment of commitment to UNSC Resolution 1540.

Non-Proliferation

Identify/discuss actions and measures each country has taken, is taking, and/or will be taking in fulfilment of commitment in this regard. Addressing non-proliferation and disarmament continued to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy priorities in 2018. The EU in 2018 continued to support universal accession to relevant international treaties and instruments as well as their full and effective implementation, particularly with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Arms Trade Treaty. EU's support for the CTBT remains strong and universal; it welcomed the CTBT ratification by Thailand in 2018.

The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative, a flagship activity implemented with the support of the UN and other international partners and contributing to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, grew steadily; it currently has 61 partner countries, including all ASEAN member states. Employing an all-hazard approach, the initiative has proven to be a useful regional platform to assess threats and enhance cooperation with international and regional organisations to help with national capacity building in the field of CBRN risk mitigation.

In March 2018, the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the establishment of the Initiative's South East Asia Regional Secretariat, seated in Manila, offered the opportunity to showcase the Initiative to members of the ARF as a reliable operational network worthy of further reinforcement. The National CBRN Action Plans (NAPs) for risk mitigation, one of the main elements of the Initiative's methodology, have continued to be useful coordination instruments at country level and as an efficient tool to channel donor support in this field. Coordination with other actors in the region (i.e. the US, Canada, Australia, Japan) has proved essential and should be continued in order to avoid duplication and strengthen the position of the national focal points of our initiative. Cambodia (May 2017), Vietnam (January 2019) and the Philippines (May 2019 – EU not yet officially notified) already count on officially approved NAPs developed with the support of the CBRN CoE. The total investment in South-East Asia of the CBRN CoE has amounted to more than EUR 26 million.

The EU will maintain its policies aimed at strengthening the global disarmament architecture and multilateral non-proliferation regimes. This includes continued diplomatic efforts towards the goal of achieving a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. The threat from illicit small arms and light weapons will continue to be addressed through international cooperation and support by the EU for concrete projects in third countries. The EU will also support international efforts to enhance outer space security.

Concerning recent developments, the EU took part in the 10th ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NP and Disarmament). The EU will continue to implement the JCPOA in respect of Iran and to support the ongoing diplomatic process for the complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, the EU continued to emphasize the importance of the peaceful applications of the CTBT and the role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its International Monitoring System (CTBTO IMS), especially on its commitment to nuclear safety and contribution to nuclear security.

The EU is a natural partner in the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. For instance, the EU contributes to the ITER project, demonstrating the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion as a safe, environmentally responsible and abundant energy source where ARF partners also participate. The EU has substantial experience in nuclear safety and is happy to share it within the ARF framework. The EU regards nuclear security as an enabler of peaceful uses and it is aware that the implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material may require capacity building; the EU is ready to provide assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU also encourages a revision to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its civil applications, where the EU is willing to organize an event on this topic in the region.

The EU continues to reaffirm its commitment to preserve the Southeast Asia region free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and to promoting relevant international instruments; this includes the entry into force and universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the commitment to fight against the illicit trade in conventional arms, including through the Arms Trade Treaty.

iii. Transnational Crime

Actions taken in adherence to ARF Statements, e.g.:

- Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes
 - Identify/discuss bilateral and multilateral cooperation, regular or intermittent, institutionalized or ad hoc, with other ARF states in this regard.
- Promoting Collaboration on the Prevention of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit Drug Manufacture
 - Identify/discuss bilateral and multilateral cooperation, regular or intermittent, institutionalized or ad hoc, with other ARF states in this regard.
- Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism
 - Identify/discuss bilateral and multilateral cooperation, regular or intermittent, institutionalized or ad hoc, with other ARF states in this regard.

Serious and organised crime represents an underestimated threat globally. It remained on the agenda of EU political dialogues with many countries and regional and international organisations, in particular in relation to drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings. EU-funded assistance programmes and CSDP missions contributed to translating political orientations into practice. These actions also seek to complement the EU (internal) Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime 2018- 2021.

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In the region, the EU remains actively involved through capacity building efforts and through political dialogues on transnational crime with ASEAN. The EU holds regular consultations with ASEAN partners on the topic. The EU and ASEAN in 2017 agreed to convene the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) – EU Consultations in the margins of the annual ASEAN SOMTC on a regular basis, in accordance with SOMTC processes to promote dialogue and cooperation on ways to tackle different aspects of transnational crime of mutual concern. The security of the EU is intertwined with the security of the ASEAN region, especially in addressing the threats posed by terrorism and transnational crime. As such, combating terrorism and transnational crime is one of the main areas of ASEAN-EU cooperation as reflected in the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022.

While recognising the importance of economic and trade connectivity, connectivity also facilitates security challenges like transnational crime. To counter this danger, greater cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, particularly with Europol could be further explored, such as through exchange of information and other practical activities to help identify and counter transnational crime networks, especially relating to trafficking in human beings and drugs. To this end, the EU hosts a Europol office within its Delegation in Singapore.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Actions taken in adherence to ARF Statement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Assistance, etc.

 Identify/discuss actions and measures each country has taken, is taking, and/or will be taking, at the national, bilateral and/or multilateral levels, in fulfilment of commitment in this regard.

In terms of humanitarian response in 2019, the EU, through its humanitarian aid operations (ECHO), has focused on the Rohingya crisis (in Myanmar and Bangladesh), as well as on the consequences of conflict in Mindanao (Philippines), while maintaining the potential to also respond to new disasters in the region.

With regard to disaster preparedness and resilience, ECHO action in 2019 will be focused on Bangladesh, Philippines, Nepal and regional or multi-country initiatives in South-East Asia. Disaster preparedness is also systematically mainstreamed into humanitarian assistance, as appropriate in each situation. DG ECHO's Disaster Preparedness strategy contributes to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the priorities set up by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) work programmes 2016-2020.

While building on lessons learned from over 20 years of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programming (DIPECHO), DG ECHO is looking at further shifting towards preparedness for response and early action. The core focus of its funding is on: i) integration of contingencies and preparedness arrangements into locally owned service provisions and social protection for the systems to be risk-informed and shock responsive; ii) forecast-based early actions; iii) urban preparedness with emphasis on mega cities; and iv) national and local capacities for early response mechanism.

DG ECHO support in South East Asia aims at assisting the improvement of regional response systems and national capacities, ensuring these are responsive and inclusive to community priorities and filling gaps when these are overwhelmed. ECHO has been working on Disaster Preparedness (DP)/DRR in ASEAN countries since 1995. The first DIPECHO action plan was launched in 1998, since when a total investment of almost EUR 81 million has been made so far in this area. The EU provides financial support for the Integrated Programme in Enhancing the Capacity of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and ASEAN Emergency Response Mechanisms (EU-SAHA). The EU CBRN CoE Initiative sent an observer to participate in the ARDEX 2018 held in Indonesia.

Cooperation on disaster management is a positive contribution to the strategic aims of ASEAN sustainable development and to the regional integration process; it reinforces the centrality of ASEAN structures in South East Asia, facilitating ASEAN leadership to "Respond-As-One." But the EU stands ready to help as a humanitarian assistance partner of ASEAN when disasters strike and national response capacities are overwhelmed.

The EU welcomes the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management and the "ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (AADMER) Programme for 2016 – 2020 and is keen to further strengthen cooperation on disaster management notably by supporting AADMER and the ASEAN Secretary General in his role of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator, or by reinforcing operational links and mutual exchange of information with the AHA Centre. Experience shows that better results come from promoting exchanges of expertise on training with the ASEAN Emergency Response Team (ERAT), and by facilitating mutual participation in exercises.

A renewal of the EU-ASEAN disaster management dialogue, previously held in Brussels in 2012 and 2015, is being planned with a possible visit of an ASEAN civil protection expert group in Brussels in October 2020, on the occasion of the European Civil Protection Forum.

v. Maritime Security

Actions taken in adherence to ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, e.g.

 Identify/discuss all actions and measures each country has taken, is taking, and/or will be taking in fulfilment of commitment.

Maritime security in the Asia-Pacific Region is crucial to global – and EU – prosperity . Southeast Asia is the destination for almost a quarter of EU exports and is among the fastest-growing export markets, being also home to the fastest-growing economies. The EU is strongly committed to the principles of international law, as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to ensure a rules-based international maritime order and the peaceful and sustainable use of the seas.

Europe and Asia are connected with a trade route crossing the Indian Ocean and passing the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca straits - two piracy prone areas. Energy supplies, raw materials and goods transiting these waters are of vital importance to most economies worldwide. Maritime transport carries 90% of world trade and over 40% of the world's merchant fleet is EU/EEA-controlled.

With this heavy reliance on maritime trade, the EU has actively engaged in promoting maritime security and safety in the Asian region. The EU has a long history of engagement helping East and West African countries upgrade the level of their capacity at sea: maritime situational awareness has been much enhanced in East Africa through the sequence of Commission led projects MARSIC, CRIMARIO and MASE; the EU is leading the antipiracy campaign thanks to its military operation ATALANTA, supported by capacity building operations such as EU CAP SOMALIA, which also indirectly benefit Asian trade with Europe.

The EU has also stressed the need to ensure the freedom of navigation and has called upon all claimants in the South China Sea to refrain from its militarisation, to pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes through international law and to conclude rapidly an effective and legally binding Code of Conduct through transparent negotiations.

The EU maritime security policy has gained a new momentum building on the adoption of the Council Conclusions on Global Maritime Security in June 2017. In this regard, the EU is promoting global maritime security, in particular through the revision of the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan (June 2018) which increases the EU's focus on civil military cooperation, information sharing and addressing global challenges to EU sea basins and all oceans through regional responses. In line with the EU Global Strategy, the revised EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan reaffirms the role of the EU as a global maritime security provider. In this regard, the EU is developing regional approaches to key maritime areas taking full advantage of the EU co-chairmanship of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) intersessional meeting on maritime security together with Vietnam and Australia and making the best use of operational activities (EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA) and regional maritime strategies (Gulf of Guinea and Horn of Africa).

The EU also seeks to export its experience in maritime security with regional actors through seminars, workshops for experts from both continents and the continuation of its EU-ASEAN high level dialogues and is actively engaged in fostering closer relations with the ASEAN region, building on the achievements of the ongoing EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security. Several proposals for confidence building measures and sharing knowledge and best practices about the maritime domain have been promoted by the EU . Future meetings of the EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security can also take into account the potential for the EU and ASEAN to factor their common concerns into the ARF ISM and vice versa.

Areas of cooperation previously identified would include sharing regional best practices, port security, maritime situation awareness (technology and information sharing), possible civil and military staff exchanges (Coast Guards and Navies) or training, search and rescue operations, resilience of maritime infrastructure, as well as preserving and restoring marine biodiversity.

At international level and in particular in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the EU and its member states are willing to intensify their cooperation with ASEAN countries to enhance maritime security and safety through the adoption of new common rules, in many important areas such as the deployment of armed guards onboard vessels transiting high risk areas to deter piracy, counter-terrorism or other politically and economically sensitive issues such IUU fishing.

Piracy attacks have decreased almost to zero over recent years in the case of the Western Indian Ocean, following the deployment in 2008 of EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and other similar naval combined forces, although challenges remain. This mission, in combination with the wider international response and the implementation of best management practices (designed in international platforms such as CGPCS) by commercial ships and the provision of private armed guards onboard ships have proved successful to considerably reduce the number of attacks at sea.

Yet, the number of piracy incidents in the region remains a subject of international concern. In this respect, the EU supports steps taken by regional structures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including programmes such as the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) framework, and will maintain its Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme funded by its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. This initiative was funded by the EU and focused, since 2009, on the security and safety of essential maritime routes in areas affected by piracy, helping to secure shipping and trading sea-lines of communication.

IV. Role of ARF

- National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security
- Identify/discuss efforts aimed at strengthening ARF capabilities in regional security management.

b. Future of ARF

 Identify/discuss views about future challenges and prospects for the ARF, and your contributions to improving the ARF's ability to manage those and progress towards its express objectives in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, continued to address regional and international security issues. The HR/VP will take part in the 26th ARF Ministerial in Bangkok on 2 August 2018, setting out the EU's views on the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. The EU contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum is a tangible demonstration of its willingness to support the ASEAN-led security architecture in South East Asia. As stated on numerous occasions, the EU looks forward to making this interaction deeper and wider and is ready to make a significant contribution to all ASEAN-led processes, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting – Plus.

The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a long-standing and active ARF member, the EU is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules-based regional security order. The ARF offers a valuable platform for the EU and its Asian partners to engage on a broad range of issues such as maritime security (which ISM the EU co-chairs now with Vietnam and Australia until end 2020), nonproliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Drawing on its comprehensive approach, the EU has engaged actively with ARF partners at various levels, e.g. through Intersessional Meetings, the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) and the related Defence Officials' Dialogue, the Senior Officials' Meeting and the ARF Ministerial. The EU respects and promotes the central role of ASEAN in the emerging regional architecture and believes in the need to ensure transparency and synergy between ARF and other regional fora such as the ADDM+ meetings and the East Asia Summit.

The EU is keen to make the ARF, in line with ARF Ministerial Guidance, more 'action oriented'. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of

strengthening the organisational and institutional structures of the ARF, including the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat.

The Senior Military Advisor to the EEAS' Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) has represented the EU in the ARF DOD and ASPC formats, covering confidence building measures, maritime security, counter piracy, chemical biological radiological and nuclear response, and countering hybrid threats. The military advisor has led bilateral defence engagement triggered by ARF activity in Tokyo, Singapore and Seoul, the IISS Fullerton and Shangri-La forums, and in Indonesia speaking on EU Common Security and Defence Policy at the Sentul International Peace Facility.

The EU is also keen to strengthen the quantity and quality of EU engagement in ARF and ASEAN security-related activities. In this respect, the EU has been particularly active in the area of maritime security: after four EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogues on Maritime Security, a fifth such dialogue is envisaged to be held in 2020 in the EU, and co-chairmanship of the ISM on Maritime Security (2018-2020) together with Vietnam and Australia will continue for a final year.

INDIA

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

World politics is in a state of flux, aggravating global and regional challenges to international peace and security. New and emerging technologies have also impacted on regional as well as global security environment. The Indo-Pacific region has continued to confront numerous traditional and non-traditional security threats. India has strengthened its cooperative engagements in the Indo-Pacific based on converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. India's Act East policyremains cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Development and economic prosperity of Indo-Pacific region is confronted with the challenge of terrorism. It has grown more lethal and has expanded its reach. India shares global concerns about terrorism and believes that, in an era when networking amongst terrorists is reaching alarming proportions, only through collective cooperation can the terror organizations and their networks be fully disrupted, perpetrators identified and held accountable and strong measures against those who encourage, support and finance terrorism and provide sanctuary to terrorists, be undertaken.

In 2018, the world stood in solidarity with India on the 10th anniversary of 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai as India reiterated its firm commitment to combating the menace of terrorism at the global level and strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. India continued to hold structured consultations in 2018 through the Joint Working Groups on Counter Terrorism with various partner countries such as Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Russia, Tunisia, UK, US, Uzbekistan and with EU, BRICS and BIMSTEC.

The possibility of terrorists acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and clandestine proliferation continue to pose serious threats to international security. WMD terrorism will remain a potent threat

as long as there are terrorists seeking to gain access to WMDs and delivery systems for malicious purposes. India's resolution entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", which was first introduced in 2002, was again adopted in 2018 by consensus by the 73rd session of the UNGA. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by 90 countries, calls upon UN Member States to take measures aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to support international efforts in this regard.

Korean peninsula has been a cause of global and regional concern. India has welcomed the inter-Korean Summit meetings held at Panmunjom (27 April 2018) and Pyongyang (18-20 September 2018) and the USA-DPRK Summit Meeting (12 June 2018) held in Singapore and Hanoi (February 2019), expressing hope that such engagements would help in reducing tension and pave the way for lasting peace and reconciliation in the Korean Peninsula. India has expressed concern over the danger of nuclear and missile proliferation in the region.

Maritime threats and the challenges faced at Sea is another area of security concern. Oceans hold the key to fortunes of Indo-Pacific region States in a fast evolving global order. Oceans are the cradles of civilisations and a civilisation can only prosper when the seas are safe, secure and free for all. South China Sea is an important trade route for many States in the Indo-Pacific region accounting for about 30% of the global maritime trade. All countries in the region have an interest in ensuring peace, stability and sustainable development in this critical water way. India opposes any use of force or threat to use force to resolve maritime disputes and remains committed to maintaining freedom of navigation in international waters, the right of passage and overflight, unimpeded commerce and access to resources in accordance with recognized principles of international law including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Iranian nuclear issue has also been a factor in shaping the regional security environment. India has maintained that Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and diplomacy by respecting Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as also the international community's strong interest in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. India believes that all parties should engage constructively to address and resolve issues that have arisen with respect to the JCPOA.

The new challenges such as Cyber threats loom large in the horizon as demonstrated by the incidents of ransomware, Wannacry attacks and crypto currency thefts. Being cross-cutting and trans-boundary in nature, they affect all countries in the region and credible cooperative measures need to be planned and implemented to address this challenge.

Climate change has emerged as the biggest threat to humanity and poses existential challenge to biological life on earth. India played a pioneering role on climate change and global warming issues. India hosted the First General Assembly of the International Solar Alliance in New Delhi on 2 October 2018, coinciding with the commemoration of the 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi. 75 countries have signed and 54 countries have ratified the Alliance.

From the very beginning, India has presented to the world its philosophy of uniting mankind and erasing artificial barriers. The concept of "vasudhaiva kutumbakam" - the whole world is one family is at the core of our civilization. Today, this concept is at the core of India's vision for the world as well as Indo-Pacific region. The principles underlining this concept, inclusivity, equality and openness also guide India's Indo-Pacific vision. Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, delivered a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018 during which he articulated India's vision for the Indo-Pacific region, which is pursuit of "Security and Growth for All in the Region" (SAGAR) in an inclusive Indo-Pacific framework.

a. Bilateral Ties

India has continued its pragmatic and outcome oriented engagements through strengthened bilateral, regional and multilateral partnerships. Prime Minister's informal summits with Russia and China, the 2+2 talks with the US, high level engagements with ASEAN countries, Africa, Central Asian Republics, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the EU and European countries, including the first India-Nordic Summit, are illustrative of a new phase in the expansion of India's diplomatic engagements.

India is a leading development partner of Bangladesh; it has extended concessional lines of credit totalling around the US \$ 8 bn and is working closely with the government of Bangladesh to achieve lasting progress in improving security, energy cooperation, trade, connectivity and people-to-people ties to provide developmental benefit to the entire region. In resolution of old and outstanding issues, in 2015, the two countries signed a Land Boundary Agreement resolving issues relating to enclaves of adversarial possession of territory. India and Bangladesh are working together on all fields of cooperation including military – to – military ties, capacity building, creation of shared energy infrastructure, improved transport links (land, sea, inland waterway and air), and easier movement of people.

India is also deeply conscious of the humanitarian and security implications of the displacement of nearly one million persons in Bangladesh from contagious areas of Rakhine state in Myanmar. India recognizes the, economic burden this crisis places upon Bangladesh's society and economy. While praising Bangladesh generosity, India urges the world to help Bangladesh cope with the humanitarian burden as India has done though the provision of four large tranches of aid and to prioritize addressing significant socio economic challenges in Rakhine State, to facilitate the return of displaced persons of all communities to their homes an Myanmar.

Bordering the North Eastern States of India, the stability and prosperity of Myanmar is crucial for the regional security. India and Myanmar enjoy good bilateral relations and cooperation in security matters between the two countries has substantially improved. Efforts are on to improve connectivity and infrastructure gaps and to promote development of the region. India is cooperating with Myanmar in diverse fields, including in the development of institutions in Myanmar.

The newly elected leaders of the Maldives and Bhutan made India the destination of their first overseas visits which reflects the priority accorded by India and these countries to the bilateral ties. India's ties with Sri Lanka remained close and were further strengthened during the year, marked by close contacts at the highest political level, increasing trade and investment, and implementation of people-oriented developmental projects.

The year witnessed several key developments in India-Afghanistan ties, including the delivery of wheat and pulses to Afghanistan from India, expansion of air freight corridor between the two countries, and commencement of work for several India-assisted socio-economic developmental projects in Afghanistan, identified under the New Development Partnership announced in 2017.

India shares a deep connect with the ASEAN and continues its active engagement in many areas contributing to regional peace and stability, particularly through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as EAS, ARF, and ADMM-Plus. The India-ASEAN strategic partnership has strengthened by virtue of flourishing cultural and civilizational links and enhanced people-to-people cooperation. India continues to attach importance to ASEAN centrality and unity in ensuring peace and stability in the region.

There has been substantial progress in the implementation of the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity (2016-2020). In addition, efforts are underway for developing a new Plan of Action (2021-2025) that will help further strengthen the ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership in the next five years. In this regard, due focus is being accorded on activities that would enhance India ASEAN connectivity, support ASEAN community building objectives and expand cooperation in the maritime domain. India has reiterated of support to ASEAN's MPAC 2025, the IAI Work Plan III and agriculture development strategy.

The MEA in partnership with the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas; National Maritime Foundation (NMF) and ASEAN-India Centre at RIS organized the 3rd EAS Conference on Maritime Security and Cooperation in Bhubaneshwar on 8 & 9 June 2018.

The Conference discussed issues relating to Maritime Cooperation, Maritime Security, Maritime Safety, Good Order at Sea, Blue Economy and Sustainable use of Ocean Resources.

Blue Economy is increasingly seen as a driver of inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development of Indo-Pacific region. It is identified as a new pillar of economic activity in the coastal areas and linked hinterlands through sustainable tapping of oceanic resources. With a view to promoting the development of Blue Economy in the region and enhancing India-ASEAN cooperation in Blue Economy, the 2nd India-ASEAN Workshop on Blue Economy was organized at New Delhi on 18 July 2018. The participants of the Workshop adopted ten policy recommendations.

Delhi Dialogue is an annual Track 1.5 forum for discussing politico-security, economic and socio-cultural issues between ASEAN and India. The 10th anniversary edition of Delhi Dialogue (DDX), held on 19 - 20 July 2018 in New Delhi was on the theme "Strengthening India-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation". In her address, then EAM, Smt. Sushma Swaraj, emphasized on a forward looking agenda that seeks to recapture our common maritime heritage. Some of the areas she identified where ASEAN and India could cooperate and work together were Blue Economy, Maritime Safety and Security to include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), countering terrorism and piracy at sea, and countering transnational crime.

Australia is a strategic partner of India. Regular exchange of high-level visits is a testimony to growing India-Australia relations in different sectors including trade and investment, education and skills, mineral resources, and defence and security. Relations between the two countries reached a new high during the year with the first-ever visit of an Indian President to Australia from 21-24 November 2018.

The Closer Developmental Partnership between India and China reached a new milestone in 2018 with the first Informal Summit between Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, and President, Mr. Xi Jinping, held in Wuhan in April 2018. The Informal Summit, which reflected the desire on both sides to raise the level of their bilateral relations, set the stage for enhanced

high level engagements throughout the year. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi themselves held three more bilateral meetings during the year on the margins of multilateral summits. India joining the SCO as a full member and China taking over the chairmanship of SCO in 2018 provided further opportunities for greater interaction between the two sides at senior levels. Bilateral visits by the Ministers of Defence, Public Security and Foreign Affairs of China further expanded the scope of cooperation between the two sides. In order to further strengthen the contacts at people-to-people level, the two sides also launched a High Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges.

India-Japan relationship has been transformed into a partnership with great substance and purpose and is a cornerstone of India's Act East Policy. India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, forged during the visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to Japan in 2014, continued making significant strides in 2018. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi's visit to Tokyo in October 2018 for the 13th India-Japan Annual Summit with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further built upon the unprecedented transformation in the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan over the last nearly five years, covering a wide range of areas of cooperation and highlighting the shared values and interests of the two countries.

India-ROK bilateral relationship, elevated to the level of Special Strategic Partnership during the visit of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi to ROK in 2015, gathered further momentum with the State visit of President Moon Jae-in to India from July 8-11, 2018 and of Prime Minister Modi to Seoul in February 2019. The visit of First Lady of the Republic of Korea, Mrs. Kim Jung-sook to participate in the Deepotsav event organised by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh brought to fore historical links between Ayodhya (India) and Gimhae (ROK). Other important events in 2018 included the visits of the Speaker of ROK's National Assembly and their Foreign and Defence Ministers to India.

The 'Special and Privileged' Strategic relationship with Russia, which constitutes an important dimension of India's foreign policy, attained a new high with the first landmark Informal Summit between President Mr. Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister

Shri Narendra Modi in Sochi, Russia in May 2018. This was further consolidated with the visit of President Putin to India for the 19th bilateral Annual Summit in October 2018. Prime Minister's meetings with President Putin on the margins of the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, East Asia Summit in Singapore and G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires and the regular exchange of visits at the level of Ministers and senior officials during the year added further depth to our bilateral engagement. Both sides continued their cooperation in the Strategic sectors of defence, civil nuclear energy and space. There was a special emphasis on strengthening bilateral trade and economic ties with the first India-Russia Business Summit held on the margins of the visit of President Putin and the first India-Russia Strategic Economic Dialogue held in St. Petersburg in November 2018.

2018-19 witnessed significant forward movement in India's bilateral relations with the U.S. The first-ever Trilateral Summit involving leaders of India, the U.S. and Japan took place in November 2018 in Buenos Aires. The inaugural meeting of the India-U.S.Ministerial 2+2 Dialogue in September 2018 set the stage for rich discussion and outcomes on foreign policy, defence and security fields. India's elevation as a Strategic Trade Authorization Tier-I partner country for the purpose of U.S. trade in dual-use items reflected benefits to India as a Major Defence Partner of the U.S.. Counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination with the U.S. on regional counter-terrorism challenges improved significantly.

The visit by Prime Minister of Canada to India and the India-Canada Strategic Dialogue of the two Foreign Ministers, both in February 2018, provided impetus to functional cooperation on a number of areas, including for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The 16th meeting of the India-Canada Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and its Expert Sub-group was held in Ottawa in March 2019.

b. <u>Multilateral Ties</u>

India has continued to take steps towards strengthening regional cooperation under BIMSTEC in the area of counter-terrorism and transnational crime. India leads the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime under

the BIMSTEC framework. In an effort to involve the strategic community of the region in discussing collective action towards combating traditional and non-traditional security threat, India organised the first BIMSTEC Think Tanks Dialogue on Regional Security in November 2018 in New Delhi. With a view to enhance preparedness of BIMSTEC Member States around issues on cyber security, India had organised IDSA-BIMSTEC Workshop on Cyber security cooperation in New Delhi in December 32018. The Government of India invited the leaders of BIMSTEC member states for the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister and other members of the Union Council of Ministers on May 30, 2019.

India considers IORA as an important instrument for promoting cooperation and ensuring stability in the region. India has been supportive of further invigoration of IORA activities across a wide spectrum, ranging from renewable energy and the Blue Economy to maritime safety and security. India announced new initiatives at the 18th IORA Council of Ministers Meeting in November 2018 Durban, after the successful implementation of wide ranging initiatives announced by India during the IORA Leaders Summit on 7 March 2017 in Jakarta and the meetings of the Council of Ministers and Committee of Senior Officials in the preceding years.

India is of view that the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) offers a broad-based platform for developing operational synergies with the Navies in the region. India is a founding member of IONS and is actively engaged in its collaborative efforts. The 10th anniversary of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was celebrated by Indian Navy from 13-14 November 2018 in Cochin. Chiefs of Navies of Bangladesh, Iran, Japan, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, South Africa and the UAE as well as senior delegates from 16 other IONS member nations attended the celebrations. The tenth anniversary provided an important opportunity to generate a flow of information among naval professionals resulting in common understanding and possible agreements on the way ahead to tackle common concerns related to maritime security.

II. National Contributions to Regional Security

a. <u>Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation,</u> Arms Control and Disarmament

The twin goals of containing proliferation and developing a global agenda on disarmament continue to be accorded high priority by ARF members. India has an unwavering commitment to global efforts for preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), India has been actively supporting the institutional strengthening of the Conventions, including through their effective implementation.

India has participated actively in the ARF ISMs on Non Proliferation and Disarmament and related workshops and seminars. It has also participated in the meetings and conferences related to Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. India has a robust system of export controls and is a member of Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. It also subscribes to the Hague Code of Conduct.

India's nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. It believes that nuclear disarmament can be achieved in a step by step manner endorsed by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory as outlined in India's Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament to CD in 2007. All states possessing nuclear weapons need to make a contribution by engaging in a meaningful dialogue to build trust and confidence which would reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. Progressive steps, such as supporting multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are needed for complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

India attaches importance to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It supports the commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD as part of its Programme of Work in accordance with the Shannon Mandate.

India also places great value on the role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to meet global energy needs in a clean and sustainable manner. All States have a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with their obligations.

The global concerns regarding nuclear terrorism and clandestine proliferation, which continue to pose serious threats to international security, are shared by India. Nuclear terrorism will remain a potent threat as long as there are terrorists seeking to gain access to nuclear material and technologies for malicious purposes. In this regard, India had contributed actively to the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process and continues to engage with partners in the Nuclear Security Contact Group. In consonance with the security requirements perceived by India, the nuclear security architecture in the country has been fortified and it has also participated in various endeavours aimed at strengthening security architecture at the global level. India hosted the 2017 Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in February 2017 in New Delhi.

India believes that the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is a very important instrument to ensure that non-state actors do not get access to nuclear material and technologies. Industry is an important stakeholder and partner in combating the proliferation of WMD. To help strengthen the architecture for export controls, India, in collaboration with the government of Germany and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) hosted the India-Wiesbaden Conference 2018 on 16-17 April 2018.

b. <u>Humanitarian Assistance and</u> Disaster Relief

India's HADR and Search & Rescue efforts in the Indian Ocean have been increasingly in evidence. Building on its 2004 tsunami relief experience, India has since undertaken a wide range of HADR operations. Deployment of Indian Naval ships for major non-combatant evacuation operations in Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen have benefitted not just Indian citizens but nationals of several countries in the region and beyond. From bringing drinking water to the Maldives in the wake of a major water crisis, to providing relief supplies by air to Fiji and Sri Lanka, India has been the one of the first to respond in times of distress in the immediate as well as extended neighbourhood of India. As the "first responder" to calls of assistance, India provided relief supplies and medical assistance to flood and cyclone victims in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Recently, Indian Navy was the one of the first to render assistance in the evolving humanitarian crises in aftermath of Cyclone IDAI that hit Mozambique on 15 March 2019. In response to a request from Republic of Mozambique, the Government of India immediately diverted 3 Indian naval ships to the port city of Beira, where they undertook HADR, rescuing many people and providing medical assistance. Indian Navy Helicopters took several sorties to facilitate aerial survey by Disaster management officials of Mozambique, for evacuation of people, dropping of food & water packets in cyclone affected areas.

India along with Myanmar, as co-chairs of the ADMM Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine for the period 2017-2020, has undertaken various activities. The three important initiatives, organisation of ASEAN Military Medicine Conference, the conduct of standalone Field Training Exercise on medical operations in the event of an earthquake in densely populated region in March 2019 in India and publication of the ASEAN Handbook on Military Medicine are tangible outcomes of the India's Co-chairmanship of Military Medicine EWG.

India will be launching a new initiative related to disaster relief, the Coalition of Disaster Resilient Infrastructure. It would be a virtual coalition of countries which would have capacity in handling post disaster infrastructure development. This initiative aims to help the victim country affected by natural disaster in seeking requisite assistance from donor country in a speedy and seamless manner.

c. Transnational Crime

With the advancement of technology, international terrorism, organized crime and illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs have assumed transnational and global dimensions with wide ranging ramifications for the peace, security and stability of the country. The scale and complexity of these emerging threats make partnerships vital.

India has signed 41 Bilateral Agreements/ Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Drugs and Other relevant issues and Treaties/ Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters are in force with 39 countries.

d. Maritime Security

Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific region assumes significance due to its geopolitical nature, passage of large volume of trade, vulnerable choke points, abundance of natural resources and the increase in interest by global players. In this era of global connectivity and economic interdependence, all nations have a stake in maritime security and ocean governance both for trade and oceanic resource. This is an issue of significant relevance to the growing economies of Indo-Pacific region as economic growth of the region remains critically dependent on oceanic connectivity and stable maritime environment. Maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific region continues to be fragile. Non-traditional threats to maritime security are also on the rise such as maritime terrorism, smuggling, transnational crimes, drug-trafficking, piracy, unregulated private maritime security companies, and proliferation of sensitive items.

India's economic development is directly linked to its overseas trade and energy needs, most of which are transported by sea. India's oil imports have risen to nearly 80% of its needs, almost all of which is transported by sea. 95% of India's total overseas trade by volume is through shipping and one third of the world's bulk cargo and half its container traffic passes through the Indian Ocean. The security of trade and commerce is, therefore, of utmost primacy

and importance for India. The proximity of choke points such as Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and others and the presence of naval forces in the near vicinity make maritime security even more relevant today. Maintenance of a secure maritime environment, which enables unhindered pursuit of economic activities, is, therefore, essential for the overall economic development and security of the country.

India has a long history of being a maritime nation and its maritime interests are strategic and significant in all directions. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi's strategic vision 'SAGAR' meaning "Security and Growth for All in the Region" comprehensively outlines India's vision of advancing cooperation and using country's capabilities for larger benefit of the region. It's not just limited to safeguarding mainland and islands but covers efforts to deepen economic and security cooperation in maritime relationships. Convergence of interests, and an approach based in the spirit of cooperation will advance economic activity and peace in maritime region of India. The primary responsibility for peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean rests with those who live in the region. India's approach is not exclusive and aims to bring countries together on the basis of respect for international law. India believes that respecting freedom of navigation & over flight and adhering to international norms particularly UNCLOS is essential for peace and economic growth in the larger and inter-linked oceanic geography of the Indo-Pacific. India is a part of national, bilateral and plurilateral cooperative endeavours in the fields of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), coastal surveillance and white shipping that contribute to larger oceanic security and safety.

According due importance to the issue of maritime security, ARF organizes Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on maritime security which deal extensively with the issues of piracy, trafficking of drugs and humans and unregulated fishing. India regularly participates in the ARF events to promote maritime security initiatives. India is also part of various multilateral fora which are actively deliberating maritime security issues in the region and include ADMMPlus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship in Asia (ReCAAP) and Contact Group on piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). India took an active role

in fighting piracy, both to its west and east. India is a founding member of the CGPCS mechanism and the Indian Navy has been undertaking anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the sea routes of the Indian Ocean since 2008. India has been laying additional emphasis on developing greater synergies with the navies in the region by investing sufficient expertise in consultation forums like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Maritime Safety and Security (MSS) is one of the six priority and focus area for Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and India is part of a working group involved in formulating and implementing the work plan related to MSS.

India is contributing to regional maritime security by ensuring safety and security of maritime traffic by helping its maritime neighbours set up their coastal surveillance networks for developing shared Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). In this context, India launched the Information Fusion Centre- Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) at Gurugram, India in December 2018. The IFC-IOR is a major regional initiative to put in place a mechanism for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and to ensure situational awareness of the maritime activities in the region. This Centre will establish linkages and coordinates with national agencies and multinational constructs that are relevant to maritime safety and security. It will collate, analyze and disseminate information related to maritime safety and HADR requirements at Sea. In this regard, India has also signed White Shipping Agreements with a number of countries, provided capacity building assistance and ensured capability enhancement by imparting MDA related training.

To facilitate sharing of best practices in maritime information sharing and better understanding of maritime security challenges, the Indian Navy hosted a Maritime Information sharing Workshop (MISW) on 12-13 June 2019 which saw the participation of 50 delegates from 30 countries. The event included interactive sessions with Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) from participating countries on issues such as maritime piracy, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime governance, etc.

Indian ships have undertaken coordinated patrolling and EEZ surveillance on the request of neighboring countries. India has also provided hydrographic support to chart the waters of Indian Ocean Region. This has been augmented with the large training and capacity building efforts.

e. <u>Cyber Issues</u>

Cyber domain including Internet has emerged as an important catalyst for change in India. India supports a multi-stakeholder approach on matters related to internet governance. Indian policy is guided by democratic values and support for a governance structure that is open, democratic, and inclusive.

As a key member of the UN, India participated in discussions leading to adoption of two resolutions in December 2018 by the UN General Assembly which established the Sixth United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information security. These Groups are expected to delineate how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States and regulate the norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States.

India signed bilateral agreement on cooperation in cyber security with Seychelles in June 2018. India and the USA renewed their agreement to cooperate in the field of cyber security in July 2018. India and the Kingdom of Morocco signed an agreement on cooperation in cyber security in September 2018. India participated in the ICANN 63 meeting in Barcelona held in October 2018 to discuss and develop policies for the Internet's naming systems.

India hosted the first BIMSTEC Workshop on Regional Cyber Security Cooperation from 05 to 07 December 2018 in New Delhi. In the workshop issues like regional cyber security preparedness, challenges and their national approaches to secure cyberspace, cyber politics and governance including UNGGE, UNODC and Budapest Convention were discussed.

During the 5th India-EU Cyber Dialogue, held on 12 December 2018 in Brussels, the 1st India-Netherlands Cyber Dialogue, held on 14 December 2018 in The Hague, and the 3rd India-Japan Cyber Dialogue, held on 27 February 2019 in Tokyo, the topics of discussion were cyber policies and international cyberspace, applicability of international law, norms of responsible State behaviour, confidence building measures, capacity building, cybercrime and data protection regimes, global cyber developments, national policies, bilateral CERT-CERT cooperation, ICANN and internet governance, cyber-attack incidents and response, domestic cyber security strategies and policies, policy and measures on supply chain risk and international cooperation.

India participated in the 5th meeting of UNODC Intergovernmental Expert Group on Cybercrime (IEGC) in Vienna during the period 27-29 March 2019 which focused on building the capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice stakeholders to combat cybercrime as an ongoing and continuous process.

III. Role of ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays a central role in the deliberations on evolution of a security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. India views ASEAN as the driving force of the ARF and believes that the ASEAN way of "dialogue and consensus" should remain the ARF's guiding principle. ASEAN's centrality and unity has been an asset for the entire Asian continent. It has long functioned as an anchor of stability in the region and its continuance, in that role, is critical. The criticality of ASEAN to the larger continental stability came to the fore, again, when it conceptualized and implemented the East Asia Summit (EAS) process. India is privileged to be one of its original members.

India views ARF as an important initiative towards carving a pluralistic, cooperative security order in Asia reflective of the unique diversity of the region. India believes that the ARF should continue to evolve into a balanced, open and inclusive framework for Asian and non-Asian partners to interact and cooperate in addressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges. The cooperative activities conducted under the ARF framework have contributed to confidence building and regional peace

and stability over the years. The candid discussions on regional and international security issues in ARF have also contributed to a greater understanding of the complex issues involved.

To ensure the relevance of this Forum, in the changing regional security landscape, ARF should enhance its role by further strengthening its work on Confidence Building Measures and explore and advance the overlap with Preventive Diplomacy. This forum should also continue to develop in a balanced and inclusive manner, to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. India hopes that there would be a greater operational complimentarity and synergy between the ARF and other forums such as EAS and ADMM Plus. The ARF should be guided by the ARF Vision Statement and shaped by the needs of the region. As efforts are being made to address new areas of concern relevant to the region, it will be in the interest of all to utilise the existing mechanisms to their capacity prior to creation of newer platforms. There is also a need to a focus on more tangible and qualitative outcomes.

India's participation in ARF is in consonance with its "Act East" policy, and development of closer links with the ASEAN as a full-dialogue partner. India actively participated in all the Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) and the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) held under the aegis of ARF. Minister of State for External Affairs Gen. Dr. V. K. Singh (Retd.) attended the 25th ARF Ministerial Meet in Singapore on 4 August 2018. India's regional engagements are strengthened by a broad range of bilateral defence and security relationships with members of ASEAN and the EAS.

INDONESIA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Indonesia highlights the importance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to upholding the ASEAN Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations, and universally recognized international law thereby enhancing regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity as well as promoting mutual confidence and trust.

Indonesia remains of the view that maritime security in the region as top priority. Indonesia's perspective of the regional security outlook is consistent with its strategic geographical location, its nature as the largest archipelago in the world, and its vision to be the global maritime fulcrum. Southeast Asian waters and the surrounding area are vital to the region's economy, trade, transportation, and communication.

Disputes generated from overlapping claims in the area underscores the necessity for peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is therefore crucial that all parties to refrain from activities that may escalate tensions, and to fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

Indonesia attaches great importance to peace and stability in the South China Sea, even though Indonesia is not a claimant state in the territorial dispute in the area. Indonesia appreciates the start of negotiation of the Single Draft Negotiating text of COC since early 2019, and Indonesia remains of the view that expediting the COC negotiation process is essential to achieving the main objective to govern the behavior of states in the region.

In the face of the threat of terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism that remains in our region, we need to manage our cross-border interactions. Consolidating border management or information sharing is one way we can tackle this issue together. Our efforts at counter-radicalization are even more crucial. Reports of various terrorist attacks in other parts of the world, and the rapid growth of terrorist groups and rebel groups that practice terrorism are worrisome. They are now big enough to challenge governments, even as they keep on murdering and terrorizing innocent people. We must stop them.

One that remains our concern in the region comes from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Indonesia believes that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threatens the existence of every nation in the world, humanity, as well as peace, security and stability of the world at large.

On the issue of denuclearization of North Korea, Indonesia stresses the importance of a constructive dialogue as the main component of a peace process, which will ultimately be pivotal to the achievement of regional and international peace and security. In the near future, involvement of an independent and competent body (IAEA) in the verification process will certainly help to achieve the goal of a permanent denuclearization of the Peninsula.

At the same time, Indonesia welcomes the positive progress in Korean Peninsula, including the three Inter-Korean Summits between ROK – DPRK, DPRK and the US as well as DPRK and the Russian Federation. Indonesia believes all concern parties need to enhance and have dialogue will continue to raise the confidence and trust for both sides, including military level dialogue and family reunion.

To safeguard the region from the threat, Indonesia has always been committed to intensify the ongoing efforts of the State Parties of the Treaty of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and the Nuclear Weapons States to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the early signing

and ratifying of the Protocol to that Treaty, as reflected in the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Overview of national security and defence policy

Today's global security and strategic environment influences national defence. National policy should dynamic and adaptive particularly to address the increasingly complex and multidimensional, considering that there are military and non-military threats, and hybrid threats, which can be categorized as factual and non-factual. These threats include terrorism, radicalism, separatism and armed rebellions, natural disasters, border violations, sea piracy and natural resources theft, epidemics, cuber attacks and espionage, trafficking and drug abuse as well conventional war and armed conflicts. Internal country conditions cannot be separated from the influence of the strategic environment triggered by ideology, political, economical, socio-cultural, and security factors. These developments become challenges in managing national defence.

Indonesia pursues an independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia believes that neighbouring countries are friends with a shared commitment to promoting security and stability in the region. Establishing a common perspective is needed to minimize problems faced in international relations, both bilateral and multilateral fora.

Indonesia relies on a total defence system in order to achieve national goals. The system essentially involves all citizens and all other national resources, each with a role and function. The involvement of every citizen is based on love for the homeland oriented towards a common goal to serve national interests. Maritime defence is based on a concept of Indonesia serving as the Global Maritime Fulcrum. This concept of national defense guides every citizen in recognizing national goals, national interests, the nature of national defence, national defence system,

national defence functions and national defence basic principles.

Indonesia has actively contributed to the work of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus in promoting regional peace and security through dialogue and cooperation. Within the framework of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, in 2018 and 2019, Indonesia participated in:

- 13th ADMM-Plus EWG on PKO & MPC, Sydney,
 7-9 November 2018;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM WG) and ADSOM-Plus WG, Phuket, Thailand, 27 February - 1 March 2019;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) and ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus (ADSOM-Plus), Singapore, 10-13 July 2018;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM WG), Singapura, 18 September 2018;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) and ADSOM-Plus, Cha-am, Phetchaburi, Thailand, 2-4 April 2019;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM WG), Bangkok, Thailand, 13 – 15 May 2019.

Indonesia has played an active role in promoting and enhancing cooperation among ASEAN peacekeeping forces, including by initiating an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network (APCN). In the framework of ADMM-Plus, Indonesia co-chairs the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) with Australia for the period 2017 to 2020. The ADMM Plus EWG on PKO meeting took place in Sentul, Bogor, on March 27-28, 2019 and was attended by delegates from Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, the Philippines, Australia, United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, India and New Zealand.

Indonesia attaches great importance of multilateralism. It is reflected by Indonesia's active participation in the international organizations such as in the United Nations. Indonesia serves its role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from January 2019 to December 2020. But Indonesia's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations dated back since 1957, when

the country dispatched its first deployment of military contingent to UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt. Since then, Indonesia has been a proud contributor by sending more of its military and police servicemen as peacekeepers.

The country's involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations has always reflected the mandate emanating from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, to actively participate and contribute in the maintenance of world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice.

Indonesia's commitment to UN Peacekeeping Operations has also transformed the latter into one of the country's flagships of diplomacy in the United Security Council membership.

As of March 2019, Indonesia's contribution to UN peacekeeping amounted to 3,080 peacekeepers. This number places Indonesia in the rank 8 out of 122 Troop/Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs). They are deployed in 8 missions out of 14 UN missions, namely UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur-Sudan), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), UNMISS (South Sudan), MINURSO (Western Sahara), and UNISFA (Abyei-Sudan).

To foster Indonesia's contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations, Indonesia has contributed 850 personnel of Rapid Deployment Battalion to MONUSCO in Democratic Republic of the Congo. As MONUSCO is mandated predominantly in the protection of civilians, the battalion provides robust protection for local people, including, to help maintaining peace and stability during the respective country's presidential election in December 2018.

In 2019, Indonesia is finalizing its deployment of a 140-personnel Formed Police Unit to MINUSCA in Central African Republic. The unit has been equipped with SWAT capability to boost the performance of protection of civilian according to the mission's need.

Indonesian peacekeeping contingent has been supported with moderate numbers of women personnel to help better implementation of the protection of civilian mandate in the field. As of March 2019, 106 female personnel are in the missions and serve as troops, military staff,

Formed Police Unit, Individual Police Officers, and some as doctors and nurses.

Their presence has been a critical enabler to generate strong social interactions with the locals by exercising community engagement activities under the Civil-Military Coordination/CIMIC, notably protection to women, girls, and children. Indonesian women personnel are able to further help the contingent in winning the hearts and minds of the local community as an important component to support successful implementation of mandated tasks, as well as useful to provide safety and security to the peacekeepers themselves.

Those postures of contribution thus far have placed Indonesia as one of the main enablers to keep the UN well-resourced and well-oiled to run the machinery of peace operations.

Under the Vision of 4,000 Peacekeepers and its implementing Roadmap, Indonesia is set to be more assertive and aims to deploy up to 4,000 peacekeepers by the end of 2019. As of May 2019 there were 2,702 Indonesian military and police personnels including 82 women have participating in nine missions. Indonesia also pledged to deploy one Military Composite Battalion, one Formed Police Unit, and 100 Individual Police Officers, including 40 female officers

Moving forward, Indonesia is keen to strengthen its contribution and support initiatives that bolster UN Peacekeeping substantively for its ultimate aim that is to assist a nationally-owned and -led endeavor by the host country to build sustaining peace and development. Among others is by enhancing the capacity of the Indonesian Peacekeeping Center in Sentul, as an international hub for regional training, and marshalling the role of the country's civilian capacities, including women participation, into peacekeeping missions to help effective implementation of the contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping mandates.

b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

i. Total defence expenditure on annual basis

1) Defence expenditure

Defence development is prioritized on the defence strength and increasing the professionalism of soldiers, supported by the availability weapon system capable of supporting preparedness and mobility.

2) Defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

In the year of 2018, the defence budget and expenditure amounts to 107.6 trillion Rupiah. This represents an increase in defence expenditure to 5 % of Indonesia's GDP.

ii. Total number of active personnel in national armed forces is 800.000.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter terrorism

a. <u>The Role of Indonesia in AMMTC</u> and <u>SOMTC</u>

In October 2018, AMMTC in its 12th Meeting in Myanmar adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2018-2025) which is known as the ASEAN PoA PCRVE 2018-2025. It consists of 4 (four) priority areas, namely: (a) Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, (b) Counter Radicalisation and Promote Deradicalisation, (c) Law of Enforcement and Strengthening National Legislation Related to Countering Radicalisation and Violent EXtremism, and (d) Partnership and Regional Cooperation. The document of ASEAN PoA PCRVE 2018-2025 was initiated by SOMTC Indonesia that is established to follow up the mandate given by Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2017) and contribute to the realisation of the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together. In addition, the ASEAN PoA is also aimed to further strengthen the close cooperation among ASEAN Member States in preventing and countering the rise of radicalisation and violent extremism.

In order to implement the ASEAN PoA PCRVE 2018-2025, SOMTC-Indonesia has planned to organised 3 (three) Meetings of ASEAN Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Pillars in 2019 to develop a Work Plan of the ASEAN PoA PCRVE. The involvement of relevant ASEAN Sectoral Bodies from other ASEAN community pillars in drafting the Work Plan is a reflection that the participation of all stakeholders is required to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

The first ASEAN Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Pillar Meeting was already held in Bali on 4-5 April 2019. As many as 13 ASEAN Sectoral Bodies apart from SOMTC, participated in the Meeting. The Meeting in Bali agreed to refer the Work Plan as "Bali Work Plan". The second Meeting will be held in Surabaya in August 2019, while the third Meeting will take place in Bangkok, Thailand, in October or November 2019 after the Bali Work Plan is adopted by AMMTC in its 13th Meeting. The purpose of the third Meeting is to introduce the Bali Work Plan to ASEAN dialogue partners and encourage them to take part in its implementation.

At the Bali Meeting, there was also a concurrence to engage civil society in ASEAN in the process of formulating the Bali Work Plan. To this end, SOMTC-Indonesia will organise a Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Consultation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 2-3 July 2019. In addition, in order to to share good practices, discuss successes, challenges, and future areas of cooperation surrounding the P/CVE agenda with European Union and United Nations, the Bali Meeting also supported SOMTC-Indonesia' proposal to organise a Leadership Exchange Programme that will be held in September 2019 in Brussels, Belgium. The participants of the Programme will be representatives from the SOMTC Member States, the relevant Sectoral Bodies/Organs/Entities attending the first ASEAN Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Pillars Meeting in Bali, and from the European Union.

b. <u>The Role of Indonesia in ASEAN</u> Regional Forum (ARF)

In the context of ARF, Indonesia at the 16th ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ARF ISM on CTTC) in Bali, 20-21 March 2019, submitted an ARF Statement on CVE to be agreed by ARF leaders.

If adopted, the Statement is the first of its kind for ARF leaders in addressing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism at the ARF. The draft of the ARF Statement on CVE is still being discussed among the ARF participants.

c. <u>Young Ambassadors for Peace</u> <u>against Terrorism and</u> Violent Extremism

On 22-25 April 2019, the National Counter Terrorism Agency of Indonesia (BNPT) organised a Regional Workshop on Establishing Youth Ambassadors for Peace against Terrorism and Violent Extremism. The workshop invited young participants from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. This Regional Workshop is an expansion of the prevention program for youth that has been initiated by BNPT since 2016, which is known as the "Ambassadors for Peace" program. The main aim of the Regional Workshop is to share Indonesia's best practices in engaging youth in countering terrorism and violent extremism and establishing regional networks amongst youth in the effort of constructing and disseminating counter narratives and positives messages within online platforms to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The participants of Regional Workshop agreed to issue a "Jakarta Youth Declaration on the Establishment of Youth Ambassadors for Peace against Terrorism and Violent Extremism" and one of the points of the declaration is their concurrence to establish a youth network to exchange best practices and lessons learned in developing and disseminating counter narratives on the internet and other social media platforms.

Indonesia's Efforts at the National Level

a. <u>The adoption of the revised</u> Anti-Terrorism Law

In May 2018, the Parliament of Indonesia approved the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law which has come into force in June 2018 through Law Number 5/2018. The Law reflects the balance of hard and soft approach that have been implementing in Indonesia in countering terrorism.

Some of the new features of the Revised Law as follows: (i) criminalizing acts of individuals joining as FTFs abroad; (ii) criminalizing those individuals

supporting others to join as FTFs; (iii) criminalizing the incitement to terrorism; (iv) criminalizing preparatory acts of terrorism; (v) establishing a whole set of chapter for the prevention of terrorism, which focused on counter-radicalization, deradicalisation, and national preparedness against the acts of terrorism; and, (vi) setting up a clear guideline on restitution and compensation for victims of terrorism.

b. <u>Developing a National Plan of</u> Action on CVE

Apart from taking steps to revise Indonesia's current Law on Counter-Terrorism, Indonesia is also strengthening its policies against terrorism including violent extremism through its effort to develop a National Plan of Action in Countering Violent Extremism or better known as RAN PE. If adopted, RAN PE will complement the prevention efforts stipulated in the revised Law. The process of developing the RAN PE has been started since August 2017 and in January 2019, President of Indonesia granted his approval for BNPT to draft the Presidential Regulation on RAN PE. To follow up the President's approval, BNPT already sets up a Team from relevant line Ministries and Agencies to draft the Presidential Regulation on RAN PE. It is expected that the Presidential Regulation could be adopted in September 2019.

The RAN PE prescribes a "whole-of-government approach and whole-of-society approach". Representatives from the government and non-government entities have been actively involved in the drafting process. After intensive discussion with other ministries and agencies, the RAN PE will consist of three main pillars, namely (a) Prevention; (b) Law Enforcement and Strengthening Legislative Framework; and (c) Partnership and International Cooperation.

c. <u>Initiatives of Soft Approach</u>

Indonesia has taken initiative programs in furthering the soft approach in order to counter terrorism and violent extremism, as follows:

 Establishing a platform of synergy with 36 Ministries and Governmental Agencies to enhance coordination between BNPT and other government agencies in countering terrorism.

- Prevention (in 32 provinces to strengthen collaboration among BNPT, local government and CSOs in countering terrorism. Its main task is to collaborate with local stakeholders, both government and non-government entities, to plan and execute programs of CVE that are needed in local context (local wisdom). The programs are determined by the assessment of the Forum itself. The programs devised by the Forum are varied, mainly related to counter narratives development, and assisting former terrorist convicts or the family of terrorist convicts in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration.
- Establishing Pusat Media Damai (the Center of Peace Media) to detect, monitor and counter the terrorist propaganda.
- Inearly 2018, BNPTheld a National Reconciliation program by inviting former terrorist convicts and victims of terrorist attacks. Around 124 former terrorist convicts and 51 victims of terrorist attacks took part in the program. The program is aimed at cementing the culture of forgiveness between those two groups. As a result of the program, those former terrorist convicts are committed to assisting the government by becoming agents of peace.
- Initiating community empowerment programs as part of the deradicalisation programs outside of prisons, in two villages of former terrorist convicts, such as establishing Islamic Boarding Schools and Islamic Learning Centres focusing on multiculturalism, nationalism, and the spirit of unity in diversity. Those two villages are in Sei Mencirim-North Sumatra, and in Tenggulun-East Java.
- Recruiting more than 816 youth or the so-called "millennials" in 13 provinces across Indonesia to promulgate the message of peace, unity and harmony. It is deemed to be more effective as it disseminates message between their peers and promotes a sense of empowerment to the youth. It is also a part of national effort to promote the role of youth. It is a pertinent element as part of a broader counter-narrative campaigns against radicalism and violent extremism campaigns.

Measures Against Terrorist Financing

Indonesia has been establishing money laundering and terrorist financing regime since 2002 and complementing it by formulating counter terrorist financing law in 2013.

The Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) is the forefront institution in preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing. It has three main functions such as receiving reports, analysing and disseminating the final products as well as financial intelligence reports to the competent authorities. In terms of terrorist financing investigation, the special detachment 88 Indonesian National Police is the agency which uses the reports for further intelligence hints of investigation, while the National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA) is one of the respective coordination agencies using the financial intelligence information in regards to countering the financing of terrorism.

Indonesia has conducted the national risk assessment on terrorist financing including the white paper on risk mapping of terrorism financing related to the domestic terrorist network affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The risk-based approach enables countries to prioritize their resources and allocate them efficiently. It is necessary to enhanced the strategic collaboration among the financial service providers, financial intelligence units, intelligence community, law enforcement agencies and regulators in the terms of information sharing and supervision especially in particular areas within Indonesian region.

To fully support international counter-terrorism, particularly its efforts to fight terrorist financing, Indonesia actively participates as a member of Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML). The government of Indonesia is deeply committed to build a robust defence against the financing of terrorism through the application of global policy standard which known as 40 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations.

By virtue of Indonesia's active diplomatic and domestic efforts, Indonesia has been delisted from the International Cooperation Review Group-Financial Action Task Force (ICRG-FATF). Furthermore, Indonesia through the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of 52 countries to strengthen the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regime.

On 2018, the FATF validates the status of Indonesia as an observer within the FATF organization. Moreover, at the APG plenary meeting on July 2018, Indonesia valued effectively prevents money laundering and terrorist financing.

To further its efforts at combating money laundering and terrorism financing, Indonesia is in the process of applying to become a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member. Currently, Indonesia still continues to make efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the counter terrorist financing regimes.

Indonesia identified three emerging challenges in countering the financing of terrorism: Firstly, it is suspected that humanitarian aids are likely being exploited by terrorist groups to fund their radical movement both domestic and overseas. We reveal the risk of social media in those crowd funding networks and examine the nexus between extremist groups and humanitarian aids. Secondly, the use of new payment method as part of financial technology innovations is identified as one of significant challenges. It is essential to have a comprehensive prevention scheme in combating the potential abuse of payment services for terrorist financing purposes. Thirdly, the potential use of alternative money remittance and currency exchange providers as channels for supporting the movements, these vibrant trends are also related to the issue of border protection.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Indonesia has taken necessary measures to comply with Security Council Resolution 1540, including cooperation with neighboring countries. Indonesia has always been constructively participating in multilateral negotiations to strengthen non-proliferation and to achieve disarmament of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) in all its aspects.

The Government in 2016 proposed the amendment of the Law No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy which will stipulate three main issues under the National Policy and Strategy of Nuclear Security as well as the penalty that has not been provided by current national law. The three main issues are as follows:

- Developing the integrated information system to support nuclear security;
- Increasing coordination related to nuclear security by synergizing the duties and functions of relevant Government authorities; and
- 3. Strengthening the infrastructure of nuclear security.

On 22 February 2017, Presidential Decree No. 19 Year 2017 on Indonesian National Authority on Chemical Weapons, finally entered into force. With this Decree, Indonesia has a strong legal framework for our National Authority on Chemical Weapons, and proper modalities for enforcing all obligations of the chemical weapons convention.

With regard to enforcement actions, the Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency and relevant agencies conduct monitoring/control on the issuance of regulations and permits, carries out inspections, and implements procedure of the nuclear material inventory accounting system. The verification of inventory is managed by routine inspection, which involves the monitoring of the quantity, location and ownership; movement of materials from one installation to another; and export and import of nuclear materials. Routine inspection also includes monitoring waste management.

Disarmament

Based on Indonesia's commitment to nuclear disarmament, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of multilateralism as "the core principle" in meetings on non-proliferation and disarmament. In line with this, Indonesia underlines that the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament should be achieved by lawful methods pursuant to the prevailing international law and within the framework of the United Nations.

Indonesia maintains its position that all pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and comprehensive manner.

Indonesia consistently calls on the nuclear states to fulfill their obligation to reduce their nuclear weapons as part of the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, with a clear time frame.

In addition, Indonesia desires that the process of nuclear disarmament be carried out in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner. On the other hand, the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to pursue their national choices in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be upheld. It is our strong belief that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will ensure the survival of humankind in a regime of sustainable development.

Indonesia has become one of the first fifty countries to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on the 20th of September 2017 on the sidelines of the 72nd UN General Assembly in New York. Indonesia is of the view that the treaty is complementary to the NPT and serves as a major step towards our common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Indonesia is also among the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Treaty, having signed it on the same day it was opened for signature, on 24 September 1996. Indonesia believes that the CTBT is a key element in the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

As an Annex II country, Indonesia has ratified the CTBT through Law No. 1 year 2012, a very timely initiative as it was taken soon after ASEAN Member States concluded negotiations with Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) on the latter's accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011.

As part of our unwavering contribution towards the universalization of the CTBT, Indonesia, together with Hungary, assumed Co-presidency of Article XIV Conference in 2013-2015.

Indonesia also actively participated in the series of meetings of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), which was held in Washington DC in 2010, Seoul in 2012, The Hague in 2014 and Washington DC in 2016.

Since the inception of the NSS, Indonesia played constructive and have presented a "gift basket" which serve as a reference for countries striving to enhance safety and security in accordance with their respective national processes and legal systems.

Non-Proliferation

Indonesia's reaffirms its principled positions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. Indonesia believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and are essential for strengthening international peace and security. Non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament.

Pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring nuclear disarmament obligations is both counterproductive and unsustainable. Indonesia emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and nondiscriminatory agreements.

Indonesia continues to advocate that the universality of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) be made a priority and urges states, which are not yet parties, to immediately accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states.

In line with the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint 2025, Indonesia envisions a Southeast Asia that is not only a nuclear weapons-free zone but also a region that is free of all other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, Indonesia stands ready to intensify the ongoing efforts between ASEAN and NWSs to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty with a view to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol of SEANWFZ by the NWSs at the earliest.

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

On the other hand, Indonesia believes that nonproliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable rights of States to acquire, have access to, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

The inalienable right of each State to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle, for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

On 5-7 February 2018, during the working visit of the Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, Indonesia and IAEA signed a practical arrangement on enhancing technical cooperation among developing countries and strengthening South-South cooperation. The arrangement covers a three-year period (2018-2021).

Indonesia has been at the forefront of technical cooperation in such fields as enhancing food security and plant breeding, where Indonesia has assisted trainees from Asian and African countries. In this regard, help was extended by the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) and its Center for Isotopes and Radiation Application (CIRA, BATAN), which is a designated IAEA Collaborating Centre engaged in developing new crop varieties to improve agricultural yields and food security.

iii. Transnational Crime

Information Sharing and Intelligence
Exchange and Document Integrity and
Security in Enhancing Cooperationto
Combat Terrorism and Transnational
Crimes

Transnational crime is a major threat to global security. In Southeast Asia. Because of this serious threat to stability and security, ASEAN has become vulnerable. The ASEAN action plan in combating transnational crime (Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime), focuses on several types of transnational crime such as illicit drugs trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, weapons smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, international banking crime and cybercrime.

Considering that crime incidence has a significant impact on stability and security, as it can disrupt and threaten national development, Indonesia has vigorously enforced the relevant laws to protect its citizens from transnational crime.

Promoting Collaboration in the Prevention of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit Drug Manufacture

Performing across-ministries and other relevant agencies coordinations, especially those in charge of supervising the import, export, producers, suppliers and end users of precursors; (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Director General of Customes and Excise, drug and food supervision agency), checking on companies or individuals who's suspected of sending types of precursors that can be used as raw material for drug productions based on informations and reports received from abroad and within the country. This kind of informations could be recieved through information sharing channel of member countries' Interpol.

Legal basis:

- Law of the Republic of Indonesia no.
 35 of 2009 on Narcotics,
- 2. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia no. 40 of 2013 on the Implementation of Law No. 35 of 2009 on Narcotics,
- 3. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia no. 44 of 2010 on Precursors

Illicit Drug Trafficking

Indonesia is in a state of narcotics emergency with various problems of drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The prevalence of abuse is at 1.77% or about 3-4 million Indonesians abusing drugs. Furthermore, Indonesia also become one of the biggest targets for narcotics distribution by international networks. These facts clearly show the complex reality, trends and existing circumstances Indonesia is facing. For Indonesia, comprehensive efforts being taken must also include strict and proper law enforcement measures against drug traffickers.

In tackling world drug problem, Indonesia focuses its efforts in 3 (three) areas, which are: **demand** reduction, supply reduction and international cooperation.

Demand reduction measures remain an integral part of Indonesia's drug control strategies with a view to reduce and eliminate the illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; and drug-related health and social risks. In light of this, Indonesia has recently launched a National Action Plan for Strengthening the Prevention and Eradication of the Misuse and Illicit Circulation of Narcotics and Narcotics Precursors on August 2018. The Action Plan is designed as a four-pronged strategy focusing on prevention of drug abuse; eradication of illicit drugs, rehabilitation and treatment as well as research and development.

Moreover, under Law on Narcotics, the government provides treatment and rehabilitation for victims of drug abuse. In 2018, more than ten thousands individuals enjoyed rehabilitation services in Indonesia. The National Narcotics Agency has also implemented the Outreach Drop In Center (ODIC) Program in all provinces in Indonesia, to expand services to addicts and victims of drug abuse in remote areas and among the most vulnerable.

In the area of **supply reduction**, Indonesia focuses on eliminating the illicit production, manufacture, marketing and distribution of, and trafficking in, psychotropic substances, including synthetic drugs, as well as the diversion of and illicit trafficking in precursors.

To tackle this problem, Indonesia has established a national interdiction task force comprising of relevant national agencies to combat illicit drugs coming in and out of Indonesia. Within the region, Indonesia initiated ASEAN Seaport Interdiction Taskforce in 2016 to combat transnational drug trafficking via sea routes, and prevent and deter drug syndicates from using ASEAN countries' seaports to distribute illicit drugs.

It is imperative for countries exposed to world drug problems to engage and participate in initiatives taken in bilateral, regional, and international levels. Hence, Indonesia believes that **international cooperation** remains important to deter criminal syndicates and drug traffickers.

With the spirit of common and shared responsibility, Indonesia has established agreements and cooperation with other countries in the region. In light of this, the Indonesian government also organizes judicial cooperation to arrest perpetrators of organized crime involving narcotics, such as through extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA). Indonesia is a party to the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and establishes 8 (eight) bilateral agreements on MLA and 11 (eleven) bilateral agreements regarding extradition.

Bearing in mind the different capacities and circumstances of member states, Indonesia is of the view that in addressing the world drug problem, several factors should be taken into account, such as a zero-tolerance stand against drugs, a comprehensive and balanced approach, and the sovereign rights of each country. To this end, Indonesia welcomes the adoption of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025 as a guideline to address illicit drug activities and mitigate their consequences on society.

Trafficking in Persons and People Smuggling

Preventing and combating trafficking in persons is high on Indonesia's agenda. Indonesia is a country of origin, in addition to being a transit country and a destination for trafficking in persons. The majority of the victims of trafficking from Indonesia are Indonesian migrant workers who were sent to work abroad through illegal channel, especially domestic workers and workers in the fisheries sector.

Against this background, the Indonesian government has undertaken reforms and greater works to strengthen its efforts to combat trafficking in persons. At the multilateral level, Indonesia is a party to United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the Protocol to Suppress, Prevent and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UNTOC since 2009.

At the regional level, Together with Australia, Indonesia has established teh Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime to strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating smuggling of migrants as a shared responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination.

Along with other ASEAN countries, Indonesia has concluded ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children which entered into force since 8 March 2017. Indonesia also involves in other deliberations on counter trafficking within the framework of the ASEAN, through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime.

On the national level, Indonesia has enacted a law on Anti-Trafficking in Persons comprising four main pillars: prevention, prosecution, and victims' protection, and the international cooperation in curbing this heinous crime. Indonesia has also established the Task Force for Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Persons, comprised of relevant related government agencies. The Task-Force main approaches are advocacy, public awareness, protection, and joint training.

Indonesia also views that to effectively combat trafficking in persons, a global and collective response, as well as a greater understanding of its root causes are of importance. To that end, Indonesia is standing ready to work together with other countries within the framework of ARF and beyond.

IV. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

In recent years, Indonesia established a comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) governance system through the Disaster Management Law and its subsidiary regulations and policies, Disaster Management Agencies at the national and local levels, risk analysis and Disaster Management plans, partnership and coordination with DRR stakeholders, and all relevant bureaucratic instruments. Considering its importance, commitment to DRR has increased significantly with the passing of the new National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2015-2019, in which disaster management and risk reduction are among priority development programs, particularly as investment to protect economic growth and human development. Indonesia has achieved International Organization for Standardization (ISO) No. 22327 on communitybased landslide early warning system.

At the global level, Indonesia's remains firmly committed to the strenghtening of the implementation of international frameworks for disaster risk reduction. This includes the commitment on the outcome of the 3rd United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) that is the Sendai Framework On Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015 - 2030. Indonesia stresses the importance of international cooperation to ensure the implementation of SFDRR to strenghten the capacity of developing countries to promote best practices, knowledge sharing and technology transfer. Indonesia also emphasizes the strategic importance of monitoring frameworks at the global and regional levels such as the Global Partnership for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) and the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) to ensure the implementation of SFDRR.

Indonesia has shown its continuous commitment and support of the GPDRR 2019 by the presence of the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia who delivered an official statement during the forum. At the same time, the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Cultural Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia also took part as keynote speaker in the High Level Dialogue Session on "Advances in National and Local Strategies on Disaster Risk Reduction: Achieving Sendai Target E". Furthermore, the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency delivered a statement during the Working Session on "Build Back Better and the Outcomes of the World Reconstruction Forum".

In 2017, Indonesia encouraged AHA Centre to be involved in the distribution of humanitarian assistance to all displaced inhabitants without discrimination in Rakhine State, Myanmar. AHA Centre provided the following assistance:

1) deployment of ASEAN relief items from the regional stockpile in Subang, Malaysia; 2) deployment of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT); and 3) technical assistance such as information management, report writing and secondary data analysis.

Following endorsement at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat in Chiang Mai on 17-18 January 2019, a Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA) Mission of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) personnel was sent to Rakhine State, Myanmar, on 4-13 March 2019. The Preliminary Mission comprises experts from several ASEAN Member States, and officials of the AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat. The overall goal of the Preliminary Mission is to conduct a preliminary needs assessment to support the Myanmar Government in its efforts regarding the repatriation process.

During the 2nd High-Level Strategic Coordination Meeting held in Naupuitaw, Myanmar on 27 May 2019, ASEAN and the Myanmar government agreed to immediately commence practical measures to alleviate the situation in Rakhine State. They discussed the recommendations of the Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA) and the plan for the Comprehensive Needs Assessment to facilitate the repatriation of displaced persons in Rakhine State. The meeting agreed to immediately implement a number of "low-hanging fruits" identified in the report, namely, to undertake in-country capacity building programme for ASEAN-ERAT based in Myanmar to support the repatriation process when it commences; and to establish a technical working group, comprising representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat, the AHA Centre, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine, the Department of Disaster Management, and other relevant Myanmar officials and experts, to discuss the detailed modalities of implementation of recommendations on the potential areas of collaboration identified in the PNA Report in Rakhine.

Indonesia continues to enhance its role in the region's disaster management by hosted the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) 2018. ARDEX was held on 5-8 November 2018 in Cilegon, West Java. The Exercise is expected to strengthen ASEAN's collective response to massive disasters in region.

Indonesia's contributes through its efforts at improving the preparedness of the stakeholders within ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia and Australia organized the 2018 East Asia Summit: International Disaster Assistance Workshop in Perth, WA on 8 to 10 May 2018. The Workshop discussed and developed the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit (EAS Toolkit) to enhance the capacity of EAS

participating countries for responding to disasters. In this regard, several initiatives have been undertaken, such as Indonesia's active involvement in the formulation of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), and its active participation in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) by being co-chair for 2 (two) working groups namely the ACDM Working Group on Recovery and ACDM Working Group on Knowledge and Innovation Management.

V. Maritime Security

As an archipelagic nation, Indonesia places maritime security at the heart of its Maritime Domain Awareness to secure peacefull passage of international shipping through the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passages (ASLP), Sea-Lanes of Communications (SLOC) and Sea-lanes of Trade (SLOT)., Indonesia pledges to secure the international shipping to enjoy freedom of transit, freedom of navigation and innocent passage by implementing the principles of international laws and regimes.

Indonesia intends to manage the resillience of its maritime resources based on the principles of Blue Economy in order to maintain the sustainability of food security for mankind. Indonesia builds and develops maritime infrastructures and connectivity, and pursue maritime diplomacy as well as maritime security and defense.

Indonesia encourages the enhancement of maritime cooperation in the region, as that is in line with its focus on maritime diplomacy, which is based on sovereignty, security, and prosperity approaches. In this regard, as described in the White Book of Indonesian Maritime Ocean Policy, Indonesia identifies seven pillars of such cooperation:

1) Management of Marine Resources and Development of Human Resources; 2) Defense, Security, Law Enforcement and Safety at Sea;
3) Ocean Governance and Institutions; 4) Economic and Infrastructure of the Marine Sector and of Prosperity Enhancement; 5) Management of the Ocean Space and Protection of Marine Environment;
6) Maritime Culture; and 7) Maritime Diplomacy.

In this sense, the ASEAN Regional Forum has rightly decided on maritime security and resilience as

one of its main concerns. The range of maritime security issues is not limited to traditional security issues, but also extends to the discussion of non-traditional maritime security issues relevant to the region. On the other side, maritime resilience deals with any threats to marine resources that may link to human's ignorance of their activities at sea or naturally per se.

Indonesia believes that it is our responsibility as a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, not only to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and to preserve its maritime resources, but also to ensure the safety of shipping and navigation as well as the security of the seas. Indonesia stresses the importance of sharing best practices, developing confidence building measures and capacity building programs in order to enhance our respective capabilities in dealing with maritime security issues.

For that purpose, Indonesia has concluded a number of bilateral agreements and has been part of regional or international arrangements for managing issues of common concern, such as combating illegal activities at sea, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal fishing. Indonesia has arranged for separate coordinated patrols with almost all countries sharing maritime boundaries with Indonesia.

The ASEAN sub-region of the Sulu Sea, where Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines share borders, is facing threats, such as piracy, armed robbery against ships and terrorism. It is imperative to counter these threats within the ASEAN framework and other sub-regional mechanisms. In order to effectively address the issue, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines will conduct Trilateral Patrols in the Sulu Sea. Meanwhile, together with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia continues to secure the busiest sea passage in the region by carrying out the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), comprising of coordinated sea patrols, combined maritime-air patrols as well as intelligence and information sharing activities.

Indonesia puts great emphasis in preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU Fishing. Indonesia observes that IUU fishing is a crosscutting issue, closely related with other crimes, such as

people smuggling, human trafficking, forced labor, drugs trafficking, and violation of sanitary and environmental protection regulations. In this regard, Indonesia is of the view that IUU fishing should be dealt with in a comprehensive and holistic manner with emphasis on law enforcement and security aspects.

Thus Indonesia welcomes closer cooperation to deal with this issue in the region, including through the adoption of ARF Statement on Cooperation to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing in 2017. This Statement provides valuable reference and options on how we could further explore practical measures to strengthen existing cooperation in addressing IUU fishing under various ASEAN-led mechanisms.

To follow up this Statement, Indonesia, together with the United States, convened the ARF Workshop on Best Practices in Maritime Data Analysis to Strengthen Regional Maritime Security from 17 to 19 July 2018 in Bali, Indonesia. Indonesia and the US also co-hosted the ARF Workshop and Table Top Exercise on Crimes Related to Fisheries that was held in Bali on 26 – 28 June 2019.

Through other measure, Indonesia is also vibrant to continuously work on the establishment of a regional cooperation agreement against crimes related to fisheries. Thailand, Viet Nam, and China also have stated their availability to cooperate on the issue.

Indonesia has also conducted capacity building initiatives with countries and mechanisms such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting (HACGAM), Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region (RPOA-IUU), and ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum (AFCF), as well as through training and other meetings.

In domestic level Indonesia has established International Fish Force Academy of Indonesia (IFFAI) as an international training and training ground for law enforcement officers in the field of fisheries. And to bold our commitment to strengthen the commitment of responsible fisheries management, Indonesia has convened "Our Ocean Conference" (OOC) in Bali on 29-30 October 2018.

Indonesia has also established cooperation with Global Fishing Watch (GFW) as a form of transparency of management and/or utilization of fishery resources. We encourage that ARF Participants could also be part of this mechanism to build transparency of fisheries management in the region.

Vi. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)

The advent of cyber capabilities provides both opportunities and challenges. Cyberspace is reshaping the international security environment and the economic and social development of nations worldwide, opening up a new world of capabilities and opportunities. However, cyber threats also pose an increasingly serious challenge to regional security.

Indonesia deems it essential for countries to strengthen cooperation in the area of capacity building, information/intelligence sharing, as well as network building among law enforcement agencies.

IV. Role of ARF

ARF remains important as an inclusive forum in the Asia-Pacific region for fostering constructive dialogue and cooperation among the Participants on political and security issues of common interest and concern.

In the face of an evolving regional architecture, ARF has to maintain its relevance by fully leveraging its potential and demonstrating its uniqueness. One of the strong points of the ARF is that it has built a foundation for political security dialogues that encompasses both civil and military elements. The idea that the ARF could cover the niche on civil-military cooperation has been highly supported by ARF Participants. Even so, the cooperation between the two elements should not stop at disaster relief training/operations or holding regular ARF meetings exclusively attended by military representatives. Instead, the ARF should foster interaction between the civil and military sectors by increasing military representation in all ARF meetings. Combining constructive ideas from the two perspectives is the formula for the ARF to maintain its relevance.

Subsequently, the ARF could also optimize various tools already provided in the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement. These tools empower the ARF to expand and enhance its institutional effectiveness in order to ensure the implementation of the Plan of Action. Those tools include the promotion of the role of the ARF Chair, the activation of the Friends of the ARF Chair, the strengthening of the ARF Unit, the enhancement of the role of the ARF EEPs, and the expansion of ARF partnerships with other regional and global institutions.

It is essential to understand that the ARF is not only an institution, but also a process through which countries in the Asia Pacific region strive to maintain dialogue and carry out activities to promote CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms. A more robust, substantive, proactive, and action-oriented ARF is therefore instrumental to the process. Indonesia is strongly committed to contribute to this cause by continuously generating initiatives and actively participating in the work of the ARF.

Indonesia is committee to keeping it active role in the ARF, including by co-chairing the ARF Peacekeeping Experts Meeting in Indonesia, ARF Workshop on Women Peace and Security and the ARF Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Mitigation.

Indonesia also proposes the ARF Statement on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism to be considered and adopted by ARF Foreign Ministers.

On the whole, Indonesia envisions a more robust, substantive, proactive and action-oriented ARF. Indonesia will therefore continue to contribute to the realization of the ARF's potential through active participation, initiatives and the development of innovative ideas.

JAPAN

I. Japan's Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Since the beginning of the twenty first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale, and this has substantially influenced the dynamics of international politics. In addition, interdependency among counties further expands and deepens. Due to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape a global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence. The security environment has become more complicated with concerns over the increase of "gray-zone" situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests in the context of insufficient institutionalization of cooperative security frameworks, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, cases involving employment of methods to alter the status quo, such as "hybrid warfare", that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and nonmilitary realms and ones including intervention in democracy from foreign countries through the manipulation of information and other methods are also being pointed out. Issues related to the transfer, proliferation and improvement of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including the possibility of acquisition and use of such weapons by terrorist organizations, etc., constitute a major threat to the entire international community, including Japan. Regarding terrorism, although the decline of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is being witnessed, it is still necessary to be careful of the influence of the non-state actors including international terrorist organizations in the international community. In addition, there is a growing concern over large-scale acts of terrorism

targeting so-called soft-targets in recent years. Advances in communication tools, including social networking services (SNSs), are also being used in the diffusion of violent extremism, one of the primary causes of terrorism, and the expansion of the range of activities by terrorist organizations. Recent advances in science and technology are invigorating activities in new spheres such as cyberspace and outer space. While this presents big opportunities, it also brings about new risks and threats, with the applicable norms yet to be established. Furthermore, technology transformation which can bring about an essential change to the nature of the society and people's lives, such as IoT, robot, AI, quantum technology, is advancing, and not only the international competition to gain superiority in technologies is becoming severer, but also the movement to make use of these technologies for security purposes is becoming more active.

Against these backgrounds, the Indo-Pacific region is making progress cooperating in the field of non-traditional security issues through confidence-building measures, not only in bilateral and trilateral frameworks but also in multilateral security frameworks, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Japan welcomes these developments, as these efforts contribute to create a better regional security environment. Japan is eager to further promote and develop these multi-layered initiatives through the above-mentioned regional frameworks securing peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, situation surrounding Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are major issues that can destabilize the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. It is essential to continue discussing these issues at ARF.

Maritime issues including those surrounding the South China Sea are directly linked to the peace and stability of the region and the international community as a whole. The international community pays attention to these issues in the context of

thorough respect for the rule of law and securing the freedom of navigation and overflight. In the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated the "Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea": (i) making and clarifying their claims based on international law; (ii) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (iii) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. These three principles gained supports from many countries, and Japan will consistently support actions based on these principles. In this context, Japan strongly hopes for full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002, and the conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Diplomatic efforts such as COC should lead to demilitarization and free and open South China Sea.

On the other hand, Japan shares with relevant countries serious concerns over the continuing unilateral actions in the South China Sea that could change the status quo and raise tensions in the region, including large-scale and rapid land reclamation, building of outposts, as well as their use for military purposes, including deployment of offensive weapons. At the same time, attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea by force or coercion are unacceptable, and Japan will continue to respond calmly and resolutely while strengthening coordination with the relevant countries, along with strengthening communication in order to make the East China Sea a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship." Each state needs to refrain from unilateral actions and acts based on the universally-recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in light of the final award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS on July 12, 2016, which is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute. In particular, coastal states need to recognize that in maritime areas pending final delimitation, they are obliged by international law to refrain from unilateral actions that would cause permanent physical change to the marine environment, be it for military or civilian purposes. Japan strongly hopes that the parties' compliance with the award will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

In the G7 Foreign Ministers' joint communique issued in April 2019, the G7 foreign ministers reiterated their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order based on international law, to the peaceful management and settlement of disputes without using the threat, and to the freedom of navigation and overflight. In this context, they stressed the importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the rule of law, and expressed their intention to work together with ASEAN and other countries in this endeavor. They further expressed their serious concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas, reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral actions that escalate tensions, and urged all parties to pursue demilitarization of disputed features.

ARF can play an important role in ensuring the rule of law at sea, the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law. In this context, Japan welcomes a number of initiatives that have been taken within the framework of ARF such as official events aimed to discuss maritime security issues in the region. Japan, for its part, organized the ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in March 2018 in Tokyo, co-chairing with Malaysia. Through active discussions, experiences and lessons learned from participating countries and regional frameworks were shared among ARF members who face various maritime challenges including piracy and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. In addition, the participants deepened their understanding on international cooperation on MDA through exchange of views on the needs of ARF members for enhanced MDA capabilities. To follow up the discussions at the workshop, Japan, in cooperation with Viet Nam, will convene the second workshop on International Cooperation on MDA in Tokyo in the 2019-2020 inter-sessional year. The second workshop will focus on concrete areas of interest identified in the first workshop including piracy and armed robbery against ships, IUU fishing and maritime terrorism.

Although North Korea has taken measures as blowing up its nuclear test site in public in 2018, it has not dismantled all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). There has been no essential change in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. In May 2019, North Korea went ahead with launches of short ranged ballistic missiles. For denuclearization, what is critical is the full and expeditious implementation of the agreement between the leaders of the US and North Korea including North Korea's commitments towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as indicated in the Joint Statement of the US-North Korea Summit issued in June 2018.

To this end, it is imperative for each country to fully implement the relevant UNSCRs. From this perspective, Japan will continue to steadily take measures for their implementation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard are conducting information gathering activities for vessels suspected to be in the violation of UNSCRs including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean-flagged vessels. JMSDF has found several activities strongly suspected ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea, and Japan shared information with Partner countries, notified UNSC 1718 Committee and the Panel of Experts and published the information. Partner countries engaged in monitoring and surveillance activities based in Japan against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers. Japan will cooperate with the US, and trilaterally with the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and coordinate closely with the international community including China and Russia, and aim for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

With regard to Japan-North Korea relations, Japan seeks to normalize its relations with North Korea, through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concern such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, as well as settlement of the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

1. Japan's Security Policy

(1) "Proactive Contribution to Peace"

The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more testing and uncertain. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities. Being well aware of this, and under its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will contribute even more actively to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as a control tower, and in accordance with the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will continue its path as a peace-loving nation, work in close cooperation with the US and other partners as a major global player in the international community, and implement its national security policies in a steadfast manner, thereby making a more proactive contribution to peace and stability of the region and the world more than ever. Under this policy, Japan puts its efforts in the area of maritime security including anti-piracy measures in Asia and Africa, and utilizes capacity-building assistance in the Southeast Asia.

(2) Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security

Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security took effect in March 2016. The legislation is designed for Japan both (i) to make a seamless response to any situation amid an increasingly severe security environment surrounding the country, and (ii) to put into concrete practice its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, and thereby administer more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community.

Now that the Legislation for Peace and Security has taken effect, Japan's "use of force" will be permitted, under the Constitution, to exercise the right of collective defense in a limited manner in addition to the right of individual self-defense if the "Three New Conditions," which are unmatched worldwide in terms of stringency, are met.

The legislation has expanded the range of activities in which Japan can engage in during UN PKOs. It also allows Japan to participate in internationally coordinated operations for peace and security that are outside the UN PKO framework. Furthermore, the legislation allows Japan to engage in cooperation and support activities, such as supply and transportation under certain conditions, when the peace and security of the international community is threatened including those concerning UN resolutions. By allowing these activities, the legislation enables Japan to better contribute to the peace and stability of the international community.

However, Japan's postwar posture as a peaceloving nation has not been changed for more than 70 years. Japan has taken various opportunities to explain both its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" and the Legislation for Peace and Security to the countries concerned in a transparent and sincere manner, winning support and understanding from countries around the world.

2. Japan's Defense Policy

(1) National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2019 and beyond sets forth Japan's basic defense policy, the roles of Japan's defense capability, and the organizational objects for and the target level of specific organization of Self-Defense Forces, etc. Japan's security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the former NDPG was formulated. The Prime Minister announced in his Policy Address in January 2018 that the Government would revise the NDPG by the end of 2018. Following its examination by the Government, including discussion at the advisory panel ("Council for Security and Defense Capability"), the new NDPG was approved by the Cabinet in December 2018.

The new NDPG sets out the following three points: (i) strengthening Japan's own architecture for national defense, (ii) strengthening the Japan-US Alliance, and (iii) strengthening active promotion of security cooperation, under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy. Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to defend such national interests as Japanese nationals, territory and sovereignty.

The NDPG calls for the building of a "Multi-Domain Defense Force" that enables (1) execution of cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome, (2) sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and (3) strengthening of the Japan-US Alliance as well as the promotion of security cooperation. As capabilities, especially, in new domains-space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum-will remarkably enhance overall military capability to conduct operations, states are focusing on these areas.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) is, on the other hand, the first five-year defense buildup program laid out to achieve the target level for defense capabilities set forth in the NDPGs.

The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately 27,470 billion yen in FY 2018 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately 25,500 billion yen over the next five years. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately 17,170 billion yen in FY 2018 prices, and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately.

(2) Defense-Related Expenditures

In addition to the cost of maintaining and operating the JSDF, defense-related expenditures in Japan include the cost of improving the living environment in the vicinity of defense facilities and support for US forces stationed in Japan.

As the budget based on the new NDPGs and MTDP mentioned above, the FY2019 defense-related expenditures budget includes an array of projects aimed at the establishment of a Multi-Domain Defense Force.

Excluding the costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO (the cost of implementing the SACO Final Report to mitigate the impacts on people in Okinawa), the US forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, the expenditure budget for FY2019 has been increased by 68.2 billion yen (or 1.4% growth rate) from the previous fiscal year to 5,007 billion yen, marking the seventh consecutive year of growth.

Including 25.6 billion yen in SACO-related expenses, 167.9 billion yen in the US forces realignment related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and 6.2 billion yen in expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, 50.8 billion yen in expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, Japan's total defense-related expenditure budget for FY2019 amounts to 5,257.4 billion yen, an increase of 66.3 billion yen, or growth rate of 1.3% from the preceding fiscal year.

The FY2019 defense-related expenditure is 0.88% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), SACO-related expenses, US forces realignment related expenses, expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft and the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, excluded, and 0.93% with the above four included.

3. Japan-US Security Arrangements

Given an increasingly severer security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, securing the forward deployment of US forces based on the Japan-US Security Treaty and strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-US Alliance are essential not only for the security of Japan, but also for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance, the two countries have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, such as ballistic missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and maritime security, including efforts made under the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and the Legislation for Peace and Security.

In light of the recent security environment, the US will strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the Alliance. Japan and the US will further enhance cooperation with allies and partners in the region.

III. Japan's Contributions to Regional Security

1. Maritime Security

Japan is a maritime nation that has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued "Free, Open and Stable Seas." For Japan, maritime rights and interests, which are the basis for economic survival, including the freedom of navigation and overflight, and development of marine resources, are of great importance toward securing peace and security. To ensure these maritime rights and interests in the long-term and in a stable manner, it is indispensable to maintain a maritime order and ensure safe maritime transport. Furthermore, "Free, Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by a maritime order governed by law and rules and not by force, are essential for peace and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the international community as a whole. To maintain and develop "Free, Open and Stable Seas," Japan contributes actively to maintaining and strengthening maritime order and ensuring safe maritime transport through various initiatives such as counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close coordination and cooperation with other countries.

As part of its efforts to secure the safety of navigation in Asia, Japan had advocated the establishment of a forum to provide EAS member countries with the opportunity to discuss maritime cooperation and maritime issues in the region, which born fruit in the form of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). At the sixth EAMF, which was held in Manila, the Philippines, in December 2018, Japan underscored the importance of maintaining and strengthening a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law in

the Indo-Pacific region and of making this region a global commons that brings stability and prosperity to any country, while introducing Japan's efforts in the area of maritime security including capacity building assistance for maritime law enforcement capabilities such as anti-piracy measures and MDA.

In addition, Japan took the initiative in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Japan has been actively contributing to the implementation of the ReCAAP by sending Executive Director and Assistant Director to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) from its inception and supporting ReCAAP ISC's efforts in the area of information sharing and capacity building assistance through making financial contributions among others. For instance, the second Capacitu Building Executive Programme on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia was held in Tokyo in 2018. This Executive Programme provided an opportunity for the participants from 22 countries to deepen their understanding on Japan's efforts and views on such topics as the importance of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, safety of sea lanes, freedom of navigation, rule of law at sea, enhanced cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies, MDA and counter piracy/armed robbery against ships operations by utilizing the ReCAAP framework. Japan and Singapore will convene the third Executive Programme in Singapore in September 2019.

In ARF, Japan co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS) with the Philippines and the United States from August 2014 to August 2017. Together with the co-chairs, Japan worked on revising the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. Co-Chairmanship was handed over to Viet Nam, Australia and EU. Furthermore, Japan serves with Malaysia as the lead countries for "confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements, and cooperation," which is one of the priority areas for the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. In this context, Japan hosted the ARF Seminar on Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia, in Tokyo in March 2015 (co-chairing with the US, Malaysia, and India), ARF Seminar on Regional Confidence Building and Law of the Sea, in Tokyo in December 2015 (co-chairing with Vietnam and India), and ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in Tokyo in March 2018 (co-chairing with Malaysia).

2. Disaster Relief

Japan has provided active support in responding to large-scale natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, Japan dispatched Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Self-Defense Force Units to Indonesia: in response to the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami in September; During FY2018, Japan provided emergency relief goods in three cases to assist the people affected by major natural disasters, such as the flood in Lao PDR and Myanmar.

In April 2018, the 17th ARF-ISM on DR in Seoul was held. The meeting was attended by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Authorities, and Disaster Relief Agencies from ARF member states as relevant international organizations. The meeting discussed ways to enhance disaster management capacity and disaster risk reduction, emerging issues in disaster relief including man-made disasters, enhanced civil-military coordination, the link between disaster reduction and sustainable development, and enhancement of disaster recovery capacity. The ISM also exchanged views on the processes and procedures of military engagement in disaster operations. Japan will continue to work with other ARF participants and contribute to ARF activities in order to make regional disaster relief cooperation more practical and effective.

In addition, Japan is an active player in other regional frameworks as well. For example, Japan proactively participates in EAS initiatives that address disaster risk reduction as a priority area. In the framework of Japan-China-ROK trilateral cooperation, the three countries hold a regular table top exercise on disaster management, whereby they discuss the humanitarian assistance and disaster management mechanisms of each country in order to enhance mutual understanding. Within the framework of Japan-ASEAN cooperation, Japan provides three types of assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). The first type of assistance concerns the development and operation of an ICT-based disaster management system. This has helped facilitate timely information-gathering and responses, and international rescue and relief operations. The second type concerns the development and operation of the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA). DELSA has been developing a framework for stockpiling emergency relief supplies at specific locations and transporting these items to disasterhit areas. The third type of Japan's assistance through the AHA Centre concerns a human resources development project in DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction). This project involves a four-month training program for officials at the DRR organization in ASEAN Member States. Japan welcomes the proactive and abstractive role the AHA center played in extending humanitarian support for the affected persons in regards to the situation in the Marawi and Rakhiane State.

3. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

In the field of counter-terrorism, Japan continues to make efforts against international terrorism and violent extremism in cooperation with the countries and the regional and international organizations concerned. In this regard, at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Vientiane, Laos in September 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide approximately 45 billion yen over the next three years for Asia as comprehensive counter-terrorism measures consisted of (i) improvement of counter-terrorism capacity, (ii) measures to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism, and (iii) social and economic development assistance for creating a foundation for a moderate society. He also stated that Japan would help develop 2,000 personnel for counter-terrorism over the next three years. In September 2018, Japan had already achieved this goal one year ahead of its goal.

Japan has continuously held multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with nations in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. To help build counter-terrorism capacity, Japan supports projects in such areas as border control, aviation security, maritime security, and law enforcement under a number of frameworks, which include the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue (AJCTD),

the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (AMMTC+Japan), and the Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (SOMTC+Japan). The center of ASEAN-Japan cooperation in this area is the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime, which was adopted by the 17th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in Myanmar in November 2014 and expanded its scope to include international organized crime. In order to implement this declaration, SOMTC+Japan adopted its updated "SOMTC + Japan Work Plan for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2018-2022) " in 2018, based on which SOMTC+Japan has further strengthened cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational crime.

Japan has also been stepping up its efforts to combat transnational crimes in the Indo-Pacific region in three major aspects. The first aspect is strengthening transnational legal frameworks. For example, Japan has been tackling drug problems in alliance with ARF member countries through measures such as the exchange of information on synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS), and investigative cooperation in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and other drug-related treaties. The second aspect is supporting local initiatives designed to combat illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, and corruption in the Southeast Asia through projects of Japan's ODA and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The third aspect is promoting policy coordination with various countries and international organizations. Japan actively participates in multilateral frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and the Bali Process, which involves consultations on irregular immigrants and trafficking in persons. Furthermore, Japan will host the 14th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Kyoto, in April 2020, whose main theme is "Advancing crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law: towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda".

4. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Facing serious challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the divergence of views on how to advance nuclear disarmament, Japan, as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings during war, will continue to take concrete and practical steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan believes that the promotion of cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States is necessary to achieve such a goal, taking the severe international security situation into account.

In this regard, Japan is committed to maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation mechanism and has been engaging in various diplomatic efforts to this end. These efforts include the contribution to the three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) through the NPT Review Process, as well as the submission of resolutions on the total elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly, the activities through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, and the contribution to the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD). In addition, Japan has been engaged in efforts for facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a member of the Group of Friends of the CTBT. Also, Japan is contributing to the creation of the necessary dynamism and momentum for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiation.

Taking into consideration serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime, Japan is engaged in outreach activities in the Indo-Pacific region with the aim of achieving three key objectives: (i) promoting the universalization of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and reinforcing their implementation at the national level, inter alia IAEA Safeguards are the fundamental component of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and it remains our key objective to increase the number of States with

the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP); (ii) establishing and strengthening export control systems; and (iii) raising awareness of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and enhancing related efforts. As part of these activities, Japan has been hosting a range of meetings each year, including the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and Asian Export Control Seminar. In July 2018, Japan hosted PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise Pacific Shield 18 at Yokosuka with the participation

5. Cyberspace and Outer Space

Cyber attacks are becoming increasingly diversified and sophisticated. Some attacks target huge number of organization and individual as seen in recent attacks by "Wannacry," "Notpetya," and APT10. At least since 2014, attacks by "APT10" based in China targeting managed IT service providers (MSPs). How to develop systems and capabilities to protect states, and the lives and property of the citizens from such cuber attacks constitutes a major challenge from both national security and economic perspectives. To this end, Japan is working with other countries concerned to promote a mutual understanding on these issues in a number of areas. One such area is deliberating international rules, including those on how to apply existing international law to acts in cyberspace as well as developing international norms. Other areas include supporting capacity building and developing confidence-building measures.

Countries in Indo-Pacific Region are discussing cyberspace issues under frameworks such as ARF and ASEAN+3 meetings. The ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), which was endorsed at the 22nd ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2015, calls for confidence-building measures, awareness-raising, capacity building support, regarding cybersecurity. Japan is proactively participating in international meetings on these issues to boost cuber security in the region. From the viewpoint of the increasing importance of the situation surrounding cyberspace, ARF recognizes the value of continuing to exchange views from a comprehensive standpoint with the aim of promoting a peaceful, safe, open, and coordinated ICT environment, and preventing conflicts and crises through capacity-building assistance while

building confidence among nations. In January 2019, Japan co-chaired the ARF-ISM on ICTs Security 1st Open Ended Study Group (Study Group) on Confidence Building Measures in Singapore as co-chair countries with Malaysia and Singapore. Following this meeting in March 2019, Japan co-chaired 3rd Study Group and 2nd ARF-ISM in Singapare. Japan will host the next ISM in the spring in 2020. Going forward, Japan will increase its support for capacity building in cyber security with a focus on ASEAN countries according to the "Japan's Basic Strategy of Cybersecurity Capacity Building."

Japan's bilateral initiatives include discussions and dialogue on cyberspace with the US, Australia, the U.K., France, India, Russia, Israel, Estonia, Germany, ROK, Ukraine, and European Union (EU). Japan has also been holding trilateral talks involving China and ROK, and exchanging views with such international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)..

In addition to these initiatives, Japan will accelerate ties with ASEAN countries and public/private-sector collaboration to reinforce its efforts to address cyber security issues.

In order to deal with issues pertaining to the increase of congestion in outer space and threatening space activities of other countries to secure the safe and stable use of outer space, Japan has been proactively engaged in building a safe space environment and promptly developing international rules. Within the framework of the ARF, Japan has been playing a leading role, as it hosted the second ARF Workshop on Space Security, which was held in Tokyo in 2014, promoting the common understanding of the member states with regard to the current situation of space environment and the importance of prompt development of international rules. Japan also has been conducting bilateral consultations and cooperation with various countries focusing on space issues. Japan is committed to the establishment of the rule of law in outer space. For this purpose, Japan has been actively engaged with discussions in multilateral for aincluding United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which adopted the "Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities" in June 2019, as well as encouraging the recognition and development of norms of behavior, as mentioned in the joint statement of G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April 2019.

6. Preventive Diplomacy

Japan believes it is important for ARF to make steadu progress from the first stage of the "promotion of confidence-building measure" to the second stage of "development of preventive diplomacy" and further to the third stage of "approaches to dispute settlement." However, despite the cumulative efforts of the ARF countries have so far succeeded in facilitating confidence-building measures to a certain extent, progress toward the development of preventive diplomacy has only just begun. In this context, Japan welcomes the approach taken in the ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Training, held in in Yogyakarta in November 2015, and the ARF Training Course on Preventive Diplomacy, held in Hanoi in March 2016; that is, the approach of analyzing case studies in the region while sharing the understanding of the concept and modus operandi of preventive diplomacy among the ARF participants in order to promote preventive diplomacy. Japan has long been committed to conflict prevention and peace building through human resources development and other modalities means. Japan will take advantage of its expertise in these areas to further contribute to the ARF's efforts to promote preventive diplomacy.

7. ADMM-Plus Initiatives

The ADMM-Plus, in which Defense Minister has been participating from Japan since its establishment, provides a framework for addressing a wide range of security issues common to the region. Japan is committed to this framework with the aim of developing the forum into a key pillar of regional security cooperation. Within the ADMM-Plus, seven Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) have been established to increase concrete military-to-military cooperation in handling security issues common to the region: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counter terrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian mine action and cyber security. Japan is taking part in each EWG to further enhance regional security cooperation by actively exchanging views with other countries and making proposals.

Under the framework of ADMM-Plus EWG, Japan has intensified cooperation with other member countries. In the first cycle, from 2011 to 2013, Japan acted as co-chair of the EWG on military medicine along with Singapore, conducting field training exercises on HA/DR and military medicine in Brunei in June 2013. In the second cycle, from 2014 to 2017, Japan co-chaired the EWG on HA/DR together with Lao PDR. Efforts were made to formulate a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the establishment and management of a Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) so as to amplify the activities of assisting foreign forces that are accepted by disaster-affected countries in the event of natural or other disasters. In August 2015, for example, a table top exercise (TTX) was conducted in Lao PDR. In September 2016, exercises on HA/DR and military medicine, AM-Hex 2016, were conducted in Thailand in order to test the final draft of the SOP. At the 9th EWG meeting on HA/DR in December 2016, the SOP was adopted and it has been on the track of discussion in the framework of ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) since then. In the third cycle, from 2017 to 2020, Japan has actively participated in and contributed to each EWG.

The ADMM-Plus is a vital framework providing the member countries with opportunities to conduct multilateral talks on a wide range of regional security issues in an open manner. Japan believes it is important to keep this framework open without putting any restriction on the issues to be addressed in the forum, while allowing the participating countries to discuss a wide range of issues in a candid manner.

IV. Japan's Future Contribution to Enhance Capability of ARF

As a framework for candid discussion on the political and security issues of the entire Indo-Pacific region, ARF has steadily contributed to confidence-building in the region. In recent years, various initiatives have been put forward in a wide range of areas, including maritime security, disaster relief, counter terrorism and transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, preventive diplomacy, cyberspace, and outer space. Some of these initiatives have been translated into exercise-type activities, such as the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREX).

During the inter-sessional year of 2015-2016, Japan played a leading role in animated discussions within the ARF by exercising initiatives in such areas as maritime security, disaster relief, outer space, and counter terrorism.

To further develop ARF as an action-oriented framework instead of making it serve merely as a forum for dialogue, ARF countries that co-organize each initiative need to establish practical agenda items and programs with the cooperation with stakeholders, including relevant international organizations and experts. Also, member states need to work more closely with one another to avoid duplications among initiatives and produce favorable outputs. In addition to these efforts to improve ARF functions, it is also important to strengthen cooperation with other regional security frameworks in pursuing effective synergy. The edge of the wedge is the area of disaster relief. In this particular area, similar exercises are increasingly conducted under different regional frameworks such as ADMM plus. Member states need to streamline such exercises from the viewpoint of reducing personnel and financial costs for participating countries and pursing practical initiatives. The ARF Multi-Year Strategic Exercise Plan Workshop, held in April 2015, discussed how to optimize disaster relief exercises. Such discussions are in line with this awareness. They give a hint as to how the effectiveness of the ARF can be ensured in the future.

Japan will proactively contribute to improve ARF functions and coordinate among different regional frameworks while continue to exercise initiatives in various areas.

LAO PDR

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Regional and international peace and security, and development cooperation are of paramount importance to all countries and regions to achieve sustainable development as well as regional economic integration. Nevertheless, some parts of the world remain complex and evolving due to various challenges and uncertainties in pursuing their national socio-economic development and cooperation, such as terrorism, violent extremism, political and social unrests in some countries, natural disasters, climate change, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking of illicit drug, armed conflict, issue of cyber security, cyber-crime and poverty and development gap. In addition, geopolitical landscape is more diversified and economic globalization is confronted with the rising of protectionist policies. Apart from this, the digital disruption also places challenges to the development in the region, which requires countries to adapt and embrace the opportunities presented by the advancement of technology.

Peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region has continuously been maintained and promoted through bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation and platforms, including ASEAN-led mechanisms. The good relationships between countries have been enhanced, and they continue to grow and yield fruits of peace and prosperity.

Recently, the inter-Korean ties have been improved and the Inter-Korean Summits concluded with concrete outcome which signifies the enduring aspiration of the Korean people for peace, prosperity and unification. Equally important, the three meetings between the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA), the first meeting held on 12 June 2018 in Singapore and second meeting held on 28 February 2019 in Hanoi, Viet Nam and the third meeting on 30 June 2019 in the demilitarised zone (DMZ), also have shown

the positive development. The Lao PDR welcomes and supports such positive development and views that the outcomes of the aforementioned meetings are significant milestones for the relationships between the two Koreas and between the DPRK and the U.S., which will in turn contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the world as well as the denuclearisation of the Peninsula.

The peaceful and stable environment in the Asia-Pacific presents a solid foundation not only for countries in the region in the pursuit of their socio-economic development and mutually beneficial cooperation, but also for ASEAN in consolidating and strengthening its community through the realisation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

The achievements of ASEAN over the past 5 decades have proved the relevance of ASEAN and made ASEAN a unique and developed example of regional inter-governmental organisation, playing a significant role in promoting and maintaining peace, security, stability and prosperity in the region. Besides, ASEAN-initiated frameworks or platforms have served as venues where ASEAN and its external partners as well as external partners themselves engage one another on issues of common interest and concern, thus contributing to enhancing mutual trust and confidence among participants and also promoting peace, security, stability and development in the region and beyond. Most importantly, ASEAN's centrality has been recognised by all external partners. Moving forward, ASEAN will further strengthen its resilience and innovation, while enhancing its external relations through its outward looking policy to ensure the realisation of regional economic integration and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025. The adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific by the ASEAN Leaders is a significant milestone as the Outlook will equip ASEAN with a common approach on engagement and cooperation in the wider Indo-Pacific region based on the principles and areas of cooperation that outlined in the Outlook.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Since its proclamation in 1975, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has implemented the two strategic tasks of national safeguarding and development by pursuing its consistent People's Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy of self-defence with the participation of the entire Lao multi-ethnic people in conjunction with socio-economic development and international cooperation in accordance with its foreign policy of peace, independence, friendship and cooperation.

The objective in the pursuit of the People's Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy is to safeguard the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to protect national interests and the entire Lao multi-ethnic people, and to ensure national security and social order, thus creating a favourable environment for socio-economic development of the Nation. The Lao PDR's consistent policy is to neither participate in any military bloc or alliance, nor allow foreign military bases in the territory of the Lao PDR since its armed forces are for self-defence only.

The national defence and security is the task of the entire Lao multi-ethnic people where everyone has a role to play as stipulated in the Constitution of the Lao PDR.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

The Lao PDR is fully committed to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and ASEAN Charter, and pursuant to its foreign policy of peace, independence, friendship and cooperation and the People's Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy of self-defence, the Lao PDR has deepened and widened its cooperative relations with all friendly countries and regional and international organisations around the world through the principle of mutually beneficial cooperation to enhance mutual understanding, trust and confidence in the region and the world, thereby ensuring a favourable environment for promoting development cooperation.

To date, the Lao PDR has established diplomatic relations with 140 countries and actively participates in sub-regional, regional and international frameworks such as ASEAN, ASEAN-initiated frameworks (ASEAN Plus One, APT, ARF, ADMM Plus, EAS and AMMTC), United Nations, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEANAPOL, INTERPOL, Moscow Conference on International Security, Xiangshan Forum and Shangri-La Dialogue, among others.

The Lao PDR has over the years been entrusted and given the honour to chair many sub-regional, regional and international meetings. To name a few, the Lao PDR chaired ASEAN in 2004-2005, the 1st Meeting of State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, the 9th ASEM Summit in 2012 and ASEAN for the second time in 2016, including the ADMM and other defence-related meetings. The Lao PDR is also the Coordinator of Clearance and Reduction Education 2017-2019 under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Lao PDR has been working with regional and international communities to address various challenges of common concern and interest based on its ability and in accordance with the established international principles and norms.

a. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

The Government of the Lao PDR always attaches great importance to counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime. The Lao PDR has a consistent policy on cooperating with international community to prevent and combat all forms of terrorism. At the national level, numbers of legal framework have been issued and amended such as Law on National Public Security (2014) and Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (2015). More importantly, the Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Panel Code have been amended to criminalize all act of terrorism as well as suppressing and punishing illegal activities related to the crime of terrorism which cause loss to life and property of its citizens, public security and order and national integrity. Operational Organisation called National Counter-Terrorism Ad-Hoc Committee has been established, which leads Ministry of Public Security with mandate, inter alia, to act as an advisory body to the Government on counter-terrorism related issues.

Whereas the National Ad-Hoc Committee on Implementing and Reporting United National Security Council Resolutions 1737 has led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This Committee oversees the implementation of all UNSC terrorism-related resolutions and to submit the National Report to the 1737 Committee.

Moreover, the Lao PDR attaches great importance to the issues of anti-money laundering and counter-funding of terrorism. The Anti-Money Laundering Intelligence Office was established in 2007 under the direct supervision of the Bank of the Lao PDR. In addition, the National Assembly of the Lao PDR enacted the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) on 21 July 2014 upon the request of the National Coordination Committee for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism, a government body with the mandate to supervise such issues. Following that, the President of the Lao PDR promulgated the Decree No. 012/PO, dated 4 February 2015 to implement the new Law on AML/CFT. The latter laid the fundamental and legal framework for the Lao PDR to undertake the work of the AML/CFT rigorously. In addition, the Lao PDR issued sub-legislation under the Law AML/CFT "Order on withholding, Freezing or Seizure of Funds Relating to Financing of Terrorism (revised), No. 03/PM, dated 11 February 2016".

At the bilateral level, to ensure safety and security in the border areas, and to jointly address border-related issues, the Lao PDR has bilateral cooperative mechanism on border issues with each of its immediate neighbouring countries, namely Lao-Cambodia General Border Committee (GBC), Lao-China Joint Border Inspection Committee, Lao-Myanmar Provincial/Regional Border Committee (P/RBC), Lao-Thai General Border Committee (GBC), and Lao-Viet Nam Border Committee (BC).

At the regional level, the Lao PDR joined the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in 2007, which is a sub-regional body of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in order to further advance the work on anti-money laundering and counterfunding of terrorism in the country as well as to enhance cooperation with other countries in the region. The Lao PDR ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism on 28 November 2012.

The Lao PDR successfully hosted and chaired the 9th AMMTC, 3rd AMMTC+China Consultation and related Meetings, which were convened in Vientiane in 2013. The Lao PDR also hosted and chaired the 17th SOMTC and its related Meetings, and co-chaired the 12th SOMTC+ Russia Consultation meeting held on 22-27 May 2017 in Vientiane, and chaired the 21st ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and its related meetings held on 21-24 November 2017.

At the international level, the Lao PDR has always implemented all UNSC terrorism-related resolutions and closely worked with International Community to prevent and combat terrorism. This included information sharing, regularly attended international training and seminars on the margin of INTERPOL and other related transnational crime meetings. The Lao PDR as a state party and signatory to the following 13 UN conventions on counter-terrorism:

- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971);
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973);
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979);
- International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);
- Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991);
- Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994);
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and
- International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).

Recently, the Lao PDR is one the countries faced with the emerging ICT/Cubercrime. As number of individuals and entities have significantly accessed to Information Communication and Technology, it is more likely that they are vulnerable to cyber-threats and cyber-attacks such as information and data theft, scam, phishing and spear phishing attack. These cyber-attacks have caused social-economic insecurity as well as a threat to national security. Therefore, the Government of Lao PDR has been working closely with regional and international organizations to prevent and combat cybercrimes. In order to counter cybercrimes, number of legal frameworks have been issued and amended namely Law on Data Protection (2017), Law on Prevention and Combating cubercrime (2015), Law on National Public Security (2014), Law on E-Transaction (2012), Law on Telecommunication (2011). Moreover, we have amended Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and Penal Code to criminalize an act of conducting cybercrimes. Ministry of Public Security, leading by General Department of Police and Ministry of Post, Telecommunications (Lao Computer Emergency Response Team-Lao CERT) are the main operational government agencies addressing this issue. To ensure the prevention and respond of such transnational crime, the Lao PDR is a part of INTERPOL24/7 and the country will continue to working closely with International Community to tackle ICT threats effectively and in timely manner.

b. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Underscoring the great importance of disarmament and non-proliferation in ensuring durable international peace and security, the Lao PDR is supportive of multilateral disarmament efforts under United Nations frameworks.

The Lao PDR has neither the capacity nor the intention to produce, use or possess, transport, transfer or deliver nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to any states or non-state actors. The Lao Government fully supports the effort of the international community on disarmament and non-proliferation in the world and this should be carried out under the principle of multilateral

diplomacy. Today, nuclear proliferation continues to be a major threat to global peace and security. Amid regional conflicts and disputes as well as civil unrests occurring across various regions, the international community should redouble its efforts to address the issue of armament. In this context, the Lao PDR will continue to work closely with regional and international communities to address those issues.

In addition, the Lao PDR is a state party to a number of regional and international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation such as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and recently signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or Nuclear Weapon Treaty Ban, among others. Furthermore, being one of the members of APG, the implementation of the 40 recommendations on Counter-Proliferation Financing CPF is a mandate.

The Lao PDR believes that the creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones has significantly contributed to strengthening the global regime of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and the enhancement of regional and global peace and security, and consolidated international efforts towards peace and security. The Lao PDR further reiterates that the recognizance of these zones by the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) is of great importance.

The Lao PDR recognizes the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Lao PDR became a member of the IAEA in 2011 and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol in November 2014. Currently, the Lao PDR is drafting the Law on Radioactive Protection and Nuclear Safety, Decree on Duel-Use Goods Management related to Weapon of Mass Destruction and the Law on Counter Proliferation Financing.

To address the serious impact arising from the unexploded ordnances (UXOs), the Lao PDR,

as a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or OSLO Convention, has been actively promoting this universal Convention in order to prevent further victimization of humankind. In addition, the country has accessed to the CCW and has been a party to the Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Addressing the UXO impact remains a top priority for the Lao Government. The Lao PDR was a first among the few countries in the world to adopt its own national Millennium Development Goal called MDG9 in early 2000 and recently launched its own national SDG entitled "SDG18: Lives Safe from UXO". However, UXO clearance, victim assistance and mine-risk education remain challenges for the Lao PDR to fully operate due to the fact that the operation is a very complex process which requires sufficient resources, human and technical capacities, Therefore, that is very important that all countries, International Organisations and INGOs continue to support and assist UXO/Mine Action Sector in the Lao PDR. In order to further strengthen regional cooperation in this area, the Lao People's Army and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are co-chairing the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) from 2017 to 2020, and so far have successfully conducted

- 5th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 22-25 May 2017, Vientiane, Lao PDR:
- 6th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 1-5 October 2017, Moscow, Russia;
- 7th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 24-27 April 2017, Xiengkhouang, Lao PDR; and
- 8th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, October 2018, Moscow, Russia.

In addition, the Lao PDR supports the role of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre as the center of excellence to encourage efforts to address explosive remnants of war (ERW), to facilitate cooperation between interested ASEAN Member States and relevant institutions, including the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and has contributed USD 10,000 to the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The Lao PDR places high importance to and supports regional and international cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) based on its limited resources and in accordance with the principle of request or consent of the affected countries.

The Lao PDR is a party to four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and two additional Protocols as followings: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

The Lao PDR hosted and chaired the 7th Joint Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Relief on 5 April 2017 in Vientiane and the 31st ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, 8th Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Relief, 5th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management and 6th Conference of Party to ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response on 17-19 October 2017 in Luang Prabang, and the Lao PDR has volunteered to be co-chair of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief for 2 inter-sessional years (2018-2020).

The Lao People's Army has actively contributed to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). To name a few, the Lao People's Army co-chaired the ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR with Japan from 2014 to 2016 and successfully carried the following activities:

 5th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR on 10-12 December 2014, Vientiane, Lao PDR;

- 6th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR (TTX) on 5-7 August 2015, Vientiane, Lao PDR;
- 7th ADMM-Plus EWG on 9-10 December 2015, Tokyo, Japan;
- 8th ADMM-Plus EWG on 10 May 2016, Tokyo, Japan;
- AM-HEX 2016, 1-11 September 2016, Chonbury, Thailand; and
- 9th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR, 14-16 December 2016, Vientiane, Lao PDR.

In addition, the Lao People's Army hosted and chaired the 7th ACMMC under the theme: "Strengthening ASEAN Military Medical Cooperation in HADR" on 11-15 July 2017 in Vientiane, Lao PDR.

The Lao PDR has co-chaired with Canada and China the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ARF ISM on DR) for the cycle 2019-2021, the co-chairs successfully hosted the 18th ARF ISM on DR on 2-3 April 2019 in Vientiane, the Lao PDR.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR has jointly organised annual seminars on international human rights law (IHL) to promote awareness and understanding of IHL in the Lao PDR.

d. People smuggling

The Lao PDR acknowledges that people smuggling and human trafficking violate fundamental rights, freedom and dignity of its citizens as stipulated in the Lao PDR's Constitution and laws as well as in international conventions. Therefore, the Government has attached great importance to addressing those issues by establishing a National Steering Committee on Human Trafficking in 2004 as a dedicated anti-trafficking governmental body, which is comprised of high ranking government officials from ministries concerned. Amongst others, the Committee cooperates with neighbouring countries, international agencies as well as with non-governmental and civil society organizations to actively run projects and joint activities in response to human trafficking that takes place domestically and across the border. It also enhances the implementation of the policies and legislation as well as National Plans of Action (NPA) and other preventive measures on countering human trafficking to be in line with sub-regional and

regional action plans. To support this ambitious work of the Committee, the Ministry of Public Security set up the Department of Anti-Human Trafficking to act as the Secretariat and the National Focal Point for cooperation with foreign governments, and regional and international organisations. The Department of Anti-Human Trafficking chaired the 32nd Meeting of Heads of Specialist Units on Trafficking in Persons on 23 May 2017 in Vientiane Lao PDR.

In order to institutionalize the fight against human trafficking as well as to bring justice to the victims and punish the offenders, the Law on Anti-Human Trafficking has been approved by the Lao National Assembly in 2015 after a broad consultation process. The law calls for strong punitive measures, including maximum penalty of life imprisonment and covering all forms of human trafficking while also foreseeing protection and assistance for the victims. In fact, the law reflects our obligations and commitments under relevant regional and international instruments to which the Lao PDR is party.

In order to fight against human trafficking in a comprehensive and effective manner, the Lao Government further enhances its strong bilateral cooperation and collaboration with countries in the region such as Thailand, Viet Nam and China as well as multilateral collaboration with ASEAN and Mekong sub-region countries, including through ASEAN-Australia cooperation on counter trafficking, Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking Process (COMMIT) and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crimes.

The Lao PDR signed the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) in 2015 and ratified it in 2017.

At the international level, the Lao PDR has concluded bilateral agreements and is party to the following conventions on and relating to the fight against human trafficking:

- Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others in 1978;
- Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;

- Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
- Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Lao PDR and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
- Agreement between the Government of the Lao PDR and the Government of Viet Nam on cooperation in Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Persons and Protection of Victims of Trafficking;
 - Agreement between the Governments of the Lao PDR and People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Preventing and Trafficking in Persons;
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Lao PDR and the Government of Australia Concerning Mutual Cooperation in Combating Unlawful migration, Trafficking in Humans and Smugglings of People.
- United Nation Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and Human Right Trafficking;
- Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.

IV. Role of the ARF

Since its inception, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral forum with ASEAN as the primary driving force, has played an important role in promoting mutual understanding, confidence and trust among diverse participants through dialogue and practical cooperation, thereby contributing positively to the maintenance and promotion of peace, stability and development cooperation in the region and the world as a whole.

The ARF has achieved significant progress in its three-stage process towards the ultimate stage of conflict resolution. In light of growing traditional and non-traditional security challenges and in moving forward, all participants should build upon the achievements made thus far including through joint initiatives, and move the ARF process forward

at a pace comfortable to all ARF participants, taking into account the diversity of this Asia-Pacific region with a view to further enhancing mutual understanding, trust and confidence, and maintaining and promoting peace, stability and cooperation for development in the region and the world at large. To this end, the Lao PDR will continue to work with all participants under ARF processes, including the ARF ISM on DR that the Lao PDR is a co-chair from 2018 to 2021, in contributing to the realisation of the ARF Vision Statement.

MALAYSIA

Overview of the Regional **Security Environment**

The current geopolitical landscape remains fluid especially with the emergence of security challenges which in turn generates genuine interest to increase security cooperation. Issues such as the rise of violent extremism at a scale never seen before across the region, volatility in the Korean Peninsula, and the tense situation in the South China Sea continue to challenge the preservation of regional stability and economic development.

Malaysia, in this regard, remains committed to giving priority to the efforts in ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. Malaysia maintains strong defence cooperation with other ASEAN Member States, as well as dialogue partners, by playing an active part in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS). These for a are important elements of the strategic regional architecture that is vital for the security of the region.

Since its establishment, the ARF has been an effective tool in contributing towards the region's peace, security and stability. This is partly attributable to the nature of the ARF, which encourages inclusive, open and frank discussions on political and security issues affecting the Asia-Pacific region.

II. National Security and **Defence Policy**

Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

The primary objective of the Malaysia's National Defence Policy is to protect and defend national interests which form the foundation of Malaysia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and economy. In 2019, the new Government of Malaysia feels that the aspiration in regard to the vision and wayforwards of achieving a grand national strategy

for security and defence needs to be explored as a possibility of positioning and projecting Malaysia as a middle-power. Hence, Malaysia moves ahead into formulating its own Defence White Paper (DWP). The objective of the DWP is to embody the Government of Malaysia's aspiration in strengthening the National Defence Policy and formulating directions and strategic priorities for nation's security.

As DWP is a blueprint in building a national policy on national defence and security, it will provide insight into the role of Malaysia to safeguard the nation's defence as stipulated in the provisions of the Federal Constitution and its generic legal frameworks and national priorities. The DWP is also intended to function as an outline on the direction of the nation's defence and security. As a statement of both intent and capability, the DWP takes into account the presence and position of the defence sector within the whole of government hierarchy. It is also based upon the present National Defence Policy guidelines. This ensures that the DWP continues to be in harmony with the agenda and aspirations of the Government.

At present, Malaysia enjoys a strong international profile. This strategic position was achieved through an active participation within the United Nations since 1960 as well as its central role in the creation of ASEAN. Within the defence sector, Malaysia has been assuming a leadership role. This is apparent through the establishment of security mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, the Malacca Straits Patrol and the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement. It is hoped that this DWP will prepare Malaysia to provide necessary support in promoting foreign policy implementation through peaceful means by working hand-in-hand with the relevant lead ministries and take cognisant of the peaceful diplomacy and effective negotiations especially within the framework of ASEAN and other international forum.

On Cybersecurity, Malaysia believes that the most effective way in addressing and tackling cyber security issues is through a collective effort at the national level. Thus, the setup of National Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) is one of the commitments demonstrated by the Government of Malaysia in managing cyber security concertedly and holistically. NACSA is the national cyber security lead agency that brings together the nation's best experts and resources in the field of cyber security under one roof, with the objectives of securing and strengthening Malaysia's resilience in facing cyber threats and risks.

Further to this, Malaysia has made another notable step in advancing its cybersecurity ambition through the development of the Malaysia Cyber Security Strategy (MCSS). MCSS will serve as a 5 years comprehensive strategy which will encompass all aspects of Malaysia's cyber security concerns including governance; legislation and enforcement; innovation, industry development, technology security and research & development (R&D); capacity building and awareness raising as well as encourage stronger international engagement and cooperation. It will also address all relevant target groups and stakeholders in Malaysia.

The MCSS will be realised through the mobilisation of human resource and the development of infrastructure which will focus on the creation of the National Cyber Security Workforce to ensure the optimal utilisation of existing resources and expertise. NACSA, the national cyber security lead agency will be entrusted to formulate and drive the effectuation of this Strategy.

Total defence expenditure on an annual basis

i. Defence expenditure for 2019

Operating expenditure : RM 10,270,468,200

(USD 2,485,299,247.38)

Development expenditure: RM 3,647,748,700

(USD 882,700,469.17)

Total defence expenditure: RM 13,918,216,900

(USD 3,367,999,716.55)

II. Defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) – 1.1% (2018)

III. Defence expenditure per capita - RM429.77 (USD 104.00)

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter-terrorism

Malaysia reaffirms the need for more effective international cooperation to accelerate counterterrorism efforts. Malaysia remains committed to tackling this evolving threat, especially from groups such as Da'esh, by fully supporting the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, Malaysia strives to ensure that appropriate national measures are taken to implement these resolutions.

Brutal and heinous terrorist attacks perpetrated in recent years, such as the cowardly attacks aimed at Muslim worshippers in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019 and on churches and hotels in Colombo, Sri Lanka on 21 April 2019, demonstrated the evolving methods of terrorists and violent extremists. Such attacks were directed at soft targets including places of worship, restaurants, cultural sites, and public areas where people gather to meet and socialise. Taking this into account, it is becoming increasingly important not just to protect the land and maritime border areas and national key infrastructure, but also public places.

With this in mind, the Government of Malaysia has formulated Guidelines on Enhancing the Security of Public Places and Facilities from Terrorist Attacks. These guidelines aim to enhance security in public places and facilities by involving government agencies (federal, state and local authorities), the private sector and the public (Malaysian citizens or foreigners in the country) by raising awareness on the actual risks, taking appropriate preparedness measures, promoting better interoperability and ensuring resilience against attacks.

Counter-Messaging

Malaysia is proactive in countering the narratives put forth by Da'esh, through the establishment of the Digital Strategic Communications Division (DSCD) under the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) as well as the Counter Messaging Centre (CMC), which is operated by the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). Since its inception on 1 August 2016, DCSD has designed, produced and disseminated hundreds of digital counter/alternative narrative products, which include digital banners,

videos and digital comics, over three major social media platforms, namely Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The CMC, together with enforcement elements, has been instrumental in synchronising efforts to counter radical social media messages and to present the true image of Islam.

The digital products cover a range of themes that are highly relevant to countering violent extremism - among others, raising awareness among parents of youths who could be vulnerable to radicalisation, attacking the myths of masculinity associated with the romanticised notion of jihad, using figures and images from popular culture as well as traditional poetry, and satirizing and undermining the efforts of Da'esh.

Promoting a People-Centred Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Malaysia believes that terrorism needs to be addressed in a holistic and comprehensive manner, and not through means of force alone. Malaysia is of the view that winning the hearts and minds of the people is far more effective than other measures combined. Apart from strict legislative and enforcement measures, Malaysia adopts a "whole-of-government" approach focusing at addressing the root causes leading to terrorism, principally the social and economic grievances of society.

Malaysia has also implemented deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes to change the mindset of radicalised extremist individuals. Here, the Government of Malaysia employs a two-pronged strategy that places importance on the collective and inclusive participation of all relevant entities involved in the programme, as follows:

- Entrusting renowned clerics or *ulama* figures in providing accurate explanations of jihad or struggle from a religious perspective;
- Assigning former terrorists or rehabilitated persons to be positive role models to persuade former comrades to leave their misconceived struggle, as they would be able to point out with more credibility, any crucial factual misrepresentations and misconceptions which are linked to radicalism;

- Empowering family members, who could assist in persuading terrorists to abandon their misguided pursuits, both psychologically and spiritually; and
- Endowing non-governmental organisations which could assist in creating societal awareness of the negative consequences of terrorism and violent extremism.

This approach, complemented with various forms of welfare programmes to facilitate their reintegration into society, has shown success. In addition, the Malaysian Institute for Research in Youth Development has also conducted studies to gauge the perception and potential influence of Da'esh among students of higher education institutions in Malaysia. These studies have facilitated the planning of counter-radicalisation efforts among youth in Malaysia. For instance, the Ministry of Youth and Sports has produced informative brochures on Da'esh for circulation among students and youths.

Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT)

The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) is also involved in conducting public awareness programmes. This include SEARCCT's officials' engagement sessions with university and college students on the dangers of terrorism and extremism, with a view to developing their skills in countering the spread of terrorist propaganda online. As the Government of Malaysia understands counter-terrorism is also a 'battle of ideas', this initiative aims to complement on-going counter-terrorism efforts by focusing on the development of 'mental firewalls' among the population, particularly the youth and other vulnerable groups, in order to prevent them from being influenced by extremist ideologies.

As of April 2019, SEARCCT has conducted 246 capacity-building programmes. These programmes have been attended by 9,632 participants of which 2,009 were foreign nationals and 7,623 were locals. A total of 27 programmes have been planned for the year 2019, of which four have been completed thus far. Between 2003 and 24 April 2019, a total of 1,195 participants from ASEAN Member States attended regional courses/workshops organised by SEARCCT.

Youth has long been a target of radicalisation and recruitment by terrorists. With this in mind, SEARCCT's public awareness programmes in the past several years, have been focusing on youth, particularly the undergraduate students, through the Centre's University Lecture Series (ULS) awareness programme. This programme is held at various public and private tertiary education institutes across Malaysia throughout the year. The aim of the programme is to sensitise the students on the dangers of terrorism and violent extremism as well as to build their mental resistance, should they be exposed to such ideas. Since 2011, SEARCCT has conducted the ULS in over 20 tertiary education institutes nationwide, reaching over 8,500 students.

In the effort to build a more resilient community against the spread of terrorist propaganda, particularly online, SEARCCT has been active in analysing, developing and disseminating counter and alternative narratives through various digital platforms. Since the establishment of the Digital Strategic Communications Division (DSCD) in 2016 under SEARCCT, the Centre has designed and produced hundreds of digital products which covers a range of themes that are highly relevant to countering violent extremism, from raising awareness among parents of youth that could be vulnerable to radicalisation, to attacking the myths of masculinity associated with the romanticised notion of Jihad, to using figures and images from popular culture as well as traditional poetry and to satirise and undermine the efforts of Daesh.

The first two-series workshop entitled 'Student Leaders Against Youth Extremism and Radicalisation' (SLAYER), was attended by 100 undergraduate leaders from institutes of higher learning across Malaysia. The workshop's module was designed to invoke a sense of responsibility among undergraduate leaders in countering the terrorist threat on a peer-to-peer level. Throughout the workshop, participants were exposed to current terrorism and extremism trends among youth, and the need for all parties to be part of the solution in countering these threats. The participants were also taught how to produce digital counter-narrative products and disseminate them via social media platforms.

Promotion of Inter-Civilisation Dialogue

On 2 April 2019, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted without a vote, Resolution A/RES/73/285 entitled "Combating Terrorism and Other Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief". Malaysia, alongside Indonesia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar and Turkey sponsored the resolution. Another 36 Member States co-sponsored the resolution.

The resolution, among others, condemned in the strongest terms the heinous and cowardly terrorist attack aimed at Muslim worshippers in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15 March 2019; deplored all acts of violence against persons on the basis of their religion or beliefs including all attacks on religious places; and called for strengthened international efforts to foster a global dialogue on the promotion of a culture of tolerance and peace based on respect for human rights and the diversity of religions and beliefs.

Malaysia, in explaining its position following the adoption of the UNGA resolution, asserted that acts of terror and violence based on religion or beliefs must be rejected as a whole, and called on all Member States to earnestly promote inter-cultural and interfaith dialogue in promoting peace, moderation and religious tolerance. Malaysia's constructive engagement that led to the adoption of the resolution is in line with the Foreign Policy Framework of the New Malaysia vis-à-vis proactive in foreign policy conduct that requires the country's foreign policy practitioners to engage more actively in the processes to shape opinions and build consensus.

The adoption of the UNGA resolution demonstrated that the global community is united in condemning acts of terrorism that targets individuals, including persons belonging to religious minorities; and based on or in the name of religion or belief. Malaysia remains resolute in combatting and preventing acts of terror and violence based on religion or belief.

At the national level, Malaysia continues to promote mutual understanding and tolerance among members of its multiracial and multi-religious society by organising inter-religious dialogues, as well as educational and community programmes.

Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security Exchanging Cooperation to **Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes**

At the regional level, Malaysia, together with other ASEAN Member States, has implemented practical measures to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, which includes working with external partners. ASEAN cooperation in combating terrorism primarily takes place within the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC).

On security cooperation, Malaysia has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with most of its ARF partners in particular fields, such as transnational crime, anti-money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing, as well as cybersecurity.

Malaysia continues to exchange information and financial intelligence with more than 150 members of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and 34 countries including ASEAN countries with which Malaysia has signed MoUs. Malaysia also plays a leading role in the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, through the provision of AML/CFT-related training and technical assistance especially on the effective implementation of AML/ CFT requirements and preparation for Mutual Evaluation Exercises (MEE) for members in the region.

A groundbreaking achievement for the region was producing the first terrorism financing Regional Risk Assessment of Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) in eight Asia-Pacific nations, namely Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and new partners namely Brunei and New Zealand. The risk assessment, launched at the Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, called on regional authorities to improve data collection and sharing nationally and across the region to identify, monitor and disrupt high-risk NPOs and also vet personnel to make it harder for terrorists to infiltrate NPO finances. This work was built on a previous major milestone, the issuance of the Regional Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (RTFRA) in August 2016.

Malaysia also takes part in the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) meetings. APEC considers terrorism a direct threat to its vision of secure, open and prosperous economies. The meetings discuss the grouping's joint actions in addressing the terrorist threat and plan capacity building programmes to help secure the region's people and its economic, trade, investment and financial systems from terrorist attack or abuse and trade-based money laundering.

On intelligence sharing, the Royal Malaysian Police continues to work closely with INTERPOL and its counterparts through the I-24/7 Global Police Communications System, through which crucial information on terrorism and terrorist activities can be communicated in real time. Such information sharing includes the reporting to INTERPOL of stolen and lost travel documents.

Malaysia's membership in the FATF, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Egmont Group also provides it with a platform to cooperate in various AML/CFT initiatives, especially in terms of information sharing and capacity building.

Measures against Terrorist Financing (TF)

On 28 March 2019, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2462 (2019) on preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist acts. The resolution expands the focus to key emerging issues, including innovative terrorist financing techniques used to launder money or finance terrorism. Following the adoption, the UNSC convened an open debate chaired by the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, as President of the UNSC. The meeting was attended by Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT), President of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and 68 UN Member States, including Malaysia. In our intervention, Malaysia emphasised our commitment to the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) agenda led by the FATF, which directly implements targeted financial sanctions on UN designated persons and entities.

The Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) conducted on Malaysia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime in 2014 recognized the high level of compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations on preventive measures including suspicious transactions reporting (STR), customer due diligence (CDD) and wire transfers requirement. In addition, the assessors also acknowledged the reporting institutions' (RI) understanding on ML/TF risk, AML/CFT obligations and application of mitigating measures.

Malaysia's legal framework supports its ability to give effect to the UNSCR 1267 designation for asset freezing measures without delay. The Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLA) and its regulations provide for an automatic translation of UN's designations into designations under Malaysian law and direct reference to the lists maintained by the UN. Malaysia's well-developed systems to promptly transmit designations and freezing obligations to the RIs and the public without delay add to its effectiveness.

Malaysia's AML/CFT requirements are also imposed on virtual currency exchangers through invocation as RIs under AMLA. Following the invocation, the Central Bank of Malaysia has issued the AML/CFT Policy for Digital Currencies - Sector 6 (the Policy). The scope of requirements under the Policy includes the identification and verification of customers and beneficial owners, on-going monitoring of customers' transactions, sanction screening, suspicious transaction reporting and record keeping.

Malaysia continues to work closely with selected RIs, which include financial institutions, to share current and emerging TF trends and methods as well as operational intelligence to support the efforts of the Royal Malaysian Police in preventing terrorism and terrorism financing. This partnership, which involves meetings on a periodic basis, has resulted in effective enforcement actions including the arrest and prosecution or deportation of individuals suspected to be involved in terrorist activities, and an increase in the number of suspicious transaction reports. Malaysia has also recently issued restricted red flags and typologies to improve RIs awareness on TF methods and channels to support early detection

of TF-related transactions and further improve the quality of STR submission.

The National Strategic Plan on Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing and Counter-Proliferation Financing (NSP) for 2015-2020 was developed to address findings and gaps identified through risk assessment processes and the MEE, and to fulfil other domestic needs. The following action plans have been initiated to ensure effective implementation of preventive measures against the risks of ML/TF:

- Continuing and intensifying guidance and outreach programmes to reporting institutions including on sharing of risk information on TF threats, targeted financial sanctions (TFS) on TF and other compliance issues.
- ii. Ensuring consistent application of AML/CFT measures across financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) through the establishment of Financial Sector Sub-Committee and DNFBP Sub-Committee, which consist of regulators and supervisors of financial institutions and DNFBPs.
- iii. Strengthening the implementation framework on TFS on TF with the establishment of a working group led by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). The deliverables include refining parameters and procedures for variation of the freezing order of listed entities, refining parameters for listing individuals and entities under the domestic list and strengthening engagement with relevant stakeholders affecting by the TFS.
- iv. Preventing the abuse of non-profit organization (NPO) from the threat of TF through greater coordination among NPO regulators in the areas of risk information sharing, organising outreach and dialogue sessions and undertaking risk-based supervision on high-risk NPOs.

Assessing the trends of terrorist incidents from 2017 onwards, incidents continue to persist in this region, among others are in Marawi which started in May 2017 and lasted for almost six months, suicide bombing in Surabaya in May 2018 and bombing in

Cotabato city and at the Roman Catholic cathedral in southern Philippine on 31 December 2018 and 29 January 2019. These are among the notable incidents whilst the region continues to be impacted by numerous attempts and small incidents which manifested that terrorist operation in ASEAN region is less likely to reduce. Whilst the ISIS continue to be defeated, the returning and movements of foreign fighters can be depicted as multinationals, strategically collaborative, competent with technology, globally well-financed and operates in small scale. Within the less structured, flexible and fluidity environment, we are also facing lone wolf extremist who are self-radicalised through the reach of Internet. In the world of terrorist and extremist, technology is vital as it aids recruitment of new members while setting imaginary virtual caliphate organization to spread their ideology, all happening within the sphere of cyber domain, in which becomes Malaysia's greatest concern too.

Against this backdrop, Malaysia continues to combat terrorism and extremism in our backyard as well as in cyberspace collectively across national agencies as well as through external cooperation. Minister of Defence of Malaysia, during the VIII Moscow Conference on International Security on 24 April 2019 has offered three workable solutions for short- and long-term implementation namely;

- i. A better understanding among religions through multiple engagements with people in order to eliminate misjudgement which could lead to anger and hate;
- ii. Enhance cooperation with external partners through network of cyber defence to counter radical ideology. In this context, information sharing is vital to overcome this common non-traditional security threat; and
- A tighter firearms control to avoid shootings spree in the future is important as we see many cases of unlawful use of firearms in liberal countries which led to incidents such as mass shootings that had happened in the United States, New Zealand and the Netherlands.

The situation in Myanmar's Rakhine state too continues to be a perpetuate concern to Malaysia. To this effect, there is an approximately of 100,000 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia of which not all of them are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Malaysia sees Rohingya ethnic issue merely not a domestic problem but a growing regional security issue. Malaysia also remains concern over the Rakhine state of Myanmar being a fertile ground for future terrorist cell. It is also feared that the suffering faced by the Rohingya Muslims will be manipulated by terrorists. Given the importance to counter terrorism from its root, international partners and ASEAN in particular should play an active role to support and assist Myanmar in addressing and finding solution to this matter.

Thus, in line with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2178 and 2396 in relation to returning foreign fighters, Malaysia has assumed soft preventive approaches to counter terrorist propaganda, including using counter narratives to counter extremist ideologies. Malaysia also initiated the Counter Messaging Centre (CMC) under the purview of the Royal Malaysia Police to monitor the use of internet and social media by terror groups to disseminate stories and radical ideology as well as to counter their narrative and rhetoric. Likewise, since 2014, Malaysia has developed a dedicated task force to provide awareness, counter-narratives and conduct deradicalisation program amongst the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel. This indeed is part of the winning of hearts and minds of people approach in which continue to become Malaysia most paramount strategy in fighting terrorism and extremism.

Cyber Security

In the era of digital economy and the emergence of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry Revolution 4.0, cybersecurity becomes a critical aspect that must not be overlooked. Today's virtual environment has now becoming more complex as it consists of connected devices that cannot be protected by traditional cybersecurity approaches. It is undeniable that the technological advancement brings with it many opportunities, but it also poses cyber security threats and risks to our world today. Realising this, numerous efforts are being done

at this region - to curb these threats and risks as well as to increase the trust and confidence in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).

To date, ASEAN in collaboration with its partners, have made some significant achievements in cybersecurity through the development of regional framework, plan, strategy, statement and declaration related to cybersecurity namely ASEAN Regional Forum Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2020, ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection, ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy, ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Cybersecurity Cooperation, ASEAN Declaration to Prevent and Combat Cybercrime, among others.

A number of cybersecurity-related platforms across the three (3) ASEAN pillars with different focuses have also been established namely ASEAN Network Security Action Council (ANSAC) under ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers Meeting (TELMIN), ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of ICTs (ARF ISM on ICTs Security) under ARF, SOMTC Working Group on Cyber Crime under ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus Expert Working Group on Cybersecurity (ADMM-Plus EWG-CS) under ADMM.

With a view to ensuring that ASEAN-led cybersecurity mechanisms are complementing and not duplicating each other, as well as to prepare ASEAN as a region to participate in cybersecurity discussions at the international fora (particularly at the United Nations) with the aim to guarantee that our regional interests are taken into account and clearly represented, our Leader's during the 32nd ASEAN Summit have tasked the relevant ASEAN Ministers to closely consider and submit recommendations on feasible options of coordinating cybersecurity efforts among various platforms of the three pillars of ASEAN, so that ASEAN's efforts are focused, effective, and coordinated holistically. This message by the ASEAN Leaders is loud and clear that it is paramount for ASEAN to drive its cybersecurity agenda synchronically regardless of discipline or area, and to move as one entity at the international fora to ensure a stronger, unified and inclusive ASEAN's voice on this cross-cutting matter.

Under the co-chairmanship of ARF ISM on ICTs Security by Malaysia, Singapore and Japan since 2018, five confidence building measures (CBMs) proposals have been thoroughly discussed and debated during these meetings, which has resulted in the adoption of three of them by the 25th ARF Ministerial Meeting on 6 August 2018. Two more CBMs proposals have yet to be adopted with one of them is co-leading by Malaysia and Australia i.e. CBM#1 on the "Establishment of ARF Points of Contact Directory on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies". CBM#1 is one of the practical measures addressed in the ARF Work Plan on ICTs Security. It consists of the contacts of personnel from diplomatic, policy, technical and enforcement of ARF participating countries that will improve the connectivity and communications between ARF participating countries especially in the event of cyber conflicts. The approach taken by Malaysia and Australia for this proposal is to make it voluntary, simple, pragmatic and a doable exercise with the aim of becoming a fundamental platform for many more CBMs.

A consensual agreement on CBM#1's proposal was reached during the 2nd ARF ISM on ICTs Security held in Singapore on 28 to 29 March 2019. This concept paper was later presented to ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF ISG on CBMs and PD) on 2-3 May 2019, ARF Senior Officials Meeting on 31 May 2019 for endorsement, and 26th ARF Meeting in 2 August 2019 for adoption.

As reported by the Global Cyber Security Index 2018, Malaysia ranked high within the top ten in the category for most committed countries towards enhancing cyber security domain which includes legal, technical, organisational, capacity building and cooperation measures. At regional level and ASEAN in specific, Malaysia has continuously taking steps in improving capabilities in cyber security through the establishment of ADMM-Plus EWG on Cyber Security in 2017. With the available platform and striving to enhance Malaysia's capability in countering cyber threats with versatile approach, Malaysia will be co-chairing the EWG on Cyber Security with the Republic of Korea for the duration of three years from 2020 to 2023.

The Ministry of Defence established a Cyber Defence Operations Center (CDOC) in 2017, responsible for formulating and implementing cyber defence strategies and operations plan. CDOC has grown and continued to be equipped with a cyber-effective monitoring asset as well as experienced in detection of cyber threats involving multiple domains and defence industries. Malaysia believes that CDOC's capability can be further enhanced through sharing of expertise with regional and Plus partners under the ambit of ADMM-Plus.

CDOC has also developed good relations with national cyber security agencies at the national level such as the NACSA, RMP, Cyber Security Malaysia and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). With this fundamental support, CDOC has the ability to conduct and implement cyber security training and exercise either physical or virtual with regional and international partners.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Malaysia strongly believes that the total elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) must remain at the top of the international agenda. Malaysia is convinced that the complete elimination of such weapons would significantly contribute towards international peace and security.

Malaysia is also fully committed in preventing the proliferation of WMDs and their related technologies and delivery systems. In this regard, Malaysia is Party to a number of international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs, among others the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Malaysia is also a Signatory State to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Malaysia also reaffirms the significance of UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) in preventing the proliferation of WMDs. To this effect, Malaysia continuously undertakes the necessary measures in implementing all aspects and obligations under UNSCR 1540 (2004).

National Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

In fulfilling the obligations stipulated under UNSCR 1540 (2004), Malaysia enacted the Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010) on 5 April 2010, which came into force on 1 January 2011. STA 2010 provides for control over the export, transhipment, transit and brokering of strategic items, including arms and related material, and other activities that will or may facilitate the design, development and production of WMDs and their delivery systems.

In order to give full effect to the provisions of STA 2010, several subsidiary legislative provisions were also enacted. After seven years of implementation, STA 2010 underwent its first amendment in 2017. The purpose of the amendment was to adapt the STA to the changing dynamics of proliferation scenarios and to ensure its compliance with the relevant UNSC resolutions without discouraging trade activities. The amendments came into force on 8 September 2017. Key elements of the 2017 amendment include the introduction of penalties, introduction of the presumption of export, and the appointment of additional authorized officers under the Act with respect to the enforcement of proliferation financing.

Malaysia has also made amendments to its Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act, which came into effect in September 2014. The Act is currently known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The new amendments intended to reflect international standards and domestic requirements and enhance the investigative powers of the law enforcement agencies of which will result in greater clarity on reporting obligations, greater enforcement powers and higher penalties.

Malaysia had also introduced the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 to replace the Internal Security Act 1960. The Act was introduced under article 149 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution to handle internal security issues, including public order, acts of terrorism, sabotage and espionage. The Act contains adequate provisions to curb any militant activities in the country. For instance, any act of violence, as underlined in Chapter VI A (on offences relating to terrorism) of the Penal Code, is tantamount to security offences under the First Schedule of the Act.

Other relevant domestic legislation in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) in Malaysia include the Penal Code, the Customs Act 1967, the Arms Act 1960, the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Act 1958, the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984, the CWC Act 2005, the Prevention and Control of Infectious Disease Act 1988, the Poisons Act 1952, and the Pesticides Act 1974.

Malaysia's involvement in activities related to Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Malaysia continues to support activities under the ambit of the ARF relating to non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Pursuant to the decision of the 23rd ARF Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane, Lao PDR, in July 2015, Malaysia, together with Canada and New Zealand, co-chaired the 7th, 8th and 9th ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD), held respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2015), Putrajaya, Malaysia (2016) and Auckland, New Zealand (2017). The deliberations of the ISMs revolved around the three (3) pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Malaysia joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and endorsed the Initiative's Statement of Principles on 21 March 2012. Malaysia co-hosted a Regional Nuclear Detection and Response Table Top Trilateral Exercise with the GICNT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, on 7-9 August 2018. The exercise involved three countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, focusing on enhancing detection and response to nuclear security threats involving shared maritime borders and public areas.

Malaysia is also a Participating State to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 23 April 2014. Malaysia is committed to upholding the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and believes that it adds value to a country's existing arrangements and efforts to curb illicit trafficking of WMDs.

Malaysia is also actively undertaking efforts towards enacting comprehensive nuclear legislation, which will allow Malaysia to ratify and accede to various international instruments on nuclear safety and security such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Protocol, the IAEA Additional Protocol and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The Bill will also strengthen Malaysia's efforts in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation field.

The Malaysian National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), officially established in September 2006 in conjunction with the promulgation of the CWC Act 2005, has served as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to assist Malaysia in fulfilling its obligations under the CWC.

The Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE) under the Ministry of Defence serves as the Lead Agency for the implementation of the BWC in Malaysia, and is responsible in ensuring that Malaysia continues to fully adhere to its obligations under the Convention.

Malaysia recognises that it is important for States Parties to undertake necessary measures, including reviewing relevant constitutional process to implement the provisions of the Convention, as stipulated under Article IV of the BWC. In demonstrating its commitment to the BWC, Malaysia is in the process of finalising a comprehensive BWC Bill, which would reinforce existing domestic legislation such as the Arms Act 1960, Customs Act 1967 and STA 2010.

In strengthening domestic capabilities in the field of biosecurity, Malaysia, in collaboration with the Netherlands and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, had developed a National Laboratory Biosecurity Assessment and Monitoring Checklist in 2018.

iii. Transnational Crime

Malausia has introduced several laws and policies to combat transnational crime. These initiatives are amended, reviewed and rationalised on a regular basis to address key concerns and challenges of today's transnational crime outlook. Malaysia also believes that close relationships with neighbouring countries as well as strong global cooperation serve as important impetus in combatting the spread of transnational crime.

Information Sharing and Intelligence **Exchange in Enhancing Cooperation** to Combat Transnational Crimes

Malaysia will continue to play its role in the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Convention to Combat Transnational Crime, which was adopted on 30 September 2015 during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (10th AMMTC) in Kuala Lumpur. The declaration, among others, recognises the continued need to be vigilant and to address the issue in a timely manner, to reiterate ASEAN's commitment in combatting transnational crime as specified by AMMTC, and to endorse two new areas of concern, namely illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber, as well as people smuggling.

Through the ARF platform, Malaysia hosted the 22nd ARF on 6 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. Out of the five priority areas under the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), Malaysia has been tasked to lead two, namely Priority 3: Use of Information and Communication Technologies, with Russia and Australia, and Priority Area 4: Counter Radicalisation, with Australia.

Malaysia has been working closely with ASEAN Member States and shall continue to conclude security arrangement in the forms of Agreements / Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with like-minded countries to forge strategic cooperation in eliminating and disrupting the commission of these crimes by criminal syndicates.

With regard to broader multilateral fora, Malaysia participated in the 27th Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 18 May 2018. The annual meeting is held to discuss issues concerning crime prevention and criminal justice.

Promoting Collaboration in addressing the issue of Trafficking in Persons and **Smuggling of Migrants**

Malaysia ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC) on 24 September 2004 at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly. UNTOC is the main international instrument to counter transnational organised crime, including trafficking in persons. Subsequently, Malaysia acceded to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, on 26 February 2009.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, the lead agency on transnational crime for Malaysia, is currently studying the remaining two UNTOC supplementing Protocols, particularly the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

The 7th Ministerial Conference on Bali **Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking** in Persons and Related Transnational **Crime and its associated Senior Officials**' Meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia on 6 and 7 August 2018.

Malaysia is an active member of the Bali Process framework, and is one of the 15 Member States of the Bali Process Ad Hoc Group. The group, established during the 3rd Ministerial Conference on the Bali Process in 2009, serves as a mechanism for comprehensive dialogue to address regional crises on a case-by-case basis. Malaysia is also Co-Chair of the Bali Process Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks, together with New Zealand.

A Consultative Conference on the ASEAN People Smuggling Work Programme was held from 2 to 5 September 2018 in Kuala Lumpur in partnership with Australia. The main purpose of this conference was to develop, deliberate and finalise the ASEAN SOMTC Work Programme to Combat People Smuggling 2019-2021 together with all ASEAN Member States. The ASEAN SOMTC Work Programme on People Smuggling 2019-2021 was endorsed ad referendum at the 18th Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) and presented as part of the ASEAN Work Programme at the 12th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC).

Amendments to the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007

On the domestic front, Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (ATIPSOM) with the latest amendments incorporated in 2015. This demonstrates Malaysia's political will and relentless efforts in addressing trafficking in persons.

On this point, three regulations were gazetted under ATIPSOM, namely:

- i) ATIPSOM (Permission to Move Freely and to Work) (Foreign National) Regulations 2016;
- ii) Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (Released of Trafficked Person) (Foreign National) Regulations 2016; and
- iii) ATIPSOM (Payment of Allowance to Trafficked Persons) Regulations 2017.

Malaysia, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, launched the National Action Plan (NAP) against Trafficking in Persons for 2016 to 2020 on 16 August 2016. The NAP outlines the government-led transformation process following an amendment to the ATIPSOM ACT 2007 in 2018. Amendments were made to include provisions that support a more victim-centered approach.

Promoting Collaboration on the Prevention of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit Drug Manufacture

Malaysia applies a comprehensive, balanced and holistic approach in combating drugs. Stringent measures are adopted to address drug supply related-matters i.e. drug trafficking, while preventive education, community empowerment as well as treatment and rehabilitation approaches are implemented to significantly reduce the drug threats and protect our nation from the scourge of drug.

Malaysia strictly adheres to the rule of law in the development and implementation of drug policies, as well as protecting fundamental freedoms and inherent dignity of all individuals. The reviewed National Drug Policy adopted in 2017 is a comprehensive, integrated and balanced policy that incorporates all areas of supply and demand reduction approaches through five main strategies, namely Preventive Education, Treatment and Rehabilitation, Law Enforcement, Harm Reduction and International Cooperation.

To promote adequate availability of internationally controlled narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes while preventing their diversion and abuse, Malaysia has implemented various measures which include the annual legitimate requirement (ALR) of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine as a prerequisite for import permit application. In 2017 and 2018, a total of 334 and 393 estimates/assessment were approved respectively.

Malaysia also takes continuous measures to control precursors which include issuance of e-permit system, routine inspections and audits and control on imports of machines and equipment used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations. In 2017, 402 import permits and 942 export permits were issued while 463 import permits and 1,059 export permits were issued. 13 import permits for medicine making machines were issued in 2017 and in 2018, 16 import permits were issued. Audit on precursors were also conducted on 120 premises in 2017 and 126 premises in 2018.

Malaysia appreciates the assistance provided by the relevant authorities in Southeast Asia, especially in strengthening narcotics, psychotropic substances and precursor control to prevent diversion. Over the years, training and capacity-building activities as well as assistance in the development of national policies and strategies has been provided. In addition, technical assistance tools including handbooks, manuals, DVD's, and other materials were also shared as guidance and technical support.

Malaysia acknowledges the importance of international cooperation in addressing the world drug problem. Recently in the 62nd Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs held on 14 – 22 March 2019 in Vienna Austria, ASEAN Member States had reiterated that the world drug problem is a shared responsibility and thus, working collectively is integral in combating the drug problem.

Malaysia continuously cooperates with ARF countries in maintaining close and regular contact especially in exchanging operational intelligence on activities of cross border smuggling on drugs, precursor chemicals and information of new modus operandi of drug couriers transiting to Malaysia.

To that end, the Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) conducts joint sea and land border operations with Indonesia and Thailand annually as below:-

- i. Indonesia (PATKOR KASTIMA) Annual sea operation between Malaysia and Indonesia to prevent contraband item including precursors and drug smuggling.
- ii. Indonesia (OPS SEDAR KASTIMA) Annual land border operation between Malaysia and Indonesia to prevent precursors and drug smuggling within Sarawak and Sabah Malaysia) and Kalimantan (Indonesia)

iii. Thailand

Annual land border operation between Malaysia and Thailand to prevent precursors and drug smuggling within Perlis, Kedah, Perak and Kelantan (Malaysia) and Thailand

RMCD also participated in the CATalyst Operation coordinated by World Customs Organization (WCO) and Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices Asia Pacific (RILO AP) to counter precursors and drug trafficking through air mode amongst Asia Pacific customs administration countries. RMCD also participated in ASEAN Seaport Interdiction Task Force (ASITF) to counter precursors and drug trafficking through sea mode among ASEAN countries. Bilateral and ad hoc meeting were also held between RMCD and other countries like Indonesia, Philippines, India and Australia to enhance cooperation and exchange of intelligence/ information on the prevention of precursors and illicit drugs.

Promoting Collaboration in Addressing Drug Trafficking

Malaysia is always committed in its effort towards combating illicit drug activities in the country. The involvement of Malaysia in the regional cooperative mechanisms under the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

on Drug Matters (AMMD) such as ASEAN Seaport Interdiction Taskforce (ASITF) and ASEAN Airport Interdiction Taskforce (AAITF) can be utilised to increase and strengthen cross-border and intraregional cooperation especially in curbing illicit drug trafficking.

Malaysia actively shares information on drug related matters through ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network (ADMN) managed by ASEAN Narcotics Cooperation Centre (ASEAN-NARCO) and supervised by ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD). ADMN was jointly formulated by ASEAN Member States to present the drug situation in ASEAN as well as specific issues on drug policy, research and innovation and implementing programmes. Much development has been carried out on the ADM Report System as the online ADM Report System was developed on ASEAN-NARCO website in the area of technical development and capacity building for data collection.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

In the last couple of years, ASEAN has experienced multiple devastating earthquakes, major floods, numerous cyclones and droughts that severely affected its member states. The vulnerabilities of this region stemming from population growth, unplanned urbanization, environmental degradation, climate change combined with geological, hydrometeorological and man-made hazards. It has, consequently increased the frequency and the impact of the disaster itself.

Each disaster is a profound reminder to enhance our readiness and preparedness at many levels. Since the signing of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), Malaysia has pledged to collectively respond with other ASEAN Member States in the regional disaster preparedness, as well as coordinating effective utilization of ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response; coordination of multi-national maritime search and rescue; the speed of receiving of aid and humanitarian assistance as well as its effective and timely distribution; management of consular assistance; and information and media management. Malaysia will continue to support the efforts to improve ASEAN Joint Disaster Response Plan and look forward

to the exercise that will stimulate two large-scale scenarios; Metro Manila Earthquake and Mentawai Megathrust Tsunami, and other relevant trainings, namely ARF Technical Exercise, and Training Course on Urban Search and Rescue (USAR).

In line with "One ASEAN, One Response 2020 and Beyond: ASEAN responding to disasters as One", Malaysia urges all parties to refine the critical role by ASEAN Member States in establishing a sustainable and effective mechanism in the dynamic humanitarian landscape of the region through ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). The collaboration we have established through ARF, and with the support from its partners would help AHA Centre to become more impactful and remain relevant to the needs of the ASEAN Member States and the wider ASEAN Community. ARF, undoubtedly is an important platform to chart the future direction of ASEAN's disaster cooperation and take stock on the previous successes, weaknesses and challenges.

Disasters being natural or man-made require quick and effective response through coordinated manner. Typhoons, floods, landslides, earthquakes etc are among the common type of disasters which continue to strike Southeast Asia countries. Malaysia however, is relatively less vulnerable to natural disasters as compared to its neighbours. Nevertheless, it also experiences a fair share of disasters, especially flood whereby 9% of Malaysia total land area are flood prone in which approximately resided by 4.8 million people facing the risk of floods. Moreover, while landslides and droughts often happens, Malaysia also faces haze caused by open burning and forest fires.

Civil-Military Coordination in HADR

Imminent calamities would eventually require close collaboration between civilian bodies and military. It is also important to note the unique focus and vision of every institution involved in civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Malaysia reiterates the importance of establishing standardized ASEAN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination courses and exercises to cultivate an effective coordination in times of disaster, to realize *One ASEAN One Response*, as well as building trust and confidence between the disaster

management entities and defence sector. ARF is a strategic platform for ASEAN and partners of many sectors to synergize strength, synch their focus and collectively execute HADR missions.

Taking into account the rising number of natural and man-made disasters at home as well as within the Southeast Asia region, the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) has been incorporated into ADMM-Plus structure, serving as a collective contribution of defence sector towards regional security architecture. Recognizing the importance of ADMM-Plus on HADR, Malaysia has introduced the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) on HADR with objective to facilitate the coordination and rapid deployment of ASEAN military capabilities, under a single ASEAN banner, to areas of crises in a quick and timely manner. The proposal was adopted at the 9th ADMM in 2015 in Langkawi, Malaysia, and in the following year, the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the AMRG on HADR was adopted during the 10th ADMM in Vientianne, Lao PDR in 2016.

The AMRG on HADR has been executed under the ambit of ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on HADR, co-chaired by Malaysia and United States of America from 2017 to 2020. The operationalisation of the AMRG on HADR and enhancement of civilian-military cooperation in HADR are the main outputs of the 3rd Cycle of the EWG on HADR. The underlying objective is to enhance cooperation among ASEAN countries and strengthen regional capability in dealing with security challenges, in particular disasters. Under this partnership, the 12th ADMM has adopted the ToR on Military Representative in 2018 and is now looking forward to concluding and adopting its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) by 2020.

Not limited to regional context of ASEAN, Malaysia also has been actively participating in HADR initiatives globally. The early days saw Malaysian military armed forces deployed to Chaman, Pakistan in 2001/2002, Acheh in 2005, Battagram, Pakistan Earthquake Assistance in 2005/2006 etc. These initiatives were aligned to Tun Mahathir policy of 'Islamic Ummah' which interlocking with Malaysia's humanitarian responsibility under foreign relations framework. In view of this, Malaysia also has participated in peacekeeping operations and HADR in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 war.

Likewise, our recent HADR initiatives involve response to the Rohingua refugees' crisis. The Government of Malaysia has agreed to set up the Malaysian Field Hospital at Cox Bazar in November 2017 which is currently manned by 56 personnel, of which 16 are medical officers and specialists.

Malaysia under the ADMM and ADMM-Plus EWG platforms, mooted and table the concept of an ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief or AMRG on HADR, as a collective group of militaries of ASEAN countries working together with the goal to prepare for an ASEAN military team for quick deployment to areas of crises in coordinated manner. The coordination will be under a single ASEAN banner, considering the existing regional response mechanisms as coordinated by AHA Centre. The proposal was adopted at the 9th ADMM in 2015 in Langkawi, Malaysia, and, the TOR of the AMRG on HADR was adopted during the 10th ADMM in Vientianne, Lao PDR in 2016.

The initiative has been executed under the ADMM-Plus Exert Working Group on HADR co-chaired by Malaysia and United States of America under the third cycle of 2017 to 2020. The operationalisation of the AMRG on HADR is the first objective of the EWG through series of testing with the final Staff Exercise (STAFFEX) and Communication Exercise (COMMEX) in July 2019 to further testing and refined SOPs for finalisation and adoption by ADMM in 2020. The second objective, aimed at integrating ADMM-Plus HADR initiatives into broader ASEAN Disaster Relief and Emergency Response, by integrating national focal points for disaster management, the AHA Centre, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), as appropriate, into AMRG activities, which will also be further tested in the final STAFFEX and COMMEX. While ASEAN militaries are a first responder, militaries do not operate in a vacuum when conducting HADR in ASEAN; as such the civilianmilitary stakeholder cooperation and coordination mechanisms need to be address too. For that, the inclusion of relevant support mechanisms and initiatives in the AMRG on HADR and ASEAN MNCC SOPS are vital to the timely and effective delivery of lifesaving assistance to disaster victim.

Through the EWG and across key sectoral pillars, joint training and exercises with Plus countries are continuously carried out to develop capability of the defence establishments as well as a platform for professional development towards achieving the 'One ASEAN One Response' of ASEAN Disaster Relief and Emergency Response.

Maritime Security

Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines established $the \, Framework \, for \, Trilateral \, Cooperative \, Arrangement$ between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Immediate Measures to Address Security Issues in the Maritime Areas of Common Concern (Framework TCA) in Jakarta, Indonesia on 14 July 2016. The Framework TCA was designed to intensify maritime security efforts to address security challenges, including kidnapping of seafarers by militant groups and transnational crimes.

Under the Framework TCA, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have agreed, inter alia, to render immediate assistance, share information and intelligence, establish a focal point and hotline of communication as well as establish a Transit Corridor to provide a safe passage for merchant ships transiting the maritime areas of common concern. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have further agreed to undertake trilateral maritime patrol, trilateral air patrol and trilateral port visit to enhance maritime security and safety in the Sulawesi Sea and Sulu Sea area. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have also established the INDOMALPHI Joint Working Group Meeting on Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement to serve as a platform to formulate, coordinate and implements the Framework TCA's activities.

The signing and implementation of the Framework TCA by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are a testament to the shared commitment by the three countries to tackle the growing security challenges, particularly armed robbery against ships and kidnapping for ransom in the maritime areas of common concern.

IV. Role of the ARF

Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF is now more than a quarter century old this year. It is an ambitious project in regional security cooperation that brings together 27 participating countries to engage in constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security matters and contribute towards "confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region".

Like our fellow ARF Participants, Malaysia is of the view that it is important to build on the ARF's current work, with the aim of addressing the region's security challenges. This process must take place at a pace comfortable to all, on the basis of consensus, in line with established principles of the ARF. Malaysia firmly believes that despite the progress made thus far, the ARF cannot be complacent with what it has achieved. The ARF has to adapt itself to the new security challenges especially in light of the evolving global and regional environment. This would be a daunting task as these challenges are multi-faceted and cross-dimensional in nature. However, this scenario should present the ARF Participating Countries with an opportunity to renew their individual and collective commitment in strengthening existing dialogues and practical cooperation. After 25 years, should be able to transform from "a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues", to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security as well as to embrace cooperation in the diverse fields of comprehensive security.

MYANMAR

Overview of the Regional Security Environment

- General observations of contemporary regional security environment according to each country's security perspective
- Asia-Pacific is a strategically important region in the world. As Southeast Asia is typically included in Asia-Pacific region, some problems occurring in Asia Pacific region have threatened the peace, stability and security in the region. Southeast Asia region is strategically located between Eastern and Western hemispheres of the world. In Southeast Asia, the synergy of ASEAN member states in the political, economic and cultural sectors, have largely contributed to regional security and stability. Yet, among the ASEAN member states, issues such as border disputes between neighboring countries, multiple claims to certain islands, illegal border trades, transnational crimes, human trafficking and interference in the internal affairs of other nations are the problems that needed to be carefully tackled.
- The military expansions of regional states, the issues of disputed islands in East Asia and the power rivalry of super powers are the regional security problems which can transmute from the form of a spark to a flame at any time. If the problems are not peacefully tackled, these situations will impact from state-level security to regional security. As mentioned above, there are not only traditional security threats to the Asia-Pacific region, but also the non-traditional security threats to the region. The threats include inter-national terrorism, production of WMDs, arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal drugs producing and trafficking, human trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters and climate change, epidemic of infected diseases and illegal

migration. As the consequences of technology developments, the momentum of Globalization assists the spread of non-traditional security problems and such threats are likely to endanger the regional to global security.

2. **National Security and Defence Policy**

Overview of national security and a. defence policy

- Identify and briefly discuss national security and defence orientation, doctrine, and/ or strategy
- Myanmar Tatmadaw upholds the three main national causes as the national policy and always takes the responsibility of national security and defence. Regarding the Defence of the Union of Myanmar, the article 42 of State Constitution (2008) has clearly promulgated that:
 - The Union of Myanmar shall not commence aggression against any nation.
 - No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of Myanmar.
- The Republic of the Union of Myanmar lays down the following National Defence Policies to safeguard the national interests of the Union as well as the citizens:
 - To prevent all acts detrimental to the three main national causes which are non-disintegration of the Union, nondisintegration of the national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.
 - To formulate the National Defence with (ii) the People's War Strategy centered at Tatmadaw as pillar depending on the synergy of entire people.
 - (iii) To valiantly and effectively prevent foreign aggression and interference in the internal affairs of the Union,

- deploying various ways and means while avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
- (iv) To employ a defence system that has oriented towards friendly relations with other nations in accord with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
- (v) Not to permit forming military alliance with other nations and the deployment of any foreign troops in the territory of the Union.
- (vi) To cooperate with international community in non-traditional security issues and anti-terrorist affairs and to render assistance when calamities occur in the Union.

b. Data Contribution to ARF Arms Register

- Provide all requisite information as per the following subcategories
 - i Total defence expenditure on annual basis
 - (1) Defence expenditure The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar allocated Defence Budget about US \$ 2.1 Billion (3.1 % of GDP) for 2018-2019 fiscal year.

3. National Security and Defence Policy

- Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and has promoted the regional cooperation. In the same year, Myanmar became the member of Bay of Bengal Initiative of Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and has promoted the cooperation with South Asian countries. After becoming the ASEAN Member State, Myanmar joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is the most important political and security platform in Asia-Pacific region and has participated in the dialogues and workshops organized by the ARF.
- Myanmar has commenced the formulation of the bills for anti-terrorism since 2005.
 After carrying out the amending and adding

- the complements to the bills with regard to the funding terrorism and handing over of criminals, Myanmar signed the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Among Like-Minded ASEAN Member Countries. Moreover, Myanmar signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism-ACCT as member in 2007 and ratified the Convention in 2012.
- Regarding anti-narcotic measures, Myanmar has attended annual Meetings of ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter-ASOD as an observer before joining ASEAN. After becoming a member of ASEAN in August 1997, Myanmar has annually attended the ASOD since its 20th meeting in Brunei and has been implementing its resolutions.
- Myanmar had successfully hosted1st ASEAN Military Medicine Conference from 18 to 22 February 2018, 25th Annual Myanmar Military Medical Conference from 21 to23 February 2018, 6th Myanmar-Thai Navy to Navy Talks from 14 to 17 May 2018, 6th ASEAN Militaries Analyst-to-Analyst Intelligence Exchange from 27 to 29 November 2018 and 2nd ASEAN Military Medicine Conference from 17 to 21 February 2019.
 - For regional cooperation, Myanmar signed the MOU for narcotic drugs control with China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia in 1993 and MOU for the Centre of Information Sharing in Asia-Pacific region was signed with ASEAN Member States and Republic of Korea in 2014. A 15-year project for total elimination of narcotic drugs was implemented from 1999-2000 to 2013-2014 through the adoption of five measures: the elimination of poppy cultivation; eradication of narcotic drug use; preventative measures; organising local people to support the measure; and cooperation with international organizations. Anti-narcotic measures are also conducted in real time collaboration with adjacent countries in the region. In order to meet Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Project's requirements, another 5-year drug elimination plan for the fiscal years 2014-2015 to 2018-2019 is currently being implemented. For the effectiveness of

anti-narcotic measures, the Department of Narcotic Drugs Elimination was reorganized into Myanmar Police Force Narcotic Drug Suppression Division in 2013.

- In order to develop the friendly relations with regional countries, senior officials from Myanmar Armed Forces have all paid goodwill visits to regional countries. Reciprocally, military leaders from regional countries have also paid goodwill visits to Myanmar. Senior military officials and related ministers from Myanmar have attended ASEAN defencerelated meetings and participated in regional security activities. Moreover, Myanmar has participated in regional security exercises.
- As ASEAN is enclosed in the Asia-Pacific region, the security threats to the region are also challenges for ASEAN. International terrorism, production of WMDs, arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal drug producing and smuggling, human trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters, climate change, epidemic of infected diseases and illegal migration are the challenges not only for the region but also for the global security.

Act of terror is still remained as one of the most challenging measures to the sustainable security in the ASEAN region even though sustainable security in fact focuses on four interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity: climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the majority world, and global militarisation. The underlying root causes for such acts of terror are affiliated with the stimulus such as politics, nationalism and religion. Regardless of type of terrorism, human resources and modernized technologies will compulsorily be required in order to conduct counter terrorism.

As the impacts of the security threats grow among ASEAN member states, all member states have compulsorily to share the information related to counter terrorism. Any type of terrorism is to be the concerns of any country, and the common security threat for ASEAN Member States, the deeper cooperation among ASEAN militaries become necessary.

Preventive measures and intelligence services should be sorted out as a high priority, additionally accompanying activities such as enhancing cooperation, reciprocal assistance in technology and training sectors, bilateral and multilateral support among countries and creating blockage in interconnection among terrorist extremist groups.

- The acts of terror become the prominent threat in 21st century, and these terrorist activities are carried out by the individual groups or non-state actors. Some terrorist organizations are able to establish their connection not only with other organization within the country, but also with those from other countries and regions. Consequently, the cooperation among ASEAN member states is necessarily required for conducting counter terrorism, otherwise the Safe Havens for the terrorist organizations will also be existed occurring their continuous attacks around the world.
- As for Myanmar, the Union is actively participating in matters relating to counter terrorism as in regional forums, workshops, and conferences in cooperation with other ASEAN member states and international communities. ASEAN member states have to enhance the bilateral and multilateral relations and deepen military and security cooperation to respond to the challenges relating to acts of terror which we are now confronting and support us building our future nations as to be peace, tranquil and developed. Coordination among countries will surely support for dissolving the problems and enable to confront the challenges. Moreover, the betterment of the relationship among the ASEAN militaries will ensure the successful implementation processes of counter terrorism.
- With regards to the role of ASEAN armed forces, the contributions of the armed forces based on the principles of coordination and cooperation to the stability and peace of the region are critically required. In responding to the regional security challenges by the cooperation and principles of joint actions,

the role of ASEAN armed forces should continue emphasizing on a more stable and secure region. Moreover, the non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters, terrorism, maritime security and transnational crimes, epidemics, food and energy security, human security, cybercrimes, climate changes and global warming are still regional concerns and the ASEAN armed forces should continue conducting the information sharing, capacity building, joint exercises and trainings.

ASEAN member states should continue enhancing peace and stability of the region in cooperative manner, encourage the states to sign the additional protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), cooperate more in the areas of traditional security challenges and non-traditional security challenges that will impact regional peace and stability such as the risk of extremists and terrorists, disaster management and information security, drug trafficking, human and arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal migration, money laundering, sea piracy and maritime security, climate change and epidemics like Zika.

Participation in cooperative arrangement in/ germane to Asia-Pacific

Indentify and briefly discuss national cum regional response to the following security issues as per their enclosed sub-categories. If necessary, include additional categories and discuss responses.

Vi. Cyber Security

Actions taken in adherence to ARF statement on Cooperation against Cyber Attacks and Incidents.

- Sharing of Information on National Strategies, Policies, Law Best Practices Standard Operating Producers (SOP) as well as Rules and Regulations
- Awareness- Raising and Information Sharing on Emergency Response to Cyber crimes, cyber attacks and cyber incidents
- Capacity Building for Cyber Security personnel

- Conducting Cyber Exercise and Cyber Security Competitions
- Information Sharing about Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
- Information Sharing about establishment of Sectoral CSIRS (Computer Security Incident Response Team)
- Cooperation and Coordination of ASEAN Member States to combat cuber crimes, cuber attacks and cyber incidents

NEW ZEALAND

1. Overview of the regional security environment

- 1. The Indo-Pacific region is central to New Zealand's security and economic wellbeing. New Zealand values its engagement with regional security architecture, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which promote the common goal of a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. New Zealand plays an active part in helping these forums realise their objectives. Sustained commitment to bilateral and regional relationships underlines the importance that New Zealand places on partnerships within the region and the wider global security environment.
- As a small country, New Zealand depends on 2. the international rules-based system to ensure an even playing field for all countries and to ensure the prosperity and stability of the region. These rules are not just for the benefit of small countries. They provide certainty and equal opportunities and protections for all states, no matter their size.
- In addition to a strong rules-based system, 3. close regional cooperation on security threats is increasingly important as the nature of threats continues to evolve. New Zealand is working to ensure that we – as a country and as a region – are equipped to deal with the emerging risks posed by the increased use of technology, potential security impacts of climate change and the diverse range of actors seeking to challenge global rules and norms.
- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be the most pressing security threat in our region. The DPRK's possession and ongoing development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is a clear violation of United Nations Security Council

- resolutions. We have been encouraged by dialogue and diplomatic efforts in the last 18 months towards a peaceful solution to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK, but the outcome of the US/DPRK Summit in Ha Noi in February 2019 was a reminder that the issues involved are complex and will take time to resolve. It is our hope that diplomatic efforts will continue and enable progress towards resolving the long-standing challenges on the Korean Peninsula and enhance the stability and prosperity of our region. New Zealand remains committed to its international obligations, including the full and effective implementation of sanctions in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
- 5. Prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific region also depends on a secure maritime environment and the peaceful resolution of disputes. All ARF members have an interest in avoiding miscalculations and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. New Zealand is concerned that activities such as land reclamation, construction and militarisation could escalate tensions and erode the trust and confidence that is needed to deliver solutions. It is important that all parties take steps to rebuild trust, avoid provocative actions and manage tensions. New Zealand continues to encourage full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties and conclusion of an effective and enduring Code of Conduct which is in accordance with international law and does not impinge on the rights and interests of third parties
- 6. New Zealand is also strongly committed to an open, rules-based trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring

longer term regional security and prosperity. New Zealand is committed to pursuing multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements that support this goal. New Zealand also aims to strengthen the broader regional trade architecture to ensure it is resilient to future shocks. New Zealand attaches considerable importance to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in 2010. New Zealand has other bilateral FTAs or Closer Economic Partnerships with many other ARF members, including China, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei.

Several ASEAN members are also part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which entered into force for New Zealand, Mexico, Singapore, Japan, Canada and Australia on 30 December 2018 and for Viet Nam on 14 January 2019. New Zealand is looking forward to Malaysia, Brunei, Chile and Peru ratifying the agreement ahead of the 2nd Commission meetings that we will host in Auckland between 7-9 October 2019. New Zealand is actively participating in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In addition to the network of free trade agreements, the work of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) promoting trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific is of considerable importance to New Zealand.

2. New Zealand's security and defence policy

2.1 Overview of national security and defence policy

As a founding member of the United Nations, respect for international norms and law is fundamental to New Zealand's approach to promoting security, stability and peace. While New Zealand's domestic territorial borders are distant from direct conflict, there are fragile states within the Indo-Pacific region. Trans-national threats such as the impacts of climate change, terrorism, arms proliferation, organised crime, and cyber attacks do not respect borders and have the ability to

disrupt in complex ways. Recognising this, New Zealand is highly committed to multilateral solutions to security threats and the promotion of effective international rules. New Zealand takes a multi-layered approach to security that includes strong bilateral relationships, regional partnerships, and support for regional architecture and institutions. ASEAN-centric regional security architecture has an increasingly important role in bringing countries together and providing a forum for discussions. Our view is that these forums fulfil an important role promoting understanding, entrenching habits of dialogue and facilitating practical military-to-military cooperation.

- 9. New Zealand therefore has a strong interest in fostering and maintaining a network of robust international relationships, which include:
- New Zealand's alliance with Australia;
- the Five Power Defence Arrangements (New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom);
- the Five Eyes partnership (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States);
- close bilateral ties with Pacific Island neighbours, including those for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities;
- close and growing bilateral ties with a number of Indo-Pacific partners from North Asia to Southeast Asia; and
- Pacific and Indo-Pacific regional security architecture such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM), the ARF and the ADMM Plus, in addition to the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process).
- 10. On the basis of ongoing Defence Assessment work and the Government's priorities, New Zealand has updated its defence policy settings in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. This Statement describes Defence's value to New Zealand in terms of its contributions to the community, the nation and the world, with emphasis on community and environmental resilience. It also provides an updated perspective on the evolving strategic environment; increases the priority

for the Defence Force being able to operate in the South Pacific (to the same level as that for New Zealand's territory, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica); features a new set of principles for Defence; and underscores the importance of contributing to New Zealand's key security partnerships. The statement reaffirmed that the ADMM-Plus remains New Zealand's principal forum for multilateral defence engagement in Asia. The Statement has been supplemented by standalone assessments such as The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities. The Statement will be supported by indicative planned investments as set out in the Defence Capability Plan 2019.

2.2 Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

11. The total appropriation for the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2018 was NZ\$3.271.120 billion, of which operating expenses were NZ\$2.562.901 billion and capital expenditure was NZ\$708.219 million.

3. New Zealand's contribution to regional security

Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

- 12. As was demonstrated by the callous and violent terrorist attack against the Muslim community at worship in New Zealand on 15 March 2019, no country is immune from the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. New Zealand remains firmly committed to countering terrorism and transnational organised crime. To prevent, detect, and respond to these threats, New Zealand is engaged at the multilateral, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
- 13. To support achievement of New Zealand's global security priorities, including assisting with capacity building in neighbouring states, New Zealand has a number of specialised security funds, including dedicated Global and Pacific Security Funds. The specialised security funds assist New Zealand's achievement of its Plan of Action with ASEAN, particularly in areas of border control; legislation;

- law enforcement; policy; irregular migration; and prevention/counter radicalisation and countering the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters.
- 14. Globally, Da'esh/ISIS and its affiliates continue to pose a significant threat to international and regional security. The March territorial defeat of Da'esh/ISIS in Syria does not mean victory, and the group has transitioned to insurgency tactics. There is also considerable risk presented by the possibility of foreign terrorist fighters currently in Iraq and Syria relocating to other conflict zones or returning home, including to our region.
- 15. In line with our commitment to reduce the risk of South East Asia being a target or source of terrorism we are sharpening our strategic focus, and plan to strengthen efforts to support partners to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, to counter the root causes of violent extremism by building resilient communities, and help invigorate mechanisms that promote coherence and coordination of counter-terrorism policy and practice within governments and across the region.
- 16. Breaking down the silos that impede cooperation within governments and the barriers that hinder cooperation between governments is necessary to tackle these significant and complex transnational security threats. New Zealand seeks to work closely with our partners in the region to invigorate mechanisms that help achieve coherence in policy and practice, including ASEAN-centred initiatives such as those under the umbrella of the ASEAN Regional Forum. New Zealand's offer to co-chair and host the 2020 ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime is indicative of the importance that we place on this regional mechanism, especially as a forum for advancing broader regional efforts to counter violent extremism online.
- 17. On a bilateral basis, capacity building in South East Asia is a significant focus of New Zealand's global counter-terrorism engagement. We have long-standing relationships with

institutions in the region such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement and the South East Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Malaysia). Recent examples of capacity building initiatives New Zealand has contributed to across the region include:

- training of law enforcement personnel on Countering Violent Extremism(CVE);
- training of corrections staff to help manage extremist prisoners;
- aviation security and counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training; and
- post-blast crime scene investigation courses.
- 18. New Zealand is a Steering Group member of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process). As part of our contribution to managing the security and humanitarian challenges posed by irregular migration, New Zealand is an active and constructive Bali Process member. In addition to Co-Chairing (with Fiji) the Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking Networks, New Zealand also provides support for regional capacity building, including through our capacity building assistance and secondment contributions to the Bali Process' Regional Support Office.
- 19. New Zealand also works closely with the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering to support the coordination of technical assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to combat transnational organised criminal and terrorist groups, by targeting their financial systems and processes. In 2017 we contributed NZ\$3.6million to the APG for a five-year activity that will support Pacific island countries in complying with international anti-money laundering standards.
- 20. New Zealand has funded and organised a number of regional capacity building workshops for ASEAN countries on key issues, including anti-money laundering/ counter-terrorist financing standards, cyber security, terrorist prosecutions, chemical and nuclear security, major event security, and maritime and aviation security. These efforts are complemented by significant bilateral

- work to build individual national capability, especially within law enforcement agencies.
- 21. New Zealand also participates in multilateral initiatives which engage on counter-terrorism projects in the region, including the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).
- 22. In addition to its work in South East Asia, New Zealand also works with Pacific Island countries (PICs) to help strengthen resilience and build capacity to respond to a range of shared security challenges. In 2018, Pacific Islands Forum Leaders endorsed a new declaration, the Boe Declaration, which affirms an expanded concept of security, encompassing traditional and non-traditional challenges encountered by the region, prioritising human security, environmental security, transnational crime, and cyber security. New Zealand strongly supports the implementation of the Boe Declaration, and channels this through new initiatives on information sharing, leadership training, cyber security, and national security policy development. These programmes are in addition to the number of initiatives New Zealand supports through the Pacific Islands Forum, including enhancing aviation and maritime security, drafting and implementing national counter-terrorism legislation and supporting the ratification of international counter-terrorism instruments. New Zealand works closely with and funds regional law enforcement agencies such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat, Oceania Customs Organisation and the Pacific Immigration Directors' Conference, and contributes to their consideration and responses to regional security issues. New Zealand provides technical assistance, capacity building, and mentoring for law enforcement and border agency officials in the region.

Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

23. New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also

- participated in the UNGA conference to negotiate the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). New Zealand ratified the TPNW treaty in 2018 and continues to encourage non-signatory states to sign, and signatories to ratify it. To this end, New Zealand hosted a conference in Auckland in 2018 specifically to support Pacific Island countries doing this and we attended a similar conference in Bangkok in 2018 focused on South East Asian countries. New Zealand has continued its active promotion of nuclear disarmament more generally, including through its membership of the New Agenda Coalition and its current leadership of the De-alerting Group.
- 24. New Zealand is a strong proponent of nuclear weapon-free zones in view of their role in reinforcing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. New Zealand is party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga) and has had legislation in place since 1987 creating a New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone. New Zealand strongly encourages all Nuclear Weapons States to ratify the Protocols to Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, including the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and the Treaty of Rarotonga, without any reservations or interpretative declarations.
- 25. New Zealand supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important contribution to regional and global security. New Zealand has welcomed ratification of the CTBT by Annex 1 and 2 states in the region and encourages ratifications by all ARF participants.
- 26. New Zealand is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides the global focal point for nuclear cooperation and safeguards. New Zealand is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and supports international projects involving the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We encourage all states to sign Additional Protocol agreements with the IAEA.

- 27. New Zealand joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in 2007, and is committed alongside over 80 GICNT partners to preventing nuclear or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. New Zealand has contributed to the GICNT in the Indo-Pacific region by: developing a table-top exercise kit for use by other GICNT partners in testing their own national response systems; supporting radioactive source security projects in Southeast Asia; providing funding support to GICNT workshops in the Indo-Pacific region; and helping its Pacific island neighbours address the risk of nuclear/ radiological security.
- 28. New Zealand is a strong proponent of enhancing nuclear security. In 2016, New Zealand ratified two key nuclear security treaties: the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In 2016, New Zealand also enacted a new Radiation Safety Act to ensure its legislative framework for the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material meets current international best practice. New Zealand has provided financial support for nuclear security capacitybuilding projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
- 29. New Zealand is a party to Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. It has provided financial assistance for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to assist with the removal of chemical weapons materials in Libya and Syria, and has spoken out strongly against the use of chemical weapons in Malaysia, Syria and the UK.
- 30. New Zealand works to prevent proliferation by helping to develop and implement export controls as an active member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. New Zealand has in place a comprehensive national export control regime. New Zealand will chair the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2019-2020.

- 31. New Zealand's involvement in the Proliferation Security Initiative, including its membership of the Operational Experts Group (the PSI steering committee) and participation in exercises and capacity building initiatives have enhanced New Zealand's capabilities to prevent proliferation activity both nationally and in collaboration with partners. New Zealand has developed (and shared with PSI partners) a Model National Response Plan, which provides easy-to-follow guidance on the range of issues that need to be considered in developing a framework for responding to proliferation situations. As part of the PSI Asia-Pacific exercise rotation, New Zealand hosted a PSI table-top exercise in Wellington in 2015. New Zealand would welcome further adherence to the PSI throughout the Asia-Pacific as part of a coordinated effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.
- 32. Given the role played by the unregulated global arms trade in fuelling conflict, New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which it ratified in 2014. It sees the ATT contributing meaningfully to international and regional peace, security and stability. To support broader membership of the Treaty, New Zealand sponsored the development of ATT model legislation and also of a control list in order to assist countries to implement their domestic obligations under the ATT. New Zealand also hosted a conference in Auckland in 2018 to promote greater adherence to the ATT and other conventional arms treaties among Pacific Island countries. New Zealand looks forward to working closely with its ARF partners to build a strong ATT regime.
- 33. New Zealand strongly supports the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APLMBC). New Zealand is currently the coordinator for national implementation measures in the CCM and has produced model legislation for use by small states with no history of use or contamination. New Zealand encourages other ARF participants that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to both Conventions.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

- 34. The Indo-Pacific region continues to be afflicted by natural disasters that underline the need to continue deepening practical and effective cooperation in relation to disaster reduction, response, relief and recovery. New Zealand has been an active participant in ARF and EAS exercises to prepare and respond to regional disasters. Over the past year, New Zealand has supported humanitarian responses totalling NZ\$8.75 million encompassing the Sunda Strait tsunami (Indonesia); the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami (Indonesia); the Lombok earthquake (Indonesia); Typhoon Mangkhut (Philippines); flooding in Lao PDR; support for stateless Rohingya communities (northern Myanmar); and support for displaced peoples and host communities impacted by conflict in Marawi (Philippines).
- 35. New Zealand is continuing to play its part in deepening regional capacity to prepare and respond to disasters, including drawing on lessons learned from the Christchurch earthquakes. New Zealand is committed to further cooperation and implementation of work plans in ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS contexts. Disaster Risk Management is a priority study area for our knowledge and skills investments in the Indo-Pacific region.
- 36. New Zealand has been a solid proponent of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre since its inception, and has trained ASEAN officials in disaster response leadership at the University of Canterbury and contributed technical expertise to the Centre. We are currently jointly working on a needs assessment and design of an AHA Centre e-learning series.
- 37. New Zealand successfully co-hosted the Pacific Environmental Security Forum (PESF) with the United States Indo-Pacific Command (US INDOPACOM) on 21-24 May 2019. The Forum convened 120 civil-military participants from nearly 40 Asia-Pacific countries and regional organisations. Discussions centred on the theme of building resilience in the Pacific and facilitated

alignment with existing regional efforts. The forum generated strong momentum for the network of mid-senior regional practitioners and identified environmental security projects for practical civilian and military partnership. The US INDOPACOM seeks to continue this momentum towards the Philippines' hosting of the PESF in 2020.

38. New Zealand has a strong legacy of supporting Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) clearance in the Indo-Pacific region for nearly 20 years. We currently implement an \$11.5 million four year package of demining support in Lao PDR.

Maritime Security

- 39. In 2008, ARF Ministers identified maritime security as one of the ARF's key areas. New Zealand is actively involved in implementation of the maritime security work plan, and in sharing its experiences on various maritime security-related issues, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and oil-spill response.
- 40. New Zealand co-hosted with Malaysia an ARF Capacity Building Workshop on Ship Profiling in Kuala Lumpur, 24 to 25 May 2016. The workshop improved the capacity of ARF participants in ship profiling, helping countries develop greater maritime awareness, which in turn contributes to regional maritime security.
- 41. In May 2018, New Zealand hosted the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue with Singapore as co-chair. The dialogue included thematic sessions on maritime counter-terrorism, counter-terrorism interagency cooperation, and chemical, biological and radiological defence.

ICTs Security

42. Connectivity is a crucial driver of our region's growth. However, with increased connectivity comes increased exposure to cyber threats. New Zealand remains concerned by the growing number of cyber incidents globally, including activity undertaken by both state and non-state actors. New Zealand sees the ARF as an important forum to improve transparency, understanding and confidence

- among regional partners in cyber space. To this end, we were pleased to participate in the second Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the use of ICTS in March 2019, and the associated Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures. We are pleased with the progress made on a number of concrete measures, including establishment of a Points of Contact Database, and look forward to further progress in this area.
- 43. New Zealand remains committed to building regional cyber security capacity, including through membership of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, with a particular focus on our Pacific and South-East Asian neighbours. In the ADMM-Plus, New Zealand has co-chaired with the Philippines the new Experts' Working Group on Cyber Security since April 2017. During the three year term as co-chair, New Zealand seeks to promote practical and effective cooperation among ADMM-Plus countries to enhance capacity for the protection of cyberspace and address challenges to regional cyber security. To date, four ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Cyber Security meetings and a Cyber Security Legal Seminar have been hosted by the co-chairs. The Expert Working Group has successfully agreed a cyber incidents points of contact directory; hosted a cyber security legal seminar for subject matter experts; compiled a cyber terminology glossary; and devised a draft communications plan to guide how cyber security issues are escalated and communicated.
- 44. One growing ICT challenge the region faces is the unprecedented use of social media by terrorist groups. This has forced states to adapt, with many adopting sophisticated counter-messaging protocols and systems to enable them to convey another view to would-be terrorists. New Zealand experienced first-hand how social media can be co-opted as a tool of terrorism in the attacks of 15 March on Christchurch's Muslim community. In response, New Zealand developed (with France) the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online. The Call represents a unique effort to have

tech companies and countries work together to tackle the shared problem of this content and its harmful effects, while protecting a free and open internet and human rights online.

4. Role of ARF

New Zealand's contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

- 45. For New Zealand, the ARF is a key mechanism for security engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. It contributes to building an environment of dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of regional security issues. The ARF is also contributing in an important way to the development of international norms and principles on security that are directly relevant to this region. The large number and diversity of practical ARF projects under implementation in 2019 reflects the ARF's increasing ability to respond to contemporary security challenges facing this part of the world.
- 46. New Zealand also attaches considerable importance to working with its ARF partners to advance the ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda, in line with the ARF's three-stage evolution. In April 2019, New Zealand co-chaired with the US, Indonesia and Timor-Leste a Preventive Diplomacy Workshop on Early Warning Systems in Dili. This workshop followed two others co-chaired by New Zealand: one on negotiation and mediation in Naypyidaw in September 2018 (with the US and Myanmar) and one on Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-conflict Environment in Dili in April 2017 (with Singapore and Timor-Leste).
- 47. New Zealand is committed to working with its ASEAN partners to ensure coherence between the ARF and other pieces of the regional architecture, in particular the EAS and ADMM-Plus. While the ARF and ADMM-Plus have their distinct mandates and different memberships, greater functional coordination between them on issues that straddle multiple fora, such as disaster relief/management, cyber security and maritime security, would help to achieve streamlining and eliminate unnecessary duplication of activities. New Zealand also actively supports efforts to

strengthen the EAS, to ensure it can fulfil its role as the region's premier forum for leaders to address issues of strategic risk.

Future of ARF

48. The ARF is a forum that was established with the aim of fostering habits of constructive dialogue on issues of concern. At the ARF's outset it was envisaged that the Forum would move as part of its evolution from a confidence building phase to preventive diplomacy, and finally to conflict resolution. The ARF has constructed a solid base of confidence building measures and made progress in the field of preventive diplomacy. But it has yet to reach its potential. New Zealand supports the ARF in increasing its capacity and effectiveness in the preventive diplomacy space, and encourages all participants to keep an eye to the future to ensure we are well-equipped when we move into the conflict resolution phase.

THE PHILIPPINES

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

- 1. For decades, the Asia Pacific has been one of the fastest growing regions in the world, reaping the benefits of economic integration and interdependence. However, the rapid shifts in the global balance of power could risk disrupting the region's peace and prosperity. While the security environment in the region is relatively stable, it remains susceptible to the complex relationships and growing strategic divergences between major powers. In fact, their competing visions for regional order is one of the key uncertainties in the future of the Asia Pacific.
- The region also continues to face an array of immediate security problems that challenge the ability of states to engage in cooperative actions. These range from longstanding territorial disputes and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, transnational crimes, natural disasters and humanitarian crises, and cybercrimes. Enhanced dialogue and meaningful cooperation among states, external partners, and other relevant stakeholders are therefore necessary to effectively address these issues and prevent those that may seek to undermine prospects for stability and security in the region. Equally important, commitments must be concretized into tangible outcomes.

Maritime Security

3. In the quest for sustainable development, great emphasis is placed on maritime security to provide a stable and secure environment in which economic growth can take place. The seas and oceans are the shared heritage of humankind – connecting and transcending nationalities and regions – making possible the transit of voluminous trade that sustain the economies. However, the seas and oceans

- can also become channels for security threats. Apart from the disputes over sovereign rights in parts of the seas, militarization and other unilateral activities may increase tension and undermine regional stability. Other challenges associated with managing maritime spaces include marine environmental degradation, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships, safety of navigation, smuggling of illicit drugs, trafficking in persons, and climate change.
- 4. To address these maritime security concerns, states must build their own enforcement capacity, and patiently engage in sustained dialogue and meaningful cooperation grounded on international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as shared values and interests.

Situation in the Korean Peninsula

- 5. The continuous intensification of cross-border engagements between the Republic of South Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signals a positive momentum towards achieving the goal of reconciliation and sustainable peace in the Korea Peninsula. The establishment of an inter-Korean liaison office in Kaeshong and the conduct of a joint railway inspection in North Korea are concrete developments that reinforce the efforts towards realizing demilitarization, inter-Korean economic cooperation, and a peace treaty to finally conclude the Korean War.
- 6. The Summits between the United States (US) President Donald Trump and the DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un held in June 2018 in Singapore and February 2019 in Hanoi, though regarded as breakthroughs, continue to face difficulties in harmonizing perspectives and ensuring tangible progress. There remain uncertainties about DPRK's

willingness to dismantle its nuclear facilities as reports show that 13 of approximately 20 undeclared ballistic missile operating bases are active in DPRK's mountainous regions.¹ This development poses serious threat not only to the Korean Peninsula, but also to the broader Asia-Pacific region. The DPRK should therefore remain committed to efforts towards achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region. The international community, for its part, should remain vigilant and committed to effectively enforcing UNSC resolutions and upholding international regimes on non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction

Regional Power Dynamics

- 7. The regional security environment is largely underpinned by the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between and among major powers. This rivalry figures prominently as the most vital long-term strategic concern in the region, necessitating the prudent management of relations and the strengthening of existing multilateral mechanisms. The emergence of new ideas and concepts for a regional security architecture need to be underpinned by the goal of enhancing existing mechanisms, and ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation.
- 8. Amidst the changes in the security landscape, sustaining ASEAN Centrality is vital to manage the impact of the actions by and interactions among major powers in the region. Regional peace and stability will rest on the commitment and efforts by all states to a stable, open, and rules-based order.

Terrorism

1. The evolving nature of terrorism and violent extremism is considered a global security threat. With the loss of its territory in the Middle East, the Islamic State (IS) is redirecting its resources to other regions where IS remains to be relevant and have strong affiliates,

- such as Southeast Asia. Local terror groups that have pledged allegiance to IS and have established Southeast Asia as a fertile hotbed for Daesh recruitment and operations, putting the region at risk of becoming an alternate arena in realizing IS's long-term goals of expanding its territory, influence, and ideology.
- Qaeda have become increasingly lethal as they adapt to technological advancements. The growing sophistication of terror groups has been apparent in their recruitment and radicalization techniques, particularly in the use of cyberspace and social media. Reports have shown that there is growing usage and distribution of online terrorrelated manuals, audio, and video clips. Terror organizations have also established their own specialized websites and online portals through encrypted methods available for their members and radicals worldwide.
- The extent of terrorism and its evolving nature necessitate stronger cooperation and collaboration among states and other stakeholders. Apart from sharing of best practices and expertise in deradicalization, national governments must also continue to strengthen and standardize security laws and border controls, increase intelligencesharing, enhance community vigilance, and develop rehabilitation practices and preventive measures.ASEAN Member States may also consider increasing combined training and operation programs, utilizing state of the art technology. Likewise, there must be urgency in addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism and violent extremism such as economic inequality, social injustices, and marginalization.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

4. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to non-state actors constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. The risk that the region may be used as a hub for the illicit trade, transfer or diversion of sensitive items and commodities that have WMD significance should not be disregarded. With the growing terrorist threat,

¹ Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha, and Lisa Collins, "Undeclared North Korea: Missile Operating Bases Revealed," CSIS, November 12, 2018, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-koreas-undeclared-missile-operating-bases/ (accessed February 6, 2019).

states are called to abide byand fully implement treaties and agreements on arms control and nonproliferation.

Cybersecurity

- The rapid advancement of information and communications technologies (ICTs) is one of the critical issues affecting global security. The growing global dependence on ICTs increases sophisticated cybersecurity risks such as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, data breaches, electronic espionage, state-sponsored cyberwarfare, cybercrimes involving financial fraud, and online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Cyberattacks compromise national security by paralyzing government functions and disrupting military technologies, disrupting financial institutions and business corporations, and endangering the lives, privacy, and safety of ordinary citizens. In addition, the easy access to the internet has also resulted in the rise of radicalization, as insurgents, terrorists, and other groups have used this space to spread extremist ideologies and false information.
- 6. The international community should be able to effectively adapt and respond to challenges emanating from cyberspace, especially as cybercrimes transcend international border. This would entail updating national legislations on cubercrime-related issues, increasing the number and building the capacity of cybersecurity professionals and experts, especially in the law enforcement and security sectors, and strengthening critical infrastructures. There should also be enhanced and sustained cooperation and collaboration between stakeholders at the local, national, regional, and international levels to address the gaps and ongoing improvements in strengthening cybersecurity initiatives.

Natural Disasters

According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNSIDR) and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED), climate-related and geophysical disasters in 2017 killed 1.3 million people worldwide and left more than 4.4 billion people injured, homeless, displaced and

in need of emergency assistance². According to the Asian Development Bank, damage caused by disasters amounts to USD 48.7 billion annually in the Asia Pacific³. Hence, the increasing intensity and frequency of natural disasters is a major concern for the international community. States must continue to implement measures geared towards environmental preservation and sustainable development to mitigate the impact of climate change, and enhance disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) initiatives to build community resilience.

II. National Security and **Defense Policy**

Overview of National Security and Α. **Defense Policy**

- The Philippines advances its commitment to 8. achieve its vision of a secure, peaceful, and prosperous nation with the adoption of the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2018 entitled "Security and Development for Transformative Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People." The NSS, which was formally launched in July 2018, articulates in concrete terms the country's National Security Policy (NSP) and lays down the ways and means to attain the national security vision. Priority strategic actions were identified through a holistic and multi-sectoral approach to address the challenges and threats to national security. The evolving security environment at the regional and international levels informs the Philippines's domestic policies. In this regard, the NSS steers the country's collective efforts towards regional development and stability.
- 9. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018-2022 manifests the government's firm commitment to protect the Filipino people and safeguard national security

² Economic losses, poverty and disasters: 1998-2017. Available at https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/61119 (accessed 19 March 2019).

³ Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific. Available at https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climatechange-asia-and-pacific (accessed 19 March 2019).

from existing and emerging threats brought about by an increasingly volatile security environment. It serves as the cornerstone of Philippine defense policy in upholding the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, promoting and sustaining internal stability, disaster risk preparedness, global peace and security operations, and good governance. The NDS reinforces the mutual role of security and development in nation-building. It also highlights the importance of securing public order and national security as key factors to achieving inclusive growth, resilient society, and a globally competitive economy.

10. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remains steadfast in upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the country. The exercise of their constitutional mandate is guided by the National Military Strategy (NMS) 2018. The NMS advocates for the holistic, multi-sectoral, and people-centered approach to safeguarding national security.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

11. For the fiscal year 2019, the allocated defense budget of the Philippines is PHP 186.2 billion (USD 3.6 billion), which is a 36.4 percent increase from PHP 136.5 billion (USD 2.610 billion) allocation in 2018. The defense budget also amounts to 5 percent of the proposed government budget (PHP 3.757 trillion) for 2019.

III. National Contributions to Promoting Regional Security

A. Counter-terrorism

12. The 2018 Global Terrorism Index cautioned that while terrorism-related deaths worldwide declined in 2017, the Philippines and Myanmar are the Southeast Asian countries recorded to have the highest number of deaths in 2017 since 2002. It ranks the Philippines as the 10th country worldwide with a high terrorism impact. Apart from the IS and its affiliates, the New People's Army (NPA) is also considered a perpetrator of violence and terrorism in the country. The NPA was responsible for 235 attacks in 204 cities across the country in 2017.

- 13. The Government's new anti-terrorism campaign, Development Support and Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan, utilizes a Development-Governance-Security Framework which takes cognizance of the important relationship among development, governance, security, and sustainability. It primarily seeks to address internal security threats, specifically, the Communist Terrorist Group (CTG) or the CPP-NPA-NDF, and the Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs) composed of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI). It is built on the country's Ambisyon 2040, the Philippine Development Plan, the National Security Policy, the National Peace and Security Roadmap, and the Department of National Defense Guidance and Policy Thrusts.
- 14. DSSP Kapayapaan also identifies areas of cooperation and convergence among government forces, specifically the AFP, national and local government units, and other stakeholders, including the civil society, non-governmental organizations, academe, and religious sector. The AFP seeks to enhance linkages with these stakeholders as they have the potential to help bridge the gap in services to communities through community-based development, technology, research, conflict resolution, information campaign, values education, and enabling mechanisms for mobilizing local, national, and international support for peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, the DSSP *Kapayapaan* employs strategies that are consistent with the rule of law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law.
- 15. On the rehabilitation of Marawi City, the Philippine government has unveiled a master plan that covers five priority areas:
 - Implementation of Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (BMCRRP) which covers areas outside Ground Zero;
 - 2. Creation of a compensation fund;
 - Rehabilitation of Ground Zero or the Most Affected Area (MAA);

- 4. Livelihood assistance; and
- 5. Rebuilding of mosques.

The master plan is estimated to have a total funding requirement of PHP 86.5 billion or USD 1.63 billion. Actions are also being undertaken to address debris management, land acquisition, and the construction of road infrastructure, and underground and water facilities. The government seeks to complete the rehabilitation project in three to five years. Through this endeavor, the government hopes to help residents resume their normal lives, particularly the internally displaced persons (IDPs), women and children.

- 16. The Philippine government recognizes that the defeat of the Daesh-inspired terror groups in Marawi City requires further strengthening of counter-terrorism efforts. Thus, the Armed Forces of the Philippines established the Counter-Violent Extremism Plan which guides the AFP in preventing the spread of violent extremism and Daesh ideology and the possible establishment of a wilayat or an ISIS province in the country. It highlights the important nexus between sustainable development and security governance, and incorporates the whole-ofnation approach. The country is also steadfast and vigilant on the possible return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) from Southeast Asia who initially joined IS in Syria and Iraq. The Philippine Bomb Data Center (PBDC), in coordination with the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC), INTERPOL General Secretariat and other pertinent national government agencies, have operationalized the INTERPOL Project Watchmaker Database through a border management operation at the Zamboanga Seaport in Zamboanga City. This initiative aims to screen, identify, and arrest personalities listed in the database and includes the recovery and confiscation of explosives. Moreover, the government is also strengthening its efforts to prevent backdoor entry of bio-terrorism related materials.
- 17. In order to address terrorism financing, Republic Act 10168, otherwise known as the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012, was enacted by the Philippine Congress. This is a significant progress as this legislation gives authority to the Anti-Money Laundering Council to investigate terrorism financing and issue an ex parte order to freeze, without delay, property or funds that are in any way related to terrorism financing, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the Anti-Terrorism Council. RA 10168 also enumerates acts that constitute financing of terrorism and its corresponding penalties.
- 18. Recognizing the increasing popularity and use of virtual currencies for money laundering and terrorism financing, the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) released Circular 944 s. 2017. The Circular requires remittance and transfer companies to be certified by the BSP. At the same time, it mandates companies to put in place adequate risk management and security control mechanisms to address, manage, and mitigate technology risks associated with virtual currencies.
- 19. To complement its national initiatives and policies, the Philippines is actively participating in multilateral efforts to combat terrorism. Through ASEAN, Member States and their Dialogue Partners are able to develop concrete capacity-building and information sharing initiatives in combating terrorism in both land and sea. One example is the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Counter Terrorism (CT) which has conducted counter terrorism exercises through the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security (MS) and CT Exercises. The Philippines also supports the ASEAN Our Eyes Initiative (AOEI), which is an intelligence-sharing platform in the region that aims to facilitate a more effective and immediate response terrorism.
- 20. The Philippines also appreciates the improving situation in the tri-border area in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea. The adoption of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) in 2016 by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines has

- considerably enhanced regional efforts in addressing piracy, terrorism, kidnappings, and other crimes at sea in their shared maritime borders. To further strengthen the TCA, coordinated maritime and air patrols have been instituted in the area through the Trilateral Maritime Patrol and Joint Air Patrols mechanisms launched in June 2017 and October 2017, respectively. Information-sharing and communications has also been implemented through the establishment of Military Coordination Centers (MCCs) in each of the member states in Tarakan, Indonesia, Tawau, Malaysia, and Bonggao, Philippines.
- 21. Since the adoption of the TCA, Abu Sayaf Group seaborne kidnappings targeting foreign personalities along the maritime areas of common concerns have been significantly reduced, resulting in less ransom money collected for the group. Reported cases of crew abductions in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea have declined to two actual incidents and one attempted incident in 2018, down from three incidents and four attempts in 2017, and 12 incidents and six attempts in 2016, according to the data collected by the ReCAAP ISC.
- 22. In September 2018, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines recognized the need to address threats posed by the Daesh and other terrorist groups, including the importance of a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism and the continuing need for greater regional integration. Notwithstanding continuing challenges, the TCA shows the importance of regional cooperative mechanisms to effectively address transnational maritime threats. The TCA also aligns with the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security issued in 2003.
- Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament
- 23. The Philippines's firm and principled commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation is anchored on its 1987 Constitution which states that "the Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory."

- 24. Support for the regulation of arms and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction stems from the Philippines's strong adherence to the principles of international law for the promotion of global peace and security. The Philippines subscribes to, and is party to, all major nonproliferation and disarmament conventions including the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (TFC), the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles (HCoC), the Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA-SALW), the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Philippines also takes pride in being one of the first states to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a landmark agreement that delegitimizes the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 25. The Philippines emphasizes that challenges confronting the global security environment should deepen and not sway states' resolve to take further steps in nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control. These measures can help reduce tensions, build confidence, and restore trust, thereby creating conditions for improved interstate relations.
- 26. Balanced implementation of, and compliance with, all articles of the NPT are necessary to ensure the Treaty's long-term viability and vitality. The Philippines, during the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, reiterated the need for the full and effective implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 13 practical steps in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the 64-point action plan in 2010 NPT Review Conference.

- 27. Recognizing the destructive effect on the environment of nuclear testing, and the humanitarian consequence of nuclear weapon use, the Philippines urges the eight remaining Annex 2 states to promptly sign and ratify the CTBT to usher its entry into force.
- 28. Together with other ASEAN Member States, the Philippines reiterates its commitment to preserve Southeast Asia as a region free from nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The Philippines further affirms the crucial role played by nuclear weapon free zones in promoting regional peace and security, and advocates for the timely signing and ratification of the SEANWFZ's protocol by the nuclear weapons states.
- 29. In 2018, the Philippines celebrated the 60th year of its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 60 years of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of the inalienable right of all NPT parties to research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Among the highlights of the celebration was the visit of IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano to the Philippines on 7-9 February 2018.
- 30. The IAEA is assisting the Philippines in developing human capacity in nuclear power infrastructure, achieving food security through sustainable agriculture, and enhancing health through better cancer diagnosis and treatment. In coordination with the IAEA, the Philippines is improving its national nuclear legislative and regulatory framework. The Comprehensive Nuclear Regulation Act, which will create an independent nuclear regulatory body for all activities and facilities involving sources of ionizing radiation, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives in 2018.
- 31. The Philippines continues to host the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Southeast Asia which

- fosters regional cooperation on CBRN risk mitigation and first responders' capabilities. The spread of CBRNEs needs to be carefully monitored as they are used as ingredients in the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The spread has been facilitated by the rise of illicit networks that serve as conduits for the illegal transfer of these elements. On 12-13 April 2018, the Philippines also convened an interagency workshop to raise awareness, mitigation of and preparedness against CBRN risks.
- 32. The Philippines has made significant strides in enhancing its capabilities to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALWs). It has completed the draft of the Philippine National Action Plan on SALWs. The Philippines is currently working to address the gaps on gun licenses and permits, and improving documentation of firearms. It has also actively participated in the Third UN Conference to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects (PoA-SALWs). The Philippines's efforts to implement the PoA-SALWs is complemented by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which will soon be ratified by the Philippine Senate.
- 33. The Philippines champions the inclusion of gender aspects in international security discourse, particularly on the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. In 2018, the country actively participated in the regional workshop on Women, Peace and Security held in Bangkok, Thailand. The workshop provided opportunities for NGO representatives and parliamentarians from Southeast Asian countries to exchange ideas, discuss strategies, and consider opportunities for joint initiatives to address the challenges posed by illicit trade in small arms and its impact on women.

C. Transnational Crime

34. The Philippines continues to grapple with the adverse effects of transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. These transboundary concerns not only hinder social and economic development, but also pose a threat to public order and overall security.

- 35. In countering the spread and use of illicit drugs, the Philippine government is determined to pursue a proactive solution to the drug problem with emphasis on upholding the rule of law, observing due process, and complying with the country's commitments under human rights conventions. In 2018, the government developed the Philippine Anti-Illegal Drug Strategy (PADS) which outlines a plan of action that encourages collaboration and the harmonization of anti-illegal drugs initiatives among national government agencies. These are anchored on the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 and the National Security Policy. The three governing principles of the PADS 2018 are 1) evidence-based and culturally appropriate, 2) comprehensive and balanced approach, and 3) inter-sectoral and participatory.
- 36. While the anti-drug operations have garnered the most interest and scrutiny from the public, the Philippine government emphasizes its comprehensive approach to combating the drug problem to include preventive education and public awareness, treatment and rehabilitation, law enforcement, sustainable alternative development programs, and dispensation of justice. Programs such as Oplan Sagip and Barkada Kontra Droga (Peer Group Against Drugs) also encourage the participation and involvement of local government units, faith-based groups, and civil society groups in attaining drugs-free communities. The government has also been organizing various seminars and workshops for parents, health professionals, law enforcers, and the youth to disseminate information and discuss issues on prevention of drugs. Information dissemination efforts and advocacy campaigns were strengthened through the utilization of technology and social media. The government has also been providing assistance to drug dependents and their families in the filing of petitions for admission in treatment and rehabilitation centers. In order to ensure that drug users are provided

- with appropriate interventions, communitybased treatment and rehabilitation programs/ services were also established.
- 37. To monitor the effectiveness of programs and initiatives, the government has also put in place the Integrated Drug Monitoring and Reporting Information System (IDMRIS) and the Integrated Drug Abuse Data and Information Network (IDADIN). The IDMRIS monitors the implementation of anti-drug programs by national agencies, local government units, and partner groups and organizations. It also serves as a venue for reporting implementers of drug prevention-related programs. The IDADIN is an online data pooling and collection system used by Treatment and Rehabilitation Facilities nationwide for treatment, rehabilitation and aftercare of drug dependents. It also allows authorities to monitor and determine the admission, relapse rate, and profile of drug users. Data acquired from these systems would contribute to a more informed and evidence-based policy-making and strategy formulation.
- 38. In 2017, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Human Trafficking Division, the Philippine National Police Women and Children's Protection Center (PNP WCPC), and the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) task forces investigated 488 suspected trafficking cases which led to the arrest of 283 suspects, an increase of 272 from 2016 figures. During this period, the government initiated the prosecution of 117 alleged traffickers (441 in 2016) and secured convictions of 65 traffickers (55 traffickers in 2016)⁴. These efforts have been recognized in the 2018 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report which placed the Philippines in Tier 1.
- The government has sustained its efforts to provide anti-trafficking training to its officials. Approximately 238 programs on basic and advanced skills training were conducted,

⁴ United States Department of State. 2018 Trafficking in Persons Reports. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282798.pdf (accessed 15 March 2019)

- with a focus on investigation and prosecution of cases involving forced labor, child soldiers, and child victims of online sexual exploitation.
- 40. Recovery and reintegration programs for trafficked persons has been facilitated by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). In particular, the DSWD provides psycho-social support, medical services, legal assistance, livelihood assistance, and skills training. There are also 44 residential care facilities (24 facilities are for children. 12 for women, and one for both men and women) that provide services such as traumainformed care units to victims of trafficking and other forms of exploitation.
- 41. The experiences of the Philippines in combating transnational crimes demonstrate the need for an integrated approach among government agencies and the active support by other sectors, complemented by strong collaboration with international partners.

D. Climate Change

- 42. The Climate Change Commission (CCC) under the Office of the President of the Philippines was established under the Climate Change Act of 2009 to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change. Local government units are required under the Climate Change Act to develop and implement their local climate change action plans (LCCAP) as part of the whole-of-government approach in addressing climate change.
- 43. The CCC has partnered with various international and civic organizations to further promote adaptation and mitigation strategies. The CCC, together with a select group from government, non-government, and academic institutions, crafted the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change (NFSCC) as a roadmap in creating a climate-resilient Philippines.
- 44. The NFSCC was eventually translated into the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2011-2028 to specifically develop priority programs and activities that address

- the immediate needs of the country in relation to climate change adaptation and mitigation. The Philippines is determined to meet its commitments to the Paris Agreement through the effective implementation of the NCCAP, which prioritizes food security, water sufficiency, environmental stability, human security, climate-smart industries, sustainable energy, and capacity development. A People's Survival Fund was also established in 2012 to provide long-term financing to climate change adaptation projects.
- 45. In 2017, the Paris Agreement was signed by President Rodrigo Duterte. This signals the Philippine commitment to reduce its carbon emissions by 70 percent below projected levels by the year 2030. The Philippine recognizes that climate change is a day-to-day problem that can be addressed through cooperation of states and that it is the duty of states to abide by their commitments towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.

E. **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster** Relief

- 46. Given its geographical location, the Philippines has a very high exposure to extreme natural events such as earthquakes, typhoons, and storm surges. The World Risk Report 2018 ranked the Philippines as the third country with the highest disaster risk. The Global Climate Risk Index 2019 ranked the Philippines as the fourth highest country to have been affected by natural disasters in a 20-year period from 1998 to 2017.
- 47. The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, otherwise known as Republic Act 10121, serves as the main framework of the government in mitigating risks, enhancing disaster response, and improving societies' disaster resilience. It was this legislation that shifted the government's perspective to a more comprehensive and holistic DRRM process.
- 48. The Philippines has actively participated in UN and ASEAN meetings and discussions aimed at enhancing humanitarian assistance and disaster response. During the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the Third UN

World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), the Philippines underscored the importance of having a more responsive post-2015 DRR framework that takes into consideration the difference between states' geography, geological conditions, and levels of development. In ASEAN, the Philippines has engaged with other ASEAN Member States and ASEAN's partners through the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Disaster Management, the Conference of Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Plus meetings. The Philippines also strongly supports and actively participates in the work of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) in responding to both natural and human-induced disasters, under the One ASEAN, One Response.

F. Maritime Security

- 49. As an archipelagic state, the Philippines is fully committed to guaranteeing maritime security in its waters and in the region, and to the conservation and sustainable use of coastal and marine resources. In this regard, issues such as armed robbery at sea, illegal drug trafficking, poaching, kidnapping, maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime environmental degradation, among others, are of great concern to the country.
- 50. As a littoral state, the Philippines continues to affirm the importance of maintaining peace and promoting stability, freedom of navigation and overflight in and above the South China Sea, freedom of international commerce and other peaceful uses of the sea, addressing territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, and in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines also underscores the need for parties to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in

- the conduct of activities that may complicate the situation, and expeditiously conclude an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
- 51. The Philippines has undertaken multilateral and bilateral steps to contribute to the peaceful management and resolution of the disputes. As the current Country Coordinator for the ASEAN-China Dialogue Partnership, the Philippines continues to work closely with ASEAN Member States and China towards the early conclusion of negotiations on an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). In this regard, the Philippines welcomed the agreement by ASEAN Member States and China on a Single Draft COC Negotiating Text, which was announced at the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on 2 August 2018.
- 52. Pending the conclusion of negotiations on the COC, the Philippines remains committed to the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It supports the implementation of early harvest measures, particularly the successful testing of the hotline between the ministries of foreign affairs of ASEAN Member States and China to manage maritime emergencies in the South China Sea, and the operationalization of the Joint Statement on the Application of the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea. The Philippines also participated in the conduct of the ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise in August and October 2018. The Exercise is an important contribution to building confidence and trust, and enhancing mutual understanding among the navies of ASEAN Member States and China.
- 53. At the bilateral level, the Philippines and China established the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM) in 2017 as a venue for both sides to discuss their concerns on the South China Sea issue. At the third meeting in Beijing in October 2018, the parties affirmed the need to prevent and properly manage incidents at sea and enhance maritime dialogue and cooperation

in the South China Sea. In line with this, the Philippines and China exchanged views on enhancing cooperation on the areas of political-security, maritime search and rescue, maritime safety, marine environmental protection and marine scientific research, and fisheries in Working Group meetings under the BCM framework. In November 2018, the two parties also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Oil and Gas Development, which lays out a framework to facilitate negotiations toward joint oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the South China Sea.

- 54. The Philippines also actively participates in maritime security discussions in ASEAN-led forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM-MS), the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and the ADMM Plus. In December 2018, the Philippines hosted the 8th AMF and the 6th EAMF in Manila. The forums encouraged ASEAN Member States to strengthen the AMF as the foremost regional mechanism on maritime security, and stressed the need for further cooperation and collaboration among ARF States to address current and emerging maritime issues, including through seminars and workshops in the areas of international law, maritime security and safety, and marine environmental protection. The Philippines recognizes the value of these different forums in fostering dialogue and confidence-building on maritime issues at different levels, and supports efforts for greater coordination and synergy among these platforms.
- 55. The Philippines underscores the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation at the operational level. On this note, the Philippines supports and looks forward to the 2nd ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise (AMNEX) to be held in Vietnam in 2020.
- 56. While recognizing the role played by navies in addressing specific maritime concerns, the Philippines also advocates greater cooperation among coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies in

- the region, considering how incidents can also occur involving civilian vessels. Having previously hosted the 2nd Experts' Group Meeting on the Establishment of an ASEAN Coast Guards Forum (ACGF), the Philippines looks forward to further discussions to explore the feasibility of creating an ACGF.
- 57. In August 2018, the Philippines also hosted a comprehensive visit, board, search, and seizure workshop in Manila under the 17th Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT). The workshop was led by the US Coast Guard and was participated by the navies and coast guards of Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, US, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Philippine Coast Guard also hosted a multilateral combined exercise in Cavite City in November 2018 with the Japan Coast Guard and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Center (ReCAAPISC). At the Track II level, the Philippines also supports and welcomes progress on the development of common operating principles for maritime law enforcement vessels in the region to reduce miscalculation and increase predictability during encounters.
- 58. Another advocacy of the Philippines is the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In 2017, upon the proposal of the Philippines, ASEAN Member States and China adopted the Declaration for a Decade of Coastal and Marine Environment Protection in the South China Sea (2017–2022). The Declaration affirmed the commitment of the parties to the preservation and sustainable management of coastal and marine ecosystems in the South China Sea, and underscored the need for substantive regional cooperation. The Philippines encourages the parties to act on their commitments under the Declaration.
- 59. Apart from the South China Sea, the Philippines is undertaking measures to protect and preserve the marine environment in other parts of its maritime domain. In May 2018, the Philippines declared a portion of the Philippine Rise (previously the Benham Rise),

a spawning ground for the Pacific bluefin tuna, as a Marine Resource Reserve divided into a 50,000-hectare area Strict Protection Zone and a 300,000-hectare Special Fisheries Management Area. In June 2018, the Philippines also passed the Expanded National Integrated Protected Areas System Act (E-Nipas) Act, which increased the number of statutory protected areas from 13 to 107 across the archipelago. The Act also strengthens protected area management by enhancing the capabilities of local government, especially with regard to the formulation of protected area management plans, and by increasing the budget for protected areas potentially by up to 823 percent. Through the Act, the Philippines hopes to achieve targets related to coastal and marine area conservation in the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the Sustainable Development Goals by 2020.

60. At the regional level, the Philippines promotes the creation of a network of marine protected areas (MPAs). It welcomes the ASEAN Joint Statement to the 14th Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity issued in 2018, where ASEAN Member States underscored their commitment to, among others, establish MPAs with clear assessments of their connectivity to other MPAs. In this regard, the Philippines also acknowledges the role of the ASEAN Center for Biodiversity (ACB), which it hosts in Los Baños, Laguna, in facilitating collaboration among ASEAN Member States on biodiversity conservation through, for instance, the ASEAN Heritage Parks Program. The Philippines also recognizes the roles of the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI), the Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAF-DEC) in enhancing regional cooperation on sustainable development and marine environmental protection.

G. Security of Information and Communications Technologies

61. the advancement in information and communications technology (ICT) offers countries enormous opportunities for economic growth and social development, but also poses growing risks to national security. It is therefore important that governments harness the potentials and thwart the threats from cyberspace.

- 62. The Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT), the primary agency tasked to plan, develop, and promote the ICT development agenda in the country, launched the National Cybersecurity Plan 2022 in May 2017. Among its primary goals is to implement cyber resiliency through:
 - Continuous and safe operation of critical infrastructures, public, and military networks;
 - Implementation of cybersecurity measures to enhance the ability to respond to threats before, during and after attacks;
 - Effective coordination with law enforcement agencies; and
 - 4. Raising awareness on cybersecurity.

DICT also launched the Cyber Security Management System project in January 2019, which is a unified platform that allows the DICT and its cybersecurity partners from the private sector to assist government agencies in the detection and prevention of cybersecurity-related threats.

- 63. The Armed Forces of the Philippines has also been pursuing initiatives to enhance its cyber defense through the creation of the AFP Cybersecurity Strategic Plan (CSP) and the organization of a Cyber Security Summit. The CSP aims to enhance the AFP's cyberspace capabilities, while the Summit aims to educate and raise the awareness of the Armed Forces on the latest trends in cybersecurity.
- 64. The Philippines also actively participates in regional efforts to address cybersecurity threats. At the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC) held in Singapore in September 2018, ASEAN Member States recognized the need for a formal

regional cybersecurity mechanism among the various platforms of the three pillars of ASEAN. The AMCC participants agreed to work towards adopting and implementing voluntary, non-binding, and practical norms of state behavior in cyberspace, as enshrined in the 2015 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

- 65. The Philippines also values the endeavors and commitment of the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Cyber Security. Since its establishment in 2017, the EWG has developed a point of contact directory for cyber incidents, a cyber-terminology glossary, and a draft communications plan to guide the escalation and communication of cyber security issues. In addition, the EWG has also established an information sharing portal, and has conducted a cyber-security legal seminar for subject matter experts.
- 66. Another significant milestone is the Philippine ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe, which is the first legally binding multilateral instrument to address cybercrimes. The Convention aims to foster international cooperation and harmonization of national laws to detect, investigate, and prosecute cybercriminals at both domestic, regional, and international levels.

IV. Role of the ARF

- 67. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has emerged to become one of the most dynamic platforms for discussing common security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, guided by the concepts of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. It has bolstered interstate cooperation and has proven that as security challenges continue to evolve, so has the readiness and ability of the ARF to adapt and respond to issues critical to regional security.
- 68. The ARF's role as a key driver of constructive dialogue and consultation on security matters in the region, rests on its ability to move

- towards the second stage of its main goal – the development of preventive diplomacy (PD) mechanisms. While the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBM) remain important, the Philippines supports and is committed towards the full implementation of the PD Work Plan.
- 69. The ARF should also work towards the development of an effective and timely crisis management capacity through the utilization of existing institutional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus. Enhanced coordination among these mechanisms will be crucial in addressing enduring and emerging security threats. The ARF should also continue enhancing its linkages with Track 1.5 and Track 2 initiatives such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs), as they could be useful avenues to explore ways to enhance CBMs and preventive diplomacy.
- 70. As the Philippines reaffirms its strong support for the ARF as a platform for confidence-building and preventive diplomacy towards regional peace and stability, it also urges the ARF to develop concrete measures that could bring immediate, long-lasting, and tangible benefits for the people of the region. An institution's strength resides not in written declarations or commitments, but in the practice and implementation of agreements.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Sustainable development in our region can only be achieved in a stable security environment. While interdependence among countries has reached an unprecedented level, the fear for potential conflicts and tensions still lingers in the region. We are also witnessing new and emerging challenges, such as ICT security threats. Therefore, the importance of regional cooperation cannot be overemphasized in order to jointly address and respond to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. Against this backdrop, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has continuously made efforts to promote sustainable peace not only on the Korean Peninsula but also throughout the region.

a. The Korean Peninsula

Following the two Inter-Korean Summit meetings and the historic US-North Korea Summit, another Inter-Korean Summit took place from 18 to 20 September 2018, this time in Pyongyang. President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong un of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK held candid and in-depth discussions on various issues including the denuclearization agenda and practical steps to advance inter-Korean relations to a new and higher dimension by fully implementing the Panmunjom Declaration. Also, it reaffirmed North Korea's commitment to complete denuclearization with Chairman Kim expressing clear intention for further concrete measures on denuclearization.

The two leaders also signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 which consists of five major parts: i) the cessation of military hostilities, ii) the advancement of exchanges and cooperation, iii) the reinforcement of humanitarian cooperation, iv) the rejuvenation of the sense of reconciliation and unity, and v) efforts for complete denuclearization.

To this end, the two sides agreed to the following:

- i) To fully abide by and faithfully implement the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain adopted as an annex to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration; to engage in constant communication and close consultations to review the implementation of the Agreement.
- ii) To hold an initiation ceremony for the connection of railways and roads; to normalize, as conditions mature, the Gaeseong industrial complex and the Mt. Geumgang Tourism Project; to actively engage in inter-Korean environment cooperation; to strengthen cooperation in the areas of prevention of epidemics, public health and medical care.
- iii) To open a permanent facility for family reunion meetings in the Mt. Geumgang area; to give priority to resolving the issue of video reunions and exchange of video messages between separated families through inter-Korean Red Cross talks.
- iv) To promote cultural and artistic exchanges; to participate together in the 2020 Summer Olympic Games and cooperate in bidding for the joint hosting of the 2032 Summer Olympic Games; to hold meaningful events to celebrate the 11th anniversary of the Declaration on the advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity.
- v) The North dismantles permanently the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of experts; the North expresses its willingness to continue to take additional measures as the United States takes corresponding measures.

Moreover, Chairman Kim agreed to visit Seoul at an early date at the invitation of President Moon Jae-in.

The ROK Government has exerted efforts to implement the agreements made at the Inter-Korean Summit meetings by holding a series of inter-Korean talks in a variety of areas including the military, Red Cross activities, railways and roads, sports and forestry. Also, the Joint Liaison Office opened on 14 September 2018 in Gaeseong to facilitate contact between the South and the North. Furthermore, an initiation ceremony for the connection of railways and roads took place on 26 December 2018, preceded by months-long joint surveys conducted in advance.

In the military front, the two sides agreed to cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, air and sea in the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain. The South and the North also agreed to demilitarize the Joint Security Area (JSA). In accordance with the agreement, eleven Guard Posts (GP) that lie within 1km of the other side's post in the DMZ from each side were withdrawn as a preliminary measure in order to completely withdraw all guard posts within the DMZ. Also, new roads that connect the two Koreas across the DMZ were built and mines and explosives were removed for the pilot joint remains recovery project.

The ROK government played an important role to revive momentum for the US-DPRK denuclearization talks in the ROK-US Summit held on 24 September 2018, a week after the September inter-Korean Summit. The US announced its plan to have a second US-DPRK Summit and Secretary Pompeo's plan to visit North Korea in October.

In preparation for the second US-DPRK Summit, high-level talks between the two sides were held from 17 to 19 January 2019 in Washington DC. The US and DPRK continued negotiations at the working-level from 6 to 8 February in Pyongyang, and in Hanoi in the run-up to the second US-DPRK Summit.

The second US-DPRK Summit held from 27 to 28 February 2019 in Hanoi did not result in a joint statement, but it provided an opportunity for both sides to enhance the understanding of each other.

It is the hope of the ROK and the international community that dialogue between interested parties continues toward the realization of complete denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. As North Korea expressed its willingness for complete denuclearization, it is necessary to come up with concrete ways to implement it through consultations with relevant countries, thereby achieving substantial progress in denuclearization as soon as possible.

ROK will continue to spare no effort to achieve complete denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula in close coordination with the US in cooperation with the international community by creating a virtuous cycle between inter-Korean and US-DPRK relations.

In line with such endeavors, the ROK will support the resumption of US-DPRK dialogue by engaging North Korea in substantive dialogue at future inter-Korean talks.

The ROK's Visions for Regional Cooperation

Nowadays, various initiatives and strategies for strengthening cooperation are being presented in the region. The Republic of Korea is of the view that those concepts and policies can facilitate the cooperation for peace and mutual prosperity, rather than competing with each other, and takes note that they share the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international norms and ASEAN-Centrality. As a responsible state in the region which is committed to play a full part, the Republic of Korea has proposed People-centered Community of Peace and Prosperity as a vision for regional cooperation and mutual development and launched the New Southern Policy (NSP) to this end. The NSP aims to expand and deepen partnerships with various countries in the region, including ASEAN, India and beyond. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the New Southern Policy and strengthen the role we play in the region, we are actively seeking cooperation with other initiatives or policies. As we continue to explore the scope for synergy with other initiatives, the aforementioned principles will be the basis for cooperation in the region.

More specifically, the NSP is underpinned by three pillars: People, Prosperity, and Peace. The first pillar is focused on promoting mutual understanding and enhancing quality of life by strengthening people-to-people ties. The second pillar aims at promoting mutual growth and sustainable prosperity by fostering mutually beneficial and future-oriented economic relations. Lastly, the third pillar focuses on securing peace and stability in this region which is essential in achieving mutual prosperity. In this regard, the well-established ASEAN-led mechanisms including the ARF provide a valuable platform for us to deepen cooperation in both traditional and non-traditional security issues including terrorism, violent extremism, cyber security and disaster relief. The ROK will continue to work with the ARF Participants in strengthening and expanding the scope of cooperation and contributing to regional peace and stability.

Equally important, the New Northern Policy aims to create future growth engines through enhanced connectivity with Eurasian countries in transportation, logistics, energy sectors, etc. to usher in the era of a northern economic community of peace and prosperity. The Strategies and Priority Projects of the New Northern Policy, unveiled by the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation, seek to achieve peace in the North East Asian region and in the entire Eurasian continent. In particular, the 9-Bridge strategy that was agreed upon between the ROK and Russia pursues multiple cooperative projects simultaneously in areas of power, gas, railways, fisheries, port, the northern sea route, shipbuilding, agriculture and industrial complex. With regard to Central Asian countries, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum Secretariat is playing a key role for the development of projects in six priority areas – transport and logistics, energy, modernizing and diversifying industries, climate change and environment, health and medical services, education and culture. The New Northern Policy does not contradict other regional cooperation strategies, but it rather remains open to coordinate with them.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

a. Overview of National Security and Defense Policy

The ROK government has established and been promoting its National Security Strategy that includes the vision of a Peaceful and Prosperous Korean Peninsula in the security domain.

While maintaining robust security, the ROK government is determined to resolve North Korean nuclear issue and establish permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

The ROK military has established and been promoting defense policies to realize the defense vision of Competent Security, Robust Defense. The ROK Ministry of National Defense seeks to strengthen military readiness posture and build a trusted military by fostering an advanced military culture that is desirable for both citizens and military personnel. Furthermore, the ROK will enhance its defense capability based on the robust ROK-US combined defense framework, in support of the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.

b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register (as of 2018)

- i. Total Defense Budget (in KRW billions): 43,158
- ii. Defense Budget-to-GDP Ratio: 2.41%
- iii. Defense Budget per capita (in KRW billions): 0.0008

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter-terrorism

Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Although ISIS has been defeated from its stronghold in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism is spreading to every corner of the world including Asia. The Republic of Korea is fully committed to the fight against terrorism and has been stepping up its efforts to combat terrorism at national, regional and global levels.

Terrorism in the world is evolving once again with technological development, and terrorist threats of using ICTs, UAS (Unmanned Aerial System), and other high-tech methods are prevalent. Facing these challenges, the ROK has been fostering global cooperation. Together with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the ROK launched the Asia ICT and Counter-terrorism

Dialogue (2017-18), which provided a platform to find ways to counter terrorists' internet exploitation and to bolster public-private engagement. Furthermore, the ROK co-hosted the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) 3rd Regional Workshop to counter UAS Threats last March. The workshop provided an opportunity to share UAS threat perception in Asia and develop best practices to counter the threat.

While rigorously countering imminent terrorist threats, the ROK has been emphasizing the importance of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), which is often noted as a fundamental cause of terrorism. Following the recommendations adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2016, the ROK established its own National Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in January 2018 and submitted it to the UN in November. The Plan takes a whole-ofgovernment approach and marks significant progress in combatting violent extremism in Korea. Moreover, the ROK organized the interregional conference on P/CVE with the OSCE in April 2018. The conference facilitated regional coordination by sharing best practices and identifying areas for possible cooperation in the field. The ROK government is also working closely with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT) to build capacities of countries vulnerable to violent extremism by financially supporting the UN OCT's PVE projects.

Terrorist financing is one element creating a favorable environment for terrorism. As a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the ROK has actively participated in global efforts for countering terrorist financing. Serving as a FATF president from July 2015 to June 2016, the ROK gave its full support to the establishment of the FATF Training and Research Institute (TREIN) in Busan, Korea. TREIN has provided various training courses on countering terrorist financing for FATF-identified jurisdictions and has actively organized several expert workshops and a total of 10 FATF standards training courses by January 2019.

Along with multilateral and regional efforts, the ROK has also held bilateral consultations on counter-terrorism to discuss effective policies, share information and strengthen bilateral partnership in addressing terrorism. Between the years 2017 and 2018, the ROK held counter-terrorism consultations with the US, Russia, China, and the EU, which produced concrete measures to fight against terrorism.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, **Arms Control and Disarmament**

As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery continues to pose grave challenges to international peace and security, the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The ROK will continue to faithfully implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions until it is assured of that complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has been achieved.

The ROK remains strongly committed to the non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The ROK will not cease its contribution to reinforcing the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA Safeguards system including through the universal application of the Additional Protocol (AP). Although the 2015 NPT Review Conference was unable to see the adoption of a final document, the ROK will work with other State Parties to further the progress made during the Conference by actively participating in the 2020 NPT Review process. The ROK will continue to seek an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to call for an immediate start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Meanwhile, the ROK hosted the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) Working Group meeting in July 2018.

In response to the growing risk of WMD terrorism, the ROK is working towards the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. As the prevention of WMD and related materials from falling into the hands of terrorists is a vital task, the ROK has been actively engaging in the promotion of effective implementation of the resolution 1540. Such efforts include the chairing of the 1540 committee for the 2013-2014 terms and hosting of the industrial outreach conferences in September 2016 and in September 2018.

As a member of all major multilateral export control regimes, the ROK has been endeavoring to contribute to developing such regimes. The ROK served as the Chair of the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the 2016-2017 terms. The ROK also has been striving to join the global efforts to keep non-participants to the regimes well informed and provide them with practical assistance.

As an original state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the ROK has actively participated in the international efforts to support and strengthen the CWC regime and to prevent any use of chemical weapons. The ROK chaired the 23rd Conference of States Parties to the CWC held in November 2018, and it has been holding Seoul Workshops on the Peaceful Development and Use of Chemistry for Member States of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Asian Region since 2012. The ROK has also contributed to reinforcing the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the only legally-binding international treaty regulating the international trade of conventional arms. The ROK ratified the ATT in February 2017, and submitted its initial report and the first national implementation report in May 2018 and May 2019, respectively. As a Party to the ATT, the ROK will actively contribute to promoting transparent and responsible arms transfers.

The ROK has relentlessly sought ways to boost global counter-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the ROK has actively engaging in PSI-related international efforts. The ROK has annually participated in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings and Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) exercises. The ROK will continue to reach out to the PSI partners in the region to strengthen global counter-proliferation efforts.

Every year, the ROK hosts the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). At the 17th Conference in December 2018, approximately 50 experts and high officials gathered and discussed the challenges for the nuclear nonproliferation regime

and ways to address them under the agenda of the 'Disarmament to Save Humanity - towards a World Free from Nuclear Weapons'.

iii. Transnational Crime

The ROK has been increasing efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under the Criminal Act, thereby identifying and protecting the victims of human trafficking. The ROK amended its Criminal Act in 2013 to newly introduce a comprehensive provision for trafficking in persons as part of its efforts to meet the standards of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). In 2015, the ROK ratified the UNTOC and the Protocols thereto in addition to these legislative measures. In August 2016, the National Human Rights Commission developed the Indicators for the Identification and Protection of Trafficking in Persons, which were distributed to the relevant government branches and recommended for use as guidelines to identify and protect victims. As a result of these efforts, the ROK annually ranked as a Tier 1 country in the U.S. State Department's Trafficking in Persons Reports.

In 2018, the ROK participated in the Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC, continuing the efforts to maintain the legal framework against, and to sternly respond to, transnational crimes such as human trafficking. Moreover, the ROK attended the 7th Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process in August 2018. Through these meetings, the ROK reaffirmed its strong support for countering transnational crimes, including trafficking in persons, and strengthening cooperative efforts therein.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The humanitarian policy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is designed with a view that humanitarian action, development cooperation and peace building efforts complement each other. The increased intensity and frequency of disasters have been responsible for most of the human and economic losses. The impacts of these disasters will be long-lasting, hindering and reversing progress towards achieving development goals. While ensuring a rapid and effective response to emergency needs, the ROK is to take an integrated approach that

considers the efforts in preventing humanitarian crises and reducing future humanitarian needs.

The ROK has been a strong advocate of forging greater regional cooperation. During the co-chairmanship of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief with Thailand in 2016-2017, the ROK contributed to distilling the ARF Work Plan for Disaster Relief 2018-2020. This work plan is underpinned by a very clear guiding principle: the ROK's humanitarian engagement seeks to improve the quality and coordination of humanitarian efforts through regional mechanisms in strengthening disaster preparedness, response, and resilience.

In the follow-up to and in view of the implementation of the work plan, the ROK has provided financial support to foster the development of national disaster risk reduction strategies in Bangladesh, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It aims to share business models, best practices and home-grown approaches to raise the awareness of potential disaster risks and to take further steps in establishing contingency measures at the local and national levels.

Given that the Asia-Pacific region is exposed to frequent unforeseen natural hazards, it is a key humanitarian task to respond rapidly to suddenonset disasters to save lives, alleviate suffering and protect human dignity in humanitarian emergencies. The ROK government provided approximately 11 million US dollars in response to 20 urgent humanitarian crises in 2018. Through timely and tailored contingency measures, the ROK contributed to alleviating the suffering of the people affected and filling the void resulting from destroyed livelihoods and damaged infrastructure.

The ROK is to play a significant humanitarian assistance role in the region both as a donor country and as a humanitarian actor. In July of 2018, the ROK dispatched Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) for approximately 30 days in response to a flash flood which occurred in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The KDRT Emergency Medical Team provided emergency medical care and prevention tools for infectious diseases reaching 152 patients per day. In September of 2018, a strong earthquake and tsunami severely impacted Sulawesi, Indonesia. Immediately, the ROK deployed two of its Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircrafts to assist the Indonesian government's disaster response efforts including material relief and logistics support for more than 40 days.

The ROK also has been at the forefront of efforts to strengthen the humanitarian sector by increasing the involvement of people affected by crises in humanitarian efforts as participants in the response instead of merely being recipients of humanitarian aid. In 2010, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction for Northeast Asia and Training Institute for Disaster Reduction was established in Incheon, the ROK. The institution has played significant roles in building human capacity, carrying out advocacy initiatives, and assisting governments in implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The number of trainees reached 6,521- from 131 countries- in 2018.

Humanitarian efforts must be adapted to meet the different needs of people affected by different types of crises. The ROK will continue its relentless efforts to identify and narrow the gap between the increasing humanitarian needs and the resources available, and to ensure that the limited resources reach those in greatest need.

Maritime Security

Maritime security covers a wide range of issues today. Countering and preventing piracy is one of them and is still critical due to its direct influence on the shipping industry and fisheries. The ROK has been a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) since 2006, attending Governing Council Meetings in order to join regional efforts to combat piracy. Also, close cooperation with Information Sharing Center (ISC) has continued by seconding Korean staff to ISC since 2007.

The ROK provides voluntary contribution for ReCAAP to support regional capacity building. Approximately 90,000 US dollars have been contributed annually from 2008 to 2012, and 130,000 US dollars have been annually provided from 2013 to 2018, a 50% increase for the ROK to broaden its role and participation in combating piracy in the region.

In order to take part in the world's joint efforts in the fight against piracy in Somalia, the ROK has deployed the Cheonghae (meaning "pure sea") Anti-Piracy Unit to the high seas off the coast of Somalia since 2009. The Cheonghae Unit has conducted convoy missions to protect vessels from pirates as a part of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under the command of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Furthermore, the Cheonghae Unit has also participated in the EU Naval Force's Operation Atalanta since February 2017, which carries out operations such as convoy missions to protect vessels of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and World Food Programme (WFP) and patrolling in Somali shores.

The ROK has also played an important role in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) since 2009. The ROK has not only participated in the meetings where diverse discussions on countering piracy take place, but also made financial contributions to substantially support the coastal states' capacity building. The total contribution to the CGPCS Trust Fund amounts to 1.5 million US dollars from 2011 to 2018 including an additional contribution of 200,000 US dollars in 2018.

In addition, the ROK had made financial contributions to the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund to strengthen the judicial capacity and support good governance of the Government of Somalia and neighboring countries, adding up to 0.8 million US dollars from 2009 to 2017. Last year, considering the recent rise in piracy attacks near the Western Africa region, an additional 100,000 US dollars were contributed to the West and Central Africa Maritime Security Trust Fund. The ROK will continue to cooperate with IMO to support educational and training programs to strengthen the capabilities of related employees in maritime development and maritime governance in the region.

vi. ICTs Security

The Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) continues to provide immense opportunities for social and economic development and to grow in importance for the international community. However, due to the dual-use in technology, its development has also brought unprecedented

challenges. Not only have malicious activities using ICTs increased, but also its ways and means have highly advanced. This trend carries serious implications for international peace and security.

Malicious actors are ceaselessly plotting offensive activities using ICTs, not only targeting individuals and businesses but also the critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure is one of our priorities as attacks on national critical infrastructure can literally paralyze the whole nation.

Considering the cross-border nature and ripple effects of cyber threats, it is essential to forge a strong partnership in responding to malicious cyber activities. As cyber security cannot be adequately addressed single-handedly by any country alone, regional and international cooperation in this field is of utmost importance for cybersecurity. Recognizing this, the ROK places a great deal of importance on establishing cooperative mechanisms.

In order to set a course of action with a more strategic and systematic approach, the ROK launched the National Cybersecurity Strategy in April 2019. It declares the ROK's vision and goals in cybersecurity and outlines strategic tasks at individual, industry and government levels.

The ROK has been holding a series of bilateral and trilateral cyber policy consultations with a view to discussing potential steps for cooperation and strengthening the concerted response to cyber threat. In 2018, the ROK had bilateral consultations with the United States and the EU and a trilateral consultation with the United States and Japan. In 2019, the ROK had the third bilateral consultation with Russia in January and will continue to have productive and constructive dialogues with partner countries.

At the international level, the ROK has participated in four rounds of the UN Group of Governmental Group (GGE) on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International Security and contributed to its achievements. In particular, the ROK has put a great emphasis on the 'due diligence' principle that States should not knowingly allow their territories to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. In December 2018,

the UN General Assembly established two processes – the GGE and the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) – to discuss the issue of security in the ICT environment during the period of 2019-2021. To build upon the progress made in the previous GGEs, the ROK will actively participate in the upcoming relevant meetings in the UN.

At the regional level, the ROK has put forth a great amount of efforts and resources since it held the ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in 2004, when the cuber issue came to the fore as an important issue on the regional agenda. In May 2019, the ROK hosted, in cooperation with the OSCE, the Second Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security to discuss measures to enhance regional cooperation against cyber threats by sharing experience with the OSCE.

Recognizing the importance of establishing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the field of ICTs, the ROK has actively participated in discussions at the Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, as well as the Open Ended Study Group (OESG) on Confidence Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of ICTs. The ROK welcomes the five Confidence Building Measures suggested and adopted at the ISM and OESG and stands ready to implement and develop them in cooperation with the ARF participants. The ROK reaffirms its commitment to continuously play a valuable part in the establishment of regional Confidence Building Measures on cybersecurity.

In addition, the ROK has contributed to bridging the gap in cyber security capacity among countries. While the digital divide by countries and regions is becoming more and more serious, many malicious actors in cyberspace tend to take advantage of weak links within the global cyber ecosystem. As countries with low cyber security capacity are often targeted to be used as a transit route, the ROK views capacity building as one of the priority areas in promoting ICT security. Indeed, this was well reflected in the fact that the ROK newly included capacity-building as a major item on the agenda for the Global Conference on CyberSpace in Seoul in 2013.

Taking this initiative a step further, the ROK has implemented various capacity building projects with developing countries by establishing the Global Cybersecurity Center for Development (GCCD) in 2015 and the Cybersecurity Alliance for Mutual Progress (CAMP) in 2016. Through these projects, the ROK provides policy advice, consultations and training on cyber-security measures to developing countries. Since 2015, the GCCD hosted capacity building seminars in 13 countries to provide practical information and relay the ROK's experience. Also, CAMP has 43 countries and 57 agencies as its participants and has so far hosted four congresses and five regional fora.

IV. Role of ARF

National Contributions to Enhancing ARF and Regional Security

As a founding member of the ARF, the ROK is committed to its vision of promoting confidence-building measures, developing preventive diplomacy, and elaborating approaches to conflicts in the region. The ROK participated in the ARF's various CBMs and PD activities during the inter-sessional year of 2018-2019, which include the Inter-Sessional Support Group meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, five Inter-Sessional Meetings and the meeting of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons, along with other CBMs and PD workshops and seminars. In particular, the ROK government co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBMs and PD) and Defense Officials' Dialogue (DOD), which were held in Seoul, the Republic of Korea on May 2-3, 2019. The ROK also co-chaired the 11th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD) in Bali, the Republic of Indonesia on April 8-9, 2019.

The ROK government will deepen its engagement in the ARF's endeavors without pause and, in this vein, the ROK would like to continue to co-chair the ARF ISM on NPD in 2020 with Indonesia and Japan. The ROK looks forward to working closely with the ARF Participants in contributing to building confidence and strengthening cooperation in this region.

b. Future of ARF

As a unique intergovernmental forum concerned with multilateral security in the region, the ARF has served as an effective venue for exchanging views on common security threats and seeking for joint responses to them. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has played an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region, by facilitating dialogue among countries in the region and providing opportunities to freely exchange views on various security issues at the regional and international level. At the same time, the ARF has carried out a multitude of Track 1 activities as part of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy activities. These activities include measures to respond to emerging security challenges of a non-traditional and transnational nature, including natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes, and cuber threats.

The more sophisticated security landscape in the region necessitates the ARF harnessing its strengths to the fullest and working to build complementary relationships with other regional mechanisms, such as the ADMM+ and the East Asia Summit. Furthermore, it is essential that the ARF Participants strive to make the Forum more efficient by further streamlining the process of its meetings. Considering that the ARF can constantly change and evolve in accordance with the needs of the Participating Countries, the ARF Participants should relentlessly seek ways to further strengthen the mechanism while enhancing its efficiency. The ROK notes that the ARF process has been effectively reinforced through active negotiations among the Participants and hopes to further strengthen the ARF process through continuous discussions and cooperation within the ARF framework.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific holds a special position in the emerging multi-polar system of international relations, providing an example of fruitful cooperation between the countries with various political and socio-economic systems. The region is among the leaders in terms of global growth and integration process, as well as development of multilateral structures and network diplomacy.

With all its positive trends, a serious conflict potential of the Asia-Pacific remains. The reliance on force is growing, and certain States seek to build up their own military capacities and ensure their security at the expense of others' security. Of particular concern are the attempts to reshape the established regional architecture in accordance with narrow national objectives and introduce the "rules-based order" formula instead of generally recognized norms of international law. This situation can lead to strengthening bloc-based arrangements, setting new dividing lines and impairing principles of multilateral cooperation in the region.

The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula remains a potential threat to the regional security. The process of settling existing differences launched in 2018, which has been developing de facto in line with the relevant China-Russia roadmap, faces difficulties caused primarily by the lack of trust between the DPRK and the USA as well as between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. Tension in the Korean Peninsula can be reduced by gradual movement towards each other and real practical steps aimed to support the overall political and diplomatic process.

Besides, any arrangements to stabilize the situation or set up a mechanism of peace and security in the Northeast Asia should be multilateral and supported by the international community. Currently, Russia together with its partners is drafting a plan of action on a comprehensive settlement of the Korean Peninsula problems with a view to converging the approaches of the parties concerned and laying the foundation for a further joint response to key security challenges in the subregion.

The situation in the Asia-Pacific is adversely affected by developments in certain Middle East and North African countries, first of all due to aggravating international terrorist threat. Terrorist attacks in New Zealand in March 2019 and Sri Lanka in April 2019 resulting in numerous victims were illustrations of that. The Russian Federation continues to help eliminate the remaining hotbeds of terrorism and extremism in Syria while facilitating, including in the framework of the Astana Format together with Iran and Turkey in coordination with the UN, the political settlement as provided for in UNSC resolution 2254. Today, it is crucial to increase depoliticized assistance to the Syrians for post-conflict reconstruction and speed-up refugee return process.

The military and political situation in Afghanistan remains complicated with increased combat activities of the Taliban Movement. Russia advocates the reconciliation process with the participation of a wide range of Afghan political forces, including the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Taliban. The Moscow Format of Regional Consultations on Afghanistan initiated by Russia along with the work of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group has considerable potential to contribute to these efforts at the international level. The surge in drug production in the country, which is the world largest supplier of heroin, is of particular concern.

The situation in the South China Sea requires permanent monitoring. The parties to the territorial disputes in this area should respect the principle of non-use of force or threat of force and continue to seek for political and diplomatic solutions to the current problems in conformity with international law. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the instruments adopted by ASEAN and

the People's Republic of China, namely the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC agreed upon in 2011, serve as a basis for resolving the situation in the South China Sea. Negotiations should be held between the parties directly involved in the disputes in the most efficient format determined by themselves. The Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that is being drafted by the ASEAN Member States and China is intended to be an efficient conflict-prevention tool.

II. Defence Policy of the Russian Federation and International Military Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

The main objectives of Russia's defence policy are determined by the President of the Russian Federation in the 2015 Russian National Security Strategy and the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

Russia ensures its national security on the basis of principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness. While the use of military measures is stipulated only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information and other non-force instruments have been exhausted.

The activities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific are carried out in strict compliance with international norms and bilateral agreements, posing no threat to peace and stability in the region.

Russia is focused on the comprehensive enhancement of defence ties with Asia-Pacific nations. We cooperate in both multilateral and bilateral formats. Russia assigns a particular role in ensuring regional security to the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Russia is completing co-chairing with Laos the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action, the tangible result of which is the assistance to the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center in Phnom Penh, as well as the mine-clearing operation by a special Russian military engineer

team in the territory of Laos affected by the Vietnam War. Starting from 2020 Russia will co-chair together with Myanmar ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism.

Chinese-Russian military cooperation is based on the Agreement between the Defence Ministry of China and the Defence Ministry of Russia as of 11 November 1993. The strategic level of our cooperation is stipulated in the "roadmap", which defines priorities and avenues of interaction between Russia and China in the defence sector until 2020. The Chinese People's Liberation Army sent its contingent to the large-scale maneuvers "Vostok-2018" at the Tsugol training range. In late April 2019 Russian Navy ships took part in the naval parade in Qingdao and in the joint exercise "Naval Interaction".

India remains Russia's leading partner in the field of military-technical cooperation. New Dehli is provided with necessary assistance in development of its military-industrial complex, including within the "Make in India" national programme implemented by the Indian Government. Multifaceted cooperation is established between the defence ministries, including meetings at the ministerial level and consultations between Chiefs of the General Staff of all army branches, as well as intensive delegation exchanges. The annual "Indra" joint military exercises took place in India in October-December 2018. The Agreement to set up an Indian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation was signed in 2018. Bilateral cooperation with ASEAN Member States is developing. In April 2018, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Mutual Protection of the Results of Intellectual Activity and Intellectual Property in the Course of Bilateral Military-Technical Cooperation was signed with Brunei Darussalam. In 2019 the Russian Defence Minister held negotiations in Moscow with his counterparts from Indonesia (February) and Malaysia (April).

Major importance is attributed to the friendly calls of Russia's Navy to the ports of Asia-Pacific countries (in 2018–2019 Russian naval ships visited the ports of Brunei Darussalam, China, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Vietnam).

The Russian Ministry of Defence annually hosts in Moscow the Conference on International Security. In April 2019 this forum welcomed representatives from 111 countries, including those from the Asia-Pacific. Their participation in the International Army Games 2019 as well as the International Military-Technical Forum "Army-2019" organized by Russia will contribute to building stronger ties in the defence area.

III. Nuclear and Missile Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Asia Pacific

The Russian Federation makes a significant contribution to the nuclear disarmament efforts. Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals on a bilateral basis. The role of nuclear weapons in the national military doctrine has been significantly diminished.

Russia did its utmost to retain the regime of the 1987 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), whose collapse could substantially complicate the situation in the Asia-Pacific in case of deployment of relevant US missile armaments.

Russia scrupulously implements the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), having reached the limits of warheads and delivery vehicles set by this document. In view of the correlation between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, stipulated, inter alia, in the New START, the steps to deploy the Global Ballistic Missile Defence System in the Asia-Pacific, which can affect the regional and global security and stability, arouse deep concern.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important tool for strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime. The status of Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) has yet to be formalized. Russia reaffirms its readiness to sign with standard reservations the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty and is open to consultations between the P5 and ASEAN to institutionalize this nuclear-weapon-free zone as soon as possible.

The threat of an arms race in outer space and its becoming an arena for military confrontation is of serious concern. The draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, proposed by Russia and China, aims at countering these negative trends. Our resolution "No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space" (NFP) within the UNGA First Committee has been co-sponsored by 49 States, including 12 Asia-Pacific countries. Moreover, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam are full-fledged NFP participants, who made the relevant political commitment in bilateral statements signed with Russia.

IV. Combating International **Terrorism and Transnational** Crime in the Asia-Pacific

Given the growing terrorist threats, Russia pays special attention to developing practical cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, with Asia-Pacific nations, as well as to strengthening their counter-terrorism capacities. In view of the latest developments, emphasis is placed on countering the stronger influence of ISIS, Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups, and the cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), as well as combating the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology and terrorism financing.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) Leaders' Statement on Countering the Threat of FTF and Returnees proposed by Russia was adopted in Singapore in November 2018. The document is focused on the best standards of international anti-terrorist cooperation and based on the fundamental provisions of the UN counter-terrorism documents.

Under co-chairmanship of Russia and Indonesia of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in 2018-2019 ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime for 2019-2021 has been drafted. These issues are in the focus of the relevant ASEAN-Russia Dialogue mechanisms.

The Counter-Terrorism Working Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also remains instrumental in the field of anti-terrorism. It gives the floor for promoting fundamental approaches to international counter-terrorism cooperation. We consistently expand partnership relations with Asia-Pacific countries within the FATF and the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering based on its model to which Russia is an observer.

Given the increasing threats of terrorists using chemicals and biological agents as weapons, most Asia-Pacific countries continue to support the initiative to develop an international Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva proposed by Russia in 2016 with the aim of countering WMD terrorism.

V. International Information Security in the Asia-Pacific

In 2018 considerable progress was made in the area of security in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the Asia-Pacific.

Among the priority areas of international information security within the ARF we consider further developing of regional confidence-building measures in cyberspace, drafting a list of universal terms in that field, development of cooperative efforts to counter the use of ICTs for criminal and terrorist purposes, capacity building, as well as a substantive discussion on Internet governance aimed at internationalizing and increasing the role of States in that process.

The 13th East Asia Summit adopted the EAS Leaders' Statement on Deepening Cooperation in the Security of ICTs and of the Digital Economy. The document recognizes the importance of strengthening international cooperation to ensure the security of the information and communication environment in accordance with international law, norms and principles of responsible conduct of States in the information space, and welcomes the development of additional rules of conduct. The importance of respect for the sovereignty of States and the willingness of the EAS participating countries to develop dialogue on these issues are emphasized.

VI. Emergency Response in the Asia-Pacific

Russia continues to promote regional cooperation in the field of disaster management and humanitarian assistance.

The Russian EMERCOM delegations regularly participate in the annual ASEAN Strategic Dialogue on Disaster Management, focusing on the issue of development of a global network of crisis management centres envisaged to become an effective tool for interaction and coordination of various national rescue services at the State level.

In November 2018 Russian representatives took part in the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX-18) devoted to enhancing cooperation between the relevant regional and national structures in case of major emergencies was practiced. In October 2018 the Russian EMERCOM staff participated in a course on coordination of search and rescue teams in Indonesia, organized by the INSARAG Secretariat and the National Search and Rescue Agency of the Republic of Indonesia.

In July 2018 a delegation of the Russian EMERCOM participated in the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Ulaanbaatar. The event was focused on actions taken by Asia-Pacific countries under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

The Russian side promotes exchange of best practices and coordination between the relevant agencies of the SCO Member States in their joint response to emergencies. In August 2018 representatives of the SCO emergency agencies held a seminar in Bishkek on awareness-raising and alerting of the population in the event of natural and man-made disasters. In November 2018 the SCO earthquake response table top exercise planning conference was held in New Delhi.

In 2018 the EMERCOM of Russia delivered over 60 tons of humanitarian aid to the Republic of Indonesia and the Lao People's Democratic, including mobile power plants, tents, boats, crockery, blankets and foodstuffs.

Special contributions of the Russian Federation to the UN World Food Programme in 2018-2019 were used to provide humanitarian food aid to the DPRK and Myanmar. An additional special contribution is planned to provide food aid to Laos. Wheat is supplied to the DPRK. A supply of vegetable oil to Myanmar is planned for 2019.

Priority is given to the development of practical emergency prevention and response cooperation with neighboring countries at the local level. To ensure safe navigation on the Amur River in September 2018 joint Russian-Chinese exercises on emergency response on river vessels were held in the area of the bridge crossing between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe that was under construction at that time.

VII. Regional Security Architecture and Trends in Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

The existing challenges in the Asia-Pacific require collective efforts and building of a non-bloc regional architecture of equal and indivisible security that would serve common interests and meet the present-day realities. It should be based on the rule of international law, principles of non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force or the threat of force. ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms are the cornerstone of such a system today. The best platform for the region-wide dialogue on this topic is the mechanism of the EAS Ambassadors' Meeting in Jakarta involving experts from capitals.

SINGAPORE

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

ASEAN today is confronted with increasingly complex challenges arising from major power competition, a fraying global consensus on free trade and globalisation, pushback against the multilateral rules-based order, and technological disruption. While greater connectivity has 'shrunk' the region and accelerated regional economic integration, ASEAN is also seeing the emergence of transnational challenges such as terrorism, climate change, and cyber threats. The rapid expansion of the digital realm has also created the need for a rules-based cyberspace. No single country can tackle these challenges on its own. Against this backdrop, ASEAN has cultivated a robust network of partners and instituted ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to strengthen confidence, trust, and practical cooperation among the key stakeholders of our region. ASEAN can only remain relevant and effective as a regional bloc if it stays united and at the core of the regional architecture. It must also continue to prioritise flexibility in order to come up with innovative solutions to the challenges of the day. The ASEAN Smart Cities Network is one example of how ASEAN can work with its external partners to foster an integrated and interoperable regional architecture which harnesses the benefits of the digital revolution. In this regard, Singapore will continue to work towards strengthening these bodies, forging closer ties with our partners, and exploring new partnerships and avenues for cooperation, with ASEAN Centrality as our core guiding principle.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Singapore's defence policy is built on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy. Singapore believes in the need for a strong defence to ensure that we enjoy peace and security. A strong defence also provides us with the political space and freedom needed to act in the best interests of our people. This is why Singapore has invested steadily and prudently in defence over the years to build up a professional and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Given our small size and lack of resources, Singapore makes use of technology as a force multiplier to augment our well educated conscript force and overcome our limitations. Singapore's defence expenditure in FY2018 stood at 3.0 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

As a small country, Singapore's security and prosperity are highly dependent on regional peace and stability. Through extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Singapore seeks to establish strong and friendly ties, with defence establishments and armed forces regionally and globally. Singapore also believes that regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue. As such, Singapore actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including ASEAN platforms like the ADMM, ADMM-Plus, EAS, ARF, Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), and Five Power Defence Arrangements.

The ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN and a key component of the regional security architecture. Established in 2006, the ADMM aims to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and practical cooperation in defence and security matters. Singapore's 2018 ADMM and ADMM-Plus Chairmanship focussed on three key areas: (i) enhancing regional counter-terrorism cooperation; (ii) strengthening the region's capability to respond to chemical, biological, and radiological threats; and (iii) installing practical Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)/codes for unplanned

encounters in the aviation and maritime domains to reduce miscalculations and unintended incidents. At the ADMM Retreat in February 2018, the ASEAN Defence Ministers expressed support for these three focus areas and issued a Joint Statement on Countering Terrorism in ASEAN to reaffirm their commitment to step up counter-terrorism efforts. The ASEAN Defence Ministers also agreed to an ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise, which was conducted in Zhanjiang, China, in October 2018. At the 12th ADMM in October 2018, the ASEAN Defence Ministers adopted the following concept papers: (i) Establishment of a Virtual ASEAN Network of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defence Experts; (ii) Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME); (iii) Observership of ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group (EWG) Activities; (iv) "Our Eyes" Initiative; and (v) Terms of Reference (TOR) for the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Military Representative to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance in disaster management (AHA Centre). They also issued the 12th ADMM Joint Declaration on "Strengthening Cooperation, Building Resilience" and agreed on the conduct of an ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise in 2019. At the 5th ADMM-Plus in October 2018, the ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers adopted practical CBMs and the 5th ADMM-Plus Joint Statements on Preventing and Countering the Threat of Terrorism.

Singapore is highly encouraged by the good progress achieved in the seven ADMM-Plus EWGs in the areas of maritime security (MS), HADR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), counter-terrorism (CT), military medicine (MM), humanitarian mine action (HMA), and cyber security (CS). Singapore is co-chairing the EWG-MS with the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the third EWG cycle from 2017 to 2020. We aim to sustain the momentum of practical military-to-military cooperation and promote maritime security norms based on respect for international law. At the 12th EWG-MS Meeting in Singapore in November 2017, the ADMM-Plus Navies agreed to collectively adopt the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). CUES was practiced during the EWG-MS Field Training Exercise, which was successfully conducted in May 2019 involving 19 ships, 10 aircrafts and approximately 700 personnel.

Under the ARF, Singapore also co-chaired the 22nd ARF Heads of Defence Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM) with Japan in 2018, which provided a platform for the ARF defence colleges to network and share best practices.

The SLD is held annually in Singapore and organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Since its inception in 2002, the SLD has established itself as the foremost defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific region. The 18th SLD was held from 31 May to 2 June 2019, and was attended by participants from 51 countries and 35 Ministers from Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. PM Lee Hsien Loong delivered the keynote address in commemoration of Singapore's Bicentennial and participants exchanged candid views on pertinent security issues, including global terrorism and cyberattacks.

The SLD Sherpa Meeting, also organised by the IISS, supplements the SLD process by providing an inter-sessional platform for senior officials to engage in frank discussions on security issues. The seventh SLD Sherpa Meeting was held from 27 to 29 January 2019, and was attended by about 70 delegates from over 20 countries. Former Australian Defence Minister Christopher Pyne delivered the keynote address.

III.(i) Counter-Terrorism

The threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region. Continued vigilance and cooperation by all countries are needed to deal with the complex and long-term challenges posed by terrorism and its underlying ideologies.

Since the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime, ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts have made much progress. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines in 2007, is the first regional legally-binding anti-terrorism pact. Singapore was one of the first AMS to ratify the Convention. The ACCT entered into force on 27 May 2011, and has been ratified by all 10 AMS since January 2013. Recognising the importance of preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism, ASEAN adopted the Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism and

the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2018-2025 in 2017 and 2018 respectively. Singapore welcomes these significant achievements, which enhance regional cooperation against terrorism and affirm the region's commitment to the global strategy on counter-terrorism.

In support of regional capacity building, under the auspices of the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, Singapore has hosted a number of counter-terrorism workshops and initiatives relating to: (i) Border Security; (ii) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives; (iii) Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism; (iv) Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios; and (v) Aviation Security.

Singapore is committed to strengthening the regional counter-terrorism security architecture. In November 2018, the ADMM noted Singapore's 3R Concept (Resilience, Response, Recovery), which aims to foster greater regional counter-terrorism cooperation. Singapore also hosted a Track 1.5 symposium, the 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-Terrorism Symposium: Building a Collective Approach, in October 2018. The symposium brought together cross-sectoral perspectives on how we can strengthen the region's collective efforts against terrorism.

III.(ii) Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Singapore is active in combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). We ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1976, and concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. Singapore also ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and adopted the modified Small Quantities Protocol in March 2008. Singapore supports the universalisation of both the CSA and the AP, and works closely with the IAEA on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Singapore serves regularly on the IAEA's Board of Governors (BOG). Our most recent two-year term ended in

September 2018, during which Singapore hosted several training fellowships and conducted regional workshops on topics such as emergency preparedness and response, nuclear regulatory law, and food safety. Singapore is also party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and supports efforts to promote its early entry into force.

Singapore joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in May 2010 and subscribed to The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in August 2011. In September 2014, Singapore acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and accepted the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM. Singapore ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism in September 2017.

Singapore strongly supports counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and recognises the importance of preventing rogue groups, such as terrorist organisations, from acquiring WMD. Singapore has actively participated in the PSI since its establishment in 2003. Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia to be in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG), and has hosted PSI exercises and meetings. Singapore has participated in PSI activities, such as the 3rd High-Level Political Meeting and OEG Meeting in Paris, France in May 2018, and Exercise Pacific Shield in Tokyo, Japan in July 2018.

Singapore fully supports the efforts of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to further develop capabilities and readiness against the threat of chemical weapons. We participated in the 19th Annual Meeting of National Authorities and 23rd Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 2018. Pursuant to Article X, Singapore has been conducting the Emergency Response to Chemical Incidents training course on a biennial basis since 2009. The fifth instalment of the course was conducted in December 2017, which benefitted 21 participants from 12 OPCW Member States in Asia. The sixth instalment is scheduled for December 2019. The course has been a platform for the sharing of experiences on the management of hazards.

In addition, Singapore values the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW as a participant of the Temporary Working Group on Sampling and Analysis and Verification. Since 2012, Singapore has also been submitting returns on the Biological Weapons Convention's (BWC) CBMs annually.

Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally-binding international instrument that regulates the international transfer of conventional arms, on 5 December 2014. This reaffirms Singapore's commitment to the elimination of the threat posed by the illicit arms trade and to international disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives that promote global peace and security.

As a reflection of our commitment to prevent WMD proliferation, Singapore adheres to a robust and enhanced export control regime. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act controls the transfer and brokering of goods capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, stockpile or acquire WMD, along with strategic goods and related software and technology. The Act's control list is regularly updated to ensure that it keeps abreast of technological developments and remains aligned with the four multilateral export control regimes. In May 2018, Singapore Customs organised the Customs-Competent Authority Seminar to enhance awareness of the trading community on the regulatory requirements for various controlled goods and recent developments.

Singapore regularly organises the annual Joint Industry Outreach Seminar on Strategic Trade Management with the US Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS), the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The most recent seminar was held in December 2018. The Seminar keeps the industry abreast of the latest developments in export controls and best practices for improved compliance. Since 2011, Singapore has participated in the Annual Asian Export Control Seminars (AECS) held in Tokyo, which addresses domestic industry outreach and international collaboration. Singapore also participates regularly in the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo, including the most recent meeting in March 2019.

Singapore supports the EU's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CBRN CoE) initiative in Southeast Asia. Our agencies and experts have been involved in numerous CBRN CoE projects and activities. Singapore has contributed regional bio-risk experts to develop training materials and conduct workshops on laboratory design, engineering and operations in several regional countries under Project 46. Singapore's Public Utilities Board (PUB) also participated in Project 61, which addresses the sound management of chemicals and their associated wastes.

III.(iii) Transnational Crime

Regional security challenges are increasingly transnational and non-traditional in nature and cannot be adequately addressed by individual countries' domestic policies. Singapore therefore believes in the need for a concerted regional effort to combat transnational crimes.

The Singapore Police Force (SPF) has forged a strategic partnership with the credit card industry to generate merchant awareness in credit card crime prevention. SPF's Commercial Affairs Department is also represented at the Singapore Card Security Group, which comprises various card-issuing banks and companies. The SCSG meets frequently to share fraud-related intelligence and develop joint strategies to prevent and counter card fraud related activities. It has also conducted several joint merchant education programmes targeting specific retail sectors.

Under the aegis of the ASEAN Ministerial and Senior Officials' Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC & SOMTC), Singapore is the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd for international economic crime (IEC). Singapore conducts an annual IEC Course to equip relevant investigators with competencies required for the investigation of commercial crime. This course reviews the latest trends, threats, and challenges facing law enforcement agencies in the area of commercial crime and seeks to provide updates on the latest developments in white-collar crime. The next course will be held in 2020.

Singapore takes a serious view of trafficking-inpersons (TIP) crimes. An inter-agency taskforce,
jointly led by Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs
and Ministry of Manpower, was formed in 2010
to coordinate whole-of-government strategies
to fight TIP. The Taskforce works closely with
the law enforcement agencies and embassies
of countries that victims may originate from.
Such close cooperation allows for reports of
trafficking to be quickly and thoroughly investigated.
Information-sharing and upstream enforcement
against human traffickers also prevent the
exploitation of the innocent.

Singapore supports regional and international efforts to combat TIP. Singapore cooperates with other AMS through platforms such as the AMMTC and SOMTC, which oversees the region's effort to combat TIP.

Singapore had worked closely with other AMS on the development of the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) which was signed by ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015. Singapore's Instrument of Ratification was deposited with the ASEAN Secretary-General on 25 January 2016. The ACTIP has since come into force on 8 March 2017, as the 6th AMS, vis-a-vis the Philippines, deposited its instrument of ratification with the ASEAN Secretary-General on 6 February 2017. Following the signing of the ACTIP, Singapore also worked closely with other AMS on the development of the ASEAN Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (APA) and the Bohol Trafficking in Persons Work Plan, which were endorsed in 2015 and 2016 respectively. The APA and Work Plan complement the ACTIP by outlining specific actions and policies to address the challenge of combatting TIP.

Beyond ASEAN, Singapore also works with partners such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as well as the Group of Friends United Against Human Trafficking (GOF) in New York and Geneva, to explore more effective ways to combat TIP.

Singapore is a party to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol). The UN TIP Protocol is an optional Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). It seeks to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons while protecting victims and promoting cooperation among State Parties.

III.(iv) <u>Humanitarian Assistance</u> and Disaster Relief

Disasters can affect any country without warning. As a good neighbour and friend, Singapore provides assistance where we can, undertaking HADR missions when the need arises.

In 2018, Singapore deployed seven ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) members in support of the AHA Centre for three ASEAN-ERAT missions. We assisted the national disaster management agencies of the affected AMS in carrying out needs assessments. We also responded to AMS' requests by deploying: (i) two ERAT members to provide technical assistance to mitigate the Landfill Fire in Yangon; (ii) our Operation Lionheart Contingent to participate in search and rescue, disaster relief, and victim recovery efforts in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Son Tinh in Lao PDR; and (iii) two Republic of Singapore Air Force aircraft to deliver humanitarian aid and assist in the evacuation of earthquake victims after the Central Sulawesi Earthquake.

Beyond participating in overseas operations, Singapore seeks to build regional capacity for HADR. Singapore launched the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in September 2014 to provide a platform for military-to-military coordination in HADR, and to support the military of a disaster-affected State. The RHCC contributes by: (i) providing partner militaries with a comprehensive picture of the disaster's impact, assessed needs, and requests and offers of assistance, in order to facilitate decision-making by minimising duplication and gaps; (ii) enhancing information-sharing and operational coordination between partner militaries to facilitate a multinational military response; and (iii) deploying a forward coordination unit into the disaster-affected State, to support HADR efforts on the ground. The RHCC's focus on military coordination complements existing disaster response institutions – such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

and the AHA Centre. Singapore is appreciative of like-minded countries that have supported and partnered with the RHCC. These countries include Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, France, India, Lao PDR, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, the ROK, Russia, Thailand, the UK, and Viet Nam, which have attached International Liaison Officers (ILOs) to the RHCC or exchanged contact points for disaster relief. In addition, the RHCC has also signed two Memoranda of Understanding with the US Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) and the US Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), which facilitate bilateral cooperation and operational linkages.

From 2 to 4 April 2019, the RHCC/SAF partnered the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, the Bangladesh Armed Forces Division, and the US CFE-DM to co-organise a multinational HADR Table-Top Exercise, Exercise Coordinated Response (COORES) 2019. COORES built military linkages, enhanced mutual understanding and interoperability, and strengthened military cooperation in disaster relief. COORES involved 25 militaries from across the Asia-Pacific region and Europe and 19 international organisations, governmental agencies and non-government organisations.

Since 2015, Singapore has been hosting the annual Strategic Policy Dialogue on Disaster Management (SPDDM) to chart long-term strategies for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and sharpen ASEAN's policy direction, strategic engagements, and thought leadership in disaster management. In addition, Singapore organised the ASEAN Senior Executive Programme in Disaster Management, targeted at nurturing the planning and crisis management capacities of the senior leadership cadre within each AMS' National Disaster Management Organisation. Singapore is the Lead Shepherd for the development of the AHA Centre's Information and Communication Technology (ICT) capabilities, with funding support from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF)

III.(v) Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Singapore has a strong interest in keeping the international sea lines of communication open, safe, and secure. Singapore takes a serious view of any threats to the freedom and safety of navigation. To this end, Singapore works with like-minded countries to uphold international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and plays an active part in fostering regional maritime security cooperation and enhancing port security.

As a major hub port and one of the top ten ship registries in the world, Singapore is committed to the security of seaborne cargo. As one of the first States to implement the International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Singapore has contributed actively to capacity building programmes at various regional forums to assist countries in their implementation of the ISPS Code. Singapore is also party to the IMO's International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention 1988), and the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (SUA FFP 1988).

Given the existence of vital sea lines of communication in the region such as the South China Sea (SCS), the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait, Singapore cooperates closely with key stakeholders to uphold maritime security and freedom of navigation. To this end, Singapore remains fully committed to the following three principles which have gained broad consensus amongst regional stakeholders: (i) primary responsibility for the security of regional waterways lies with the littoral States; (ii) the international community, including major user States and bodies, like the IMO, have an important role to play; and (iii) new cooperative measures should be developed in line with UNCLOS and other international conventions.

These principles have translated into cooperative efforts at a regional level. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is a joint undertaking by the littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, to enhance maritime security in the SOMS. The MSP comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol,

the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" maritime air patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Since its inception in July 2004, the MSP has substantially reduced the incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in the SOMS. The 5th MSP Exercise was held in Singapore in January 2019, where members reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring the MSP's operational effectiveness and tested their processes and linkages for information-sharing and coordination.

Singapore is also supportive of ASEAN's approach towards the maritime issues encapsulated in the Bali Concord II, signed in October 2003, which reiterates the transboundary nature of maritime issues and the need to address them in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive way.

Apart from conducting air and sea patrols, Singapore also believes in enhancing maritime awareness and ensuring systematic and timely exchanges of information to keep sea lanes safe. In this regard, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which was established in 2009, seeks to advance inter-agency and international cooperation in maritime information-sharing through its linkages to operations centres and network of ILOs. The IFC's partnerships and the pooling of various information-sharing and analytical systems in one location have enabled the IFC to cue operational responses to a wide range of maritime security issues, including piracy, hijacking, search and rescue, weapons proliferation, and human/arms trafficking, and smuggling. The ASEAN ILOs in IFC also serve as the Permanent Secretariat of the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting. As of March 2019, the IFC have established links with international maritime centres, operational centres and agencies from 40 countries. A total of 139 ILOs from 23 countries have been deployed at the IFC since its establishment. As of March 2019, 19 ILOs have been accredited to the IFC from 18 different countries: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, the ROK, Thailand, the UK, the US, and Viet Nam. In May 2019, the IFC hosted the 2019 Maritime Information Sharing Exercise as well as the ADMM-Plus EWG-MS Field Training Exercise, to advance information-sharing and sense-making among navies, coast guards and other relevant maritime agencies and operations centres.

Singapore is a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP); the first intergovernmental initiative that promotes and enhances cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. Singapore is also the host State of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) since its formation in 2006. As of May 2019, a total of 20 States are Contracting Parties to the ReCAAP, namely, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the UK, the US, and Viet Nam. Over the years, the ReCAAP ISC has established itself as an authority on trends and analyses of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, and continues to play an instrumental role in disseminating timely and accurate information for governments and industry members alike. The ReCAAP ISC has collaborated with partner organisations and the industry to produce useful practice guides for the maritime community, such as the Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia launched in February 2016. The ReCAAP ISC has also supported numerous capacity building efforts to improve the capability of regional governments to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The ReCAAP is held up as a successful model of regional cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships by the IMO and has inspired other similar initiatives, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (GoA).

Beyond regional cooperation, Singapore also shares the international community's deep concern over the scourge of piracy threatening key sea-lines of communications in other parts of the world like the GoA. To this end, Singapore has been contributing to the multinational counter-piracy efforts under the ambit of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 since 2009. The SAF has deployed five Task Groups, including one Landing Ship Tank with two Super Puma helicopters on a Frigate with a Naval Helicopter as well as a Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to the GoA. At the request of the Combined Maritime Forces, Singapore took command of the CTF 151 in 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016, and 2018.

III.(vi) ICTs Security

Cyber threats are a transboundary and cross-cutting challenge to all AMS. At the same time, the cubersphere is also a key enabler of economic progress, job creation and better living standards as AMS enter into a digital future.

The ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Cybersecurity Coordination was endorsed by Leaders in April 2018 during Singapore's ASEAN Chairmanship. The Statement reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to a secure and resilient rules-based cyberspace and tasked Ministers to: (i) recommend feasible options for coordinating cybersecurity efforts across the three pillars of ASEAN; and (ii) identify norms of State behaviour in cyberspace that ASEAN can adopt and implement, taking reference from the 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE) Report. Since 2016, Singapore has also hosted the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC), held on the side-lines of the Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW). The Chairman's Statement of the 3rd AMCC on 19 September 2018 contained the following outcomes: (i) participants subscribed in-principle to the 11 voluntary and non-binding norms recommended in the 2015 UNGGE Report; and (ii) the AMCC will continue to be the non-formal interim platform for cyber discussions. Singapore will be convening a 4th SICW and AMCC in October 2019, which will provide a platform for facilitating discussions on cross-cutting cybersecurity issues among ICT Ministers and Cybersecurity Ministers and Senior Officials from all AMS.

Singapore hosted the inaugural ASEAN Senior Officials Roundtable on Cybercrime (SORC) in June 2013, which was attended by ASEAN SOMTC Leaders and their cybercrime experts. In addition, the SORC comprised an industry briefing segment, where global experts and academia briefed the meeting on the latest regional threats and challenges in cybercrime. The 6th SORC was held in July 2018.

The Cyber Security Authority of Singapore (CSA) has obtained formal endorsement from ASEAN Network Security Action Council (ANSAC) and

ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Senior Officials Meeting (TELSOM) to coordinate cybersecurity efforts across ASEAN. To that end, CSA has proposed elevating the AMCC to the status of an official ASEAN platform for cross-cutting cybersecurity discussions, which falls under the ambit of the ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers' Meeting (TELMIN). This is in accordance with the direction set out in the Leaders' Statement on Cybersecurity Coordination. Singapore has also been tasked by ANSAC to study the feasibility of establishing an ASEAN Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and is leading the study for each AMS to conduct a self-assessment of its CERT's capability gaps.

In our capacity as the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd on Cybercrime, Singapore has been working closely with other AMS and key stakeholders, such as INTERPOL, to identify priority areas of common interest to harmonise ASEAN's competencies in combating cybercrime. Singapore has also organised a number of training programmes and meetings for AMS to encourage information sharing and build a close network of cyber experts within the region. The initiatives proposed to combat cybercrime are in close alignment with the objectives in the ASEAN Political Security Blueprint 2025.

Alongside Malaysia and Japan, Singapore currently co-chairs the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ARF ISM on ICTs Security). The ARF ISM on ICTs Security and its Open Ended Study Group (OESG) focus on the adoption of CBMs to facilitate communication, informationsharing as well as the exchange of know-how and best practices. In so doing, we can reduce the risk of cyber conflict, and build inter-country trust and confidence in cuberspace. Singapore hosted the 3rd ARF OESG in January 2019, and the 4th ARF OESG as well as the 2nd ARF ISM on ICTs Security meeting in March 2019.

In terms of capacity building, Singapore launched a SGD 10 million ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme (ACCP) in 2016. To date, the ACCP has trained 170 ASEAN officials in various aspects of cybersecurity policy and incident response. Singapore will be launching an SGD30 million ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of

Excellence (ASCCE) in October 2019. The ASCCE is an expansion of our existing ACCP, and will run cyber-capacity-building programmes out of a physical facility.

In terms of awareness building, Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs was a supporting partner of the RSA Conference Asia Pacific and Japan, held in Singapore in July 2018. Furthermore, three iterations of the ASEAN Cybercrime Prosecutors' Roundtable Meeting have been held in Singapore from 2016 to 2018 as part of the SICW.

In terms of regional cooperation, Singapore and INTERPOL have implemented the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Development Project, which is funded by the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund 2.0. Singapore also proposed to set up an ASEAN Cyber Capability Desk within the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) and has seconded an officer to take up the position of the Head of the ASEAN Desk.

Singapore has been convening an annual ASEAN CERT Incident Drill (ACID) for the last 13 years to strengthen the cybersecurity preparedness of AMS, reinforce regional coordination drills, and enhance regional cooperation. All 10 AMS, as well as five ASEAN Dialogue Partners – Australia, China, India, Japan and the ROK – participated in the ACID.

Singapore has been an active participant in key international platforms facilitating discussions on cyber norms, capacity building, and CBMs. Singapore is deeply committed to continuing discussions on international cyber rules and norms at multilateral fora, such as the UNGGE and Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) resolutions at the UN General Assembly in 2018. Singapore is committed to supporting both processes. To address a transboundary issue like cybersecurity, the international community has to remain united.

IV. Role of ARF

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994 as an open and inclusive forum to discuss key political and security issues. Its evolution from Stage I Promotion of CBMs to Stage II Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) mechanisms, more than 15 years into its inception, is a significant development. This evolution reflects its success in

engendering greater confidence and trust among ARF Participants, fostering closer collaboration and candid dialogue, as well as responding to the complexities in the evolving regional geostrategic landscape.

The implementation of the PD agenda and CBMs, in accordance with universally recognised norms and principles of international law, ensures that the ARF moves ahead to address the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the region. As we enter the next 25 years of the ARF, regional security challenges will only become more complicated. This calls for stronger coordination and cooperation among ARF Participants, and constant refinement of the ARF's focus to keep pace with the shifting geostrategic landscape. The ARF will need to work with other ASEAN-led mechanisms in the regional ecosystem to synergise complementarities and minimise duplication in functions. It should also explore ways to engage Track II processes to bolster its own effectiveness.

Singapore remains fully committed to the ARF and its role as a key pillar in the multi-layered regional security architecture.

SRI LANKA

National Contributions to Regional Security

Counter-terrorism

In Sri Lanka, mainly two enactments have been used in tandem for the purposes of counter-terrorism: these are the Public Security Ordinance (No. 25 of 1947), and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979.

Since 9/11, new counter-terrorism legislation, that is, the 2005 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act and the 2006 Prevention of Money Laundering Act has focused on the financing of terrorism. Also the Financial Transactions Reporting Act, No. 6 of 2006 came into existence which established the Financial Intelligence Unit of Sri Lanka.

Domestic legislation passed on International Conventions/Protocol ratified by Sri Lanka:

Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act No. 25 of 2005, Offences against Aircraft Act No. 24 of 1982, Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Act No. 31 of 1996, Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Act No. 11 of 1999, Prevention of Hostage Taking Act No. 41 of 2000, Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Act No. 42 of 2000

Terrorism related regulations made under the United Nations Act No: 45 of 1968 to give effect to UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).

Accordingly to date Sri Lanka has promulgated the following UNSCRs by way of regulations under the UN Act of Sri Lanka:

Terrorism, terrorist financing (UNSCR 1267 (1999), UNSCR 2253 (2015) UNSCR 1373 (2001) & UNSCR 2368 (2017)

Sri Lanka has currently banned eight organizations and 155 individuals under the terms of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 (2001) which allows for states to take the necessary steps domestically to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, commit terrorist acts and provide safe havens.

Main governing domestic laws on transnational crime (Trafficking, Smuggling & drugs):

Sri Lanka is a Party to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized crime (UNTOC) and ratified one of its 3 main Protocols, i.e the Trafficking Protocol.

Presently there are existing domestic legislation relevant to the trafficking of persons such as, amendments to the Penal Code (2006), Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act No. 47 of 1956, Brothels Ordinance 1889, Vagrants Ordinance 1842, National Child Protection Authority Act No. 50 of 1998, Children and Young Persons Ordinance of 1939, Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act No. 21 of 1985, Immigrants & Emigrants Act No. 20 of 1948. Evidence Ordinance amendment No. 32 of 1999, Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children Act No. 30 of 2005, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act No. 25 of 2002 etc.

Sri Lanka has sufficient existing legislation to combat people smuggling. The Immigration and Emigration Act No: 20 of 1948 was amended by Act No: 31 of 2006 to bring in the provisions of migrant smuggling. However at present, a new draft Immigration Act is underway, which is inclusive of all relevant provisions of the Smuggling Protocol. Once it is concluded, Sri Lanka will be in a position to ratify the Smuggling Protocol under the UNTOC.

Legislation pertaining to drug control in Sri Lanka is the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Act, the Penal code, Cosmetic, Devices and Drugs Act,

Customs Ordinance and Indigenous Medical Act. The Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1935, which has undergone many amendments, most recently in 1984 (Act No. 13), is the principal statutory enactment regulating poisons, opium and dangerous drugs in the country.

Other statutes with provisions relating to drugs include;

- The Penal Code (Ordinance no. 2 of 1983 as subsequently amended) in particular, Chapter 14, which covers public health and safety.
- The Cosmetics, Devices and Drugs Act (Act No. 27 of 1980, as amended by Act No. 38 of 1984). The Act regulates the manufacture, sale, distribution, labeling and advertising of all commercial drugs.
- The Ayurveda Act (Act No. 31 of 1961 as amended by Act No. 5 of 1962) entitles ayurvedic physicians to obtain opium and cannabis for manufacture of their medicinal preparations.
- The Customs Ordinance (Ordinance No. 17 of 1869, imposes prohibitions and restrictions of both import and export of substances prohibited under the Poisons Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance).

Sri Lanka has also signed many bilateral/regional Treaties/MOUs on Terrorism and Transnational crime.

ii. Maritime Security

Sri Lanka is the Lead Coordinator in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) priority area "Maritime Safety and Security". Sri Lanka convened a two-day IORA "Maritime Safety and Security" Workshop from 4 – 5 September 2018, to facilitate the establishment of a Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security. The Working Group provides a mechanism for engaging maritime officials and experts across Member States to promote regional cooperation on maritime safety and security by providing a platform to discuss collective member state priorities in the sphere of maritime safety and security. The first meeting of the Working Group is being convened towards the latter part of 2019.

Sri Lanka functions as the Secretariat of the Working Group on Operations at Sea of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) which enables Sri Lanka Navy, the focal point to contribute to maintain order in threatened regions in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka is also an active member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.

Sri Lanka Navy convenes annually the "Galle Dialogue" maritime conference, thus facilitating discussions on maritime security.

iii. Maritime Domain Awareness

Sri Lanka as an island nation is situated almost at the central point in between the two entry points to the Indian Ocean. With increased shipping activities globally, the need for Maritime Domain Awareness will be a fundamental issue. Moreover, Maritime Domain Awareness cannot be confined to a single country. Sri Lanka believes that establishing a networking system among all countries, to obtain real-time, updated and authenticated information is required to effectively create Maritime Domain awareness to deal with the challenges faced in the maritime domain.

iv. Cybercrime

Sri Lankan Government has taken steps to combat threats against Cybercrime. The Computer Crimes Act No. 24 of 2007, is the primary legislative too in this respect.

On 1st September 2015, Sri Lanka became the first country in South Asia to become a State Party to the Budapest Cyber Crime Convention. As such it has demonstrated a strong commitment to harmonize and improve our national laws in accordance with international best practices. Consequently, Sri Lanka has taken steps to improve investigative techniques and enhance the ability of its Criminal Justice officials and to benefit from effective international cooperation measures.

In order to address evolving Cybercrime challenges, Sri Lanka has embarked on a review of our criminal justice measures in the area of child safety online. Consequently, Sri Lanka recently approved an amendment to the Obscene Publications Ordinance to comprehensively deal with Child Pornography related offences. A New Chapter titled "Child Pornography through the use of Computer Systems" will be introduced through this amendment.

A specialized "Cyber Crime Investigations Unit" has been established in the Criminal Investigation Department of Sri Lanka Police (CID), with two provincial branches. This functions as the 24/7 contact point under the Budapest Cybercrime Convention. This unit was upgraded recently thanks to the generous contributions from the Republic of Korea. The CID Cyber team has also benefitted from enhanced training under Global Action against Cybercrime (GLACY) program of the European Union/ Council of Europe, implemented in partnership with Interpol.

Securing electronic evidence from Foreign Service Providers is vital for the investigation and prosecution of Cyber Crime offences. Recognizing this need, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act No. 25 of 2002 was recently amended by Act No. 24 of 2018 with features of the Budapest Convention.

Cyber Security

Sri Lankan Government adopted a comprehensive Cyber Security strategy in October 2018. Consequently, Sri Lankan Government has finalized a Cyber Security Bill and also preparing data protection legislation.

The primary objectives of the draft Cyber Security legislation are (a) to ensure the effective implementation of the National Cyber Security Strategy in Sri Lanka, (b) to prevent, mitigate and respond to cyber security threats and incidents effectively and efficiently; and (c) to empower the Cyber Security Agency of Sri Lanka and other institutional frameworks related to cyber security in order to provide for a safe and secure cyber security environment and to protect critical information infrastructure.

An important feature of the Cyber Security Bill are the provisions which enables the Minister to designate "Critical Information Infrastructure" ("CII"). The criteria for the designation of CII as well as the duties and obligations imposed on the owners of computers and computer systems, once they are designated as CII.

These initiatives are led by the Ministry of Digital Infrastructure and Information Technology, with support of other key stakeholders.

The Ministry has included the private sector in these efforts and the Government will follow an inclusive approach by consulting key stakeholders in the Review of this new draft legislation.

THAILAND

Overview of the Regional Security Environment

- Thailand's ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Chairmanship comes at a time of rapidly evolving geo-strategic dynamics and multi-faceted transboundary challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. There is increased competition amongst the major powers. Transboundary challenges, in particular, transnational crime, terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security, natural disasters, and pandemics have grown, both in terms of intensity and sophistication. The onset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution has brought forth both disruptive technologies and technological solutions. These developments have brought about immense challenges to regional efforts to promote sustainable peace, security and prosperity, while maintaining ASEAN's centrality and strategic value added.
- Despite these challenges, the regional security situation remains relatively stable and peaceful. There have been positive developments on key regional issues as a result of multilateralism, regionalism and diplomatic initiatives. These include the efforts to reinforce economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, the strong momentum of regional integration, the commitment to promote cooperation and partnership between ASEAN and external partners and the promotion of sustainable security through the deepening of strategic trust which will contribute to maintaining the Asia-Pacific region as an area of peace, security and prosperity.

ASEAN Centrality in the Evolving Regional Architecture

The strengthening of the ASEAN-centred regional architecture is supported by shared norms and principles of international law, as embodied in key instruments such as the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Declaration on the Conduct of

Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), among others. With wider recognition of its governing principles in inter-state relations in response to security challenges in the fast-changing geo-political environment, the TAC has become ever more valid and relevant. Reinforcing the TAC and its principles which will strengthen regional norms and their application to the wider region beyond Southeast Asia, should thus be a priority for ASEAN and its partners, especially the High Contracting Parties to the TAC.

- The long-term goal is to realise a Strategic New Equilibrium that will be conducive to peace, security and prosperity for all in the Asia-Pacific region, and from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The 34th ASEAN Summit on 23 June 2019 in Bangkok adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific which is "ASEAN's Vista" on the evolving regional geo-strategic landscape anchored on existing norms and principles including those enshrined under the TAC, and on engagement with partners, not a response to other initiatives existing in the region. It thus aims to promote win-win cooperation in areas that are constructive and mutually beneficial, namely, connectivity, sustainable development, maritime cooperation and economic cooperation. It is based on the principle of inclusiveness and the 3Ms: Mutual Trust, Mutual Respect, and Mutual Benefit.
- 5. The ASEAN-centered regional architecture comprising the East Asia Summit (EAS) at its apex, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Plus One, has provided ASEAN with a strong convening power and a platform to establish rules and norms for a regional order. These for a have provided venues for key players to engage in dialogue for the enhancement of strategic trust, the strengthening of confidence-building measures and the promotion of preventive diplomacy, focusing on win-win cooperation and concrete deliverables. They will ultimately contribute to attaining "sustainable security" within the ASEAN region and beyond.

Regional Security Environment

- There have been some recent positive developments regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula, with some prospects for continued peaceful dialogue amongst parties concerned. This includes the Meeting between President Putin of Russia and Chairman Kim of the DPRK in April 2019, the Meeting between President Xi of China and Chairman Kim in June 2019, the Summit between U.S. President Trump and Chairman Kim in February and their meeting at the Demilitarised Zone in the Korean Peninsula in June 2019. We hope that all parties concerned will continue peaceful dialogue and work towards establishing lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Joint Statement by the U.S. and DPRK Leaders. Meanwhile, implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions remains an obligation of the international community. In this connection, the ARF, as an ASEAN-led platform, has a role to play in helping create a conducive environment for peaceful dialogue.
- 7. The Asia-Pacific region is home to vast maritime areas and important trade and transportation routes. Promoting maritime cooperation, security, safety and connectivity, is therefore one of the region's priorities. Safe and secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are important to enhancing maritime connectivity in the region as well as driving maritime commerce. There have been continuous efforts to address transnational crime at sea, including piracy, armed robbery, trafficking of illicit drugs and goods. Other increasingly important maritime issues, such as marine resources management, including combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Fishing) have fostered cooperation to jointly address the issue. Moreover, to complement these efforts, practical cooperation, maritime domain awareness (MDA), information-sharing and intelligence exchange must also be enhanced.
- Regarding the South China Sea, there have been positive developments. ASEAN and China continue negotiations on and look forward to an early conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct (COC). The completion of the first reading

- of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text COC is a welcomed development. ASEAN and China as well as the international community attach importance to ensuring freedom of navigation in and overflight of the South China Sea. In the meantime, all parties concerned should continue to work together to enhance trust and confidence, and exercise self-restraint in order to maintain the positive momentum in relations and create an environment conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS 1982.
- 9. Full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is also important and is being pursued. Win-win functional maritime cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as marine environmental protection, including addressing the shared challenges of plastic and marine debris, has helped enhance trust and confidence as well as promote the implementation of the Declaration for a Decade of Coastal and Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea. The long-term goal is to ultimately transform the South China Sea into a Sea of Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development, through cooperative actions that are anchored on the ideas of prevention, protection and partnership.
- 10. The continuation and acceleration of the ASEAN Community integration process has led to enhanced connectivity amongst countries in Southeast Asia and the wider region. While this is positive, it can potentially render the region more vulnerable to the threats of transnational organised crimes, including trafficking in persons and people smuggling, irregular migration and illicit drug trafficking. This landscape requires ASEAN to enhance its border management cooperation through enhanced coordination in all aspects, including information sharing and intelligence exchange, implementing appropriate measures to ensure safety and security from land, air and sea border challenges, and catalysing joint action to help address multifaceted dimensions of transnational crime. There is thus a need to ensure a balanced approach between safety and security on the one hand, and cross-border trade facilitation and the seamless movement of goods and people on the other.

- 11. Priority should continue to be given to combatting trafficking in persons, people smuggling, and irregular migration. These closely linked concerns are caused by transnational organised crime elements that increase the vulnerability of victims. The critical challenges required the full implementation of the Bohol Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Work Plan 2017-2020.
- 12. The persistent challenge of drug trafficking, in terms of volume and types, has prompted ASEAN to take further action to address illicit drug activities. These include proactive cooperation through the ASEAN Narcotics Cooperation Center (ASEAN-NARCO) based in Bangkok, the implementation of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs (2016-2025) and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to Tackle Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle (2017-2019), under the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (AMMD). Such cooperation provides a comprehensive strategy to tackle drug-related activities, including investigation and arrest of major drug producers or traffickers, promotion of health and area development, and cooperation with external parties. ASEAN reaffirms the resolute stand against legalization of illicit drugs for non-medical and non-scientific use, in line with the Statement delivered by ASEAN at the 5th Intersessional United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) Meeting of the 61st Commission on Narcotic Drugs on 7-9 November 2018.
- 13. Over the past several years, cybersecurity has been increasingly in the spotlight. The focus on cybersecurity has reflected the growing regional and international attention to the issue, with regard to a continued attempt to balance the opportunities afforded by the digital economy with the challenges due to the increased sophistication of cuber threats. The landscape requires enhanced cooperation at regional and international levels to ensure a safe, secure and resilient cyberspace, and sufficient capabilities to combat cybercrime. Although several cyber management attempts are in place, more actions remain to be done, including adoption of a risk-centric, layered-defence approach to cyber threats. This involves promoting sufficient and well qualified security professionals in the field of innovative technology. Moreover, achieving greater prosperity in the digital economy prompts

- ASEAN to ensure safety and security for both the business sector and the public. The main tasks for ASEAN include the identification of a coordinating mechanism between ASEAN and ASEAN-led frameworks related to cybersecurity and development of a list of voluntary, practical norms of state behaviour in cyberspace, to ensure that such challenges areas are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. Equally important is training and capacity-building, and this is where the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre plays an important catalytic role in the region.
- 14. The threat of terrorism and violent extremism is likely to persist in 2019. ASEAN needs to address the significant security risks posed by returning combatants of nationals to the region from other regions affected by terrorism and violent extremism. ASEAN's agenda on counter terrorism and violent extremism is guided by the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), which aims to deepen cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism. Collective efforts involving ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), the ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), the East Asia Summit, and the ARF, need to be further strengthened to undertake a comprehensive and coordinated action in countering terrorism and radicalisation. Combatting terrorism requires a sustainable approach in addressing the root causes and the conditions conducive to the spread of radicalised ideologies. This would include poverty eradication, encouraging tolerance and utilising the moderation agenda, and promoting inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues in the region, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

2. National Security and Defence Policy

Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

15. In relation to Thailand's national security and defense policy, the Ministry of Defense has published its policy statement in an effort to promote transparency, and to enhance trust and confidence between Thailand and ASEAN Member

States (AMS), as well as with other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region. According to the policy statement, the missions of the Ministry of Defense are outlined as follows:

- To safeguard and uphold the institution of the Monarchy with His Majesty the King as the Head of State and the Highest Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, so that the Institution of the Monarchy remains as the center that harmonises hearts and souls of the Thai people, and as the most important institution of the nation, and to accomplish this through making every effort in cooperation with other government agencies.
- To enhance defense cooperation with neighbouring nations, ASEAN Member States, friendly nations, and international organisations, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to support the arrangement of the security environment, the collective building of confidence, peace and stability, with focus on the prevention and reduction of conflict with neighbouring countries. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense aims to maintain a positive image of the nation within the international arena and seeks to strengthen defense cooperation with the international community through support for peace and humanitarian missions under the UN umbrella. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will initiate and develop a wider scope of military cooperation, and maintain the balance of relationships between nations in the region, and will seek to expedite the process of activities under cooperation frameworks between Thailand and neighbouring countries for the survey and demarcation of boundaries, as well as support the integration of the ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN-Political Security Community.
- To enhance the integration of strengths and capabilities with every sector by incorporating every aspect of national powers to support national defense. During peace time, the Ministry of Defense will utilize all resources for the benefit of the country, through a comprehensive approach in enhancing every aspect of national powers to support all operative missions for the security of the nation. This can be achieved by prioritising support towards the urgent policies of the Government, especially on national reformation, the arrangement of social discipline, the restriction of illegal activities and the

- reconciliation of the people in the nation. Moreover, emphasis will also be given to accelerating the restoration of peace and safety for the lives of the people in the southernmost provinces, and for the security of their assets. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will utilise all resources to support the safeguarding of national interests, the national development for security purposes, and the provision of assistance to the people, especially on problems arising from disasters, epidemic and communicable diseases. Also, focus will be given to solve problems relating to natural resources and environment, water resource management, illegal immigration and other transnational crimes including arms, drugs and human trafficking, piracy, computer crimes and international terrorism.
- To enhance the capability of the armed forces and the national defense system to ensure readiness for safeguarding the independence, sovereignty, security and national interests through both the preparation of force, and the use of force, by adhering to the principle of the maintenance of forces for self-defense purposes. Priorities will be given to the deployment of forces for joint operations, and the development of personnel for combat readiness. Moreover, efforts will be made towards improving proactive intelligence gathering to ensure timely strategic warnings and the provision of information for decision making. Furthermore, in enhancing the capabilities, emphasis will be given to improving joint logistics by utilizing the standard platform of military equipment, as well as other equipment with potential for effective utilization bu each service, and also by strengthening cooperation with the people to ensure that military missions are supportively carried out during peace time. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will seek to develop the reserve systems in accordance with military necessities, those of which include development of reserve forces for mobilisation, military equipment and energy to ensure preparedness in responding to the nation's security needs.
- To strengthen the defense industry through the integration of capabilities from both public and private sectors, and to capitalise on the cooperation between AMS and work towards becoming selfreliant with regards to the production of the necessary military equipment. Moreover, the Ministry

of Defense seeks to strengthen the scientific and technological aspects of its defense industry in order to achieve equal standards with those of other nations in the region, and to work with all sectors at both the domestic and international levels. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense aims to enhance the standard and the secureness of its information technology and communication systems, and to improve its ability to respond to the threat of cyber warfare.

- f. To give priority to the provision of assistance to war veterans and their families to enable them to live in society with honour and dignity, and to enhance the morale of all personnel who had served to defend the nation. Also, efforts will be given to the enhancement of the capabilities of war veterans so that they can contribute further towards national security.
- g. To establish the appropriate structure for the Armed Forces and work towards the enhancement of the quality of personnel within the Ministry of Defense, through increasing their knowledge, skills, sets of morals and ethics, and to ensure that all personnel are equipped with physical and mental preparedness in carrying out their duties. Also, appropriate work will be given towards the improvement of the benefits of its personnel to give a morale boost for their work. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will ensure professionalism from its personnel, and support further integration with the population in all aspects in order to maintain national security.
- h. To enhance armed forces capability in order to counter the non-traditional threats, the Ministry of Defence focuses on administration reform before commencing to the restructuring of the armed forces. For the first phase of the reform, priority will be given to the preparation of personnel, equipment, education, defence industry research and development for self-reliance, improvements to the national defence capabilities, joint operations with allied armed forces.
- i. Promotion of confidence in the capabilities of the armed forces is an important means to support regional efforts in addressing security-related challenges. In this connection, Thailand's defence budget for fiscal year 2018 amounted to

- 111,962 million baht (approximately 3,394 billion US dollars). This is equivalent to 1.44 percent of Thailand's national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
- 16. In an effort to promote military cooperation and mutual trust and confidence, the Ministry of Defense has set out its immediate policies to use all existing security mechanisms at all levels to contribute towards regional security. With regard to its Immediate Policies for the 2018 Fiscal Year (1 October 2017 30 September 2018), the Ministry of Defense has set out to ensure regional peace, stability and security through implementation of the following policies:
- a. To restructure and better the composition and deployment of troops along the borders in order to support the launch of the ASEAN Community and the establishment of the Special Economic Development Zones. Here, emphasis will be given towards the collective readjustments of troop deployments, enhancement of the command and control systems, and the strengthening of the legal system by all authorities concerned.
- b. To maintain and strengthen military cooperation with neighboring countries, ally nations and major powers, and to reinforce the strong ties with international organizations in order to address international threats through collective efforts. Amongst others, this includes ensuring preparedness for participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN framework.
- c. To support the Government's undertakings to realise the priorities set out in the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, with particular focus on the political-security pillar of the ASEAN Community. The Ministry of Defense will aim to support the Government by placing importance on the strengthening of military cooperation with AMS and other partners within and beyond the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense seeks to maintain a leading role in developing relations within the security cooperation frameworks, and in particular, in the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus, and the ARF for peace, stability and security.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will give importance to participation in cooperation frameworks which will provide opportunities for the armed forces of the region to engage in practical cooperation to promote mutual interests of participating countries and enhance capacities for the future, such as the activities of the ADMM's initiatives and the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups, which includes the expansion of cooperation with other civilian agencies and international organisations to confront non-traditional challenges in the region. At the 34th ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Leaders approved the inclusion of the ASEAN Center of Military Medicine (ACMM) as a subsidiary body under the ADMM in Annex 1 of the ASEAN Charter. The Center will add value to the overall humanitarian assistance and disaster relief framework of the region, as well as complement the work of the ASEAN Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in improving the region's response and coordination mechanisms.

Thailand reiterated its commitments to d. addressing the issues related to Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), issues concerned with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean, forest encroachment and preservation measures, problems of community waste, spread of drought and addressing problems from haze caused by forest fires.

National Contributions to Regional Security

Joint Exercise

17. Cobra Gold is one of the largest multinational exercises in the Asia Pacific region which has been held annually in Thailand since 1982. It is known to be one of the largest theater security cooperation exercises in the Indo-Pacific, with aims to strengthen military ties, and improve capabilities and interoperability of participating countries, through planning and conducting combined and joint operations over a range of both civic and military activities, including enhancing maritime security, preventing and mitigating emerging disease threats, and responding to large-scale disasters.

The 38th iteration of the Cobra Gold 18. theater exercises took place during 12-23 February 2019 at various locations throughout Thailand. This year's exercises focused on 'light training', featuring three main activities: (1) STAFF Exercise (STAFFEX), (2) Field Training Exercise (FTX), and (3) Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA). There were an estimated 8,784 military officers from 29 countries in attendance, seven of which (Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the United States) were full participants. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) drill had participants from ten countries (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Fiji). Seven countries (Thailand, the U.S., Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and Malausia) participated in the main training, while two others (China and India) took part in an additional assistance program drill. Furthermore, 11 countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Israel, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland) attended other exercises as observer countries ("COLT"). Cobra Gold contributes to building trust and confidence as well as practical cooperation through joint training and exchange of valuable experiences.

Peacekeeping

19. Thailand has always been committed to the cause of United Nations peacekeeping and has been a troop-contributing country since 1958. As of 2019, Thailand contributes an engineering contingent of 273 personnel to UNMISS in South Sudan, as well as military and police officers to three UN peacekeeping missions, namely UNAMID in Darfur, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan, and UNMISS in South Sudan. The deployment of a Horizontal Military Engineering Company (HMEC) to join the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is in pursuit to fulfill the pledge at the Leaders' Meeting on Peacekeeping 2015, attended by the Thai Prime Minister, on 28 September 2015. The troop arrived in Juba and commenced its operation since 23 December 2018. The Thai HMEC's main responsibilities include road construction and infrastructure building in the United Nations military camp. The contingent also endeavour to promote development initiatives and

the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) bestowed by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej The Great to assist in achieving a sustained peace which complements Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions).

- 20. Furthermore, Thailand supports the work of the High-Level Panel established by the UN Secretary-General and chaired by H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta to conduct a comprehensive review of UN peace operations and its report submitted to the UN Secretary-General. In addition, Thailand also supports the UN Secretary-General's initiative on Action for Peacekeeping by endorsing the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN peacekeeping Operations to reaffirm the commitment to strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
- 21. Primarily, Thailand puts the protection of women and children, as well as elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse, high on agenda. Thus, Thailand supports the initiative of the UN Secretary-General by signing the Compact between the UN Secretary-General and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand: Commitment to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse in 2018. The document reaffirms the commitment of the Royal Thai Government and the United Nations to prevent, support and comprehensively assist victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel and non-United Nations personnel deployed under a Security Council mandate.
- 22. In addition to the standard training requirements, Thailand and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict organized training on child protection to the HMEC for troops deployed to the UNMISS on 4-6 June 2018 so as to ensure enhanced safety of children in conflict situations.
- 23. Given that the Communique of the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Meeting in November 2017 recognized the existence of barriers to the development and deployment of qualified women peacekeepers, Thailand therefore has called on the United Nations to review rules and regulations that may hinder the roles and ratio of female officers joining peacekeeping operations on the ground.

24. The Thai military has also been active in promoting enhanced cooperation within ASEAN and with partner countries on peacekeeping training. In this regard, Thailand has initiated and continues to support the ASEAN network of peacekeeping centres and an Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to promote training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel.

Counter-terrorism

- 25. The region has witnessed continuing terrorist attacks. Terrorism remains one of the major threats to the Asia-Pacific region. Thailand reaffirms its commitment to combat terrorism and violent extremism. In recent years, fighting against errorism has shifted its focus to the terrorist diaspora, those who have returned home or are dispatched to the next potential spot. Moreover, activities in the cyber domain and the use of ICTs and the internet for terrorist purposes and disseminating extremist propaganda, need to be closely monitored and addressed. Active regional and international cooperation to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is thus essential.
- 26. Thailand places emphasis on a comprehensive and sustainable response to terrorism which includes addressing root causes through soft and hard approaches in a balanced and holistic manner. encouraging international cooperation, and promoting interfaith dialogues and values of moderation and peaceful coexistence in multicultural societies. To this end, Thailand has implemented the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2017-2021) focusing on prevention, response and rehabilitation, to counter terrorism and its cooperation at regional and international levels. Thailand has supported effective implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and has currently ratified 10 out of 19 UN conventions and protocols on counterterrorism. Furthermore, the Anti-Money Laundering Office of Thailand (AMLO), in partnership with Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Indonesian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC), hosted the 4th Regional Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) Summit on 6-8 November 2018, in Bangkok. At the Summit, the Bangkok Communique was adopted aimed to pilot a secure online regional information sharing platform to disrupt transnational crimes in 2019.

27. At the regional level, Thailand looks forward to working closely with AMS to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (2018-2025), and to promote strategic information exchange on terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism.

Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

- 28. Thailand continues the policy not to develop, acquire or proliferate any kind of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, as well as fully observes commitments and obligations on non-proliferation of WMD. Therefore, Thailand has earmarked a budget for non-proliferation efforts and peaceful use of nuclear technology, including through development of research and laboratory facilities, building up human resources, and strengthening legal framework.
- 29. With the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act enacted in February 2017, Thailand is pursuing ratification and accession to all relevant nuclear non-proliferation treaties and conventions.

As a result of said Act, to date, Thailand has ratified or acceded to the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Its 2005 Amendment, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Most recently, Thailand also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2018, and currently pursuing the ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

30. As one of the first three countries to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 20 September 2017, Thailand looks forward to its entry into force.

In this connection, Thailand, in collaboration with New Zealand, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) through its Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), hosted the "Regional Workshop on Why We Need the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" on 31 August 2018, at the United Nations Conference Centre in Bangkok. The Workshop aimed to promote further awareness of the TPNW in order to facilitate the signing and/or ratification process of the Treaty.

- 31. At the same time, Thailand reaffirms the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation and recognises the complementarity between the TPNW and the NPT, as both share the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this connection, as a State Party to the NPT, Thailand has been an active player in advancing nuclear disarmament as required under the Article 6 of the NPT, as well as promoting nuclear security through international fora, such as the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).
- 32. The draft Act on Trade Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction Related Items (TCWMD Act) was endorsed by the Cabinet in 2016. It has passed the third reading of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), and is expected to come into force on 1 January 2020. The draft Act covers control on the export and re-export of goods, as well as the transit, transshipment and transfer of technology. Currently, the Department of Foreign Trade (DFT) is drafting subordinate regulations under the TCWMD, which will cover relevant issues such as the conditions, procedures, and criteria for the issue of licenses of dual-use items and self-certification, as procedures for obtaining a bulk license.
- 33. At the regional level, Thailand has been actively contributing to the enhancement of capability of AMS in nuclear security, safety and safeguard within the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM). Thailand supports the formalization of relations between ASEAN and the IAEA, which will enhance cooperation between the two entities on nuclear-related matters. Thailand looks forward to the signing of the the ASEAN-IAEA Practical Arrangements (PA) by the ASEAN Secretary-General on behalf of ASEAN, and the IAEA Director-General. As ASEANTOM Chair, Thailand hosted the 6th Annual Meeting of the ASEANTOM

on 2-3 July 2019, in Krabi. The Meeting discussed several ongoing regional technical cooperation projects, including emergency preparedness and responses (EP&R) project and regional early warning radiation monitoring network in ASEAN. The Meeting also adopted the ASEANTOM Work Plan 2019-2023 as a framework for ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy in compliance with the IAEA standards.

- 34. As State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction or Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Thailand adheres to transparent and accountable management of biological agents and toxins, whereby there is need for increased coordination and sharing of experiences and good practices. In this connection, Thailand and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) co-hosted the "South-East Asian Workshop on Global Challenges to Successful Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540(2004), and Regional Efforts to Address Them" in September 2017 in Bangkok. The workshop noted a fruitful exchange of good practices on the implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004), and on advancements in biotechnology, biosafety and biosecurity, and intangible technology transfer (ITT).
- 35. Furthermore, Thailand attaches high importance to fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention), particularly on completing mine clearance in remaining contaminated area of 2,557 square kilometers. In this connection, Thailand submitted in August 2017 the revised Second Article 5 Extension Request, setting out a two-phrase program for completing mine clearance, which Thailand is proceeding with its second phrase spanning from 1 November 2018 to 31 October 2023. Thailand fully supports the work of an ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre. We will continue to work with AMS and regional and international partners to exchange good practices on addressing the effects of anti-personnel mines, mine risk education and victim assistance, in line with our commitment under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Transnational Crime

- 36. Transnational crimes continue to pose major challenges affecting the Asia-Pacific region. Greater interconnectedness, technological advancement, economic linkages, and free flow of movement of peoples have been exploited by transnational criminal groups worldwide. In recognition of ASEAN's vulnerability to these threats due in large part to its higher degree of integration, Thailand has implemented the Strategy to Prevent and Combat Transnational Organised Crimes (2015-2021) in efforts to combat transnational crime in five identified priority areas, namely terrorism, illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber, infringement of intellectual property rights, trafficking in persons, and drug trafficking. To this end, Thailand believes that developing a more coordinated ASEAN-wide border management cooperation arrangement will be key to protecting the region from transnational crimes.
- 37. Thailand continues to implement the Border Management Plan on Security Issues B.E. 2559-2564 (2016-2021) focusing on setting system and related mechanisms for border areas protection, as well as improving intelligence exchange. Furthermore, in recognition of the significance of pushing forward the ASEAN-wide border management cooperation arrangement idea. Thailand in collaboration with the UNODC hosted the "High-Level Regional Conference: Synchronising Trade and Security Plans in Support of ASEAN 2025", on 3-4 April 2019 at the UN Conference Centre in Bangkok. The Conference was presided over by H.E. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, and aimed to enhance cooperation among AMS to strike a balance between regional security, stability and safety on the one hand, and facilitation of cross-border trade and movement of people on the other. Thailand believes this would enable ASEAN to mitigate the possible negative impact of enhanced physical connectivity and deepening economic integration especially with the full implementation of the ASEAN Single Window in 2019.
- 38. Thailand continues to commit to a "zero tolerance" policy against human trafficking, which measures driven by the 5Ps-approach (policy and legal framework, prosecution, protection,

prevention, and partnership) are implemented. This led to Thailand's ratifying the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) on 24 July 2016. Thailand also welcomes the Bohol TIP Work Plan 2017-2020, endorsed on 13 November 2017 and envisioned to drive the work of the ASEAN on trafficking in persons from 2017-2020 consistent with the ASEAN Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (APA). In this connection, Thailand in collaboration with AMS and ASEAN Partners, through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the SOMTC, AMMTC and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (ARFISM on CTTC) will continue to support the implementation of harmonized regional activities to combat TIP in four thematic areas of the APA including (1) prevention of TIP, (2) protection of victims, (3) law enforcement and prosecution of crimes of TIP, and (4) regional and international cooperation and coordination.

- 39. With attempts to translate the APA into practice, the ACWC Regional Guidelines and Procedures to Address the Needs of Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children was endorsed in March 2018 with the aim of providing AMS common approach for practical implementation of the ACTIP. The Guidelines and Procedures were recently launched on 4 April 2019 in Bangkok. As a step forward, the Guidelines and Procedures will be further tailored as useful tools and capacity building for practitioners at the national level over the course of the coming years.
- 40. Furthermore, Thailand advocates Public–Private–Civil Society Partnership (PPCP), which raises awareness of the importance of addressing human trafficking, as well as collaborating to develop the quality of life, lower economic disparities, and eliminate injustice on a humanitarian basis. More than fifty agencies to foster Public–Private–Civil Society Partnership are also committed to the Memorandum on Cooperation to Prevent, Suppress, and Anti Trafficking in Persons.
- 41. Another phenomenon that has become a major concern in the region is irregular migration. Joint action and firm focus on tackling the root causes is necessary. Concrete measures are needed to develop quality of life and lower disparities,

eliminate injustice and social inequalities, and promote human rights. Thailand has been closely collaborating with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Bali Process and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in addressing irregular migration, including in maritime areas.

- 42. Thailand also serves as a lead shepherd for illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber, thus combatting these challenges, which involves trade activity that generates an estimated revenue of 2.5 billion USD each year is another priority. On 21-22 March 2019, Thailand hosted the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Illegal Wildlife Trade, in Chiang Mai. Following successful discussion on several topics including global and regional wildlife trade policy, demand reduction, law enforcement and wildlife cybercrime, the Meeting issued the "Chiang Mai Statement of ASEAN Ministers Responsible for CITES and Wildlife Enforcement on Illegal Wildlife Trade", reflecting commitment to combatting wildlife and timber trafficking by reducing demand for wildlife consumption, stressing the importance of law enforcement and fighting against wildlife cybercrime, as well as promoting international collaboration to address the issue in collective, holistic, and sustainable manners.
- 43. The drug situation in ASEAN remains alarming with the influx of methamphetamine tablets and crystalline methamphetamine from illicit drug production sites in the Golden Triangle. Five AMS, namely Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Thailand, together with China, face the direct impact of illicit drug trafficking. In this regard, the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network, the ASEAN-NARCO Website and the ASEAN Airport Interdiction Task Force are important supportive tools in tackling the drug trafficking problem.
- 44. The Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) hosted the 7th ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network (ADMN) Operational Workshop during 5-7 March 2019, in Bangkok. The workshop was attended by representatives from AMS, ASEAN Secretariat, Thailand Substance Abuse Academic Network, and ONCB staffs. Main objective of the workshop included sharing information on regional drug situation, conducting the 4th drug monitoring report of ASEAN region, and reviewing

the ADM Report System Manual providing AMS with the same working standard.

- Addressing illicit trafficking of precursor 45. chemicals in the Golden Triangle is one other major priority. AMS has formulated the ASEAN Cooperation Plan in Tackling Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle (2017-2019) to support the work of five AMS together with China, and the Safe Mekong Operation initiated in 2012. As the Operation will continue until 2022, AMS remains committed to patrolling the Mekong River and working together to tackle drug problems, with emphasis on exchanging information. In the same vein, the Safe Mekong Coordination Centre (SMCC), located in Chiang Mai Province, acts as the information center for combating drugs through coordination on river and land patrols, information sharing, identifying targets and raids, and blocking the flow of precursors used for drug production in the Mekong countries. Since its operations, hundreds of arrests along with drug-related cases have been reported, proving the operation to be efficient and productive.
- 46. Thailand places importance to alternative development and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs), considering them as central to the "people-centred" approach in addressing drugrelated problems. As a result, community leaders of the selected twin villages and local officers from Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Thailand were met to pursue common development goals as an alternative to solve drug problems. It is expected that this recent collaboration would reduce drug production and trafficking activities in the Golden Triangle, resulting in drug situation in the sub-region being under control within the next few years.
- 47. Rapid ICT technological advancement and ever-increasing digital connectivity have made cyber threats more diverse, complex and impactful. ASEAN therefore is constantly required to calibrate an appropriate balance between security and business facilitation as well as to promote regulatory alignment across borders. With this in mind, Thailand has been pursuing Thailand 4.0 policy to create an innovative economy that can reap the full benefits of digitization. Accordingly, Thailand passed the Cybersecurity Act, leading to the establishment of the National Cybersecurity

Commission to be chaired by the Prime Minister. The main purpose of the Bill is to ensure necessary regulatory frameworks to prevent, respond and alleviate cyber threats, particularly against Critical Information Infrastructures (Clls). Moreover, Thailand is also working on the draft Personal Information Protection Act, aimed to standardize mechanisms and supervise measures to protect personal information.

- 48. At the regional level, Thailand has proposed and supported the "Seamless and Digital ASEAN" agenda underpinned by a healthy cyber ecosystem including a secured ICT infrastructure and effective cybersecurity regulations. To this end, Thailand successfully hosted an ASEAN Digital Agility Leaders' Meeting, focusing on five aspects, namely cybersecurity, smart city, connectivity and mobility, harmonisation and alignment, and manpower and society.
- 49. On 14 September 2018, Thailand inaugurated the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC) in Bangkok to serve as a training centre for public authorities and information infrastructure companies in ASEAN to enhance regional cybersecurity capacity. The Centre organised the first Cyber SEA Game to raise awareness on the technical side of ASEAN Cybrsecurity. The AJCCBC plans for a total of 9 training sessions during the course of 2018-2019 on three issues: Cyber Defence Exercise with Recurrence (CYDER), digital forensics and malware analysis. Thailand also hosted the International Conference on Cybersecurity: Implications on Peace and Security in the ASEAN Region, on 10-11 May 2019, in Bangkok. The Conference highlighted Thailand's priority on strengthening cybersecurity underpinning the development of sustainable ASEAN Community in the age of digital disruption, as well as building resilience to growing cuber threats and cubercrime through the "whole of ASEAN" approach to realise a "Seamless and Digital ASEAN".
- 50. Thailand attaches great importance to preparing against Communicable Diseases, Non Communicable Diseases, Emerging Infectious Disease, and Chemicals Diseases caused by occupations and environmental pollution as they are one of main threats to human security. Thailand has joined the regional and international

communication in finding ways to prevent and tackle these problems by regularly and actively participating in related meetings and fora such as the Meeting of ASEAN Working Group of Health Cluster 1: Promoting Healthy Lifestyle on Health Priority 4: Occupational and Health Cluster 2: Responding to all hazards and emerging threats for the ASEAN Post 2015 Health Development Agenda, ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM), in which in 2016 the threat of Zika Virus in the region was addressed and the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED), organized by the Western Pacific Regional Office and the South East Asia Regional Office of the World Health Organization.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is a critical and cross-sectoral coordination issue. Main challenges include promoting closer integration of efforts across ASEAN sectoral bodies, as well as between ASEAN and other regional frameworks such as the ARF, EAS, and ADMM-Plus. In this regard, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and its Work Programme 2016-2020 remain the basis for cooperation among AMS to prepare and respond to disaster emergencies in concerted manner. This major challenge, however, has been completed to a certain degree by the signing of "The ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, one Response" in 2016. Furthermore, Thailand reaffirms our support to an active role of the AHA Centre, the ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT), and other ASEAN tools to deal with HADR challenges.

52. In addition, Thailand, as a Party to the AADMER and a member of the Governing Board of the AHA Centre, continuously plays an active role in strengthening ASEAN's efforts in the area of disaster management. In 2018, Thailand, as one of the lead countries in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management Working Group on Prevention and Mitigation, hosted the Regional Conference on Risk Informed Development, the 2018 Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Governance Academic Seminar, and the meeting on the development of the Disaster Responsive Social Protection Guidelines. Thailand also participated in the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise 2018 (ARDEX-18).

53. Thailand supports regional efforts to enhancing capacity in disaster response and disaster management in line with the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Disaster Health Management, adopted at the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila. Thailand officially launched an ASEAN Satellite Warehouse in Chai Nat Province during the 34th ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The warehouse will enhance the mobilisation and delivery of relief items rapidly to disaster-affected areas. We are also committed to strengthening regional collaboration on public health at the national and regional levels in line with the AADMER through the operationalisation of the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration and the Phase 2 Plan of Action of the ASEAN Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (ADRFI), that would support the provision of disaster risk financing and insurance solutions in the region with a view to close ASEAN's protection gap and reinforce disaster resilience.

Maritime Security and Cooperation

The Asia–Pacific region continues to face maritime challenges, including piracy, armed robbery against ships, as well as issues related to marine environmental protection including the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Although the overall incidents in Asia have decreased in 2018, piracy and armed robbery against ships remain a prevailing security concern due to active criminal activities in several areas and vulnerability of important sea lines of communication, notably the Straits of Malacca which connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Given the complex and wide-ranging nature of maritime security issues, Thailand has finalized the Maritime Enforcement Administration Act, which will upgrade Thailand Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center (THAI-MECC) into the Thailand Maritime Laws Enforcement Administrative Center (THAI-MLEAC). The Centre will serve as a national focal point on maritime matters with augmented role and greater authority in the management of maritime interests. At its core, the THAI-MLEAC would function as a de facto coast guard agency.

55. At the regional level, Thailand has participated in the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols since 2008, the air patrol "Eyes in the Sky" since 2009, as well as the secondment of rotating officers to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC). Moreover, Thailand has actively taken part in regional fora that also deal with maritime security and cooperation such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Maritime Forum (EMF) and the Expanded AMF (EAMF) to contribute to the dialogue and discussions which would pave way for substantive cooperation, particularly in the areas of capacity building, maritime domain awareness and maritime connectivity.

56. On 8 January 2019, the European Union (EU) formally announced the lifting of a yellow card for Thailand in recognition of the substantive progress Thailand has made in tackling IUU fishing since 2015. These include legal reform, fishery management, fleet management, monitor, control and surveillance, traceability and law enforcement. Building on such success, Thailand will continue to promote cooperation towards sustainable fisheries, including the development of an ASEAN Network for Combatting IUU Fishing. This includes strengthening ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) and the ASEAN Sectoral Working Group on Fisheries (ASWGFi). Several policy frameworks have been developed and implemented by the AMS, on a voluntary basis. These include the Regional Code of Conducts on Responsible Fisheries (RCCRF), the Resolution and Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region (adopted in 2001), Resolution and Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region Towards 2020 (adopted in 2011). The implementation of these policy frameworks has been supported by the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) located in Thailand under the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership (ASSP) mechanism. Accordingly, several fisheries cooperative frameworks have been developed by SEAFDEC in collaboration with AMS to facilitate cooperation toward the integration of the ASEAN Community.

57. Moreover, ASEAN aims towards ensuring that fisheries sector in Southeast Asian Region is environmentally, economically and socially sustainable. To obtain this goal, the ASEAN Meeting on Combatting IUU Fishing in Partnership with

the EU was convened on 4-5 April 2019. During the Meeting, ASEAN agreed to explore the possibility of establishing an ASEAN Network for Combatting IUU Fishing, as well as implementing sustainable fisheries management.

58. On forced labour issues, Thailand has taken a significant step as part of efforts to addressing the problem by ratifying the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Work in Fishing Convention No. 188, 2007 (C188) on 30 January 2019, making Thailand the first country in Asia to ratify the Convention. The move reflects Thailand's strong political will to ensure that the working conditions in domestic fishing industry meet ILO standards. In this regard, the ILO will provide support and technical assistance for Thailand to implementing the Convention, which will come into force on 30 January 2020.

59. Thailand also attaches great importance to promoting marine environmental protection, in particular on marine debris issue. On 5 March 2019, Thailand hosted the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Marine Debris (SAMM-MD) in Bangkok, highlighting potential negative impacts of marine debris on marine biodiversity, health, society, and economy, and discussing best practices on combatting the issue. In this connection, the 34th ASEAN Summit. adopted the Bangkok Declaration on Combatting Marine Debris in ASEAN Region, and welcomed the ASEAN Framework of Action on Marine Debris. As part of continued efforts to sustain the momentum, Thailand in collaboration with Viet Nam and the United States co-hosted the "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop on Marine Debris Management for Sustainable Fisheries and Food Security in Southeast Asia" on 13-15 May 2019. The Workshop aims to discuss sources and challenges, as well as highlight best practices and opportunities for regional cooperation to preserve marine environment and ensure sustainable fisheries management and food security in the ASEAN region.

Role of the ARF

National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

As one of the ASEAN-led platforms central to promoting ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture, the ARF remains a primary forum to foster constructive and meaningful dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern in the Asia–Pacific region. Progress in the implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action to implement the ARF Vision Statement should be nurtured. In this respect, Thailand supports the comprehensive implementation of the Plan, as well as the ARF Work Plans under the respective priorities areas within the ARF process. Concrete steps include the conduct of training, workshops, and exercises in accordance with ARF's purposes and principles.

Future of the ARF

- 61. Thailand remains convinced that a central function of the ARF involved the adoption and implementation of CBMs and stepping further to Preventive Diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution. As the ARF's scope of activities has expanded, the ARF has to explore synergies of activities and initiatives in order to ensure effectiveness and avoid duplication. To this end, the ARF may wish to focus on a specific theme to generate practical dialogue and discussion, such as the thematic issue of sustainable security, for 2019. It also needs to evolve into a process that could contribute to addressing and managing the important regional concerns in a more timely manner. In this connection, concerted effort to maintain momentum towards implementing PD is key to realising the ARF's full potential. Therefore, there is a need to implement the PD agenda in line with universally recognised norms and principles of international law. Preventive Diplomacy has to be implemented in tandem with ongoing efforts on CBMs, to ensure that the ARF moves ahead in order to be more effective, yet at a pace comfortable to all.
- With the diverse expertise of the Participants, the ARF can provide a platform for concrete

- cooperation to help address emerging security challenges including cubersecurity, maritime securitu, terrorism, transnational crime and natural disaster. Sharing of best practices and capacity-building activities should be encouraged to enable ARF Participants to respond to these challenges in a more timely and effective manner and help contribute to sustainable security in the Asia-Pacific region.
- 63. In addition, the ARF needs to develop greater sunergies with other ASEAN-led platforms, including the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, as well as exchange best practices with other regional security organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), among others. Furthermore, more interaction between Track 1.5 and 2 entities, including ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) should be encouraged. This would allow ARF participants to mutually explore better way to enhance CBMs and PD in the region.
- 64. Looking to the future, the ARF needs to effectively manage its three core priorities of promoting CBMs and preventive diplomacy, nurturing a culture of cooperation on practical security issues, and encouraging closer civilian-military dialogue and cooperation, in a situation of growing resource constraints and proliferation of regional platforms dealing with security. In so doing, the ARF would be a new testament to ASEAN's vision and determination in contributing to regional peace and security through inculcating norms, facilitating the gradual alignment of security perspectives, forging trust and confidence, and ultimately making full use of preventive diplomacy to cope with the region's emerging security challenges. As such, the ARF should continue to be an important component of the ASEAN-centred regional architecture.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

For well over 20 years, the ASEAN Regional Forum has worked to advance stability and cooperation within the Asia-Pacific. Traditional and nontraditional security concerns continue to pose a challenge to peace and stability in the region, making ongoing engagement through the ARF valuable. The ARF has been successful over time using open dialogue, tangible cooperation, and results-driven initiatives to find common understandings and solutions to uncommon problems. Through our membership in the ARF, the United States affirms its commitment to finding consensus solutions based on respect for international law and shared values. ASEAN centrality plays an essential role in the ARF process, and the United States fully supports a constructive, action-oriented ARF with ASEAN at its core. Furthermore, the United States believes that clearly defined, proactive approaches in the ARF process will yield the largest benefits to regional stability. Therefore, we pledge to support the ARF to advance its goal of implementation of Preventive Diplomacy measures, including through empowering the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). The cooperative results from ASEAN-centered multilateral fora and the implementation of Preventive Diplomacy principles to date show promise for the Indo-Pacific region and are indispensable to U.S. security interests. The United States urges all ARF participants to engage with deliberateness, understanding, and vision to deepen our cooperation and advance peace in the region for decades to come.

The **U.S.-Japan** Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The partnership built under this treaty has promoted seamless cooperation on a wide range of regional and global security issues, leveraging the presence of U.S. forces to respond to security threats. The close cooperation between the Japanese Government and the United States in responding to the region's natural disasters

demonstrates the importance of our relationship and our exceptional capabilities to respond quickly. We have taken steps to expand our security cooperation by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to ensure that the bilateral alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. We are also moving forward with the Japanese Government to implement our military base realignment and consolidation plan. Progress on force realignment will help us to establish a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture in the Indo-Pacific region – critical to U.S. national interests. We continue to work closely with the Japanese Government to address emerging challenges in space and cyberspace, and to strengthen our missile defense capabilities to counter threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the ARF, Japan has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues, including as a co-chair of the newly established ARF Intersessional Meeting on Information and Communications Technology Security (ARF ISM on ICTs Security). The U.S. commends Japan for its strong commitment to add the collective voice of the influential G7 nations to discussions on maritime security challenges, humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, peacekeeping operations, global economic resiliency, climate change, cyber policy issues, global health system improvements, and human rights policies of the Indo-Pacific.

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a linchpin of regional security and represents our ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK. We will continue to enhance ongoing work within the Alliance to deepen our comprehensive strategic partnership based on our common values and mutual trust. This past year included support to the diplomatic efforts to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK and bring a lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula. We continue to make progress in advancing U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation and enjoy a well-established

cooperation in the area of missile defense. We continue to expand trilateral information-sharing on DPRK missile and nuclear capabilities. The United States has also prioritized efforts to enforce the multiple UNSCRs on the DPRK, while leading a multinational effort to disrupt and increase the cost of North Korean illicit activities at sea. The United States and the ROK relationship has evolved into a global partnership. We are working together, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also in places such as Lebanon, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia. This collaboration includes global health security, peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts.

We continue to enhance our alliance with Australia through greater cooperation on addressing shared regional and global interests, including countering violent extremism. The United States and Australia continue to work towards full implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives announced by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in 2011. Rotations of U.S. Marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft in Australia's Northern Territory improve interoperability and capacity through opportunities to train and exercise both bilaterally and multilaterally in the region. The U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) – which met at the minister level in August 2017 and at the Counterterrorism Coordinator level in April 2019 – also plays a positive role in enhancing regional stability and security. Officials from Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Hawaii in October 2016 for the annual Security and Defense Cooperation Forum where they signed a Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement and discussed defense and security policies, regional capacity development, peacekeeping operations, maritime security and trilateral training and exercises. In addition, New Zealand and Japan participated alongside 33,000 Australian and U.S. troops in the 2017 Talisman Saber exercise, a biennial joint military exercise that promotes civilian-military cooperation and operational integration.

U.S.-New Zealand relations are the best they have been in decades. Relations have improved dramatically since the signing of the 2010 Wellington Declaration. In 2012, the Washington Declaration,

signed by then Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman allowed greater flexibility in terms of joint military exercises and military educational exchanges. As a result, the United States and New Zealand have conducted increased joint military exercises. The November 2016 visit of the USS Sampson, the first by a U.S. military vessel in three decades, marked a new stage in the normalization of defense ties. The annual Strategic Dialogue is the United States' top-level regular policy discussion with New Zealand. The two sides began holding formal defense policy dialogues in 2013. The United States continues to value its partnership with New Zealand in advancing the ARF's capacity to address regional security challenges through Preventive Diplomacy; New Zealand's leadership on this issue is critical to maintaining the ARF's effectiveness and relevance as a regional security body.

The **U.S.-Philippines** Mutual Defense Treaty continues to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Our bilateral cooperation continues to contribute to regional peace and stability, with particular focus in the areas of maritime security, disaster response, and counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping operations and non-proliferation. The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, supports a joint commitment to advancing mutual security interests by increasing our interoperability, supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines' defense modernization plans, and improving our ability to respond to natural disasters in the region. The United States will continue to advance this enduring strategic alliance through high-level dialogues, such as the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. Opportunities for progress also exist where we share a common interest in expanding regional defense and security cooperation through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus and other vehicles. The United States continues to support Philippine participation in joint exercises with other partners in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions, as well as encouraging the Philippines to invite participation by neighboring countries in bilateral military exercises, such as Exercise Balikatan.

The United States and Thailand have been treaty allies for over 60 years and we continue to collaborate to address humanitarian and security concerns

such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, disaster relief, nonproliferation, and maritime security. The combined U.S.-Thai response to the 2018 flooded cave rescue of the Wild Boar soccer team demonstrated the value of our alliance in responding to humanitarian crises in the region. After the March 2019 election, the United States looks forward to working with the newly formed Royal Thai government to advance mutually beneficial goals in the region.

The **United States and Indonesia** share an interest in addressing strategic challenges as partners. In 2015, the United States and Indonesia forged a Strategic Partnership to expand cooperation on shared strategic interests in the region. As part of this partnership, our Defense Ministers signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation that serves as a guide to expand defense collaboration. The statement covers five pillars of defense engagement: maritime, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), defense modernization, and countering transnational threats. In 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency concluded a work plan to expand bilateral cooperation in the area of maritime security. To build bilateral and regional capacity, the U.S. and Indonesian militaries conduct regular exercises, such as the Army-to-Army Exercise Garuda Shield, Air Force fighter jet Exercise Cope West as well as multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo in Indonesia. In 2019, both countries agreed to hold 240 operations, including one JCS sponsored staff exercise and several service-level maneuver exercises. Looking forward, the focus is to reduce the capability gaps of the Indonesian Armed Forces in areas that closely align with U.S. security interests, in areas such as maritime security, CT and HA/DR. Indonesia continues to focus its professional military education on sending students to the U.S. National and Service War Colleges, U.S. Service Command and General Staff Colleges, and Maritime Security and Defense Professionalization courses further building our people-to-people ties. Over the last 5 years, the United States has invested over \$5M in institutional capacity building, providing over 400 hours of workshops and engaging 1,700 military and civilian officers in the goal of improving joint concepts and readiness through improved defense strategy, planning, budgeting and acquisition processes.

Singapore is a strong partner of the United States and an active participant —regionally and globally—to ensure peace and stability. Our two countries have close and long-standing defense ties with our militaries participating in several bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. In addition, Singapore hosts the rotational deployment of United States military aircraft and ships to conduct a variety of maritime patrol activities to counter piracy and terrorism, as well as provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region. Singapore trains approximately 1,000 military personnel in the United States each year. Singapore was the first and only Asian country to have contributed both assets and personnel to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and recently committed to extend and expand its contributions. In 2018, the Singapore Navy commanded Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden. In 2018, we further broadened our relationship by re-signing a memorandum of understanding for the Third Country Training Program (TCTP), an ASEAN capacity building initiative jointly managed by the United States and Singapore. Aimed at bridging development gaps in the region, the TCTP has provided technical assistance and training to over 1000 officials through more than 40 workshops since its inception in 2012. The TCTP curriculum includes non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity and cybercrime. In October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong affirmed the strong and enduring partnership between the two countries, especially in the economic, defense, security, and people-to-people spheres. Recognizing the transboundary nature of cybersecurity threats, the two leaders affirmed the progress made under the 2016 MOU on Cybersecurity Cooperation and their commitment to work together during Singapore's 2018 ASEAN chair year to secure the digital economy as a key engine for future economic growth. In the ARF, Singapore has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cuber issues, including as a co-chair of the newly established ISM on ICTs Security. As a like-minded partner on terrorism issues and as a co-chair of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Counterterrorism along with Australia, Singapore plays an important role in facilitating regional efforts against violent extremism. As the world's largest transshipment port, we work closely with Singapore on trade security and counter proliferation efforts, and Singapore has begun a three-year trial of the Cargo Targeting System (CTS).

The relationship between the United States and Malaysia has reached new heights in recent years, and the United States is eager to continue working with our Malaysian partners to increase regional and global security. A robust slate of bilateral and multilateral military exercises has enhanced our respective capabilities to promote regional security and respond to humanitarian disasters. The United States values Malaysia's past contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and we are working closely on counter terrorism issues, including stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIS. Malaysia is also an important partner in stemming the proliferation of nuclear materials. The United States looks forward to working closely with Malaysia in advancing our shared priorities and interests in the context of promoting regional cooperation, peacekeeping capacity building, respect for international law, ASEAN centrality, and the maintenance of peace and stability. In the ARF, Malaysia has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues, including in the newly established ISM on ICTs Security. Malaysia also plays an active role in the ISM on CTTC, and hosted a U.S.-funded ARF workshop on aviation security and information sharing in July 2019.

U.S.-Vietnam relations have undergone a dramatic transformation since we normalized ties in 1995, and Vietnam has emerged as one of our strongest partners in the Indo-Pacific. Our robust partnership with Vietnam on political, security, economic, and people-to-people ties through a healthy set of annual dialogues spanning issues from human rights to security and defense relations, the United States and Vietnam are cooperating in areas such as security, peacekeeping operations, trade, nonproliferation, health, the environment, science and technology, education, and human rights. Defense ties in particular have grown rapidly over the past several years, embodied by the lifting of the lethal weapon sales ban in 2016 and the historic March 2018 visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier to Danang. In 2019, the United States and Vietnam signed an MOU strengthening cooperation and joint efforts to combat wildlife trafficking as a serious transnational crime. Criminal justice sector ties have also developed rapidly since 2016, with numerous trainings, exchanges, and workshops to increase Vietnam's capacity and interoperability to combat transnational crime, effectively and fairly prosecute

crimes, and enhance maritime security in support of a more free and open Indo-Pacific.

The **U.S.-India** strategic partnership stands upon shared values and complementary visions of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. In accordance with the National Security Strategy, the U.S. Government views India as a leading partner in safeguarding a free and open Indo-Pacific. During his June 2019 visit to New Delhi, Secretary of State Pompeo outlined his priorities for deepening bilateral and regional cooperation with India. The United States holds regular consultations with India, including bilaterally, trilaterally with Japan, and in a quadrilateral format with Australia and Japan. President Trump and Prime Minister Modi meet regularly, and the United States and India held their first 2+2 Ministerial between the Secretary of State, Minister of External Affairs, Secretary of Defense, and Minister of Defence in Delhi in September 2018. These leader-level meetings and cabinet-level engagements are supported by more than 30 additional high-level dialogues and working groups ranging from defense, regional security, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping to trade, energy, oceans, health, cybersecurity, and education. The United States and India are collaborating to promote mutual prosperity and sustain the rules-based global order. U.S.-India defense cooperation continues to expand following the 2016 designation of India as a Major Defense Partner and we are working to finalize additional enabling agreements to facilitate even greater military-to-military cooperation and interoperability. The U.S. and Indian militaries are increasing the scope, complexity, and frequency of joint military exercises. MALABAR, our annual naval exercise, is now a trilateral engagement with Japan and in recent years has featured joint maritime reconnaissance, carrier operations, and anti-submarine warfare exercises. India has deepened its involvement with the biennial Rim-ofthe-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise hosted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and we welcome its continued participation. Both countries are committed to creating a new annual tri-service exercise focused on amphibious operations. We also look forward to working with India and likeminded partners to deepen humanitarian and disaster relief cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States seeks a constructive, resultsoriented relationship with China. The United States does not seek to contain China, and does not believe in any so-called "clash of civilizations." Rather, the United States recognizes that countries' interest mesh and conflict over time. Therefore, we seek cooperation with China where our interests align, such as achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea, stopping the flow of fentanul from China into the United States, and establishing a mutually beneficial trade relationship that is good for the United States, good for the Chinese people, and good for the rest of the world. In other areas, we will compete to defend American interests and values like transparency, the rule of law, market-based economic competition, freedom of navigation and overflight, human rights, and religious freedom. China has openly committed to upholding these and other principles that underpin security and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific. The United States asks that China stand by its word and protect the rights of its people, rather than detaining over one million ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang, making unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, and engaging in disruptive trade practices. With regards to the South China Sea, the United States has a vital national interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peace and stability. The Chinese military's provocative reclamation and militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, and its attempts to coerce and intimidate, threaten the sovereignty of other nations and undermine regional stability. The United States urges all claimants, including China, to manage and resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States seeks a fair and reciprocal trade relationship in accordance with international norms, and we are taking action to address the unfair trade practices that China has engaged in for decades. The U.S.-China economic relationship is very important, and the United States is committed to reaching meaningful, fully enforceable commitments to resolve China's structural issues. When U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in the United States April 6-7, 2017, the two presidents agreed to expand areas of cooperation while effectively and candidly addressing differences. Underscoring the need for high-level engagement to make concrete progress on key issues, the two sides established a Comprehensive Dialogue. It is overseen by the two presidents and has four cabinet-level pillars: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue.

United States defense engagement with Brunei continues to increase. In addition to our annual bilateral Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise, Brunei hosted the first exercise between U.S. and Bruneian land forces, Pahlawan Warrior in 2018. Brunei has also consistently participated in the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational maritime exercise, and this year, Brunei will join the ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise, along with the other ASEAN Member States. U.S. military officers have attended the Royal Brunei Armed Forces Staff College since January 2014, with the sixth student, a U.S. Air Force officer currently enrolled. We continue to look for ways to expand our military-to-military cooperation, including through increased information sharing. On the back of diplomacy and defense cooperation, the promising U.S.-Brunei relationship aims to help secure mutual security interests in Southeast Asia.

The United States has cooperated with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in areas of mutual concern ranging from international peacekeeping, defense reform and professionalization to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. In early 2017, the Royal Cambodian Government suspended all military-to-military exercises with the United States. Since then they have conducted three joint military exercises with the People's Liberation Army. In response to democratic backsliding, we suspended the delivery of four Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) and have carefully considered the pace of restoring our military-military relationship until we see progress. In January 2019, DASD Felter participated in a Defense Policy Dialogue in Cambodia. In March 2019, INDOPACOM hosted the most recent Bilateral Defense Dialogue laying out the plans for limited cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as peacekeeping. We continue to cooperate in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian mine action, medical research, and

Laos' chairmanship of ASEAN and the signing of a Comprehensive Partnership between the United States and the Lao PDR in 2016 provided new opportunities for bilateral engagement. While we continue to address legacy issues, like the important Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) accounting mission and helping Laos manage contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO), we are building a new relationship for the 21st century. The many facets of our cooperation—which include health, law enforcement, trade, education, environmental protection, military issues, cultural preservation, disaster preparedness, trafficking in-persons and illegal drugs, entrepreneurship, energy, rule of law programs, and more—address the country's most critical and systemic needs.

Another way that we are engaging the nations of Cambodia, Laos, Muanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, is through the regional cooperation and economic integration efforts of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI builds human capital and regional capacity in the engagement areas of Water, Energy, Food, and the Environment; and Human Development and Connectivity, which includes Connectivity, Education, Health, and Women's Empowerment. Additionally, the Friends of the Lower Mekong is a consortium of the LMI members and the primary donors and international financial institutions supporting the Mekong countries' development. Key FLM programs include the Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership, a joint training platform designed to address the Lower Mekong countries' infrastructure planning and policy needs, and the Mekong Water Data Initiative, designed to strengthen disaster risk reduction through improving access to relevant data and increasing the ability to apply the data to policy-making. Engagement through LMI strengthens ASEAN not only by promoting the sustainable development level of the Lower Mekong countries, but also by providing a venue for transboundary cooperation on their most pressing challenges.

The United States values defense cooperation with Timor-Leste in areas of mutual concern ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster response to maritime and border security to defense reform and professionalization. During the 2018 Bilateral Defense Discussion, Timor-Leste's Minister of Defense requested U.S. assistance with rehabilitating Baucau Airfield. Timor-Leste demonstrated

commitment to regional security by participating in a number of multinational exercises. In 2018, Timor-Leste participated in Pacific Angel with the U.S. Air Force, which included medical and engineer civil action projects. Timor-Leste also participated in Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT), which enhances their maritime security efforts. The Hari Hamutuk exercise enhances Timor-Leste's interoperability by partnering the F-FDTL with the United States, Australia, and Japan. In 2019, Timor-Leste participated in Pacific Partnership with the U.S. Navy, which included a HA/DR simulation exercise and symposium. A Navy Seabee detachment has an enduring presence in Timor-Leste since 2009 and partners with the F-FDTL, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Education. The detachment recently completed its 95th construction project. The United States hosts a number of military officers and ministerial civil servants as part of the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program. This year, Timor-Leste will celebrate its first U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduate. Timorese IMET graduates continue to fill roles of prominence and enhances defense professionalization. Additionally, the United States sponsors an English language-training course in Timor-Leste, which trains 40 military personnel each year.

Papua New Guinea (PNG)'s strategic location make it a critical partner for the United States and allies in preserving the freedom of navigation in the South Pacific and in advancing other priorities of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. PNG possesses the land area, population, endowment of natural resources and relatively diversified economic base to serve as a policy bellwether within the South Pacific. PNG's security challenges include maritime domain awareness; border security; logistics and resourcing; and policing in districts experiencing high rates of crime, gender violence and/or intercommunal violence. The United States contributed to preparations for conducting the 2019 Bougainville referendum, which will advance the process launched by the 2001 Peace Agreement between Bougainville and the National Government. PNG hosted APEC in 2018, and U.S. and PNG security forces worked together on in-shore security, security planning and logistics. APEC opened the door to additional cooperation on refining security capabilities. PNG and U.S. forces participated in regional exercises,

worked to locate missing American World War II personnel, and advanced opportunities to plan unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal. Exchange opportunities range from conferences and workshops on common priorities like fisheries enforcement and port security to leadership programs like Ranger School and the staff colleges. In 2019, Papua New Guinea sent its first cadet to the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. Actions taken under the Indo-Pacific Strategy's security pillar complemented other lines of actions that focus on economics (developing a welcoming climate for U.S. investment and development initiatives) and promote Western values (delivering opportunities for women; implementing people-to-people education and cultural exchanges; supporting the fight against HIV and polio; protecting environmental equities in PNG's rich biodiversity; and encouraging resiliency and disaster risk reduction)

The United States and the European Union are deepening collaboration with Asian partners to advance regional security and development, and to build regional institutions and support for the rule of law. The United States and the EU share common goals to promote human rights, freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and respect for international law in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We are working together to encourage China to deepen its engagement with the international community, act in accordance with international law and standards, and participate responsibly in the global economic order. We are also coordinating our messages to condemn dangerous and unlawful DPRK provocations, uphold UNSC Resolutions, and pressure the regime to address its egregious human rights abuses. U.S.-EU cooperation has also played a critical role in supporting Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition, we joint-sponsored in March a UNHRC resolution calling for the creation of a fact-finding mission. We regularly collaborate with the EU through the Friends of the Lower Mekong mechanism as well as other senior-level forums. As we rebalance our interests and investments to the Indo-Pacific, we look forward to continually expanding our coordination with the EU through the ARF and other regional fora.

Likewise, the **DPRK's** UN-proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a serious threat to

international peace and security. However, there is great momentum now for positive change, following President Trump and Chairman Kim's shared commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula made last year in Singapore. The United States remains in close contact with the ROK and Japan to coordinate our DPRK engagement; our alliances remain ironclad, and ensure peace and stability in the region. Sanctions remain in full effect until North denuclearizes. The full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions by the international community brought us to this moment, and will ensure a successful outcome of this process.

Additional global security issues, such as transnational crime (drug, human, and wildlife trafficking and other conservation crimes), the security situations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremists returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and global climate change, all continue to threaten regional and international stability. Many of these issues are transnational in nature and require concrete multilateral and national responses from ARF participants. Results-oriented cooperation has proven to be the best course of action for promoting peace and prosperity in the region. The continued strengthening and growth of the ARF's institutional capacity, enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships, and burden-sharing efforts provide the best solution to these security concerns.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

Throughout 2017 and presently, the United States continued its comprehensive engagement with the region through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As stated in the *2017 National Security Strategy*, the United States focuses on four vital, national interests-organized as the strategy's four pillars:

- i. Protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life
- ii. Promote American prosperity
- iii. Preserve peace through strength
- iv. Advance American influence

This NSS and its four themes are guided by a return to principled realism.

The strategy is realist because it is clear-eyed about global competition: It acknowledges the central role of power in world affairs, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests. It is principled because it is grounded in the knowledge that promoting American values is key to spreading peace and prosperity around the globe.

As the United States continues to pursue the four themes, it will continue to work with allies and partners to manage the challenges we see throughout the Indo-Pacific:

- The ongoing threat of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation and its dangerously provocative behavior;
- Longstanding disputes over territory, associated maritime zones, and resources, including in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
- The menace of terrorism and its trans-regional networks – including foreign fighters returning from and departing to conflict zones away from the Asian-Pacific region, terrorist financing, and violent extremist messaging. Addressing the problem of terrorist radicalization and recruitment is a fundamental component of a holistic strategy;
- To limit the spread of both homegrown and international terrorist groups;
- The great human and economic toll of natural disasters like the April 2015 Earthquake in Nepal, the 2015 flooding in Myanmar, and the 2016 Aceh earthquake in Indonesia.
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction;
- The global threat of pandemic disease that can spread around the world;
- Environmental degradation and the threat posed by climate change;

- Disruptive and potentially destructive activities
 by State actors in outer space; and
- Malicious activities by state and non-state actors in cyberspace.

Ensuring that the United States is prepared to prevent conflict requires a combination of defense, diplomacy, and development. These tools of statecraft enable the United States to strengthen the capability of its allies and partners to help preserve stability. The United States remains committed to retaining security capabilities to deter conflict, reassure allies, and if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. These objectives require the United States to be capable of responding to a broad range of challenges that are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities.

Resources:

http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/12/2017.pdf

a) Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

A broad range of data is publicly available from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/Budget2017/

i. Total defense expenditure on annual basis

a) The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Total Defense Budget Request was \$639.1 billion, which is \$33.1 billion (about 0.5 percent) more than the FY 2017 enacted level of \$606 billion, to finance base and overseas contingency operations.

Figure 1-1. Department of Defense Budget

\$ in billions	FY 2016	FY 2017 ^{/1} Request	FY 2018 Request	FY17 – FY18 Change
Base	521.3	521.8	574.5	+52.8
OCO	58.9	65.0	64.6	-0.4
Total	580.3	586.7	639.1	+52.4

Discretionary budget authority.

b)

The FY 2018 budget request is designed to protect capabilities that are most closely aligned with the defense strategy's objectives to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The budget also maintains a ready force, continues to take care of service members and their families, extends enterprise reforms that control costs, and seizes opportunities to build the future force by developing new and innovative operational concepts and dominating technological frontiers including undersea, cyber, space, electronic warfare, and other advanced capabilities. In developing the FY 2018 budget and planning for future years, the Department supports progress toward achieving and maintaining full-spectrum combat readiness by all four Military Departments.

Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ii.

The budget for national defense was 3.3% of GDP in FY 2018.

Table 7-7: DEFENSE SHARES OF ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY AGGREGATES (Continued) (Percentages of Indicated Totals)

% of Federal Spending		% of Net Public Spending		DoD as % of Public Employment				DoD as % of	% of Gross Domestic		
Fiscal Year National	al openuing	(Federal, State & Local)		Military & Civilian		Civilian Only		Total Labor	Product		
	DoD	National Defense	DoD	National Defense	Federal	Federal, State & Local	Federal	Federal, State & Local	Force	DoD	National Defense
2009 Base 2009 Total	14.0 18.1	18.8	9.0 11.6	12.1	51.3	9.1	25.4	3.1	1.4	3.4 4.4	4.6
2010 Base 2010 Total	14.6 19.3	20.1	9.4 12.4	12.9	51.4	9.4	26.3	3.3	1.4	3.4 4.5	4.7
2011 Base 2011 Total	14.6 18.8	19.6	9.4 12.1	12.6	52.6	9.6	27.7	3.5	1.5	3.4 4.4	4.6
2012 Base 2012 Total	14.9 18.4	19.2	9.4 11.7	12.1	52.6	9.6	27.9	3.5	1.4	3.3 4.1	4.2
2013 Base 2013 Total	14.7 17.6	18.3	9.2 10.9	11.4	52.3	9.4	27.4	3.4	1.4	3.1 3.7	3.8
2014 Base 2014 Total	14.3 16.5	17.2	8.9 10.3	10.7	51.9	9.2	27.2	3.3	1.4	2.9 3.4	3.5
2015 Base 2015 Total	13.2 15.3	16.0	8. 4 9.6	10.1	51.5	9.1	27.1	3.3	1.3	2.7 3.1	3.3
2016 Base 2016 Total	13.3 14.7	15.4	8.5 9.4	9.8	50.4	8.9	26.3	3.3	1.3	2.8 3.1	3.2
2017 Base 2017 Total*	12.7 14.0	14.8	8.2 9.1	9.6	50.7		26.7			2.7 3.0	3.1
2018 Base 2018 Total	13.7 14.8	15.9	8.9 9.5	10.2	51.1		27.0			2.8 3.0	3.3

ent of Defense figures for FY 2017 consist of continuing resolution funding, the military construction family housing enactment, and the Security Assistance Appropriations Act. They do not include the Request for

These figures are calculated from data in the OMB Historical Tables, past Economic Reports of the President, U.S. Census Bureau data, and data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Certain non-Defense data were not avapast 2016.

Further information can be found at:

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18 Green Book.pdf

^{1/} Includes the Continuing Resolution, Military Construction and Family Housing Enactment, and the Security Assistance Appropriations Act. Does not include adjustment to reflect the March Request for Additional Appropriations.

iii. Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population

Table 3-2: MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS (End Strength)

	FY 2016	FY 2017 ¹			FY 2018		
		Base	oco	Total	Base	oco	Total
Active Military Personnel ²							
Authorization Request	1,301,444	1,305,900		1,305,900	1,314,000		1,314,000
Enacted Authorization	1,301,444	1,305,900		1,305,900	Ť	o Be Determine	ed
Current Estimate							
Army	475,400	476,000		476,000	476,000		476,000
Navy	324,557	323,900		323,900	327,900		327,900
Marine Corps	183,604	185,000		185,000	185,000		185,000
Air Force	317,883	321,000		321,000	325,100		325,100
Total Active Military	1,301,444	1,305,900		1,305,900	1,314,000		1,314,000
Selected Reserve Personnel							
Authorization Request	811,668	813,200		813,200	815,900		815,900
Enacted Authorization	811,668	813,200		813,200	To	o Be Determine	ed
Current Estimate							
Army							
Army Reserve	198,395	199,000		199,000	199,000		199,000
Army National Guard	341,589	343,000		343,000	343,000		343,000
Total Army	539,984	542,000		542,000	542,000		542,000
Navy	57,980	58,000		58,000	59,000		59,000
Marine Corps	38,453	38,500		38,500	38,500		38,500
Air Force							
Air Force Reserve	69,364	69,000		69,000	69,800		69,800
Air National Guard	105,887	105,700		105,700	106,600		106,600
Total Air Force	175,251	174,700		174,700	176,400		176,400
Total Selected Reserve	811,668	813,200		813,200	815,900		815,900
Total Current Estimate of Military							
Personnel Authorizations	2,113,112	2.119.100		2.119.100	2.129.900		2.129.900

^{1.} FY 2017 reflects authorized end strength, and does not include projected end strength submitted in the Request for Additional Appropriations

Further information can be found at:

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/FY18 Green Book.pdf

III. National Contributions to Regional Security:

The United States remains committed to promoting peace, stability, and consensus in the region by contributing support and participating in a broad range of security activities. The United States specifically focuses on contributing to the following regional issues:

i. Counterterrorism

The United States is actively engaged in multilateral and regional efforts to strengthen regional partners and allies and to promote continued regional cooperation on counterterrorism measures. The human atrocities and extreme acts of violence committed by ISIS are not isolated to the Middle East. ISIS has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to direct and inspire attacks in Europe and Asia, including the horrific attacks in Indonesia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. It is critical that U.S. and coalition

partners cooperate purposefully to counter ISIS and its violent extremist outgrowths. The Indo-Pacific is not immune to terrorist influence either; therefore, the United States seeks to encourage and support strategic counterterrorism policies in the region. This approach places a premium on building the institutional capacities of states to promote the rule of law and eliminate the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

The United States is deeply concerned about ISIS's continued influence in recruiting followers from Southeast Asia and the terrorist group's ability to inspire attacks in the region. We encourage ASEAN to increase information sharing on suspected terrorists, particularly by requiring the provision of advance passenger information and passenger name record (API/PNR) data on all airline passengers and by connecting all points of entry to INTERPOL's I-24/7 global police communications system (I-24/7). To help ensure passenger screening against INTERPOL I-24/7 law enforcement databases,

^{2.} Does not include full-time Guard or Reserve end strength

the United States is prepared to assist ASEAN member states in connecting priority ports of entry and automating the reporting of stolen and lost travel documents to INTERPOL. The United States encourages global commitment to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on foreign terrorist fighters, which includes obligations to strengthen border security and information sharing.

The United States encourages states to implement the UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, including developing national action plans to take a whole-of-society approach to combating this security threat. The United States works closely with regional partners at the United Nations and in regional fora such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and APEC to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and international instruments related to countering terrorism. The United States also cooperates closely with many regional partners in the APEC Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), which contributes to regional security by conducting capacity building projects on issues including countering foreign terrorist fighter travel, strengthening border security, protecting critical infrastructure and soft target protection, and countering the financing of terrorism. The USG, through USAID, supports ASEAN to establish a comprehensive, multidisciplinary work plan for the implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism under the Manila Declaration, called the PCRVE Work Plan (2019-2025). USAID provided technical experts to work closely with the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime Working Group on Counterterrorism (SOMTC WG-CT) to draft the work plan. The drafting process included two regional consultations amongst relevant ASEAN stakeholders (14 ASEAN Bodies) at a meeting in Bali, Indonesia April 4th -5th and amongst civil society organizations in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia July 2nd -3rd (involving 21 CSOs from the region). The final consultation meeting amongst ASEAN Bodies will be held in Surabaya, Indonesia August 7th – 8th to finalize the draft work plan, which will then be circulated for the endorsement of SOMTC and all relevant ASEAN Sectoral Bodies. It is expected to be adopted at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in Thailand in October.

The United States also serves with the Russian Federation as the Co-Chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary partnership of 86 nations and five official observers, and its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. To advance its mission, the GICNT has conducted 10 senior-level meetings and more than 80 other multilateral activities, including workshops and tabletop exercises, across the GICNT focus areas of nuclear detection, forensics, and response and mitigation. Japan hosted the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT on June 1-2, 2017 in Tokyo, where the partners considered the outcomes of the 10th Anniversary Meeting, hosted by the Netherlands in 2016, and proposals to implement both new and enduring priorities of the GICNT community.

The ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan contributes to regional security through work in its priority areas - Illicit Drugs; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN); and Counter Radicalization. The United States is co-leading efforts to combat illicit drugs and CBRN. In February 2017, the United States partnered with the Philippines to sponsor an ARF workshop on medium and long-term support for victims of terrorism. We aspire to see the progress made at both of these workshops continue in the future. Additionally, the United States is proposing two CTTC-related workshops; one on the topic of CBRN risk mitigation and another on aviation security and information sharing. The first of this workshop series took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in July 2019.

The U.S. Department of State works closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to support its mission in protecting the United States by promoting effective aviation and border security screening with our foreign partners through enhanced information sharing. For example, an important effort in our counterterrorism work is Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), an initiative on domestic and international information sharing signed following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Through HSPD-6, the State Department works with the TSC to negotiate the exchange of KST identity and encounter data with

foreign partners to enhance our mutual border screening efforts. HSPD-6 arrangements establish institutionalized operational mechanisms for the reciprocal sharing of unclassified, biographic KST identities between the United States and its foreign partners. They also facilitate the reporting of encounters with these identities between partners. Such arrangements enhance U.S. and foreign partners' border security by helping prevent and interdict the travel of KSTs while further strengthening our counterterrorism cooperation at a strategic policy level.

The TSC, as the U.S. government entity that manages the U.S. watchlist, implements these arrangements with foreign partners. These arrangements allow partners to screen identities against a subset of U.S. government-sourced KST data, which helps deter terrorist travel by creating an extra layer of security. HSPD-6 arrangements are a pre-requisite to participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). To date, the United States has over 70 such arrangements in place. The U.S. Department of State also works closely with its partners at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to strengthen global aviation security by engaging foreign partners in bolstering aviation screening at last point of departure (LPD) airports with direct flights to the United States to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding commercial flights. The United States has also provided bilateral counterterrorism financing for capacity building assistance to several nations in the region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malausia. The United States continues to support the enabling of its partners and allies to secure the region effectively from potential terrorist threats.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, **Arms Control and Disarmament**

The United States seeks to strengthen the objectives and obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in ways that are safe, secure, and supportive of the nonproliferation regime. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter potential adversaries and assures U.S. treaty allies and other security partners that they can count on the extended deterrence commitments undertaken by the United States.

The NPT remains critical to our common security. In this NPT review cycle, we seek consensus on the need to strengthen and maintain the NPT as the cornerstone of an effective nonproliferation regime that allows for the possibility of further progress on nuclear disarmament and expanding access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We seek the universalization of the Additional Protocol to ensure that IAEA safeguards remain effective and robust and to uphold the Treaty's integrity by addressing noncompliance.

In July 2018, the United States hosted the first meeting of the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament. Representatives from 42 countries met at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, DC, to deliberate on ways to address challenges in the security environment and improve prospects for disarmament negotiations. The CEND Working Group (CEWG) Kick-off Plenary meeting marked the first official gathering of participants in the CEND initiative. The 97 CEWG participants sought to identify ways to improve the international security environment in order to overcome obstacles to further progress on nuclear disarmament. The United States supports the long-term goal of creating an environment conducive to further nuclear disarmament negotiations and fashioning a world in which nuclear weapons are no longer necessary to deter aggression and maintain global strategic stability. Achieving these objectives will require meaningful and realistic dialogue that seeks to address the underlying security concerns that cause countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and to pursue effective measures that will help create such an environment. This approach stands in contrast to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which ignores the security concerns that make nuclear deterrence necessary, contains no provisions for verifying nuclear disarmament, and will only further polarize the international community on matters of nonproliferation and disarmament. The United States does not support the TPNW, which will not lead to the elimination of a single nuclear weapons, nor enhance any state's security. The five NPT nuclear-weapon states (P5) have met regularly to discuss nuclear policy, promote mutual confidence, and discuss issues related to the fulfillment of the NPT.

The United States supports the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy programs in conformity with the NPT and believes that nuclear energy (when pursued according to international standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation) can be a viable source of energy to states looking to meet increasing energy demands. We maintain, however, that such efforts must be conducted in a transparent manner and in full cooperation with the IAEA. The application of nuclear technologies via IAEA technical cooperation programs can also stimulate development in the areas of food security, hydrology, and human health. We believe that adopting the IAEA's Additional Protocol (AP) to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is an important step that states can take to strengthen IAEA safeguards and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. We call upon all ARF participants who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the AP and, where appropriate, bring into force a Small Quantities Protocol based on the IAEA's modified model. We stand ready to help states build capacities to fully implement the AP. As noted in the November 2013 Joint ASEAN-U.S. Leader's Statement, the ARF also can play an important role in helping states comprehend the AP and overcome any challenges to its implementation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, as well as illicit spread of related materials, threaten the security of the entire international community. One way that the United States has supported regional approaches to addressing this global challenge is by raising awareness of the requirements of UNSCR 1540 and by promoting its full implementation in the region. The United States has taken measures to meet all of its obligations under UNSCR 1540, measures it continues to improve as witnessed in its submissions to the 1540 Committee. The United States has also supported efforts in the ARF toward this end and has promoted greater cooperation between the ARF and the UN Security Council 1540 Committee.

One international effort that helps states to meet the goals of UNSCR 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which to date, 105 countries have endorsed. Many ARF participants have already endorsed the PSI, profiling their concrete commitment to regional peace and security to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials in the region. Japan hosted the PSI Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER), Exercise Pacific Shield, in July 2017. This exercise built on the momentum from the Australia PSI APER Exercise Pacific Protector. The United States encourages all countries concerned with the threat WMD proliferation poses to international peace and security to endorse the PSI.

iii. Transnational Crime

The United States augments the capabilities of regional actors and supports the region on a broad range of transnational crime issues through U.S. federal, state, and local experts and international and nonprofit organizations. These programs include capacity building for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges to investigate and prosecute transnational crime cases, cooperate during interdiction efforts on land and in maritime environments, and to facilitate international legal cooperation. Capacity building efforts often focus on specialized topics such as combatting drug, human, and wildlife trafficking; corruption; money laundering; and financial crimes; as well as supporting reforms to implement international standards, such as the UN Convention against Corruption and UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In addition, the United States has taken steps to protect the economic interaction in the region against cybercrime and intellectual property piracy, and to disrupt the financial activities of transnational criminals and facilitators.

The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand continues to deliver advanced training for civil law enforcement development to ASEAN member states. The ILEA is an important platform to address areas of mutual concern, including transnational organized crime, cybercrime, financial crimes, corruption, and all forms of trafficking. The Academy increases institutional capacity, promotes regional law enforcement networks among our partner states, and builds relationships with the US law enforcement community in an effort to address the aforementioned threats and promote the rule of law. Alumni are often serve at the respective countries' highest ranks in the criminal justice sector, including senior police and prosecutors, Supreme Court justices, and parliamentarians.

Since 1999, ILEA Bangkok has trained over 15,000 law enforcement professionals throughout Southeast Asia, thus creating and strengthening international operational networks. The ILEA Bangkok alumni are part of the global ILEA alumni network of over 70,000.

Narcotics production and trafficking are also challenges for all ARF member nations. There are vast networks of highly organized drug trafficking organizations that span the region and threaten regional and U.S. national security through their production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and precursor chemicals. The U.S. government supports partner nation capabilities to disrupt narcotics use, production, and trafficking by teaching best practices for demand reduction programs, and providing training to improve capacity to detect and interdict illicitly trafficked substances. These efforts ensure countries can fight international drug trafficking and related criminal activities in their home countries. In March 2017, the United States co-chaired a concept development workshop with Thailand on the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC) to explore the viability of establishing such a platform. The workshop underscored the growing need for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies and other relevant agencies to combat transnational crime. The workshop participants also agreed to next steps to 1) assess and strengthen existing mechanisms for information and intelligence sharing at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels and 2) to further explore the concept of a more comprehensive platform or center of information sharing and intelligence exchange such as the ATTIC. We further encourage all countries to implement the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1972, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, which constitute the cornerstone of the international drug control system.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has direct food, economic and environmental security impacts on coastal communities and their nations' rule of law, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific region houses the world's most productive and biodiverse marine ecosystems

that provide food and income to over 200 million people in the region; however, unsustainable fishing practices threaten the region's biodiversity, food security and livelihoods. IUU-fished seafood accounts for as much as 30 percent of the global seafood harvest. In Southeast Asia, severely overfished waters in the Gulf of Thailand have made it almost impossible for vessels to operate in their historic fishing grounds. Since 1961, the average catch in Thai waters has decreased by 81 percent. Fishing operations have moved increasingly farther out to sea — and remain there for longer periods. Fisheries depletion raises the cost of fishing and exerts downward pressure on wages. Fewer people are willing to work under these conditions, which promotes human trafficking for fishing operations. IUU fishing could also contribute to tensions in the East and South China Seas. To further the fight against IUU fishing, the United States is working with international partners to improve global fisheries enforcement by strengthening efforts to detect, identify, interdict, and adjudicate illegal fishing activity and the illicit networks that support it through enhanced cooperation and information-sharing. In 2018, the United States and Indonesia will co-chair a workshop on maritime data analysis tactics and techniques to identify unusual and potentially illegal fishing and vessel activity to enable countries to utilize analytical tools and processes to combat IUU fishing and crime that may be associated with IUU fishing. Another model of this type of effort is the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI), a partnership between the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and local law enforcement agencies in Oceania. OMSI bolsters maritime domain awareness, increases law enforcement presence, and expands at-sea law enforcement capabilities by matching available Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement expertise and local enforcement authorities. The Oceans project, supported by USAID, strengthens regional cooperation to combat IUU fishing, promotes sustainable fisheries and conserves marine biodiversity in the Asia-Pacific region. Through this project, the US works with public and private sector partners to strengthen electronic catch documentation and traceability (eCDT) that ensures fisheries resources are legally caught and properly labeled. The USG and partners trained over 1,200 regional stakeholders across 12 ASEAN and Coral Triangle countries in program technical areas, including electronic catch documentation and traceability, sustainable fisheries management, public-private partnership development, and human welfare and gender equity. The partnership has leveraged over \$1.4 million in public and private sector partner funding for increased sustainability of program interventions, including from the Monterey Bay Aquarium Seafood Watch, Thai Union, and Inmarsat. In addition, the USG is conducting comprehensive research to identify and assess opportunities for ASEAN to support the advancement of a regional multi-sectoral strategy to address the challenges associated with forced labor in the fishing industry and to propose ways in which development partners might best support those opportunities. The research is expected to kick-off in September 2019.

In collaboration with the Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center, USAID supported a workshop to explore how existing catch documentation and seafood traceability data could be exchanged within the region in better identify legitimate and illegitimate trade.

The United States commends progress on the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP), especially women and children, which ntered into force on March 8 following ratification by the Philippines. Now that ACTIP has come into force, we urge all member states to follow the lead of those who have already ratified and promptly deposit instruments of ratification. We also encourage all countries to ratify and to implement the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States and ASEAN enjoy a strong partnership on combating trafficking in persons a partnership that we look forward to continuing. We seek to continue this partnership and have presented proposals for future collaboration to the SOMTC. We are still committed to assisting member states in developing and implementing victim compensation schemes and funds, as prescribed under ACTIP. The USG continues to support ASEAN on the implementation of the ACTIP through its technical cooperation on developing the ASEAN Regional Guidelines and Procedures to Address the Needs of Victims of TIP, which was launched in April 2019. In collaboration with the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), USAID supported the drafting of a Regional Model Toolkit (RMT) to provide guidance to practitioners across ASEAN. The RMT, once adopted by ASEAN, will be used as a resource by ASEAN member states for tailored training and capacity building at the national level in the coming years.

Through the USAID Asia regional Counter Trafficking In Persons (ASIA CTIP) program and country-specific activities in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, the USG addresses transnational and regional challenges to combat trafficking in persons, building upon existing USG-supported CTIP activities in the region. The program strengthens regional platforms for governments, NGOs, and service providers to effectively cooperate across borders and ensures that assistance and support can be provided and accessed in countries of transit and destination. USAID also partners with U.S. companies to promote industry-wide adoption of practices that reduce opportunities and incentives for cheap, exploited, and trafficked labor

We encourage all countries to ratify and to implement the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In 2017, the United States supported a regional migration project, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), to build the capacity of national and local governments in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia to contribute to the protection and increased resilience of vulnerable in vulnerable situations, including those in crisis situations. Objectives include helping government and non-government stakeholders to identify migrants' needs and deliver tailored, protection-oriented support; empowering migrants to avail themselves of humanitarian assistance; and building governments' capacity to implement harmonized and evidence-based policies and collaborate through regional mechanisms.

In 2017, the United States continued to support a Secretariat and capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia (as well as Central America) implemented by IOM Headquarters in Geneva to encourage countries to adopt and implement the "Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster" ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines were the culmination of the 2014-2016 Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative, co-chaired by the United States and the Philippines, and assisted by a working group of countries and stakeholders, including, among others, Australia, Bangladesh, and the European Commission. The Guidelines are the product of extensive consultations with a wide range of governments, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector; they are a voluntary tool that States and others can follow in situations where migrants become stranded because of conflict or a serious natural disaster

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

ARF Dialogue Partners experience a variety of natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, as well as manmade crises, including civil conflict, which often result in significant financial and human costs. In response to these events, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance to affected populations in the region, while simultaneously working to reduce disaster vulnerability in communities and building national response capacities. In FY 2018, the U.S Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responded to thirteen natural disasters in Asia, and to complex emergencies in three ARF countries, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Pakistan, and worked with agencies from across the U.S. Government to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations.

In Pakistan, USAID/Food For Peace (USAID/FFP) provided \$57 million to World Food Programme (WFP) for food assistance activities in Pakistan. Out of this total, WFP used \$13.5 million to support the local and regional procurement and distribution of food and \$43.5 million for 'twinning'—the milling, fortifying, and distribution of GoP-provided wheat. WFP assisted over 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees in northwestern Pakistan, including highly sensitive and volatile areas along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.

The U.S Department of State provided more than \$22 million to support health and protection programs for conflict-affected Pakistanis. USAID/ OFDA provided nearly \$14 million in FY 2015 for emergency relief in Pakistan, an ARF participant since 2004. Furthermore, USAID/OFDA provided \$5.7 million of funding for Responding to Pakistan's Internally Displaced (RAPID)—a response fund used countrywide to respond to disaster and conflict-related displacement. USAID/OFDA supported livelihoods, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance to drought and flood-affected people. USAID/OFDA also provided logistics, shelter, and WASH assistance to IDPs and refugee returnee populations.

In Myanmar, USAID/FFP supports WFP to distribute locally and regionally purchased food or cash based-transfers to approximately 172,000 conflict-displaced persons and other vulnerable communities in Rakhine, Kachin, and Northern Shan States. 146,000 beneficiaries are targeted with general food distribution and 26,000 beneficiaries will receive relief cash-based transfers in the areas with accessible markets and functioning cash infrastructure. USAID/FFP's support through WFP includes targeted distribution of fortified blended foods to children under five and pregnant and lactating women. In FY 2016 and 2017, USAID/ FFP contributed \$13.4 million to WFP to support food assistance activities benefiting IDPs and vulnerable communities – including those affected by the Summer 2016 floods. In Myanmar, USAID/ OFDA provided over \$18 million in FY 2018, which supported agriculture and food security, economic recovery, health, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) initiatives; distribution of relief supplies; and humanitarian coordination, information management, and logistics operations benefiting conflict-affected populations in Rakhine, Kachin, and northern Shan states. Between FY 2012 and FY 2018, USAID/OFDA provided nearly \$49 million to address humanitarian needs resulting from the ongoing complex emergency.

To mitigate the effects of future disasters on vulnerable populations, the United States supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs aimed at saving lives; protecting livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure before, during, and after a disaster; and increasing community resilience to natural

hazards. The United States supports regional and country-specific DRR programs. The U.S. Department of State, INDOPACOM, and USAID/OFDA collaborate on support to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre by building its capacity for disaster monitoring and response. In 2019, the USG through USAID/OFDA supported the AHA Center to establish and convene a working group for disaster management training and curriculum development, manage disaster-related information, develop assessment tools, and assist in the development of a Regional Joint Disaster Response Plan. Instruction on the implementation of the incident command system (ICS) by the United States Forest Service strengthened the decision-making capabilities of partner countries. Supported by USAID Regional Advisors in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, this training focuses on building regional capacity through train-the-trainer courses. In 2019, regional DRR support includes emergency operations center (EOC) and multi-agency coordination trainings, basic and intermediate courses on ICS, the development of online training modules, and the adaptation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

The United States sponsors and/or participates in numerous HA/DR-related exercises with regional partners every year, including the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, East Asia Summit (EAS) HADR Exercise, the ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX), exercise Cobra Gold with Thailand, exercise Balikatan with the Philippines, Gema Bhakti with Indonesia, and Angkor Opening with Cambodia. In addition, the United States sponsored Disaster Relief Exercise and Exchanges (DREEs) through the Lower Mekong Initiative, further enhancing multi-lateral coordination, communication, and cooperation among the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam to enhance response readiness to natural disasters in the Lower Mekong region

The United States remains committed to developing ASEAN HA/DR capabilities and streamlining the ASEAN response mechanism. We believe developing and testing an ASEAN Military Ready Group (AMRG) SOP during this cycle as an important step in that direction. As part of the U.S. commitment to advancing civil - military coordination in ASEAN and throughout

the Asia Pacific region, we recognize the need to further synchronize the defense efforts of the ADMM / ADMM-Plus with the civilian-led efforts in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and by the AHA Centre. We see this as a critical step toward realizing the vision of 'One ASEAN, One Response,' and we look forward to furthering these efforts during the next three years.

The Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions enhance regional disaster preparedness capabilities. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel strengthen relationships between civilian and military specialists from countries in the region to cooperate on medical and engineering projects and practice disaster response procedures. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force respectively recognize the effectiveness of establishing relationships and training before disasters. In 2018, the U.S. Hospital Ship Mercy conducting the Pacific Partnership mission visited Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Vietnam while USNS Fall River will visit Yap, Palau, Malaysia, and Thailand. Pacific Angel engagements are planned for: Suai, Cova Lima Municipality, Southwest Timor-Leste; Tam Ky, Quang Nam Province, Vietnam; Luganville, Espiritu Santo Island and Tanna, Tanna Island, Vanuatu; and Anuradhapura (North Central Province), Puttalam (Northwest Province), Vavuniya, (Northern Province), Sri Lanka. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions improve the ability of providers and subject matter experts from the United States working side-by-side with counterparts from other countries to prepare for and better respond to disasters, such as pandemic illness, typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. In 2018, Pacific Partnership supporting partners included more than 800 military and civilian personnel from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, Peru, and Japan. Pacific Angel missions have in the past involved military personnel from New Zealand, Australia, France, the Philippines, Indonesia and Tonga. These two humanitarian missions underscore the United States' efforts in the Pacific region to provide assistance and enhance disaster relief capacity.

Lastly, the United States is the permanent Secretariat of the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS). PASOLS provides a congress for senior logisticians to exchange and discuss best practices and lessons learned, review regional issues and initiatives, and exchange information that strengthen cooperation throughout the region. The majority of ARF participants attend the annual PASOLS Seminar. Heads and representatives of military logistics organizations from 28 countries took part in the 2017 PASOLS conference, including Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. PASOLS aims to promote open dialogue for military logistics chiefs in the Asia-Pacific region to further build Supply Chain networks and enhance cooperation towards a more consolidated response to common security challenges, particularly peacekeeping missions. PASOLS' regional presence and logistics focus is an ideal platform for ARF Participants to continue dialogue and strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration of disaster response efforts.

v. Maritime Security

The Indo-Pacific region and its maritime waterways are critical to U.S. security. Together with our interagency colleagues and regional allies and partners, the United States strives to ensure that the Indo-Pacific will remain open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. To protect free and open access, the United States focuses on three objectives: safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards.

The United States has, throughout its history, advocated for the freedom of the seas and sky. Freedom of the seas includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to transit through international waterways. It also includes all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace for military ships and aircraft as set out in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces currently do all around the world.

For 70 years, U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific region has played a vital role in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security. We note several continuing trends, including rapid military

modernization, growing resource demands, and territorial and maritime disputes, that have the potential to create instability. Many countries across the region are significantly enhancing their naval and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capabilities. Although most nations are using these capabilities in a responsible manner, ongoing provocative actions continue to heighten tensions in the region and raise concerns. Actions such as the use of MLE vessels to coerce rival claimants, and unsafe air and maritime behavior raise the risk of miscalculation or conflict. Maritime vessels are also increasingly being used to traffic terrorists and materiel. Increase screening measures and controls, such as those identified in UNSCR 2396 on foreign fighters, are needed to deter illicit and terrorist use of the maritime sector.

The tensions arising from maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific are deeply concerning to the United States. The Indian Ocean, East China Sea, and South China Sea are all vital thoroughfares for global commerce and energy. Well over half the world's merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world's largest economies – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China.

With regards to the South China Sea, the United States has a vital national interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peace and stability. Although the United States takes no position on sovereignty over disputed land features, we take a position around the world that disputes should be resolved peacefully, without the use of force or coercion, and in accordance with international law. To that end, we urge claimant countries to conform all of their maritime claims to international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

China's efforts to assert its unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea threaten the regional rules-based order and undermine international law. China's provocative reclamation and militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, and its attempts to coerce and intimidate other nations undermine regional stability. The United States urges all claimants, including China, to manage

and resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolving disagreements, including the use of third party dispute settlement, such as arbitration, negotiation, multilateral fora, or other peaceful international mechanisms. In this regard, the United States takes note of the importance of the July 12, 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in the China-Philippines arbitration, and notes that it could serve as a useful basis for claimants to resolve their overlapping maritime claims.

On negotiations towards an ASEAN-China SCS Code of Conduct, we will continue to advocate for a meaningful Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that is fully in accordance with international law. We support ASEAN's ongoing efforts to negotiate a meaningful and effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that is fully in accordance with international law. We are concerned, however, at reports that China has been pressing ASEAN member states - behind closed doors - to accept limits on with whom states may conduct military exercises and offshore energy development. These proposals put at risk the autonomy of ASEAN states, and pose a direct challenge to the interests of the broader international community, including the United States. The United States urges all negotiating parties to ensure that rights and interests of third parties are respected and that any eventual Code be crafted in full accordance with international law.

In the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the degradation in China-Japan maritime security relations. We support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid a miscalculation or a dangerous incident.

We further believe the ARF can help put in-place supportive diplomatic structures that lower tensions and help claimant States manage these disputes peacefully. This forum needs to play an increasingly important role in reinforcing international law and practice and in building practical cooperation among member states.

The United States is not standing still in light of the challenges we face in the maritime domain. There should be no doubt that the United States will maintain the military presence and capabilities to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners against potential threats in the maritime domain.

The U.S. Navy is pursuing a comprehensive strategy focused on four lines of effort:

- i. Strengthen U.S. Naval capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed.
 - The U.S. Navy is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.
 - The U.S. Navy will increase the size of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent over the next five years to maintain a higher tempo of routine and persistent maritime presence activities across the Pacific region.
- **ii.** Work together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity.
 - The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are building greater interoperability and developing more integrated operations, actions, and activities with our regional allies and partners.
 - The U.S. Pacific Fleet is increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of their regional exercise program, with a particular focus on increasing the operational exercise complexity with Southeast Asian partners and expanding the multilateral exercise program.
 - The U.S. Navy has also implemented a Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2015. The initiative increases training and

exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain awareness capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia.

- **iii** Leverage defense diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road.
 - The U.S. Navy is actively seeking to mitigate risks in the Indo-Pacific region, both through bilateral efforts with China, as well as region-wide risk reduction measures.
 - Recently, the U.S. Navy and China's Ministry of National Defense concluded an historic Memorandum of Understanding on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. This MOU currently includes annexes on ship-to-ship and air-to-air encounters.
 - U.S. Navy and People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) vessels have also successfully employed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) during recent interactions, which reduce risk in the region and demonstrate cooperativeness on the seas.
- iv. Strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture.
 - The United States is enhancing its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and the EAS. The United States promotes candid conversations about ongoing challenges in the maritime domain, and encourages greater information sharing and cooperative solutions.

In addition to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard lines of efforts on the seas, the United States regularly conducts maritime exercises with regional partners to build confidence and to enhance regional maritime readiness. Cooperative activities such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)

exercise foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. In February 2017, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) participated in the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) with the U.S. Coast Guard's 14th District in the western Pacific Ocean. OMSI is a joint maritime security operation designed to enhance maritime domain awareness, increase law enforcement presence, and expand at-sea law enforcement capabilities throughout Oceania. During the exercise, sailors had the privilege of working side by side with an elite Coast Guard Law Enforcement team. The team provided invaluable training to Murphy's Visual Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) team to include tactical team movements, tactical combat casualtu care, and safe boarding techniques. These are just a few of several engagements aimed to develop cooperation, promote common seafaring practices, and enhance mutual trust.

Additionally, the United States participated in its fourth Governors' Council meeting with the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) since becoming the organization's 20th contracting party (member) in 2014. The United States has been proactive in assisting the development of a ten-year strategy plan for the future of ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) to become a Centre of Excellence by 2020. The United States is also working with regional partners to improve the safety and well-being of mariners through the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training on Counter-Piracy (EAST-CP) program. The United States is enhancing the capacity of the coast guards, navies, and law enforcement and judicial sectors of partner nations to address not only piracy, but also the broad scope of illicit maritime activity ranging from illegal fishing to the trafficking of arms, narcotics, and people. Training and technical expertise are delivered through a variety of cooperative training programs supported by the U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and USAID. The workshops incorporate the knowledge of technical experts in the maritime transport sector and regional survivors of piracy to address issues ranging from preparedness and survival, ransom negotiations, to post trauma care upon returning home.

v. Information and Communications Technologies

The speed and efficiency of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are of great benefit to commerce and development. At the same time. ICTs introduce vulnerabilities that countries must proactively address, as the risks can impact national and regional security and economic prosperity – especially in Asia, where e-commerce is a significant and increasing portion of many developing countries' economic growth. In a cyberincident of national significance, the unique nature of the ICTs, including the lack of external observables of ICTs and the difficulty in determining the nation or entity responsible, may lead states to act precipitously, with significant consequences for strategic ICT stability and international security. To reduce the risk of conflict stemming from ICT incidents, practical confidence building measures (CBMs) are needed to enhance the predictability of state activities and reduce national security risks. This can be achieved by fostering transparency, increasing cybersecurity cooperation, and developing incident response capacity within and among states. These practical measures in the form of CBMs can help reduce the risk of conflict.

In the interest of increasing ARF's budding Preventive Diplomacy role and promoting regional cyber stability, the United States welcomes the establishment of the ISM on ICTs Security and supports continued ARF dialogue on enhancing international ICT stability via the 2015 ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs. We support further institutionalization of cyber work within the ARF, the development and implementation of cyber CBMs in the ARF and continued ARF discussion on preventive diplomacy's role in cyberspace. The United States will cooperate with other ARF Participants on the development of relevant cyber workshops and projects in 2018 to support the ARF Work Plan.

IV. Role of the ARF

a) National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

The United States remains committed to building institutional capacity in the ARF and strengthening its role in the regional security architecture. Besides the many projects mentioned above, the United States seeks to increase the ARF's capacity to serve as a Preventive Diplomacy mechanism and action-oriented forum aimed to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Demonstrating U.S. commitment to ASEAN and to the ARF, the United States established a U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2011, and was the first ASEAN Dialogue Partner to create a dedicated mission to better assist and support this important security platform. The elevation of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship to a strategic partnership in 2015 and the Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summit in California in 2016 further demonstrate the strong U.S. pledge to advancing engagement with ASEAN and the ARF. The United States will also continue to work with ASEAN to strengthen and build capacity in the ARF Unit – a critical element of process sustainment and administrative protocol. A reinforced ARF Unit will benefit ASEAN members and all ARF dialogue partners as the engine of a credible and resultsoriented organization.

b) Future of the ARF

The ARF serves as a useful and increasingly capable venue for broad, multilateral cooperation; and dialogue on a number of security issues. The ARF's inclusiveness, maturing commitments, and growing experience position it to achieve success on a targeted agenda that addresses common issues of interest for all ARF participants. Since the ARF's inception in 1994, the confidence building measures that have characterized ARF engagement have facilitated greater trust and confidence among its participants. However, its participants now should take deliberate steps toward shaping the ARF into an institution that faces important security challenges head-on, with the capability to conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Furthermore, the escalation in coercion and the militarization by ARF participant governments highlight the urgent need for the ARF

to go beyond just providing confidence-building measures. In this regard, the United States supports efforts to develop the ARF's Preventive Diplomacy capability together with the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), which would move the ARF one-step closer toward its ultimate goal of becoming a regional Conflict Resolution body.

As stated in the opening paragraph, ASEAN centrality and leadership are critical to the future of the ARF. As ASEAN achieves greater integration, it will play an even more influential role in solving regional and global political-security issues. Although ASEAN already demonstrates leadership on many issues, such as pandemic disease, climate change, IUU fishing, foreign terrorist fighters, and peacekeeping operations, it will need to continue to shape the ARF into a robust institution capable of addressing many of the pressing security needs in the region.

It is important to highlight the context of the ARF as one element of a broader regional security architecture that includes the EAS, ADMM-Plus, and EAMF. The United States is committed to continuing its engagement to help shape a robust and coherent architecture in the Indo-Pacific region – including a key role for the ARF in promoting stability and prosperity - through a transparent and inclusive process. Developing rules-based frameworks for dialogue and cooperation will help maintain stability and economic growth while resolving disputes through diplomacy are especially important in a region facing territorial and maritime disputes, political transformation, political and civil unrest, the challenges of climate change, and natural disasters. The United States is committed to building on its active and enduring presence in the Indo-Pacific region and working with its partners to support the ARF as an effective mechanism for confronting transnational security issues troubling the region today.

VIET NAM

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment:

In 2018 and the early half of 2019, Asia-Pacific region is generally peaceful and stable, yet potential risks and complicated developments remain. The situation of the Korean Peninsula has seen positive progress through the continued dialogues in 2018 and early 2019, including the inter-Korean Summits, the two US-DPRK Summits and the recent Russia-DPRK Summit. However, due to differences, related parties have yet reach a consensus. In addition, the region is facing various threats, traditional and non-traditional alike. challenges such as, disasters, piracy cyber security and terrorism and violent extremism, among others, are affecting regional peace, stability and prosperity. In particular, the escalating competition among major powers further complicates the situation, increase uncertainty and put pressure on other countries in the region.

With regard to the issue of the East Sea (South China Sea), ASEAN and China have reached agreement on the Framework of COC and started the COC negotiations. On the other hand, there remain developments of concern on the ground, including militarisation that affect peace, stability, maritime security and safety, as well as hinder efforts to maintain a conducive environment for the COC negotiations.

II. National Security and Defense Policy:

a) Overview of national security and defense policy:

Viet Nam always attaches great importance to the task of maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development. Viet Nam's defense policy is based on country's foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, diversification, multilateralisation of external relations; Viet Nam is a friend, reliable partner of all countries and a responsible member of the international community. Viet Nam pursues a peaceful, self-defense policy, and is against the use of force or threat to use of force in international relations, aiming to solve differences and disputes by peaceful means and on the basis of international law; and advocates to not align with one country against another.

Viet Nam's policy of gradually modernising the military is in accordance with the economic development, which includes strengthening the defense capacity and only maintains military power in the extent necessary for self-defense. Viet Nam is against arms race in the region and the world.

b) Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

(i) Defense expenditure

Viet Nam has made a mandatory allocation of the State budget for defense expenses and in particular for maintaining weapons and equipment for armed forces. Currently, the annual average defense expenditure is approximately 2.1 percent of GDP.

(ii) Military personnel

Viet Nam's core military force currently maintains 450,000 active personnel which includes regular troops, local forces, and militia. Viet Nam is gradually reducing the number of troops in accordance with the actual situation and the country's requirements.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

(i) Counter terrorism

Looking back the last year, it is seen that the threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region and the global. We have witnessed great efforts by all countries in dealing with long-term challenges posed by terrorism and violent extremism. Regarding terrorism prevention, there are no international terrorist attacks or active terrorist groups that have been detected in Viet Nam. Viet Nam is also known for not being a transit point of terrorist and terrorist groups. However, Viet Nam considers international terrorism as one of the most serious threat, especially when terrorism has started to spread through the Internet and with the large number of young Internet users in Viet Nam, this has created a facilitating condition for terrorist groups to propagandise or make recruitment. Therefore, Viet Nam pays greater attention to terrorism prevention for citizens focusing on youngster and reaffirms our commitments in working closely with countries in the region to counter international terrorism.

In efforts to enhance regional cooperation in fighting terrorism, Viet Nam has actively worked with ASEAN's member states and the dialogue partners, through ASEAN-led mechanisms namely the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, ARF, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, EAS... In addition, we have focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation with ARF Participants to share information on terrorism threats and to enhance capacity building of the officers.

Viet Nam looks forward to more concrete cooperation in countering terrorism, to set up a framework for collaboration in implementing the UN Security Council's Resolution 2396 (2017) on strengthening of measures to counter threats posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and the Resolution 2496 (2019) on "preventing and combating the financing of terrorist". Viet Nam has ratified and implemented the Law on prevention of money laundry in 2012, which regulates prevention and combat of terrorism financing through banking activities.

(ii) Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms control and Disarmament

Viet Nam is party to various international agreements in the area of non-proliferation, counterproliferation, arms control and disarmament. Viet Nam supports regional efforts in strengthening cooperation to respond to Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Challenges (CBRN), including the initiative made by Singapore as the 2018 ASEAN

Chair in establishing a network of CBRN experts in ASEAN. We will continue to send delegations to attend relevant international conferences and workshops, including: ASEAN Armies CBRN Subject Matter Expert Exchange, 14th International CBRN Commandants and Commanders Conference in Singapore (July 2019).

Viet Nam pursues a consistent policy of supporting efforts by the international community for non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. We have engaged vigorously in the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), committing to strive along with other nations toward the common goals of disarmament.

(iii) Transnational Crime

At present, regional security challenges are getting increasingly transnational and non-traditional in nature that no single country can deal with. Therefore, Viet Nam considers enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries in combating transnational crime as one of the key priorities in maintaining comprehensive national security.

Regarding illicit drugs, during the past few years, Viet Nam has been actively engaging in multilateral and regional mechanisms designed to strengthen cooperation in combating illicit drugs such as: ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (AMMD), ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters (ASOD) and ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference (ASEANAPOL). Viet Nam hosted many activities including the 38th ASOD (2017), the 1st ASOD-Russia Coordination Meeting (2017), the 3rd ASOD-India Coordination Meeting (2017), and the 6th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (2018). In support of regional capacity-building for police officers in charge of drug-related crimes, Viet Nam has organised a number of drug-related crimes training courses for some ASEAN Member States focusing on basic techniques and tactics in drug investigation and analysis.

As an active contributor in combating human trafficking, Viet Nam has been developing a Plan of Action to carry out the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) and Regional Plan of

Action (RPA). Furthermore, Viet Nam also partnered with other countries in fighting this crime, for example the Australia-Asia Program on Trafficking in Person 2014-2018, and cooperated with Malaysia Police to find better ways to combat trafficking in person as well as launch practical activities in Viet Nam.

(iv) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

Viet Nam actively participates in HADR cooperation activities in the region, including activities within the framework of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on HADR; the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX-18) (Indonesia, 4-10 November 2018).

Regarding bilateral cooperation, Viet Nam actively cooperates with countries in the region to conduct training activities to improve humanitarian support and disaster relief capacity and timely support neighbouring countries when disaster occurs.

(v) Maritime Security

Viet Nam also participates in a proactive and responsible manner in activities within a number of ASEAN and ASEAN-led frameworks, including the ARF, the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security, etc. We have sent naval ships and personnel to join the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise. Viet Nam also engages with other regional centres through information sharing and multilateral fora/conferences, such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, the Global Coast Guard Summit (Working Level Meeting) and the 6th Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Commander's Forum etc.

Within the bilateral cooperation, Viet Nam has closely coordinated with other maritime law enforcement forces of regional countries to conduct many practical cooperation activities such as delegations exchange, performs fishery coordinated patrols, information sharing, organising joint training courses to build capacity etc.

(vi) ICTs Security

On cybercrime, Viet Nam has not only intensified cooperation with ASEAN and regional partners, but has also focused on amending and supplementing legal documents on cybercrime as well as enhancing capacity building for internal officers. Viet Nam has co-hosted a number of activities with external partners to promote cooperation and information exchange on this field, including the recent 5th Strategic Meeting on Payment Card Fraud with EUROPOL with the objective of discussing and mapping out strategies to effectively tackle future cybercrimes.

In 2018, Viet Nam has approved law on cyber security which aims to create a regulatory framework to better deal with cyber security threats in the country.

IV. Role of ARF:

ARF DOD continues to be a valuable channel for interaction, providing useful supports and strengthen confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. The ARF Security Policy Conference (APSC) is a forum for Member States to present their views on regional security issues, clarify their defense policies and share experiences in dealing with regional security threats. In the future, ARF should come up with new initiatives and measures to ensure the effectiveness of ARF while reducing costs and optimising the utilisation of resources.


The ARF Vision Statement and the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement (2010) has been serving as guiding documents for the ARF activities for the last 10 years. The new ARF Vision and Plan of Action for its next period of development should reflect the regional security developments as well as emerging challenges to come up with concrete measures to guide ARF cooperation further forward toward the realisation of lasting peace, stability and security in the region.



















ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2019

Compiled and Published by:

Department of ASEAN Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand
443 Sri Ayudhya Road
Bangkok 10400 Thailand



www.mfa.go.th



