ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK
2018
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) celebrates its 25th anniversary in 2018 as our geostrategic environment becomes more complex. We are confronted with emerging transnational challenges, including terrorism and cyber threats, rapidly evolving political alignments, the rising tide of protectionism, and technological disruption amidst the ongoing digital revolution. These are uncertain times, and no single country can deal with these challenges alone. Against this backdrop, the ARF has become all the more salient for fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues, and contributing to confidence-building efforts and preventive diplomacy.

The ARF remains the largest and most diverse ASEAN-led platform in terms of membership. Every year, the 27 ARF Participants come together to exchange views on major political and security issues, and to pursue practical cooperation under the Inter-sessional Meetings (ISMs) on Maritime Security, Disaster Relief, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The ARF has also evolved to keep pace with the changing geostrategic landscape. A case in point is the recent establishment of the ISM on Security of and in the Use of Information Communications Technologies (ICTs Security) at the 24th ARF in August 2017, in response to the proliferation of technology and salience of cybersecurity. To date, the ARF has conducted more than 75 workshops, 45 seminars, 25 conferences, 10 training programmes, and three disaster relief exercises. ARF Participants are committed to keeping up this strong momentum of practical cooperation and dialogue.

Singapore is pleased to publish this year’s edition of the Annual Security Outlook (ASO), an ARF tradition to promote confidence, understanding, transparency, and exchange of views among ARF Participants. This is also a useful publication to strengthen public awareness of the efforts of individual ARF Participants towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region. As the ARF commemorates its 25th anniversary, Singapore, as Chair of the 25th ARF, stands ready to work with all ARF Participants to promote peace, stability, security, and prosperity in our region.

Dr Vivian Balakrishnan
Chair of the 25th ASEAN Regional Forum
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Singapore
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2018 edition of the ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook (ARF ASO) features a total of 21 submissions from ARF Participants on their perspectives on the regional security environment, national security and defence policies, national contributions to regional security, and the role of the ARF.

Their general assessment is that the shifting geopolitical dynamics, rise of transnational threats, and technological disruption have injected new uncertainty and challenges into the regional security environment. In this regard, they reaffirmed the importance of stepping up cooperation in and implementing the Work Plans of the ARF priority areas, including Maritime Security (MS), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (NPD), Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), Disaster Relief (DR), and Security of and in the Use of Information Communications Technologies (ICTs Security). On MS, they reaffirmed the importance of safeguarding vital maritime routes that underpin the security and prosperity of the region, and encouraged ARF Participants to do more together to address transnational maritime threats. On NPD, they expressed support for continued international efforts in promoting non-proliferation and disarmament. On CTTC, they suggested that the threats be nipped in the bud and tackled at the most fundamental level first, and emphasised the importance of information-sharing and coordination amongst ARF Participants in containing and eliminating related threats. On DR, they encouraged ARF Participants to forge closer cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts, so as to enable swift response during crises. On ICTs Security, they noted the increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks which have disabled critical functions and infrastructure, and welcomed the establishment of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on ICTs Security to coordinate efforts in cybersecurity. They also encouraged the ARF to develop synergies with other ASEAN-led platforms in the aforementioned priority areas, and to strengthen linkages with Track 1.5 and Track 2 ARF mechanisms.

As the ARF commemorates its 25th anniversary this year, they reaffirmed the ARF’s continued role as an important forum to foster dialogue and practical cooperation in political and security issues, as well as the importance of preserving ASEAN Centrality and the consensus-based mechanism as the foundation of the ARF.
I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

Australia continues its efforts to support a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific, which is critical to the continued development and prosperity in our region. The regional strategic outlook continues to be challenging, including: nuclear and missile proliferation; territorial disputes; shifting power dynamics and increased competition for influence in the region; terrorism and returning foreign fighters; and the impact of transnational crime. Other challenges include technological change, challenges to globalisation and the rules-based international order, and climate change.

Australia’s approach to these security challenges is to apply appropriate domestic policy settings, maintain strong bilateral ties with regional countries, and a commitment to working cooperatively through regional and international forums in accordance with international law.

It is in this context that the Australian Government published its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which charts a clear course for Australia to pursue its interest in a more competitive and contested region and outlines Australia’s intention to step up efforts in support of a more resilient Indo-Pacific. ASEAN has bolstered regional security and prosperity for 50 years and continues to be a key partner for Australia.

Australia is committed to the central role of ASEAN in regional architecture, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Through the ARF and other groupings, in particular the East Asia Summit, we pursue a regional agenda that promotes cooperation on strategic, political and economic issues, reinforces international law, and ensures that all regional countries, large and small, have a voice on regional issues. With its well-established program of activities focused on confidence building measures and a growing preventive diplomacy agenda, the ARF can help manage tensions, set the norms of acceptable behaviour, and maintain a resilient regional order.

Countering violent extremism

Australia actively supports regional and multilateral efforts to meet the shared challenge of countering violent extremism (CVE). We work with ARF members and through multilateral forums, including the Global Coalition Against Daesh, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund to strengthen regional cooperation on CVE. Australia strongly supports the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) and encourages regional efforts to implement national action plans on PVE, in line with national priorities. Australia co-leads with Malaysia on Priority Area Four of the ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan, counter-radicalisation, and partners with the South East Asian Network of Civil Society Organisations to support civil society organisations to more effectively engage with regional governments on CVE. The Australian Government also supported the delivery of the 2018 Strong Cities Network Global Summit in Melbourne in July, the first global network of local and municipal policymakers and practitioners collaborating to counter violent extremism.

South China Sea

Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Australia does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea but we have a crucial interest in the stability of this international waterway and the laws and norms that govern it. Australia supports the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Australia opposes the use of intimidation, aggression or coercion to advance any country’s territorial claims or unilaterally alter the status quo.

The prosperity our region has enjoyed for decades is underpinned by the rules-based international order. Australia welcomes dialogue between claimants based on international law, which
reduces tensions and avoids miscalculation. To this end, we acknowledge movement toward a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. It is important that all activities and any agreements are consistent with international law (especially UNCLOS), reinforce existing regional architecture and strengthen states’ commitments to cease destabilising actions, including militarisation.

**Korean Peninsula**

The US - North Korean Summit in June and the inter-Korean Summit in April, as well as a pause in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing, have brought down tensions on the Korean Peninsula. At this time, however, the DRPK has not taken any concrete and verifiable steps towards denuclearisation. Until the DPRK takes such steps, its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles continue to pose a threat to international security. The DPRK continues to contravene and defy unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

Australia calls on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations under numerous UNSC resolutions and make good on its undertaking to denuclearise, given at the US - North Korean Summit on 12 June 2018. Australia is focused on encouraging full and thorough implementation and enforcement of UNSC resolutions to address the security threat as well as utilising its autonomous measures to exert economic and diplomatic pressure on the DPRK until it achieves complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation.

**Middle East**

The Middle East and North Africa continue to face significant political and security challenges. The security situation remains fragile, with ongoing conflict in Syria – including the deplorable use of chemical weapons – large displaced populations across the region, and the persistence of many of the political and economic factors that allowed ISIL to rise. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL has lost all but small pockets of land but still poses an ongoing security threat. The terrible conflict in Yemen continues to be intractable and dangerous, and Libya remains unstable.

Australia has an interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East. We share with the US and broader international community many concerns about problematic Iranian behaviour including missile development, regional interference and support for armed groups. Australia continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal as a mechanism to ensure Iran's nuclear activity is constrained. Australia remains committed to a two-state solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and continues to call on both sides to take courageous steps to return to negotiations towards this goal.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper assesses that powerful drivers of change are converging in a way that is re-shaping the international order and challenging Australia’s interests. In the decade ahead, Australia will need to be competitive and agile to take advantage of the opportunities that will come from dynamic Asian economies and technological and scientific advances. In parallel, risks to Australian interests are building. In particular, the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, which has underpinned its economic transformation, cannot be assured. In a more contested and competitive world, our domestic and international policies will have to work together to maximise our support of regional stability and the application of rules and norms.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2016 Defence White Paper articulate Australia’s national security and defence policy, and align our strategy, capability and resources. The Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers highlight the importance of strong bilateral ties with countries in Southeast Asia and the wider region, including the need to strengthen multilateral engagement through regional forums. In the face of greater uncertainty and complexity in the Indo-Pacific region, effective regional and international partnerships will continue to be crucial for
Australia’s security. Australia is committed to deepening its security and defence cooperation with partners in the region over coming years.

Australia will continue its engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-led frameworks to build trust, transparency and habits of cooperation across Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. At the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Sydney in March 2018, Australia’s Prime Minister and ASEAN leaders committed to closer cooperation on regional and global security challenges, such as terrorism and violent extremism, and to upholding the rules-based order in our shared region. We will continue to build on our long history of multilateral engagement through the EAS, the ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) to promote peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

b. Data contributions to ARF Arms Register

Australia’s 2016-17 fiscal year military expenditure, as provided to the United Nations in accordance with the UN Standardised Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures Guidelines under the UNGA Resolution 35/142B, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter-terrorism

Australia is active in the UN and regional forums to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities, including by supporting implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. As a member of the Global Coalition Against Daesh, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and the Financial Action Task Force, Australia has contributed to efforts to disrupt and degrade ISIL’s activities, including foreign terrorist fighter travel, financing and counter-messaging. We are also supporting the Philippines in the aftermath of the siege of Marawi City. Australia co-chairs with Indonesia the GCTF Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group, which develops, and implements best practice on CVE.

The ASEAN-Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism, signed in March 2018, provides a platform to strengthen practical regional cooperation to counter terrorism and violent extremism, and gives effect to the 2016 ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism. As chair of APEC’s Counter-Terrorism Working Group, Australia has sought to build regional security by working with partners to enhance regional capacity to secure financing, trade, travel and infrastructure – including protecting soft targets.

Australia’s international and regional counter-terrorism efforts have been complemented by a broad range of domestic measures. Australia enhanced its national counter-terrorism arrangements in 2017, including by: revising our National Counter-Terrorism Plan to align it with our Counter-Terrorism Strategy; producing our Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; and increasing practical counter-terrorism cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and police. Additionally, the Home Affairs portfolio was established on 20 December 2017 and brings together Australia’s federal law enforcement, national and transport security, criminal justice, emergency management, multicultural affairs and immigration and border-related functions and agencies.

ii. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Australia strongly supports efforts towards non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly in our own region. To give effect to the 2016 EAS Leaders’ Statement on Non-Proliferation, in October 2017 Australia co-hosted with Thailand the EAS Seminar on Non-Proliferation in the Indo-Pacific. Bringing together more than 50 representatives in Melbourne, Australia, the seminar deepened cooperation among EAS countries by increasing understanding of the strategic issues relating to WMD non-proliferation.
The 2017 EAS Leaders Statement on Chemical Weapons was an important regional contribution to efforts to uphold the international norm against chemical weapons’ use. Australia supported a number of regional workshops that facilitated implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 and demonstrated our commitment to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, including on chemical safety, countering bioterrorism and universalisation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Australia regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Australia is working closely with partners in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) to ensure the implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, as well as to generate effective measures to progress the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Sydney Declaration, led by Australia and agreed to at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, underscores the regional commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and ASEAN’s readiness to play a constructive role in contributing to peace and stability in the region. As we approach the 2020 NPT Review Conference, it is timely for all States Parties to engage constructively to strengthen the review process.

Australia actively promotes a progressive approach to disarmament – with a focus on confidence building, risk reduction, transparency and reporting – and as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.

iii. Transnational crime

a. People smuggling and human trafficking

Australia is playing a leading role in our region to manage irregular migration and to combat people smuggling and human trafficking. The Bali Process, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia, brings together the governments of 45 countries in the Indo-Pacific (covering 4.5 billion people) and three UN organisations to work to combat people smuggling, human trafficking and related transnational crime. The inaugural Bali Process Government and Business Forum (GABF) was launched in Perth on 24-25 August 2017, providing the Bali Process with a mechanism for private sector participants to advise government on the prevention and combating of human trafficking, slavery and forced labour. The GABF secretariat is working with business leaders to develop practical steps governments and businesses can take to eliminate modern slavery through ethical employment, transparency in supply chains, and safeguards and redress mechanisms. These recommendations will be presented at the next GABF event, being held prior to the Bali Process Ministerial meeting in August 2018.

Australia’s generous humanitarian resettlement program, together with its border protection policies, aim to provide safe and legal migration pathways to those in need and to discourage people from falling prey to people smugglers. Australia is increasing the number of refugees accepted under its humanitarian resettlement program to 18,750 places in 2018-19. Australia is also welcoming an additional 12,000 people displaced by the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, while providing substantial humanitarian assistance to Iraq, Syria and neighbouring countries.

A core objective of Australia’s ASEAN and Mekong Program is to combat human trafficking and the exploitation of migrant workers. At the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in March 2018, Australia announced a ten-year AU$80 million commitment to continue our long running collaboration with ASEAN to combat human trafficking in the region. This builds on Australia’s 15-year history of supporting improved criminal justice sector responses to these crimes in ASEAN. We will
continue to work with ASEAN states as they implement their landmark ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which entered into force in March 2017. The new investment will also work with civil society, the private sector and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime.

The Tripartite Action to Enhance the Contribution of Labour Migration to Growth and Development in ASEAN (TRIANGLE in ASEAN, AU$20 million, 2015-2025) provides information and services to migrant workers on their rights and promotes stronger labour migration legislation. Australia also provided AU$2 million to the Preventing the Exploitation of Migrant Women Workers in ASEAN project (2014-2017) to make new evidence based policy options on the exploitation of women migrants workers available to ASEAN policy makers.

c. Organised Crime

Rapid economic growth and enhanced physical and digital connectivity across the Indo-Pacific have created significant opportunities throughout the region, but have also exacerbated its vulnerability to organised crime. Organised crime syndicates engage in a broad range of criminal activities, including human trafficking, money laundering, corruption, illicit drug and tobacco trafficking, illegal fishing and wildlife smuggling. Australia works at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels to strengthen our collective capacity to respond to transnational organised crime. The Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), including its operational arm the Australian Border Force, work to enhance information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation through the region, and deliver a broad range of training and capacity building programs. Australia’s efforts span the prevention, investigation, prosecution and asset recovery stages of transnational crime cooperation. Additionally, the AFP’s international relationships form an integral component of Australia’s efforts to strengthen engagement with regional and international partners to address shared security challenges and enhance regional security and stability. Australia’s efforts are particularly salient in the Pacific region where we provide ongoing support for the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, consisting of 26 individual Transnational Crime Units operating across 18 countries: Australia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, American Samoa, Tuvalu, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Marshall Islands, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru and Guam.

b. Organised Crime

Despite intense law enforcement efforts, illicit drugs remain among the highest-value criminal commodities produced and trafficked in the Indo-Pacific region and cause major public health, social and criminal justice challenges. Australia works closely with law and border enforcement partners in the region to counter narcotics trafficking, including through cooperative transnational investigations, exchanges of information and capacity building activities. Australia is a strong supporter of multilateral efforts to combat cross-border trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursors regionally and globally, including by supporting international mechanisms such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Narcotics Control Board. Crystal methamphetamine (‘ice’) and its chemical precursors continue to pose a significant health and security threat to Australia and across the Indo-Pacific. The Australian Government is implementing its national strategy to reduce the harm caused by ice in Australia, including initiatives to strengthen law enforcement and border security cooperation with international partners to disrupt the supply of methamphetamine in the region. Other narcotics, including opiates, cocaine, and synthetic drugs, such as new psychoactive substances, are also of significant regional concern. Australia will continue to engage with regional partners to address the shared transnational challenge of illicit drugs.
d. Cyber issues

The region's interests in cyberspace are diverse and interconnected, from capturing the economic prosperity promised by digital trade to combating cybercrime and preserving peace in cyberspace. The number, type and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia and the region are increasing and the global nature of the Internet means we cannot respond to these threats within our borders alone. The shared opportunities and challenges of cyberspace require coordinated international responses, partnerships between governments and collaboration with the private sector.

Australia welcomes the establishment of the ARF Intersessional Meeting on ICT Security and the open-ended Study Group on Confidence Building Measures. Both will be important forums for strategic discussion on cyber issues in our region. There is a need for measures between states to address misperception, prevent miscalculation, and facilitate de-escalation. We are helping to build regional mechanisms for effective incident response, crisis management and risk reduction through initiatives such as the ARF Cyber Points of Contact Directory.

The Australian Government appointed an Ambassador for Cyber Affairs, Dr Tobias Feakin, who commenced in January 2017. He led the development of Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, released by Foreign Minister Bishop in October 2017. The Strategy sets an ambitious agenda across the full spectrum of cyber affairs and frames Australia's international cyber interests comprehensively and dynamically. The Strategy has seven key themes, outlining Australia’s plans to: maximise opportunities for economic growth and prosperity through digital trade, foster good cyber security practices, reduce the risk of cybercrime, promote peace and stability in cyberspace, advocate for multi-stakeholder Internet governance, promote respect for human rights and democratic principles online and encourage the use of digital technologies to achieve sustainable development.

To meet commitments in the Strategy, our Cyber Cooperation Program has been expanded from AU$4 million to AU$15 million over four years (2016-2020). Australia’s Cyber Cooperation Program improves cyber capacity in the Indo-Pacific region. Key areas of focus for the Program include enhancing regional capacity to combat cybercrime, increasing capability to respond to cyber incidents, reducing the risk of conflict between states and promoting best practice in the use of technology for development, consistent with Australia’s commitment to an open, free and secure Internet.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Australia has responded rapidly and generously to humanitarian crises in 2017-18. Australia has provided AU$51.5 million in humanitarian assistance since September 2017 in Bangladesh and Myanmar including emergency supplies in Rakhine State and food, shelter, clean water and essential health services in Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh.

Strengthening Australia's civil-military coordination through Defence exercise engagement remains a key priority to ensure that we continue to strengthen whole-of-government response to stabilisation of countries and recovery post disasters. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade staff supported military exercises in 2017 with a humanitarian and stabilisation component in the ASEAN region including Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines and Tempest Express in Thailand. Through an agreement with the World Food Programme's United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (WFP-UNHRD), Australia has pre-positioned humanitarian supplies in Subang, Malaysia, that can be deployed at short notice.

Regional cooperation and preparedness remains essential to ensure coordinated international assistance that effectively augments nationally-led responses. Australia has continued its support for the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit, a regional resource on arrangements for sending and receiving international disaster assistance. In
April 2018, Australia and Indonesia co-chaired a workshop to explore the application of the Toolkit in the context of a catastrophic disaster occurring in a non-ASEAN EAS country.

Australia also participated in the 3rd session of the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific. This multi-stakeholder group, currently chaired by Singapore, brings together the humanitarian, civilian and military actors involved in disaster response preparedness planning and disaster response in the region.

Linked to the work of the RCG, Australia and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, launched a publication – Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model. The publication will help strengthen the coordination of operational planning between civilian and military actors in the following countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Myanmar and the Philippines.

Australia continues to provide technical assistance in disaster preparedness through the deployment of Australian disaster management specialists to government and humanitarian agencies in the region. Australia is providing AU$5.7 million over three years (AU$1.9 million per year; 2016-19) to United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction to support the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Asia Pacific region, and will invest over AU$100 million through bilateral partnerships for disaster risk reduction programs.

v. Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Australia is committed to comprehensive maritime security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. We work closely with regional partners and through international forums to enhance maritime security and promote habits of cooperation.

Australia hosted the 2018 ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS), at which we promoted regional stability and security through adherence to a rules-based regional order and a strategic culture based on global norms and international law. Australia is pleased to support the ARF’s central role in addressing regional maritime challenges and is proud to be an active contributor to its maritime security agenda. In partnership with our ARF ISM-MS co-chairs, Vietnam and the European Union, Australia is developing a new ARF Work Plan for Maritime Security, which ARF members will be asked to formally endorse in 2018.

Australia was pleased to work with Vietnam and the European Union in 2016 on the ARF Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies. This statement provides a strong basis for development of new cooperation mechanisms among maritime law enforcement agencies in the region to address issues of mutual concern, such as combating piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea, and the promotion of safe and secure sea lines of communication. We gave effect to this statement by working with Vietnam and the European Union to develop and hold an ARF workshop on the same theme in the 2017-18 ARF year. If Ministers agree, a further ARF workshop on this topic will be held in the 2018-19 ARF year. It is also proposed that in 2018-19 Australia will co-chair: with China and Thailand, a workshop on Regional Climate Change and Coastal Disaster Management; with Vietnam and the European Union, a workshop on Implementing UNCLOS to address Emerging Maritime Issues; and, with Malaysia and the United States, a workshop on national maritime single points of contact.

At the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in March 2018, Prime Minister Turnbull announced a package of maritime cooperation initiatives to strengthen: the protection of regional fish stocks; civil maritime and border protection; maritime domain awareness; and maritime law and its applications.

The transnational nature of maritime security issues require multilateral cooperation and collaboration; they cannot be solved unilaterally.
These include issues such as terrorism, natural disasters and extreme weather events, illegal fishing, piracy, the smuggling of drugs, people and goods, and looming security challenges associated with global climate change.

Regional efforts have been effective in reducing the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Indo-Pacific. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which Australia has been a member of since 2013, has supported this work. Australia will utilise its Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) membership to shape and influence the direction of regional civil maritime security by building mutual understanding with counterpart agencies. Through our membership, Australia intends to formally promote and influence greater agency-to-agency cooperation and demonstrate the importance of information sharing to achieve outcomes. Australia looks forward to hosting HACGAM in 2020.

Australia will continue to contribute to practical defence cooperation on maritime security through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) framework and its thematic Experts’ Working Group on Maritime Security (EWG on Maritime Security). The EWG on Maritime Security promotes military cooperation through exercises, workshops and other practical military engagement activities that strengthen regional maritime security capacity and institutional relationships. Australia will continue to participate in the EWG on Maritime Security, including the multilateral maritime exercise in the Republic of Korea and Singapore in May 2019.

IV. Role of the ARF

Australia is committed to continuing its long history of engagement with ASEAN regional security architecture, including the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM-Plus. We see the ARF as an important forum for frank dialogue and practical cooperation and we have a busy ARF agenda. We are particularly active as a co-chair of the ISM-MS and of other cooperative activities such as workshops to build confidence in this domain. Counter-terrorism is another of Australia’s priorities in the ARF, where we co-lead with Malaysia on priority area 4, counter-radicalisation, of the CTTC work stream. Our defence engagement in the ARF supports integrated approaches to complex security challenges including maritime security, counter terrorism, counter-proliferation and humanitarian and disaster relief. The participation of defence subject matter experts also promotes alignment with defence-led cooperation under the ADMM-Plus.
# MAIN REPORT - TO BE SUBMITTED TO UN

## UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

(Actual outlays, current prices)

**COUNTRY: AUSTRALIA**

**NATIONAL CURRENCY AND UNIT OF MEASURES: AUD $'000**

**FISCAL YEAR: 2017**

(The unit of measure should not exceed one ten thousandth of the total military expenditures.)

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**Explanatory remarks (if any):**

1. All intangibles, other plant & equipment and all military procurement - specialist military equipment (SME) have been allocated to Other (Procurement)

2. All buildings and infrastructure have been allocated to Other (Construction)
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<th>UN PEACEKEEPING</th>
<th>MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION</th>
<th>EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS</th>
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I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region is diverse in its geographical, political and socio-economic landscapes. This diversity alongside with today’s evolving global forces - geopolitical shifts, technological advancements, rapid information transfers through social media, influences of non-state actors - contribute to the varying security challenges that the region faces.

A growing concern in the region is the threat of terrorism. Despite the success in protecting the city of Marawi, Philippines from terrorists’ influence, terrorism sees no end, and regional terrorist groups continue to pose security challenges by endangering the peace and stability in the region.

Natural disasters, spanning the spectrum of safety to security, remain imminent threats that can have destabilising effects to the affected country and its neighbours.

At the same time, the positive progress in the recent engagements taking place in the Korean Peninsula is encouraging as stable relations between countries are essential for the stability of the regional environment. Hence, the region is carefully and closely observing the situation in the Peninsula, given the recent diplomatic efforts in bringing about a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Peninsula.

The fluidity and diversity of the region reiterate the need for multilateral approaches to address challenges affecting the region. As such, cooperation between and among countries in multilateral forms have continued to endure in the region. Brunei Darussalam values the regional ASEAN architecture that has continued to remain a platform for ASEAN and its regional partners to engage with one another.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Overview of national security and defence policy

Brunei Darussalam’s defence policy has remained consistent in ensuring that efforts are comprehensive, robust and integrated to protect and promote the nation’s peace and stability. Apart from collaboration with local agencies to support each other’s capabilities, Brunei Darussalam seeks to improve the level of preparedness of its military capacity to address various security challenges, as well as a continued commitment to defence diplomacy. Brunei Darussalam places emphasis on sustaining commitments in maintaining strong bilateral and multilateral engagements with defence establishments and armed forces around the world.

Defence expenditure

For the fiscal year 2018/2019, the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam’s approved budget is set at BND $492,754,700 (approximately USD $363,565,103), which is an increase of 12.9% from the previous financial year.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Brunei Darussalam values the various multilateral regional platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, East Asia Summit and many more, where these fora present opportunities for countries to engage constructively in dialogue and to cooperate practically to address common security challenges.

Brunei Darussalam has and will continue to play an active role in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus.
In addition to Brunei Darussalam's regular and active representation at the meetings, Brunei Darussalam has contributed several initiatives with a view to strengthen the regional security architecture.

One of which is the ADMM Logistics Support Framework (LSF) which intends to strengthen logistics cooperation that will enable the military forces in the ASEAN region to address non-traditional security challenges, to include but not limited to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Search and Rescue (SAR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and anti-piracy, in a coordinated and effective manner. Brunei Darussalam established this initiative the adoption of its concept paper during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2013. Subsequently, Brunei Darussalam held a Table-Top Exercise (TTX), participated by all the ASEAN Member States, in January 2016 in order to validate and verify the comprehensiveness of the LSF. Consequently, the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM) endorsed the LSF in 2016.

Moreover, recognising the need to develop an ASEAN early warning system to prevent occurrence and/or escalation of conflicts, the ADMM adopted the concept of establishing and maintaining an ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI), an initiative also championed by Brunei Darussalam.

Previously known as the Direct Communications Link (DCL), the establishment of the ADI aims at providing a permanent, rapid, reliable and confidential means by which any two ASEAN Defence Ministers may communicate with each other to arrive at mutual decisions in handling incidences or emergency situations, in particular relating to maritime security. The communications infrastructure will ultimately aim at preventing or defusing misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and therefore to prevent escalation; and to promote quick-response cooperation in emergency situations.

The ADI is launched in phases. The first phase, which is in the form of IP-based mechanism, was launched on 24 October 2017, after the ADMM-Plus Meeting in Clark, Pampanga, Philippines. The second phase is currently under deliberation among ASEAN Member States and there is a proposal to expand the initiative to Plus countries. It is anticipated that the initiative will promote open communications amongst the member states, and enhance regional and wider confidence and security building measures.

Within the ADMM-Plus where practical cooperation is the main thrust, Brunei Darussalam is strongly encouraged by the progress of the seven ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups in the areas of HADR, Military Medicine, Maritime Security, Counter Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Mine Action, and the recently-established Cyber Security.

Even when not co-chairing any EWGs during the year 2011 to 2013, Brunei Darussalam was fully supportive of the EWGs endeavours and hosted the ADMM-Plus HADR and MM Exercise in 2013, working alongside with the country co-chairs of HADR and MM that are China, Vietnam, Singapore and Japan. In addition, Brunei Darussalam co-chaired the EWG on Maritime Security with New Zealand from 2014 to 2017, in which the work of the EWG culminated into the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise that took place in both Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, and a Maritime Security Field Training Exercise in New Zealand.

All these works in the EWGs have garnered understanding, enhanced capacity-building and promoted interoperability in all Member States. More importantly, these have contributed towards deeper trust and fostering stable military-to-military relations among the armed forces of the ADMM-Plus.

**Peacekeeping and peace monitoring initiatives**

Brunei Darussalam remains committed in participating in peace support missions and currently deploys Royal Brunei Armed Forces personnel for International Monitoring Team (IMT).
and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2004 and 2008 respectively. For the 2017 – 2018 peacekeeping missions, there are eight (08) RBAF personnel and one (01) Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF) personnel for the 14th IMT contingent and thirty (30) Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) personnel participating in UNIFIL. Furthermore, Brunei Darussalam also contributes to the Mindanao peace process as a member of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) alongside with Turkey and Norway since 2014. At the operational theatre level, such initiatives provide exposure and knowledge in operation in conflict environments for the personnel involved. Consequently, RBAF plays a role in Brunei Darussalam’s defence diplomacy through its interactions and engagement with foreign counterparts and organisations. These initiatives uplift RBAF’s image as a professional force that is able to contribute meaningfully. Brunei Darussalam considers such contributions as significant in supporting regional and global efforts to bring about stability and peace.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Brunei Darussalam actively supports humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts around the region. The Royal Brunei Armed Forces significantly delivered humanitarian assistance during the tsunami in Aceh in 2004, Typhoon Haiyan in Tacloban, Philippines in 2013. Apart from that, RBAF also delivered assistance to Nepal, whereby RBAF sent one (01) RBAF medical officer, four (04) RBAF paramedics and three (03) Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) personnel to join the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel under Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) for “Operation Kukri” in support of the HADR efforts after a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck in April 2015. The quick response is a result of the familiarity and maturity of RBAF in providing relief assistance in areas hit by natural disasters. RBAF’s relief efforts were greatly aided by interoperability, a key component that continues to be emphasised in many of the military cooperation undertaken by Brunei Darussalam with its counterparts be it bilateral or at multilateral level.

Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Brunei Darussalam supports disarmament efforts and the non-proliferation of all types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) at both the regional and global level. Brunei Darussalam is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and are also parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Brunei Darussalam works closely with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and recently co-hosted a national awareness-raising and legislative assistance workshop in April 2018. The workshop aimed to provide technical assistance to Brunei Darussalam, working towards the central objective of effectively implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

IV. Role of the ARF

As one of ASEAN’s regional security architecture, the ARF complements the work undertaken by East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting to name a few. As a platform to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, the ARF should continue with efforts to make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. For the defence and military sector, the importance of ARF Defence Officials Dialogue (ARF DOD) provides a linkage to ASEAN’s dialogue partners that spans further from the current membership of ADMM-Plus.

Further to this, the Track II diplomacy also continues to play a significant part in fostering confidence-building and cooperation among defence officials of regional countries. In this regard, strengthening and utilising the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM) would add value to the discussions taking place in Track I, these
being the ARF and its affiliated meetings. As a testament of importance of this meeting, Brunei Darussalam hosted the HDUCIM from 12 to 13 November 2013.

Serving as an inclusive avenue for dialogue and multilateral cooperation, Brunei Darussalam remains committed to the ARF processes in working together with ARF members to address a wide range of regional security issues. Alignment efforts as well as synergy between the ARF and the ADMM will certainly foster complementarity towards building an effective regional architecture for ASEAN as a whole.
CAMBODIA

I. Assessment of the Regional Security Environment

Over the recent years, the dynamic Asia-Pacific region has gone through numerous changes. While the whole world appears to be moving toward peace, cooperation and development, the most complicated and dangerous issues are still alarmingly imminent. At the same time, the region is beset with several challenges, traditionally and non-traditionally, including territorial disputes and terrorism are now very much existing and place the potential and promising Asia-Pacific region in front of genuine and immediate risks.

The most recently, the countries in the region are also witnessing the great power strategy shift in the Asia-Pacific with the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", "Belt and Road Initiative", and "India's Act East Policy", which are all announced to ensure for peace, stability and cooperation in the region. However, it is plainly obvious that local politics and the shift in relative strengths of global or regional powers are in fact changing the rules of the international order previously entrenched.

The influence of defense-security issues on international relations has been on the rise. The new revolution in military affairs has been greatly changing the defense and military strategies of all countries. The military power competition around the world could possibly lead to the risk of arms races, especially at sea, and in space. Many major powers have adjusted their military strategies, increased their defense budgets, speeded up the armed forces modernization, and developed advanced weapons and equipment, and military technologies. These developments have affected not only the relations among major powers but also the national defense strategy of all countries.

Under these circumstances, no single country can handle security on its own. It is essential for countries to work together to ensure peace and security of the international community.

Against this backdrop, the Asia-Pacific region is making progress in confidence-building through common security cooperation both at bilateral and multilateral level such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, East Asia Summit... etc.

II. Cambodia's National Security and Defense Policy

In response to the fast changing national, regional, and global security environment, Cambodian security and defense strategy have also been continuously redefined and revised. The Defense Strategy Review 2013 was released in addition to the Defense White Paper 2006 for Cambodia's defense policy and security strategy within these emerging new security paradigms in region and world at large. Those include the key areas of strengthening border defense measures; PKO capability building, counter-terrorism and counter-transnational crimes capabilities, maritime security initiatives, disaster respond capability building, and others. These changes have resulted in the justification of principles more realistic features, that is, they have been aligned more closely with the situation and practical needs. This has enabled the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to overcome various obstacles. To realize the national goal, specific policies and measures have been implemented as allows:

- Contribute to external security and guarantee national unity and political stability for economic growth;
- Contribute to peace operation and building around the world. For instance, since April 2006, under the United Nations framework, Cambodia has sent its peacekeeping forces to several nations in Africa and the Middle East;
- Strengthen border protection capabilities to prevent transnational crime and infiltration of terrorists and to increase contributions to infrastructure and community development along the border;
- Expand reform measures, especially demobilization, raising living standard of the defense force, reorganizing units and restructuring training systems;
- Set up force development mechanisms as quickly as possible to ensure the sustainability and quality of the defense force;
• Increase participation in national development, especially in the field of engineering, relief operations, suppressing and elimination circulation of illegal small arms, environmental protection particularly preventing deforestation, replanting trees, and other humanitarian activities;
• Cooperate with community and fellow countries in combating terrorism and transnational crimes, maritime security and natural disaster management.

Cambodia plans to publish a new Defense White Paper in 2020 which will reflect the importance of security, stability and cohesion both in Cambodia and the region, and promote a stable, rules-based order. The White Paper will set out planned capability acquisitions and reform for the next 10 or 15 years. Priorities in the next White Paper will include addressing transnational and interconnected nature of national security threats as well as dealing with non-traditional national security challenges.

III. Cambodia’s Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter-terrorism (CT)

Cambodia has clearly shown its commitment to joining the world to combat international terrorism. Cambodia has been strengthening and improving RCAF’s capability in preventing, deterring and fighting against terrorism to maintain peace, stability, security and promote cooperation in the region and the world.

To respond to the above-mentioned perspectives, Cambodia has conducted international cooperation as a priority and active participation from relevant inter-ministries and institutions for timely deterrence, prevention and recovery. The National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) is the top institution for command and control in the fight against terrorism and its secretariat is to serve as a coordination mechanism in compliance with the Counter-Terrorism Planning Book and Cambodia’s Counter-Terrorism law, which was signed and come into force on 20 July 2007.

In addition, Cambodia has active cooperation with several partner countries in Counter-Radicalization efforts.

ii. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Cambodia is committed to non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been actively engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of Nuclear weapons. To support the global movement on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Cambodia ratified the NPT in 1972. Cambodia resumed its membership with IAEA in 2009 and ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of nuclear Material in 2006.

In November 2012, the National Assembly of Cambodia ratified two international conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and Nuclear Safety to maintain peace, security, safety and to prevent nuclear proliferation. At the regional level, Cambodia acceded to the Southeast Asia Nuclear–weapon-free Zone Treaty in 1997. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012, Cambodia successfully convinced the five nuclear weapons states to sign the protocol to the treaty.

The constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia Article 54 meaning that the production, use the storage of nuclear, chemical weapons, veatran is strictly prohibited. Moreover, in order to effectively implement the constitution Article 54 as well as to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution No.1540, relevant laws and regulations were established under the constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

In term of disarmament policy, 200,000 converted weapons were annihilated and made the first report on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2005, and the commission fulfilled the matrix table in 2016.

Significantly, the Royal Government established the National Authority for prohibition of CBRN
weapons (NACW) in June 2006, in order to fully contribute to the government's efforts as well as participate in the global effort on prohibition of CBRN weapons. Since 2016, the NACW has successfully fulfilled its international obligation with the OPCW on the area, such as:

- Updated 1540 communally matrix of Cambodia
- Signed the agreement on the Privilege and Immunity of the OPCW.
- Annual Declaration of the Kingdom of Cambodia pursuant to HCOC against Ballistic Proliferation for the year 2017 Nil report.

iii. Transnational crime

In Southeast Asian Region including Cambodia, transnational crime is a common concern and complicated challenge. Up to date, the trend of transnational crime has not been decreased. The transnational crime poses threats to stability, security, economic growth, and public order of every country in the region. Although cooperative effort has been made between countries in the region to suppress and to prevent transnational crime, activity of this crime is still constantly developing across the countries' borders through well-structured and organized networks of those criminals. Moreover, due to the evolution of globalization and regional integration where national borders are broader, there are more flow of humans, flow of financial, and technologies crossing from one country to another are more convenient. Additionally, the fast development of information and modern technologies are the factors that make it easy for transnational criminals to conduct illegal activities.

To this end, Cambodia is working with other countries concerned that share a common understanding in a number of areas, as follow:

a. Cyber crime is newly emerging criminal activities carried out by means of computers or internet in modern information technology era. Computers may have been used for hacking, publishing fake news about governments, accessing and stealing data from state institutions, and disturbing private companies causing enormous financial losses. Currently, this type of crime has become dangerous throughout the globe.

To response this emerging challenge, Cambodia has continuously expanded cooperation with all ASEAN members to comprehensively understand the risk and dig out the source of cybercrime in order to take measure. We also enhance the capacity of IT technical experts to timely prevent cyber attack. Cambodia is of the view that it might be time for the region to have a special center in order to distribute and share cyber intelligence to fight cyber crime.

b. Illegal Arms Smuggling is also a global concern that needs to be closely monitored especially while terrorism and anti-government groups are re-rising in the region. Terrorists could have used weapons retaining from illegal trade to attack the government forces.

In this regard, Cambodia has worked with all relevant institutions to strictly enforce on tracking system of all flows of goods' categories in all targeted areas, and gateways in both local and along the border of each country. Cambodia is also increasing cooperation in the region to reciprocally provide information related to the case or individual suspected of arms and ammunition smuggling as well as increasing the efficiency of law enforcement on illegal arms smuggling, explosives storage and punishing the criminals.

c. Drug trafficking is still a warning issue in the region especially in the areas along the Mekong River. Recently, the competent authorities in the region have seized the drug aimed to sell in the countries outside the region such as Australia, Japan and New Zealand with the higher amount than previous years.

To respond to growing challenges of drug trafficking in recent years, Cambodia has developed capacity of checking and monitoring of custom officials and competent authorities, and modern equipment for scanning improvised
illicit substances should be fully equipped especially in specific areas such as airport, seaport, and check-point along the borders. Cambodia urges that the implementation of law and punishment of criminal should be strictly enforced in every country. It is important to enhance awareness and education of population especially youths about the risk and harmful effects of drug addiction.

d. Human Trafficking and exploitation of labor remains challenging in the region. There are tens of thousands of victims have been trafficked across the borders. They were deceived and forced into hard labor without salary, and women have been trafficked into a world of prostitution and sexual slavery.

The Cambodian government’s commitment to combat trafficking is high - the government has established a national mechanism and legal framework to combat TIP. Moreover, Cambodia has worked with neighboring and partners countries in the region to combat human trafficking and exploitation of labor in term of awareness rising and education of population to understand the law and relevant regulations on labor law locally and internationally, immigration law, and migration risk in order to defend themselves from getting cheated by the broker. Cambodia also firmly enforces the implementation of Immigration Law to all relevant implementing authority and strengthens the law efficiency to strictly punish the criminals in accordance with the law.

iv. Humanitarian assistant and disaster relief (HADR)

As we are all aware, globalization has brought about new opportunities and challenges to the global environment which eventually influences the world’s political, economic, and security stability. Over the years, complexities from these changes have brought about a growing competition in the region. Compounded with environmental degradation, technological advancement, cyber security, socio-cultural and geopolitical changes have created even a greater uncertainty and complexity to our global environment. Non-traditional threats both man-made and natural disasters have been increasingly prevalent to our global environment. As far as natural disasters are concerned, relentless typhoons, cyclone, landslides, and massive earthquakes in our region have increased in frequency at an alarming rate possibly due to the impact of climate change. For the heavily-impacted countries and region, the damage caused by these man-made and natural disasters often outweigh the abilities of governments to quickly respond and assist.

The Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia has been working tirelessly with its ASEAN member states, civil societies, and non-governmental organizations to establish and ratify new concepts, procedures, guidelines, and regulations on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation emergency responses. Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie (RCG) have been implementing exercise activities on disaster relief operations with ASEAN as well as foreign partners in line with the ASEAN charter and other existing mechanisms; and is committed to support all defense cooperative activities conduct in the framework of ASEAN. These activities are the integral part in turning vision into reality through forming partnership and collaborative engagement.

Therefore, disaster preparedness and readiness is the key element to the strategic blueprint for the ASEAN Community to hedge against this uncertainty as well as the key element to promote a successful outcome and turning vision into reality. Cambodia believes that through continued effort to strengthen relationship and closer cooperation while implementing more frequent pragmatic defense cooperative activities among the ASEAN militaries will, undoubtedly, build trust, confidence, professionalism and partnership. In addition, our ASEAN militaries will possess the capabilities, skill sets, and intellectual knowledge to respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of our capabilities, skill sets, intellectual knowledge, and work closely with friends, and strategic partners.
To contribute to national, regional, and the world security, the Royal Cambodian Government, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie have carried out a lot of measures to counter both traditional and nontraditional threats as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations through the implementation of national legislation, and national policy such as Law on Disaster Management, as well as through the establishment of National Committee for Disaster Management (NCDM). Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie will increase its participation in both bilateral and multilateral defense cooperative activities; particularly in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HA/DR).

v. Maritime security

Regional dynamic and ASEAN’S development have been highly evaluated as ASIA’s central economic growth, peace and stability, whilst remarkable developments ASEAN has also been facing variety of challenges especially piracy, sea robbery, human and drug trafficking and other non-traditional threats.

In order to properly respond to these threats, The National Committee for Maritime Security’s (NCMS) appropriate maritime policy has been developed and put in the place by taking into account the constitutional provisions, and national strategy and vision. Cambodia has actively taken part in a number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, Cambodia is a party to the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, a party to the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 1970 and a signatory to the 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1983. Cambodia has participated in almost all forms of maritime security fora including ARF, AMF, EAMF, ACGF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, ACDFIM, WPNS and ANCM, etc. In additional, Cambodia is also an active member of a sub-regional organization namely Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Interoperability Initiatives or Gulf of Thailand Initiatives (GOTI).

The Royal Cambodia Navy (RCN) plays a pivotal role in protection Cambodia’s maritime coastline, islands and territorial waters, monitoring the security of its main deep-water ports and major waterways. Moreover, the RCN has been carrying out its international missions under the framework of ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) and spirit of ADMM, as a compass and an integrated approach in maintaining peace security and stability in the region and the world. As a result, The RCN has been enhancing its capabilities internally and internationally through exercising, training, experiencing and joining patrol best practices in order to upgrade human resources capability for interoperability and harmony. Especially, in the international fleet review on the auspicious accession of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the ASEAN in the year 2017 hosted by Kingdom of Thailand.

All things considered, Cambodia has developed maritime security policy and Cambodia has taken part in number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, the NCMS and RCN express its fullest commitment and support to any efforts or initiatives with the objectives to promote cooperation within ASEAN Community and maintaining regional maritime peace, security and stability.

IV. Role of ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a first region wide Asia-Pacific multilateral forum for official consultations on peace and security issues. An outgrowth of the annual ARF activities, with the participation from 10 ASEAN member states plus 17 dialogues partners, the ARF provides a setting for discussion and diplomacy and the development of cooperative responses to regional problems. The principle and modalities of dialogue and cooperation fostered by the ARF, such as mutual respect, dialogue on an equal footing, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, together with the cooperative security concept, are increasingly accepted by country in the region.
The uniqueness of the ARF is that the forum serves as an effective platform where regular collaboration and meeting between military and civil elements in the region take place. The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As an active and responsible ARF member, Cambodia is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules based regional order, while upholding the central role of ASEAN in any ASEAN-led forums. Cambodia will also continue to make valuable contribution to the forum through its continuous active participation, contributing ideas and initiatives in many ARF activities, including co-chairing various ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting with other ARF member states.
I. Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2017, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained overall stability. Countries in the region have been enjoying a relatively stable political situation, major powers have conducted frequent interactions, and regional hotspot issues and disputes are by and large under control. The Asian economy has remained stable and registered progress, with continued good prospects for mid- and long-term growth. Regional cooperation in Asia has maintained positive momentum, and regional integration and economic integration have further deepened. Pursuing peace, seeking stability and promoting development are the mainstreams of the region.

Meanwhile, there are still destabilizing and uncertain factors in Asia, mixed with old and new conflicts, and traditional and non-traditional security issues. The security situation in Northern Myanmar and the Rakhine State is unstable. The relations between India and Pakistan are fragile. The peace talk process in Afghanistan has run against obstacles. Extremist forces are stepping up their penetration into Asia. Due to the impact of anti-globalization and protectionism, the Asia-Pacific faces insufficient momentum for future regional cooperation. In addition, US policy adjustments will have inevitable ramifications on the situation in the region.

II. China’s Defense Policy and Multilateral Military Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

1. China’s defense policy

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive. It will never seek hegemony or military expansion, nor will it participate in any arms races. The objective of its national defense is to safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and to ensure the peaceful development of the country. The tasks of its national defense mainly include: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests; maintaining social harmony and stability; advancing modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and promoting world peace and stability.

2. Defense budgets

China pursues a policy of coordinated development of national defense and the economy. Based on the needs of national defense and the development of national economy, it decides on the budgets for national defense, as appropriate, and manages the spending of the budgets in accordance with law. China’s defense expenditure follows a strict system of fiscal allocation. Each year’s defense budget must be written into the draft national budget plan, and shall be reviewed and approved by the National People’s Congress.

In 2017, China’s defense expenditure was 1.044397 trillion yuan. The budget for 2018 saw an increase of 8.1% to 1.106951 trillion yuan. China’s defense expenditure falls into three almost equally distributed categories: spending for personnel, for training and maintenance, and for equipment. China spends a relatively small share of its GDP on defense, about 1.3%, which is lower than the over 2% observed in other major countries in the world.

3. Multilateral military diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

Since 2017, in a spirit of openness, pragmatism and cooperation, the Chinese military has continued to expand multilateral military exchanges and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In October 2017, General Chang Wanquan, then State Councilor and Minister of Defense, attended the China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) held in the Philippines. In February 2018, General Chang attended the China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Singapore. China also took part in Cobra Gold 2017 & 2018, an annual multilateral joint military exercise held in Thailand.
China continued to fully participate in the pragmatic cooperation in various fields under the ADMM-Plus mechanism, such as sending delegates to participate in expert group meetings on peacekeeping and mine-clearing operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and military medical science, and maritime security. China also co-chaired the Counter Terrorism Expert Group with Thailand, and hosted a Counter Terrorism Expert Group Meeting in Guangzhou in March 2018.

The Chinese military has actively participated in international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance by providing relief supplies and medical aid to the affected countries. In 2017, the Chinese and US militaries held a joint live-troop exercise and a seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Portland, Oregon.

III. China’s Efforts to Promote Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2017, China has been committed to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It has kept positive interactions with other major countries, fully participated in regional cooperation, and actively responded to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. China has played its part in building an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful Asia-Pacific region that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity.

1. Relations with other major countries in the Asia-Pacific region

China-US relations

Since 2017, the overall relationship between China and the United States has remained stable and gained important progress.

The two countries have maintained close contacts at the leadership level and other levels. The two heads of state held three meetings and have maintained close exchanges on China-US relations and issues of shared interest through phone calls and correspondence. On 6-7 April 2017, President Xi Jinping met with President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago, Florida upon invitation. On 8 July, President Xi met with President Trump in Hamburg, Germany. On 8-10 November, at the invitation of President Xi, President Trump paid a state visit to China. The two countries also successfully held the first round of the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, the Social and People-to-People Dialogue, and the Law Enforcement and Cyber Security Dialogue.

Bilateral exchanges and cooperation in various fields have continued to grow; and the two sides have maintained communication and coordination on regional and international issues such as the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, the Middle East and Afghanistan as well as on global challenges.

The two sides have continued to maintain communication on Asia-Pacific affairs and hold dialogues and cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as APEC, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum. Both sides have stressed their desire to push for new and greater progress in China-US relations and jointly promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

China-Russia relations

Being each other’s biggest neighbor, China and Russia are comprehensive strategic partners of coordination and regard each other as diplomatic priority. China-Russia relations show a more positive momentum of high level development and have achieved fruitful outcomes.

In 2017, President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin five times. During President Xi’s state visit to Russia in July 2017, the two heads of state signed and published the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Further Expansion of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation, as well as the Joint Statement on the Current Status of Global Affairs and Important International Issues, and approved the Action Plan...
to Implement the Provisions of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation for 2017–2020. These efforts have injected strong impetus into the growth of China-Russia relations. Furthermore, the two sides have made active efforts in advancing the Belt and Road Initiative and its integration with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, in deepening cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, in enhancing their coordination and cooperation in international affairs, in pushing forward both countries’ development and prosperity, and in safeguarding world peace and stability.

China and Russia have maintained close communication within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, G20, and APEC, and have kept good cooperation in matters concerning the Asia-Pacific region. The two sides have worked together to promote the political settlement of regional hotspot issues, and contribute to peace, stability, growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

China-Japan relations

The year 2017 marked the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and the year 2018 marks the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the People’s Republic of China and Japan.

Leaders of the two countries have met several times on multilateral occasions. In July 2017, President Xi Jinping met as agreed with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during the G20 Hamburg summit. In November, President Xi met again with Prime Minister Abe during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. In the same month, Premier Li Keqiang met with Prime Minister Abe during the East Asia leaders’ meetings.

The two countries have actively carried out political dialogues and defense exchanges and cooperation. In May 2017, then State Councillor Yang Jiechi co-chaired the fourth round of China-Japan High-Level Political Dialogue with Head of Japan’s National Security Council Shotaro Yachi in Japan. In February 2018, then State Councillor Yang Jiechi met with Mr. Shotaro Yachi, who was visiting China then. In January 2018, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono paid an official visit to China, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with him. In April 2018, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi paid an official visit to Japan and restarted the China-Japan High-Level Economic Dialogue after an eight-year hiatus.

Since 2017, the National People’s Congress of China and the Japanese Diet have held three parliamentary exchanges. The two countries also held a new round of security dialogue and three rounds of high-level consultation on maritime affairs. Progress was also made in expert panel consultations on the establishment of air and maritime contact mechanisms.

To mark the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations, the two countries held a series of commemorative events in 2017. On 8 September, a reception was held in Beijing to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. On 28 September, the Chinese Embassy in Japan held a reception to mark the 68th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Abe and several Japanese cabinet members attended the reception.

China-India relations

Since 2017, the China-India strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity has maintained its overall momentum of development.

In June and September 2017, during the Astana Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS Leaders’ Meeting in Xiamen, President Xi Jinping held bilateral meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In April 2018, President Xi held an informal meeting with Prime Minister Modi in Wuhan. The two countries have made steady progress in practical cooperation in various fields, and maintained communication...
and coordination on international issues including climate change and through multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, BRICS, G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the China-Russia-India mechanism. In December 2017, then State Councilor Yang Jiechi co-chaired the 20th Special Representatives’ Meeting on the China-India Boundary Question with Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. The two sides also held a meeting of the Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination for China-India Border Affairs. Despite Indian troops’ crossing of the boundary in the Sikkim section of the China-India border and entry into the territory of China, peace and stability has been restored in the border areas after the incident was settled.

2. Regional cooperation

China-ASEAN cooperation

China regards ASEAN as a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy, and firmly supports ASEAN Community Building, ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation and ASEAN’s increasing role in regional and international affairs.

The year 2017 marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of ASEAN. On 8 August, President Xi Jinping sent a message of congratulations to ASEAN’s rotating chairman Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. The year 2017 also marked the China-ASEAN Year of Tourism Cooperation. On 16 March, the opening ceremony of 2017 ASEAN-China Year of Tourism Cooperation was held in Manila, the Philippines. On 13 November, the 20th China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was held in Manila. At the meeting, Premier Li Keqiang reviewed the fruitful results of China-ASEAN cooperation. He proposed the formulation of the “2030 Vision for China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership”, upgraded the “2+7” cooperation framework into a “3+X” cooperation framework, designated the year 2018 as the China-ASEAN Year of Innovation, and jointly announced with leaders of ASEAN countries the commencement of consultations on a “Code of Conduct for the South China Sea”. The meeting adopted the Joint Statement on Further Deepening the Cooperation on Infrastructure Connectivity, the Joint Statement on Comprehensively Strengthening Effective Anti-corruption Cooperation, the Joint Statement on Tourism Cooperation, and the Declaration for a Decade of Coastal and Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea (2017-2027).

In 2017, bilateral trade between the two sides reached US$514.82 billion, an increase of 13.8% year-on-year. Cooperation between the two sides steadily progressed. A series of meetings and activities were held, including the 16th China-ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting, the 16th China-ASEAN Transport Ministers’ Meeting, the 12th China-ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers’ Meeting, the 7th China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting, the 1st China-ASEAN Information Ministers’ Meeting, the 2nd China-ASEAN Justice Forum, the 14th China-ASEAN Expo, and the 10th China-ASEAN Education Exchange Week.

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation

ASEAN Plus Three has served as the main vehicle for East Asia cooperation. Since 2017, thanks to the efforts of all parties, APT cooperation has secured new progress. During this period, the APT Macroeconomic Research Office has been granted by the UN General Assembly the Permanent Observer Status, and released its inaugural flagship report, i.e., the APT Regional Economic Outlook 2017. Members have agreed to make effective use of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) as a preventive loan facility, and make CMIM more practical, effective and safe. The negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) have progressed smoothly. Several rounds of negotiations and the Economic Ministers’ Meetings were held. The Leaders’ Meeting was also held for the first time.

On 13 November 2017, the 20th APT Leaders’ Meeting was held in Manila, the Philippines. At the meeting, Premier Li Keqiang proposed important initiatives relating to the building of the East Asian Economic Community, including proposals on enhancing cooperation in six major areas, namely trade liberalization and facilitation, industrial
capacity and investment, infrastructure and connectivity, finance, sustainable development, and people-to-people exchanges.

China has been actively promoting pragmatic cooperation in various fields within the APT framework, and has held a series of events, including the Seminar on the 1st International Symposium on APT Industrial Capacity Cooperation, the 15th East Asia Forum, the 4th East Asia Modern Agricultural Workshop, the 11th APT Workshop on Cooperation for Cultural Human Resource Development, and the APT Seminar on Innovation Cooperation for SME Service Institutions.

China-Japan-ROK cooperation

The pragmatic cooperation between China, Japan and the ROK has steadily advanced. In 2017, a number of meetings among the three countries were held, including the 5th Trilateral Heads of Government Meeting on Disaster Management, the 10th Trilateral Health Ministers’ Meeting, the 9th Trilateral Central Bank Governors’ Meeting, the 19th Trilateral Environment Ministers’ Meeting, the 6th Trilateral Heads of Customs Meeting, the 17th Trilateral Policy Dialogue Meeting among the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO), the Trilateral Youth Summit, and the 2nd Trilateral High-Level Dialogue on Arctic Affairs.

In May 2018, the 7th China-Japan-ROK Leaders’ Meeting was held in Japan.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

The East Asia Summit is a “leaders-led strategic forum.”

On 14 November 2017, the 12th East Asia Summit was held in Manila, the Philippines. Premier Li Keqiang pointed out at the meeting that all member states should maintain the nature of the EAS as a “leaders-led strategic forum”, uphold ASEAN centrality, and advance economic development and political and security cooperation in parallel, as the two wheels driving EAS forward, that they need to keep to the right direction, enhance overall planning and improve institution building to bring about sound and sustained development of the EAS. To this end, all member states should work together to speed up regional integration, promote sustainable development, tackle non-traditional security threats, develop new approaches to security, and improve regional security architecture.

China has been actively promoting EAS cooperation in various areas. Since 2017, it has organized the Track II Seminar on EAS Regional Security Architecture, the 3rd EAS Clean Energy Forum Workshop, the 3rd EAS New Energy Forum, the 6th EAS Exercise on Emergency Response to Earthquake, and the EAS and East Asian Cooperation International Forum.

The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)

The LMC framework aims to enhance good-neighborliness and friendship among the six countries along the Lancang-Mekong River, promote sub-regional economic and social development, narrow development gap, and help build the ASEAN Community. The LMC has undergone a period of rapid development, during which a number of projects aimed at improving people’s wellbeing were launched, bringing tangible benefits to the people of the six countries.

On 15 December 2017, the 3rd LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Dali, Yunnan Province, China. The Meeting issued the Joint Press Communiqué of the 3rd LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, announced the “2017 List of Projects of LMC Special Fund”. The Meeting also announced the establishment of the Hotline Platform of LMC, and circulated the “Matrix of Follow-ups to the Outcomes of the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting and the Second Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”.

On 10 January 2018, the 2nd LMC Leaders’ Meeting was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The Meeting issued the Five-year Action Plan of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018-2022)
and the Phnom Penh Declaration of the Second Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting. The Meeting also circulated the “List of the Second Batch of Cooperation Projects”, and the “Reports of the Six Joint Working Groups of Priority Areas”. The leaders of the six countries highly appreciated the progress of the mechanism and decided to upgrade the “3+5” cooperation framework into a “3+5+X” cooperation framework, under which focuses would be put on cooperation in areas including water resources, production capacity, agriculture, human resources, and health care, so as to steer the LMC from a phase of nurturing to one of further growth.

**Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

In 2017, the SCO maintained a healthy and steady development, and continued to make progress in cooperation across the board. From 8 to 9 June, the 17th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the SCO Member States was held in Astana. President Xi Jinping attended the meeting. At the meeting, India and Pakistan were officially granted membership status of the SCO, the Astana Declaration of the Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Convention on Combating Extremism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were signed, and the Declaration on the Joint Fight Against International Terrorism was released. From 30 November to 1 December, the 16th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO Member States was held in Sochi. Premier Li Keqiang attended the Meeting. The parties signed a joint communiqué and other documents.

The SCO also held meetings of chief justices, prosecutors general, foreign ministers, defense ministers, education ministers, ministers of justice, economic and trade ministers, cultural ministers, and heads of the health department, as well as the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group Meeting. China actively promoted and participated in SCO cooperation across the board. Since it took over the rotating chair of the SCO after the Astana summit, China has successfully hosted or sponsored a number of important events. China’s bilateral relations with other SCO member states, observer states and dialogue partners continued to grow.

**Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)**

In 2017, China continued to hold the chair of CICA for a second term. It organized a series of important events, actively implemented the confidence-building measures of CICA across the board, and promoted CICA process in all respects.

On 28 and 29 June, the 2nd Conference of the CICA Non-governmental Forum was held in Beijing. The theme of the Conference was “25 years of CICA: for Asia’s Security and Development”. The parties conducted in-depth discussions on implementing the Asian security concept, establishing an Asian security framework, and jointly building the “Belt and Road,” and reached broad consensus.

On 20 September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired an informal meeting of CICA foreign ministers at the UN Headquarters in New York. Foreign ministers or their representatives from more than 20 countries had an in-depth exchange of views on regional and international situation, as well as CICA cooperation. The Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the CICA Member States on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Establishment of the CICA was issued.

In 2017, China, as the chair of CICA and a coordinating or co-coordinating country in agriculture, finance, and the environment, hosted a number of events, including the Workshop on Capacity Building for Consular Officials from CICA and Asian Countries, the CICA Aviation Symposium, Workshop on Crop Cultivation and Pest Disease Control Skills for CICA Member States, Workshop on CICA Border Defense, CICA Environmental Cooperation Dialogue, 2017 Seminar on the Theory and Practice of Rural Development and Poverty Reduction in CICA Member States, which gave strong impetus to the CICA process.
3. Non-traditional security cooperation

Cooperation on disaster relief

Since 2017, with an open and cooperative attitude, China has been actively enhancing practical cooperation on the prevention, reduction and relief of disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. China has hosted a number of meetings, including the 5th Trilateral Heads of Government Agency Meeting on Disaster Management, the 9th Joint Meeting of China-Japan-ROK Fire Brigade’s Association, China-ASEAN Forum on Disaster Prevention and Reduction and Sustainable Development, and the 7th United Nations International Conference on Space-based Technologies for Disaster Risk Reduction. China has also participated in various multilateral meetings and events, including the 5th Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the 11th APEC Senior Disaster Management Officials’ Forum, the 5th Session of the UNESCAP Committee on Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2017 ISDR Asian Partnership on Disaster Reduction, and the Seminars on Monitoring Technologies for the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Under China’s coordination, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies joined hands in disaster prevention and risk reduction programs, as well as recovery and reconstruction projects. To this end, China has held 15 training sessions to help improve the competence of officers and technical experts from developing countries. It has also sent several chartered flights to deliver assistance materials to Mexico, thus enhancing international cooperation on disaster relief with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the next step, China will continue to work with relevant parties to establish and improve mechanisms for exchange of visits between officials, information sharing, personnel training, technological exchanges, simulation exercises, project cooperation, and emergency aid, in an effort to enhance bilateral and multilateral practical cooperation and jointly improve disaster response capacities of the region.

Counter-terrorism cooperation

In 2017, the counter-terrorism situation in the Asia-Pacific region was generally good. Countries in the region have generally strengthened their counter-terrorism measures and enhanced their counter-terrorism cooperation. Positive progress was made in regional counter-terrorism operations. However, influenced by factors such as accelerated infiltration of international terrorist forces into the region, continued spillover of terrorist threats from the Middle East, and the spread of the thoughts of violence and extremism, the Asia-Pacific continued to see active actions by extremist terrorist groups of the region, frequent occurrence of terrorist activities, and ever-emerging hazards associated with cyber terrorism and the return of foreign terrorists to the region. China is a victim of terrorism and faces the direct and ongoing threat of the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces represented by the “Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement”.

In 2017, China carried out counter-terrorism consultations and dialogues with the United States, Russia, Canada, Australia, and the Republic of Korea. At the same time, China actively participated in counter-terrorism exchanges and cooperation within multilateral mechanisms such as APEC, ARF, BRICS, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and successfully hosted the 2nd BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group Meeting, the 3rd China and Neighboring Countries Counter-terrorism Conference, and China-Russia-India Informal Meeting on Anti-Terrorism. Guided by the principles of mutual respect, equality and cooperation, China stands ready to work with countries in the region to jointly address regional terrorist threat and safeguard regional peace and stability.

Cooperation on combating transnational crimes

The Chinese government attaches great importance to combating transnational crimes. It actively participated in international cooperation on transnational crime cases with other countries.
in the Asia-Pacific region, concluded judicial cooperation treaties, and carried out bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and assistance training.

In 2017, China hosted the 86th INTERPOL General Assembly, during which it proposed to adhere to the principles of cooperation, innovation, rule of law and win-win results in a joint effort to promote global security governance. China signed the Memorandum of Understanding between China and ASEAN on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, launched major projects such as the construction of a drug rehabilitation center in the Philippines. China started the building of a demonstration site for training of foreign police officers, and organized several training courses for them. Thanks to the “Fox Hunting” campaign, more than 1,000 fugitives have been brought back to China. A total of 999 Chinese suspects of telecommunication frauds were arrested in Cambodia, Viet Nam, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. In February 2017, the China-Malaysia Criminal Justice Assistance Treaty entered into force. China also held negotiations on the extradition treaty with Malaysia and Japan respectively.

China stands ready to further enhance judicial and law enforcement cooperation with relevant countries in a joint effort to fight transnational crimes, including enhancing extradition cooperation under the framework of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and conducting cooperation regarding the recovery and sharing of criminal proceeds.

Cooperation on cyber security

Cyber security has become a global challenge that bears on the sovereignty, security and development of all countries. China has always been a builder, maintainer and contributor of the cyberspace, and is committed to building a cyberspace that is peaceful, secure, open, cooperative and orderly. China has been strengthening cyberspace cooperation in line with the four principles of peace, sovereignty, co-governance and universal benefit. Since 2017, China has continued to consolidate its dialogue mechanisms and maintained dialogues with Asia-Pacific countries on cyber affairs. In March, China released the Strategy for International Cyberspace Cooperation, offering the “China Approach” for global governance of cyberspace. China hosted and chaired the 3rd BRICS Expert Group Meeting on Cyber Security, and facilitated the conclusion of the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Cyber Security. It also held the Forum on International Cooperation in Countering Cybercrime of the 4th World Internet Conference, in order to promote the establishment of a cyberspace community of shared destiny. China attended the 2nd Working Group Meeting of International Law in Cyberspace held by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), and proposed at the meeting to formulate the AALCO model articles on International Cooperation in Countering Cybercrime. China has been deeply engaged in the United Nations consultation process concerning cyber crimes, promoted the convening of the 3rd and 4th Meetings of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Cybercrime and the adoption of the UN GGE’s work plan 2018-2021, initiated discussions on substantive issues concerning cybercrime, and proposed with the other BRICS countries at 26th Session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) a draft resolution titled “Strengthening Cooperation to Combat Cybercrime”. China has also participated in the formulation of the APEC Internet and Digital Economy Roadmap, in an effort to explore future APEC collaboration on digital economy. China has actively participated in the ASEAN Seminar on International Rules of Cyberspace, constructively promoted the implementation of an ARF work plan on cyber security, and further promoted the process to combat cybercrime under the framework of the ARF.

Cooperation on maritime security

At present, the overall maritime security situation in the Asia-Pacific is stable. Maritime transport routes in the region remain open and unimpeded. At the same time, maritime security risks are on
the rise. In particular, non-traditional security threats have become more prominent. The lack of mutual trust and understanding among some countries in traditional security areas also poses risks to maritime security.

Safeguarding maritime peace and security is a common responsibility of all countries in the region, and it is in the common interest of all parties. With focuses on air-sea search and rescue, marine environmental protection, disaster prevention and risk reduction, China has actively participated in bilateral, regional and international cooperation on maritime security, and has conducted exchanges, joined exercises and training between the militaries, maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime administration agencies, which greatly promoted regional cooperation in dealing with non-traditional security threats.

Since 2017, China has participated in the 18th Experts Meeting and Senior Officials’ Meeting of the North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum held in Japan, and the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) 13th Working Level Meeting and Senior Officials’ Meeting held in Pakistan. It also held working talks with the Korean Coast Guard, held the 2nd preparatory meeting with the Philippine Coast Guard to discuss the formation of a Joint Coast Guard Committee on Maritime Cooperation (JCCG), held talks with the US, Japan and South Korea respectively to discuss fishery law enforcement, carried out China-US patrols to crack down on illegal fishing in the Pacific Ocean, and conducted a joint patrol with Viet Nam in a common fishing zone in the Beibu Gulf. In addition, China and ASEAN countries successfully held a joint maritime search and rescue drill at waters off Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, China. China has actively promoted the construction and management of the Lancang-Mekong Maritime Security Supervision Facility. It has also organized a number of events such as a capacity-building project concerning ship operations and management systems in Asia, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) seminar on model training courses for seafarers, and the IMO Regional Seminar on the Assessment and Examination of Seafarers. Furthermore, China has held training sessions for countries along the Straits of Malacca on oil spill risk assessment and monitoring.

China continues to actively implement the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). It actively supports the capacity-building and development of the Information Sharing Center (ISC) of the Agreement through participating in the 11th Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP ISC, and in the High-Level Seminar and capacity-building activities organized by the ISC. In view of China’s contribution to ReCAAP ISC, China was elected as the vice chair of the ISC Governing Council for a three-year term. As of February 2018, the Chinese Navy had sent 92 submarines in 28 batches and 62 helicopters on escort missions to the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, completed 1,117 batches of escort missions for 6,469 Chinese and foreign ships, escorted or rescued over 10 ships that had been attacked or released by pirates, and rescued 45 ships that had been chased by pirates.

Situation in the South China Sea has continued to stabilize and cool down. The South China Sea issue has returned to the correct track of resolving disputes through negotiations and consultations between parties directly concerned. China and ASEAN countries, under the framework of full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), pushed forward practical maritime cooperation and built more consensuses on working together to manage and control the South China Sea. To actively promote consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), China and ASEAN countries have held one Senior Officials’ Meeting on the implementation of the DOC and four Joint Working Group Meetings. At the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in August 2017, the foreign ministers jointly confirmed the ASEAN-China framework for the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” At the China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting held in November, Premier Li Keqiang and leaders of ASEAN countries formally announced that consultations on the text of the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” had
started. The parties also achieved early harvests such as the “Senior Diplomats’ Hotline” to address maritime emergencies.

Cooperation on non-proliferation and disarmament

China has always supported and taken an active part in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and called for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

China attaches great importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the bedrock of the international disarmament and non-proliferation system. China participated actively in NPT review conferences and the P5 Conference on Implementing the NPT, and has earnestly pushed the implementation of the outcomes of the NPT review conferences. In May 2017, China attended the 1st Organizational Meeting of the 10th NPT Review Conference 2020 held in Vienna. China will continue to participate constructively in the review process of the NPT, work together with all parties to promote in a balanced manner the three pillars of NPT, namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear power, and seek practical and effective outcomes from this round of the review process.

China remains committed to upholding the purposes and goals of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and actively supports all work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTCBO). Since 2017, China has made significant progress in the construction and certification of nuclear activity monitoring stations within its border. There have been a total of five CTBT-certified stations in China. China firmly supports the ASEAN countries in their efforts to establish a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, stands for the early signing of the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone, and looks forward to signing of the protocol with ASEAN at an early date.

China always stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons and chemical weapons, supports enhanced effectiveness, authority and universality of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and attaches great importance to and supports international exchanges and cooperation under the framework of the Conventions. In 2017, China and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) co-hosted Advanced Assistance and Protection Training Course for the Asian region in Beijing in July, an advanced course on the comprehensive management of chemicals in Shanghai in August, and a training course on medical defense against chemical weapons in Xi’an in September. These efforts have helped countries in the Asia-Pacific region to improve their compliance capabilities, and have played a constructive role in enhancing the universality and effectiveness of the Conventions.

China supports the important role of the United Nations in the field of non-proliferation. In August 2017, China and the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council co-hosted in Xi’an the 2nd Training Course for 1540 Points of Contact in the Asia-Pacific region, an effort to improve the capacity of regional countries in implementing Security Council Resolution 1540.

IV. China’s Observations on the Future Development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF is an influential and inclusive official platform for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the parties have focused on measures to build confidence, adhered to effective principles of ASEAN centrality, seeking consensus through consultation, and accommodating the comfort level of all parties. They have constantly promoted practical cooperation across the board and played an important role in maintaining regional peace and stability. Looking forward, China holds that the ARF should do the following work well:
First, it should focus on cooperation in non-traditional security fields.

Non-traditional security challenges have gradually become a major threat to regional security, and represent the most important direction of the Forum’s work. All parties should further increase their attention and input, actively promote pragmatic cooperation in disaster relief, counter-terrorism, fight against transnational crime, cyber security and maritime security, and enhance cooperation through information technology exchanges, experience sharing and personnel training, so as to resolve non-traditional security issues in a more effective manner.

Second, it should advance the preventive diplomacy process in an orderly manner.

The ARF should follow the ARF Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy adopted in 2001 and the ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan adopted in 2011, respect regional diversity and national sovereignty, seek consensus through consultation, explore a step-by-step process for preventive diplomacy that meets the realities of the region, and carry out active discussions on the practice of preventive diplomacy in areas of relatively low sensitivity where all parties concerned can reach consensus.

Third, it should strengthen coordination with other regional mechanisms. Coordination and cooperation should be strengthened with such mechanisms as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the ASEAN Maritime Forum Plus. The ARF should strengthen the optimization and integration of regional resources, to form a structure where each has its distinctive focus, yet all complement each other, and build a future-oriented regional security framework in line with regional realities that can meet the needs of all parties involved.

As a founding member of the ARF, China has taken an active part in ARF development and played a constructive role in ensuring its sound progress by promoting practical cooperation in various sectors. In recent years, China has organized many cooperation programs under the ARF framework, accounting for over one third of the total programs every year, thus making great contribution to promoting practical cooperation of the Forum. Since 2017, China has held a number of projects, such as the Workshop on Earthquake Emergency Response and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Capacity Building, the ARF Training Course on Capacity Building on Disaster Comprehensive Loss Assessment, Recovery and Reconstruction, the ARF Workshop on Typhoon Disaster Risk Reduction and Damage Mitigation and the ARF Workshop on Ferry Safety.

Going forward, China stands ready to work with other members to deepen dialogue and cooperation in various areas, promote sound and steady development of the Forum, and contribute more to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
I. Overview of the Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The situation in the Asia-Pacific region during the past one year was much complicated and volatile in the crisscross of growing tension and détente.

While energetic efforts were being focused on preserving peace and security of the region, reckless remarks and actions inciting conflict and dispute went on and aroused anxiety and concern.

In the course of the region's advance towards multi-polarization, destabilizing factors have become intensified as divergent demands and interests of various countries confronted with each other and caused frictions between them.

Arms race in the region has escalated still more.

The regional powers are unduly obsessed with military build-up so as to expand their military leverage and sphere of influence and to secure strategic superiority in the whole region covering the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The imprudent behavior of an island country is another source of apprehension and concern of the surrounding and regional countries due to its acceleration of building a military power transcending the self-defense capability.

Practices of high-handedness endangering the stability of the region are being justified and perpetrated blatantly in the form of expansion and consolidation of military alliance, staging various kinds of military drills on a regular basis and open interference in domestic affairs of other countries.

Prevailing security environment of the region proves that those with power hold sway over everything and the powerless are subjected to subordination and sacrifice, and the shelter of existing international law and organizations has also its limitations to rely on.

The truth and lessons of past history show that the main key to achieving independent development and guaranteeing peaceful prosperity of the country is mighty national power.

Moreover, it is important at the present time to strengthen the unity and cooperation of the regional states on the basis of respect for sovereignty and equality and to establish a new and just international order through actions for the common interest.

II. Situation on the Korean Peninsula and DPRK’s Security and Reunification Policy

Situation on the Korean peninsula

Up until last year, the Korean peninsula was recognized as the hottest spot in the world.

Joint military exercises were carried out ceaselessly throughout the year under various pretexts on the Korean peninsula and its vicinity where strategic assets and armed forces had been concentrated in vast numbers. Therefore the Korean peninsula fell victim to the worst-ever crisis with the highest risk of military conflict.

Under such circumstances, a momentous strategic change was brought about which enabled the DPRK to safeguard the security of the state and the safety of the people and prevent the war on the Korean peninsula.

As from the beginning of this year, the DPRK put forward proactive initiatives and proposals for improving the inter-Korean relations and preserving the peace on the Korean peninsula, and made strenuous efforts for their realization with a strong will to end the history of confrontation on the Korean peninsula and to contribute to the security of the region.

Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, stated in his New Year Address this year that the north and the south
should improve the frozen inter-Korean relations and glorify this meaningful year as an eventful one noteworthy in the history of the nation.

Thanks to proactive efforts of the DPRK, pleasant breeze is blowing in favor of reconciliation and reunification on the Korean peninsula as the large-scale delegation of the north participated in the 23rd Pyongchang Winter Olympics and the delegation of the special envoy of the south Korean president visited the north while mutual visits of the north and south art troupes were made.

Numerous inter-Korean visits and exchanges covering diverse areas of politics, culture, sports, etc. over a span of just five months since last January made up for the past 10 years in terms of scope, volume and significance, which is a remarkable change and a cause for celebration.

The whole world is watching in amazement and expectation the undergoing sudden changes in the situation on the Korean peninsula.

April 27, 2018, which heralded the start of a new history, will forever be recorded as a historic milestone in the annals of the national reunification.

The touching scenes of the top leaders of the north and the south of Korea crossing freely the dividing line hand in hand and pulling down the separation barrier in an instant stirred great cheers and ecstasy of the whole world.

The adoption of the Panmunjom Declaration is a clear manifestation of the will to usher in a new era of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity. It demonstrated to the world that the north and the south of Korea can improve their relations, ease the tensions on the peninsula and make a breakthrough in achieving the independent reunification of the country when they pool their efforts together in the spirit of By Our Nation Itself.

The world is witnessing the energetic diplomatic activities of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK.

Chairman Kim Jong Un paid three friendly visits to China from March this year and had significant summit meetings with President Xi Jinping.

Chairman Kim Jong Un held the summit meeting and talks with President Trump on Sentosa Island of Singapore on June 12, 2018 for the first time in the histories of the two countries.

The top leaders of the DPRK and the U.S. expressed expectation and belief that the two countries which have lived in the quagmire of hostility, distrust and hatred would pass the unhappy past over and dynamically advance toward an excellent and proud future beneficial to each other, and that another new era, the era of the DPRK-U.S. cooperation would open up.

The joint statement adopted at the summit talks specified the commitment of both sides to establish new DPRK-U.S. relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries aspiring after peace and prosperity and to join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

It also stipulated that the DPRK, reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration, should commit to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the DPRK and the United States should commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

The DPRK-U.S. summit talks held in Singapore with success amid enthusiastic support and welcome of the whole world come to be a great event of weighty significance in further promoting the historic trend toward reconciliation and peace, stability and prosperity being created in the Korean Peninsula and the region and in making a radical switchover in the most hostile DPRK-U.S. relations, as required by the developing times.

The Korean peninsula became the focus of great concern of international community for harboring worst-ever crisis of nuclear war until last year, but now it receives applause of support and welcome instead. This epochal change is the precious
fruition of the love for the nation, firm will for peace and great determination of Chairman Kim Jong Un.

**DPRK’s security policy**

Now that it became possible to reliably guarantee the security of the state and the safety of the people, the DPRK clarified its stand to make positive contributions to the building of the world free from nuclear weapons in conformity with the aspiration and desire common to humankind.

As practical steps for it, the DPRK discontinued nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire from April 21, 2018, and dismantled the northern nuclear test ground before the eyes of the international press corps on May 24 in order to ensure transparency of the discontinuance of nuclear test.

The dismantlement of the nuclear test ground is an important process moving towards global nuclear disarmament as it is a vivid manifestation of the DPRK’s will to join in the international aspiration and efforts for total halt to the nuclear test. In order to achieve peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and realize its denuclearization, it is crucial, above all, to terminate deep-rooted distrust and hostility and build mutual confidence between the DPRK and the U.S.

The two countries should commit themselves to refraining from antagonizing each other out of mutual understanding, and take legal and institutional steps to guarantee it.

It is urgent to make bold decision on halting irritating and hostile military actions against each other so as to build lasting and durable peace-keeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.

It is important to abide by the principle of step-by-step and simultaneous action in achieving peace, stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK will facilitate close contact and active dialogue with neighboring countries and the international community in order to defend peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the world.

**National reunification policy of the DPRK**

National reunification is an age-old aspiration of the Korean nation and improving the inter-Korean relations is a prerequisite for achieving peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula and shaping a bright future of national prosperity.

The inter-Korean summit meeting and talks took place and the Panmunjom Declaration was adopted at Panmunjom on April 27 this year at the time when a historic turn was being made in the Korean peninsula. Such events are of great significance in the national history which opened up a bright prospect for the future of inter-Korean relations and reunification.

The Panmunjom Declaration specified a number of practical matters for achieving improvement and development in the north-south ties, defusing the acute military tensions and the danger of war and building a durable and lasting peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

The north and south should hasten the future of independent reunification and national prosperity by sincerely implementing the declarations and all the agreements that had already been adopted including the Panmunjom Declaration.

The Korean nation itself is the motive force of national reunification which can be accomplished only through concerted effort in the spirit of By Our Nation Itself.

The history proves that peace and stability would be ensured when the north and the south join hands and move towards reconciliation and cooperation, but mutual mistrust and hostility would only lead to the escalation of tension and danger of war.
III. Role of the ARF

The present historic trend towards reconciliation and peace, stability and prosperity being created on the Korean peninsula fully accords with the aims of the ARF pursuing regional peace and security, mutual trust and cooperation through dialogue and negotiation.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the DPRK’s entry into the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.”

The DPRK remains unchanged in its position to develop friendly and cooperative relations with ASEAN countries under the principles of respect for sovereignty, equality and reciprocity, and to contribute to joint efforts for achieving confidence-building and preventive diplomacy through its participation in ARF activities.

The DPRK expresses deep thanks to the Singaporean government for its sincere cooperation of providing all conditions and best conveniences for the historic DPRK-U.S. summit meeting and talks.

The DPRK-U.S. summit talks held in Singapore will be recorded in history as an important occasion that opened up a new phase for achieving peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK will develop good-neighborly and friendly relations with all the countries that respect its national sovereignty and are friendly to it, and make sincere efforts to ensure lasting peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region and build a new and just world.

The DPRK expresses belief and expectation that the ARF will actively give positive impetus to efforts for ensuring peace, stability and development in the Korean peninsula and the region.
1. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The inter-sessional year of 2017 to 2018 continued to build upon good EU engagement in the region. Europe and Asia share an interest in preserving peace in our regions and international cooperation on a global scale. To preserve and strengthen economic exchanges, Europe and Asia must also work together on global security. Those who believe in a multilateral global order have an interest and a duty to join forces. Europe and Asia, together, can be the engine of a more cooperative approach to world politics. As such, the EU announced on 28 May 2018 that it was increasing its engagement on security in and with Asia.1

The EU’s objectives continue to be its engagement with its current strategic partners in Asia (China, India, Japan, South Korea) as well as deepening cooperation with other partners, along with ASEAN and its member states.

The EU will expand its cooperation with Asian partners into areas such as capacity building, training programmes – including on UN peacekeeping – and joint exercises. EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance. The EU’s actions are framed by the core tenets of the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and now the 2018 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. The EU aims to contribute to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, development of international law and promotion of peaceful solutions to conflicts.

On the basis of its own experience, the EU is a natural supporter of efforts aiming at building a robust multilateral and rule-based, cooperative security order in Asia. Since its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012 the EU has intensified its engagement with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); EU leaders have attended key high-level multilateral meetings on security in the region, from the Shangri-La Dialogue on Security in Asia to annual ARF Ministerial Meetings. This year, the EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Ms Federica Mogherini will join the ARF leaders for the Ministerial Meeting in August in Singapore. Since 2014, EU-ASEAN cooperation has been further strengthened thanks to the implementation of the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU enhanced partnership (2013-2017). In August 2017, the EU-ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference adopted the second EU-ASEAN Plan of Action (2018-2022), which will guide cooperation between the two regions. EU-ASEAN political partnership is undergoing a positive momentum. The EU is committed to support ASEAN, including on security-related issues, as confirmed by the several ARF activities organised or co-chaired by the EU in recent years. This is an important ingredient for the upgrading of EU-ASEAN relations, an objective that the EU continues to consider a priority in the region.

Based on its 2015 strategy “The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with strategic purpose”, the EU has significantly strengthened its cooperation with ASEAN; a dedicated EU Ambassador to ASEAN was appointed; EU assistance has been increased to €200 million (from €70 million) and to €3 billion (from €2.2 billion) to ASEAN countries eligible for EU development assistance (2014-2020).

2. National Security and Defence Policy

2017 and 2018 were decisive years for the European Union’s external action. In addition to the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the EU adopted Council Conclusions on Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia. The former outlines the EU’s immense potential as a global player and draws attention to priority areas like resilience.

building, integrated approach to conflicts and crises and an enhanced link between internal and external policies, with attention, inter alia, to migration, as well as to counter terrorism. Efforts to improve communication and public diplomacy aim to increase awareness of the EU and the role it plays in global issues.

The EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia emphasises the role of the EU has a global security partner and recognises the increasing importance of Asian security for European interests. The Conclusions identify the following as key areas for deeper security engagement: maritime security, cyber security, counter terrorism, hybrid threats, conflict prevention, the proliferation of Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear weapons and the development of regional cooperative orders.

Within the EU, the EU formally launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017. This seeks to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. This will thus enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security partner, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. The EU also agreed to establish a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff. The MPCC improves the EU’s capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more coherent manner.

Also in 2017, the EU launched the European Defence Fund, designed to help EU Member States reduce duplications in spending and get better value for money. The Fund will coordinate, supplement and amplify national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology.

In that regard, following the June European Council and July Warsaw NATO Summit and including the Joint Declaration by the leaders of the institutions of EU and NATO, the EU is looking at ways to demonstrate ongoing broad cooperation as well to translate the wish of EU Member States and NATO nations to take the partnership further (in theatre, cyber, maritime and capabilities development) as well as to prepare the ground for further strengthening of the partnership, notably on countering hybrid threats. In December 2017, the EU endorsed a further set of areas of cooperation with NATO, including counter-terrorism, women, peace and security, and military mobility.

In 2018, the EU also adopted conclusions on strengthening civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which identified actions to make civilian CSDP more effective on the ground. It also identified ways in which civilian missions could contribute to tackling security challenges.

Throughout the year, the EU coupled diplomacy with new and existing sixteen Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations on the ground such as EU NAVFOR Somalia, missions with an executive mandate in Kosovo (EULEX), military training in Mali (EUTM Mali), Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) or the more recent EU naval operation against human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean called EUNAVFOR MED Sophia.

As set out by the EUGS, none of these situations or conflicts can be solved by the EU alone. For that reason, these missions have incorporated third countries from the earliest stage. 18 non-EU countries are now able join EU operations for peace and security, thanks to the permanent Framework Participation Agreements they have signed and ratified. For that reason as well, the EU will continue to promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, and invests in cooperative relationships to spur shared global responsibilities.

Internationally, the EU used its diplomatic and economic influence to press for political solutions to conflicts in Syria, Libya and Ukraine. It continued to work intensively to foster the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

In regard to Syria, the EU continues to play a crucial role in gathering the international community around the objective of ending the violence in Syria, in order to reaffirm support for the political
talks in Geneva and to save lives thanks to its humanitarian aid. In April 2018 the EU organised and co-chaired the second “Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” together with the United Nations.

Concerning Iran, the EU will continue its work on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and has announced that the EU and its Member States are coordinating measures and mechanisms to protect the economic investments of European businesses that have legitimately invested and engaged in Iran. Other priorities include taking forward the EU’s work in Libya. Building on an already active role in Africa the EU will continue strengthening peace and resilience including through CSDP missions and operations. The EU continues to develop strong working partnerships in Central and South-East Asia. The EU is actively involved in regional diplomacy on consensus building for peace in Afghanistan through its Special Envoy for Afghanistan. In particular, the EU engages in bilateral dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbours - China, India, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries - and with international stakeholders, including Russia and the US.

Moreover, over the last years the EU has develop a holistic approach in the external dimension of migration, fully embedding migration within our overall relations with third countries, and based on the principles of partnership and shared responsibility. The EU’s main priority has been and remains to save lives and provide protection to those in need thereof, ensuring legal pathways in order to reduce irregular and dangerous journeys, while also enabling migrants and refugees to stay closer to home and helping the development of third countries in order to address in the long term the root causes of migration. This approach has proved to bring results. There is progress on strengthening cooperation with third countries on migration, in a tailor-made fashion, and we have seen an increasing political engagement of partners both at bilateral level, as well as at regional level.

A very clear example has been the creation of the AU-EU-UN Taskforce on Libya in November 2017, where the political commitment of all actors, EU, African Union, together with the IOM and UNHCR, and coupled with flexible and rapid funding from the EU under the EUTF, has allowed us to have an important impact in fostering protection for migrants on the ground and increasing humanitarian evacuations and returns. Since the start of the joint EU-AU-UN scale-up operation, IOM has assisted to 20.000 voluntary returns. UNHCR has evacuated a total of 1,731 persons from Libya, including 1,409 to Niger’s Emergency Transit Mechanism. On this basis, we are further expanding the work with the Libyan authorities also on areas such as the fight against trafficking and smuggling.

Ultimately, the EU's biggest added value is its wide range of tools – political, economic, security and humanitarian – to tackle important foreign policy challenges. In a world where security challenges are quickly evolving and becoming ever more complex, the EU's approach to external action adds particular value by addressing all dimensions of a crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation. The EU Global Strategy acknowledges this dimension by putting forward a concept of “integrated approach” whereby the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts. The EU's approach to global challenges, working closely with international and regional partners brings collective efforts and can deliver results in fields such as climate change, sustainable development, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management and relief. As part of this comprehensive approach, joint conflict and crisis analysis will continue to support the formulation and review of the EU strategic approach to conflict-affected and fragile contexts. The EU will continue to implement its policy commitment to establishing and promoting the use of mediation as a ‘tool of first response’ to emerging and ongoing crisis situations. In this regard, the Union continues to support specific peace processes for example in Libya, Syria, Colombia, Myanmar/Burma and the Philippines.
3. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counterterrorism

The fight against terrorism continued to take centre stage in the work of the EU during the year. Counterterrorism is a priority for the EU and ASEAN member states and it needs to be approached strategically from a civilian and criminal justice perspective with emphasis on human rights and the rule of law. It forms one of the priority areas in the EU’s Conclusions on Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia.

The EU’s key objectives at global level remain to deepen the international consensus and to enhance international efforts to combat terrorism. Moreover, the EU will work to strengthen its response to international terrorism through multilateral cooperation, political dialogue and concrete support to third countries. The EU supports the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism presented by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) in early 2016 and supports work to mainstream Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in counter-terrorism and related efforts, including in respect of strategic communication, radicalisation and foreign terrorist fighters.

At a global level, the EU strongly emphasises concerns over the Syria/Iraq related Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) phenomenon, their possible return to their regions of origin, and the spread of ISIL/Da’esh in the ASEAN region as well as beyond. Both ASEAN and the EU share this concern, which reaffirms EU commitment to intensify cooperation with ASEAN member states and within the framework of the ARF in combating terrorism.

The EU actively promotes a criminal law approach in CT. The respect for the rule of law and human rights is fundamental for this. The EU promotes law enforcement and judicial cooperation, addresses the conditions conducive to terrorism, strives to block terrorist financing and counter-radicalisation as well as recruitment for extremists and terrorists.

The terrorist threat is now more diffuse, helped by globally accessible internet propaganda and the FTF and returnee FTF phenomena. The EU wishes stronger cooperation with ASEAN partners to the very important issue of addressing terrorism.

The new EU-ASEAN Plan of Action (2018-2022) calls for the review of the implementation of the ARF Work Plan to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2014-2017), and prepare for the next generation Work Plan that takes into account new mutually agreed priority areas. Countering radicalisation and violent extremism are priority areas that feature in the new Plan of Action. This dialogue addressed issues of common concern such as violent extremism and foreign terrorist fighters as well as exploring venues for further cooperation, including in the UN Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) frameworks. The EU will be placing counter-terrorism and security experts in Central Asia (based in Bishkek) and South-East Asia (based in Jakarta).

In this context the EU considers the GCTF as an excellent multilateral platform connecting the ASEAN region in a complementary way to the UN system. It specifically addresses capacity-building measures in Southeast Asia through the working group co-chaired by Indonesia and Australia. In addition, trans-regional CT cooperation between EU and ASEAN can clearly benefit from the networks entertained through the GCTF and its various partners in the regions. The workshop “Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism in the ARF Region” took place in Brussels on 15/16 February 2017. The workshop was co-chaired by The Philippines, Australia and the EU. The workshop gathered over 100 delegates from ARF Member States, as well as representatives from international, regional and civil society organizations. The workshop was aimed at taking stock of relevant P/CVE initiatives in the concerned regions, shared lessons learned, good practices; and to identify areas for possible cooperation in support of the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime 2015-2017, which specifically identifies CVE as one of its four priority areas. Particular focus
was put on the role of youth in P/CVE initiatives; de-radicalization, reintegration and rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders; implementation of P/CVE policy frameworks at the regional and national level; and the importance of strategic communications in P/CVE efforts.

In this matter, the EU has included trafficking in human beings, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation as a part of the ARF CTTC Work Plan (2015-2017). Its review and a new plan stay among the EU's priorities.

Last, but not least, the EU remains actively involved in the region through capacity building efforts. The EU is involved in political dialogues on counter-terrorism with ASEAN and security dialogues with ASEAN-partner Indonesia; the EU, inter alia, holds regular consultations with ASEAN-partners on CT and transnational crime, the latest consultations on transnational crime took place in Jakarta in May 2016 and were chaired, from the EU side, by the head of the EEAS counter-terrorism division. A Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime Consultation was held in May 2017 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, with the EU also represented.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Non-proliferation and disarmament continued to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy in 2017. The EU in 2017 continued to support universal accession to relevant international treaties and instruments as well as their full and effective implementation, particularly with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Arms Trade Treaty. EU’s support for the CTBT remains strong and universal. The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, a flagship activity implemented with the support of the UN and other international partners and contributing to the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540, grew steadily; it currently has 60 partner countries, including all of ASEAN member states. Employing an all-hazard approach, the Initiative has proven to be a useful regional platform to assess threats and enhance cooperation with international and regional organisations to help with national capacity building in the field of CBRN risk mitigation.

At the occasion of the 5th anniversary (March 2018) of the establishment of the Initiative’s South East Asia Regional Secretariat, seated in Manila, the Initiative was recognised by all members of the ARF as a reliable and operational structure/network to be reinforced. The National CBRN Action Plans for risk mitigation, one of the main elements of the Initiative’s methodology, were regarded as an efficient tool to drive and channel donors’ support. The effort of coordination with the other actors present in the region (i.e. the US, Canada, Australia) has proved to be essential and should be continued in order to avoid duplications and strengthen the position of the national focal points of our initiative. Currently four projects are being implemented, including providing on-site technical assistance to the Regional Secretariat and a project on export control systems for dual use items, with total budget amounting to EUR 25 million.

Increasing the political visibility of the Initiative, its achievements in the region as well as pending and emerging challenges vis-à-vis ASEAN, represents a long-term objective to be pursued. Current Singapore chairmanship’s priorities, which include, among others, promoting CT cooperation and building collective capabilities to fight against chemical, biological and radiological threat, and in particular its upcoming role of coordinator for the EU within ASEAN for next three years, could provide a promising platform.

The EU will maintain its policies aimed at strengthening the global disarmament architecture and the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. This includes continued diplomatic efforts towards the goal of achieving a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. The threat from illicit small arms and light weapons will continue to be addressed through international cooperation and support by the EU for concrete projects in third countries. The EU will also support international efforts to enhance outer space security.
Concerning recent developments, the EU took part in the 10th ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NP and Disarmament), in Korea (5-6 April 2018). The EU will continue to implement the JCPOA in respect of Iran and to support the ongoing diplomatic process for the complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, the EU emphasized the importance of the peaceful applications of the CTBT and the role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its International Monitoring System (CTBTO IMS), especially on its commitment to nuclear safety and contribution to nuclear security.

In fact, the EU is a natural partner in the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. For instance, the EU contributes to the ITER project, demonstrating the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion as a safe, environmentally responsible and abundant energy source where ARF partners also participate. The EU has substantial experience in nuclear safety and is happy to share it within the ARF framework. The EU regards nuclear security as an enabler of peaceful uses and it is aware that the implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material may require capacity building; the EU is ready to provide assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU also encourages a revision to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its civil applications, where the EU is willing to organize an event on this topic in the region.

On substance, the EU reaffirm its commitment to preserve the Southeast Asia region free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction by strengthening cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promoting relevant international instruments; this includes the entry into force and universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the commitment to fight against the illicit trade in conventional arms, including through the Arms Trade Treaty.

iii. Transnational Crime

Serious and organised crime represents an underestimated threat globally. It remained on the agenda of EU political dialogues with many countries and regional and international organisations, in particular in relation to drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings. EU-funded assistance programmes and CSDP missions contributed to translating political orientations into practice. These actions also seek to complement the EU (internal) Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime 2018-2021.

In the region, the EU remains actively involved through capacity building efforts and through political dialogues on transnational crime with ASEAN. The EU holds regular consultations with ASEAN-partners on the topic, being the latest consultations in Jakarta in May 2016.

The EU and ASEAN in 2017 agreed convene the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) – EU Consultations in the margins of the annual ASEAN SOMTC on a regular basis, in accordance with SOMTC processes to promote dialogue and cooperation on ways to tackle different aspects of transnational crime of mutual concerns.

The EU side believes that the security of the EU is also intertwined with the security in the ASEAN region, especially in addressing the threats posed by terrorism and transnational crime. As such, the EU further highlights that combating terrorism and transnational crime is one of the main areas of ASEAN-EU cooperation as reflected in the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2021.
In the eyes of the EU, economic and trade connectivity is a priority, yet connectivity also facilitates security challenges like transnational crime, which undermines nation-states' capability in addressing threats to security. To counter this danger, greater cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, particularly with Europol could be further explored, such as through exchange of information and other practical activities to help identifying and countering transnational crime networks, especially those ones on trafficking in human beings and drugs. To this end, the EU is delighted to host a Europol office within its delegation in Singapore.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

In 2017 and 2018, the EU continued to support the development of regional capabilities in the ARF/ASEAN framework in the specific field of disaster response. The EU remained a significant actor in the field of international disaster relief, where it has an interest in shaping the process of fostering cooperation at a regional and international level.

The EU acknowledges that South East Asia is amongst the regions most affected by disasters around the world. Therefore, through the disaster preparedness program (DIPECHO) and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU has a strong track record of supporting ASEAN and its Member states, and is increasingly engaging in more disaster management activities and policy related issues with ASEAN.

The Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid department has been engaging with the ASEAN Secretariat on the future development of the "ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (AADMER) post 2015 as well as reinforcing operational links and mutual exchange of information with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre). The 2018 regional ECHO humanitarian implementation plan for South and East Asia and the Pacific includes the response to man-made and natural disasters, as well as disaster risk reduction and resilience activities in ASEAN countries, Bangladesh and Nepal. In terms of response, its focus is on Myanmar/Burma (7 million EUR) and Bangladesh –refugees- (3 million EUR). As regards Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and resilience in ASEAN countries, all actions will contribute to the implementation of the AADMER 2016-2020 Work Programme and one or more of the six priority programmes described therein.

The EU supports financially the Integrated Programme in Enhancing the Capacity of AHA Centre and ASEAN Emergency Response Mechanisms (EU-SAHA).

Cooperation on disaster management is a positive contribution to the strategic aims of ASEAN sustainable development and to the regional integration process; it reinforces the “centrality” of ASEAN structures in South East Asia, facilitating ASEAN Leadership to “Respond-As-One.”

It is important to stress the progress made by the EU and its continued commitment at political level, being aware that further cooperation in the years to come and development of mutual solidarity mechanisms are much welcome. The EU stands ready to help as a humanitarian assistance partner of ASEAN when disasters strike and national response capacities are overwhelmed.

Furthermore, the EU welcomes the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management and the "ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (AADMER) Programme for 2016 – 2020 and is keen to further strengthen cooperation on Disaster Management notably by: supporting AADMER; the ASEAN Secretary General in his role of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator; or by reinforcing operational links and mutual exchange of information with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). Experience shows that better results come from promoting exchanges of expertise on trainings with the ASEAN Emergency Response Team (ERAT), and by facilitating mutual participation in exercises.
Lastly, the EU presence in the latest edition of the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on Disaster Relief) in Bangkok was a tangible sign of the EU’s commitment towards ARF and ASEAN in this topic.

v. Maritime Security

Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific Region is crucial to world-wide prosperity and to the EU’s growth prospects. Southeast Asia buys almost a quarter of EU exports and it is among the fastest-growing export markets, being also home to the fastest-growing economies. In addition, the European Union has a strategic interest in regional security and stability in Asia, as stated in the EUGS. Almost 50% of world shipping by tonnage transits the South China Sea.

Europe and Asia are connected with a trade route crossing the Indian Ocean and passing the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca straits - two piracy prone areas. Energy supplies, raw materials and goods transiting these waters are of vital importance to most economies worldwide. Maritime transport carries 90% of world trade and over 40% of the world’s merchant fleet is EU/EEA-controlled.

With this heavy reliance on maritime trade, the EU has actively engaged in promoting maritime security and safety in the Asian region. Indeed, the EU has a long history of engagement helping East and West African countries upgrade the level of their capacity at sea; maritime situational awareness has been much enhanced in East Africa through the sequence of Commission led projects MARSIC, CRIMARIO and MASE; the EU is leading the antipiracy campaign thanks to its military operation ATALANTA, supported by capacity building operations such as EU CAP SOMALIA, which also indirectly benefit Asian trade with Europe.

The EU is strongly committed to the principles of international law, as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to ensure a maritime rule-based international order and the peaceful and sustainable use of the seas and oceans.

The EU has also stressed the need to ensure the freedom of navigation and has called upon all claimants in the South China Sea to refrain from its militarisation, to pursue the peaceful settlement of disputes through international law and to conclude rapidly an effective and legally binding Code of Conduct through transparent negotiations.

In line with trade and trafficking flows between the EU and the rest of the world, the EU intends to focus more of its financial instruments over the coming period in the Central and Eastern India Ocean. The EU seeks to export its experience in maritime security with regional actors through seminars, workshops for experts from both continents and the continuation of its EU-ASEAN high level dialogues. Taking into account the above, the EU is actively engaged in fostering closer relations with ASEAN region, building on the achievements of the ongoing EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security between the two regions thus implementing the external branch of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, 2014).

The EU, with its co-chairs, Vietnam and Australia, is fully engaged in chairing the next three-years cycle of ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS from 2018-2020) to ensure consistency and synergy with the EU-ASEAN HLD on MS. Several proposals for confidence building measures and sharing knowledge and best practices about the maritime domain have been designed by the EU and will soon be fine-tuned with our ASEAN partners to cover the next few years of maritime security cooperation. Future meetings of this HLD shall take into account this high potentiality for the EU and ASEAN to factor their common concerns/intentions in the ARF ISM and vice versa.

Areas of cooperation previously identified would include sharing regional best practices, port security, maritime situation awareness (technology and information sharing), possible civil and military staff exchanges (Coast Guards and Navies) or training, search and rescue operations, resilience of maritime infrastructure, as well as
preserving and restoring the marine biodiversity in a region (South China Sea) which is considered by many scientists to be the centre of gravity of the global maritime ecosystem.

At international level and in particular in International Maritime Organization (IMO), the EU and its Member states are willing to intensify their cooperation with the ASEAN countries to enhance maritime security/safety through the adoption of new common rules, in many important areas such as the deployment of armed guards on board vessels transiting high risk areas to deter piracy, counter-terrorism or other politically and economically sensitive issues such as IUU fishing.

Piracy attacks have decreased almost down to zero over recent years in the case of the Western Indian Ocean, following the deployment in 2008 of EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and other similar naval combined forces, although challenges remain. This mission, in combination with the wider international response and the implementation of the Best Management Practices (designed in international platforms such as CGPCS) by commercial ships and the provision of private armed guards on board ships have proved successful to considerably reduce the number of attacks at sea.

Yet, the number of piracy incidents and attacks in seas in South East Asia has recently increased, and are now becoming a subject of growing international concern. In this respect, the EU is willing to transfer its positive experiences, and support steps taken by regional structures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea. In this regard, the EU welcomes programmes such as the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) framework, and will keep on implementing its Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme funded by its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. This initiative was funded by the EU and focused, since 2009, on the security and safety of essential maritime routes in areas affected by piracy, helping to secure shipping and trading sea-lines of communication.

Finally, it has also been decided to shift the next EU-ASEAN Seminar on Security and Defence to Jakarta where it will be organised in Nov 2018 by the Indonesian National Defence University in coordination with the EU Security and Defence College (ESDC).

4. Role of ARF

In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, continued to address regional and international security issues. The HR/VP will take part in the 25th ARF Ministerial in Singapore on 8 August 2018, setting out the EU’s stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. The EU contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum is a tangible demonstration of its willingness to support the ASEAN-led security architecture in South East Asia. As stated on numerous occasions, the EU looks forward to making this interaction deeper and wider and is ready to make a significant contribution to all ASEAN-led processes, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting – Plus.

The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a long-standing and active ARF member, the EU is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules-based regional security order. The ARF offers a valuable platform for the EU and its Asian partners to engage on a broad range of issues such as maritime security (which is co-chaired now with Vietnam and Australia until end 2020), non-proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Drawing on its comprehensive approach, the EU has engaged actively with ARF partners at various levels, e.g. through Intersessional Meetings, the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) and the related Defence Officials’ Dialogue, the Senior Officials’ Meeting and the ARF Ministerial. The EU respects and promotes the central role of ASEAN in the emerging regional architecture and believes in the need to ensure transparency and synergy.
between ARF and other regional fora such as the ADDM+ meetings and the East Asia Summit.

The EU is keen to make the ARF, in line with ARF Ministerial Guidance, more ‘action oriented’. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of strengthening the organizational and institutional structures of the ARF, including the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat.

In order to underscore the EU’s growing role as a security provider, investment in the ARF has also been given in the field of security and defence through engagement by a uniformed member of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Senior Military Advisor to the EEAS’s Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) has represented the EU in the ARF DOD format covering confidence building measures, maritime security, counter piracy, chemical biological radiological and nuclear response, and countering hybrid threats in Malaysia, Laos and New Zealand as well as in the ARF ASPC format in Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, and Singapore. The military advisor has led bilateral defence engagement triggered by ARF activity in Tokyo, Singapore and Seoul, the IISS Fullerton and Shangri-La forums, and in Indonesia speaking on EU Common Security and Defence Policy at the Sentul International Peace Facility.

The EU is also keen to strengthen the quantity and quality of the EU engagement in ARF and ASEAN security-related activities. In this respect, the EU has been active in the area of Maritime Security (High Level Dialogues in Jakarta 2013, Kuala Lumpur 2015, Bangkok September 2016 and Manila 2017, as well as an ISM in Brisbane 2018); Preventive Diplomacy (ARF trainings in Brunei 2014, Indonesia 2015 Myanmar 2017); CBRN (EU-funded Centre of Excellence plus ARF workshop in Manila in 2015); Disaster Management and Crisis Response (dedicated EU support for AHA Centre), Cyber security (Kuala Lumpur 2015 and 2016 with Malaysia), ARF Workshop on Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism (with the Philippines and Australia in February 2017) or the Workshop on Trafficking in Persons with Indonesia (in April 2017)
I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

It is increasingly self-evident that towards the end of the closing years of the second decade of the 21st century, the world is undergoing rapid, structural changes. There is no clear point of referral to understand these changes, described by some as tectonic shifts, let alone predict the vector of their outcome. Many see a world in transition, driven by rapidly evolving technological changes alongside the advent of the challenges that they pose to prevailing global hierarchies. The need is to craft an appropriate response in a cooperative framework.

India’s interests in the region are vast, and its engagement is deep. In the Indian Ocean region, relationships are becoming stronger. To the East, the Malacca Strait and South China Sea connect India to the Pacific and to most of its major partners - ASEAN, Japan, Republic of Korea, China and the Americas. Trade in the region is growing rapidly. And, a significant part of its overseas investments flow in this direction. ASEAN alone accounts for over 20%.

India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region was outlined by Prime Minister Modi during the Shangri La Dialogue on 1 June 2018. It stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it and ASEAN is central to this vision. A common rules-based order for the region must equally apply to all individually as well as to the global commons. All must have equal access, as a right under international law, to the use of common spaces on sea and in the air that would require freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law. India stands for open and stable international trade regime and will support a rule-based, open, balanced and stable trade environment in the Indo-Pacific Region, which lifts up all nations on the tide of trade and investment. Connectivity unites a region to enhance trade. But for connectivity projects to succeed in the region, it is important to build bridges of trust based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, good governance and transparency. An Asia of rivalry will hold all back; whereas, an Asia of cooperation will shape this century. It is a responsibility that both existing and rising powers have. India believes that contests must not turn into conflict; differences must not be allowed to become disputes. It is normal to have partnerships on the basis of shared values and interests. India, too, has many in the region and beyond.

Apart from traditional security challenges, the region increasingly faces non-traditional challenges that are transnational in character. These non-traditional challenges emanate from terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, humanitarian disasters, environmental degradation and cyber crime. Recent incidents such as the ransom-ware attack are a manifestation of the indiscriminate damage and harm with the potential of completely undermining sovereignty of states and transcending national boundaries.

On the positive side, regional groupings have emerged as one of the building blocks of global order. Their driving force and commonality are the most obvious of all. ASEAN has long functioned as an anchor of stability in the region and its continuance in that role is critical. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has emerged as an important initiative for developing a pluralistic, cooperative security order reflective of the diversity of the Asia Pacific region. The ARF can play a critical role in warding off the daunting challenges posed by the traditional and non-traditional threats standing dangerously at the door step and help in developing open, transparent, balanced and inclusive security architecture in the region. In order to strengthen this regional and international security environment, India attaches importance to multifaceted engagements with its partners in both bilateral as well as multilateral frameworks.

a. Bilateral ties

Bilateral ties within the extended neighbourhood have been a priority for India. Whether it be Japan, Singapore or the United States, India has maintained its relationship with other States and
intends to develop them further. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping was held on the sidelines of Ninth annual BRICS Summit in Xiamen, China on 5 September 2017. One of the important points made during the meeting was that peace and tranquillity in the border areas was a prerequisite for the further development of our relationships and that there should be more efforts made to really enhance and strengthen the level of mutual trust between the two sides.

India’s ties with Japan – from economic to strategic – have been completely transformed. It is a partnership of great substance and purpose that is a corner-stone of India’s Act East Policy. Amongst the various bilateral summits, on July 8, 2017, Indian Prime Minister and Japanese Prime Minister had a Summit Meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany. In the Joint Statement “towards a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific", India and Japan articulated the “central role" of both the countries in “safeguarding and strengthening" a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.

During the 18th Annual Summit between India and Russia which took place on June 2017, both the countries concluded several agreements related to cooperation over a very wide range of activities. The 18th Summit also witnessed the adoption of the "St. Petersburg Declaration" which highlighted the multi-faceted cooperation between India and Russia. Subsequently PM Modi and President Putin also met at the sidelines of Astana SCO summit in June 2017 and G20 Summit in Hamburg in July 2017.

With Singapore, India has had the longest un-interrupted naval exercise, which is in its twenty fifth year now. Singapore and India reaffirmed their strong and long standing defence relationship in bilateral talks on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting on October 24, 2017. India and Singapore on November 29, 2017, signed an agreement to deepen cooperation in maritime security and called for ensuring freedom of navigation in critical sea lanes. There is a strong momentum in cooperation with Republic of Korea.

And, there is a fresh energy in partnerships with Australia, as also New Zealand.

Relations between India and the US have also continued to progress. Prime Minister Modi was hosted by President Trump at the White House on June 26 for an official visit to Washington, D.C. They touched upon the stewardship of the Indo-Pacific region, fighting global terrorism, adherence to international laws on freedom of navigation and increasing fair and free trade. Gen. (Dr) V. K Singh, Retd, Minister of State for External Affairs met US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting.

b. Multilateral ties

The year witnessed intensive diplomatic multilateral engagements. India participated in regional and global discourses, with a constructive approach to all issues. During the year, India became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as two multilateral export control regimes namely Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. The coming into force of the International Solar Alliance (ISO), a treaty based international organization, marks India’s role in addressing the vital issue of climate change. India also participated in various global conferences such as the SCO Summit, the G-20 Summit, the BRICS Summit, the East Asia Summit and the World Economic Forum at Davos. India also hosted the Global Conference on Cyberspace and the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in November 2017, the 3rd edition of the Raisina Dialogue and the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in January 2018.

India’s diplomatic outreach was also marked by simultaneous engagement with countries to the region East, West and South of India. In pursuance of its ‘Act East’ policy, the Prime Minister attended the 15th ASEAN-India Summit and the 12th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in November 2017. Signifying the importance of the region for India, the Prime Minister highlighted his visits to eight out of ten ASEAN countries. Year-long celebrations marked the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue partnership and India hosted the
landmark ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit in January 2018, with all the ten ASEAN Heads of States participating as Guests of Honour at the Republic Day celebrations on 26 January 2018.

India’s proactive engagement in the Indian Ocean Region was further intensified by Prime Minister’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), advancing cooperation and using capabilities for larger benefits. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) mechanism has a vital role to play in realizing this common aspiration for the region. India considers IORA as an important instrument for promoting cooperation and ensuring stability in the region. India has been supportive of further invigoration of IORA activities across a wide spectrum, ranging from renewable energy and the Blue Economy to maritime safety and security. India announced a range of initiatives during the IORA Leaders Summit on 7 March 2017 in Jakarta.

I. National Security and Defence Policy

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

India’s national security, based on its enduring social, religious, moral and ideological principles, thus, evolves from the more than 5000 years old nation’s culture and history. The core values of the Indian State can be found reflected in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, inter alia, sovereignty, secularism, democracy, justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, human dignity, unity and integrity of the nation. From these precepts flow the enduring respect for diversity, peaceful co-existence, pluralism, tolerance and support for a just international order.

In line with its national values, the Government has continued to accord high priority to relations with countries in Asia. In general, India’s approach of seeking closer ties, building stronger connectivity and expanding cooperation has seen greater support and acceptance among our partners in the larger neighbourhood.

India is pursuing greater cooperation on political and security matters with countries of the region in pursuance of its "Act East Policy". Since May 2014, India’s President, Vice President and Prime Minister have, among them, visited nine out of ten ASEAN countries. India has also proactively engaged with the various ASEAN centric organizations, notably the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), in shaping the regional discourse on Counter Terrorism, Disaster Management and Maritime Cooperation. The Prime Minister’s presence at the three East Asia Summits and his visits to EAS participating countries like the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Australia brings out new salience of the Indo-Pacific in India's foreign and security policy paradigms. India's cooperation remained focused on implementing projects related to connectivity, developing contacts and stronger integration with the region as well as building partnerships with ASEAN Regional Forum member states on security and defence focussing on various traditional and non-traditional security threats in the region.

II. National Contributions to Regional Security

a. Counter Terrorism

Terrorism remains the most pervasive and serious challenge to international peace and security. India strongly condemns terrorism in all forms and manifestations and emphasises that no cause or grievance can ever justify acts of terrorism, whether based upon ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic or any other reasons.

India firmly believes that unprecedented spread of terrorism mandates a comprehensive and decisive collective response on part of the entire community, without double standards and selectivity, in accordance with international law and UN Charter. India urges all countries and entities to work sincerely to disrupt terrorist networks and their financing, stop cross-border movement of terrorists, enhance cooperation in intelligence sharing, law enforcement, developing best practices and technologies, mutual legal
assistance, extradition arrangements and capacity building for counter-terrorism.

Multilateral and regional forums such as the ARF become pivotal in tackling this challenge as it brings together key States in the region to combat terrorism. In support of ARF initiatives related to counter terrorism, India has participated in a number of counter-terrorism workshops and seminars in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios. India co-chaired, along with host country Indonesia, the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Trans National Crime (ISM-CTTC) in April 2017 in Semarang.

India has been actively pursuing the cause of counter terrorism, not only at regional forums such as the ARF but also at national and international forums. It regularly participates in the meetings of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Global Counter Terrorism Forums (GCTF). As a founding member of the GCTF, India participated in the 12th GCTF Coordination Committee meeting and the 8th GCTF Ministerial Plenary meeting in New York, USA from 18-20 September 2017. It also participated in FATF meetings held in Spain from 17-23 June 2017, Argentina from 23 October to 3 November 2017 and the FATF Plenary and Working group meeting in Paris from 18-23 February 2018 and 24-29 June 2018. More importantly, India is also pushing for disqualification of member states supporting “terrorism and radical extremism” from the Commonwealth and seeking to develop counter terrorism cooperation at other regional groupings such as BRICS and BIMSTEC.

India continues to hold structured consultations through Joint Working Groups on Counter Terrorism (JWG-CT) with various partner countries. The JWGs provide a forum for counter-terrorism cooperation enabling sharing of information, experience and assessments regarding global terrorism, training and capacity building including in relevant technologies and equipment, countering terrorist finance, strengthening of multilateral efforts in the area of counter-terrorism, and facilitating agency-to-agency cooperation. They have served as a useful platform in addressing common concerns such as growth of regional and international terrorism, drug-trafficking, financing of terrorism, cyber security, use of internet by terrorists, border security, law enforcement, mutual legal assistance and extradition. India currently engages with senior interlocutors of twenty three nations and three regional groupings through the mechanism of the JWG-CT. From April 2017 till date, India held meetings of the JWG-CT with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Mauritius, Malaysia, United Kingdom, Japan, Egypt, Tunisia, France, USA, Australia, BRICS and the EU. India leads the Joint Working group on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime under the BISMTEC framework.

The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) is a proposed convention which intends to criminalize all forms of international terrorism and deny terrorists, their financiers and supporters access to funds, arms, and safe havens. India has also welcomed the UN initiative to build a counter terrorism office and has been actively pursuing the development of CCIT at the United Nations. India further pressed for the adoption of CCIT following the July 2016 Dhaka attack. This convention has been under negotiations at the United Nations General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee established by Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 on Terrorism and the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal). India proposed this convention in 1996 and has since demanded its finalisation and adoption consistently, especially in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The issue was once again pushed by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in his address at the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly held in September 2014.

India organized a conference on Counter Terrorism from 14 to 16 March 2017 titled ‘Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Region’. In addition, Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented an 11 point action plan to counter terrorism globally at the G-20 Summit held in Hamburg, Germany in July 2017 and an Indo-European Union Joint Statement on cooperation in combating terrorism was also
issued at the 14th India-EU Summit held on 6 October 2017 in New Delhi. Furthermore, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) in concert with the European Union (EU), organised a workshop titled Countering Online Radicalisation – Tools and Challenges in New Delhi on 16-17 May, 2018.

b. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The twin goals of containing nuclear proliferation and developing a global agenda on disarmament continue to engage States of the ARF. India has an unwavering commitment to global efforts for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) it supports global and non-discriminatory international conventions and encourages efforts for strengthening their implementation.

India has participated actively in the ARF ISM on Non Proliferation and Disarmament and related workshops and seminars. It has also participated in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and in the UN Plan of Action to Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. To further strengthen the debate on CCW, India, in collaboration with the International Red Cross Society (ICRC) Regional Centre and the Indian Society for International Law (ISIL) hosted an International Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which was held in New Delhi on 5-6 December 2017. India has a robust system of export controls and is part of the Missile Technology Control Regime (June 2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (December 2017) and the Australia Group (January 2018). It also subscribes to the Hague Code of Conduct (June 2016).

India remains committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. It believes that nuclear disarmament can be achieved in a step by step manner endorsed by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. All states possessing nuclear weapons need to make a contribution by engaging in a meaningful dialogue to build trust and confidence which would reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. Progressive steps, such as supporting multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are needed for the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons paving the way for their complete elimination.

India attaches importance to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It has stated its willingness to participate constructively in FMCT negotiations in the CD as part of its Programme of Work in accordance with the Shannon Mandate. India is a responsible nuclear member of the world community, and would approach these negotiations keeping in mind its commitment to the international community.

India also places great value on the role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating expansion of nuclear energy to meet global energy needs in a clean and sustainable manner. All states have a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with their obligations. A number of agreements and reciprocal commitments have been concluded as part of the India’s civil nuclear initiative.

The global concerns regarding nuclear terrorism and clandestine proliferation, which continue to pose serious threats to international security, are followed closely by India. Nuclear terrorism will remain a potent threat as long as there are terrorists seeking to gain access to nuclear material and technologies for malicious purposes. In this regard, it has contributed actively to the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process and continues to engage with partners in the Nuclear Security Contact Group. In tune with the security requirements as perceived by India, the nuclear security architecture in the country has been
fortified and it has also participated in various endeavours aimed at strengthening security architecture at the global level. India also hosted the 2017 Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in February 2017 in New Delhi.

India believes that the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is a very important mechanism to ensure that non-state actors do not get access to nuclear material and nuclear technologies. Industry is an important stakeholder and partner to governments in combating the proliferation of WMD, as they produce and deal with so-called dual use materials that could be used for proliferation purposes. To help strengthen the architecture for export controls, India, in collaboration with the government of Germany and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) hosted the India-Wiesbaden Conference 2018 on the theme “Securing Global Supply Chains through Government-Industry Partnerships towards effective implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540” in April 2018.

c. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

India is one of the most natural disaster prone countries in the world. About 58.6% of the Indian landmass is prone to earthquakes; over 12% is prone to floods; 68% of the cultivable area is susceptible to drought and out of the 7500 km long coastline, about 5700 km is prone to cyclones. This has made India highly conscious of its responsibility to the safety and security of the Indian Ocean and has been active in promoting maritime domain awareness, concluding White Shipping Agreements, ensuring coastal surveillance and conducting hydrographic services.

India’s HADR and Search & Rescue efforts in the Indian Ocean have been increasingly in evidence. Building on its 2004 tsunami relief experience, India has since undertaken a wide range of HADR operations and has been the first to respond in times of distress in our immediate as well as extended neighbourhood, from major evacuations in Yemen and South Sudan to supply of drinking water to the Maldives and providing relief supplies by air to Fiji and Sri Lanka. India has been a regular participant in the ADMM Plus EWG on HADR and has effectively contributed in discussions towards developing a disaster response mechanism for vulnerable countries in the region.

In the 37th meeting of SAARC Council of Ministers (CoM) in Pokhara, Nepal, it was decided that SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) will be located in New Delhi. This recommendation was to be provisionally implemented subject to confirmation by the Nineteenth SAARC Summit. The Blue Print for the SDMC prepared by NIDM and NDMA was discussed in SAARC Expert Group Meeting and was approved for its future activities. The Interim Unit was initially housed in NIDM and later on shifted to the sprawling GIDM Campus, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. SDMC (IU) has so far organized the following training programmes which were attended by participants from all SAARC countries:-

f. Seasonal Climate Forecast Mechanism for South Asia 6-8 December, 2017.
g. Mainstreaming Disaster Management in Infrastructure Sector 8-12 January, 2018

The Republic of India also hosted the first Annual Disaster Management Exercise for ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ countries (BIMSTEC DMEx-2017) on 10-13 October, 2017 at New Delhi. BIMSTEC DMEx - 2017 provided a significant platform for sharing best practices and experiences with all member countries involving their response teams. About 200 disaster professionals from all seven BIMSTEC countries participated for the first time in tabletop and field exercises.
The Union Home Minister Mr Rajnath Singh led a delegation to the Kyrgyz Republic to attend the 9th Meeting of Heads of Government authorities of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states, dealing with the prevention and elimination of emergency situations on 24-25 August, 2017. During this meeting, Union Home Minister also moved a proposal to organise a Joint Urban Earthquake Search and Rescue exercise of SCO member states to improve collective preparedness and also to host the next meeting of SCO Heads of Departments dealing with disaster prevention in 2019. Both the proposals moved by the Home Minister were accepted unanimously by all the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

In April 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), in collaboration with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) organized a round-table conference, which included representatives from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the World Bank, private sector infrastructure lenders, insurance companies, and academia. The Round Table discussed four areas for collaboration assessing disaster risk: standards of design and implementation; good risk management practices in infrastructure projects; financing new infrastructure and mechanisms for covering risks and; mechanisms for supporting recovery in infrastructure sectors after disasters.

The states of Indo-Pacific are more prone to natural disasters due to their geographical location. Initiatives taken by ASEAN Regional Forum to combat disaster relief have been successful in this regard. India actively participated in the last ARF disaster relief exercise. India participated in the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional meeting (ISM) held on disaster relief on 4 April 2018 in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

India was co-chair with Vietnam for the Executive Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2013-2017 under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meet (ADMM) Plus construct. Additionally, a number of mutually beneficial initiatives have been undertaken such as a team from Indian Army to impart training to Cambodian Armed Forces in Demining Operations and recovery of unexploded munitions and in UN peacekeeping operations. The 3rd cycle of the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Military Medicine (2017-2020) is to be chaired by Myanmar & India. The objective of this cycle is to continue to establish better cooperation in medical operation amongst Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) countries for Civil Special Operation/Military Operations other than war (MOOTW) especially in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions as the region continues to face non-traditional security challenges.

d. Transnational Crime

With the advancement of technology, international terrorism, organized crime and illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs have assumed transnational and global dimensions with wide ranging ramifications on the peace, security and stability of the country. The scale and complexity of these emerging threats make partnerships vital.

The legal/bilateral framework for combating transnational crimes and international terrorism includes Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) in Criminal Matters, Memoranda of Understanding/ Agreements on Security Cooperation, Bilateral Instruments of Cooperation on Prevention and Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Chemical Precursors, and related Offences and Agreements on Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which are signed between India and other countries.

During the 13th SAARC Summit held at Dhaka in November, 2005, it was inter-alia, decided that SAARC Interior / Home Ministers would meet annually preceded by a meeting of the Interior / Home Secretaries. So far 8 meetings of the SAARC Interior / Home Ministers have been held, the latest being at Colombo (11th – 13th July, 2017). SAARC conducted a specialised Training Course
on “Transnational Crime: SAARC Perspective” on 2nd – 13th April, 2017 in Dhaka (Bangladesh). A meeting of Core Group of SAARC Immigration and Visa Experts was also held on 10th October, 2017 in the SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu. India has signed 40 bilateral agreements / Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on security, drugs and other related issues and as on 31 December 2017, treaties/agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters are in force with 39 countries.

India’s economic resurgence is directly linked to its overseas trade and energy needs, most of which are transported by sea. India’s oil imports have risen to nearly 80%, almost all of which is transported by sea. 95% of India’s total overseas trade by volume is through shipping and one third of the world’s bulk cargo and half its container traffic passes through the Indian Ocean. The security of trade and commerce is, therefore, of utmost primacy and importance for India. The location of choke points such as Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and others and the presence of multinational maritime forces make maritime security even more relevant today. Maintenance of a secure maritime environment, which enables unhindered pursuit of economic activities, is, therefore, essential for the overall economic development and security of the country.

India has a long history of being a maritime nation and its maritime interests are strategic and significant in all directions. The arc of influence of Indian Ocean extends well beyond its littoral limits. Its initiative of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region is not just limited to safeguarding mainland and islands and defines efforts to deepen economic and security cooperation in maritime relationships. Convergence of interests, and an approach based in the spirit of cooperation will advance economic activity and peace in maritime region of India. The primary responsibility for peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean rests with those who live in the region. India’s approach is not exclusive and aims to bring countries together on the basis of respect for international law. India believes that respecting freedom of navigation & over flight and adhering to international norms particularly UNCLOS is essential for peace and economic growth in the

The Indo-Pacific region is endowed with a large land mass with vast water bodies offering connecting routes to the region. A number of island states inhabit the region. In this era of global connectivity and economic interdependence, all nations have a stake in maritime security and ocean governance both for trade and resource. This is an issue of significant relevance to the growing economies of Indo-Pacific region as economic growth of the region remains critically dependent on oceanic connectivity and stable maritime environment. It is a fundamental factor in ensuring the welfare and economic security of the region. Maritime security environment in the Indo-Pacific region continues to be fragile. Non-state threats to maritime security are also on the rise from maritime terrorism, smuggling, transnational crimes, drug-trafficking, piracy, unregulated private maritime security companies, and proliferation of sensitive items.

The 17th meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) between India and Bangladesh was held at Dhaka on 10th -11th December, 2017 to discuss the security and border management related issues. In the meeting, issues related to security, border management, working of institutional arrangements, cooperation in prevention of illegal activities along the border, capacity building, and implementation of key bilateral treaties pertaining to security were discussed. Under the aegis of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of India and Government of Australia on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, the first Joint Steering Committee Meeting between the two countries was held on 06 October 2017 in New Delhi. The focus of the meeting was on matters relating to counter-terrorism, smuggling & human trafficking, transnational crime and combating illegal drug trafficking. India also participated in the 5th ASEAN Plus India Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (5th SOMTC+India) in Vientiane, Lao PDR in May 2017.

e. Maritime Security

The Indo-Pacific region is endowed with a large land mass with vast water bodies offering connecting routes to the region. A number of island states inhabit the region. In this era of global connectivity and economic interdependence, all nations have a stake in maritime security and ocean governance both for trade and resource. This is an issue of significant relevance to the growing economies of Indo-Pacific region as economic growth of the region remains critically dependent on oceanic connectivity and stable
larger and inter-linked marine geography of the Indo-Pacific. India has been laying additional emphasis on developing greater synergies with the navies in the region by investing sufficient expertise in consultation forums like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).

Floating Armoury is an important issue which has exposed a nebulous area in the rapidly growing practice which is substantiated by recent events. Taking cognisance of this issue, India introduced a paper proposing development of an international regulatory framework for floating armouries at the 97th session of the Maritime safety Committee of International maritime organization held in London last year. India has also actively participated in arrangements like the SOMS (States of Malacca and Singapore) mechanism for maritime safety.

According due importance to the issue of maritime security, ARF organizes Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on maritime security which deals extensively with the issues of piracy, trafficking of drugs and humans and unregulated fishing. India regularly participates in the ARF events to promote maritime security initiatives. India partnered with Philippines in organization of a workshop on Best Practices in Implementing Safety of Navigation Instruments last year, in Manila, Philippines. India organized the 3rd EAS Conference on Maritime Security and Cooperation that was held in Orissa on 8-9 June 2018.

India is also a part of various other multilateral institutions which are actively deliberating maritime security issues in the region and include ADMM Plus, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship in Asia (ReCAAP) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). India also took an active role in fighting piracy, both to its west and east. Since 2008, the Indian Navy has undertaken 70 anti-piracy escort missions in the Gulf of Aden contributing to greater maritime security in the region. India is also the co-chair of the Working Group on Operations at Sea under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) construct.

f. Cyber Issues

India attaches great importance to the growing threat of cyber in the multitude of domains, from nuclear to conventional weapons to the daily functioning of governments. India has been actively participating in and contributing to cyber conferences and conventions to voice its views, shape global cyber policy discourses and strengthen cyber security.

In recognition of the claim staked by India, for a bigger role in international cyber policy issues, India hosted the 5th edition of the Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS) which saw the participation of 3500 delegates from more than 135 countries, present either physically or virtually, including more than 30 ministerial delegations. The prestigious global event was the largest GCCS held till date, which led India to join UK, South Korea, Netherlands, Hungary and USA as hosts to the conference. India was also the co-chair of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), a conglomeration of sixty organizations and states which work together on practical initiatives to strengthen global cyber security issues. GFCE held its annual meeting on the sidelines of GCCS 2017 in New Delhi and came out with a Delhi Communiqué where the global agenda for cyber capacity building was unveiled.

India participated in the deliberation of the 5th UNGGE as a member along with experts from twenty four countries to study issues related to responsible behaviour of states and applicability of international law to the use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) with a view to promoting common understanding and exploring possible cooperative measures to address these issues. It is also an active member of a select group of thirty five countries of the Working Group for Enhanced Cooperation under the United Nations Committee for Science and Technology of the World Summit for Information Society, which is currently debating on ways and means to enhance international cooperation for the implementation of the Tunis Agenda. India also participated in deliberations with ICANN to promote India's role in Internet Governance Structures, with UNODC
to deliberate on a new International Convention on Cyber Crimes and at the BRICS forum to form common positions on cyber issues.

India considers Cyber Defence Diplomacy as an essential element of engagement with other nations and has shown its commitment to enhance capacity in protecting the agencies of cyber space by having meaningful and active participation by the Senior Officers / Experts on ‘ADMM Plus EWG on Cyber Security’ and ‘Seoul Defence Dialogue’. These forums have contributed towards common understanding for shared awareness, collaboration and cooperation. India has the capacity and is willing to help ASEAN countries and other nations in capacity building in the field of cyber security in both the Civilian and Defence sectors. Towards the same, the cyber security is required to be included in the bilateral Armed Forces Training / Exercises with ASEAN countries. At the regional level, India hosted the 15th Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT) Annual General Meeting and Conference, a regional community of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Computer Security Incidence Response Teams (CSIRTs) to strengthen cyber security initiatives in the region. India also participated in the Open Ended Working Group of the ARF and provided inputs on the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) discussed during the two working groups.

g. Peacekeeping

India has cumulatively contributed more than 200,000 troops and police personnel since inception of UN peacekeeping in 1948 - the largest number from any country. We have participated in more than 49 UN Peacekeeping Missions and 163 Indian peacekeepers have made the supreme sacrifice while serving in various UN Missions. Besides, India has provided 15 Force Commanders, 7 Deputy Force Commanders and 5 Military Advisors (MILAD) or Deputy Military Advisors (Dy MILAD). The high standards of performance maintained consistently by the Indian troops and policemen deployed on UN Missions under challenging circumstances have won them high regard worldwide which is evident by the 47 gallantry and 2 distinguished awards conferred to Indian peacekeepers.

Currently, India is the third largest troop and police contributor with 6,693 personnel deployed in 9 out of 14 active UN Peacekeeping Missions of which 552 are police personnel. Most Indian peacekeepers are deployed in MONUSCO (DRC), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNIFIL (Lebanon), MINUJUSTH (Haiti) and UNDOF (Golan Heights).

Taking a lead in training and capacity building, India established the Center for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in New Delhi in 2000. CUNPK represents India in the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) and it acted as the Secretariat of IAPTC from 2006 till 2016. The CUNPK offers UN Pre-Deployment Courses (12 per year, average 500 troops per year), International Courses (UN Staff & Logistic Officers, UN Military Observers, UN Military Contingent Officers, UN Peacekeeping Course for African Partners, UN Female Military Officers, Senior Mission Leadership and other thematic courses), National Investigating Officers Course, Training of Trainers Course and Logistics Course for Contingents. The Centre has so far trained 1332 foreign officers from 98 countries and 7493 Indian officers as on April 30, 2018.

The UN Peacekeeping Course for African Partners (UNPCAP) at the CUNPK is a unique annual trilateral partnership programme on peacekeeping training initiated in 2016 between India, the US and African countries. The third iteration of the course was held in May 2018. In line with UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has requested the TCCs to deploy more female officers and to reach the 15% target of women participation out of their existing Military Observer (MILOB) and Military Staff Officer (MSO) posts in UN Missions by end of December 2018. India has already achieved this target in December 2017.

III. Role of ARF

The ARF has made significant progress since its inception in 1994, especially cooperative activities in the area of non-traditional security challenges. It has emerged as an open and inclusive forum for the nations of Indo-Pacific region to have
2017 marked the 25th anniversary of the ASEAN-India Dialogue Partnership. Prime Minister Modi observed that the “Act East Policy” is a reflection of the importance India attaches to its strategic partnership with ASEAN. During his address at the 15th India-ASEAN Summit on November 14, 2017, in Manila, Philippines, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, stated that India places ASEAN at the core of its ‘Act East’ Policy and which is central to the regional security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN way of “dialogue and consensus” has served the grouping well and should remain an ARF’s guiding principle.

ARF provides a valuable platform through practical cooperation can be forged amongst the member States in addressing various challenges. Regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. This is in line with India’s values and culture. India actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including the ASEAN led forums. All aspects discussed in the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) such as cyber security, de-radicalization, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises are facets India is keen to contribute to and collaborate with other ARF members.

In consonance with the changing regional security landscape, ARF should further strengthen its activities on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy. Operationally, India also hopes that there should be greater synergy between ARF and other forums such as EAS and ADMM Plus. India remains fully supportive of the ARF process and its role as a key pillar of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. India is committed to the multi-layered ARF mechanisms, in accordance with the spirit outlined in the ARF 2020 Vision Statement and the Hanoi Plan of Action.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Indonesia underlines the importance of the ARF to upholding the ASEAN Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations, and universally recognized international law thereby enhancing regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity as well as promoting mutual confidence and trust.

In the maritime aspect, Indonesia’s view of the regional security outlook is consistent with its strategic geographical location, its nature as the largest archipelago in the world, and its vision to be the global maritime fulcrum. We therefore deem maritime security in the region as top priority. Southeast Asian waters and the surrounding area are vital to the region’s economy, trade, transportation, and communication.

The situation in the South China Sea continues to be in the spotlight of the international community. Even though Indonesia is not a claimant state in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Indonesia attaches great importance to peace and stability. The recently agreed framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea demonstrates the commitment shared by ASEAN and China to safeguarding peace, security, and stability in the region.

Disputes generated from overlapping claims in the area underscores the necessity for peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is therefore crucial that all parties to refrain from activities that may escalate tensions, and to fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

In the face of the threat of terrorism within our own territory, we need to manage our cross-border interactions. Consolidating border management or information sharing is one way we can tackle this issue together. Our efforts at counter-radicalization are even more crucial. Reports of various terrorist attacks in other parts of the world, and the rapid growth of terrorist groups and rebel groups that practice terrorism are worrisome. They are now big enough to challenge governments, even as they keep on murdering and terrorizing innocent people. We must stop them.

One of the main concerns in the region comes from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Indonesia believes that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threatens the existence of every nation in the world, humanity, as well as peace, security and stability of the world at large.

The recent positive developments on the Korean Peninsula after the North Korean participation in the Winter Olympic Games in February 2018 in Pyeongchang, South Korea, is welcomed by many nations in the region, including Indonesia. The rapprochement between South and North Korea was further strengthened by the Summit between their respective leaders in Panmunjom on 27 April 2018 and on 26 May 2018. The Summit between US-North Korea on 12 June 2018 in Singapore is another significant step towards the establishment of permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula and the advancement of the inter-Korean relations.

On the issue of denuclearization of North Korea, Indonesia stresses the importance of a constructive dialogue as the main component of a peace process, which will ultimately be pivotal to the achievement of regional and international peace and security. In the near future, involvement of an independent and competent body (IAEA) in the verification process will certainly help to achieve the goal of a permanent denuclearization of the Peninsula.

To safeguard the region from the threat, Indonesia has always been committed to intensify the ongoing efforts of the State Parties of the Treaty of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and the Nuclear Weapons States to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the early signing and ratifying of the Protocol to that Treaty, as reflected in the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.
II. National Security and Defence Policy

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Today's global security and strategic environment influences national defence. A significant factor during the next five years is economic growth and how it affects regional military power enhancement. This will greatly affect the patterns and forms of threat that are increasingly complex and multidimensional, considering that there are military and non-military threats, and hybrid threats, which can be categorized as factual and non-factual. These threats include terrorism, radicalism, separatism and armed rebellions, natural disasters, border violations, sea piracy and natural resources theft, epidemics, cyber attacks and espionage, trafficking and drug abuse as well as conventional war and armed conflicts. Internal country conditions cannot be separated from the influence of the strategic environment triggered by ideology, political, economical, socio-cultural, and security factors. These developments become challenges in managing national defence.

Indonesia pursues an independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia believes that neighbouring countries are friends with a shared commitment to promoting security and stability in the region. Establishing a common perspective is needed to minimize problems faced in international relations, both bilateral and multilateral.

Indonesia relies on a total defence system in order to achieve national goals. The system essentially involves all citizens and all other national resources, each with a role and function. The involvement of every citizen is based on love for the homeland oriented towards a common goal to serve national interests. Maritime defence is based on a concept of Indonesia serving as the Global Maritime Fulcrum. This concept of national defense guides every citizen in recognizing national goals, national interests, the nature of national defence, national defence system, national defence functions and national defence basic principles.

Indonesia has actively contributed to the work of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus in promoting regional peace and security through dialogue and cooperation. Within the framework of ADMM and ADMM-Plus, in 2017 and 2018, Indonesia had participated in and hosted:

- 5th ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network (APCN), Bogor, Indonesia, 28 Nov – 1 Des 2017;
- 11th ADMM & 4th ADMM-Plus, Clark, the Philippines, 23-24 October 2017;
- ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM WG) & ADSOM-Plus WG, Manila, the Philippines, 27 Feb – 3 March 2017;
- ADSOM & ADSOM Plus, Cebu, the Philippines, 4 – 7 April 2017;
- The Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) 10th Annual Meeting, Manila, the Philippines, 27 - 30 March 2017;
- Trilateral Maritime Patrol & launching of the Maritime Command Center, Tarakan, Indonesia 19 June 2017;
- ADSOM WG & ADSOM-Plus WG 2018, Singapore, 10-12 January 2018;
- ADMM Retreat, Singapore, 6 February 2018;
- 12th ADMM Plus EWG on PKO & IPC, Bali, Indonesia 11 – 13 April 2018

Indonesia has played an active role in promoting and enhancing cooperation among ASEAN peacekeeping forces, including by initiating an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network (APCN). In the framework of ADMM-Plus, Indonesia co-chairs the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) with Australia for the period 2017 to 2020.

Beyond the region, Indonesia is also duty-bound to contribute to world peace in accordance with the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This is the rationale behind Indonesia’s involvement in peacekeeping operations, as the country’s contribution to the shaping of a better world of peace and social justice as well as equitable prosperity.
Indonesia has actively participated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1957 through its contributions to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East. It is currently the top contributing country to UNIFIL (Lebanon), where the Indonesian contingent stands at 1,284 personnel, while one navy-ship has been deployed with the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force.

As of April 2018, there were 2,694 Indonesian military and police personnel participating in nine United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, namely MINURSO (Western Sahara), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNISFA (Abyei, Sudan), and UNMISS (South Sudan). The number places Indonesia in the 8th rank among 124 Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), and also the biggest T/PCC in South East Asia.

In recent years, Indonesia has fulfilled its sustained and firm commitment to step-up its presence in UN peacekeeping. In this regard, the Government has formulated a “Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019” as a strategic guidance that underpins Indonesia’s effort to becoming a top ten T/PCCs through the deployment of 4,000 personnel by 2019.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia established the Indonesian National Defense Force Peacekeeping Center in Sentul, West Java in December 2012. The Center serves as a venue for pre-deployment trainings, joint exercises, as well as regional and international peacekeeping workshops and seminars, and for improving the capacity and professionalism of Indonesian peacekeepers, to prepare them for the multidimensional and increasingly complex demands and mandates of UN PKOs.

Indonesia co-chaired the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, on the sidelines of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly. In the Summit, Indonesia pledged to deploy one Military Composite Battalion, one Formed Police Unit, and 100 Individual Police Officers, including 40 female officers. Indonesia also reiterated a commitment to deploy civilian experts to UN missions, in line with the Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019.

Additionally, Indonesia has actively participated in the Panel Discussion of the follow-up to the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, including the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Meeting in Vancouver, Canada, 14-15 November 2017. The Panel Discussion is crucial to the advancement of peacekeeping reform through the efforts of Member States and the UN to create innovative solutions to help T/PCCs in financing the procurement of critical equipment specifically needed for UN Peacekeeping.

In the future, Indonesia expects to enhance its contributions in response to UN requests. As Indonesia is aware that peacekeeping is not only about military operations, each Indonesian peacekeeping team will include a diplomat, a peace worker, and a trusted person to implement the UN mandate. Indonesia will also enhance its peacekeeping professionalism, modernize its equipment and increase the number of its women peacekeepers.

b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

i. Total defence expenditure on annual basis

1) Defence expenditure

Defence development is prioritized on the defence strength and increasing the professionalism of soldiers, supported by the availability weapon system capable of supporting preparedness and mobility.

2) Defence expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)

In the year of 2017, the defence budget and expenditure amounts to 105 trillion Rupiah. This represents an increase in defence expenditure to 1.5% of Indonesia’s GDP.

Total number of active personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population is 520,000.
III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter terrorism

Terrorism remains a major threat to national, regional and global security, and has undermined political and economic stability as well as social welfare of nations. The recent terrorist attacks in the vicinity of three churches and police station in Surabaya and Pekanbaru, Indonesia on 13, 14 and 16 May 2018 were a strong reminder for Indonesia on the need to continuously strengthen counter terrorism efforts at all levels.

Indonesia is of the view that the involvement of the international community will help cleanse the world of extremism, radicalism and terrorism. Indonesia also believes that counter-terrorism efforts require addressing root causes and “conditions conducive” to terrorism. As the root causes of terrorism are varied and complex, the strategy to address them must be comprehensive. In this context, Indonesia stands ready to strengthen regional and international cooperation to combat terrorism, including through this forum.

In response to the Siege of Marawi 2017 and in order to enhance cooperation in addressing the common threats of terrorism and violent extremism confronting the region, Indonesia organized a Trilateral Meeting on Security among the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia in Manila on 22 June 2017. In addition, on 29 July 2017, Indonesia and Australia co-hosted a Sub-Regional Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Cross Border Terrorism in Manado. The meeting discussed ways to combat the threat of cross-border terrorism and returning foreign fighters in the region. Participating countries at the meeting were Indonesia, Australia, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and New Zealand.

As the Lead Shepherd of the ASEAN Working Group on Countering Terrorism, Indonesia managed to seek ASEAN concurrence to adopt the revised ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism 2016-2025 (ACPoA on CT) at the AMMTC in Manila, September 2017.

Furthermore, to follow up the Manila Declaration 2017 on dealing with violent extremism that leads to terrorism, the Government of Indonesia hosted an Ad-hoc Working Group Meeting on 3-5 April 2018 in Bali to draft a Regional Plan of Action on Countering Violent Extremism. The Meeting has come to an agreement that the Plan of Action has 4 (four) pillar, namely: (a) Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism; (b) Counter Radicalisation and Promote Deradicalisation; (c) Law Enforcement and Strengthening National Legislation Related to Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism; and (d) Partnership and Regional Cooperation. Thus, ASEAN will become one of regional entities that follow up the General Assembly Resolutions No: A/70/L.41 on 9 February 2016 to have a Regional Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.

Indonesia applies a combined approach in countering terrorism i.e. hard and soft approach. In terms of the hard approach, Indonesia has issued Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Combating-Terrorism and Law No. 9 Year 2013 on the Prevention and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. In providing the appropriate legislative framework for countering terrorism, Indonesia has amended its Law on Combating Terrorism, among others, in order to deal with the threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

The revision of the anti terrorism law, among others, provides more authority to law enforcement officials to apprehend terrorist suspects for crimes committed as preparatory act, and criminalize those who support or join terrorist networks whether based in the country or outside the country. Moreover, the revision does not comprise the element of law enforcement only, but also the elements of prevention, under the coordination of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT). The elements of prevention consist of national preparedness, contra radicalisation and deradicalisation.

In terms of the soft approach, the de-radicalization program consists of two main elements. First, the rehabilitation program aimed at the terrorists during police detention and imprisonment to transform them into law-abiding citizens. The
second element is the reintegration program aimed at helping the former-terrorists after serving their punishment in prison to break ties with their old terrorist cells and join the community. The counter-radicalization program is also aimed at increasing the awareness of society on the danger of violent radicalism and extremism whilst at the same time empowering communities to be more resilient against radical and extremist propaganda.

At the ASEAN level, Indonesia has been serving as the Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) voluntary lead shepherd for counter terrorism and as Chairman of SOMTC Working Group on Counter Terrorism.

At the international level, Indonesia has conducted robust efforts to support counter terrorism measures within the United Nations framework. In this regard, Indonesia has engaged in various cooperation mechanisms with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). Indonesia will also work closely with United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT), which was established in 2017 as lead coordinator of the United Nations on the issue of Counter Terrorism. Furthermore, Indonesia also undertakes efforts to implement the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS). The important role of Indonesia in countering international terrorism has been acknowledged by the United Nations through the re-election of Indonesia as a member of the Advisory Board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Center (AB UNCCT) for 2015-2021.

To continuously support the United Nations measures against terror, Indonesia also actively participates in the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF). In the GCTF Ministerial Meeting on September 2017, Indonesia together with Australia was appointed Co-chair of Countering Violent Extremism Working Group for the period of 2017-2019. During this Co-Chairmanship, the Working Group will focus on Social Media, CVE in Prison, and the role of Women and Family at CVE.

In this regard, on 7-8 May 2018 in Bali, Indonesia together with the United States and the Netherlands co-hosted a regional workshop on the Initiatives on Addressing the Challenge of Returning Families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. This workshop is the second workshop out of three workshop that would be held by the GCTF to address the problems posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters who have accompanying family members. The workshop will come up with a non-binding good practices to handle the returning families of FTFs which will be put forward for the endorsement at the 2018 GCTF Ministerial Meeting in September 2018.

In the context of the United Nations, Indonesia together with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee co-hosted the 6th Regional Meeting of Heads of Intelligence and Security Services concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Influences in South-east Asia in Bali on 9-10 November 2017. The purpose of the Meeting is to assess how far each country in the region in following up the UNSC Resolution with regard to sanctions to ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida. Participants from 12 countries took part at the Meeting, namely Australia, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Moreover, Indonesia contributes to capacity building for law enforcement officers on the issue of terrorism and transnational crime. In this regard, Indonesia has established the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in cooperation with Australia. Since its establishment in 2004, JCLEC has become a major center of excellence in the region. As of February 2018, JCLEC had organized 1,014 training programs involving 24,680 participants and 5,462 trainers from more than 70 countries.

Promoting a people-centred approach to counter-terrorism

Indonesia believes that promoting a people-centered approach is essential to success in countering terrorism. In this regard, Indonesia has maximized the involvement of citizens in tackling
violent extremism in their communities through close partnership with the police at the precinct level under the community-policing program. The program is aimed at building trust and mutual understanding between the police on the ground and the members of the community in general so that intensive communication can be developed to detect early signs of terrorism in the community.

Promotion of inter-civilization dialogue

The promotion of inter-faith dialogue provides an avenue for fostering tolerance and mutual understanding within pluralistic communities. This effort is carried out in tandem with empowering moderates in support of counter-radicalism actions. Thus, Indonesia is actively promoting dialogue or exchange of views among different religious and ethnic groups at the international level.

Indonesia has also recognized the significant role of civil society in countering terrorism through campaigns for a peaceful, tolerant and harmonious nation. In partnership with civil society organizations, the Government has organized a capacity building program to develop a community empowerment program and other activities aimed at neutralizing terrorist propaganda.

Information sharing and intelligence exchange among countries plays a key role in countering-terrorism, particularly in stopping the flux of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In this regard, Indonesia has strengthened its cooperation with other countries, including with ASEAN countries.

Information sharing and intelligence exchange and document integrity and security in enhancing cooperation to combat terrorism and transnational crimes

Information sharing and intelligence exchange among countries plays a key role in countering-terrorism, particularly in stopping the flux of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In this regard, Indonesia has strengthened its cooperation with other countries, including with ASEAN countries. Until early 2018, there were around 500 to 600 Indonesian citizens who were deported after they attempted to go to Syria. Some of them used ASEAN countries as transit points before traveling to Turkey and ultimately to Syria.

Indonesia also maintains good cooperation with Middle East countries, including the Government of Syria and Iraq in monitoring Indonesian citizens in conflict zones, as well as collecting evidence for the prosecution of Indonesian citizens who are suspected to be involved in terrorist groups as FTFs.

Measures against terrorist financing

To fully support international counter-terrorism, particularly its efforts to fight terrorist financing, Indonesia actively participates as a member of Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML). By virtue of Indonesia's active diplomatic and domestic efforts, Indonesia has been delisted from the International Cooperation Review Group-Financial Action Task Force (ICRG-FATF). Furthermore, Indonesia through the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of 52 countries to strengthen the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regime. To further its efforts at combating money laundering and terrorism financing, Indonesia is in the process of applying to become a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member.

Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Indonesia has taken necessary measures to comply with Security Council Resolution 1540, including cooperation with neighboring countries. Indonesia has always been constructively participating in multilateral negotiations to strengthen non-proliferation and achieve disarmament of WMD in all its aspects.

The Government in 2016 proposed the amendment of the Law No. 10 Year 1997 on
Nuclear Energy which will stipulate three main issues under the National Policy and Strategy of Nuclear Security as well as the penalty that has not been provided by current national law. The three main issues are as follows:

1. Developing the integrated information system to support nuclear security;
2. Increasing coordination related to nuclear security by synergizing the duties and functions of relevant Government authorities; and
3. Strengthening the infrastructure of nuclear security.

On 22 February 2017, Presidential Decree No. 19 Year 2017 on Indonesian National Authority on Chemical Weapons, finally entered into force. With this Decree, Indonesia has a strong legal framework for our National Authority on Chemical Weapons, and proper modalities for enforcing all obligations of the chemical weapons convention.

With regard to enforcement actions, the Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency and relevant agencies conduct monitoring/control on the issuance of regulations and permits, carries out inspections, and implements procedure of the nuclear material inventory accounting system. The verification of inventory is managed by routine inspection, which involves the monitoring of the quantity, location and ownership; movement of materials from one installation to another; and export and import of nuclear materials. Routine inspection also includes monitoring waste management.

In addition, Indonesia has installed seven RPMs (Radiation Portal Monitors) in main harbors (Batam, Balawan, Makassar, Bitung, Tanjung Priuk, Tanjung Perak, and Semarang) to strengthen its nuclear security detection capacity.

**NPT regime**

**Disarmament**

Based on Indonesia’s commitment to nuclear disarmament, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of multilateralism as “the core principle” in meetings on non-proliferation and disarmament. In line with this, Indonesia underlines that the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament should be achieved by lawful methods pursuant to the prevailing international law and within the framework of the United Nations.

Indonesia maintains its position that all pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and comprehensive manner.

Indonesia consistently calls on the nuclear states to fulfill their obligation to reduce their nuclear weapons as part of the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, with a clear time frame.

In addition, Indonesia desires that the process of nuclear disarmament be carried out in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner. On the other hand, the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to pursue their national choices in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be upheld. It is our strong belief that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will ensure the survival of humankind in a regime of sustainable development.

Accordingly, Indonesia hosted two (2) Regional Dialogue and Consultations on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Towards the PrepCom 2017 (co-hosted with Chair-designate Netherlands) and Towards the PrepCom 2018 (co-hosted with Chair-designate Poland)

Additionally, Indonesia contributed to the deliberations of the 1st and 2nd Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT, which was held in Vienna on the 2 to 12 May 2017 and in Geneva on the April 26 to 4 May 2018. Throughout the meeting, Indonesia endeavored to provide constructive recommendations for the Review Conference 2020.
Noting the slow progress towards Nuclear Disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States, Indonesia totally supports and welcomes the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on the 7th of July 2017.

Indonesia has become one of the first fifty countries to sign the Treaty on the 20th of September 2017 on the sidelines of the 72nd UN General Assembly in New York. Indonesia is of the view that the treaty is complementary to the NPT and serves as a major step towards our common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Indonesia is also among the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Treaty, having signed it on the same day it was opened for signature, on 24 September 1996. Indonesia believes that the CTBT is a key element in the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

As an Annex II country, Indonesia has ratified the CTBT through Law No. 1 year 2012, a very timely initiative as it was taken soon after ASEAN Member States concluded negotiations with Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) on the latter’s accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011.

As part of our unwavering contribution towards the universalization of the CTBT, Indonesia, together with Hungary, assumed Co-presidency of Article XIV Conference in 2013-2015.

Indonesia also actively participated in the series of meetings of the Nuclear Security summit, which was held in Washington DC in 2010, Seoul in 2012, The Hague in 2014 and Washington DC in 2016.

Since the inception of the NSS, Indonesia played constructive and have presented a “gift basket” which serve as a reference for countries striving to enhance safety and security in accordance with their respective national processes and legal systems.

**Non-proliferation**

Indonesia’s reaffirms its principled positions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. Indonesia believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and are essential for strengthening international peace and security. Non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament.

Pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring nuclear disarmament obligations is both counterproductive and unsustainable. Indonesia emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and nondiscriminatory agreements.

Indonesia continues to advocate that the universality of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) be made a priority and urges states, which are not yet parties, to immediately accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states.

In line with the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint 2025, Indonesia envisions a Southeast Asia that is not only a nuclear weapons-free zone but also a region that is free of all other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, Indonesia stands ready to intensify the ongoing efforts between ASEAN and NWSs to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty with a view to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol of SEANWFZ by the NWSs at the earliest.

**Peaceful use of nuclear energy**

On the other hand, Indonesia believes that non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable rights of States to acquire, have access to, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

The inalienable right of each State to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign, right to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle, for peaceful purposes...
without discrimination, and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

On 5-7 February 2018, during the working visit of the Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, Indonesia and IAEA signed a practical arrangement on enhancing technical cooperation among developing countries and strengthening South-South cooperation. The arrangement covers a three-year period (2018-2021).

Indonesia has been at the forefront of technical cooperation in such fields as enhancing food security and plant breeding, where Indonesia has assisted trainees from Asian and African countries. In this regard, help was extended by the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) and its Center for Isotopes and Radiation Application (CIRA, BATAN), which is a designated IAEA Collaborating Centre engaged in developing new crop varieties to improve agricultural yields and food security.

iii. Transnational crime

Information sharing and intelligence exchange and document integrity and security in enhancing cooperation to combat terrorism and transnational crimes

Today, transnational crime is considered a major threat to global security. In Southeast Asia. Because of this serious threat to stability and security, ASEAN has become vulnerable. The ASEAN action plan in combating transnational crime (Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime), focuses on several types of transnational crime such as illicit drugs trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, weapons smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, international banking crime and cybercrime.

Considering that crime incidence has a significant impact on stability and security, as it can disrupt and threaten national development, Indonesia has vigorously enforced the relevant laws to protect its citizens from transnational crime.

Indonesia considers drug abuse a deadly threat to the nation, as the country has about four million drug users. Indonesia is one of the few countries that have imposed the harshest drug laws in the world. To Indonesia, these crimes must be eradicated and dealt with comprehensively.

As a country that has become one of the biggest targets for narcotics distribution by international networks, Indonesia has taken a firm step in dealing with this modern form of national threat. At the beginning of his term, President Joko Widodo proclaimed that Indonesia was in a drugs emergency situation and called for a major war against all forms of narcotics-related crimes.

Various efforts have been carried out by the Government of Indonesia by itself and in collaboration with various national elements and components, including the private sector, the police, the military, NGOs, the education sector, and the community. These efforts require new approaches and cooperation across programs and cross-cutting issues in order to provide people with knowledge and understanding that will increase deterrence and ability to resist drug abuse.

Indonesia has also held a series of activities to strengthen the prevention approach through information dissemination and advocacy programs. Indonesia’s prevention efforts has also been strengthened by providing treatment and rehabilitation for drug abusers. Another approach that has been undertaken in this prevention effort is empowering women’s role through family based drug abuse prevention program. In every stage of education, there is an integrated curriculum which stresses prevention in the face of the dangers of drug abuse.

In addition to eradication, rehabilitation is one of the important ways of reducing the prevalence of narcotics abuse. A series of rehabilitation programs can prevent abusers from falling deeper into addiction and prevent them from relapsing. To improve the facilities of rehabilitation institutions, BNN maximizes the reach of the rehabilitation
program by providing support to rehabilitation agencies of government and community facilities scattered throughout Indonesia.

It is imperative for countries exposed to drug problems to engage and participate in initiatives taken by regional, interregional and international counter drug agencies. Indonesia is of the view that in addressing the world drug problem, several factors should be taken into account, such as a zero-tolerance stand against drugs, a comprehensive and balanced approach, and the sovereign rights of each country. To this end, Indonesia welcomes the adoption of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025 to address illicit drug activities and mitigate their consequences on society.

iv. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

In recent years, Indonesia established a comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) governance system through the Disaster Management Law and its subsidiary regulations and policies, Disaster Management Agencies at the national and local levels, risk analysis and Disaster Management plans, partnership and coordination with DRR stakeholders, and all relevant bureaucratic instruments. Considering its importance, commitment to DRR has increased significantly with the passing of the new National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2015-2019, in which disaster management and risk reduction are among priority development programs, particularly as investment to protect economic growth and human development. Indonesia has achieved International Organization for Standardization (ISO) No. 22327 on community-based landslide early warning system.

At the global level, Indonesia’s remains firmly committed to the strengthening of the implementation of international frameworks for disaster risk reduction. This includes the commitment on the outcome of the 3rd United Nation World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) that is the Sendai Framework On Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015 – 2030.

Indonesia stresses the importance of international cooperation to ensure the implementation of SFDRR to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to promote best practices, knowledge sharing and technology transfer. Indonesia also emphasizes the strategic importance of monitoring frameworks at the global and regional levels such as the Global Partnership for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) and the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) to ensure the implementation of SFDRR.

During GPDRR 2017, Indonesia served as Co-chair for the platforms of deliberation on coherence between SFDRR and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indonesia also shared its achievements and experiences in integrating SFDRR into the national development framework. Indonesia also introduced a number of initiatives to build the resilience of communities and cities against disaster, such as the establishment of “Kota Tangguh” (resilient city), “Sekolah Aman Bencana” (Safe School), and Community Based Early Warning systems.

In 2017, Indonesia encouraged AHA Centre to be involved in the distribution of humanitarian assistance to all displaced inhabitants without discrimination in Rakhine State, Myanmar. AHA Centre provided the following assistance: 1) deployment of ASEAN relief items from the regional stockpile in Subang, Malaysia; 2) deployment of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT); and 3) technical assistance such as information management, report writing and secondary data analysis.

Indonesia continues to enhance its role in the region’s disaster management by hosting the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) 2018. ARDEX is scheduled to held on 5-8 November 2018 in Cilegon, West Java. The Exercise is expected to strengthen ASEAN’s collective response to massive disasters in region.

Within the ADMM Plus EWG on HADR, Indonesia participated in the 12th ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA on 31 January to 2 February 2018; and in the 13th Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Initial Planning Conference – Exercise in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 18 and 19 April 2018. Within Army-to-Army cooperation, Indonesia and Thailand organized a Subject Matter Experts Exchange (SMEE), in Jakarta, Indonesia from 2 to 5 May 2018 and in Bangkok, Thailand from 9 to 12 May 2018.

Indonesia’s contributes through its efforts at improving the preparedness of the stakeholders within ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia and Australia organized the 2018 East Asia Summit: International Disaster Assistance Workshop in Perth, WA on 8 to 10 May 2018. The Workshop discussed and developed the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit (EAS Toolkit) to enhance the capacity of EAS participating countries for responding to disasters.

In this regard, several initiatives have been undertaken, such as Indonesia’s active involvement in the formulation of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), and its active participation in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) by being co-chair for 2 (two) working groups namely the ACDM Working Group on Recovery and ACDM Working Group on Knowledge and Innovation Management.

v. Maritime security

As an archipelagic nation, Indonesia places maritime security at the heart of its domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, Indonesia has the obligation to secure the international shipping lanes by observing international laws and regimes such as the regime of maritime domain, the regime for the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passages (ASLP), Innocent Passage, Sea-lanes of Communications (SLOC) and Sea-lanes of Trade (SLOT).

Indonesia intends to manage its maritime resources in a sustainable way, to build and develop maritime infrastructures and connectivity, and to pursue maritime diplomacy and defense. Therefore, Indonesia encourages the enhancement of maritime cooperation in the region, as that is in line with its focus on maritime diplomacy, which is based on sovereignty, security, and prosperity approaches. In this regard, Indonesia identifies seven pillars of such cooperation: 1) Management of Marine Resources and Development of Human Resources; 2) Defense, Security, Law Enforcement and Safety at Sea; 3) Ocean Governance and Institutions; 4) Economic and Infrastructure of the Marine Sector and of Prosperity Enhancement; 5) Management of the Ocean Space and Protection of Marine Environment; 6) Maritime Culture; and 7) Maritime Diplomacy.

In this sense, the ASEAN Regional Forum has rightly decided on maritime security as one of its main concerns. The range of maritime security issues is not limited to traditional security issues, but also extends to the discussion of non-traditional maritime security issues relevant to the region.

Indonesia believes that it is our responsibility as a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, not only to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty and its maritime resources, but also to ensure the safety of shipping and navigation as well as the security of the seas. Indonesia stresses the importance of sharing best practices, developing confidence building measures and capacity building programs in order to enhance our respective capabilities in dealing with maritime security issues.

For that purpose, Indonesia has concluded a number of bilateral agreements and has been part of regional or international arrangements for managing issues of common concern, such as combating illegal activities at sea, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal fishing. Indonesia has arranged for separate coordinated patrols with almost all countries sharing maritime boundaries with Indonesia.
The ASEAN sub-region of the Sulu Sea, where Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines share borders, is facing increasing threats, such as piracy, armed robbery against ships and terrorism. It is imperative to counter these threats within the ASEAN framework and other sub-regional mechanisms. In order to effectively address the issue, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines will conduct Trilateral Patrols in the Sulu Sea. Meanwhile, together with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia continues to secure the busiest sea passage in the region by carrying out the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), comprising of coordinated sea patrols, combined maritime-air patrols as well as intelligence and information sharing activities.

Indonesia puts great emphasis in preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU Fishing. Indonesia observes that IUU fishing is a crosscutting issue, closely related with other crimes, such as people smuggling, human trafficking, forced labor, drugs trafficking, and violation of sanitary and environmental protection regulations. In this regard, Indonesia is of the view that IUU fishing should be dealt with in a comprehensive and holistic manner with emphasis on law enforcement and security aspects. Thus Indonesia welcomes closer cooperation to deal with this issue in the region, including through the adoption of ARF Statement on Cooperation to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing in 2017 which was co-sponsored by Indonesia, the United States, Timor-Leste and Canada. This Statement provides valuable reference and options on how we could further explore practical measures to strengthen existing cooperation in addressing IUU fishing under various ASEAN-led mechanisms.

To follow up this Statement, Indonesia, together with the United States, will convene the ARF Workshop on Best Practices in Maritime Data Analysis to Strengthen Regional Maritime Security from 17 to 19 July 2018 in Bali, Indonesia. Indonesia also proposes the convening of the ARF Workshop and Table Top Exercise on Crimes Related to Fisheries in 2019.

Indonesia has also conducted capacity building initiatives with countries and mechanisms such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting (HACGAM), Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region (RPOA-IUU), and ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum (AFCF), as well as through training and other meetings.

Internally, Indonesia has established International Fish Force Academy of Indonesia (IFFAI) as an international training and training ground for law enforcement officers in the field of fisheries. And to bold our commitment to strengthen the commitment of responsible fisheries management, Indonesia will convene “Our Ocean Conference” (OOC) in Bali on 29-30 October 2018.

Indonesia has also established cooperation with Global Fishing Watch (GFW) as a form of transparency of management and/or utilization of fishery resources. We encourage that ARF Participants could also be part of this mechanism to build transparency of fisheries management in the region.

vi. Information and communication technologies (ICTs)

The advent of cyber capabilities provides both opportunities and challenges. Cyberspace is reshaping the international security environment and the economic and social development of nations worldwide, opening up a new world of capabilities and opportunities. However, cyber threats also pose an increasingly serious challenge to regional security.

Indonesia deems it essential for countries to strengthen cooperation in the area of capacity building, information/intelligence sharing, as well as network building among law enforcement agencies.
IV. Role of ARF

The Joint Communiqué of the 50th Asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, Philippines on 5 August 2017 gives a vision of the future direction of the ARF. The ARF remains important as an inclusive forum in the Asia-Pacific region for fostering constructive dialogue and cooperation among the Participants on political and security issues of common interest and concern.

In the face of an evolving regional architecture, ARF has to maintain its relevance by fully leveraging its potential and demonstrating its uniqueness. One of the strong points of the ARF is that it has built a foundation for political security dialogues that encompasses both civil and military elements. The idea that the ARF could cover the niche on civil-military cooperation has been highly supported by ARF Participants. Even so, the cooperation between the two elements should not stop at disaster relief training/operations or holding regular ARF meetings exclusively attended by military representatives. Instead, the ARF should foster interaction between the civil and military sectors by increasing military representation in all ARF meetings. Combining constructive ideas from the two perspectives is the formula for the ARF to maintain its relevance.

Subsequently, the ARF could also optimize various tools already provided in the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement. These tools empower the ARF to expand and enhance its institutional effectiveness in order to ensure the implementation of the Plan of Action. Those tools include the promotion of the role of the ARF Chair, the activation of the Friends of the ARF Chair, the strengthening of the ARF Unit, the enhancement of the role of the ARF EEPs, and the expansion of ARF partnerships with other regional and global institutions.

It is essential to understand that the ARF is not only an institution, but also a process through which countries in the Asia Pacific region strive to maintain dialogue and carry out activities to promote CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms. A more robust, substantive, proactive, and action-oriented ARF is therefore instrumental to the process. Indonesia is strongly committed to contribute to this cause by continuously generating initiatives and actively participating in the work of the ARF.

Indonesia is committed to keeping an active role in the ARF, including by co-chairing the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (2017 – 2020) with Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (2018-2020) with Russia.

On the whole, Indonesia envisions a more robust, substantive, proactive and action-oriented ARF. Indonesia will therefore continue to contribute to the realization of the ARF’s potential through active participation, initiatives and the development of innovative ideas.
I. Japan’s Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Rapid shifts in the global power balance after the end of the Cold War have enhanced the significance of the Asia-Pacific region, while deepening the relationships of security interdependence and providing opportunities for cooperation across the region. At the same time, these changes have caused problems and tensions in the region and made its security environment even more severe. Large-scale military forces remain concentrated in the areas surrounding Japan. Some actors possess nuclear weapons or continue their development. Meanwhile, the region is facing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, etc. Risks that could hinder open access and free use of various domains such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace are increasing than ever before. In addition, there are growths of international threats, large-scale natural disasters and transnational crime in the regions. Under these circumstances, no single country can no longer secure its peace and security by its own power. It is essential for countries to work together to ensure the peace and security of the international community.

Against these backgrounds, the Asia-Pacific region is making progress cooperating in the field of non-traditional security issues through confidence-building measures, not only in bilateral and trilateral frameworks but also in multilateral security frameworks, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Japan welcomes these developments, as these efforts contribute to create a better regional security environment. Japan is eager to further promote and develop these multi-layered initiatives through the above-mentioned regional frameworks securing peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, situation surrounding Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are major issues that can destabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. It is essential to continue discussing these issues at ARF.

Maritime issues including those surrounding the South China Sea are directly linked to the peace and stability of the region and the international community as a whole. The international community pays attention to these issues in the context of thorough respect for the rule of law and securing the freedom of navigation and overflight. In the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea”: (i) states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law; (ii) states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (iii) states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. These three principles gained supports from many countries, and Japan will consistently support actions based on these principles. In this context, Japan strongly hopes for full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002, and the early conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

On the other hand, Japan remains seriously concerned over the continuing unilateral actions in the South China Sea that could change the status quo and raise tensions in the region, including large-scale and rapid land reclamation, building of outposts, as well as their use for military purposes, including deployment of offensive weapons. Each state needs to refrain from unilateral actions and acts based on the universally-recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in light of the final award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS on July 12, 2016, which is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute. In particular, coastal states need to recognize that in maritime areas pending final delimitation, they are obliged by international law to refrain from unilateral actions that would cause permanent physical change to the marine environment, be it for military or civilian purposes. Japan strongly expects that the parties’ compliance with the award will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. Japan acknowledges the launch of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Such diplomatic efforts should lead to demilitarization and free and open South China Sea.
In the G7 Foreign Ministers’ joint communique issued in April 2018, the G7 foreign ministers reiterated their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order based on international law, to the peaceful management and settlement of disputes without using the threat, and to the freedom of navigation and overflight. In this context, they stressed the importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the rule of law, and expressed their intention to work together with ASEAN and other countries in this endeavor. In the Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique issued in June 2018, the leaders expressed their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas, reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral actions that could escalate tensions, and urged all parties to pursue demilitarization of disputed features. In addition, to follow up on the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Joint Communique, which was issued in Lucca, Italy, in April 2017, the 3rd G7 High-Level Meeting on Maritime Security was held in Rome in November 2017, where the participants discussed countering illegal activity at sea, improving safety and security of maritime environment and enhancing awareness in the maritime domain.

ARF can play an important role in ensuring the rule of law at sea, the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law. In this context, Japan welcomes many initiatives that have been made at ARF for official events aimed to discuss maritime security issues in the region. Japan, for its part, organized the ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in March 2018 in Tokyo, which was co-chaired by Japan and Malaysia. Through active discussions, experiences and lessons learned from countries or regional frameworks on MDA were shared among ARF members who face various maritime challenges including piracy and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing. In addition, the participants deepened their understanding on international cooperation on MDA through exchange of views on the needs of ARF members for enhanced MDA capabilities.

As North Korea conducted nuclear tests in January and September 2016, and September 2017, and has launched 40 ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2016, the United Nations Security Council continued to unanimously adopt relevant resolutions, deciding that North Korea shall abandon all weapons of mass destructions, including biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit” reaffirmed North Korea’s commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan supports this as a step for the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern regarding North Korea. Japan continues to work with the international community for peace and stability in the region and beyond, and to urge North Korea to fully implement the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, including its uranium enrichment activities, violates the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks. The international community must continue to strongly urge North Korea to dismantle all WMD, including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missile of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. To this end, it is imperative for each country to fully implement measures against North Korea pursuant to the relevant UNSCRs. On top of these measures, Japan will also continue to steadily implement measures of its own. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard are conducting information gathering activities for vessels suspected to be in the violation of UNSCRs including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean-flagged vessels. JMSDF has found several activities strongly suspected ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea, and Japan shared information with Partner countries, notified UNSC 1718 Committee and published the information. In April 2018, Partner countries have decided to engage in monitoring
and surveillance activities based in Japan against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers. Japan will continue to closely coordinate with countries concerned, including the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia, strongly urging North Korea to change its policy and comply with the relevant all UNSCRs.

With regard to Japan-North Korea relations, Japan continues to seek to normalize its relations with North Korea through comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, as well as settlement of the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. The abductions issue is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and the safety of Japanese citizens.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

1. Japan’s security policy

   (1) “Proactive contribution to peace”

   The security environment surrounding Japan has become even severer due to the dramatic change in the global power balance and the emerging threats that extend beyond national boundaries. No nation can maintain its own peace and security by itself. Being well aware of this, and under its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will contribute even more actively to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as a control tower, and in accordance with the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will continue its path as a peace-loving nation, work in close cooperation with the U.S. and other partners as a major global player in the international community, and implement its national security policies in a steadfast manner, thereby making a more proactive contribution to peace and stability of the region and the world more than ever. Under this policy, Japan puts its efforts in the area of maritime security including anti-piracy measures in Asia and Africa, and utilizes capacity-building assistance in the Southeast Asia.

   (2) Japan’s legislation for peace and security

   Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security took effect in March 2016. The legislation is designed for Japan both (i) to make a seamless response to any situation amid an increasingly severe security environment surrounding the country, and (ii) to put into concrete practice its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, and thereby administer more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community.

   Now that the Legislation for Peace and Security has taken effect, Japan’s “use of force” will be permitted, under the Constitution, to exercise the right of collective defense in a limited manner in addition to the right of individual self-defense if the “Three New Conditions,” which are unmatched worldwide in terms of stringency, are met.

   The legislation has expanded the range of activities in which Japan can engage in during U.N. PKOs. It also allows Japan to participate in internationally coordinated operations for peace and security that are outside the U.N. PKO framework. Furthermore, the legislation allows Japan to engage in cooperation and support activities, such as supply and transportation under certain conditions, when the peace and security of the international community is threatened including those concerning U.N. resolutions. By allowing these activities, the legislation enables Japan to better contribute to the peace and stability of the international community.

   However, Japan’s postwar posture as a peace-loving nation has not been changed for more than 70 years. Japan has taken various opportunities to explain both its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and the Legislation for Peace and Security to the countries concerned in a transparent and sincere manner, winning support and understanding from countries around the world.
2. Japan’s defense policy

(1) National defense program guidelines and the medium-term defense program

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2014 and beyond set forth the basic principles for Japan’s national defense, explains the significance and role of its defense capabilities, and on the basis of these provides fundamental guidelines for future capability development, including the specific architecture of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the target level for main equipment improvement. In light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan since 2010 when the previous guidelines were drawn up, the Government made a Cabinet decision on the new NDPG in December 2013, taking the NSS into account.

The new NDPG sets out the following three points: (i) Japan’s own efforts, (ii) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and (iii) active promotion of security cooperation, as the pillars for the essential defense of the lives and property of Japanese people as well as the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters, and airspace. The NDPG calls for the building of a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” that will enable the JSDF to conduct a diverse range of JSDF activities seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as demanded, under the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. It also calls for promoting a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) is, on the other hand, the first five-year defense buildup program laid out to achieve the target level for defense capabilities set forth in the NDPGs. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately 24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately 700 billion yen will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform.

(2) Defence-related expenditures

In addition to the cost of maintaining and operating the JSDF, defense-related expenditures in Japan include the cost of improving the living environment in the vicinity of defense facilities and support for US forces stationed in Japan.

As the budget based on the new NDPGs and MTDP mentioned above, the FY2018 defense-related expenditures budget includes an array of projects aimed at the establishment of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.

Excluding the costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO (the cost of implementing the SACO Final Report to mitigate the impacts on people in Okinawa), the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and the expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft, the expenditure budget for FY2018 has been increased by 39.2 billion yen (or 0.8% growth rate) from the previous fiscal year to 4,938.8 billion yen, marking the fifth consecutive year of growth. Major factors behind the growth include additional JSDF activity expenses needed to respond to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, as well as personnel expenses resulting from requests relating to organizations/personnel and compensation system review, and obligatory outlay expenses relating to equipment, etc. on past contracts.

Including 5.1 billion yen in SACO-related expenses, 216.1 billion yen in the U.S. forces realignment related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and 31.2 billion yen in expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft, Japan’s total defense-related expenditure budget for FY2018 amounts to 5,191.1 billion yen, an increase of 66 billion yen, or growth rate of 1.3% from the preceding fiscal year.

The FY2018 defense-related expenditure is 0.88% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). SACO-related expenses, U.S. forces realignment related
expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft excluded, and 0.92% with the above three included.

3. Japan-U.S. security arrangements

Given an increasingly severer security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, securing the forward deployment of U.S. forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance are essential not only for the security of Japan, but also for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance, the two countries have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, such as ballistic missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and maritime security, including efforts made under the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and the Legislation for Peace and Security.

In light of the recent security environment, the U.S. will strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the Alliance. Japan and the U.S. will further enhance cooperation with allies and partners in the region.

III. Japan’s Contributions to Regional Security

1. Maritime security

Securing the safety of navigation is indispensable for the international community as a whole, and international coordination and cooperation are crucial to maintain it. “Open and Stable Seas” underpinned by a maritime order that is governed not by force or coercion but by laws and rules that constitute global commons essential for peace and prosperity of the entire world. It is necessary to maintain and develop them. From this perspective, Japan has been striving to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight through various initiatives such as counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close coordination and cooperation with other countries.

As part of its efforts to secure the safety of navigation in Asia, Japan has advocated the establishment of a forum to provide EAS member countries with the opportunity to discuss maritime cooperation and maritime issues in the region, which has borne fruit in the form of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). At the fifth EAMF, which was held in Indonesia in December 2017, Japan underscored the importance of maintaining and strengthening a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region and of making this region a global commons that brings stability and prosperity to any country, while introducing Japan’s efforts in the area of maritime security including capacity building assistance for maritime law enforcement capabilities such as anti-piracy measures and MDA.

In addition, Japan took the initiative in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Japan has been actively contributing to the implementation of the ReCAAP by making financial contributions to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) and supporting ReCAAP ISC’s efforts in the area of information sharing and capacity building assistance. For instance, the 2nd Capacity Building Executive Programme on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia was held in Tokyo in 2018. This Executive Programme provided an opportunity for the participants from 22 countries to deepen their understanding on Japan’s efforts and views on such topics as the importance of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, safety of sea lanes, freedom of navigation, rule of law at sea, enhanced cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies, MDA and counter piracy/armed robbery against ships operations by utilizing the ReCAAP framework.

At the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Vientiane, Laos in September 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would further strengthen support for ensuring the rule of law at sea and maritime safety by conducting
human resources development for approximately 1,000 personnel over the next three years.

In ARF, Japan co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS) with the Philippines and the United States from August 2014 to August 2017. Together with the co-chairs, Japan worked on revising the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. Co-Chairmanship was handed over to Viet Nam, Australia and EU. Furthermore, Japan serves with Malaysia as the lead countries for “confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements, and cooperation,” which is one of the priority areas for the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. In this context, Japan hosted the ARF Seminar on Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia, in Tokyo in March 2015 (co-chairing with the US, Malaysia, and India), ARF Seminar on Regional Confidence Building and Law of the Sea, in Tokyo in December 2015 (co-chairing with Vietnam and India), and ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in Tokyo in March 2018 (co-chairing with Malaysia).

2. Disaster relief

Japan has provided active support in responding to large-scale natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2017, Japan dispatched two Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Expert Teams to Sri Lanka: An Expert Team in response to the damage caused by the collapse of a garbage mound at the disposal site in April; An Expert Team in response to the damages from the floods and landslides caused by the heavy rainfall in June. During FY2017, Japan provided emergency relief goods in four cases to assist the people affected by major natural disasters, such as the heavy rainfall in Sri Lanka and the earthquake in Papua New Guinea. In addition, Japan extended emergency grant aid in four cases in response to humanitarian crisis such as the destabilized situation in the northern part of Rakhine State, Myanmar.

Japan also co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) together with Myanmar and China (from July 2013 to July 2016). In February 2016, it co-chaired the 15th ARF-ISM on DR in Nay Pyi Taw. The meeting was attended by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Authorities, and Disaster Relief Agencies from ARF member states as relevant international organizations. The meeting discussed regional frameworks, activities, and cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, from both civil and military perspectives in light of the latest initiatives taken by these countries. As Myanmar has often been hit by floods and cyclones in recent years, the participants generally seemed to have much interest in disaster risk reduction (DRR). In fact, many questions were asked in relation to the capacity-building assistance that Japan has been providing to ASEAN, as JICA has already extended assistance in Myanmar of various kinds in this sector. Japan will work with other ARF participants and contribute to ARF activities in order to make regional disaster relief cooperation more practical and effective.

In addition, Japan is an active player in other regional frameworks as well. For example, Japan proactively participates in EAS initiatives that address disaster risk reduction as a priority area. In the framework of Japan-China-ROK trilateral cooperation, the three countries hold a regular tabletop top exercise on disaster management, whereby they discuss the humanitarian assistance and disaster management mechanisms of each country in order to enhance mutual understanding. Within the framework of Japan-ASEAN cooperation, Japan provides three types of assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). The first type of assistance concerns the development and operation of an ICT-based disaster management system. This has helped facilitate timely information-gathering and responses, and international rescue and relief operations. The second type concerns the development and operation of the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA). DELSA has been developing a framework for stockpiling emergency relief supplies at specific locations and transporting these items to disaster-hit areas. The third type of Japan’s assistance through the AHA Centre concerns a human
resources development project in DRR. This project involves a six-month training program for officials at the DRR organization in ASEAN Member States. Japan welcomes the proactive and abstructive role the AHA center played in extending humanitarian support for the affected persons in regards to the situation in the Marawi and Rakhiane State.

3. Counter-terrorism and transnational crime

In the field of counter-terrorism, Japan continues to make efforts against international terrorism and violent extremism in cooperation with the countries and the regional and international organizations concerned. In this regard, at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Vientiane, Laos in September 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide approximately 45 billion yen over the next three years for Asia as comprehensive counter-terrorism measures consisted of (i) improvement of counter-terrorism capacity, (ii) measures to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism, and (iii) social and economic development assistance for creating a foundation for a moderate society. He also stated that Japan would help develop 2,000 personnel for counter-terrorism over the next three years. As a part of this commitment, in February 2018, Japan decided to contribute approximately 38 million US dollars for enhancing counter-terrorism and violent extremism measures in Asia through UN and other international organization, which is additional to the last year’s contribution of approx. 35 million US dollars.

Specifically, Japan has continuously held multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. To help build counter-terrorism capacity, Japan supports projects in such areas as border control, aviation security, maritime security, and law enforcement under a number of frameworks, which include the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue (AJCTD), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (AMMTC+Japan), and the Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (SOMTC+Japan). Based on the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime, which was adopted by the 17th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in Myanmar in November 2014 and expanded its scope to include international organized crime, SOMTC+Japan is now working on the development of the SOMTC + Japan Work Plan for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2018-2022), which will further strengthen our efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational crime.

Japan has also been stepping up its efforts to combat transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region in three major aspects. The first aspect is strengthening transnational legal frameworks. For example, Japan has been tackling drug problems in alliance with ARF member countries through measures such as the exchange of information on synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS), and investigative cooperation in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and other drug-related treaties. The second aspect is supporting local initiatives designed to combat illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, and corruption in the Southeast Asia through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The third aspect is promoting policy coordination with various countries and international organizations. Japan actively participates in multilateral frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and the Bali Process, which involves consultations on irregular immigrants and trafficking in persons.

4. Non-proliferation and disarmament

The international community is facing serious challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as highlighted by North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, while the difference on approaches towards a
world free of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon States, between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, and even among non-nuclear-weapon States remains. In spite of the severe security situation which the international community finds itself in, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, will continue to take concrete and practical steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons, believing that only the promotion of cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States will lead to a world free of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, Japan is committed to maintaining and enhancing the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has been engaging in various diplomatic efforts. These efforts include the contribution to the three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) through the NPT Review process, as well as the submission of resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly, the activities through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the contribution to the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD). In addition, Japan has been engaged in efforts for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a member of the Group of Friends of the CTBT. Also, Japan is currently contributing to the creation of the necessary dynamism and momentum for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiation as a members of the high-level expert preparatory group.

Taking into consideration serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime, such as North Korea’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, Japan is engaged in outreach activities in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of achieving three key objectives: (i) promoting the universalization of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and reinforcing their implementation at the national level; (ii) establishing and strengthening export control systems; and (iii) raising awareness of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and enhancing related efforts. As part of these activities, Japan has been hosting a range of meetings each year, including the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and Asian Export Control Seminar.

5. Cyberspace and outer space

Cyber attacks are becoming increasingly diversified and sophisticated. Some attacks target huge number of organization and individual as seen in recent attacks by “Wannacry,” “Notpetya,” and other types of malware, as well as attacks that resulted in the lots of crypto currency equivalent to approximate 58 billion Japanese Yen from the Coincheck Inc. in January 2018. How to develop systems and capabilities to protect states, and the lives and property of the citizens from such cyber attacks constitutes a major challenge from both national security and economic perspectives.

To this end, Japan is working with other countries concerned to promote a mutual understanding on these issues in a number of areas. One such area is deliberating international rules, including those on how to apply existing international law to acts in cyberspace as well as developing international norms. Other areas include supporting capacity building and developing confidence-building measures.

Countries in Asia-Pacific Region are discussing cyberspace issues under frameworks such as ARF and ASEAN+3 meetings. The ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), which was endorsed at the 22nd ARF, calls for confidence-building measures, awareness-raising, capacity building support, and crime control regarding cybersecurity. Japan is proactively participating in international meetings on these issues to boost cyber security in the region. From the viewpoint of the increasing importance of the situation surrounding cyberspace, ARF recognizes the value of continuing to exchange views from a comprehensive standpoint with the aim of promoting a peaceful, safe, open, and coordinated ICT environment, and preventing conflicts and crises through capacity-building assistance while building confidence among nations. In January
2018, Japan held the ARF-ISM on ICTs Security 1st Open Ended Study Group (Study Group) on Confidence Building Measures in Tokyo as co-chair countries with Malaysia and Singapore. Following this meeting, in April 2018, Japan co-chaired 2nd Study Group and 1st ARF-ISM in Kuala Lumpur. In February 2018, Japan and the UK co-hosted Cyber Workshop with ASEAN in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. Going forward, Japan will increase its support for capacity building in cyber security with a focus on ASEAN countries according to the “Japan’s Basic Strategy of Cybersecurity Capacity Building.”

Japan’s bilateral initiatives include discussions and dialogue on cyberspace with the U.S., Australia, the U.K., France, India, Russia, Israel, Estonia, Germany, ROK, Ukraine, and European Union (EU). Japan has also been holding trilateral talks involving China and ROK, and exchanging views with such international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In addition to these initiatives, Japan will accelerate ties with ASEAN countries and public/private-sector collaboration to reinforce its efforts to address cyber security issues.

In order to deal with issues pertaining to the increase of congestion in outer space and threatening space activities of other countries to secure the safe and stable use of outer space, Japan has been proactively engaged in building a safe space environment and promptly developing international rules. Within the framework of the ARF, Japan has been playing a leading role, as it hosted the second ARF Workshop on Space Security, which was held in Tokyo in 2014, promoting the common understanding of the member states with regard to the current situation of space environment and the importance of prompt development of international rules. Japan also has been conducting bilateral consultations and cooperation with various countries focusing on space issues. Japan is committed to the establishment of the rule of law in outer space. For this purpose, Japan has been actively engaged with discussions in multilateral fora including establishing the “Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the United Nations, as well as strengthening norms of responsible behavior for all space activities, as mentioned in the joint statement of G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in April 2018.

6. Preventive diplomacy

Japan believes it is important for ARF to make steady progress from the first stage of the “promotion of confidence-building measure” to the second stage of “development of preventive diplomacy” and further to the third stage of “approaches to dispute settlement.” However, despite the cumulative efforts of the ARF countries have so far succeeded in facilitating confidence-building measures to a certain extent, progress toward the development of preventive diplomacy has only just begun. In this context, Japan welcomes the approach taken in the ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Training, held in Yogyakarta in November 2015, and the ARF Training Course on Preventive Diplomacy, held in Hanoi in March 2016; that is, the approach of analyzing case studies in the region while sharing the understanding of the concept and modus operandi of preventive diplomacy among the ARF participants in order to promote preventive diplomacy. Japan has long been committed to conflict prevention and peace building through human resources development and other modalities means. Japan will take advantage of its expertise in these areas to further contribute to the ARF’s efforts to promote preventive diplomacy.

7. ADMM-Plus Initiatives

The ADMM-Plus provides a framework for addressing a wide range of security issues common to the region. Japan is committed to this framework with the aim of developing the forum into a key pillar of regional security cooperation. Within the ADMM-Plus, seven Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) have been established to increase concrete military-to-military cooperation in handling security issues common to the region:
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counter terrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian mine action and cyber security. Japan is taking part in each EWG to further enhance regional security cooperation by actively exchanging views with other countries and making proposals.

Japan had helped to intensify cooperation with other member countries in military medicine areas by acting as co-chair of the EWG on military medicine along with Singapore, conducting field training exercises on HA/DR and military medicine in Brunei in June 2013. From 2014 to 2017, Japan co-chaired the EWG on HA/DR together with Lao PDR. Efforts were made to formulate a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the establishment and management of a Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) so as to amplify the activities of assisting foreign forces that are accepted by disaster-affected countries in the event of natural or other disasters. In August 2015, for example, a table top exercise (TTX) was conducted in Lao PDR. In September 2016, exercises on HA/DR and military medicine, AM-Hex 2016, were conducted in Thailand in order to test the final draft of the SOP. At the 9th EWG meeting on HA/DR in December 2016, the SOP was adopted and it has been on the track of discussion in the framework of ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) since then.

The ADMM-Plus is a vital framework providing the member countries with opportunities to conduct multilateral talks on a wide range of regional security issues in an open manner. Japan believes it is important to keep this framework open without putting any restriction on the issues to be addressed in the forum, while allowing the participating countries to discuss a wide range of issues in a candid manner.

IV. Japan’s Future Contribution to Enhance Capability of ARF

As a framework for candid discussion on the political and security issues of the entire Asia-Pacific region, ARF has steadily contributed to confidence-building in the region. In recent years, various initiatives have been put forward in a wide range of areas, including maritime security, disaster relief, counter terrorism and transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, preventive diplomacy, cyberspace, and outer space. Some of these initiatives have been translated into exercise-type activities, such as the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx). During the inter-sessional year of 2015-2016, Japan played a leading role in animated discussions within the ARF by exercising initiatives in such areas as maritime security, disaster relief, outer space, and counter terrorism.

To further develop ARF as an action-oriented framework instead of making it serve merely as a forum for dialogue, ARF countries that co-organize each initiative need to establish practical agenda items and programs with the cooperation with stakeholders, including relevant international organizations and experts. Also, member states need to work more closely with one another to avoid duplications among initiatives and produce favorable outputs. In addition to these efforts to improve ARF functions, it is also important to strengthen cooperation with other regional security frameworks in pursuing effective synergy. The edge of the wedge is the area of disaster relief. In this particular area, similar exercises are increasingly conducted under different regional frameworks such as ADMM plus. Member states need to streamline such exercises from the viewpoint of reducing personnel and financial costs for participating countries and pursing practical initiatives. The ARF Multi-Year Strategic Exercise Plan Workshop, held in April 2015, discussed how to optimize disaster relief exercises. Such discussions are in line with this awareness. They give a hint as to how the effectiveness of the ARF can be ensured in the future.

Japan will proactively contribute to improve ARF functions and coordinate among different regional frameworks while continue to exercise initiatives in various areas.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Regional and international peace and security, and development cooperation are of paramount importance to all countries and regions to achieve sustainable development as well as regional economic integration. Nevertheless, many countries in various parts of the world are currently facing growing challenges and uncertainties in pursuing their national socio-economic development and cooperation, such as terrorism, violent extremism, natural disasters, climate change, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking of illicit drug, armed conflict, issue of cyber security and poverty and development gap. In addition, geopolitical landscape is more diversified and economic globalization is confronted with the rising of protectionist policies.

Peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region has continuously been maintained and promoted through bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation and platforms, including ASEAN-led mechanisms. The good relationships between countries have been enhanced, and they continue to grow and yield fruits of peace and prosperity.

Recently, the inter-Korean ties have been improved and the Inter-Korean Summit concluded with concrete outcome which signifies the enduring aspiration of the Korean people for peace, prosperity and unification. Equally important, the Summit between the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA) held on 12 June 2018 in Singapore also concluded with positive achievements. The Lao PDR welcomes and supports such positive development and views that the outcomes of the aforementioned Summits are significant milestones for the relationships between the two Koreas and between the DPRK and the U.S., which will in turn contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the world as well as the denuclearisation of the Peninsula.

The peaceful and stable environment in the Asia-Pacific presents a solid foundation not only for countries in the region in the pursuit of their socio-economic development and mutually beneficial cooperation, but also for ASEAN in consolidating and strengthening its community through the realisation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

The achievements of ASEAN over the past 5 decades have proved the relevance of ASEAN and made ASEAN a unique and developed example of regional inter-governmental organisation, playing a significant role in promoting and maintaining peace, security, stability and prosperity in the region. Besides, ASEAN-initiated frameworks or platforms have served as venues where ASEAN and its external partners as well as external partners themselves engage one another on issues of common interest and concern, thus contributing to enhancing mutual trust and confidence among participants and also promoting peace, security, stability and development in the region and beyond. Most importantly, ASEAN’s centrality has been recognised by all external partners. Moving forward, ASEAN will further strengthen its resilience and innovation, while enhancing its external relations through its outward looking policy to ensure the realisation of regional economic integration and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Since its proclamation in 1975, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has implemented the two strategic tasks of national safeguarding and development by pursuing its consistent People’s Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy of self-defence with the participation of the entire Lao multi-ethnic people in conjunction with socio-economic development and international cooperation in accordance with its foreign policy of peace, independence, friendship and cooperation.

The objective in the pursuit of the People’s Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy is to safeguard the national independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, to protect national interests and the entire Lao multi-ethnic people, and to ensure national security and social order, thus creating a favourable environment for socio-economic development of the Nation. The Lao PDR’s consistent policy is to neither participate in any military bloc or alliance, nor allow foreign military bases in the territory of the Lao PDR since its armed forces are for self-defence only.

The national defence and security task is the task of the entire Lao multi-ethnic people where everyone has a role to play as stipulated in the Constitution of the Lao PDR.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

The Lao PDR is fully committed to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and ASEAN Charter, and pursuant to its foreign policy of peace, independence, friendship and cooperation and the People’s Comprehensive National Defence and Security Policy of self-defence, the Lao PDR has deepened and widened its cooperative relations with all friendly countries and regional and international organisations around the world through the principle of mutually beneficial cooperation to enhance mutual understanding, trust and confidence in the region and the world, thereby ensuring a favourable environment for promoting development cooperation.

To date, the Lao PDR has established diplomatic relations with 140 countries and actively participates in sub-regional, regional and international frameworks such as ASEAN, ASEAN-initiated frameworks (ASEAN Plus One, APT, ARF, ADMM Plus, EAS and AMMTC), United Nations, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEANAPOL, INTERPOL, and Shangri-La Dialogue, among others.

The Lao PDR has over the years been entrusted and given the honour to chair many sub-regional, regional and international meetings. To name a few, the Lao PDR chaired ASEAN in 2004-2005, the 1st Meeting of State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010, the 9th ASEM Summit in 2012 and ASEAN for the second time in 2016, including the ADMM and other defence-related meetings. The Lao PDR is also the Coordinator of Clearance and Reduction Education for the term 2017-2019 under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Lao PDR has been working with regional and international communities to address various challenges of common concern and interest based on its ability and in accordance with the established international principles and norms.

a. Counter-terrorism and transnational crime

At the national level, even though the Lao PDR has not yet criminalized terrorism in a comprehensive manner and does not yet have any specific law on counter-terrorism, the Government however has paid great attention to addressing this issue by enacting and using other legal measures as stipulated in the Penal Code to suppress and punish illegal activities related to the crime of terrorism which can cause damages to life and property of its citizens, public security and order and national integrity. A National Anti-Terrorism Ad-Hoc Committee has been established in the Ministry of Public Security with the mandate, inter alia, to act as an advisory body to the Government on counter-terrorism related issues and to submit the National Report to the 1373 Committee established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. Also, the Lao PDR attaches great importance to the issue of anti-money laundering and counter-funding of terrorism. The Anti-Money Laundering Intelligence Office was established in 2007 under the direct supervision of the Bank of the Lao PDR. In addition, the National Assembly of the Lao PDR enacted the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) on 21 July 2014 upon the request of the National Coordination Committee for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism, a governmental body with the mandate to supervise such issues. Following that, the President of the
Lao PDR promulgated the Decree No. 012/PO, dated 4 February 2015 to implement the new Law on AML/CFT. The latter laid the fundamental and legal framework for the Lao PDR to undertake the work of AML/CFT rigorously. In addition, the Lao PDR issued sub-legislation under the Law on AMK/CFT “Order on the Withholding, Freezing or Seizure of Funds Relating to Terrorists of Financing of Terrorism (revised), No. 03/PM, dated 11 February 2016”.

At the bilateral level, to ensure safety and security in the border areas, and to jointly address border-related issues, the Lao PDR has bilateral cooperative mechanism on border issues with each of its immediate neighbouring countries, namely Lao-Cambodia General Border Committee (GBC), Lao-China Joint Border Inspection Committee, Lao-Myanmar Provincial/Regional Border Committee (P/RBC), Lao-Thai General Border Committee (GBC), and Lao-Viet Nam Border Committee (BC).

At the regional level, the Lao PDR joined the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in 2007 to further advance the work on anti-money laundering and counter-funding of terrorism in the country as well as to enhance cooperation with other countries in the region. The Lao PDR ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism on 28 November 2012.

The Lao PDR successfully hosted and chaired the 9th AMMTC, 3rd AMMTC+China Consultation, 7th AMMTC+3 Consultation and 1st AMMTC+Japan Consultation which were convened in Vientiane in 2013. The Lao PDR also hosted and chaired the 17th SOMTC and 15th SOMTC+ 3, and co-chaired with Russia the 12th SOMTC+ Russia Consultation held on 22-27 May 2017 in Vientiane, and chaired the 21st ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Department and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its related meetings held on 21-24 November 2017.

At the international level, the Lao PDR is now a state party and signatory to the following 13 UN conventions on counter-terrorism:

- Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971);
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973);
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1979);
- International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988);
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988);
- Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);
- Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991);
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and

b. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Underscoring the great importance of disarmament and non-proliferation in ensuring durable international peace and security, the Lao PDR is supportive of the equal implementation of the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Lao PDR has neither the capacity nor the intention to produce, use or possess, transport, transfer or deliver nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to any states or non-state actors. The Lao Government fully supports the effort
of the international community to address the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation in the world and this should be carried out under the principle of multilateral diplomacy. Today, nuclear proliferation continues to be a major threat to global peace and security. Amid regional conflicts and disputes as well as civil unrests occurring across various regions, the international community should redouble its efforts to address the issue of armament. In this context, the Lao PDR will continue to work closely with regional and international communities to address those issues.

In addition, the Lao PDR is a state party to a number of regional and international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation such as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or Nuclear Weapon Treaty Ban, among others.

The Lao PDR believes that the creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones has significantly contributed to strengthening the global regime of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and the enhancement of regional and global peace and security, and consolidated international efforts towards peace and security. The Lao PDR further reiterates that the recognizance of these zones by the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) is of great importance. In this regard, the Lao PDR encourages the NWSs to accede to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty as early as possible.

The entry into force of the CTBT, of which the Lao PDR also attaches great importance to, would certainly contribute to moving forward the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. However, more than 20 years after its adoption, the CTBT remains ineffective. It is, therefore, the duty of the international community to ensure the entry into force of this Treaty. In this context, we are hoping to have those who have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.

The Lao PDR recognizes the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards. The Lao PDR became a member of the IAEA in 2011 and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol in November 2014. Currently, the Lao PDR is drafting the Law on Radioactive Protection and Nuclear Safety.

To address the serious impact arising from the unexploded ordnances (UXOs), the Lao PDR, as a state party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or OSLO Convention, has been actively promoting this universal Convention in order to prevent further victimization of humankind. The Lao PDR has adopted its own national SDG “SDG18: Lives Safe from UXO” aimed at UXO clearance, risk reduction and victim assistance.

In this connection, the Lao PDR calls upon those countries which are not yet party to the OSLO Convention to accede to it. The Lao PDR also encourages friendly countries, international organisations and development partners to continue to provide funding and technical assistance to support Lao PDR's efforts to clear the UXOs in the contaminated areas in many provinces of the country. In order to further strengthen regional cooperation in this area, the Lao People's Army is co-chairing with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) from 2017 to 2020 and have successfully conducted a number of meetings as follows:

- 5th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 22-25 May 2017, Vientiane, Lao PDR;
- 6th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 1-5 October 2017, Moscow, Russia;
- 7th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, 24-27 April 2018, Xiengkhouang, Lao PDR; and
- 8th ADMM-Plus EWG on HMA, October 2018, Moscow, Russia.
In addition, the Lao PDR pledged to contribute on a voluntary basis USD 10,000 to the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre.

c. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

The Lao PDR places high importance to and supports regional and international cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) based on its limited resources and in accordance with the principle of request or consent of the affected countries.

The Lao PDR hosted and chaired the 7th Joint Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Relief on 5 April 2017 in Vientiane and the 31st ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, 8th Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Relief, 5th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management and 6th Conference of Party to ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response on 17-19 October 2017 in Luang Prabang, and the Lao PDR has volunteered to be co-chair of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief for 2 inter-sessional years (2018-2020).

The Lao People’s Army has actively contributed to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). To name a few, the Lao People’s Army co-chaired the ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR with Japan from 2014 to 2017 and has successfully hosted and chaired a number of meetings as follows:

- 5th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR on 10-12 December 2014, Vientiane, Lao PDR;
- 6th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR (TTX) on 5-7 August 2015, Vientiane, Lao PDR;
- 7th ADMM-Plus EWG on 9-10 December 2015, Tokyo, Japan;
- 8th ADMM-Plus EWG on 10 May 2016, Tokyo, Japan;
- AM-HEX 2016, 1-11 September 2016, Chonburi, Thailand; and
- 9th ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR, 14-16 December 2016, Vientiane, Lao PDR.

In addition, the Lao People's Army hosted and chaired the 7th ACMMC under the theme: “Strengthening ASEAN Military Medical Cooperation in HADR” on 11-15 July 2017 in Vientiane, Lao PDR.

d. People smuggling

The Lao PDR acknowledges that people smuggling and human trafficking violate fundamental rights, freedom and dignity of its citizens as stipulated in the Lao PDR’s Constitution and laws as well as in international conventions. Therefore, the Government has attached great importance to addressing those issues by establishing a National Steering Committee on Human Trafficking in 2004 as a dedicated anti-trafficking governmental body, which is comprised of high ranking government officials from ministries concerned. Amongst others, the Committee cooperates with neighbouring countries, international agencies as well as with non-governmental and civil society organizations to actively run projects and joint activities in response to human trafficking that takes place domestically and across the border. It also enhances the implementation of the policies and legislation as well as National Plans of Action (NPA) and other preventive measures on countering human trafficking to be in line with sub-regional and regional action plans. To support this ambitious work of the Committee, the Ministry of Public Security set up the Department of Anti-Human Trafficking to act as the Secretariat and the National Focal Point for cooperation with foreign governments, and regional and international organisations. The Department of Anti-Human Trafficking chaired the 32nd Meeting of Heads of Specialist Units on Trafficking in Persons on 23 May 2017 in Vientiane Lao PDR.

In order to institutionalize the fight against human trafficking as well as to bring justice to the victims and punish the offenders, the Law on Anti-Human Trafficking has been approved by the Lao National Assembly in 2015 after a broad consultation process. The law calls for strong punitive measures, including maximum penalty of life imprisonment and covering all forms of human trafficking while also foreseeing protection and
assistance for the victims. In fact, the law reflects our obligations and commitments under relevant regional and international instruments to which the Lao PDR is party.

In order to fight against human trafficking in a comprehensive and effective manner, the Lao Government further enhances its strong bilateral cooperation and collaboration with countries in the region such as Thailand, Viet Nam and China as well as multilateral collaboration with ASEAN and Mekong sub-region countries, including through ASEAN-Australia cooperation on counter trafficking, Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking Process (COMMIT) and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crimes.

The Lao PDR signed the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) in 2015 and ratified it in 2017.

At the international level, the Lao PDR has concluded bilateral agreements and is party to the following conventions on and relating to the fight against human trafficking:

- Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
- Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
- Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child;
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Lao PDR and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children;
- Agreement between the Government of the Lao PDR and the Government of Viet Nam on cooperation in Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Persons and Protection of Victims of Trafficking;
- Agreement between the Governments of the Lao PDR and People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in Preventing and Trafficking in Persons; and

IV. Role of the ARF

Since its inception, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a multilateral forum with ASEAN as the primary driving force, has played an important role in promoting mutual understanding, confidence and trust among diverse participants through dialogue and practical cooperation, thereby contributing positively to the maintenance and promotion of peace, stability and development cooperation in the region and the world as a whole.

The ARF has achieved significant progress in its three-stage process towards the ultimate stage of conflict resolution. In light of growing traditional and non-traditional security challenges and in moving forward, all participants should build upon the achievements made thus far including through joint initiatives, and move the ARF process forward at a pace comfortable to all ARF participants, taking into account the diversity of this Asia-Pacific region with a view to further enhancing mutual understanding, trust and confidence, and maintaining and promoting peace, stability and cooperation for development in the region and the world at large. To this end, the Lao PDR will continue to work with all participants under ARF processes, including the ARF ISM on DR that the Lao PDR will co-chair from 2018 to 2020, in contributing to the realisation of the ARF Vision Statement.
I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

The evolving nature of contemporary non-traditional security issues such as the scourge of terrorism, cyber security threats and displacement of persons, has caused instability and volatility in the region.

Of particular concern to Malaysia is the prevailing crisis in the Rakhine State, which has resulted in the tragic loss of innocent lives, the displacement of persons, and the influx of irregular migrants to neighbouring countries. This protracted situation may potentially render its victims susceptible to recruitment by extremists. Taking this into account, Malaysia encourages all ARF Participants to assist and support Myanmar in handling this complex situation, wherever possible.

The high rate of technological innovation, the dominance of commercial, off-the-shelf software and the increasing proliferation of entities with embedded and unchangeable software mean that cyber-attack potential will likely remain ahead of existing defence capabilities.

Given the importance that Malaysia attaches to cyber security, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan spearheaded the establishment of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of ICTs (ARF ISM on ICTs Security) in 2017, to ensure that the ARF has a specific platform for in-depth discussion on these pertinent issues.

At the same time, challenges of a more traditional nature still remain. The existence and the proliferation of nuclear weapons pose grave threats to the ASEAN region. To ensure that the overarching goals of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) are attained, it is crucial to ensure the accession of the Nuclear Weapon-States (NWS) to the SEANWFZ Protocol at the earliest opportunity.

Issues concerning the South China Sea remain of vital importance. Despite positive developments in the area, it is imperative that we continue to promote peace, security and stability, freedom of navigation and overflight, and non-militarisation. Adherence to the rule of law, maximum self-restraint in the conduct of activities, avoidance of the threat or use of force, as well as ensuring maritime claims are resolved through peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the UNCLOS 1982, are critical in furthering peace, security and stability, and must be the foundations for conduct and engagement in the South China Sea.

Malaysia remains committed to the full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety, and looks forward to the expeditious conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

The recent Inter-Korean Summits between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 27 April 2018 and 26 May 2018, and the Summit between the United States of America (US) and the DPRK in Singapore on 12 June 2018, are indeed positive developments which would contribute to a favourable environment in the region. Malaysia has long advocated for differences between the two Koreas to be resolved through peaceful negotiations and dialogue.

Since its establishment, the ARF has been an effective tool in contributing towards the region’s peace, security and stability. This is partly attributable to the nature of the ARF, which encourages inclusive, open and frank discussions on political and security issues affecting the Asia-Pacific region.

In this regard, Malaysia will continue to accord high priority to efforts aimed at ensuring regional peace, security and stability. Malaysia maintains strong defence cooperation with other ASEAN Member States as well as ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, by playing an active part in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus. These fora represent important elements of the strategic regional architecture, and are vital for the continued security of the region.
II. National Security and Defence Policy

The primary objective of the National Defence Policy is to protect and defend national interests which form the foundation of Malaysia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and economy. Through self-reliance, Malaysia is committed to developing the Malaysian Armed Forces’ (MAF) capability and the dependency on its own resources through relevant defence industries to support and sustain MAF operations. This is coupled with a total and integrated approach of ‘total defence’ which involves all levels of the community, from individual citizens to private actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government agencies in sharing the responsibility to defend the country.

As ASEAN is the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy, defence relations with other ASEAN Member States are of primary importance to Malaysia. Among the key components of the regional security architecture are the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus (which involves eight ASEAN Dialogue Partners). The establishment of the ADMM in May 2006 was mandated by the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action 2004. As the highest defence mechanism within ASEAN, the annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ discussions and exchange of views on current defence issues and security challenges.

As a member of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) since 1971, Malaysia is committed to it, as it has, among others, contributed towards the military’s development and enhancement of its professionalism. With this in mind, Malaysia recognises defence diplomacy as an important effort in relation to the prevention and de-escalation of conflicts which could undermine peace and stability. Malaysia believes that the appropriate, if not the best, tools to resolve traditional security issues are those based on confidence-building measures, transparency and construction of positive norms, and the establishment of effective channels of communication.

Malaysia believes that comprehensive action developed from its national security and defence policies are important in addressing traditional, new and emerging threats. Malaysia fully supports the United Nations’ and the international community’s efforts to preserve universal peace and security.

Total defence expenditure on an annual basis

Malaysia’s total defence expenditure for 2016 was about RM16.4 billion (USD4.01 billion).

Defence expenditure for 2017 was capped much lower at RM14.06 billion (USD3.49 billion).

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter-terrorism


Brutal and heinous terrorist attacks perpetrated in recent years demonstrate the evolving methods of terrorists and violent extremists. Such attacks have taken place at soft targets such as restaurants, cultural sites, and public areas where people gather to meet and socialise. Taking this into account, it is becoming increasingly important not just to protect the land and maritime border areas and national key infrastructure, but also public places.

With this in mind, the Malaysian Government is currently formulating Guidelines on Enhancing
the Security of Public Places and Facilities from Terrorist Attack. These guidelines aim to enhance security in public places and facilities by involving government agencies (federal, state and local authorities), the private sector and the public (Malaysian citizens or foreigners in the country) by raising awareness on the actual risks, taking appropriate preparedness measures, promoting better interoperability and ensuring resilience to attacks.

Counter-messaging

On countering the narratives put forth by Da'esh, Malaysia has moved forward by establishing the Digital Strategic Communications Division (DSCD) under the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), and the Counter Messaging Centre (CMC), which is operated by the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). Since its inception on 1 August 2016, DCSD has designed, produced and disseminated more than 300 digital counter/alternative narrative products, which include digital banners, videos and digital comics, over three major social media platforms, namely Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. The CMC, together with enforcement elements, has been instrumental in synchronising efforts to counter radical social media messages and to present the true image of Islam.

The digital products cover a range of themes that are highly relevant to countering violent extremism - among others, raising awareness among parents of youths who could be vulnerable to radicalisation, attacking the myths of masculinity associated with the romanticised notion of Jihad, using figures and images from popular culture as well as traditional poetry, and satirizing and undermining the efforts of Daesh.

Moving forward, Malaysia has established the King Salman Centre for International Peace, designed to counter radical ideologies and promote Islam as a religion of peace and moderation.

Promoting a people-centred approach to counter-terrorism

Malaysia believes that terrorism needs to be addressed in a more comprehensive manner, and not through military means alone. Malaysia is of the view that winning the hearts and minds of the people is far more effective than other measures combined. Apart from strict legislative and enforcement measures, Malaysia adopts a "whole-of-government" approach focusing on the root causes contributing to terrorism, principally the social and economic problems of society.

Malaysia has also implemented deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes to change the mindset of radicalised extremist individuals. Here, the Malaysian Government employs a two-pronged strategy that places importance on the collective and inclusive participation of all relevant entities involved in the programme, as follows:

- Entrusting renowned clerics or ulama figures in providing accurate explanations of jihad or struggle from a religious perspective;
- Assigning former terrorists or rehabilitated persons who could be positive role models to persuade former comrades to leave their misconceived struggle, as they would be able to point out with more credibility, any crucial factual misrepresentations and misconceptions which are linked to radicalism;
- Empowering family members, who could assist in persuading terrorists to abandon their misguided pursuits, both psychologically and spiritually; and
- Endowing non-governmental organisations which could assist in creating societal awareness of the negative consequences of terrorism and violent extremism.

This approach, complemented with various forms of welfare programmes to facilitate their reintegration into society, has shown a success rate of 97.5 percent.
In addition, the Malaysian Institute for Research in Youth Development has also conducted research to identify the potential level of understanding and acceptance of Da’esh among students of higher education institutions in Malaysia. This research has facilitated assessments on the seriousness of threats to national security, as well as planning of counter-radicalisation efforts among youth in Malaysia. For instance, the Ministry of Youth and Sports has produced informative brochures on Da’esh for circulation among students and youths.

The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) is also involved in conducting public awareness programmes. These include SEARCCT’s officials’ engagement sessions with university and college students on the dangers of terrorism and extremism, with a view to developing their skills in countering the spread of terrorist propaganda online. As the Government of Malaysia understands counter-terrorism is also a ‘battle of ideas’, this initiative aims to complement on-going counter-terrorism efforts by focusing on the development of ‘mental firewalls’ among the population, particularly the youth and other vulnerable groups, in order to prevent them from being influenced by extremist ideologies.

The first two-series workshop entitled ‘Student Leaders Against Youth Extremism and Radicalisation’ (SLAYER), was attended by 100 undergraduate leaders from institutes of higher learning across Malaysia. The workshop’s module was designed to invoke a sense of responsibility among undergraduate leaders in countering the terrorist threat on a peer-to-peer level. Throughout the workshop, participants were exposed to current terrorism and extremism trends among youth, and the need for all parties to be part of the solution in countering these threats. The participants were also taught how to produce digital counter-narrative products and disseminate them via social media platforms.

As of April 2018, SEARCCT has conducted 221 capacity-building programmes. These programmes have been attended by 8,507 participants of which 1,848 were foreign nationals and 6,659 were locals. In 2017, SEARCCT conducted a total of 21 capacity-building programmes while three programmes have been conducted since January 2018. These programmes were conducted with the cooperation of SEARCCT’s local and international collaborators. A number of representatives/officials from ASEAN Member States have attended and benefited from various SEARCCT training courses and workshops. Between 2003 and February 2018, a total of 1,151 participants from ASEAN Member States attended regional courses/workshops organised by SEARCCT.

Promotion of inter-civilisation dialogue

The concept of Moderation promotes the values of understanding, tolerance, mutual respect and inclusiveness in resolving differences and conflicts peacefully.

Malaysia successfully tabled the UNGA Resolution on Moderation at the 68th Plenary Meeting of the 72nd UNGA on 8 December 2017 in New York, with 135 Member States voting in favour. A total of 29 Member States had also co-sponsored the resolution. Among the elements in the resolution is the United Nations’ designation of 2019 as the International Year of Moderation.

At the national level, Malaysia continues to promote mutual understanding and tolerance among members of its multiracial and multi-religious society by organising inter-religious dialogues, as well as educational and community programmes.

Information sharing and intelligence exchange

At the regional level, Malaysia, together with other ASEAN Member States, has implemented practical measures to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation, which includes working with external partners. ASEAN cooperation in combating terrorism primarily takes place within the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), the East Asia
Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC).

SEARCCT has also published various works on the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism, which include the following:

a) Aviation Security in Malaysia (2008);
b) SEARCCT Selection of Articles (2009);
c) SEARCCT Selection of Articles (Volume 2) (2011);
d) Dynamics of Youth and Terrorism (2011) with JAIF;
e) Reaching the Youth: Countering the Terrorist Narrative (2012) with JAIF;
f) SEARCCT Selection of Articles (Volume1/2013);
g) Al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah (JI) (2013);
h) Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (2016) with UNODC;
i) Lahad Datu Incursion and its Impact on Malaysia’s Security (2016);
j) Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: The Case of Daesh (2016); and

On security cooperation, Malaysia has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with most of its ARF partners in particular fields, such as transnational crime, anti-money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing, as well as cybersecurity.

Malaysia continues to exchange information and financial intelligence with more than 150 members of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and 34 countries including ASEAN countries with which Malaysia has signed MoUs. Malaysia also plays a leading role in the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, through the provision of AML/CFT-related training and technical assistance especially on the effective implementation of AML/CFT requirements and preparation for Mutual Evaluation Exercises (MEE) for members in the region.

A groundbreaking achievement for the region was producing the first terrorism financing Regional Risk Assessment of Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) in eight Asia-Pacific nations, namely Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and new partners Brunei and New Zealand. The risk assessment, launched at the Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, called on regional authorities to improve data collection and sharing nationally and across the region to identify, monitor and disrupt high-risk NPOs and also vet personnel to make it harder for terrorists to infiltrate NPO finances. This work was built on a previous major milestone, the issuance of the Regional Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (RTFRA) in August 2016.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) considers terrorism a direct threat to its vision of secure, open and prosperous economies. Malaysia takes part in the annual APEC Counter Terrorism Working Group meetings, which discuss the grouping’s joint actions in addressing the terrorist threat and plan capacity building programmes to help secure the region’s people and its economic, trade, investment and financial systems from terrorist attack or abuse and trade-based money laundering.

Malaysia also engages and works closely with the UN. The UNSC Resolution 1267 Sanctions Committee, led by the Committee’s Chair, undertook a visit to Malaysia on 27-29 August 2017. The visit was held to discuss the Da’esh threat in Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region, with a view to enhancing the full and effective implementation of sanctions measures. It was the Committee’s first visit to Malaysia, following the successful visit of its Analytical Support and Monitoring Team in 2012 and 2016. The visit concluded successfully with the delisting of one of two Malaysian nationals on the sanctions list.
On intelligence sharing, the Royal Malaysian Police continues to work closely with INTERPOL and its counterparts through the I-24/7 Global Police Communications System, through which crucial information on terrorism and terrorist activities can be communicated in real time. Such information sharing includes the reporting to INTERPOL of stolen and lost travel documents.

Malaysia's membership in the FATF, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Egmont Group also provides it with a platform to cooperate in various AML/CFT initiatives, especially in terms of information sharing and capacity building.

Measures against terrorist financing

Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) conducted on Malaysia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime in 2014 recognized the high level of compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations on preventive measures including suspicious transactions reporting (STR), customer due diligence (CDD) and wire transfers requirement. In addition, the assessors also acknowledged the reporting institutions' (RI) understanding on ML/TF risk, AML/CFT obligations and application of mitigating measures.

Malaysia's legal framework supports its ability to give effect to the UNSC Resolution 1267 designation for asset freezing measures without delay. The Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLA) and its regulations provide for an automatic translation of United Nations' designations into designations under Malaysian law and direct reference to the lists maintained by the United Nations. Malaysia's well-developed systems to promptly transmit designations and freezing obligations to the RIs and the public without delay add to its effectiveness.

As of 2 January 2018, Malaysia's AML/CFT requirements are also imposed on virtual currency exchangers through invocation as “reporting institutions” under AMLA. Following the invocation, the Central Bank of Malaysia has issued the AML/CFT Policy for Digital Currencies - Sector 6 (the Policy) on 27 February 2018. The scope of requirements under the Policy includes the identification and verification of customers and beneficial owners, on-going monitoring of customers’ transactions, sanction screening, suspicious transaction reporting and record keeping.

Malaysia continues to work closely with selected RIs, which include financial institutions, to share current and emerging TF trends and methods as well as operational intelligence to support the efforts of the Royal Malaysian Police in preventing terrorism and terrorism financing. This partnership, which involves meetings on a periodic basis, has resulted in effective enforcement actions including the arrest and prosecution or deportation of individuals suspected to be involved in terrorist activities, and an increase in the number of suspicious transaction reports. Malaysia has also recently issued restricted red flags and typologies to improve reporting institutions' awareness on TF methods and channels to support early detection of TF-related transactions and further improve the quality of STR submission.

The National Strategic Plan on Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing and Counter-Proliferation Financing (NSP) for 2015-2020 was developed to address findings and gaps identified through risk assessment processes and the MEE, and to fulfil other domestic needs. The following action plans have been initiated to ensure effective implementation of preventive measures against the risks of ML/TF:

1. Continuing and intensifying guidance and outreach programs to reporting institutions including on sharing of risk information on TF threats, targeted financial sanctions (TFS) on TF and other compliance issues.

2. Ensuring consistent application of AML/CFT measures across financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) through the establishment of Financial Sector Sub-Committee and DNFBP Sub-Committee,
which consist of regulators and supervisors of financial institutions and DNFBPs.

3. Strengthening the implementation framework on TFS on TF with the establishment of a working group led by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). The deliverables include refining parameters and procedures for variation of the freezing order of listed entities, refining parameters for listing individuals and entities under the domestic list and strengthening engagement with relevant stakeholders affecting by the TFS.

4. Preventing the abuse of non-profit organization (NPO) from the threat of TF through greater coordination among NPO regulators in the areas of risk information sharing, organising outreach and dialogue sessions and undertaking risk-based supervision on high-risk NPOs.

ii. Maritime security

Trilateral cooperative arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines established the Framework for Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Immediate Measures to Address Security Issues in the Maritime Areas of Common Concern (Framework) in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 14 July 2016. The trilateral cooperative Arrangement (TCA) was designed to intensify maritime security efforts to address kidnapping of seafarers by militant groups operating in Southern Philippines. The TCA includes maritime patrols and assistance to vessels in distress, as well as the establishment of a hotline of communication during security incidents and emergencies.

The Trilateral Maritime Patrol was launched in Tarakan, Indonesia on 19 June 2017. Malaysia hosted the launching of the Trilateral Air Patrol (TAP) in Subang, Selangor, on 12 October 2017. The launching was attended by the Defence Ministers of the three countries. Malaysia subsequently conducted two TAP Operations on 8 November 2017 (participated in by observers from Malaysia and the Philippines) and 28 November 2017 (participated in by observers from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines). The Philippines hosted a Trilateral Port Visit in Tawi-Tawi, Philippines, on 13-15 November 2017.

iii. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Malaysia remains committed to pursuing global, nuclear disarmament with a view to creating a nuclear-weapons-free world. The reality of achieving this goal rests on the fulfilment of the basic bargain embodied in the three (3) pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Malaysia remains concerned that there are still impediments to further reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Weapons States. The lack of transparency, the high alert status of nuclear weapons, the continuing pursuit of nuclear programmes by a few countries and the insistence of others to remain outside of the NPT, continue to pose significant challenges to all of us.

Malaysia will continue to play a constructive role in promoting international peace and security. Malaysia is of the view that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity, and that the full and effective implementation of the NPT obligations by Nuclear Weapons States, in particular, plays a crucial role in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Malaysia regrets that no consensus was achieved during the 2015 NPT Review Conference. We hope that the upcoming 2020 NPT Review Conference will be able to achieve meaningful outcomes and that all State Parties will work together under the aforementioned pillars of the NPT, Malaysia, as the incoming Chair of the 3rd NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting in 2019, looks forward to working with all State Parties towards a fruitful meeting that would, in turn, lead to a successful 2020 NPT Review Conference.
Malaysia was actively involved in the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons Leading towards Their Total Elimination which resulted in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 7 July 2017. We are proud to be among the first few States to have signed the TPNW, and are actively pursuing its ratification. TPNW sends the powerful message that nuclear weapons are categorically unacceptable and that the political and legal impact of this Treaty will steer the international community towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Malaysia was supportive of the two UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2016. Resolutions 2270 (March 2016) and 2321 (November 2016) were adopted in response to the DPRK’s nuclear tests in January and September 2016, respectively. Malaysia, which was a non-permanent Member of the UNSC at that time, co-sponsored and voted in favour of both resolutions.

In fulfilling the obligations stipulated under UNSCR 1540 (2004), Malaysia enacted the Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010) on 5 April 2010, which came into force on 1 January 2011. STA 2010 provides for control over the export, transhipment, transit and brokering of strategic items, including arms and related material, and other activities that will or may facilitate the design, development and production of WMDs and their delivery systems.

In order to give full effect to the provisions of STA 2010, several subsidiary legislative provisions were also enacted. After seven years of implementation, STA 2010 underwent its first amendment in 2017. The purpose of the amendment was to adapt the STA to the changing dynamics of proliferation scenarios and to ensure its compliance with the relevant UNSCR without discouraging trade activities. The STA (Amendment) 2017 came into force on 8 September 2017.

Malaysia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 23 April 2014. Malaysia is committed to upholding the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and believes that it adds value to a country’s existing arrangements and efforts to curb illicit trafficking of weapon of mass destruction (WMD).

The Malaysian National Authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), officially established in September 2006 in conjunction with the promulgation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Act 2005, has served as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to assist Malaysia in fulfilling its obligations under the CWC.

Malaysia continues to support activities under the ambit of the ARF relating to non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Pursuant to the decision of the 23rd ARF Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane, Lao PDR, in July 2015, Malaysia, together with Canada and New Zealand, co-chaired the 7th, 8th and 9th ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD), held respectively in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2015), Putrajaya, Malaysia (2016) and Auckland, New Zealand (2017). The deliberations of the ISMs revolved around the three (3) pillars of the NPT.

Malaysia also hosted the Malaysia-Thailand Cross Border Nuclear Security Exercise from 31 October to 4 November 2016. This exercise, co-organised with the Thai Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was the first of its kind and saw both governments working together to prevent the proliferation of radioactive materials across state borders. Besides relevant agencies from both countries, members of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) were also invited as observers.
Malaysia will be hosting the Regional Nuclear Detection and Response Table Top Trilateral Exercise in August 2018. The exercise will be co-organised with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the IAEA and would involve three (3) countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The exercise will focus on enhancing detection and response to nuclear security threats involving shared maritime borders and public areas.

Malaysia is also actively undertaking efforts towards enacting the Atomic Energy Bill, which will allow Malaysia to ratify and accede to various international instruments on nuclear safety and security such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Protocol, the IAEA Additional Protocol and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The Bill will also strengthen Malaysia’s efforts in the non-proliferation and disarmament field.

Bioscience technology

Given that information in the biosciences field is increasingly accessible through the medium of modern information technology, Malaysia strongly believes that there is a need to enhance scientific and technological cooperation between States Parties, both for the socio-economic progress of developing countries, and for the fight against infectious diseases and threats of bioterrorism.

Malaysia, through its Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), an agency under the Ministry of Defence, has formed a technical cooperation programme in 2012 with the Cooperative Biological Engagement Programme (CBEP), Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the United States of America in the field of biosecurity. This initiative would enhance Malaysia’s capacity to protect the country against biological threats and aims to prevent bio-crime through cooperation on safe working practices, accurate techniques and procedures for assessing risks of biological misuse.


As a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Malaysia continues to fully adhere to its obligations thereunder. Malaysia recognizes that it is important for States Parties to undertake necessary measures, including reviewing relevant constitutional process to implement the provisions of the Convention, as stipulated under Article IV of the BWC. In demonstrating its commitment to the BWC, Malaysia is in the process of finalising a comprehensive BWC Bill, which would reinforce existing legislation such as the Arms Act 1960, Customs Act 1967 and STA 2010.

Arms control

With regard to arms control, Malaysia had been supportive and constructive throughout the process of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Malaysia voted in favour of all the resolutions related to the ATT, and was seen by other Member States, as well as the Presidents of the July 2012 ATT Conference and March 2013 ATT Final Conference, as a country that could bridge divides. Malaysia signed the treaty on 26 September 2013, and is currently working towards the ratification of the same.

Malaysia was also the facilitator on the issue of transit or transhipment as well as a member of the Drafting Committee during the Final ATT Conference. In demonstrating support and commitment to the Treaty, Malaysia attended the preparatory meetings as well as Conferences of States Parties since the first conference was held in Cancun, Mexico in 2015. During the meetings and conferences, Malaysia shared its views on the implementation of the Treaty and hoped that the Treaty would receive support from all states in order to achieve the Treaty’s main objective to stem illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the region.
iv. Transnational crime

Malaysia has introduced several laws and policies to combat transnational crime. These initiatives are amended, reviewed and rationalised on a regular basis to address key concerns and challenges of today’s transnational crime outlook. Malaysia also believes that close relationships with neighbouring countries as well as strong global cooperation serve as important impetus in combatting the spread of transnational crime.

Information sharing and intelligence exchange in enhancing cooperation to combat transnational crimes

Malaysia will continue to play its role in the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Convention to Combat Transnational Crime, which was adopted on 30 September 2015 during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (10th AMMTC) in Kuala Lumpur. The declaration, among others, recognises the continued need to be vigilant and to address the issue in a timely manner, to reiterate ASEAN’s commitment in combatting transnational crime as specified by AMMTC, and to endorse two new areas of concern, namely illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber, as well as people smuggling.

Through the ARF platform, Malaysia hosted the 22nd ARF on 6 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. Out of the five priority areas under the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), Malaysia has been tasked to lead two, namely Priority 3: Use of Information and Communication Technologies, with Russia and Australia, and Priority Area 4: Counter Radicalisation, with Australia.

Malaysia has been working closely with ASEAN Member States and shall continue to conclude security arrangement in the forms of Agreements / Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with like-minded countries to forge strategic cooperation in eliminating and disrupting the commission of these crimes by criminal syndicates.

With regard to broader multilateral fora, Malaysia has attended the 27th Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 18 May 2018. The annual meeting is held to discuss issues concerning crime prevention and criminal justice. The focus for this year’s meeting will be on criminal justice responses to prevent and to counter cybercrime in all its forms, particularly through the strengthening of cooperation at the national and international levels.

Promoting collaboration in addressing the issue of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants

Malaysia ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC) on 24 September 2004 at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly. UNTOC is the main international instrument to counter transnational organised crime, including trafficking in persons. Subsequently, Malaysia acceded to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, on 26 February 2009.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, the lead agency on transnational crime for Malaysia, is currently studying the remaining two UNTOC supplementing Protocols, particularly the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

The 7th Ministerial Conference on Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime and its associated Senior Officials’ Meeting are scheduled to be held in Bali, Indonesia on 6 and 7 August 2018.

Malaysia is an active member of the Bali Process framework, and is one of the 15 Member States of the Bali Process Ad Hoc Group. The group, established during the 3rd Ministerial Conference on the Bali Process in 2009, serves as a mechanism for comprehensive dialogue to address regional crises on a case-by-case basis. Malaysia is also Co-Chair of the Bali Process Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks, together with New Zealand.
Amendments to the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007

On the domestic front, Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (ATIPSOM) with the latest amendments incorporated in 2015. This demonstrates Malaysia’s political will and relentless efforts in addressing trafficking in persons.

On this point, three regulations were gazetted under ATIPSOM, namely:

i) ATIPSOM (Permission to Move Freely and to Work) (Foreign National) Regulations 2016; and

ii) Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (Released of Trafficked Person) (Foreign National) Regulations 2016; and

iii) ATIPSOM (Payment of Allowance to Trafficked Persons) Regulations 2017.

Malaysia, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, launched the National Action Plan (NAP) against Trafficking in Persons for 2016 to 2020 on 16 August 2016. The NAP outlines the government-led transformation process following an amendment last year to the ATIPSOM 2007. The purpose of the amendment was to strengthen victim protection by allowing free movement, employment and salary entitlement as well as expanding the role of non-governmental organizations.

Promoting collaboration in addressing drug trafficking

Malaysia has consistently called for stringent measures to be adopted in curbing illicit drug-trafficking. Priority should also be given to preventive programmes to curb drug abuse. Malaysia, through the National Anti-Drugs Agency, has taken the initiative on drug treatment measures by opening ‘Cure and Care’ clinics to provide treatment and rehabilitation for drug abusers, drug users, co-dependents, employers and individuals, without entailing the possibility of being charged under current laws.

Malaysia participated in the UN Special Session on World Drug Problems, held in New York from 19 to 21 April 2016. It was the 30th Special Session convened to discuss issues of common concern and interest to UN Member States. During the meeting, Malaysia, as Chair of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters, delivered the ASEAN Position Statement on Drugs.

On 10 March 2017, the Cabinet of Malaysia approved a new National Drug Policy, which incorporates new reforms to achieve a drug-free Malaysia through the elimination of supply and demand for drugs. It also provides for a more comprehensive approach in dealing with drug threats in the country.

Under the purview of the National Anti-Drug Agency (NADA), the policy is built on five fundamental areas, as follows:

i) Prevention Education;
ii) Treatment and Recovery;
iii) Enforcement;
iv) Harm Reduction; and
v) International Cooperation.

In addition, the Royal Malaysian Police, through its Special Tactics and Intelligence Narcotics Group (STING), has been tasked to conduct investigations leading to the arrest of leaders of drug smuggling syndicates.

Corruption

Malaysia’s ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) reflects its commitment to promote and strengthen measures in combating corruption at the domestic, regional and international levels. As a fully engaged member of the Convention, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) works closely with its local and international counterparts with regard to recovery of assets of illicit origin, which has direct linkages with money laundering and corruption activities.
The Malaysian National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) place combatting corruption among the seven (7) key areas of priority of the Government, to assist in the nation’s transformational program, and to enable Malaysia to become a high income nation by 2020. This is done through addressing the root causes of corruption in promoting open and transparent governance in both the private and public sectors. At the domestic level, Malaysia has put in place several comprehensive laws such as the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (Amendments 2006), Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 and the Whistle-blower Protection Act 2010.

4. Role of the ARF

This year marks the ARF’s 25th anniversary. Since its inception, the ARF has become an increasingly important platform for constructive dialogue on political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Its dynamic and inclusive composition encourages cooperation on issues of mutual concern, promoting stability in the region.

Like our fellow ARF Participants, Malaysia is of the view that it is important to build on the ARF’s current work, with the aim of addressing the region’s security challenges. As such, Malaysia looks forward to witnessing further progress in the ARF process, particularly in terms of the envisioned transition from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and subsequently to conflict resolution.

This change must take place at a pace comfortable to all, on the basis of consensus, in line with established principles of the ARF. It is axiomatic that preventive diplomacy can be carried out successfully only when there is a strong foundation of trust and confidence among us. Malaysia firmly believes that the confidence building measures collectively pursued under the auspices of the ARF over the past quarter-century have generated the requisite momentum for us to advance to the next stage, as envisaged in the ARF’s founding document.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Asia-Pacific is a strategically important region in the world. As South East Asia is typically included in Asia Pacific Region, some problems happening in Asia Pacific Region have threatened the peace, stability and security in the region. Southeast Asia region is strategically located between Eastern and Western hemispheres of the world. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN Member States through the political, economic and cultural sectors, have contributed much to regional security and stability. Yet, among ASEAN Member States, issues such as border disputes between neighbouring countries, multiple claims to certain islands, illegal border trades, transnational crimes, human trafficking and interference in the internal affairs of other nations are the problems that needed to be carefully tackled.

The military power expansions of regional States, the disputed islands issues of East Asia and the power rivalry of super powers are the regional security problems which can transmute from the form of a spark to a flame at any time. If the problems are not peacefully tackled, these situations will impact from state-level security to regional security. As mentioned above, there are not only the traditional security threats to the Asia-Pacific region, but also the non-traditional security threats to the region. The threats include international terrorism, production of WMDs, arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal drugs producing and trafficking, human trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters and climate change, epidemic of infected diseases and illegal migration. As the consequences of technology developments, the momentum of Globalization assists the spread of non-traditional security concerns and such concerns will grow from regional to global level.

II. National Defence Policy of Myanmar

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Myanmar Tatmadaw upholds the three main national causes as the national policy and always takes the responsibility of national security and defence. Regarding the Defence of the Union of Myanmar, the article 42 of State Constitution (2008) has clearly promulgated that:

(a) The Union of Myanmar shall not commence aggression against any nation.
(b) No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of Myanmar.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar lays down the following National Defence Policies to safeguard the national interests of the Union as well as the citizens:

(a) To prevent all acts detrimental to the three main national causes which are non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of the national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.
(b) To formulate the National Defence with the People’s War Strategy centered at Tatmadaw as pillar depending on the synergy of entire people.
(c) To valiantly and effectively prevent foreign aggression and interference in the internal affairs of the Union, deploying various ways and means while avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
(d) To employ a defence system that has oriented towards friendly relations with other nations in accord with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
(e) Not to permit forming military alliance with other nations and the deployment of any foreign troops in the territory of the Union.
(f) To cooperate with international community in non-traditional security issues and anti-terrorist affairs and to render assistance when calamities occur in the Union.
b. Defence expenditure

The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar allocated Defence Budget about US $2.4 Billion (3.2 % of GDP) for 2017-2018 fiscal year.

Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and has promoted the regional cooperation. In the same year, Myanmar became the member of Bay of Bengal Initiative of Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and has promoted the cooperation with South Asian countries. After becoming the ASEAN Member State, Myanmar joined ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is the most important political and security organization in Asia-Pacific region and has participated at the dialogues and workshops organized by the ARF.

Myanmar has commenced formulation the bills for anti-terrorism since 2005. After carrying out the amending and adding the complements to the bills with regard to the funding and handing over of criminals, Myanmar signed the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among Like-Minded ASEAN Member Countries. Moreover, Myanmar signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism-ACCT as member in 2007 and ratified the Convention in 2012.

Regarding anti-narcotic measures, Myanmar has attended annual Meetings of ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter-ASOD as an observer before joining ASEAN. After becoming a member of ASEAN in August 1997, the Union annually attends ASOD since its 20th meeting and has been implementing its resolutions.


For regional cooperation, Myanmar signed the MOU for narcotic drugs control with China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia in 1993 and MOU for the Centre of Information Sharing in Asia-Pacific region was signed with ASEAN Member States and Republic of Korea in 2014. A 15-year project for total elimination of narcotic drugs was implemented from 1999-2000 to 2013-2014 through the adoption of five measures: the elimination of poppy cultivation; eradication of narcotic drug use; preventative measures; organising local people to support the measure; and cooperation with international organizations. Anti-narcotic measures are also conducted in real time collaboration with adjacent countries in the region. In order to meet Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Project’s requirements, another 5-year drug elimination plan for the fiscal years 2014-2015 to 2018-2019 is currently being implemented. For the effectiveness of anti-narcotic measures, the Department of Narcotic Drugs Elimination was reorganized into Myanmar Police Force Narcotic Drug Suppression Division in 2013.

In order to build regional security and friendly relations with regional countries, Chiefs of Myanmar Armed Forces have all paid goodwill visits to regional countries. Reciprocally, Military Leaders from regional countries have also paid goodwill visits to Myanmar. Senior military officials and related Ministers from Myanmar have attended ASEAN defence-related meetings and participated in regional security activities. Moreover, Myanmar has participated in regional security exercises.

As ASEAN is enclosed in the Asia-Pacific region, the security threats to the region are also challenges for ASEAN. International terrorism, production of WMDs, arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal drug producing and smuggling, human trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters, climate change, epidemic of infected diseases and illegal migration are the challenges for not only the region but also for the global security.

With regards to the role of ASEAN armed forces, the contributions of the armed forces based on the principles of coordination and cooperation to the stability and peace of the region are critical.
In responding to the regional security challenges by the cooperation and principles of joint actions, the role of ASEAN armed forces should continue emphasizing on a more stable and secure region. Moreover, the non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters, terrorisms, maritime security and transnational crimes, epidemics, food and energy security, human security, cybercrimes, climate changes and global warming are still regional concerns and the ASEAN armed forces should continue conducting the information sharing, capacity building, joint exercises and trainings.

ASEAN Member States should continue to cooperate in enhancing peace and stability of the region and contribute in cooperative manner to encourage the States which possess nuclear weapons to sign the additional protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), traditional security challenges and non-traditional security challenges that will impact regional peace and stability such as combat the rise of extremists and terrorists, disaster management and information security, combat drug trafficking, human and arms smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal migration, money laundering, sea piracy and maritime security, climate change and protect epidemics like Zika.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region is central to New Zealand’s security and economic wellbeing. New Zealand values its engagement with regional processes, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which promote the common goal of a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. New Zealand plays an active part in helping these fora realise their objectives. Sustained commitment to bilateral and regional relationships underlines the importance that New Zealand places on partnerships within the region and the wider global security environment.

As a small country, New Zealand depends on the international rules-based system to ensure an even playing field for all countries and to ensure the prosperity and stability of the region. These rules are not just for the benefit of small countries. They provide certainty and equal opportunities and protections for all states, no matter their size.

In addition to a strong rules-based system, close regional cooperation on security threats is increasingly important as the nature of threats continues to evolve. New Zealand is working to ensure we – as a country and as a region – are well-equipped to deal with the emerging risks posed by the increased use of technology, potential security impacts of climate change and the diverse range of actors seeking to challenge global rules and norms.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be one of the most pressing security threats in our region. DPRK’s provocative behaviour throughout 2017 included its largest nuclear test and the inaugural test of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, all of which were in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. New Zealand remains committed to its international obligations, including fully implementing sanctions in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We have been encouraged by recent dialogue and diplomatic efforts towards a peaceful solution to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK. New Zealand welcomed the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, signed by the DPRK and Republic of Korea, and the Joint Statement signed by the US and the DPRK on 12 June 2018. It is our hope that these diplomatic efforts build trust and enable progress towards lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and enhance the stability and prosperity of our region.

Prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region also depends on a secure maritime environment and the peaceful resolution of disputes. All ARF members have an interest in avoiding miscalculations and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. New Zealand is concerned that activities such as land reclamation, construction and militarisation could escalate tensions and erode the trust and confidence that is needed to deliver solutions. It is important that all parties take steps to rebuild trust, avoid provocative actions and manage tensions. New Zealand encourages full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties and conclusion of a substantive Code of Conduct as a framework to manage the situation.

New Zealand is also strongly committed to an open, rules-based trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring longer term regional security and prosperity. New Zealand is committed to pursuing multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements that support this goal. New Zealand also aims to strengthen the broader regional trade architecture to ensure it is resilient to future shocks. New Zealand attaches considerable importance to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in 2010. New Zealand has other bilateral FTAs or Closer Economic Partnerships with many other ARF members, including China, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei. New Zealand is also working to ratify the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which was signed in March, including by several ASEAN members, and is actively participating in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In addition to the network of free trade agreements, the work of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) promoting trade and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific is of considerable importance to New Zealand.

II. New Zealand’s Security and Defence Policy

1. Overview of national security and defence policy

As a founding member of the United Nations, respect for international norms and law is fundamental to New Zealand’s approach to promoting security, stability and peace. While New Zealand’s borders are distant from direct conflict, there are fragile states within the Asia-Pacific region. The trans-national threats such as the impacts of climate change, terrorism, arms proliferation, transnational organised crime, and cyber attacks do not respect borders and have the ability to disrupt in complex ways. Recognising this, New Zealand is highly committed to multilateral solutions to security threats and the promotion of effective international rules. New Zealand takes a multi-layered approach to security that includes strong bilateral relationships and regional partnerships, and support for regional architecture and institutions.

New Zealand has a strong interest in fostering and maintaining a network of strong international relationships, which include:

- New Zealand’s alliance with Australia;
- the Five Power Defence Arrangements (New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom);
- the Five Eyes partnership (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States);
- close bilateral ties with Pacific Island neighbours, including those for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities;
- close and growing bilateral ties with a number of Asia-Pacific partners from North Asia to Southeast Asia; and
- Pacific and Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM), the ARF and the ADMM-Plus processes, and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process).

On the basis of ongoing Defence Assessment work and the Government’s priorities, New Zealand has updated its defence policy settings in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. This Statement describes Defence’s value to New Zealand in terms of its contributions to the community, the nation and the world, with emphasis on community and environmental resilience. It also provides an updated perspective on evolutions in the strategic environment; increases the priority for the Defence Force being able to operate in the South Pacific (to the same level as that for New Zealand’s territory, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica); features a new set of principles for Defence; and underscores the importance of contributing to New Zealand’s key security partnerships.

2. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

The total appropriation for the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2017 was NZ$3.010.791 billion, of which operating expenses were NZ$2.598.906 billion and capital expenditure was NZ$411.885 million.

III. New Zealand’s Contribution to Regional Security

Counter-terrorism and transnational crime

New Zealand is firmly committed to countering terrorism and transnational organised crime. To prevent, detect, and respond to these threats New Zealand is engaged at the multilateral, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region.
To support achievement of New Zealand’s global security priorities, including assisting with capacity building in neighbouring states, New Zealand has a number of specialised security funds, including dedicated Global and Pacific Security Funds. The specialised security funds assist New Zealand’s achievement of its Plan of Action with ASEAN, particularly in areas of border control; legislation; law enforcement; policy; countering people smuggling; and prevention/counter radicalisation and countering the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters.

Globally, Da’esh/ISIL and its affiliates continue to pose a significant threat to international and regional security. Since the Global Coalition against Da’esh’s military efforts began in 2014, largely all of the territory the group held in Iraq has been liberated. ISIS’ financial reserves, systems for collecting revenue and inward flows of foreign terrorist fighters have been substantially degraded. However, territorial defeat does not mean victory, with signs the group is transitioning to insurgency tactics in the core, and considerable risk presented by the possibility of foreign terrorist fighters currently in Iraq and Syria relocating to other conflict zones or returning home – including to our region.

In line with our commitment to reduce the risk of South East Asia being a target or source of terrorism we are sharpening our strategic focus, and plan to strengthen efforts to support partners to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, to counter the root causes of violent extremism by building resilient communities, and help invigorate mechanisms that promote coherence and coordination of counter-terrorism policy and practice within governments and across the region.

Breaking down the silos that impede cooperation within governments and the barriers that hinder cooperation between governments is necessary to tackle these significant and complex transnational security threats. New Zealand seeks to work closely with our partners in the region to invigorate mechanisms that help achieve coherence in policy and practice, including ASEAN-centred initiatives such as those under the umbrella of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

On a bilateral basis, capacity building in South East Asia is a significant focus of New Zealand’s global counter-terrorism engagement. We have long-standing relationships with institutions in the region such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement and the South East Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Malaysia). Recent examples of capacity building initiatives New Zealand has contributed to across the region include:

- training of law enforcement personnel on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE);
- training of corrections staff to help manage extremist prisoners;
- Aviation security and counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training; and
- Post-blast crime scene investigation courses.

New Zealand is a Steering Group member of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process). As part of our contribution to managing the security and humanitarian challenges posed by irregular migration, New Zealand is an active and constructive Bali Process member. In addition to Co-Chairing (with Malaysia) the Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking Networks, New Zealand also provides support for regional capacity building, including through our capacity building assistance and secondment contributions to the Bali Process’ Regional Support Office.

New Zealand also works closely with the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering to support the coordination of technical assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to combat transnational organised criminal and terrorist groups, by targeting their financial systems and processes. In 2017 we contributed NZ$3.6m to the APG for a five-year activity that will support Pacific island countries in complying with international anti-money laundering standards.
New Zealand has funded and organised a number of regional capacity building workshops for ASEAN countries on key issues, including anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing standards, cyber security, terrorist prosecutions, chemical and nuclear security, major event security, and maritime and aviation security. These efforts are complemented by significant bilateral work to build individual national capability, especially within law enforcement agencies.

New Zealand also participates in multilateral initiatives which engage on counter-terrorism projects in the region, including the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).

In addition to its work in South East Asia, New Zealand also works with Pacific Island countries (PICs) to help strengthen resilience and build capacity to respond to a range of shared security challenges. New Zealand has undertaken a number of initiatives through the Pacific Islands Forum, including an assessment of cybercrime vulnerability, enhancing aviation and maritime security, drafting and implementing national counter-terrorism legislation and supporting the ratification of international counter-terrorism instruments. New Zealand works closely with and funds regional law enforcement agencies such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat, Oceania Customs Organisation and the Pacific Immigration Directors’ Conference, and contributes to their consideration and responses to regional security issues. New Zealand provides technical assistance, capacity building, and mentoring for law enforcement and border agency officials in the region.

Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also participated in the UNGA conference to negotiate the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which it will ratify in 2018. New Zealand has continued its active promotion of nuclear disarmament including through its membership of the New Agenda Coalition and the De-alerting Group.

New Zealand is a proponent of nuclear weapon-free zones as a regional measure to reinforce nuclear disarmament and non proliferation commitments. New Zealand is party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and has had legislation in place since 1987 creating a New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone. New Zealand strongly encourages all Nuclear Weapons States to sign the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) without any reservations or interpretative declarations. This would be a welcome step in the development of nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.

New Zealand supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important contribution to regional and global security. New Zealand has welcomed ratification of the CTBT by Annex 1 and 2 states in the region and encourages further ratifications by ARF participants.

New Zealand is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides the global focal point for nuclear cooperation and safeguards. New Zealand is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and supports international projects involving the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

New Zealand joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in 2007, and is committed alongside over 80 GICNT partners to preventing nuclear or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. New Zealand has contributed to the GICNT in the Asia-Pacific region by: developing a table-top exercise kit for use by other GICNT partners in testing their own national response systems; supporting radioactive source security projects in Southeast Asia; providing funding support to GICNT workshops in the Asia-Pacific region; and helping its Pacific island neighbours address the risk of nuclear/radiological security.
Alongside a number of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand was an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summits held between 2010 and 2016. In 2016, New Zealand ratified two key nuclear security treaties: the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In 2016, New Zealand also enacted a new Radiation Safety Act to ensure its legislative framework for the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material meets current international best practice. New Zealand has provided financial support for nuclear security capacity-building projects in the Asia-Pacific region.

New Zealand is a party to Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. It has provided financial assistance for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to assist with the removal of chemical weapons materials in Libya and Syria, and has spoken out strongly against recent cases of the use of chemical weapons in Malaysia, Syria and the UK.

New Zealand works to prevent proliferation by helping to develop and implement export controls as an active member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. New Zealand has in place a comprehensive national export control regime.

New Zealand's involvement in the Proliferation Security Initiative, including its membership of the Operational Experts Group (the PSI steering committee) and participation in exercises and capacity building initiatives, has enhanced New Zealand's capabilities to prevent proliferation activity both nationally and in collaboration with partners. New Zealand has developed (and shared with PSI partners) a Model National Response Plan, which provides easy-to-follow guidance on the range of issues that need to be considered in developing a framework for responding to proliferation situations. As part of the PSI Asia-Pacific exercise rotation, New Zealand hosted a PSI table-top exercise in Wellington in 2015. New Zealand would welcome further adherence to the PSI throughout the Asia-Pacific as part of a coordinated effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.

Given the role played by the unregulated global arms trade in fuelling conflict, New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which it ratified in 2014. It sees the ATT contributing meaningfully to international and regional peace, security and stability. To support broader membership of the Treaty, New Zealand sponsored the development of ATT model legislation and control list to assist countries to implement their domestic obligations under the ATT. It also hosted a conference in Auckland in 2018 to promote greater adherence to conventional arms treaties among Pacific Island countries. New Zealand looks forward to working closely with its ARF partners to build a strong ATT regime.

New Zealand strongly supports the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APLMB). New Zealand is currently the coordinator for national implementation measures in the CCM and has produced model legislation for use by small states with no history of use or contamination. New Zealand encourages other ARF participants that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to both Conventions.

**Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief**

The Asia-Pacific region continues to be afflicted by natural disasters that underline the need to continue deepening practical and effective cooperation over disaster reduction, response, relief and recovery. New Zealand has been an active participant in ARF and EAS exercises to prepare and respond to regional disasters.

New Zealand is continuing to play its part in deepening regional capacity to prepare and respond to disasters, including drawing on lessons learned from the Christchurch Earthquakes.
Zealand is committed to further cooperation and implementation of work plans in ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS contexts.

New Zealand has been a solid proponent of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre since its inception, and has trained ASEAN officials in disaster response leadership at the University of Canterbury and contributed technical expertise to the Centre.

**Maritime security**

In 2008, ARF Ministers identified maritime security as one of the ARF’s four key areas. New Zealand is actively involved in implementation of the maritime security work plan, and in sharing its experiences on various maritime security-related issues, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and oil-spill response.

New Zealand co-hosted with Malaysia an ARF Capacity Building Workshop on Ship Profiling in Kuala Lumpur, 24 to 25 May 2016. The workshop improved the capacity of ARF participants in ship profiling, helping countries develop greater maritime awareness, which in turn contributes to regional maritime security.

New Zealand also plays an active role on maritime security in associated fora. New Zealand co-chaired with Brunei Darussalam the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Experts Working Group from 2014-2017. New Zealand delivered a robust programme of activities, including a Counter Piracy Operations Workshop, and the inaugural Maritime Security Future Leaders’ Programme. New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Australia, co-hosted the significant Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise in and between Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, 1 to 11 May 2016. The Maritime Security co-chairs also hosted the standalone Exercise Mahi Tangaroa in Auckland, New Zealand to coincide with the International Naval Review in November 2016.

**ICTs security**

Connectivity is a crucial driver of our region’s growth. However, with increased connectivity comes increased exposure to cyber threats. New Zealand remains concerned by the growing number of cyber incidents globally, including activity undertaken by both state and non-state actors. New Zealand sees the ARF as an important forum to improve transparency, understanding and confidence among regional partners in cyber space. To this end, we were pleased to participate in the first Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the use of ICTS in April 2018, and the associated Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures. We look forward to working in these groups to implement concrete measures for ensuring a safe and secure cyber environment in our region.

New Zealand remains committed to building regional cyber security capacity, including through membership of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, with a particular focus on our Pacific and Southeast Asian neighbours. In the ADMM-Plus, New Zealand has co-chaired with the Philippines the new Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security since April 2017.

One growing ICT challenge the region faces is the unprecedented use of social media by terrorist groups. This has forced states to adapt, with many adopting sophisticated counter-messaging protocols and systems to enable them to convey another view to would-be terrorists. In this new environment it is important for law enforcement to understand how criminal and terrorist groups are using cyberspace and to continue to develop the strategies to combat the threat as the mechanisms used by these groups evolve. New Zealand will continue to work with regional partners to combat this growing threat.
IV. Role of ARF

New Zealand’s contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

For New Zealand, the ARF is a key mechanism for security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. It contributes to building an environment of dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of regional security issues. The ARF is also contributing in an important way to the development of international norms and principles on security, which are directly relevant to this region. The large number and diversity of practical ARF projects under implementation in 2018 reflects the ARF’s increasing ability to respond to contemporary security challenges facing this part of the world. New Zealand also attaches considerable importance to working with its ARF partners to advance the ARF’s preventive diplomacy agenda, in line with the ARF’s three-stage evolution. In May 2018, New Zealand co-chaired with Singapore the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF ISG) in Auckland.

New Zealand, along with other ARF partners, is actively involved in advancing the ARF’s preventive diplomacy work plan. New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, China and the United States, hosted a roundtable discussion on preventive diplomacy training resources in March 2014; and, together with the United States and Thailand, conducted a Track 1.5 preventive diplomacy symposium in 2015.

In 2017 New Zealand, Singapore and Timor-Leste co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-conflict Environment, in Dili, Timor-Leste on 19-20 April. The workshop brought together over 80 participants from most ARF member countries to build regional preventive diplomacy awareness and capacity. It provided a platform for practitioners and policymakers to share knowledge and collaborate in the area of preventive diplomacy, with a focus on post-conflict contexts. In September 2018 we will co-host another workshop on peace-building tools, this time with the United States and Myanmar.

New Zealand is committed to working with its ASEAN partners to ensure coherence between the ARF and other pieces of the regional architecture, in particular the EAS and ADMM-Plus. While the ARF and ADMM-Plus have their distinct mandates and different memberships, greater functional coordination between them on issues that straddle multiple fora, such as disaster relief/management, cyber security and maritime security, would help to achieve streamlining and eliminate unnecessary duplication of activities. New Zealand also actively supports efforts to strengthen the EAS, to ensure it can fulfil its role as the region’s premier forum for leaders to address issues of strategic risk.

Future of ARF

The ARF is a forum that was established with the aim of fostering habits of constructive dialogue on issues of concern. At the ARF’s outset it was envisaged that the Forum would move as part of its evolution from a confidence building phase to preventive diplomacy, and finally to conflict resolution. The ARF has constructed a solid base of confidence building measures and made progress in the field of preventive diplomacy. But it has yet to reach its potential. New Zealand supports the ARF in increasing its capacity and effectiveness in the preventive diplomacy space, and encourages all participants to keep an eye to the future to ensure we are well-equipped when we move into the conflict resolution phase.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia Pacific is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world owing to economic interconnectedness and regionalism. However, current security dynamics have the potential to disrupt the region’s peace and prosperity. Developments in areas such as the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea can have a direct impact in regional security environment. The challenges posed by non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, violent extremism, transnational crimes, natural disasters, climate change, and cybercrimes have likewise added uncertainty in the region and beyond. Technological advancements have helped the region grow economically and enhanced interconnectedness among states. However, new technologies also have the potential to become potent threats that transcend geophysical boundaries, which makes the current and emerging security environment and dynamics more complex. Enhanced dialogue and meaningful cooperation among regional states, external partners, and other relevant stakeholders are therefore necessary to effectively address these issues.

Maritime security

The dynamism of the global economy lies heavily on the accessibility, safety, and security of the seas. While the seas facilitate commerce and connectivity, they can also become channels for security threats. Apart from the disputes over sovereign rights in parts of the seas, militarization and other unilateral activities may increase tension and undermine regional stability. Other maritime security concerns include illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and armed robbery against ships, trafficking in persons, smuggling of illicit drugs, sea level rise, and the degradation of the marine environment caused by natural and anthropogenic factors.

To attain maritime security, states must be willing to engage in constructive dialogue and have a strong adherence to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Equally important, states must also continually build their enforcement capacities to safeguard waters within their respective jurisdictions from security threats.

Situation in the Korean peninsula

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) continued the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and conducted a number of tests in 2016 and 2017, in violation of multiple UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. These activities pose serious threats not only to the Korean Peninsula, but also to the broader Asia-Pacific region.

Positive developments, including the inter-Korean Summits between Republic of Korea (ROK) President Moon Jae-in and DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in April and May 2018, and the US-DPRK Summit held in Singapore on 12 June 2018, however, marked a breakthrough that could potentially pave the way for concerned parties to work towards reducing tensions, and towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK should remain committed to efforts towards achieving sustainable peace and stability in the region. The international community, for its part, should remain vigilant and stay committed to effectively enforcing UNSC resolutions and upholding international regimes on non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons.

Regional power dynamics

Actions by and interactions among great powers create volatility in the security environment. Amidst the rapidly evolving geo-strategic landscape, promoting and sustaining a security architecture with ASEAN at its core remains important and imperative for ASEAN Member States and its external partners, including major regional powers and players, to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Towards this end, ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), among others, have to be further strengthened. Proposals for new ideas or concepts need to be underpinned by the goal
of enhancing existing mechanisms, as well as ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation.

The political-security environment of the Asia Pacific will be largely shaped by the dynamics among major powers. However, peace and stability will also rest on the commitment and efforts by all states to a stable, open, and rules-based order.

**Terrorism**

Terrorism and violent extremism continue to be a grave concern particularly in Southeast Asia. Sympathizers and supporters of the self-proclaimed Daesh/Islamic State (IS), including local terror groups, have created disruptions in societies, as witnessed by the failed attempt of the IS-inspired Maute Group to occupy Marawi City in southern Philippines in May 2017. In May 2018, terror attacks in Surabaya, Indonesia were carried out by two families affiliated with the largest faction of IS’ supporters in the country. The inclusion of a nine-year old girl among the suicide bombers raises another concern about the changing role of women and children in terrorist activities.

The threat of terrorism and spread of extremist ideologies also exist in cyberspace and the social media. Extremist groups have exploited these platforms to recruit new members, project their presence, and influence people. The IS also publishes online magazines, including one that is in Malay – a language spoken by 42 percent of Southeast Asia’s population – for possible recruits. As the IS has lost significant ground in the Middle East, it is targeting Southeast Asia as a hub for recruiting and training potential fighters.

The extent and evolving nature of terrorism necessitates stronger cooperation and collaboration among states and other societal actors. Apart from sharing of best practices, national governments must also continue to strengthen laws and border controls, enhance community vigilance, develop rehabilitation practices and preventive measures. Likewise, there must be urgency in addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism and violent extremism such as economic inequality, social injustices and marginalization.

**Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

The spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their access, means of delivery and transport from one country to another, constitute a grave threat to international peace and security. This can have serious humanitarian consequences that would have long-term implications. The universalization and the full and effective implementation of treaties and agreements on disarmament and nonproliferation are key to achieving a world without WMD.

**New and emerging weapon technologies**

Rapid advancement in technology, including automation and artificial intelligence, present an emerging challenge to the existing disarmament machinery. The emergence of new tools of strategic significance such as precision-guided and hypersonic conventional weapons, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and missile-defense systems, as well as new domains of engagement such as space and cyberspace, increase the risk of an arms race and make deterrence and arms control more difficult.

**Cybersecurity**

One of the unwanted consequences of the growing reliance of societies on information and communications technology is the rise in cyber threats. Given the accessibility and anonymity of the Internet, cybercrimes can be committed by individuals or organized criminal groups and can easily escalate to an unprecedented scale. Cyberattacks compromise national security by paralyzing government functions and disrupting military technologies, disrupting financial institutions and business corporations, and endangering the lives, privacy, and safety of ordinary citizens.

The international community should be able to effectively adapt and respond to challenges...
emanating from cyberspace. This would entail updating national legislations on cyber-related issues, and building the capacity of ICT professionals in the law enforcement and security sectors. There should also be sustained collaborative efforts between stakeholders at the national, regional, and international levels. Singapore’s focus on innovation and resilience in its 2018 ASEAN Chairmanship presents a great opportunity for ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners to discuss, address, and collaborate on cybersecurity issues.

Natural disasters

The Asia-Pacific is considered the most disaster-prone region in the world, accounting for 40 percent of all natural disasters in the past decade. According to the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2017 by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), around 43,000 people are getting killed each year since 1970 due to natural disasters. The same study revealed that between 2015 and 2030, the Asia Pacific will account for 40 percent of global economic losses from disasters.

While countries in the region have been developing varying capacities on disaster risk reduction management (DRRM), many communities, especially in the rural areas, remain vulnerable. This amplifies the need to build resilience and response capabilities at different levels through the establishment of regional early warning systems, investing in disaster risk education, and incorporating DRRM in national and local development and security plans.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

A. Overview of national security and defense policy

Despite the emergence of new security challenges and the shifts in the regional security environment, the Philippines’ defense and foreign policies will be constantly guided by principles enshrined in its 1987 Constitution. Foremost is that the Philippines is a democratic country that renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The country also values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines is also pursuing an independent foreign policy; one that upholds national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interest; ensures freedom from foreign control and interference; but at the same time, also seeks amity and cooperation with all - traditional allies and new partners alike.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2017-2022 was crafted to provide a roadmap for the Philippines to realize the vision of a “secure and prosperous nation wherein the people’s welfare, well-being, ways of life and core values; government and its institutions; territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected and enhanced; and confident of its place in the community of nations.” The NSS underscores the mutually reinforcing role of security and development: there can be no peace without development, and progress cannot thrive without peace. Thus, the NSS identifies strategies to create an environment where peace and economic development are simultaneously promoted.

The NSS also strongly complements the national vision of achieving a prosperous Philippines, where the people are free and fulfilled. As articulated in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022, the Philippines by 2040 would be a prosperous middle-class society where no one is poor; where people live long and healthy lives and are smart and innovative; and where families thrive in vibrant, culturally diverse and resilient communities.

On the security front, the Philippine government aims to further develop its defense, judicial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities to end communist insurgency and resolve internal conflicts; combat violent extremism and terrorism; achieve a drug-free society; defend the national territory and sovereignty; preserve public safety and maintain law and order; and dispense justice. On the economic front, the Philippine
government seeks to significantly narrow income gaps by reforming tax system, creating more job opportunities, reducing income inequality and improving the quality of and access to education and health.

At its core, the NSS emphasizes the need for a whole-of-nation approach – in the time-honored Filipino tradition of “bayanihan” – of working together in a well-planned, forward-looking and synchronized manner towards national progress.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), meanwhile, is mandated by the Constitution to serve and protect the people and to secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. To effectively perform this mandate in the face of complex security challenges, the Philippine government remains committed to implementing the Revised AFP Modernization Program (Republic Act 10349) towards attaining a stronger and more credible national defense. The modernization of AFP is done through acquisition of new military equipment and technology, development of base support facilities, restructuring of the military organization, and updating of military doctrines.

Further, the Philippines' security and defense policies are aimed at making the country a constructive and cordial member of the international community. The Philippines has forged different degrees of defense partnerships and cooperation in diverse areas such as counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime domain awareness, and countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. In 2017, the Philippines' Department of National Defense (DND) entered into agreements and conducted different defense-related activities with counterparts from the United States, Australia, Thailand, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Russia, China, and United Kingdom, among others. While the Philippines maintains its commitment to its longstanding alliance with the United States, it also seeks to broaden its diplomatic and defense horizons and work with new partners such as China and Russia, in pursuit of an independent foreign policy. It may be noted that India is a pertinent defense partner of the Philippines in line with the country's independent foreign policy. The Philippines-India Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Industry and Logistics Cooperation was also signed in 2017.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

For the fiscal year 2018, the defense budget of the Philippines is USD 149.70 billion (USD 2.97 billion), which is a 9.12 percent increase from PHP 137.18 billion (USD 2.72 billion) allocation in 2017. The defense budget also amounts to 3.97 percent of the total government budget for 2018.3

III. National Contributions to Promoting Regional Security

A. Counter-terrorism

The 2017 Global Terrorism Index ranked the Philippines 12th among the countries most affected by terrorist activities worldwide. There has been an increase in terror activities in the country, with the most recent being the attempt by the IS-inspired Maute terrorist group to control Marawi City in Mindanao, southern Philippines in May 2017.

After five months of security operations, the Philippine government successfully liberated Marawi City. The Philippine government received substantial support from its allies and partners such as the United States, China, Russia, and Australia in the form of intelligence sharing, capacity-building on urban warfare, and deployment of surveillance aircraft to assist in the ground operations by Philippine security forces, among others. While the attack on Marawi City underscored the severity of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia, the liberation of the city also served as an example of how close coordination and cooperation among countries play a crucial role in defeating terrorism.

At present, the Philippine government is focusing on recovery and rehabilitation of Marawi City. The

3 PHP 50.43 = USD 1.00 in December 2017 when the General Appropriations Act 2018 was signed.
Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (BMCRRP) includes the implementation of recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, and programs to rebuild the lives of Marawi residents, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs), women and children. The Philippines also welcomes and appreciates the different forms of assistance extended by international partners in this regard.

With lessons learned from the Marawi City crisis, the Philippines is steadfast and vigilant on the possible return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) from Southeast Asia who initially joined IS in Syria and Iraq. It is also closely monitoring the continuing flow of new recruits and supporters being radicalized, including members of IS-inspired or IS-affiliated local terror organizations.

Further, the Philippines has long been employing counter-terrorism strategies that are not only focused on hard targets, but also touch on counter-radicalization. The Philippine Center for Transnational Crimes (PCTC) has underlined several initiatives focusing on prevention. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) has been implementing the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) which provides livelihood and capacity-building programs for surrendering fighters and rebels. To address the spread of extremist ideologies in social media, the Philippine government is in the process of finalizing its National Action Plan on Countering Violent Extremism (NAP-CVE). This National Action Plan puts emphasis on the whole-of-nation and community-driven approach by involving the national agencies down to the local government units (LGUs), at the same time engaging various stakeholders of the society.

To complement its national initiatives and policies, the Philippines is actively participating in multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, which is a transboundary concern. An example is the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) on Immediate Measures to Address Security Issues in the Maritime Areas of Common Concern which was signed by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 2016. The TCA aims to coordinate and intensify practical cooperation to combat armed robbery against ships, kidnapping and other transnational crimes, and the movement of terrorists.

Under the TCA, the three countries have conducted ministerial meetings to discuss means to improve intelligence sharing and explore the creation of new platforms for data-sharing on countering violent extremism (CVE). In July 2017, a Sub-Regional Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Cross-Border Terrorism was held in Manado, Indonesia, in which the importance of enhancing joint border management, countering extremist propaganda and narratives, and countering terrorism financing were discussed. Also under the TCA, the three countries launched a maritime patrol and an air patrol in June 2017 and October 2017 respectively. The Armed Forces of the Philippines also launched the first phase of the trilateral training and continue to develop the Maritime Command Center (MCC) in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi.

The Philippines has also supported sub-regional efforts on counter-terrorism such as the “Our Eyes” Initiative, which is a platform among the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand for intelligence exchange aimed against terrorist and radical networks. The “Our Eyes” Initiative complements existing efforts such as the “365-Platform” developed by the ASEAN Military-to-Military Analysts Intelligence Exchange (AMAAIE).

As the chair of ASEAN in 2017, the Philippines also led the Association and external partners in adopting the following documents:

- Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism;
- East Asia Summit (EAS) Leaders’ Statement on Countering Ideological Challenges of Terrorism and Terrorist Initiatives and Propaganda;
- EAS Leaders’ Declaration on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.
The Philippines also hosted the ASEAN Conference on Peace and Prevention of Violent Extremism in September 2017 which brought together six sectors – women, youth, academe, religious, business, and political – and affirmed that multi-sectoral convergence and cooperation are crucial in addressing the drivers of conflicts and root causes of violent extremism.

B. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

The Philippines’ stance on nuclear non-proliferation is rooted in its 1987 Constitution which states a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country’s territory. For decades, the Philippines has strongly advocated for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament both in regional and international forums.

In ASEAN, the Philippines supports the full implementation of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, which in 2017 marked its 20th year of entry into force. The Philippines hopes for the accession of the P5 to the SEANWFZ Treaty, and continues to consult with other ASEAN Member States on this matter. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017, the Philippines hosted the SEANWFZ Commission Meeting, where the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to extend the SEANWFZ Plan of Action for another period – 2018-2022, towards the goal of preserving the region as a nuclear weapons-free zone and ensuring the safety of the peoples of ASEAN.

Also in 2017, the Philippines led ASEAN in issuing a statement commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Statement reiterated ASEAN’s shared interest with OPCW in prohibiting the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon by anyone under any circumstance. The Statement also called for the universal accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

At the international level, the Philippines is also among the signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which was adopted at the UN General Assembly in September 2017. The treaty is the first legally binding international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons with the goal of completely eliminating them. It also addresses legal gaps on the prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, as nuclear weapons are the only ones without an international treaty. While the treaty was not signed by nuclear weapons states, it nonetheless represents the collective resolve of the 122 states signatories to make nuclear weapons illegal.

The Philippines is also actively engaged in the work of the Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2020 Review Conference on the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also works with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of health, nuclear safety and security concerns, and nuclear non-proliferation, among others. As a demonstration of the country’s prominent role in the global discourse on the uses of nuclear energy, the Philippine representative became the President of the 61st session of the General Conference of IAEA in September 2017 in Vienna, Austria.

On the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines, either on its own or through ASEAN and the UN, has consistently voiced out its serious concern over the nuclear weapons testing and ballistic missile launches by the DPRK. The Philippines also calls on the DPRK to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017, the Philippines led the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in issuing six (6) statements concerning the nuclear tests, ballistic missile launches by DPRK.

On the recent developments in the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines welcomes the inter-Korean Summits on 27 April and 26 May 2018 and the US-DPRK Summit on 12 June 2018 and hopes that these breakthroughs would contribute to reducing tensions, opening dialogue, and eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula towards regional peace and stability.
C. Transnational crime

Given its porous borders, its integration into the globalized economy, and the presence of millions of its nationals overseas, the Philippines is also facing challenges brought about by different transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and smuggling, among others.

One of the current priorities of the Philippine government is countering the spread and use of illicit drugs, given the severity of the problem and the menace that drugs bring to communities and families. To arrest this problem, the government has intensified its anti-drug operations across the country. The Philippines’ Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) reported that from 1 July 2016 to 27 December 2017, a total of 80,683 anti-drug operations were conducted, which resulted in the arrest of 119,023 drug users, seizure of 2,560.48 kilos of methamphetamine –locally known as shabu – and destruction of 179 drug dens and clandestine laboratories.

While the anti-drug operations have garnered the most interest and scrutiny from the public, the Philippine government emphasizes its comprehensive approach to combating the drugs problem to include prevention, education and public awareness, treatment and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and dispensation of justice. Programs such as Oplan Sagip and Barkada Kontra Droga (Peer Group Against Drugs) also encourage the participation and involvement by local government units, faith-based groups, and civil society groups in attaining drugs-free communities. The government has also been organizing various seminars and workshops for parents, health professionals, law enforcers, and the youth to disseminate information and discuss issues on prevention of drugs.

The Department of Health (DOH) is taking the lead in providing drug users and drug dependents access to in-patient or residential care through treatment and rehabilitation centers established by the government. From July 2016 to February 2018, official government data reports that 1.3 million individuals surrendered themselves to authorities and are currently undergoing rehabilitation. As part of the reintegration process, 14,046 have also received technical and livelihood training.

To monitor the effectiveness of programs and initiatives, the government has also put in place the Integrated Drug Monitoring and Reporting Information System (IDMRIS) and the Integrated Drug Abuse Data and Information Network (IDADIN). The IDMRIS monitors the implementation of anti-drug programs by national agencies, local government units, and partner groups and organizations. The IDADIN, is an online data pooling and collection system used by Treatment and Rehabilitation Facilities nationwide for treatment, rehabilitation and aftercare of drug dependents. It also allows authorities to monitor and determine the admission, relapse rate, and profile of drug users.

The Philippine government is determined to pursue a proactive solution to the drugs problem with emphasis on upholding the rule of law, observing due process, and complying with the country’s commitments under human rights conventions. To strengthen and better integrate its programs and initiatives against illegal drugs, the Philippine government is in the process of finalizing the Philippine Anti-Illegal Drug Strategy (PADS) this 2018.

In combating trafficking in persons (TIP), the Philippines’ approach includes strengthening information exchanges and cooperation with other countries, convicting and punishing traffickers, and implementing proactive screening procedures to reduce the number of trafficking victims, especially women and children. In 2016, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Human Trafficking Division, Philippine National Police Women and Children’s Protection Center (PNPWCP), and the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) Taskforces investigated 553 suspected trafficking cases, including conducting 109 surveillance operations and 55 raids which
led to the arrest of 272 suspects. During this period, the government initiated prosecution of 441 alleged traffickers and secured convictions of 55 traffickers. These cases involved 131 victims, 78 of whom were children. These efforts have been recognized in the 2017 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report which categorized the Philippines in Tier 1. This is the country's second year in the Tier 1 ranking.

In terms of regional efforts, the Philippines’ ratification of the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) paved the way for the Convention's entry into force in March 2017. As the shepherd on TIP matters in ASEAN, the Philippines led the discussions on how to implement the ACTIP, which resulted in the finalization of the Bohol Trafficking in Person Work Plan 2017-2020. The TIP Work Plan is the first cross-sectoral and cross-pillar action plan developed by ASEAN to address the problem of trafficking in persons in the region. The Work Plan includes prevention of TIP, protection of victims, law enforcement and prosecution of crimes in trafficking in persons, and regional and international coordination.

Meanwhile, the Philippines’ southern maritime borders is an area of concern due to the prevalence of criminal activities related to piracy and armed robbery against ships, kidnappings, and arms smuggling, among others. To suppress these activities, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has played an active role in securing the safety of ports and maritime entry points of illegal activities. During the Marawi City siege in 2017, the PCG stemmed the flow of illegal firearms and ammunition, and prevented terrorists from escaping using commercial ships by securing all ports in Mindanao. The PCG was able to apprehend suspected terrorists in various ports.

The Philippines’ experiences in combating transnational crimes demonstrate the need for integrated approach among government agencies and the active support by other sectors, complemented by strong collaboration with international partners.

D. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Given its geographical location, the Philippines is prone to geological and hydro-meteorological hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons and storm surges. The changes in the global climate also contribute to increased frequency of extreme weather phenomena. Natural hazards can turn into disasters and pose serious threats to human lives, livelihood, and property. They can expose communities to additional risks such as diseases and food shortages, and can undercut the economic development of a country. In 2017, the Philippines’ National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) estimated that disasters lead to annual losses of PHP 206 billion (USD 4 billion) and can cut 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points from the country’s GDP. As such, it is imperative that the Philippine government prioritizes disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in both its security and development policies.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) 2011-2028 provides the framework for the Philippine government in its DRRM efforts. The NDRRMP implements Republic Act No. 10121, or the Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, towards realizing “safer, adaptive, disaster-resilient Filipino communities toward sustainable development”. The NDRRP ensures a comprehensive and integrated approach to DRRM to include disaster prevention and mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster rehabilitation and recovery. It also promotes the mainstreaming of both disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA) in the planning and implementation of projects at the national and local levels, and the integration of science-based approaches with indigenous knowledge and local best practices.

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5 Ibid.
In 2017, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Center (NDRRMC) updated the Guidelines in the Allocation of NDRRM Funds to expedite the processing and release of NDRRM Funds to member agencies and recipient communities towards a more responsive government in times of disasters. The Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI) has also been set up to provide emergency funding to provinces that are most vulnerable, as well as assistance to Filipino households in strengthening their resilience against disasters.

With emphasis on resilience and preparedness, the Philippine government is also undertaking programs in response to a possible strong earthquake caused by the Valley Fault system which runs through Metro Manila and other heavily populated neighboring provinces. A Valley Fault Atlas was developed to map all areas that are at risk should a powerful earthquake occur. The government is also organizing a quarterly national simultaneous earthquake drill (NSED) with participation from the private sector, schools, and local government units. A Community Responders’ Course is being conducted to enhance the capability of first responders, while operations centers have been strengthened to improve the transmission of data between and among government agencies and the dissemination of information to the general public.

The Philippines’ DRRM policies and programs are aimed at implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and fulfilling commitments under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Change Agreement.

At the regional level, the Philippines strongly supports and actively participates in the work of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) in responding to both natural and human-induced disasters, under the One ASEAN, One Response. In the past year, the AHA Centre provided relief assistance to victims of flash floods and landslide in Viet Nam, and to the displaced communities in Rakhine State in Myanmar. The Philippines itself has benefited from enhanced regional cooperation on HADR, as exemplified by the international efforts when Typhoon Haiyan hit central Philippines in 2013. The Philippines also received assistance from AHA Centre, ASEAN Member States, and other international partners during the Marawi City crisis that caused the displacement of thousands of residents in the city and surrounding localities.

E. Maritime cooperation

As an archipelagic state, the Philippines fully recognizes how maritime security and governance are crucial to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and its people. As such, the Philippines included maritime security and cooperation as one of its thematic priorities during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2017. The Philippines led activities on how cooperation among ASEAN Member States and with external partners on maritime security can be strengthened.

As a littoral state in the South China Sea, the Philippines affirms the importance of maintaining peace and promoting stability, freedom of navigation and overflight in and above the South China Sea, freedom of international commerce and other peaceful uses of the sea, addressing territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, and in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines also underscores the need for parties to fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), including the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that may complicate the situation, and the expeditious conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

One of the achievements of ASEAN during the Philippines’ chairmanship was the adoption of the framework of the Code of Conduct (COC) by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and China during
the ASEAN-China Post Ministerial Conference in Manila in August 2017. As a next step, the Leaders of ASEAN and China formally announced the commencement of substantive negotiations on the COC at the 20th ASEAN-China Summit on 14 November 2017 in Manila. The Philippines fully supports the negotiations for an effective and comprehensive COC and hopes that the positive relations between ASEAN and China will provide impetus for more constructive and productive dialogue towards peace, cooperation, and stability in the South China Sea, as well as contribute to marine environmental protection in the area.

During the Philippines’ ASEAN Chairmanship in 2017, the DND also initiated the Concept Paper on Guidelines for Maritime Interaction, which was adopted by the ADMM. The paper aims to establish a comprehensive framework for maritime interaction among ASEAN’s defense sectoral bodies and other maritime agencies to maintain open communications, reduce vulnerability to miscalculations, and avoid undesirable incidents at sea. This serves as the defense sector’s modest contribution while the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) is being crafted. This also complements existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI) and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

The Philippines likewise supported the launching of the ADI, which was initiated by Brunei Darussalam to provide ASEAN Defense Ministers with a secured hotline to communicate rapidly and orderly with each other, to act quickly not only during emergencies, but also to defuse unnecessary escalations that may arise from misunderstandings and miscalculations at sea.

Pending the conclusion of the negotiations on the COC, the Philippines maintains its call on all parties to remain committed to the implementation of the DOC. The Philippines also supports the implementation of Early Harvest Measures that ASEAN and China agreed to undertake in 2016, particularly the establishment of a hotline between the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China to avoid escalation of incidents. The Philippines also looks forward to the operationalization of the other Early Harvest Measure, which is the application of the principles of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea.

The Philippines also actively participates in maritime security-related discussions in ASEAN-led forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and ADMM Plus. The Philippines welcomes the addition of maritime cooperation as a new area of cooperation under the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2017. The Philippines recognizes the value of these different forums in fostering dialogue and confidence-building on maritime issues at different levels, and supports efforts for greater coordination and synergy among these platforms.

The Philippines is also pursuing cooperation with other countries at the operational level through different bilateral and multilateral activities. Among the highlights of such cooperation was the participation of the 600-man contingent and two vessels of the Philippine Navy to the 1st ASEAN Multilateral Naval Exercise 2017 (AMNEX 2017) held in Thailand in November 2017. The AMNEX signified the common desire among ASEAN Member States to deepen cooperation in addressing shared maritime concerns.

While recognizing the role played by coast guards and maritime law enforcement concerns in addressing specific maritime concerns, and noting how incidents can take place between or involving civilian vessels, the Philippines is also advocating for greater cooperation among these bodies in the region. In January 2018, the Philippines hosted the 2nd Experts’ Group Meeting on the Establishment of an ASEAN Coast Guards Forum (ACGF). The Meeting explored the possibility of setting up the ACGF to enhance communication and promote cooperation among coast guards and other agencies with similar functions within ASEAN.
As its additional contribution to maritime safety and sustainable fishing practices, the Philippines recently acceded to the following conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO):

- Anti-Fouling Systems Convention 2011
- Protocols of 1978 and 1988 to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), 1974
- Protocol of 1988 to the Load Line Convention of 1966
- FAO Compliance Agreement and Agreement on Port Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing.

The Philippines also co-chaired with India the ARF Workshop on Best Practices in Implementing Safety of Navigation Instruments in July 2017 in Manila. The Workshop discussed national experiences and drew best practices on how ARF participants implement international agreements on maritime safety and uphold safety standards in accordance with IMO conventions. The Philippines also hosted the 4th EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue (HLD) on Maritime Security Cooperation in October 2017 in Manila. The HLD allowed officials from ASEAN Member States and the EU to exchange views on maritime issues including law enforcement at sea, maritime connectivity, and conflict prevention.

Another advocacy of the Philippines is the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In 2017, the Philippines proposed the issuance of an "ASEAN-China Leaders' Declaration for a Decade of Coastal and Marine Environment Protection in the South China Sea", which was also adopted at the 20th ASEAN-China Summit. The Declaration demonstrated the commitment of ASEAN and China to manage, conserve, and preserve the marine and coastal ecosystems in the South China Sea, and is hoped to pave the way for more substantive cooperation between the two parties on this matter.

The Philippines also hosted in October 2017 the 12th Meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals – aquatic, terrestrial, and avian – under the theme "Their Future is Our Future – Sustainable Development for Wildlife and People". This was the first time that a meeting of the COP was held in Asia. The Philippines, as the only Southeast Asian country that is a party to the Convention, hopes that hosting the Meeting will increase awareness about issues affecting migratory species, and encourage other ASEAN Member States to accede to the Convention. The Meeting adopted the Manila Declaration which recognized the importance of migratory wildlife, and their conservation and preservation, in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

F. Security of information and communications technologies

The advancement in information and communications technologies (ICTs) offer countries enormous opportunities for economic growth and social development. The Philippines established the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) in May 2016 through Republic Act 10844 in recognition of ICTs' growing contribution to national progress. The DICT is the primary agency tasked to plan, develop and promote the national ICT development
agenda. It also serves as the coordinating agency on governing and regulating the ICT sector. As a newly established agency, the DICT aims to optimize all government ICT resources and networks, in accordance with the E-Government Masterplan and the Philippine Development Plan; ensure consumer protection and welfare, data privacy and security; improve public access to the internet; and harmonize and coordinate all national ICT plans and initiatives. Other agencies involved in addressing ICT-related issues include the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) created through the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and the National Privacy Commission which was created through the Data Privacy Act of 2012.

The government has also adopted the National Cybersecurity Plan 2022 which outlines the priority areas of the country in strengthening ICT resiliency. These include the following: 1) continuous and safe operation of critical infrastructures, public, and military networks; 2) implementation of cybersecurity measures to enhance the ability to respond to threats before, during and after attacks; 3) effective coordination with law enforcement agencies; and 4) raising awareness on cybersecurity.

At the regional level, the Philippines hosted the inaugural meeting of the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group (WG) on Cyber Security of the ADMM Plus in July 2017. The meeting provided a venue for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners to assess the current state of cyber security and cyber policies, towards devising means for regional cooperation. The Philippines believes that as ASEAN moves to become a more innovative and technologically capable region towards maximizing economic development, it has to be more responsive to different cyber security challenges.

IV. Role of the ARF

Twenty-five years since its establishment in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference in July 1993 in Singapore, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has developed to become one of the most dynamic platforms for discussing common security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, guided by the concepts of confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. Its expansion to 27 participants is a testament to the value of the ARF process as well as the trust and confidence in ASEAN as a driver of constructive dialogue and consultation on security matters in the region.

The establishment of the different Inter-sessional meetings (ISM) on areas of counter-terrorism and transnational crimes, disaster relief, non-proliferation and disarmament, maritime security, provide opportunities for more specialized discussions as well as concrete and tangible projects and cooperative activities among the ARF participants. Further, the convening of the 1st ARF ISM on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ISM on ICTs) in 2018 is a testament to the ARF’s vitality and readiness to take up newer issues that are increasingly critical to regional security.

Given the multitude of security issues confronting the Asia Pacific today, the Philippines affirms its strong support for the ARF as a platform for confidence-building and preventive diplomacy towards regional peace and stability.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

From a political, economic and social perspective, the Asia-Pacific region has evolved as one of the most dynamic places in the world. Sustainable development in our region can only be achieved in a stable security environment. Therefore, regional cooperation to jointly address and respond to both emerging traditional and non-traditional security challenges cannot be stressed enough. Against this backdrop, the Republic Of Korea (ROK) has continuously made efforts to promote sustainable peace not only on the Korean Peninsula but also throughout the region.

For several years, inter-Korean relations had remained strained because of North Korea’s nuclear program and its repeated provocations. In particular, 2017 was an unpredictable year due to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test and fifteen missile test launches. However, 2018 witnessed a thaw on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games as well as two inter-Korean summit meetings held on 27 April and 26 May respectively. This process of peace and prosperity on the peninsula began with President Moon Jae-in’s initiative for peace on the Korean Peninsula, which was delivered in his speech at the Körber Foundation in Berlin on 6 July 2017. The ROK, as the main stakeholder of security on the Korean Peninsula, is making utmost efforts to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, establish a peace regime and start a new chapter in the history of peace, cooperation, coexistence and prosperity.

Also, as part of ROK’s vision to diversify its foreign policy as well as further elevate relations with partners in the region, the ROK has launched the New Southern Policy (NSP). The NSP aims to broaden and deepen partnerships with ASEAN, India and beyond based on the three pillars of People, Prosperity and Peace. Among the three pillars, there is a particular emphasis on the “people”. Anchored in President Moon’s political conviction in “Putting People First”, the policy’s ultimate goal is to contribute to bettering the lives of the people in the region. The second pillar “prosperity” aims at promoting mutual growth and sustainable prosperity. Finally, the third pillars focus on securing peace and stability in this region which is essential, if not a prerequisite to achieve mutual and sustained prosperity. In this regard, the well-established ASEAN-led mechanisms including the ARF provide a valuable platform for us to deepen cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security issues including terrorism, violent extremism, cyber security and disaster management. The ROK will continue to work with ARF participants in strengthening and expanding the scope of security related cooperation and contributing to regional peace and stability.

Moreover, the ROK has strengthened its consistent efforts to foster an environment conducive to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia through its long-term regional project, the Northeast Asia+ Community of Responsibility. The project consists of three pillars: the New Northern Policy, which aims to increase connectivity between the Korean Peninsula and Eurasia; the New Southern Policy, which seeks to enhance relations with countries like ASEAN and India; and the Northeast Asia Platform for Peace and Cooperation (NAPPC), which pursues progress and institutionalization of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.

In particular, the ROK is endeavoring to establish a framework of sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia via the NAPPC. On the one hand, the NAPPC succeeds the basic spirit of the NAPCI - aspiring to promote regional multilateral cooperation by cultivating a practice of dialogue and cooperation. On the other hand, the ROK is developing the initiative to address hard security issues which is an immediate priority of the regional community, and expanding the scope of participation to include new countries which are willing and able to contribute to the cause. In this way, the ROK government envisages the NAPPC as a stable, useful platform for multilateral security cooperation which is indispensable to the peace and co-prosperity in the region.
a. The Korean Peninsula

In his speech of the [Berlin Initiative] on 6 July 2017, President Moon Jae-in announced the following five policy directions of the ROK which aims at dissolving the Cold War structure and establishing permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula: i) placing peace as the highest priority, ii) achieving denuclearization of the peninsula that guarantees the security of North Korea, iii) establishing a permanent peace regime on the peninsula, iv) fostering inter-Korean economic cooperation, and v) separating nonpolitical cooperation from political and military situations.

President Moon also urged North Korea to begin cooperation on the following tasks: i) resolution of humanitarian issues such as the reunion of separated families, ii) participation of North Korea in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, iii) mutual cessation of hostile acts around the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), and iv) resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

As reflected in the [Berlin Initiative], the policy of the ROK on the Korean Peninsula is a comprehensive one designed to achieve peaceful coexistence and co-prosperity of the two Koreas. It places the highest priority on peace, complying with the spirit of mutual respect, pursuing the sustainable development of inter-Korean relations, and ultimately aiming to achieve prosperity throughout the entire Northeast Asian region as well as the Korean Peninsula. Although the Korean Armistice Agreement is still in effect today on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK has strived to establish permanent peace through ongoing efforts as follows.

In 2017, President Moon invited North Korea to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games on several occasions. North Korea positively responded to President Moon’s invitation through Chairman Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s address, expressing North Korea’s willingness to dispatch a delegation to the Winter Olympics and improve inter-Korean relations. The South and North then agreed to have their athletes march together during the parade of nations at the opening ceremony and form a unified women’s ice hockey team. North Korea’s high-level delegations participated in both the opening and closing ceremonies, and paid a courtesy call on President Moon. Through the continued inter-Korean dialogue and personal letters delivered via special envoys from each side, the two leaders agreed to hold an inter-Korean summit in April. In the meantime, such inter-Korean dialogue created favorable atmosphere for holding a North Korea-US summit as well.

The historic 2018 Inter-Korean summit meeting was held at the ‘Peace House’ of Panmunjeom on 27 April 2018. The two leaders adopted the ‘Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula,’ declaring that there would be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and a new era of peace had begun. The Panmunjeom Declaration consists of three major parts: i) the advancement of inter-Korean relations, ii) the alleviation of military tensions, and iii) the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, the two sides agreed to the following.

i) ^to fully implement all existing agreements and declarations adopted thus far, ^to hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields, ^to establish a joint liaison office, ^to encourage more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts at all levels, ^to proceed with reunion programs for the separated families, and ^to adopt practical steps towards the connection and modernization of the railways and roads.

ii) ^to completely cease all hostile acts against each other, ^to devise a practical scheme to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone, ^to transform the demilitarized zone into a peace zone, ^to take various military measures to ensure active mutual cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts, and ^to hold frequent meetings between military authorities.

iii) ^to actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, ^to carry out disarmament in a phased manner, and ^to declare an end
to the Korean War within this year and to pursue trilateral or quadrilateral meetings with a view to turning the armistice into a peace treaty and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

Most importantly, the two sides confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Another inter-Korean summit was held on 26 May, where the two leaders agreed that the journey towards denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula must not stop under any circumstance, and they also reaffirmed the necessity to accelerate the implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.

These two inter-Korean summit meetings paved the way for the first-ever US-North Korea summit on 12 June 2018, which reaffirmed the goals of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establishment of a lasting and robust peace regime on the peninsula. The government of the Republic of Korea is of the view that only the first step was taken in the process of achieving these goals. As it was agreed to hold follow-up meetings for the inter-Korean and US-North Korea summits, the framework for dialogue has been set up; thus, enabling the inter-Korean relations and US-North Korea relations to advance like two wheels in a virtuous circle. With this framework, the ROK will continue to play an active role to ensure that the peace process on the Korean Peninsula makes steady headway.

b. U.S.-North Korea summit

In the wake of the two inter-Korean summits, the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit was held in Singapore on 12 June 2018. As the outcome of the summit, the Joint Statement signed by President Trump of the United States and Chairman Kim of North Korea was announced on the same date.

As stated by President Moon, the ROK government believes that the U.S.-North Korea summit will be recorded as a historic event that helped break down the last remaining Cold War legacy on earth. President Trump and Chairman Kim expressed their commitment to developing a "new US-North Korea relations." At the same time, reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration, North Korea committed to "work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", while Chairman Kim "reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Furthermore, the U.S.-North Korea joint statement adopted comprehensive approach which aims at not only denuclearization but also peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, thereby laying the groundwork for denuclearization and peace process kicking into a high gear. It is also worth noting that inter-Korean relations and U.S.-North Korea relations now can move forward together in a mutually reinforcing manner. In this sense, the U.S.-North Korea summit was a great victory achieved by both the United States and the two Koreas, and a huge step forward for people across the world who long for peace.

It is the hope of the ROK and the international community that the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea summit will mark a new starting point for fundamental resolution of North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. As North Korea expressed its willingness for complete denuclearization, it is necessary to come up with concrete ways to implement it through consultations with relevant countries, thereby achieving substantial progress in denuclearization as soon as possible.

In this regard, the ROK will spare no effort in working with the United States, North Korea and the international community to ensure that the US-North Korea Joint Statement can be implemented in its entirety. To that end, it is essential to continue to build trust between the United States and North Korea, while, at the same time, keeping close cooperation with relevant countries. Based on the achievements at the inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea summits, the ROK will continue to keep close coordination with the U.S. as well as cooperation with the international community, in
order to achieve complete denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

a. Overview of national security and defense policy

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) has established defense policies to realize the defense vision of ‘Competent Security, Robust Defense’. The ROK will strengthen military readiness posture, the military’s proper duty, and foster a trusted military by developing an advanced military culture that is desirable to both citizens and military personnel. Furthermore, the ROK will enhance its independent defense capability based on the robust ROK-US combined defense framework and prepare for the future by shaping the favorable strategic environment for promoting national interests.

The National Defense Objectives are: “protecting the nation from external military threats and attack,” “supporting a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula,” and “contributing to regional stability and world peace.”

b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register (as of 2017)

i. Total defence budget (in KRW billions) : 40,335

ii. Defense budget-to-GDP ratio : 2.4%

iii. Defense budget per capita (in KRW billions) : 0.0008

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

a. Counterterrorism

Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Although ISIS has been defeated from its stronghold in the Middle East in late 2017, the threat of terrorism is now advancing toward every corner of the world including Asia. The ROK is fully committed to the fight against terrorism and has been stepping up its efforts to combat terrorism at the national, regional and global level.

Following the recommendations adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2016, the Korean government established its own National Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in January 2018. The Plan takes a whole-of-government approach and marks significant progress in combatting violent extremism in Korea. ROK organized the inter-regional conference on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) with OSCE in April. The conference facilitated regional coordination by sharing best practices and identifying areas for possible cooperation in the field. ROK is also working closely with UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT) for capacity-building for countries vulnerable to violent extremism by financially supporting UN OCT’s PVE project.

The ROK successfully hosted Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games in February 2018. Security concern has mounted as it was the largest Winter Olympic ever held; 2,925 athletes from 92 countries participated. The ROK government developed a security plan based on threat assessment well ahead of the Games. A series of intensive drills followed to make sure the plan works. During the Games, more than 50,000 safety agents were mobilized. International cooperation also played an instrumental role in securing the event. On-site intelligence and police cooperation center operated in close collaboration with security officials from 50 more countries. As there was not a single conspicuous security accident happened at Pyeongchang Olympic, it is widely regarded as one of the safest Games in Olympic history.

The abuse of ICT by terrorist has become prevalent as they strive to spread terrorist ideology through the Internet. Facing with this challenge, the ROK launched the Asia ICT and Counter-terrorism Dialogue in May 2017 with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). The Dialogue provides a platform to find
ways to counter terrorists' Internet exploitation and to bolster public-private engagement. The 2nd workshop of the Dialogue was held in Bangkok in January 2018 where a range of issues were discussed including online radicalization, digital evidence and emerging trends.

Combating and disrupting terrorist financing creates a hostile environment for terrorism. As a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ROK has actively participated in global efforts for countering the financing of terrorism. Serving as a FATF president from July 2015 to June 2016, the ROK gave a full support to the establishment of the FATF Training and Research Institute (TREIN) in Busan. TREIN has provided various training courses on countering terrorist financing for FATF identified jurisdictions and has actively organized workshops including FATF-TREIN Joint Expert Meeting held in May.

Along with multilateral and regional efforts, since 2005 the ROK has held bilateral consultations on counter-terrorism with over 20 countries to discuss effective policies, share information and strengthen bilateral partnerships in addressing terrorism. In 2017, the ROK held counter-terrorism consultations with US, Russia and China respectively which produced concrete measures to fight against terrorism.

b. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery continues to gravely challenge international peace and security, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The ROK will continue to faithfully implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions until it is assured that complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has been achieved.

The ROK remains strongly committed to the non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The ROK will continue to contribute to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system, including through the universal application of the Additional Protocol (AP). Although the 2015 NPT Review Conference was unable to adopt the final document, the ROK will work with other State Parties to further the progress made during the Conference by actively participating in the 2020 NPT Review process. The ROK will continue to promote an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and call for the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

In response to the growing risk of WMD terrorism, the ROK is working towards the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Since preventing WMD and related materials from falling in the hands of terrorists is vital, the ROK has actively participated in promoting effective implementation of resolution 1540, including by acting as the Chair of the 1540 committee for the 2013-14 term and hosting the industrial outreach conferences in September 2016 and September 2018.

As a member of all major multilateral export control regimes, the ROK has been endeavoring to contribute to enhancing multilateral export control regimes. The ROK served as the Chair of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the 2016 – 17 terms and has also been actively participating in outreach mission to non-Partners in order to keep them informed about the group’s activities and provide practical assistance regarding efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery systems.

As an original member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the ROK has actively joined international efforts to uphold and strengthen the CWC regime and to prevent any use of chemical weapons. The ROK will chair the 23th Conference of States Parties in November 2018. The ROK has been holding Seoul Workshop on the Peaceful Development and Use of Chemistry for Member States of the OPCW in the Asian Region since 2012, which is to
enhance regional countries’ capacity for peaceful use of chemistry. The ROK has also contributed to reinforcing the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) took effect in the ROK on 26 February 2017. It is the only legally-binding international treaty which regulates the international trade of conventional arms. The ATT seeks to prevent and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers. As a Party to the Treaty, the ROK will actively participate in promoting transparent and responsible arms transfers.

The ROK has continually sought ways to boost global counter-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the ROK has actively participated in PSI-related international efforts. The ROK has faithfully implemented the PSI interdiction principles and participated in both the OEG (Operational Experts Group) meetings and the APER (Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation) exercises. The ROK will continue making its contribution to the global counter-proliferation efforts.

The ROK annually hosts the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). At the 16th Conference in November 2016, approximately 60 experts and high officials discussed the implications of and possible responses to key issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation.

c. Transnational crime

The ROK has been increasing efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under the criminal code, and to identify and protect victims of human trafficking. The ROK amended its Criminal Act in 2013 when it newly introduced a comprehensive provision for trafficking in persons as part of its efforts to meet UNTOC standards. In 2015, the ROK ratified UNTOC and the protocols thereto in addition to these legislative measures. In August 2016, the National Human Rights Commission developed ‘Indicators for the Identification and Protection of Trafficking in Persons,’ which was distributed to relevant government branches and recommended to be used as guidelines to identify and protect victims.

The ROK held the 4th Senior-level Workshop on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Asia and the Pacific in 2016 with the aim to further strengthen network between practitioners. In 2017, the ROK also attended the ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Trafficking Persons in April, as well as the Bali Process Business Forum in August. Through these meetings, the ROK reaffirmed its strong support for countering transnational crimes, including trafficking in persons, and strengthening cooperative efforts therein.

d. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

International society is confronted with a serious refugee crisis. More than 60 million people have been forced to leave their homes due to life-threatening conflicts and violence, placing an increased burden on the countries that accept the refugees seeking safety. Amid this situation, the Republic of Korea is actively contributing to regional and international efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The ROK provides financial support to disaster and conflict-stricken countries, supports capacity-building activities in the area of disaster management, and assists the emergency response efforts of the United Nations.

In pursuing such humanitarian activities, the ROK has followed the universal humanitarian principles of the international community. The ROK has also been actively engaged in international dialogue.

As a responsible member of international society, the ROK responded actively to increasing humanitarian needs caused by emergency disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, and infectious diseases, or by chronic disasters in conflict-stricken countries such as Syria and Iraq. Considering the urgent need for assistance to minimize damage from disasters, the ROK government provided approximately 70 million US dollars in response to more than 50 humanitarian crises in 2017.
Furthermore, the ROK has steadily increased humanitarian assistance for refugees: humanitarian assistance to refugees has increased from three million US dollars in 2010 to approximately 64 million US dollars in 2017. At the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul on May 23 - 24, 2016, the ROK pledged to increase its contribution to end conflicts and build peace, expand its contribution to education and capacity-building of women to at least 20 percent of its humanitarian assistance budget by 2020 and increase its contribution for refugees to respond to the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Along with the pledge made at the World Humanitarian Summit, the ROK announced it would offer 230 million US dollars in humanitarian assistance from 2017 to 2019, at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees which took place in New York City on September 20, 2016.

As a proactive supporter of regional disaster management, the Korean government has shown its commitment to disaster relief cooperation in the region through diverse approaches. In this regard, the ROK has served as the Co-Chair of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) during 2016-2018 and hosted the 17th ARF ISM on DR in Seoul on April 4, 2018. In addition, it led the discussions among the ARF participants to draw up the final draft of ARF Work Plan for Disaster Relief 2018-2020.

e. Maritime security

Among various maritime security issues, the ROK has especially focused on joining international movements in countering and preventing piracy. Since 2006, the ROK has been a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and sought to make a valuable contribution to the regional efforts to combat piracy. The ROK has actively taken part in the Governing Council Meetings and supported Information Sharing Center of the ReCAAP by seconding Korean staff to the Information Sharing Center since 2007.

In regards to regional capacity building, the ROK has been doing its part by providing a voluntary contribution for the work of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center. The ROK had contributed approximately 90,000 US dollars every year from 2008 to 2012 and increased its contribution by 50% in 2013. The ROK has been contributing about 130,000 US dollars annually from 2013 to 2017.

As a part of the world’s joint efforts in the fight against piracy in Somalia, the ROK has deployed the Cheonghae (meaning “pure sea”) Anti-Piracy Unit to the high seas off the coast of Somalia since 2009. The Cheonghae Unit has conducted convoy missions to protect vessels from pirates as part of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under the command of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Furthermore, The Cheonghae Unit also has taken part in the EU Naval Force’s Operation Atlanta, which carries out operations such as convoy missions to protect vessels of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and World Food Programme (WFP) and patrolling in Somali shores, to combat piracy off the Somali Coast from February 2017.

The ROK has also played an important role in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) since 2009. The ROK has not only participated in the meetings where diverse discussions on countering piracy take place, but also made financial contribution to substantially support the coastal states’ capacity building. The total contribution to the CGPCS Trust Fund amounts to 1.3 million US dollars from 2011 to 2017 including additional 200,000 US dollars contribution in 2017.

In addition, the ROK has made financial contribution to the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund to strengthen the judicial capacity and support good governance of the Government of Somalia and neighboring countries. In 2017, the ROK provided 100,000 US dollars to the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund, adding up to 0.8 million US dollars of contribution since 2009.
f. ICTs security

As the advance of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) has presented us a new domain of boundless opportunities, it also brought the unprecedented challenges with them. Especially, the advent of a ‘Hyper-connected Society’ in which people and objects are connected through a network brought us greater vulnerability. The more connected and sophisticated cyberspace becomes, the greater the risk for its misuse and abuse.

Malicious actors are ceaselessly plotting offensive activities using ICTs, not only targeting individuals and businesses but also the critical infrastructure. There is a shared regional concern over North Korea’s malicious cyber activities. Moreover, recent attacks using ICTs tend to aim at extorting cryptocurrencies, abusing the hard-to-trace nature of cryptocurrencies. Ransomware attack demanding payment in cryptocurrencies and cryptojacking are becoming more and more prevalent.

Considering the cross-border nature and ripple effects of cyber threats, no single country is immune to this looming threat. As cyber security cannot be adequately addressed single-handedly by any country alone, regional and international cooperation in this field is of utmost importance for cybersecurity. Recognizing this, the ROK places a great deal of importance on establishing mechanisms for cooperation and capacity building.

The ROK has been holding a series of bilateral and trilateral cyber policy consultations with a view to discussing potential steps for cooperation and strengthening the concerted response to cyber threat. In 2017, the ROK had bilateral consultations with the Czech Republic and NATO, while working to strengthen sub-regional cooperation through Korea-Japan-China trilateral consultations.

At the multilateral level, the ROK has been actively participating in regional cooperation since it held the ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in 2004, when the cyber issue came to the fore as an important issue on the regional agenda. In April 2017, the ROK also hosted, in cooperation with the OSCE, the Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security to discuss measures to enhance regional cooperation against cyber threats by sharing experience with the OSCE.

Recognizing the importance of establishing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the field of ICTs, the ROK has been supportive of the establishment of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, which was adopted in the 24th ARF Ministerial Meeting in August 2017. By actively participating in the Inter-Sessional Meeting, as well as the Open Ended Study Group on Confidence Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of ICTs, the ROK has been working to contribute to the concerted efforts to enhance regional cooperation in this field. The ROK’s measures to address cyber security are consistent with recommendations elaborated in the ‘ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies’, adopted in August 2015. The ROK reaffirms its commitment to continuously play a valuable part in the establishment of regional Confidence Building Measures on cybersecurity.

In addition, the ROK places great importance on bridging the gap in cyber security capacity among countries. While the digital divide by countries and regions is becoming more and more serious, many malicious actors in cyberspace tend to take advantage of weak links within the global cyber ecosystem. As countries with low cyber security capacity are often targeted to be used as a transit route, the ROK views capacity building as one of the priority areas in promoting ICTs security. Indeed, this was well reflected in the fact that the ROK newly included capacity-building as a major item on the agenda for the Global Conference on Cyber Space in Seoul in 2013.

Taking this initiative a step further, the ROK has implemented various capacity building projects with developing countries by establishing GCCD (Global Cybersecurity Center for Development) in 2015 and CAMP (Cybersecurity Alliance for Mutual Progress) in 2016. Through these projects,
the ROK provides policy advice, consultations and training on cyber-security measures to developing countries. Since July 2016, GCCD has been participating in a joint project for capacity building with World Bank and Oxford University, while leading the follow-up seminars which aim at providing quality education for developing countries which are customized to their condition.

IV. Role of the ARF

a. National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

As a founding member of the ARF, the ROK is committed to its vision of promoting confidence-building measures, developing preventive diplomacy, and elaborating approaches to conflicts in the region. The ROK participated in the ARF’s various CBMs and PD activities during the inter-sessional year of 2017-2018; these include the Inter-Sessional Support Group meeting, four Inter-Sessional Meetings and the meeting of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons, along with other CMBs and PD workshops and seminars. Also, The ROK government co-chaired the 17th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the 10th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament on April 4 and 5-6, 2018 respectively.

The ROK government will continuously deepen its engagement in the ARF’s endeavors, and, in this vein, the ROK would like to co-chair the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group meeting with Thailand in 2019. In addition, the ROK is co-chairing Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament with Indonesia and Japan. The ROK looks forward to working closely with ARF members in contributing to confidence building and cooperation in this region.

b. Future of the ARF

As a unique intergovernmental forum concerned with multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF functions as an effective venue for exchanging views on common security threats and seek common responses to them. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has played an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region, by facilitating dialogue among regional countries and providing opportunities to freely exchange views on various security issues. At the same time, the ARF has carried out a multitude of Track 1 activities as part of confidence-building measures. They include measures in response to new security challenges of non-traditional and transnational nature, including natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes, and cyber threats.

Within the evolving defense and security environment in the region, the ARF needs to fully utilize its strengths and work towards building a complementary relationship with other regional operations and mechanisms, such as the ADMM+ and the East Asia Summit. The ROK notes that ARF process has been effectively reinforced through active negotiations among member states and hopes to further strengthen the ARF process through continuous discussions and cooperation within the ARF.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific has been steadily growing at an accelerated pace and consolidating its position as an important centre of an emerging multi-polar world order. The region has been witnessing the unprecedented scale of integration efforts and active development of multilateral cooperation and network diplomacy.

At the same time, a serious conflict potential of the Asia-Pacific remains. Attempts are made to escalate the atmosphere of mutual distrust, strengthen exclusive military-political blocs and narrow the space for a constructive dialogue.

One of the major regional security threats is the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula. The situation in the Peninsula has been showing positive trends since early 2018. We welcome the outcomes of the inter-Korean summits on 27 April and 26 May in Panmunjom, as well as of US-North Korea leaders’ meeting on 12 June in Singapore. Ceasing provocative activities is an important step towards defusing the tensions and building confidence in the Peninsula.

However, it is obvious that the final settlement of the Northeast Asia problems and establishment of durable subregional peace will take a long time. Jointly we have to find a solution to such complicated issues as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demilitarization of the region in general, including the US strategic arms and THAAD missile defence systems deployed in the Republic of Korea and Aegis Ashore systems deployed in Japan. Given fundamental differences, this work is attended with major challenges and fraught with complications and setbacks.

In accordance with the Roadmap for Korean settlement developed jointly with its Chinese partners, Russia has consistently opposed enhancing military activity around the Korean Peninsula, supported direct negotiating processes between the countries involved, and cooperated with other partners to work towards launching a multilateral dialogue on the problems of Northeast Asia based on the principles of mutual respect, equal and indivisible security.

The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme is of the serious concern, given that the United States has unilaterally reneged on its commitments thereunder. This instrument is a crucial multilateral agreement approved by UNSC resolution 2231 (2015). The JCPOA has proved to be effective and became the asset of the whole international community interested in strengthening and preserving international and regional peace and stability, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia remains committed to it.

The situation in the Asia-Pacific is affected by the developments in certain Middle East countries aggravating international terrorist threat, first and foremost posed by the so-called Islamic State (IS). Russia together with Iran and Turkey as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime in Syria intends to continue steps towards achieving political settlement in that country, as provided by UNSC resolution 2254 (2015). An important contribution towards reaching peace through an inclusive, free, fair and transparent Syrian-led process is made by the Astana Format. Its ultimate goal is to launch the Constitutional Committee in Geneva based on the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi and in coordination with the guarantor countries.

The efforts to promote the political process are disrupted by certain countries’ unlawful actions, such as the attack against Syria on 14 April 2018 under the false pretext of the Syrian Government’s use of chemical weapons that had never been confirmed by any evidence from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The military and political situation in Afghanistan remains complicated with increased combat activities of terrorist groups, mainly the Afghan branch of IS and Al Qaida. Russia advocates national reconciliation and supports the proposal of the Afghan Government to hold direct peace negotiations with Taliban. The Moscow Format of Regional Consultations on Afghanistan initiated
by Russia along with the efforts of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group with the new members on board are the most promising in terms of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

The surge in drug production in Afghanistan, which usually provides substantial financial resources for the extremist groups, is of particular concern. Therefore, we call for an intensified international cooperation in combating illicit drug production, trafficking and abuse.

The situation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea requires permanent monitoring. The parties to the territorial disputes in these areas should respect the principle of non-use of force or threat of force and continue to seek for political and diplomatic solutions to the current problems in conformity with the international law. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the instruments adopted by ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, namely the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC agreed upon in 2011, should serve as a basis for settling the differences in the South China Sea. Negotiations should be held between the parties directly involved in the disputes in the most efficient format determined by themselves. The Code of Conduct of parties in the South China Sea that is being drafted by the ASEAN Member States and China is intended to be an efficient conflict-prevention tool. We commend the Framework Principles of the future document agreed upon in August 2017.

II. Defence Policy of the Russian Federation

The main objectives of Russia's defence policy are determined by the President of the Russian Federation in the National Security Strategy until 2020 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved on 26 December 2014.

Russia ensures its national security on the basis of principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness and resorts to military measures only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information and other non-force instruments have been exhausted. The activities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific are carried out in strict compliance with international norms and bilateral agreements, posing no threat to peace and stability in the region.

III. International Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

Russia is focused on the comprehensive enhancement of defence ties with Asia-Pacific nations in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. We cooperate in both multilateral and bilateral formats. Russia assigns a particular role in ensuring regional security to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ARF.

In 2017-2020, Russia and Laos are co-chairing the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action. During the implementation of the measures under the relevant three-year Work Plan, the capacity of the International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be actively engaged. The exercise to be held under the Russian-Lao co-chairmanship will be combined with the ADMM-Plus exercise on peacekeeping in Indonesia in 2019.

We are proactively developing bilateral defence cooperation with Asia Pacific countries, primarily with China, India and ASEAN Member States.

The dialogue mechanisms between Russia and China, including annual meetings of Defence Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff, command and staff negotiations, delegations exchange, as well as exercises of the armed forces, including navy, function effectively. In 2017, a Roadmap of Defence Cooperation was signed between the Russian Federation and PRC.

India remains one of Russia’s leading partners in the region in the field of military and technical cooperation. Russia assists the Indian side in developing its military-industrial complex. In 2017 the India-Russia “Indra Navy” exercise and
“Indra” joint anti-terrorist army training were first conducted in an inter-branch format. A Roadmap on developing bilateral defence cooperation and a Protocol aimed at developing bilateral military and technical cooperation were signed.

There is an emerging trend for renewed regular high-level bilateral military exchanges with Japan: 2 plus 2 consultations of foreign and defence ministers were resumed in 2017.

In 2017, a Memorandum on military cooperation and an Agreement on defence cooperation were signed with Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines respectively. Great importance is attributed to the friendly calls of Russia’s Navy to the ports of Asia-Pacific countries (in 2017–2018, Russian naval ships visited the ports of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam).

Cooperation in personnel training at the Russian military universities and academies is developing. Currently more than 1200 students from Asia-Pacific countries study at the educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The Russian Ministry of Defence annually hosts in Moscow the Conference on International Security. In April 2018, representatives of 95 countries participated in the forum, including those of the Asia-Pacific. Joint participation in the International Army Games 2018, as well as the International Military and Technical Forum “Army-2018” organized by Russia, will contribute to building stronger ties in the defence area.

IV. Nuclear and Missile Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Asia-Pacific

The Russian Federation makes a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament efforts, implementing scrupulously the 2010 Treaty with the United States on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). By 5 February 2018, we have reached the limits of nuclear arms stockpiles set by this document through their actual and verifiable reductions. However, there is still a number of problems to be addressed by the US with regard to the implementation of the Treaty. In view of the correlation between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, stipulated, inter alia, in the New START, the deployment of US Global Ballistic Missile Defence System in the Asia-Pacific arouses deep concern.

The establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones is an important tool for strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime. The status of Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) has yet to be formalized. Russia re-affirms its readiness to immediately sign the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty and is open to consultations with its Parties to institutionalize this nuclear-weapons-free zone as soon as possible.

Persistent use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq by the militants of IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated extremist groups causes serious concern of possible spread of chemical terrorism to the Asia-Pacific. To counter WMD-terrorism, Russia has proposed to draft an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The initiative has gained support from the majority of Asia-Pacific countries.

The threat of an arms race in outer space is of growing concern. The draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, proposed by Russia and China, and the multilateral initiative on no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP initiative) aim at countering this threat. The NFP resolution that the UN General Assembly has been adopting for the fourth year running, has been co-sponsored by 10 countries of the region alongside with Russia: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, DPRK, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam. Moreover, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam are
full-fledged NFP participants who have adopted the relevant political commitment in bilateral statements signed in this regard with Russia.

V. Combating International Terrorism and Transnational Crime in the Asia-Pacific

Given the growing terrorist threats, Russia pays special attention to developing practical cooperation in this field, both bilateral and multilateral, with Asia-Pacific countries, as well as to strengthening their counter-terrorism capacities. In view of the latest developments, emphasis is placed on countering the spread of the influence of IS, Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups, and the cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as combating the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology and the terrorism financing.

These issues are in the focus of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership, in particular ASEAN-Russia Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime and ASEAN-Russia Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime. The common approaches were reflected in the Statement on Joint Efforts to Counter International Terrorism adopted at the ASEAN-Russia Ministerial Meeting in Manila on 7 August 2017.

The Russian side is worried over the de-facto interruption of ARF countering-terrorism activities. In this regard, Russia together with Indonesia have proposed to co-chair the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in 2018-2019 and to focus its work on combating the foreign terrorist fighters.

At the Russian initiative the Leaders’ Statement on Countering Ideological Challenges of Terrorism and Terrorist Narratives and Propaganda was adopted at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in November 2017, which is innovative for international documents of such level. It clearly stipulates that external interference and violation of the sovereignty of States is one of the key factors of the growing terrorist threats.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also remains instrumental in the field of anti-terrorism, primarily, the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group, which gives a floor for promoting key approaches to the international counter-terrorism cooperation, in particular, in detecting and suppressing the sources and channels of terrorism financing. We consistently expand partnership relations with Asia-Pacific countries within the FATF and the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering to which Russia is an observer.

VI. International Information Security in the Asia-Pacific

The promotion of multilateral cooperation on international information security is among Russian priorities in the Asia-Pacific. In this context, the great importance is attached to the work within relevant regional formats, primarily, the ARF.

Russia is making significant efforts to ensure that respective activity of the Forum is built upon the principle of consensus, is rules-based and transparent, with clear guarantees of equal involvement of all ARF participants. The visible progress was made in that area in 2018 with the establishment of the open-ended Support Group on Confidence Building Measures to Reduce the Risk of Conflict Stemming from the Use of ICTs and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of ICTs.

Russia pays a lot of attention to the development of regional confidence building measures in cyber space, drafting the list of universal terms in that field, development of common measures to counter the use of ICTs for criminal and terrorist purposes, capacity building, as well as to a substantive discussion on Internet governance aimed at the internationalizing and increasing the role of States in that process.

Russia’s relevant authorities provided technical assistance to the ASEAN Member States and personnel training to their law enforcement agencies and special services. The educational institutions of the Federal Security Service and Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation held
training courses for ASEAN Member States on combating the crimes in the sphere of ICTs as well as computer terrorism in 2017.

At the same time any regional efforts should take into account the global goal, i.e. the development and adoption under the auspices of the UN of the universal norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States in the use of ICTs.

VII. Emergency Response in the Asia-Pacific

Russia continues to promote regional cooperation in the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The main focus in this regard is on the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership, ARF, SCO and APEC. The issues of capacity-building for the emergency preparedness and response in the region, including the development of the global network of crisis management centres in the Asia-Pacific are of major importance.

The Russian EMERCOM experts are actively involved in regional table-top exercises in the Asia-Pacific under the auspices of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. A mechanism of interaction between the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) and relevant national agencies through the global network of crisis management centres is being tested during those table-top exercises.

EMERCOM of Russia regularly participates in the ARF Inter Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group meetings, in discussions on the development of national disaster risk reduction systems and the implementation of relevant initiatives and programs to create regional environment resistant to disasters and catastrophes. The EAS and Asia-Europe Meetings are used for developing the working contacts and exchange of expertise in emergency management.

The Action Plan to Implement the Inter-Governmental SCO Agreement on Emergency Relief Cooperation in 2018-2019 was adopted at the meeting of Heads of the SCO line agencies (Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, 24-25 August 2017).

EMERCOM of Russia continues to provide practical assistance to Asia Pacific countries affected by disasters and catastrophes, as well as to improve humanitarian emergency response system to deal with large-scale emergencies abroad, with special emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region as the most disaster-prone. A number of emergency humanitarian operations were carried out in the region in 2017, in particular, in Viet Nam to overcome the consequences of the flood. The cooperation in protecting the population and territories from emergencies is being further developed with other countries of the Asia-Pacific, including China, India, the Republic of Korea and Thailand.

VIII. Regional Security Architecture and Trends in Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

Attempts to reshape the existing regional order in the interests of a small group of countries under the pretext of promoting the Indo-Pacific concepts are cause for concern. Such a policy can lead to the strengthening of bloc trends in the Asia-Pacific, emergence of new dividing lines, undermining of the multilateral decision-making process.

A sustainable response to security challenges in the region can only be ensured through the collective efforts aimed at establishment of a non-bloc system of inter-state relations which would be in common interests and adequate to present-day realities. It should be open, inclusive and transparent, based on the principles of equality and indivisibility of security, strict observance of international law, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-use of force or threat of force.
A promising platform for the development of such multilateral dialogue is the EAS, which has set up a mechanism for consultations on regional security architecture. A comprehensive legally binding document on common “rules of the game” in the Asia-Pacific is to be the outcome of this work. The efforts in that direction should be continued at a pace comfortable to all EAS participants while indispensably preserving the ASEAN centrality.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Singapore has taken on the Chairmanship of ASEAN at a critical juncture. Geostrategic dynamics in the region are becoming increasingly complicated. Transboundary challenges like terrorism, violent extremism, climate change, and cybercrime are on the rise. The global consensus on free trade is fraying, and trade rivalry between major powers presents a clear and present problem to our region where trade is strategy. In the ongoing digital revolution, technology is both an enabler and a disruptor, with governments struggling to mitigate job displacement, wage stagnation, and functional redundancy. The world as we know it is in flux, and uncertainty has become the mainstay.

Against this backdrop, Singapore has set out to build a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN. We want to strengthen ASEAN’s resilience to global and regional challenges, and to keep ASEAN relevant and forward-looking by stepping up cooperation in innovation. Singapore’s initiatives on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and the ASEAN Smart Cities Network are some of the concrete steps we are taking under our Chairmanship to forge closer integration and interoperability within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its partners, while upholding a rules-based regional architecture with ASEAN at the core. Over the past 51 years, ASEAN has served as a neutral and credible platform for its partners to engage each other and the region as a whole. ASEAN has cultivated a robust network of partners and instituted ASEAN-led mechanisms to anchor its external engagement, such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These efforts have helped to strengthen confidence, trust and practical cooperation amongst the key stakeholders of our region. ASEAN can only remain relevant and effective as a regional bloc if it stays united and at the core of the regional architecture. Amidst the changing geostrategic environment, Singapore will continue to work towards strengthening ASEAN unity and Centrality, forging closer ties with our partners, and exploring new partnerships and avenues for cooperation.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Singapore’s defence policy is based on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy. Singapore believes in the need for strong defence to ensure that we enjoy peace and security, and to provide us with the political space and freedom to act in the best interests of our people. This is why Singapore has invested steadily and prudently in defence over the years to build up a professional and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Given our small population and limited resources, Singapore focuses on force multipliers – technology, paired with a highly educated and technologically-savvy population – to overcome the limits of our small standing military. Singapore’s defence expenditure in FY2017 stood at 3.1 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

As a small country, Singapore’s security and prosperity are highly dependent on regional peace and stability. Singapore seeks to establish strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. Singapore also believes that regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. As such, Singapore actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including ASEAN, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, EAS, ARF, Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), and Five Power Defence Arrangements.

The ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN and a key component of the regional security architecture. Established in 2006, the ADMM aims to promote cooperation among members in areas of mutual interest and concern, including the promotion of consultation and cooperation in the event of any crisis or emergency. Singapore has been an active participant in the ADMM, contributing to its efforts to enhance regional cooperation and security. The ADMM provides a platform for members to discuss and address common security concerns, and it serves as a forum for the exchange of information and the sharing of best practices in the field of defence and security.

In conclusion, Singapore’s approach to security and defence is one that is forward-looking and proactive, based on the principles of collaboration, innovation, and adaptation. By working closely with its ASEAN partners and other regional and international actors, Singapore is able to maintain a strong and capable defence capability while fostering a secure and prosperous region for all.

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regional peace and stability through dialogue and practical cooperation in defence and security matters with the view towards enhancing security cooperation. At the 11th ADMM in Clark, the Philippines in October 2017, the ASEAN Defence Ministers underscored the ADMM's commitment to combat terrorism through regional and international cooperation. The 11th ADMM also agreed to Singapore's proposal to establish an ad hoc working group to develop air guidelines for military aircraft. In recognition of the important role of the ADMM-Plus in enhancing regional peace and security since its establishment in 2010, the 11th ADMM agreed to Singapore and Vietnam's proposal to annualise the ADMM-Plus. The 4th ADMM-Plus was held in Clark in October 2017, during which the Defence Ministers affirmed the value of the ADMM-Plus in strengthening practical cooperation among Member States' militaries. The ADMM-Plus Ministers also discussed the importance of establishing effective and practical measures to tackle transnational threats such as terrorism, and de-escalate tensions and prevent conflicts in the region. In this regard, the Singapore ADMM and ADMM-Plus Chairmanship will focus on: (a) enhancing regional counter-terrorism cooperation; (b) strengthening the region's capability to respond to chemical, biological, and radiological threats; and (c) putting in place practical confidence-building measures/ codes for unplanned encounters in the aviation and maritime domains to reduce miscalculations and unintended incidents. At the ADMM Retreat in February 2018, the ASEAN Defence Ministers expressed support for these three focus areas, and issued a Joint Statement on Countering Terrorism in ASEAN to reaffirm their commitment to step up counter-terrorism efforts. The ASEAN Defence Ministers also reached consensus to conduct an ASEAN-China Maritime Table-Top Exercise (TTX) in ASEAN, followed by a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in China in 2018, and agreed that these would be useful confidence-building measures to promote mutual trust and enhance regional peace and stability. The 12th ADMM and 5th ADMM-Plus will be held in Singapore in October 2018.

Singapore is strongly encouraged by the good progress of the seven ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) in the areas of maritime security (MS), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO), counter-terrorism (CT), military medicine (MM), humanitarian mine action (HMA), and cyber security (CS). Singapore is co-chairing the Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security (EWG-MS) with the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the third EWG cycle from 2017 to 2020. We aim to sustain the positive momentum of practical military-to-military cooperation, and promote maritime security norms based on respect for international law to underpin a stable international order. At the 12th EWG-MS Meeting in Singapore in November 2017, the ADMM-Plus Navies agreed to collectively adopt the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and to practise CUES during the EWG-MS Field Training Exercise in May 2019.

The SLD is held annually in Singapore and organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Since its inception in 2002, the SLD has established itself as the foremost defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific. The 17th SLD was held from 1 to 3 June 2018, and was attended by participants from 51 countries and 43 Ministers from Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered the keynote address, and participants exchanged candid views on pertinent security issues, including global terrorism and cyber attacks.

The SLD Sherpa Meeting, also organised by the IISS, supplements the SLD process by providing an inter-sessional platform for senior officials to engage in frank discussions on security issues. The sixth SLD Sherpa Meeting was held from 28 to 30 January 2018, and was attended by about 75 delegates from over 20 countries regularly represented at the SLD. ROK Defence Minister Song Young-moo delivered the keynote address.

(i) Counter-terrorism

The threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region. Continued vigilance and cooperation by all countries is needed to deal with the complex
and long-term challenges posed by terrorism and the ideologies that perpetuate it.

Since the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism efforts have made much progress. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines in 2007, is the first region-wide and legally-binding anti-terrorism pact. Singapore was one of the first ASEAN Member States (AMS) to ratify the Convention. The ACCT entered into force on 27 May 2011, and has, since January 2013, been ratified by all 10 AMS. Singapore welcomes these significant achievements on the Convention, which enhances regional cooperation against terrorism and affirms the region’s commitment to the global strategy on counter-terrorism.

In support of regional capacity building, Singapore has hosted a number of counter-terrorism workshops and initiatives in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, as well as Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios, under the auspices of the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue.

Singapore is committed to strengthening the regional counter-terrorism security architecture. At the ADMM Retreat in February 2018, Singapore introduced the 3R Concept (Resilience, Response, Recovery), which aims to foster greater regional CT cooperation. Singapore will also host a Track 1.5 symposium, the 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-Terrorism Symposium: Building a Collective Approach, in October 2018. The symposium will bring together cross-sectoral perspectives on how we can strengthen the region’s collective efforts against terrorism.

(ii) Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Singapore is active in combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). We ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1976, and concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. Singapore also ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and adopted the modified Small Quantities Protocol in March 2008. Singapore supports the universalisation of both the CSA and the AP. Singapore works closely with the IAEA on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hosted three IAEA outreach seminars, namely two seminars on the Agency’s Safeguards Systems for States in Southeast and South Asia in March 2011, and another seminar on Safeguards for States in Southeast Asia in June 2015. Singapore joined the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database in March 2012. We also jointly organise outreach workshops with the IAEA, such as the Sub-Regional Workshop on Nuclear Law in the areas of Safety, Security, Safeguards, and Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in June 2016. Singapore signed an agreement to enhance cooperation in capacity building with the IAEA in January 2015, and launched a nuclear safety research and education programme in April 2014. In July 2016, Singapore hosted IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano to visit the Singapore Nuclear Research and Safety Initiative Laboratories and the new Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility for security-sensitive materials. Singapore serves regularly on the IAEA’s Board of Governors (BOG), and is currently serving a two-year term which began in September 2016. Singapore is also party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and supports efforts to promote its early entry into force.


Singapore strongly supports counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), and recognises the importance of preventing rogue groups, such as terrorist organisations, from acquiring WMD. Singapore has actively participated in the PSI since its establishment in 2003. Singapore is the only member from Southeast Asia to be in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG), and has hosted PSI exercises and meetings, such as Exercise Deep Sabre 2016 in September 2016. Singapore also hosted the PSI OEG meeting in August 2017. In addition, Singapore has participated in PSI activities, including the PSI OEG Meeting in London, United Kingdom in April 2016, Exercise Pacific Protector in Cairns, Australia in September 2017 and the 3rd High-Level Political Meeting and Operational Experts Group Meeting in Paris, France in May 2018.

Singapore fully supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)'s efforts to further develop capabilities and readiness against the threat of chemical weapons. We participated in the 19th Annual Meeting of National Authorities and 22nd Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 2017. Pursuant to Article X, Singapore has been conducting the Emergency Response to Chemical Incidents training course on a biennial basis since 2009. The fifth instalment of the course was conducted in December 2017, and the sixth instalment is scheduled for 2019. The course held in 2017 has benefitted 21 participants from 12 OPCW Member States in Asia. The course has also encouraged a platform for the sharing of experiences on the management of hazards. In addition, Singapore values the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW as a participant of the Temporary Working Group on Sampling and Analysis and Verification. Singapore participated in the 2014 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has submitted returns on BWC Confidence Building Measures annually since 2012.

Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally-binding international instrument that regulates the international transfer of conventional arms, on 5 December 2014. This reaffirms Singapore’s commitment to the elimination of the threat posed by the illicit arms trade, as well as international disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives that promote global peace and security.

As a reflection of our commitment to prevent WMD proliferation, Singapore adheres to a robust and enhanced export control regime. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act controls the transfer and brokering of goods capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, stockpile or acquire WMD, along with strategic goods and related software and technology. The Act’s control list is regularly updated to ensure that it keeps abreast of technological developments and remains aligned with the four multilateral export control regimes. In May 2018, Singapore Customs organised the Customs-Competent Authority Seminar to enhance awareness of the trading community on the regulatory requirements for various controlled goods and recent developments. Singapore also launched the Trade Facilitation & Integrated Risk-based System (TradeFIRST) in January 2011 to provide a single holistic framework to encourage a virtuous cycle of compliance. Under TradeFIRST, companies with more robust systems, internal practices and security measures are rewarded with a higher level of trade facilitation.

In July 2017, Singapore organised the annual Joint Industry Outreach Seminar on Strategic Trade Management with the US Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) and Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The Seminar keeps the industry abreast of the latest developments in export controls and best practices for improved compliance. Since 2011, Singapore has participated in the Annual Asian Export Control Seminars (AECS) held in Tokyo, which addresses domestic industry outreach and international collaboration. Singapore also participates regularly in the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo, including the most recent meeting held in January 2018.
Singapore supports the EU’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CBRN CoE) initiative in Southeast Asia. Our agencies and experts have been involved in numerous CBRN CoE projects and activities. For example, Singapore contributed regional bio-risk experts who developed training materials and conducted workshops on laboratory design, engineering and operations in several regional countries under Project 46. Singapore’s Public Utilities Board (PUB) is currently participating in Project 61, which addresses the sound management of chemicals and their associated wastes.

(iii) Transnational crime

Regional security challenges are increasingly transnational and non-traditional in nature, and cannot be adequately addressed by individual countries’ domestic policies. Singapore therefore believes in a concerted regional effort in combating transnational crimes.

Under the aegis of the ASEAN Ministerial and Senior Officials’ Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC & SOMTC), Singapore is the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd for two transnational crime areas – namely, cybercrime and international economic crime.

Singapore’s current legal framework for International Economic Crime (IEC) is relevant and effective. Offences such as the possession and use of counterfeit credit cards and counterfeit currency are adequately addressed by various provisions in the Penal Code. The Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act also has adequate provisions to deal with criminals who commit online card fraud or make use of devices such as ‘skimmers’ and computers to steal data from genuine credit cards and provide them to counterfeit credit card syndicates. Recent amendments to the Penal Code also updated various technical definitions and references in offences related to card fraud in order to deal with the issue more effectively.

In terms of public education, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) has forged a strategic partnership with the credit card industry to generate merchant awareness in credit card crime prevention. SPF’s Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) is also represented at the Singapore Card Security Group (SCSG), which is made up of various card-issuing banks and companies. The SCSG meets frequently to share fraud-related intelligence and develop joint strategies to prevent and counter card fraud related activities. It has also conducted several joint merchant education programmes targeting specific retail sectors. In close consultation with the Monetary Authority of Singapore and other agencies, the SCSG was instrumental in recommending and implementing effective measures to enhance payment card security, including the implementation of smart chip technology on all Singapore-issued payment cards, the implementation of two-factor authentication, and card activation of new and replacement cards.

As SOMTC Lead Shepherd for IEC, Singapore has organised two ASEAN workshops, with the most recent workshop held from 14 to 16 November 2016. The workshops were funded by the ROK and were attended by representatives from all AMS and the ROK. The workshops aimed to create a platform for ASEAN law enforcement agencies to exchange information and best practices on the trends, patterns and challenges in combating international economic crime. One of the key deliverables of the workshop was the compilation and distribution of a list of focal points to facilitate information exchange, law enforcement cooperation and capacity building in combating IEC in the ASEAN region.

Singapore also conducts an annual IEC Course to equip relevant investigators with competencies required for the investigation of commercial crime. This course reviews the latest trends, threats and challenges facing law enforcement agencies in the area of commercial crime, and seeks to provide an update on the latest development on white-collar crime. 29 enforcement officers from Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore participated in the most recent IECC which was conducted from 5 to 9 February 2018. The next course will be held in 2019.
Singapore takes a serious view of trafficking-in-persons (TIP) crimes. An inter-agency Taskforce co-led by Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Manpower was formed in 2010 to coordinate whole-of-government strategies to fight TIP. The Taskforce works closely with the law enforcement agencies and embassies of countries that victims may originate from. Such close cooperation ensures that reports of trafficking are quickly and thoroughly investigated. Information sharing and upstream enforcement against human traffickers also prevent other innocent victims from being exploited. Since Singapore's National Plan of Action (NPA) was launched in 2012, much effort has been made to strengthen policies and systems along a four-pronged approach of Prevention, Prosecution, Protection and Partnerships. The NPA was completed in 2015, which served as a roadmap to build capabilities to deal with TIP in Singapore. In March 2016, the National Approach against TIP was launched to build on the success of the NPA. The National Approach sets out key strategies and the desired end outcomes to guide Taskforce agencies and stakeholders when developing their work plans to combat TIP.

Singapore supports regional and international efforts to combat TIP. Singapore cooperates with other AMS through platforms such as the AMMTC, which oversees the region's effort to combat TIP, and the SOMTC and its Working Group on TIP. Beyond ASEAN, Singapore also works with partners such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as well as the Group of Friends (GoF) United Against Human Trafficking in New York and Geneva, to find better ways to combat TIP.

Singapore had worked closely with other AMS on the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) and ASEAN Plan of Action (APA). The ASEAN Leaders signed the ACTIP at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015. Singapore's Instrument of Ratification was deposited with the ASEAN Secretary-General on 25 January 2016. ACTIP has since come into force on 8 March 2017, as the 6th AMS, viz the Philippines, deposited its instrument of ratification with the ASEAN Secretary-General on 6 February 2017.


(iv) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Disasters can affect any country without warning. As a good neighbour and friend, Singapore provides assistance where we can, participating in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions where we can make contributions that are meaningful and within our means.

In 2017, in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines' efforts against terrorists in Marawi and Mindanao, Singapore airlifted $100,000 of aid from the SAF and Singapore Red Cross to provide relief to the affected communities.

In October 2017, Singapore donated $100,000 in support of humanitarian efforts in the Rakhine State through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). Singapore also provided $270,000 of aid to Bangladesh in response to the refugee situation in Cox's Bazar. In 2018, three Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) officers were deployed to support the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) to provide assistance in Myanmar. The first mission in January 2018 provided support to the Emergency Operation Centre of the Relief and Resettlement Department of Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement of Myanmar. The second mission in April 2018 involved two SCDF officers trained in firefighting and handling of hazardous materials to provide assistance for a major rubbish dump site fire in Yangon.
Beyond participating in overseas operations, Singapore seeks to build regional capacity for HADR. As foreign military assistance can make a valuable contribution to HADR efforts, Singapore launched the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in September 2014, to provide a platform for military-to-military coordination in HADR, in support of the military of a disaster-affected State. The RHCC seeks to provide value in the following three areas: (a) providing partner militaries with a comprehensive situation picture of the disaster impact, assessed needs, requests and offers of assistance, in order to facilitate decision-making and minimise duplication or gaps; (b) enhancing information-sharing and operational coordination for a multinational military response via its linkages with partner militaries; and (c) deploying a forward coordination unit into the disaster-affected State, to support HADR efforts on the ground. The RHCC’s focus on military coordination complements existing disaster response institutions – such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the AHA Centre – that support the disaster-affected State in coordinating the overall relief efforts. With Nepal’s consent, the RHCC was able to deploy an advance team to support the Nepalese military and authorities in the wake of the April 2015 earthquake. The RHCC helped to provide the Nepalese Multi-National Military Coordination Centre and other assisting militaries and agencies with a comprehensive situation picture for monitoring the disaster situation, assessed needs, and forces deployed across Nepal. It also coordinated with partner militaries such as Brunei, France and Thailand on airlift and deployment arrangements, through their International Liaison Officers (ILOs) at the RHCC. Singapore is appreciative of like-minded countries that have come on board to support and partner with the RHCC thus far. These countries include Australia, Brunei, China, France, India, Lao PDR, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, the UK, and Vietnam, which have attached ILOs to the RHCC or exchanged contact points for disaster relief. In addition, the RHCC has also signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the US Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) and the US Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), which further facilitate bilateral cooperation and operational linkages.

From 23 to 25 January 2017, the RHCC / Singapore Armed Forces partnered the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the US CFE-DM to co-organise a multinational HADR Table-Top Exercise, Exercise COORDINATED RESPONSE (COORES) 2017. The Exercise sought to build military linkages, enhance mutual understanding and interoperability, and strengthen military cooperation in disaster relief. The Exercise saw participants from 18 militaries from across the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, and observers from 12 international organisations, governmental agencies, and non-government organisations (NGOs). Singapore is working with CFE-DM to organise a second Exercise COORES in 2019.

To promote dialogue and enhance cooperation in HADR, Singapore has assumed the Chairmanship of the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific for 2017. The RCG was formed under the ambit of the United Nations World Humanitarian Summit process, to strengthen engagements between regional civilian and military actors, and foster discussions on enhancing civil-military coordination in disaster situations. Singapore hosted the RCG Third Session in December 2017, which was the largest to date, drawing over 130 participants from 26 countries and 24 regional and international organisations, academia and the private sector.

Since 2015, Singapore has been hosting the annual Strategic Policy Dialogue on Disaster Management (SPDDM) to chart the long term strategies for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), and sharpen ASEAN’s policy direction, strategic engagements, and thought leadership in disaster management. In addition, Singapore has also organised the ASEAN Senior Executive Programme in Disaster Management, targeted at nurturing the planning and crisis management capacities of the senior leadership cadre within each AMS’ National Disaster Management Organisation. Singapore is the Lead Shepherd for
the development of the AHA Centre’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) capabilities, with funding support from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF)

(v) Maritime security

As a maritime nation, Singapore has a strong interest in keeping the international sea lines of communication open, safe and secure. Singapore takes a serious view of any threats to the freedom and safety of navigation. To this end, Singapore works with like-minded countries to uphold the sanctity of international law, including 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and plays an active part in fostering regional maritime security cooperation and the enhancement of port security.

As a major hub port and one of the top ten ship registries in the world, Singapore is committed to the security of seaborne cargo. In 2002, Singapore was the first port in Asia to participate in the US-led Container Security Initiative. As one of the first States to implement the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Singapore has contributed actively to capacity building programmes at various regional forums to assist countries in their implementation of the ISPS Code. Singapore is also party to the IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).

Given the existence of vital sea lines of communication in the region such as the South China Sea (SCS), the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait, Singapore has been cooperating closely with key stakeholders to uphold maritime security and freedom of navigation. To this end, Singapore remains fully committed to the following three principles which have gained broad consensus amongst regional stakeholders: (a) that primary responsibility for the security of the regional waterways lies with the littoral States; (b) the international community, including major user States and bodies like the IMO, have an important role to play; and (c) new cooperative measures should be developed in line with UNCLOS and other international conventions.

Singapore is also supportive of ASEAN’s approach towards maritime issues as encapsulated in the Bali Concord II, signed in October 2003, which reiterates the transboundary nature of maritime issues and the need to address them regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive way. We also continue to participate actively in various ASEAN fora such as the ARF, ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), Expanded AMF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus and ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meetings, to address maritime issues.

These principles have been translated into cooperative efforts at a regional level. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is a joint undertaking by the littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, to enhance maritime security in the SOMS. The MSP comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, the “Eyes-in-the-Sky” maritime air patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Since its inception in July 2004, the MSP has been able to substantially reduce the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in the SOMS. The 4th MSP Exercise was held in Singapore on 21 April 2016, where members reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring the MSP’s operational effectiveness, and test out their processes and linkages for information-sharing and coordination.

Apart from air and sea patrols, Singapore also believes in enhancing maritime awareness, and ensuring a systematic and timely exchange of information to keep sea lanes safe. In this regard, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which was established in 2009, seeks to advance inter-agency and international cooperation in maritime information sharing through its linkages to operations centres around the world, as well as a network of ILOs from regional and extra-regional countries. The IFC’s partnerships and the pooling of various information-sharing and analytical systems in one location has enabled the IFC to cue operational responses to a wide range of maritime
security issues, ranging from piracy, hijacking, Search and Rescue, weapons proliferation or human/arms trafficking and smuggling. The ASEAN ILOs in IFC also serve as the Permanent Secretariat of the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting. As of April 2017, the IFC had links with international maritime centres and 83 operational centres and agencies from 40 countries, and a total of 139 ILOs from 23 countries have been deployed at the IFC since its establishment. As of May 2018, there are also 17 ILOs accredited to the IFC from Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, the US and Viet Nam. In May 2017, the IFC hosted the 2nd ASEAN Maritime Security Information Sharing Exercise and the 2017 Maritime Information Sharing Exercise to advance information sharing and sense making amongst navies, coast guards and other relevant maritime agencies and operations centres.

Singapore is a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the first intergovernmental initiative that promotes and enhances cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, and the host country of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) since it was formed in 2006. As of June 2018, a total of 20 States had acceded to the ReCAAP, namely, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the UK, the US and Viet Nam. The ReCAAP’s expanded membership and network of partner organisations over the years are testament to the increasing importance attached to strengthening cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. Over the years, the ReCAAP ISC has established itself as an authority on trends and analyses of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, and continues to play an instrumental role in disseminating timely and accurate information for governments and industry alike. The ReCAAP ISC has produced quality analyses of trends in the region and has collaborated with partner organisations and the industry to produce useful practice guides for the maritime community, such as the Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia launched in February 2016. The ReCAAP ISC has also supported numerous capacity building efforts to improve the capability of regional governments to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The ReCAAP has been held up as a successful model of regional cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships by the IMO, and has inspired other similar initiatives, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (GoA), which was developed under the auspices of the IMO.

Beyond regional cooperation, Singapore also shares the international community’s deep concern over the scourge of piracy threatening key sea-lines of communications like the GoA. To this end, Singapore has been contributing to the multinational counter-piracy efforts under the ambit of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 since 2009, to secure these sea lanes for everyone’s use. The Singapore Armed Forces has deployed five Task Groups, comprising either one Landing Ship Tank with two Super Puma helicopters on a Frigate with a Naval Helicopter, as well as a Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the GoA. At the request of the Combined Maritime Forces, Singapore has taken command of the CTF 151 in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2016, and will be assuming command of CTF 151 for the fifth time from June to September 2018.

(vi) ICTs security

As a small and highly networked state, Singapore strongly believes in the importance of developing a rules-based international and regional cyberspace that could serve as an enabler for economic progress and betterment of living standards both in the ASEAN region and internationally. In this regard, Singapore recognises the importance of adopting practical, voluntary norms to guide responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, taking reference from the norms recommended in the
2015 Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. In addition, these norms need to be complemented with coordinated regional cyber policy discussions, targeted and coordinated cybersecurity capacity building, as well as robust cyber Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

Following a successful inaugural conference in 2016, Singapore hosted the 2nd ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC) on 18 September 2017, as part of the 2nd Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW). The 2nd AMCC was attended by ICT and Cybersecurity Ministers and senior officials from all AMS as well as the ASEAN Secretary-General. The assembled Ministers and senior officials endorsed a 2nd AMCC Chairman’s Statement recognising: (a) that the AMCC continues to be a useful platform for facilitating discussions of cross-cutting cybersecurity issues among ASEAN ICT Ministers and Cybersecurity Ministers and Senior Officials; (b) the need to enhance coordination of cybersecurity efforts across ASEAN’s various platforms; and (c) the need to move forward on the adoption of voluntary norms of behaviour in ASEAN to guide the responsible use of ICT, taking reference from the norms recommended in the Report of the 2015 UNGGE on Developments in the Field of ICT in the Context of International Security. Singapore will be hosting a 3rd AMCC on 19 September 2018 as part of the 3rd SICW.

In addition to the AMCC, the 2nd SICW included an International Cyber Leaders’ Symposium (ICLS), a United Nations Workshop on Cybersecurity Norms, co-organised by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as an ASEAN Cybercrime Prosecutors’ Roundtable Meeting. These meetings allowed ASEAN Ministers and senior officials to interact and exchange views with top international cybersecurity Political Office Holders, policy makers, industry leaders, academics as well as NGOs on emerging cybersecurity issues and threats, as well as to map out possible cooperation in areas such as cyber strategy and legislation building, norms adoption, implementation of cyber CBMs, and capacity building. Singapore will be hosting the 3rd SICW from 18 to 20 September 2018 with the theme of “Forging a Trusted and Open Cyberspace”.

Building on the momentum created by the AMCC and discussions on other ASEAN cybersecurity platforms, Singapore, as ASEAN Chair, proposed the first-ever ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Cybersecurity Cooperation, which was issued by the ASEAN Leaders at the 32nd ASEAN Summit in Singapore in April 2018. The Statement reaffirms the need to build closer cooperation and coordination among AMS on cybersecurity policy developments and capacity building initiatives. It also recognises the value of enhanced dialogue and cooperation with Dialogue Partners and other external partners, and in other ASEAN-led platforms including the ARF. The Statement also tasks relevant Ministers from all AMS to: (a) consider and submit recommendations on feasible options of coordinating cybersecurity efforts across the various ASEAN sectorals; and (b) make concrete progress and recommendations on the issue of practical, voluntary norms of State behaviour in cyberspace, taking reference from the voluntary norms recommended in the 2015 UNGGE Report.

Under the ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers’ Meeting (TELMIN) sectoral, Singapore chairs the ASEAN Network Security Action Council (ANSAC), which is a working group in charge of coordinating ASEAN cooperation activities related to cybersecurity. Under ANSAC, Singapore has contributed to ASEAN’s efforts to build up regional incident response capabilities by drafting the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy. Endorsed by TELMIN in November 2017, the Strategy provides a roadmap towards a more coordinated approach to building capacity in cybersecurity incident response through the ASEAN Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Maturity Framework, which allows each AMS to conduct a self-assessment of its CERT’s.
capability gaps so that regional capacity building efforts to address these gaps are relevant and not duplicated needlessly.

Singapore is currently co-chairing the newly established ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of ICTs (ISM on ICTs Security) as well as its Open-Ended Study Group (OESG). The ISM on ICTs Security and OESG provide dedicated platforms for discussion of the whole range of issues relating to security of and in the use of ICTs, focusing on developing and implementing proposals for robust CBMs to minimise the risk of misperception and conflict in the use of ICTs. The OESG has held its first two meetings in January and April 2018 respectively and the ISM on ICTs Security has held its first meeting in April 2018.

Regionally, Singapore’s cybersecurity capacity building efforts over the past two years have centred on raising cybersecurity strategy, legislation and norms awareness, as well as cyber incident response and technical capability among AMS through the conduct of workshops, under the auspices of Singapore’s S$10 million ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme (ACCP). The ACCP is delivered by the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA), in partnership with domain experts from government, industry, academia and NGOs. The range of topics covered in these workshops includes norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, application of international law to cyberspace, strategy and legislation development, critical information infrastructure protection, and incident response. To date, more than 120 Director-level participants from ASEAN have been trained under the ACCP.

Singapore has been convening an annual ASEAN CERT Incident Drill (ACID) for the last 12 years to strengthen the cybersecurity preparedness of AMS in handling cyber incidents, reinforce regional coordination drills to test incident response capabilities of the respective ASEAN National CERTs, and enhance regional cooperation. ACID involves participation by all 10 AMS, as well as five Dialogue Partners – Australia, China, India, Japan and Korea. This year’s ACID will be its 13th iteration.

In our capacity as the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd on Cybercrime, Singapore has been working closely with other AMS to identify priority areas of common interest to harmonise ASEAN’s competencies in combating cybercrime. Singapore has also collaborated with strategic partners like INTERPOL to have a clear understanding of the challenges we collectively face when tackling cybercrime, and to develop suitable programmes to enhance ASEAN's capabilities and capacity to combat cybercrime. We also work with close alignment to the objectives under the ASEAN Political Security Blueprint 2025.

In 2013, Singapore tabled a proposal for the establishment of the SOMTC Working Group on Cybercrime (WGCC) which was unanimously supported by AMS. The WGCC provides a platform for AMS to collaborate on capacity building, training, and sharing of information related to cybercrime. The WGCC has been tasked to strengthen ASEAN’s efforts and initiatives in the areas outlined in the SOMTC Work Programme for 2016-2018 namely: (a) information exchange; (b) legal matters; (c) capability building and training; (d) law enforcement matters; and (e) extra-regional partnerships. The WGCC is also a platform for AMS to: (a) discuss and adopt a coordinated approach to deal with cybercrime; (b) follow up on recommendations on cybercrime from other
ASEAN-related fora; and (c) engage Dialogue Partners on cybercrime collaboration. The 4th WGCC successfully concluded in Vientiane, Lao PDR on 23 May 2017. The 5th WGCC will take place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in the second half of 2018.

In terms of awareness-building, Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) was a supporting partner of the RSA Conference Asia Pacific and Japan held in Singapore in July 2017. Two iterations of the ASEAN Cybercrime Prosecutors’ Roundtable Meeting have also been held in Singapore in 2016 and 2017 as part of the Singapore International Cyber Week. In terms of regional cooperation, Singapore and INTERPOL are in the process of implementing the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Development Project, which is funded by the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund 2.0. Singapore mooted the proposal to set up an ASEAN Desk on Cybercrime within the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI), and has seconded an officer who has taken up the position of Head of the ASEAN Desk.

Singapore is supportive of Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI) discussions and had presented the keynote speech on Cybersecurity and the roles of Defence Cyber Organisation during the NADI Workshop on Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Radicalisation and Cybersecurity in June 2018. In terms of capacity building, Singapore has organised a number of training programmes to build up the capabilities and capacity of ASEAN law enforcement agencies to tackle the cybercrime threat. These include the 2nd Training Session on INTERPOL’s Tools and Services and Cyber Forensic Techniques in February 2016 (organised with Canada), and the 3rd Singapore-United States Third Country Training Programme (TCTP)/INTERPOL Southeast Asian Workshop on Cybercrime in October-November 2017 (organised with the US). These workshops, conferences and seminars serve as a platform for knowledge sharing and provides training in cybercrime investigations to law enforcement agencies in the region. It also draws on the expertise from more advanced ASEAN Dialogue Partners and INTERPOL to enhance ASEAN’s competencies in combating cybercrime.

IV. Role of ARF

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994 as an open and inclusive forum to discuss key political and security issues. Its evolution from Stage I Promotion of CBMs to Stage II Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) mechanisms, more than 15 years into its inception, is a significant development. It is a reflection of its success in engendering greater confidence and trust among ARF Participants, fostering closer collaboration and candid dialogue, as well as responding to the complexities in the evolving regional geostrategic landscape.

The implementation of the PD agenda and CBMs, in accordance with universally recognised norms and principles of international law, ensures that the ARF moves ahead to address the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the region. A case in point is the recent creation of the ISM on ICTs Security, against the backdrop of the ongoing digital revolution. As we enter the next 25 years of the ARF, regional security challenges will only become more complicated. This calls for stronger coordination and cooperation among ARF Participants, and constant refinement of the ARF’s focus to keep pace with the shifting geostrategic landscape. The ARF will need to work with other ASEAN-led mechanisms in the regional ecosystem to synergise complementarities and minimise duplication in functions. It should also explore ways to engage Track II processes to bolster its own effectiveness.

Singapore remains fully committed to the ARF and its role as a key pillar in the multi-layered regional security architecture.
SRI LANKA

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

i. Counter terrorism

It is proposed to include SL Armed Forces' involvement in the sector of peace building among different religions and ethnicities in the post war era. Further, their contribution to all religions, ‘events in the country by means of assets and manpower are also encouraged to be included under this point.

MOUs and agreements have been signed by the Ministry of Defence and regional countries (India, Indonesia & Vietnam). Apart from that there are MOUs have been finalized to sign with Shanghai Corporation Organization and Indonesia.

Sri Lanka enacted the convention on Suppression of terrorist financing (Amendment) act No 41 of 2011 as per the section 3(1) of the act covers (directly or indirectly) unlawfully and wilfully providing or collecting fund or property.

The Prevention of money laundering act No: 5 of 2006 and financial transaction reporting act No: 6 of 2006 prohibit terrorist Finance and money laundering. UN regulation No: 1of 2012 empowers the government to design ate Group or entities or individuals believe to commit or attempt to or participate Terrorist Financing and under UNSCR1373. Sri Lanka has gazette 8 entities and 86 individuals for asset freezing who had known and facts available for terrorist financing.

A policy frame work with regard to the countering terrorism has been proposed by government of Sri Lanka to repeal the existing Prevention of Terrorism Act of Sri Lanka to comply with the constitution and international Human Right standards. The members of Defence Forces Personal have actively participated with their suggestions and comments. The proposed draft bill on Counterterrorism act has been submitted to the cabinet of ministers for the approval and the permission has been granted to proceed.

ii. Transnational crime

Untiring efforts of Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Cost Guard in apprehending drugs at sea are highly encouraged to be included under this point. A special mention to the amounts of apprehensions made during last few years would further strengthen the point.

iii. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Armed forces of Sri Lanka extensively involved in humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations in the county and that are carried out in compliance with the international standards to provide timely need assistance to the government agencies to carry out their function at the disastrous situation.

iv. Maritime security

Sri Lankan government’s initiative to equip the Sri Lanka Navy with 20 major vessels by year 2025 is a clear point to emphasis on our interest to get involve actively on Maritime Security matters. Moreover, the establishment of the Sri Lankan Cost Guard few years back in order to strengthen the law enforcement at sea is also a fine example to this. The extensive use of our ground forces to neutralize and to detect illegal activities on land well before the matters drag off the shores is a major contributor in our effort to securing maritime security around the seas of the country.

Sri Lanka has taken initiative to send a formal request to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to serve as Secretariat for the Working Group on Operations at Sea to enhance the maritime security.

MOUs and agreements have been signed by the Ministry of Defence and countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, China, India and Australia with regards to maritime cooperation and countering Transnational Crimes through sea. Apart from that few other MOUs related to same field will be signed by Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Pakistan and Indonesia in near future.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region is in the midst of change, brought about in part by the shifting geo-strategic situation, as well as emerging global trends and regional developments. There has been intensifying interaction amongst the major powers in the region, some aspects of which have generated some uncertainties. Global trends in the form of irregular migration, trafficking in persons, illicit drug trafficking, cybercrime, terrorism, violent extremism, pandemics and natural disasters continue to pose challenges to individual and collective efforts to promote regional peace and stability. At the same time, there are growing signs of challenges to multilateralism, including the multilateral trading system. With regard to regional developments, there are some which give rise to optimism, such as the diplomatic initiatives with regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, for example.

Despite some tensions within the region, the overall regional security situation remains relatively stable, especially when compared to other regions. This has been reinforced by the upward economic growth trajectory of the Asia-Pacific region and continued strong momentum in regional integration, which partly offsets the uncertainties generated by rising protectionist sentiments.

ASEAN – Centrality in the evolving regional architecture

The long-term goal is to realize a Strategic New Equilibrium that will be conducive to peace, stability and prosperity for all in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indo-Pacific region. Such an equilibrium should be attained through peaceful interactions amongst all countries on the basis of the 3Ms: Mutual Trust, Mutual Respect, and Mutual Benefit.

The regional architecture should be based on ASEAN centrality and embrace the key principles of openness, inclusiveness, rules-based and mutual interests. It should be driven by ASEAN-led platforms which are comprehensive and flexible, and have a long history of achievements that take into account two important geo-strategic features of the Asia-Pacific region, namely, (1) the great diversity in the region in terms of political culture, economic structure, and strategic policy orientation, and (2) the lack of tradition of institutionalization of structures and mechanisms to manage change in the region.

Reinforcing the existing ASEAN-centered regional architecture, based on ASEAN-led platforms, including ASEAN Plus One and other ASEAN-Plus mechanisms, and regional norms and a culture of cooperation based on ASEAN instruments, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), is thus a key priority. This will leverage on ASEAN’s assets, in particular its regional convening power, which has been recognized by the international community. A key aspect of such reinforcing efforts is the strengthening of the East Asia Summit (EAS) which is at the apex of the regional architecture. This should be undertaken simultaneously with the strengthening of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with its emphasis on confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and enhanced interaction between civilian and defense agencies to address shared security challenges. At the same time, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) process would also need to be strengthened, with its focus on practical military-to-military cooperation and defense diplomacy.

In addition, new ideas on enhancing the ASEAN-centred regional architecture should be explored and developed on the basis of mutual interests. An important example is the Indo-Pacific idea, including other variations in nomenclature, of which there are a number of suggestions. Reflecting the reality of growing links between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, the Indo-Pacific idea should be anchored on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, mutual trust, benefit and respect, and ASEAN Centrality. The Indo-Pacific idea should complement existing cooperation arrangements in the region and focus on concrete win-win cooperation and deliverables that promote closer partnership amongst countries in the region.
At the same time, enhanced cooperation within the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework, bearing in mind the long-term goal of an East Asia Economic community (EAEc) as recommended by the East Asia Vision Group 2, and based on closer functional cooperation amongst the APT countries, should also be encouraged. Priority areas of cooperation would include areas such as finance, food security, connectivity and active aging, for example. Moreover, ideas of cooperation developed by the reinvigorated Trilateral Summit process should also complement the APT process in order to encourage better synergies.

Regional security environment

Amidst the changing geo-political landscape in the region, there has been recent positive developments with regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. This includes the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018, which resulted in the Panmunjom Declaration, the informal meeting between the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Moon Jae-in, and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim Jong Un, in May. This was followed by the historic Summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim of the DPRK on 12 June 2018. The joint statement signed at the Summit is a significant first step towards the realization of lasting peace and stability on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, with ASEAN encouraging the U.S. and the DPRK to fully implement the statement in order to lay the groundwork to establish a lasting and stable peace regime and complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In order to sustain the momentum in diplomacy, self-restraint would be important. Meanwhile, implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions remains an obligation of the international community. Looking ahead, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has a role in helping support this continued diplomatic process with regard to the Korean Peninsula which would help contribute to regional peace and security and to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Challenges in maritime areas have become a priority. Enhancing maritime security and cooperation is important for ASEAN Community building. Safe and secure Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) is important to enhance maritime connectivity in the region which helps drive maritime commerce. Proactive actions and measures are needed to deter and address transnational crimes at sea, including piracy and armed robbery of vessels. Other maritime issues such as marine resources management, including combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Fishing), also need closer cooperation. Moreover, efforts on maritime domain awareness, intelligence and surveillance must also be enhanced to maintain peace and stability in maritime areas.

On the South China Sea, there have been positive developments along the diplomatic front, as negotiations between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) have begun, building on the Framework of a COC that was adopted by ASEAN and China last year. In the meantime, all parties concerned should continue to work towards enhancing trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in order to maintain the positive momentum in relations and create an environment conducive to peaceful resolution of disputes on the basis of international law, including UNCLOS 1982. In this connection, it is important to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

Full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is important to building trust and confidence in this maritime area.

In addition to measures undertaken in the past years, such as establishment of hotlines between the Foreign Ministries of ASEAN Member States and China, win-win functional cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as marine environmental protection, including addressing the shared challenge of plastics and marine debris, will help enhance trust and confidence as well as promote implementation of the Declaration for a Decade of Coastal and Marine Environmental Protection in the South China Sea. The long-term
The goal is to ultimately transform the South China Sea into a Sea of Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development, through cooperative actions that are anchored on the key ideas of prevention, protection, and partnership.

The ASEAN Community integration process has led to enhanced connectivity amongst countries in Southeast Asia and the wider region. Criminals have taken advantage of such connectivity to undertake illicit activities and engage in transnational crimes. Border management has therefore become an increasingly important area of cooperation for the realization of an interconnected, safe and secure ASEAN Community. There is thus a need to ensure a balanced approach between cross-border trade facilitation and the seamless movement of goods and people on the one hand, and border management cooperation on the other hand. A key goal in this regard is to develop an ASEAN-wide border management cooperation arrangement. Such cooperation arrangement will help coordinate timely exchange of intelligence and sharing of information, and synchronize cross pillars efforts that will safeguard the region from transnational crimes and other cross-border challenges including pandemics.

Priority should also be given to combatting trafficking in persons and people smuggling and irregular migration. The ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), entered into force on 8 March 2017, has since served as the first regional legally binding instrument to combat trafficking in persons. The ACTIP brings the fight against trafficking in persons a step forward by creating common standards for criminalisation, prevention, assistance of victims, law enforcement and prosecution.

The continued challenge of drug trafficking has prompted ASEAN to effectively address illicit drug activities, including through the implementation of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs (2016-2025) and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to Tackle Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle (2017-2019), within the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (AMMD). The abovementioned Cooperation Plan provides a comprehensive strategy to tackle drug-related activities, including investigation and arrest of major drug producers or traffickers, promotion of health and area development, and cooperation with external parties.

With over forty percent of the global population using the internet, the Asia-Pacific region is facing critical cybersecurity challenges and cybercrime. Enhanced cooperation at regional and international levels are critical to ensure a safe, secure and resilient cyberspace, and sufficient capabilities to combat cybercrime. Efforts need to be made to fortify cybersecurity, cyberspace and critical infrastructure of States, including by adopting a risk-centric, layered-defence approach to cyber threats. This involves promoting sufficient and well qualified security professionals in the field of innovative technology. Furthermore, it is important to guarantee safety and security for both the business sector and the public as the region is moving towards digital economies.

Another area which requires urgent and collective action at all levels is the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. All parties concerned need to strengthen cooperation and collaboration on, among others, law enforcement and measures to counter the increase in the use of social media as tool to spread extremist ideologies, in line with the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT). Effective implementation of the ACCT would help bring terrorists to justice and suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. These efforts conducted within the existing ASEAN counter terrorism frameworks, such as the AMMTC and the SOMTC, should be strengthened. Also central to counterterrorism efforts is regional initiatives that encourage tolerance and moderation, including through inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues in the region.
II. National Security and Defense Policy

Overview of national security and defense policy

In relation to Thailand’s national security and defense policy, the Ministry of Defense has published its policy statement in an effort to promote transparency, and to enhance trust and confidence between Thailand and ASEAN Member States, as well as with other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region. According to the policy statement, the missions of the Ministry of Defense are outlined as follows:

a. To safeguard and uphold the institution of the Monarchy with His Majesty the King as the Head of State and the Highest Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, so that the Institution of the Monarchy remains as the center that harmonizes hearts and souls of the Thai people, and as the most important institution of the nation, and to accomplish this through making every efforts in cooperation with other government agencies.

b. To enhance defense cooperation with neighboring nations, ASEAN Member States, friendly nations, and international organizations, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to support the arrangement of the security environment, the collective building of confidence, peace and stability, with focus on the prevention and reduction of conflict with neighboring nations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense aims to maintain a positive image of the nation within the international arena, and seeks to strengthen defense cooperation with the international community through support for peace and humanitarian missions under the UN umbrella. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will initiate and develop a wider scope of military cooperation, and maintain the balance of relationships between nations in the region, and will seek to expedite the process of activities under cooperation frameworks between Thailand and neighboring countries for the survey and demarcation of boundaries, as well as support the integration of the ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN-Political Security Community.

c. To enhance the integration of strengths and capabilities with every sector by incorporating every aspect of national powers to support national defense. During peace time, the Ministry of Defense will utilize all resources for the benefit of the country, through a comprehensive approach in enhancing every aspect of national powers to support all operative missions for the security of the nation. This can be achieved by prioritizing support towards the urgent policies of the Government and the National Council for Peace and Order, especially on national reformation, the arrangement of social discipline, the restriction of illegal activities and the reconciliation of the people in the nation. Moreover, emphasis will also be given to accelerating the restoration of peace and safety for the lives of the people in the southernmost provinces, and for the security of their assets. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will utilize all resources to support the safeguarding of national interests, the national development for security purposes, and the provision of assistance to the people, especially on problems arising from disasters, epidemic and communicable diseases. Also, focus will be given to solve problems relating to natural resources and environment, water resource management, illegal immigration and other transnational crimes including arms, drugs and human trafficking, piracy, computer crimes and international terrorism.

d. To enhance the capability of the armed forces and the national defense system to ensure readiness for safeguarding the independence, sovereignty, security and national interests through both the preparation of force, and the use of force, by adhering to the principle of the maintenance of forces for self-defense purposes. Priorities will be given to the
deployment of forces for joint operations, and the development of personnel for combat readiness. Moreover, efforts will be made towards improving proactive intelligence gathering to ensure timely strategic warnings and the provision of information for decision making. Furthermore, in enhancing the capabilities, emphasis will be given to improving joint logistics by utilizing the standard platform of military equipment, as well as other equipment with potential for effective utilization by each service, and also by strengthening cooperation with the people to ensure that military missions are supportively carried out during peace time. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will seek to develop the reserve systems in accordance with military necessities, those of which include development of reserve forces for mobilization, military equipment and energy to ensure preparedness in responding to the nation’s security needs.

e. To strengthen the defense industry through the integration of capabilities from both public and private sectors, and to capitalize on the cooperation between ASEAN Member States and work towards becoming self-reliant with regards to the production of the necessary military equipment. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense seeks to strengthen the scientific and technological aspects of its defense industry in order to achieve equal standards with those of other nations in the region, and to work with all sectors at both the domestic and international levels. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense aims to enhance the standard and the secureness of its information technology and communication systems, and to improve its ability to respond to the threat of cyber warfare.

f. To give priority to the provision of assistance to war veterans and their families to enable them to live in society with honour and dignity, and to enhance the morale of all personnel who had served to defend the nation. Also, efforts will be given to the enhancement of the capabilities of war veterans so that they can contribute further towards national security.

g. To establish the appropriate structure for the Armed Forces and work towards the enhancement of the quality of personnel within the Ministry of Defense, through increasing their knowledge, skills, sets of morals and ethics, and to ensure that all personnel are equipped with physical and mental preparedness in carrying out their duties. Also, appropriate work will be given towards the improvement of the benefits of its personnel to give a morale boost for their work. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will ensure professionalism from its personnel, and support further integration with the population in all aspects in order to maintain national security.

h. To enhance armed forces capability in order to counter the non-traditional threats, the Ministry of Defence focuses on administration reform before commencing to the restructuring of the armed forces. For the first phase of the reform, priority will be given to the preparation of personnel, equipment, education, defence industry research and development for self-reliance, improvements to the national defence capabilities, joint operations with allied armed forces.

i. Promotion of confidence in the capabilities of the armed forces is an important means to support regional efforts in addressing security-related challenges. In this connection, Thailand’s defence budget for fiscal year 2018 amounted to 111,962 million baht (approximately 3,394 billion US dollars). This is equivalent to 1.44 percent of Thailand’s national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

In an effort to promote military cooperation and mutual trust and confidence, the Ministry of Defense has set out its immediate policies to use all existing security mechanisms at all levels to contribute towards regional security. With regards
to its Immediate Policies for the 2017 Fiscal Year (1 October 2017 – 30 September 2018), the Ministry of Defense has set out to ensure regional peace, stability and security through implementation of the following policies:

a. To restructure and better the composition and deployment of troops along the borders in order to support the launch of the ASEAN Community and the establishment of the Special Economic Development Zones. Here, emphasis will be given towards the collective readjustments of troop deployments, enhancement of the command and control systems, and the strengthening of the legal system by all authorities concerned.

b. To maintain and strengthen military cooperation with neighboring countries, ally nations and major powers, and to reinforce the strong ties with international organizations in order to address international threats through collective efforts. Amongst others, this includes ensuring preparedness for participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN framework.

c. To support the Government’s undertakings to realize the priorities set out in the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, with particular focus on the political-security pillar of the ASEAN Community. The Ministry of Defense will aim to support the Government by placing importance on the strengthening of military cooperation with ASEAN Member States and other partners within and beyond the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense seeks to maintain a leading role in developing relations within the security cooperation frameworks, and in particular, in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for peace, stability and security.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will give importance to participation in cooperation frameworks which will provide opportunities for the armed forces of the region to engage in practical cooperation to promote mutual interests of participating countries and enhance capacities for the future, such as the activities of the ADMM’s initiatives and the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups, which includes the expansion of cooperation with other civilian agencies and international organizations to confront non-traditional challenges in the region. The Ministry of Defence will expedite the establishment of the ASEAN Center of Military Medicine (ACMM), which will add value to the overall humanitarian assistance and disaster relief framework of the region, as well as complement the work of the ASEAN Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance in improving the region's response and coordination mechanisms.

d. To support related government agencies in solving immediate problems while maintaining Thailand’s commitments to the international community, such as in addressing issues relating to the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), issues concerned with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean, forest encroachment and preservation measures, problems of community wastes, spread of droughts and addressing problems from haze caused by forest fires.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Joint exercise

Cobra Gold is one of the largest multinational exercises in the Asia Pacific region which has been held annually in Thailand since 1982. For more than thirty years, the Exercise has served to build trust and confidence, develop and strengthen capacity to provide humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief, strengthen military to military relations, promote defense diplomacy and international cooperation and stability in the region.
The 37th edition of Cobra Gold focused on non-lethal activities, non-combat evacuation drills, and civil action programmes, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Exercise, held on 11-12 February 2018 in Thailand, conducted three main activities: (1) Command Post Exercise (CPX) in humanitarian aid projects for the public including the high-rank commanders meetings on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), (2) Medical conferences, and (3) Field Training Exercise (FTX). It was one the biggest engagements with an estimated 12,000 troops from 29 countries, seven of which (Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the United States) participated in the main exercises. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) had participation from ten countries (Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Fiji and New Zealand), while another ten countries (Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Myanmar, Viet Nam, Germany, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Brazil and Sweden) participated in the Combined Observer Liaison Team (COLT). In all, twenty ARF participating countries, including some Member States of the European Union, were involved at the Cobra Gold 2018 in Thailand, thus contributing to strengthened regional cooperation and collaboration, and increase in the ability in addressing shared security concerns.

Peacekeeping

Thailand continues to attach great importance to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, as an effective means to build and sustain peace in fragile situations. As of May 2018, 27 Thai military and police officers are participating in three UN peacekeeping missions, namely, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Also, Thailand is preparing for the deployment of a Horizontal Military Engineering Company (HMEC) to join the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2018.

Thailand has a comprehensive approach towards UN peace processes. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, are important tools for sustaining peace.

Guided by these goals, particularly the SDG 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, peacekeepers and other actors on the ground can better understand and make better efforts in integrating their works related to peace and security with development and human rights, in order to better meet the needs of local people. On this front, we share the view that there is no peace without development, no development without peace, and neither peace nor development without respect of human rights.

Thailand also believes that peacebuilding and development measures can and should be undertaken throughout the peace process, in the early stages of conflict prevention as well as during peacekeeping. Thai peacekeepers – male and female – while delivering stability and secure environment to the conflict-affected societies in various peacekeeping missions, have done and will continue to do their part to help improve their livelihood and attain sustainable development. In this regard, Thailand has successfully applied the development initiatives and the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) conceived by His Majesty the Late King Bhumibol Adulyadej in the areas covered by the UN missions in Timor Leste and Darfur.

Thailand recognizes the linkage and complementarity between Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and continues to seek ways to further promote and enhance the role of women in peace processes, including in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations as well as in post-conflict reconstruction. Thailand has consistently sent female military and police officers to join UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. The contributions of these female officers have been valued because of their cultural and gender sensitivity when engaging with local populations, in particular in assisting female
victims of sexual harassment and abuse, and for carrying out development projects, which foster self-sufficiency in conflict-ridden communities.

Furthermore, Thailand puts the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse high on our agenda and therefore reiterates the importance of supporting the Secretary-General's initiative on this matter by signing the "Compact between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand: Commitment to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse".

In addition to the standard training requirements, Thailand and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict organized training on child protection to the HMEC for troops deployed to the UNMISS in 2018 so as to ensure enhanced safety of children in conflict situations.

The Thai military has also been active in promoting enhanced cooperation within ASEAN and with partner countries on peacekeeping training. In this regard, Thailand has initiated and continues to support ASEAN network of peacekeeping centres and an Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to promote training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel.

Thailand also invests in language proficiency, both English and French, for military and police officers in order to raise profiles for their applications and to further improve their performance when they are deployed in UN peacekeeping missions, working together with the British Council and the Alliance Française. Most recently, the English language course was conducted during September - October 2017 for 22 Thai military and 29 police officers preparing to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

**Counter-terrorism**

Terrorism continues to pose profound challenges to national and regional security. The Government renews its commitment to combat terrorism and violent extremism. The country still faces challenges of being used as a transit point by violent extremism supporters due to its location and connectivity within Southeast Asia. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2017-2021) focusing on prevention, response and rehabilitation, has been guiding efforts to counter terrorism and its cooperation at regional and international levels.

In recent years, fighting against terrorism has shifted its focus to the terrorist diaspora, those who have returned home or are dispatched to the next potential spot. Moreover, activities in the cyber domain and the use of ICTs and the internet for terrorist purposes and disseminating extremist propaganda, need to be closely monitored and addressed. To this end, Thailand stands ready to cooperate with the regional and international community in combatting terrorism and violent extremism. At the same time, the root causes, such as poverty, lack of education, gender equality, social value and spread of radical ideas, must be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Community, civil society, private sector and former violent extremists offenders and victims need to be engaged. This has been translated into the promotion of social and economic development, as well as educational empowerment in accordance with goals outlined in the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Guided by the key principles of the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism, ASEAN+1 counter terrorism cooperative arrangements, and collaboration with specialized agencies of the United Nations, have helped strengthen domestic and regional efforts in the global strategy on counterterrorism.

While effective law enforcement and enhanced security measures must be maintained, steps have been taken to ensure that Thailand’s response to terrorism and extremism does not undermine the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms that Thailand seeks to uphold. In addition, prevention and suppression of financing of terrorism and an exchange of information and intelligence has also been underscored. To support this effort, “the Counter
Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Financing Act B.E. 2559 (2016) (CTPF Act), entered into force in 2016 stipulates the offences of financing terrorism (FT) and proliferation financing (PF) as criminal offences and as the predicate offences for money laundering under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (1999), and prescribes measures to designate or de-list persons or entities with linkages to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as specified in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. In this regard, the Anti-Money Laundering Office of Thailand (AMLO) plans to host the 4th Regional Counter-Terrorist Financing Summit by the end of 2018 in Bangkok, to discuss measures to close existing loopholes and improving regional coordination.

Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Thailand is fully committed to disarmament and non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological weapons - at regional and international levels. Thailand reaffirms its policy not to develop, acquire or proliferate any kind of WMD and their means of delivery, in order to achieve the global goal of total elimination of WMD, and reiterates its support for all nations to pursue this common endeavour together.

In 2017, welcoming the historic adoption of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017 in New York, Thailand was one of the first three countries to sign and ratify the Treaty on 20 September 2017. Thailand believes that this treaty establishes an international norm to prohibit and delegitimize nuclear weapons contributing to efforts towards general and complete nuclear disarmament.

At present, the draft Act on Trade Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction Related Items (TCWMD Act) was endorsed by the cabinet in 2016. It is currently under revision by the Office of the Council of State, to expand the scope of the export controls on dual-use items (DUI) potentially be used for both commercial and military purposes.

The draft TCWMD Act is expected to enter into force by the end of 2018. In addition, Thailand, with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), organized a meeting to review the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan on 6-9 November 2017 in Bangkok. The Plan has served as a tool to specify means to improving and promoting nuclear security system, and identify the country’s needs in term of nuclear security. Subsequently, the revised Plan was submitted to the IAEA on 11 April 2018.

At the regional level, Thailand have actively been contributing to enhance capability of ASEAN Member States in nuclear security, safety and safeguard within the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM). Thailand supports the formalization of relations between ASEAN and the IAEA, which will enhance cooperation between the two entities on nuclear-related matters, and look forward to the finalization of the draft Practical Arrangement. Thailand also actively supported regional efforts on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The "Thailand Consortium: Trade Control on Weapons of Mass Destruction related Items" organized on 17 – 20 July 2017 in Bangkok, was an example of Thailand’s management system of WMD-related goods and dual use items (DUI), as well as strengthening cooperation networks to develop knowledge on the issue.

At the international level, as a State Party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Thailand has been an active player in advancing nuclear disarmament as required under the Article 6 of the NPT, as well as promoting nuclear security through international fora, such as the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

As State Party of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction or Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Thailand adheres to transparent and accountable management of biological agents and toxins,
whereby there is need for increased coordination and sharing of experiences and good practices. In this connection, Thailand and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPAD) co-hosted the "South-East Asian Workshop on Global Challenges to Successful Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540(2004), and Regional Efforts to Address Them" in September 2017 in Bangkok. The workshop noted a fruitful exchange of good practices on the implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004), and on advancements in biotechnology, biosafety and biosecurity, and intangible technology transfer (ITT).

Furthermore, Thailand attaches high importance to fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention), particularly on completing mine clearance in remaining contaminated area of 2,557 square kilometers. We are confident that the mine clearance in contaminated areas could be completed within the extended time frame of 5 years (1 November 2018 – 31 October 2023) as granted by the 16th Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 2017. In this connection, Thailand supports the work of an ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre. We will continue to work with ASEAN Member States and regional and international partners to exchange good practices on addressing the effects of anti-personnel mines, mine risk education and victim assistance, in line with our commitment under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

**Transnational crime**

Transnational crimes remains a major threat to build a safe and secure ASEAN community. Strengthening border management cooperation is a key factor to effectively tackle these challenges. Thailand has implemented the Border Management Plan on Security Issues B.E. 2559-2564 (2016-2021) focusing on setting system and related mechanisms for border areas protection, as well as improving intelligence exchange.

Thailand has collaborated closely with neighboring countries and international organizations, including the UNODC, to formulate a regional strategy within which differences in capacities to manage border are addressed. In this respect, Thailand supports a balanced approach between cross-border trade facilitation and border management cooperation, with a view to developing an ASEAN-wide border management cooperation arrangement. Border Liaison Officer (BLO) Networks, acting as a centralized clearing house for information and a joint and coordinated actions point, could complement existing bilateral and multilateral communication channels between countries in the region, and support such a border management cooperation arrangement.

As a reflection of Thailand’s commitment to “zero tolerance” policy against human trafficking, measures driven by the 5Ps-approach (policy and legal framework, prosecution, protection, prevention, and partnership) are implemented. These include adopting a rights-based, victim-centered approach to trafficking in persons; enhancing protection services for victims of trafficking; amending the Witness Protection Act (2003); advocating Public-Private-Civil Society-Partnership; improving the effectiveness and expedite the prosecution of trafficking cases; and regularizing migrant workers and their children to reduce their vulnerabilities and prevent them from falling prey to trafficking networks.

The Government has increased the national budget for the fight against trafficking in persons to 116 million USD or an increase of 13.5 per cent from the previous year. Special anti-human trafficking units across the major pillars of prosecution, including the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Court of Justice. In addition, the enactment of the Royal Ordinance concerning the Management of Employment of Migrant Workers B.E. 2560 (2017) will improve migrant workers management, close loopholes for exploitation, and ensure compliance with international labour standards.

In the ASEAN framework, Thailand welcomes the endorsement of the Bohol Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Work Plan 2017-2020, which translated
the ASEAN Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (APA) into practical actions. The Bohol TIP Work Plan will be implemented in tandem with the National Plan of Action on the implementation of the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP). Thailand will continue to cooperate closely with ASEAN Member States and ASEAN Partners, through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the SOMTC, AMMTC and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes, in order to put an end to trafficking in persons.

Furthermore, Thailand advocates Public–Private–Civil Society Partnership (PPCP), which raises awareness of the importance of addressing human trafficking, as well as collaborating to develop the quality of life, lower economic disparities, and eliminate injustice on a humanitarian basis. More than fifty agencies to foster Public–Private–Civil Society Partnership are also committed to the Memorandum on Cooperation to Prevent, Suppress, and Anti – Trafficking in Persons.

Another phenomenon that has become a major concern in the region is irregular migration. Joint action and firm focus on tackling the root causes is necessary. Concrete measures are needed to develop quality of life and lower disparities, eliminate injustice and social inequalities, and promote human rights. Thailand has been closely collaborating with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Bali Process and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in addressing irregular migration, including in maritime areas.

The ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network, the ASEAN-NARCO Website and the ASEAN Airport Interdiction Task Force are important supportive tools in tackling the drug trafficking problem. The 4th ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network (ADMN) Operational Workshop was organized on 30 July – 1 August 2017 in Khon Kaen Province. The workshop, attended by participants from ASEAN Member States, ASEAN Dialogue Partners, UNODC, was aimed at finalizing the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Report 2016 and considering ADMN 2017-2018 Work Plan. The report entails online database on the ASEAN-NARCO website, promoting technical cooperation and sharing of drug related knowledge and know–how among ASEAN Member States.

Addressing illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals in the Golden Triangle is one other major priority. “The Safe Mekong Operation Plan” reinforces collaboration between China, Thailand, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Viet Nam, has yielded a positive result in ceasing illicit flows of drugs and precursor chemicals. In the same vein, the Safe Mekong Coordination Centre (SMCC), located in Chiang Mai Province, acts as the information center for combating drugs through coordination on river and land patrols, information sharing, identifying targets and raids, and blocking the flow of precursors used for drug production in the Mekong countries. Since its operations, hundreds of arrests along with drug–related cases have been reported, proving the operation to be efficient and productive.

Thailand recognizes the nexus between alternative development and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs), which is central to the “people-centred” approach in addressing drug-related problems. Therefore, Thailand supports alternative development programmes aimed at eliminating and preventing the production of illicit crops utilizing a methodology encompassing a broader conception of rural development. The program also promotes improvement of the overall quality of life of population in remote area by addressing income, education, health, infrastructure and social services issues.

At present, the Asia-Pacific region is one of the fastest growing regions in terms of internet users, which makes the region vulnerable to cyber threats. As Thailand is moving towards Digital Society, the National Cybersecurity Strategy and the draft Cybersecurity Act, with the aim to establish a national cybersecurity agency, are key to ensuring a secure and resilient cyberspace. To effectively address cyber threats, it is important to strengthen close cooperation among all countries, enhance public-private partnership, and consider
norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace. In this connection, Thailand Computer Emergency Response Team (Thai CERT), a member under the Electronic Transactions Development Agency-ETDA (Public Organization), is strengthening its capacities to respond to cyber threats, in particular intrusions, malicious code, fraud and web phishing.

At the regional level, Thailand reaffirms its commitment and will duly implement the ASEAN Declaration on the Cybersecurity Cooperation adopted at the 32nd ASEAN Summit, and the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy. Thailand supports ongoing efforts under the ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms as well as cooperation with its partners on cybersecurity and the use of ICTs, including the TELMIN and its related meetings, the Working Group on Cybercrime under the SOMTC, the ARF ISM on ICTs Security and the ARF Study Group on Confidence Building Measures to Reduce the Risk of Conflict stemming from the Use of ICTs (ARF Study Group).

Thailand also looks forward to the launch of the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre in Bangkok, which will enhance regional cybersecurity capacity building through awareness raising and training programmes. Moreover, the "ASEAN-Australia Cybersecurity Workshop: Strengthening Legal Implementation in Tackling Cybersecurity Challenges in the Region" was convened on 13 February 2018 in Bangkok, to enhance regional dialogue and cooperation to address cyber threats by developing common regional minimal standards and/or norms in the use of ICTs; developing and building capacity of cybersecurity professionals; exchanging information on cybersecurity incidents as well as best practices on criminal justice procedures related to cybercrime.

Thailand attaches great importance to preparing against Communicable Diseases, Non Communicable Diseases, Emerging Infectious Disease, and Chemicals Diseases caused by occupations and environmental pollution as they are one of main threats to human security. Thailand has joined the regional and international communication in finding ways to prevent and tackle these problems by regularly and actively participating in related meetings and fora such as the Meeting of ASEAN Working Group of Health Cluster 1: Promoting Healthy Lifestyle on Health Priority 4: Occupational and Health Cluster 2: Responding to all hazards and emerging threats for the ASEAN Post 2015 Health Development Agenda, ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM), in which in 2016 the threat of Zika Virus in the region was addressed and the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED), organized by the Western Pacific Regional Office and the South East Asia Regional Office of the World Health Organization.

**Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief**

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is a critical and cross-sectoral coordination issue. One of the key challenges has been to promote closer integration of efforts across ASEAN sectoral bodies, as well as between ASEAN and other regional frameworks such as the ARF, EAS and ADMM Plus. This major challenge, however, has been completed to a certain degree by the signing of "The ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, one Response" in 2016. Furthermore, Thailand supports an active role of the AHA Centre, the ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT), and other ASEAN tools to deal with HADR challenges.

Thailand continues to support efforts to concretely advancing cooperation on disaster management and further strengthen ASEAN's capacity in dealing with health issues in time of disasters. Within the ASEAN Regional Capacity on Disaster Health Management (ARCH Project) framework, a draft Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for medical assistance in time of disasters for ASEAN Member States and other countries are being developed.

Furthermore, China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand co-hosted the "ARF Workshop on Typhoon Disaster Risk Reduction and Damage Mitigation" on 5-6 December 2017, in Guangzhou.
The meeting encouraged an exchange of experiences on disaster risk reduction and damage mitigation caused by Typhoon. Thailand and the Republic of Korea co-chaired the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief on 3 – 4 April 2018. It advocated progress in regional cooperation and ways to build capacity for disaster management and disaster risk reduction, emerging common challenges, and the ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief (2018-2020).

As one of the locations for a new Satellite Warehouse under the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN or DELSA Project, Thailand has presented a plan to develop the ASEAN Satellite Warehouse of Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) (Phrase II) in Chai Nat Province. The warehouse is expected to open by 2019. In the long run, the DELSA could also evolve into an ASEAN logistics training function.

**Maritime security and cooperation**

The Asia-Pacific region continues to face maritime challenges, including piracy, armed robbery against ships, as well as issues related to marine environmental protection. Thailand is in the process of upgrading the Thailand Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Center (THAI-MECC) into the Thailand Maritime Laws Enforcement Administrative Center (THAI-MLEAC). The centre will serve as a national focal point on maritime matters with augmented role and greater authority in the management of maritime interests. At its core, THAI – MLEAC would function as a de facto coast guard agency.

At the regional level, Thailand has participated in the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols since 2008 and the air patrol “Eyes in the Sky” since 2009. To support regional efforts in combating maritime challenges, Thailand has actively participated in regional and international maritime security fora, including the ASEAN Maritime Forum, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP ISC), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), among others.

On sustainable fisheries management, Thailand continues to promote this important agenda through relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies such as the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) and the ASEAN Working Group on Fisheries. In this connection, an ARF Workshop on “Sustainable Fisheries Management and Food Security in Southeast Asia” was convened in Bangkok in March 2018, co-chaired by Thailand, China and the United States. Thailand is also proposing an ASEAN Common Fisheries Policy that will promote sustainable fisheries in the region, in close cooperation with the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC). Furthermore, Thailand is firmly committed to combatting IUU Fishing. Combatting IUU fishing was declared as a national agenda in 2015. Since then, Thailand has put tremendous efforts in combatting IUU Fishing, including several wide-ranging and critical reform measures, supervised by the Command Center for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) and implemented by all relevant agencies, in partnership with the private sector and civil society organizations. Following significant progress made over the past three years, the “IUU-free Thailand” policy is envisaged to be launched. To support this endeavour, Thailand is ready to share its experiences and best practices on this matter with other countries in the region and will join hands with the European Union (EU) and other States in promoting enhanced regional cooperation to combat IUU Fishing.

Furthermore, particular attention is given to address labour issues, such as the promotion of Good Labour Practices (GLP), including in the fishing and seafood processing industries. The draft Prevention and Elimination of Forced Labour Act is being considered by the National Legislative Assembly. The Work in Fishing law is being drafted. Thailand is the first country in Asia to ratify the Protocol 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention (P29), while work is in progress for Thailand to be able to sign the Work in Fishing Convention (C188) in 2018.

Thailand also attaches importance to promoting marine environmental protection. The “ASEAN-China Workshop on Marine Environmental Protection” was convened in Chai Nat in March 2018.
Protection in the South China Sea on 11-13 July 2018 in Phuket seeks to address marine environmental protection including the challenge of marine debris.

IV. Role of the ARF

National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

As one of the ASEAN-led platforms central to promoting ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture, the ARF remains a primary forum to foster constructive and meaningful dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Progress in the implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action to implement the ARF Vision Statement should be nurtured. In this respect, Thailand supports the comprehensive implementation of the Plan, as well as the ARF Work Plans under the respective priorities areas within the ARF process. Concrete steps include the conduct of training, workshops, and exercises in accordance with ARF’s purposes and principles.

Future of the ARF

Concerted efforts to maintain momentum towards implementing preventive diplomacy in the ARF is key to realizing ARF’s full potential. In this connection, there is a need to implement the PD agenda in line with universally recognized norms and principles of international law. Preventive Diplomacy has to be implemented in tandem with ongoing efforts on CBMs, to ensure that ARF moves ahead.

In addition, the ARF needs to develop greater synergies with other ASEAN-led platforms, such as the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, as well as exchange best practices with other regional security organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), among others. Furthermore, more interaction between Track 1.5 and 2 entities, including ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) should be encouraged. This would allow ARF participants to mutually explore better way to enhance CBMs and PD in the region.

Looking to the future, the ARF needs to effectively manage its three core priorities of promoting CBMs and preventive diplomacy, nurturing a culture of cooperation on practical security issues, and encouraging closer civilian-military dialogue and cooperation, in a situation of growing resource constraints and proliferation of regional platforms dealing with security. Furthermore, the ARF will need to examine the most optimal way to develop synergies with other ASEAN-led platforms, in particular the EAS and the ADMM-Plus. An assessment of how such synergies could be developed between the ARF, EAS and ADMM-Plus may need to be undertaken as part of the process of strengthening the ASEAN-centred regional architecture that deals with security issues.
I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

For well over 20 years, the ASEAN Regional Forum has worked to advance stability and cooperation within the Asia-Pacific. Traditional and non-traditional security concerns continue to pose a challenge to peace and stability in the region, making ongoing engagement through the ARF valuable. The ARF has been successful over time using open dialogue, tangible cooperation, and results-driven initiatives to find common understandings and solutions to uncommon problems. Through our membership in the ARF, the United States affirms its commitment to finding consensus solutions based on respect for international law and shared values. ASEAN centrality plays an essential role in the ARF process, and the United States fully supports a constructive, action-oriented ARF with ASEAN at its core. Furthermore, the United States believes that clearly defined, proactive approaches in the ARF process will yield the largest benefits to regional stability. Therefore, we pledge to support the ARF to advance its goal of implementation of Preventive Diplomacy measures, including through empowering the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). The cooperative results from ASEAN-centered multilateral fora and the implementation of Preventive Diplomacy principles to date show promise for the Indo-Pacific region and are indispensable to U.S. security interests. The United States urges all ARF participants to engage with deliberateness, understanding, and vision to deepen our cooperation and advance peace in the region for decades to come.

The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The partnership built under this treaty has promoted seamless cooperation on a wide range of regional and global security issues, leveraging the presence of U.S. forces to respond to security threats. The close cooperation between the Japanese Government and the United States in responding to the region’s natural disasters demonstrates the importance of our relationship and our exceptional capabilities to respond quickly. We have taken steps to expand our security cooperation by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to ensure that the bilateral alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. We are also moving forward with the Japanese Government to implement our military base realignment and consolidation plan. Progress on force realignment will help us to establish a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture in the Indo-Pacific region – critical to U.S. national interests. We continue to work closely with the Japanese Government to address emerging challenges in space and cyberspace, and to strengthen our missile defense capabilities to counter threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the ARF, Japan has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues, including as a co-chair of the newly established ARF Intersessional Meeting on Information and Communications Technology Security (ARF ISM on ICTs Security). The U.S. commends Japan for its strong commitment to add the collective voice of the influential G7 nations to discussions on maritime security challenges, humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, peacekeeping operations, global economic resiliency, climate change, cyber policy issues, global health system improvements, and human rights policies of the Indo-Pacific.

Our relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) has evolved into a global partnership, while continuing to play a key role in deterring aggression from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The United States maintains its ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK; we remain committed to growing the Alliance into a comprehensive strategic partnership based on our common values and mutual trust. This past year included the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the ROK to provide critical defensive capabilities that protect ROK citizens and U.S. forces in Korea. We have made progress in promoting U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation and enjoy a well-established trilateral exercise program in the area of missile defense. We continue to expand trilateral information-sharing on DPRK missile
and nuclear capabilities. The United States and the ROK are working together, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia. This collaboration includes global health security, peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts.

We continue to enhance our alliance with Australia through greater cooperation on addressing shared regional and global interests, including countering violent extremism. The United States and Australia continue to work towards full implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives announced by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in 2011. Rotations of U.S. Marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft in Australia's Northern Territory improve interoperability and capacity through opportunities to train and exercise both bilaterally and multilaterally in the region. The U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) – which met at the minister level in August 2017 - also plays a positive role in enhancing regional stability and security. Officials from Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Hawaii in October 2016 for the annual Security and Defense Cooperation Forum where they signed a Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement and discussed defense and security policies, regional capacity development, peacekeeping operations, maritime security and trilateral training and exercises. In addition, New Zealand and Japan participated alongside 33,000 Australian and U.S. troops in the 2017 Talisman Saber exercise, a biennial joint military exercise that promotes civilian-military cooperation and operational integration.

U.S.-New Zealand relations are the best they have been in decades. Relations have improved dramatically since the signing of the 2010 Wellington Declaration. In 2012, the Washington Declaration, signed by then Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman allowed greater flexibility in terms of joint military exercises and military educational exchanges. As a result, the United States and New Zealand have conducted increased joint military exercises. The November 2016 visit of the USS Sampson, the first by a U.S. military vessel in three decades, marked a new stage in the normalization of defense ties. The annual Strategic Dialogue is the United States’ top-level regular policy discussion with New Zealand. The two sides began holding formal defense policy dialogues in 2013. The United States continues to value its partnership with New Zealand in advancing the ARF’s capacity to address regional security challenges through Preventive Diplomacy; New Zealand’s leadership on this issue is critical to maintaining the ARF’s effectiveness and relevance as a regional security body.

The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty continues to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Our bilateral cooperation continues to contribute to regional peace and stability, with particular focus in the areas of maritime security, disaster response, counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping operations and non-proliferation. The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, supports a joint commitment to advancing mutual security interests by increasing our interoperability, supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ defense modernization plans, and improving our ability to respond to natural disasters in the region. The United States will continue to advance this enduring strategic alliance through high-level dialogues, such as the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. Opportunities for progress also exist where we share a common interest in expanding regional defense and security cooperation through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and other vehicles. The United States continues to support Philippine participation in joint exercises with other partners in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions, as well as encouraging the Philippines to invite participation by neighboring countries in bilateral military exercises, such as Exercise Balikatan.

The United States and Thailand have been treaty allies for over 60 years and we continue to collaborate to address humanitarian and security concerns such as counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, disaster relief, nonproliferation, and maritime security. The combined U.S.-Thai response to the Nepal earthquake in April and May 2015 demonstrated the value of our alliance in responding to humanitarian crises in the region. The United States notes Thailand’s commitment to hold elections as soon as possible and looks forward to Thailand’s return to inclusive democratic rule.

The United States and Indonesia share a responsibility and an abiding interest to address strategic challenges as partners. In this spirit, the United States and Indonesia committed in 2015 to forging a Strategic Partnership and to expanding cooperation on shared strategic interests in the region. The two countries pledged to strengthen collaborative efforts to address non-traditional security threats, including terrorism and violent extremism, natural disasters, illegal trafficking of wildlife, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, water security, and health pandemics. They also agreed to expand cooperation and capacity building in cyber space. In 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency concluded a work plan to expand bilateral cooperation in the area of maritime security. In October 2015, the U.S. Defense Secretary and Indonesian Defense Minister signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation that serves as a guide to expand future defense collaboration. The statement covers five pillars of defense engagement: maritime, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, defense modernization, and countering transnational threats. To build bilateral and regional capacity, the U.S. and Indonesian militaries also conduct regular exercises, such as the Army-to-Army Exercise Garuda Shield, Air Force fighter jet Exercise Cope West as well as multinational Naval Exercise Komodo in Indonesia. Most recently, Komodo commenced in May 2018 and included 48 nations to emphasize multilateral naval readiness and regional security cooperation efforts.

Singapore is a strong partner of the United States and an active participant—regionally and globally—to ensure peace and stability. Our two countries have close and long-standing defense ties with our militaries participating in several bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. In addition, Singapore hosts the rotational deployment of United States military aircraft and ships to conduct a variety of maritime patrol activities to counter piracy and terrorism, as well as provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region. Singapore trains approximately 1,000 military personnel in the United States each year. Singapore was the first and only Asian country to have contributed both assets and personnel to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and recently committed to extend and expand its contributions. The Singapore Navy is currently commanding Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden for the fifth time. In 2018, we further broadened our relationship by re-signing a memorandum of understanding for the Third Country Training Program (TCTP), an ASEAN capacity building initiative jointly managed by the United States and Singapore. Aimed at bridging development gaps in the region, the TCTP has provided technical assistance and training to over 1000 officials through more than 40 workshops since its inception in 2012. The TCTP curriculum includes non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity and cybercrime. In October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong affirmed the strong and enduring partnership between the two countries, especially in the economic, defense, security, and people-to-people spheres. Recognizing the transboundary nature of cybersecurity threats, the two leaders affirmed the progress made under the 2016 MOU on Cybersecurity Cooperation and their commitment to work together during Singapore’s 2018 ASEAN chair year to secure the digital economy as a key engine for future economic growth. In the ARF, Singapore has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues, including as a co-chair of the newly established ISM on ICTs Security. As a like-minded partner on terrorism issues and as a co-chair of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Counterterrorism along with Australia, Singapore plays an important role in facilitating regional efforts against violent extremism. As the world’s largest transshipment port, we work
closely with Singapore on trade security and counter proliferation efforts, and Singapore has begun a three-year trial of the Cargo Targeting System (CTS).

The relationship between the United States and Malaysia has reached new heights in recent years, and the United States is eager to continue working with our Malaysian partners to increase regional and global security. A robust slate of bilateral and multilateral military exercises has enhanced our respective capabilities to promote regional security and respond to humanitarian disasters. The United States values Malaysia’s past contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and we are working closely on counter terrorism issues, including stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL. Malaysia is also an important partner in stemming the proliferation of nuclear materials. The United States looks forward to working closely with Malaysia in advancing our shared priorities and interests in the context of promoting regional cooperation, peacekeeping capacity building, for international law, ASEAN-centrality, and maintenance of peace and stability. In the ARF, Malaysia has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues, including in the newly established ISM on ICTs Security.

For more than 20 years, the United States has been engaged in advancing diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Our relationship with Vietnam continues to expand and deepen, guided by the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership launched in 2013. President Barack Obama visited Hanoi in May 2016, marking just the third visit by a U.S. President since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Against the backdrop of today’s dynamic security environment, this trip was a watershed moment for continued efforts to strengthen Washington-Hanoi relations. Through a healthy set of annual dialogues spanning issues from human rights to security and defense relations, the United States and Vietnam are cooperating in areas such as security, peacekeeping operations, trade, nonproliferation, health, the environment, science and technology, education, and human rights. The United States and Vietnam signed an MOU on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011, and have continued to be engaged through U.S. Navy port visits – including the first ever at-sea exercise in 2014. Furthermore, our strong relationship with Vietnam has supported reciprocal political and military leadership exchanges. This includes a State Partnership Program between Vietnam and the Oregon National Guard to explore further collaboration on HA/DR and Search and Rescue. In May 2016, the United States signed a Letter of Agreement with Vietnam on rule of law and law enforcement, which will expand Vietnamese law enforcement capabilities and strengthen the Vietnamese criminal justice sector’s capability to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes. This supplements an LOA on maritime security signed by both parties in 2013.

Under an ambitious strategic partnership, the United States seeks to support India’s rise as a responsible regional and global partner and the bilateral relationship has witnessed a dramatic surge since the inauguration of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014. Through an intensified series of leader-level summits and cabinet-level visits, an annual Secretary of State led Dialogue, and more than 30 additional high-level dialogues and working groups ranging from defense, regional security, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping to trade, the ocean, health, cyber, and energy, the United States and India are collaborating to enhance livelihoods and sustain the rules-based global order. In accordance with the National Security Strategy, the U.S. Government views India as an integral partner in safeguarding a free and open Indo-Pacific. In recent years, U.S.-India defense cooperation has undergone a rapid expansion as part of a deepening strategic partnership as India is an important part of the United States’ South Asia Strategy and a vital partner in Afghanistan. In 2015, India and the United States renewed a ten-year Defense Framework Agreement and in 2016 concluded the politically significant Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) to facilitate closer logistics cooperation. The U.S. Congress in 2016 designated India a Major Defense Partner. Bilateral defense trade has risen from near zero
to $15 billion since 2005. The 2015 U.S.–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region continues to provide a framework for joint efforts spanning the political, security, and economic fronts, including maritime engagement, counterterrorism and piracy efforts. The two sides also held the first annual U.S.-India Maritime Security Dialogue in May 2016. In 2018, the United States and India will hold their first 2+2 Ministerial led by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, demonstrating the increasing strategic importance of our bilateral relationship. The U.S. and Indian militaries are increasing the scope, complexity, and frequency of joint military exercises, a key component of military-to-military cooperation and interoperability. MALABAR, our annual naval exercise, is now a trilateral engagement with Japan and has, in recent years, featured joint maritime reconnaissance, carrier operations, and anti-submarine warfare exercises. In 2016, the three countries launched a working group on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. India has deepened its involvement with the biennial Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise hosted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. India started as an exercise observer in 2006, deployed a ship in 2014 and 2016, and plans to participate in 2018. The annual army-to-army exercise, YUDH ABHYAS, last took place in September 2017 and continues to increase in size and scope with a Brigade-level Command Post Exercise, a Battalion-led Company Field Training Exercise, and several Expert Academic Exchanges. In 2016, the Indian Air Force and U.S. Air Force exercise together in the multilateral RED FLAG-Alaska exercise and will do so again in 2020. In 2017, India adopted the Helicopter Operations from Ships Other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) protocols, enabling U.S. and Indian helicopters to land on one another’s ships at sea. Since July 2017, the U.S. and Indian navies have also conducted three Passing Exercises (PASSEXs). In 2018, the United States and India will also establish a new annual exercise focused on amphibious operations, which will include all three Indian military services.

The United States is committed to pursuing a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China. The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies, and we share a responsibility to promote stability and growth. Our two countries should have a trading relationship that is fair and pays dividends both ways. U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in the United States April 6-7, 2017. The two presidents agreed to expand areas of cooperation while effectively and candidly addressing differences. The two sides noted the urgency of the threat of North Korea’s weapons programs, reaffirmed their commitment to a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and committed to fully implement UN Security Council Resolutions. They agreed to increase cooperation and work with the international community to press North Korea to dismantle its illegal nuclear and missile programs. Underscoring the need for high-level engagement to make concrete progress on key issues, the two sides established a Comprehensive Dialogue. It is overseen by the two presidents and has four cabinet-level pillars: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue.

The United States remains committed to supporting Myanmar’s transition to democracy. The National League for Democracy party’s victory in the November 2015 election and the subsequent transition to the democratically elected parliament and government, which assumed office on February 1 and March 30, 2016 respectively, were historic diplomatic milestones. We support efforts by the Government of Myanmar and ethnic armed groups to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. We remain concerned about the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State and the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, including the Rohingya population. We are also concerned about ongoing clashes in Kokang, Kachin State, and Shan State, and support the peaceful resolution of these conflicts. The USNS Fall River visited Yangon in March 2017. This marks the first time a Navy ship has visited Myanmar since World War II.

United States defense engagement with Brunei continues to increase. The annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise took place in November 2017. In summer 2017, Brunei co-hosted a portion of the multilateral Southeast Asian Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) at its Multinational Coordination Center, with participants from the United States, Philippines, and Indonesian Navies and Coast Guards. U.S. military officers have attended the Royal Brunei Armed Forces Staff College since January 2014, with the fourth student, a U.S. Marine recently graduating with honors, receiving the award for "Overall Excellence." In August 2018, the United States will conduct the first Pacific Pathways Joint Exercise with Brunei’s land forces, the first army-to-army engagement under the Pacific Pathways program. On the back of diplomacy and defense cooperation, the promising U.S.-Brunei relationship aims to help secure mutual security interests in Southeast Asia.

The United States has cooperated with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in areas of mutual concern ranging from international peacekeeping, defense reform and professionalization to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. In September 2016, the Cambodian Government hosted a Bilateral Defense Dialogue with United States Pacific Command, and followed up with a Mid-Term Review in February 2017. The Royal Cambodian Government recently requested that joint exercises and English language exchanges, as well as some humanitarian assistance, be suspended until after elections in 2018.

Laos’ chairmanship of ASEAN and the signing of a Comprehensive Partnership between the United States and the Lao PDR in 2016 provided new opportunities for bilateral engagement. While we continue to address legacy issues, like the important Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) accounting mission and helping Laos manage contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO), we are building a new relationship for the 21st century. The many facets of our cooperation—which include health, law enforcement, trade, education, environmental protection, military issues, cultural preservation, disaster preparedness, trafficking -in-persons and illegal drugs, entrepreneurship, energy, rule of law programs, and more—address the country’s most critical and systemic needs.

Another way that we are engaging the nations of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, is through the regional cooperation and economic integration efforts of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI focuses on technical capacity building for regional officials in line ministries working in the focus areas of Food Security; Energy Security; Environment and Water; Education; and Health. Additionally, the United States chairs a consortium of like-minded countries and international financial institutions operating in the sub-region, known as the Friends of the Lower Mekong, to engage with and support the Lower Mekong countries’ development. We do this primarily through our work together on a joint training platform designed to address the Lower Mekong countries’ infrastructure planning and policy needs. The goal is to strengthen ASEAN not only by promoting the sustainable development level of the Lower Mekong countries, but also by providing a venue for transboundary cooperation on their most pressing challenges.

The United States values defense cooperation with Timor-Leste in areas of mutual concern ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster response to maritime and border security to defense reform and professionalization. We held our annual Bilateral Defense Discussion in Honolulu in October 2017. In July 2017, the United States and Timor-Leste jointly participated in Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT), an exercise with a maritime security focus, and in August 2017, Timor-Leste participated in Koa Moana-Crocodilo, a counterterrorism exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps. In October and November 2017, Timor-Leste participated in HARII HAMUTUK, an engineering exercise with the United States, Australia, and Japan. In 2017, Timor-Leste co-sponsored with the United States and Indonesia an ARF statement on cooperation to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In March 2017, the United States together with co-chairs Thailand and China held an ARF workshop on Sustainable Fisheries and Food Security in Bangkok. The workshop focused
on sustainable fisheries management, combatting IUU fishing, and creating regional strategies to ensure food security in Southeast Asia. A Navy Seabees detachment in Timor-Leste works with Timor-Leste's armed forces on humanitarian assistance and education projects to support the country's development infrastructure needs. The United States sends Timorese military and civilian defense officials to the United States for training ranging from Basic Infantry Officer Leadership to Advanced Civil-Military Operations. Additionally, the United States sponsors an English language-training course in Timor-Leste, which trains 40 military personnel each year.

The United States and the European Union are deepening collaboration with Asian partners to advance regional security and development, and to build regional institutions and support for the rule of law. The United States and the EU share common goals to promote human rights, freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and respect for international law in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We are working together to encourage China to deepen its engagement with the international community, act in accordance with international law and standards, and participate responsibly in the global economic order. We are also coordinating our messages to condemn dangerous and unlawful DPRK provocations, uphold UNSC Resolutions, and pressure the regime to address its egregious human rights abuses. U.S.-EU cooperation has also played a critical role in supporting Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition; we jointly sponsored in March a UNHRC resolution calling for the creation of a fact-finding mission. We regularly collaborate with the EU through the Friends of the Lower Mekong mechanism as well as other senior-level forums. As we rebalance our interests and investments to the Indo-Pacific, we look forward to continually expanding our coordination with the EU through the ARF and other regional fora.

Likewise, the DPRK's UN-proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a serious threat to international peace and security. However, there is great momentum now for positive change, following President Trump and Chairman Kim's bold first step toward achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The United States remains in close contact with the ROK and Japan to coordinate our DPRK engagement; our alliances remain ironclad, and ensure peace and stability in the region. Sanctions remain in full effect until North denuclearizes. The full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions by the international community brought us to this moment, and will ensure a successful outcome of this process. Additional global security issues, such as transnational crime (drug, human, and wildlife trafficking), the security situations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremists returning from the conflicts in Iran, and global climate change, all continue to threaten regional and international stability. Many of these issues are transnational in nature and require concrete multilateral and national responses from ARF participants. Results-oriented cooperation has proven to be the best course of action for promoting peace and prosperity in the region. The continued strengthening and growth of the ARF’s institutional capacity, enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships, and burden-sharing efforts provide the best solution to these security concerns.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

Throughout 2017, the United States continued its comprehensive engagement with the region through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the United States focuses on four vital, national interests-organized as the strategy's four pillars:

1. Protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life
2. Promote American prosperity
3. Preserve peace through strength
4. Advance American influence

This NSS and its four themes are guided by a return to principled realism.
The strategy is realist because it is clear-eyed about global competition: It acknowledges the central role of power in world affairs, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests. It is principled because it is grounded in the knowledge that promoting American values is key to spreading peace and prosperity around the globe.

As the United States continues to pursue the four themes, it will continue to work with allies and partners to manage the challenges we see throughout the Indo-Pacific:

- The ongoing threat of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, proliferation, and missile programs and its defiant and dangerously provocative behavior;
- Longstanding disputes over territory, associated maritime zones, and resources, including in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
- The menace of terrorism and its transregional networks – including foreign fighters returning from and departing to conflict zones away from the Asian-Pacific region, terrorist financing, and violent extremist messaging. Addressing the problem of terrorist radicalization and recruitment is a fundamental component of a holistic strategy;
- To limit the spread of both homegrown and international terrorist groups;
- The great human and economic toll of natural disasters like the April 2015 Earthquake in Nepal, the 2015 flooding in Myanmar, and the 2016 Aceh earthquake in Indonesia.
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction;
- The global threat of pandemic disease that can spread around the world;
- Environmental degradation and the threat posed by climate change;
- Disruptive and potentially destructive activities by State actors in outer space; and
- Malicious activities by state and non-state actors in cyberspace.

Ensuring that the United States is prepared to prevent conflict requires a combination of defense, diplomacy, and development. These tools of statecraft enable the United States to strengthen the capability of its allies and partners to help preserve stability. The United States remains committed to retaining security capabilities to deter conflict, reassure allies, and if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. These objectives require the United States to be capable of responding to a broad range of challenges that are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities.


a. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

A broad range of data is publicly available from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/Budget2017/

i. Total defense expenditure on annual basis

a) The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Total Defense Budget Request was $639.1 billion, which is $33.1 billion (about 0.5 percent) more than the FY 2017 enacted level of $606 billion, to finance base and overseas contingency operations.

b) The FY 2018 budget request is designed to protect capabilities that are most closely aligned with the defense strategy’s objectives to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The budget also maintains a ready force, continues to take care of service members and their families, extends enterprise reforms that control costs, and seizes opportunities to build the future force by developing new and innovative operational
concepts and dominating technological frontiers including undersea, cyber, space, electronic warfare, and other advanced capabilities. In developing the FY 2018 budget and planning for future years, the Department supports progress toward achieving and maintaining full-spectrum combat readiness by all four Military Departments.

Further information regarding the DoD National Defense Budget can be found at:

ii. Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The budget for national defense was 3.3% of GDP in FY 2018.

Further information can be found at:
iii. Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population

Further information can be found at:

<p>| Table 3-2: MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS |
| (End Strength) |
| FY 2016 | FY 2017* | FY 2018 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>OCO</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>OCO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Military Personnel(^2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorization Request</td>
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<td>1,305,900</td>
<td>1,305,900</td>
<td>1,314,000</td>
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<td>Current Estimate</td>
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<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>325,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>1,305,900</td>
<td>1,305,900</td>
<td>1,314,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Active Military</td>
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<td>813,200</td>
<td>813,200</td>
<td>815,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selected Reserve Personnel</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Authorization Request</td>
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<td>Current Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Selected Reserve</td>
<td>811,668</td>
<td>813,200</td>
<td>813,200</td>
<td>815,900</td>
<td>815,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. FY 2017 reflects authorized end strength, and does not include projected end strength submitted in the Request for Additional Appropriations.
2. Does not include full-time Guard or Reserve and strength.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

The United States remains committed to promoting peace, stability, and consensus in the region by contributing support and participating in a broad range of security activities. The United States specifically focuses on contributing to the following regional issues:

i. Counterterrorism

The United States is actively engaged in multilateral and regional efforts to strengthen regional partners and allies and to promote continued regional cooperation on counterterrorism measures. The human atrocities and extreme acts of violence committed by ISIS are not isolated to the Middle East. ISIS has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to direct and inspire attacks in Europe and Asia, including the horrific attacks in France, Belgium and Bangladesh. It is critical that U.S. and coalition partners cooperate purposefully to counter ISIS and its violent extremist outgrowths. The Indo-Pacific is not immune to violent extremist influence either; therefore, the United States seeks to encourage and support strategic counterterrorism policies in the region. This approach places a premium on building the institutional capacities of states to promote the rule of law and eliminate the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

The United States is deeply concerned about ISIS’s continued influence in recruiting followers from Southeast Asia and the terrorist group’s ability to inspire attacks in the region. We
encourage ASEAN to increase information sharing on suspected terrorists, particularly by requiring the provision of advance passenger information and passenger name record (API/PNR) data on all airline passengers and by connecting all points of entry to INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police communications system (I-24/7). To help prevent the use of fraudulent passports, the United States is prepared to assist ASEAN member states to automate reporting of stolen and lost travel documents to INTERPOL as part of a program then-U.S. President Obama announced at the Special U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Sunnylands, California in February 2016. The United States encourages global commitment to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on foreign terrorist fighters, which introduces powerful new international obligations to strengthen border security and information sharing.

The United States encourages states to implement the UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, including developing national action plans to take a whole-of-society approach to combating this security threat. The United States works closely with regional partners at the United Nations and in regional fora such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and APEC to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and international instruments related to countering terrorism. The United States also cooperates closely with many regional partners in the APEC Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), which contributes to regional security by conducting capacity building projects on issues including countering foreign terrorist fighter travel, strengthening border security, protecting critical infrastructure, and countering the financing of terrorism.

The United States also serves with the Russian Federation as the Co-Chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary partnership of 86 nations and five official observers, and its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. To advance its mission, the GICNT has conducted 10 senior-level meetings and more than 80 other multilateral activities, including workshops and tabletop exercises, across the GICNT focus areas of nuclear detection, forensics, and response and mitigation. Japan hosted the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT on June 1-2, 2017 in Tokyo, where the partners considered the outcomes of the 10th Anniversary Meeting, hosted by the Netherlands in 2016, and proposals to implement both new and enduring priorities of the GICNT community.

The ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan contributes to regional security through work in its priority areas – Illicit Drugs; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN); and Counter Radicalization. The United States is co-leading efforts to combat illicit drugs and CBRN. In February 2017, the United States partnered with the Philippines to sponsor an ARF workshop on medium and long-term support for victims of terrorism. We aspire to see the progress made at both of these workshops continue in the future. Additionally, the United States is proposing two CTTC-related workshops; one on the topic of CBRN risk mitigation and another on aviation security and information sharing. In March 2017, we joined international governmental and non-governmental experts in studying cyber threats to the Indo-Pacific region and recommending to ARF actions to address these threats at the track 1.5 Cyber Workshop sponsored by The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, which contributed towards the creation of the ISM on ICTs Security.

The U.S. Department of State works closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its mission in protecting the United States by promoting effective aviation and border security screening with our foreign partners through enhanced information sharing. For example, an important effort in our counterterrorism work is Homeland Security Presidential Directive Six (HSPD-6), a Presidential initiative following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Through HSPD-6, the State Department works with the Terrorist
Screening Center to negotiate the exchange of identities of known or suspected terrorists with foreign partners to enhance our mutual border screening efforts. HSPD-6 arrangements establish institutionalized operational mechanisms for the reciprocal sharing of unclassified, biographic terrorist identities between the United States and its foreign partners. Such arrangements enhance U.S. and foreign partners’ border security by helping interdict the travel of known and suspected terrorists while further strengthening our counterterrorism cooperation at a strategic policy level.

The Terrorist Screening Center implements these arrangements with foreign partners. These agreements allow partners to namecheck incoming flights to their countries, which helps deter terrorist travel by creating an extra layer of security. HSPD-6 arrangements are a prerequisite to participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). To date, the United States has over 60 such arrangements in place. The U.S. Department of State also works closely with its partners at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to strengthen global aviation security by engaging foreign partners in bolstering aviation screening at last point of departure (LPD) airports with direct flights to the United States to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding commercial flights. The United States has also provided bilateral counterterrorism financing for capacity building assistance to several nations in the region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The United States continues to support the enabling of its partners and allies to secure the region effectively from potential terrorist threats.

ii. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

The United States seeks to strengthen the objectives and obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects including disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in ways that are safe, secure, and supportive of the nonproliferation regime. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter potential adversaries and assures U.S. treaty allies and other security partners that they can count on the extended deterrence commitments undertaken by the United States.

The NPT remains critical to our common security. At the first and second meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), which were held May 2-12, 2017 and April 23 – May 5, 2018, NPT Parties demonstrated a shared understanding of the fundamental benefits of the Treaty to its members. This support for the Treaty will need to be maintained as we approach the RevCon. In this NPT review cycle, we seek consensus on the need to strengthen and maintain the NPT as the cornerstone of an effective nonproliferation regime that allows for the possibility of further progress on nuclear disarmament and expanding access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We seek the universalization of the Additional Protocol to ensure that IAEA safeguards remain effective and robust and to uphold the Treaty’s integrity by addressing noncompliance.

At the 2018 NPT PrepCom, the United States also submitted a working paper on “Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament,” which emphasized our commitment to working with all states to address the international security challenges that make nuclear deterrence necessary. The United States supports the long-term goal of creating the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations and fashioning a world in which nuclear weapons are no longer necessary to deter aggression and maintain global strategic stability. Achieving these objectives will require meaningful and realistic dialogue that seeks to address the underlying security concerns that cause countries to rely on nuclear weapons for their security and to pursue effective measures that will help create conditions conducive for further progress on disarmament. This approach stands in contrast to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which ignores the security concerns that make nuclear deterrence necessary, contains no provisions for verifying
nuclear disarmament, and will only further polarize the international community on matters of nonproliferation and disarmament. The United States does not support the TPNW, which will not lead to the elimination of a single nuclear weapons, nor enhance any state’s security. The five NPT nuclear-weapon states (P5) have met regularly to discuss nuclear policy, promote mutual confidence, and discuss issues related to the fulfillment of the NPT.

The United States supports the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy programs in conformity with the NPT and believes that nuclear energy (when pursued according to international standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation) can be a viable source of energy to states looking to meet increasing energy demands. We maintain, however, that such efforts must be conducted in a transparent manner and in full cooperation with the IAEA. The application of nuclear technologies via IAEA technical cooperation programs can also stimulate development in the areas of food security, hydrology, and human health. We believe that adopting the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP) to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is an important step that states can take to strengthen IAEA safeguards and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. We call upon all ARF participants who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the AP and, where appropriate, bring into force a Small Quantities Protocol based on the IAEA’s modified model. We stand ready to help states build capacities to fully implement the AP. As noted in the November 2013 Joint ASEAN-U.S. Leader’s Statement, the ARF also can play an important role in helping states comprehend the AP and overcome any challenges to its implementation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, as well as illicit spread of related materials, threaten the security of the entire international community. One way that the United States has supported regional approaches to addressing this global challenge is by raising awareness of the requirements of UNSCR 1540 and by promoting its full implementation in the region. The United States has taken measures to meet all of its obligations under UNSCR 1540, measures it continues to improve as witnessed in its submissions to the 1540 Committee. The United States has also supported efforts in the ARF toward this end and has promoted greater cooperation between the ARF and the UN Security Council 1540 Committee. In that regard, the U.S. was an active participant in the 1540 Committee's second comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540, which served as the basis for follow-on resolution 2325 (2016). The United States encouraged all ARF participants and the forum itself to contribute to the review and was pleased that a number of states participated in the process. Lastly, the United States welcomed Myanmar’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in July 2015.

One international effort that helps states to meet the goals of UNSCR 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which to date, 105 countries have endorsed. Many ARF participants have already endorsed the PSI, profiling their concrete commitment to regional peace and security to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials in the region. In a statement delivered to the 2016 PSI Mid-Level Political Meeting (MLPM) hosted by the United States in Washington, D.C. the United States noted that “PSI remains at the heart of efforts to achieve broader non-proliferation goals, constantly innovating to overcome new challenges and leading the international community in stopping WMD-related trafficking.” Australia hosted the PSI Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER), Exercise Pacific Protector, in September 2017. This exercise built on the momentum from the Singapore PSI APER Exercise Deep Sabre, the January 2016 MLPM and lead up to the 2018 PSI High Level Political Meeting in France, marking the 15th anniversary of the PSI. The United States encourages all countries concerned with the threat WMD proliferation poses to international peace and security to endorse the PSI.

Lastly, the United States supports the agreement among ASEAN nations to establish a zone in the region free of nuclear weapons, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ Treaty reaffirms the desire of the
ASEAN State Parties to maintain peace and stability in the region and builds upon the obligations the SEANWFZ Treaty Parties undertook as non-nuclear weapon States Parties in the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other things, the SEANWFZ Treaty prohibits States Parties from allowing the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and the dumping of radioactive material in the zone, subjects that the NPT itself does not address. The United States and the other NPT nuclear weapon states welcome the efforts of SEANWFZ States Parties to work with the P5 to resolving outstanding issues with respect to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty, and remain prepared to sign the revised Protocol.

iii. Transnational crime

The United States augments the capabilities of regional actors and supports the region on a broad range of transnational crime issues. The United States conducts bilateral and regional programming to combat transnational crime, including through international and nonprofit organizations. For example, these programs include training prosecutors and judges to manage terrorism and transnational crime cases, cooperate during interdiction efforts on land and in maritime environments, and to facilitate international legal cooperation during prosecutions and investigations. We also provide training and capacity-building in training special anti-human trafficking units, and supporting reforms to implement international standards, such as the UN Convention against Corruption and UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand continues to deliver advanced training for civil law enforcement development to ASEAN member states. The ILEA is an important platform for addressing topics of mutual concern, including transnational organized crime, corruption, and all forms of trafficking. The program increases institutional capacity, promotes regional law enforcement networks among our partner states, and builds relationships with the US law enforcement community in an effort to address these common threats and promote the rule of law. Alumni are often among countries' highest ranks in the criminal justice sector, including senior police and prosecutors, Supreme Court justices, and parliamentarians. In addition, the United States has taken steps to protect the economic interaction in the region against cybercrime and intellectual property piracy, and to disrupt the financial activities of transnational criminals and facilitators.

Narcotics production and trafficking are also challenges for all ARF member nations. There are vast networks of highly organized drug trafficking organizations that span the region and threaten regional and U.S. national security through their production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and precursor chemicals. The U.S. government supports partner nation capabilities by supporting best practices for demand reduction programs, as well as providing training to improve capacity to detect and interdict illicitly trafficked substances; these efforts ensure those countries can fight international drug trafficking and related criminal activities. In March 2017, the United States co-chaired a concept development workshop with Thailand on the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC) to explore the viability of establishing such a platform. The workshop underscored the growing need for information sharing and intelligence exchange among law enforcement agencies and other relevant agencies to combat transnational crime and agreed to next steps to 1) assess and strengthen existing mechanisms for information sharing and intelligence exchange at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels and 2) to further explore the concept of a more comprehensive platform or center of information sharing and intelligence exchange such as the ATTIC.

Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise that is a conservation crisis and an acute security threat. The involvement of transnational organized crime in poaching and wildlife trafficking promotes corruption, threatens peace and security, strengthens illicit trade, destabilizes economies and communities that depend on wildlife for their livelihoods, and contributes to the spread of disease. The U.S. Government works to build law enforcement and criminal justice
capacity to combat wildlife trafficking, reduce demand for these illegal wildlife products, and facilitate international cooperation to stop the organized criminal networks that traffic wildlife. In March 2015, the United States co-chaired with Malaysia an ARF workshop on combating wildlife trafficking. This workshop convened policy makers and experts from the ASEAN region to discuss the threats from wildlife trafficking, address ways to reduce demand, and share best practices on the prevention and investigation of wildlife trafficking. The U.S. Government supported the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime’s (SOMTC)’s establishment of the Working Group on Illicit Trafficking of Wildlife and Timber and we look forward to supporting its work on implementation.

IUU fishing has direct food, economic and environmental security impacts on coastal communities and their nations’ rule of law, which is particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific region. IUU fishing could also contribute to tensions in the East and South China Seas. To further the fight against IUU fishing, the United States is working with international partners to improve global fisheries enforcement by strengthening efforts to detect, identify, interdict, and adjudicate illegal fishing activity and the illicit networks that support it through enhanced cooperation and information-sharing. In 2018, the United States and Indonesia will co-chair a workshop on maritime data analysis tactics and techniques to identify unusual and potentially illegal fishing and vessel activity to enable countries to utilize analytical tools and processes to combat IUU fishing and crime that may be associated with IUU fishing. Another model of this type of effort is the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI), a partnership between the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and local law enforcement agencies in Oceania. OMSI bolsters maritime domain awareness, increases law enforcement presence, and expands at-sea law enforcement capabilities by matching available Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement expertise and local enforcement authorities. The Safe Ocean Network, a global initiative that has been led by the United States since 2015, supports the implementation of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ umbrella capacity building program. The Safe Ocean Network initiative has provided support for training and capacity building in the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific Islands, and reinforces the U.S. Department of State’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative and the Department of Defense’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI).

The United States commends progress on the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), which entered into force on March 8 following ratification by the Philippines. Now that ACTIP has come into force, we urge all member states to follow the lead of those who have already ratified and promptly deposit instruments of ratification. We also encourage all countries to ratify and to implement the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States and ASEAN enjoy a strong partnership on combating trafficking in persons – a partnership that we look forward to continuing. We seek to continue this partnership and have presented proposals for future collaboration to the SOMTC. We are still committed to assisting member states in developing and implementing victim compensation schemes and funds, as prescribed under ACTIP.

We encourage all countries to ratify and to implement the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In 2017, the United States supported a regional migration project, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), to build the capacity of national and local governments in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia to contribute to the protection and increased resilience of vulnerable
in vulnerable situations, including those in crisis situations. Objectives include helping government and non-government stakeholders to identify migrants’ needs and deliver tailored, protection-oriented support; empowering migrants to avail themselves of humanitarian assistance; and building governments’ capacity to implement harmonized and evidence-based policies and collaborate through regional mechanisms.

In 2017, the United States continued to support a Secretariat and capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia (as well as Central America) implemented by IOM Headquarters in Geneva to encourage countries to adopt and implement the “Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster” ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines were the culmination of the 2014-2016 Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative, co-chaired by the United States and the Philippines, and assisted by a working group of countries and stakeholders, including, among others, Australia, Bangladesh, and the European Commission. The Guidelines are the product of extensive consultations with a wide range of governments, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector; they are a voluntary tool that States and others can follow in situations where migrants become stranded because of conflict or a serious natural disaster.

iv. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

ARF Dialogue Partners experience a variety of natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, as well as manmade crises, including civil conflict, which often result in significant financial and human costs. In response to these events, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance to affected populations in the region, while simultaneously working to reduce disaster vulnerability in communities and building national response capacities. In FY 2015, the U.S Agency for International Development’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responded to seven disasters in five ARF countries, including complex emergencies in two ARF countries, Myanmar and Pakistan, and worked with agencies from across the U.S. Government to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations.

In Pakistan, USAID/Food For Peace (USAID/FFP) provided $57 million to World Food Programme (WFP) for food assistance activities in Pakistan. Out of this total, WFP used $13.5 million to support the local and regional procurement and distribution of food and $43.5 million for ‘twinning’—the milling, fortifying, and distribution of GoP-provided wheat. WFP assisted over 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees in northwestern Pakistan, including highly sensitive and volatile areas along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The U.S Department of State provided more than $22 million to support health and protection programs for conflict-affected Pakistanis. USAID/OFDA provided nearly $14 million in FY 2015 for emergency relief in Pakistan, an ARF participant since 2004. Furthermore, USAID/OFDA provided $5.7 million of funding for Responding to Pakistan’s Internally Displaced (RAPID)—a response fund used countrywide to respond to disaster and conflict-related displacement. USAID/OFDA supported livelihoods, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance to drought and flood-affected people. USAID/OFDA also provided logistics, shelter, and WASH assistance to IDPs and refugee returnee populations.

In Myanmar, USAID/FFP supports WFP to distribute locally and regionally purchased food or cash based-transfers to approximately 172,000 conflict-displaced persons and other vulnerable communities in Rakhine, Kachin, and Northern Shan States. 146,000 beneficiaries are targeted with general food distribution and 26,000 beneficiaries will receive relief cash-based transfers in the areas with accessible markets and functioning cash infrastructure. USAID/FFP’s support through WFP includes targeted distribution of fortified blended foods to children under five and pregnant and lactating women. In FY 2016 and 2017, USAID/FFP contributed $13.4 million to WFP to support food assistance activities benefiting IDPs and vulnerable communities – including those affected by the Summer 2016 floods.
Since 2013, USAID/OFDA has provided technical support to the Government of Myanmar’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to improve center operations disaster response coordination and assist the Government of Myanmar’s leadership with implementing a national disaster management system, which officially began operations in 2015. As a result, Myanmar’s EOC has improved the quality and speed of disaster response in the country. When flooding and landslides struck Myanmar in July 2015, EOC staff implemented its newly developed disaster management system for the first time. The EOC enabled 24-hour emergency assistance, facilitated greater inter-governmental coordination than in any previous disaster, produced comprehensive and transparent situation reports, and expedited travel authorizations that afforded relief actors unprecedented humanitarian access. Additionally, the EOC pioneered the coordination of Myanmar government activities with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance (ASEAN AHA Centre), the Myanmar Red Cross Society, and UN agencies.

To mitigate the effects of future disasters on vulnerable populations, the United States supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs aimed at saving lives; protecting livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure before, during, and after a disaster; and increasing community resilience to natural hazards. The United States supports regional and country-specific DRR programs. The U.S. Department of State and USAID/OFDA collaborate on the support the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management and the ASEAN AHA Centre by adding functionalities to the disaster monitoring and response system. Through the early warning system, ASEAN member states share information and support decision-making processes on policymaking, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. Instruction on the implementation of the incident command system by the United States Forest Service strengthens the decision-making capabilities of partner countries. Supported by USAID Regional Advisors in the Regional Development Mission for Asia, located in Bangkok, Thailand, this training focuses on building regional capacity through train-the-trainer courses that continued through 2016. In 2016, regional DRR support continued to help develop ASEAN-wide training standards and curriculum for disaster management training and convene a working group for disaster management training.

The United States sponsors and/or participates in numerous HA/DR-related exercises with regional partners every year, including the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, East Asia Summit (EAS) HADR Exercise, the ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX), exercise Cobra Gold with Thailand, exercise Bali Katan with the Philippines, Gema Bhakti with Indonesia, and Angkor Opening with Cambodia. In addition, the United States sponsored Disaster Relief Exercise and Exchanges (DREEs) through the Lower Mekong Initiative, further enhancing multi-lateral coordination, communication, and cooperation among the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam to ensure flood response readiness in the Lower Mekong region.

The United States remains committed to developing ASEAN HA/DR capabilities and streamlining the ASEAN response mechanism. We believe developing and testing an ASEAN Military Ready Group (AMRG) SOP during this cycle as an important step in that direction. As part of the U.S. commitment to advancing civil - military coordination in ASEAN and throughout the Asia Pacific region, we recognize the need to further synchronize the defense efforts of the ADMM / ADMM-Plus with the civilian-led efforts in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and by the AHA Centre. We see this as a critical step toward realizing the vision of ‘One ASEAN, One Response,’ and we look forward to furthering these efforts during the next three years.

The Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions enhance regional disaster preparedness capabilities. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel strengthen relationships between civilian and
military specialists from countries in the region to cooperate on medical and engineering projects and practice disaster response procedures. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force respectively recognize the effectiveness of establishing relationships and training before disasters. In 2018, the U.S. Hospital Ship Mercy conducting the Pacific Partnership mission visited Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Vietnam while USNS Fall River will visit Yap, Palau, Malaysia, and Thailand. Pacific Angel engagements are planned for: Suai, Cova Lima Municipality, Southwest Timor-Leste; Tam Ky, Quang Nam Province, Vietnam; Luganville, Espiritu Santo Island and Tanna, Tanna Island, Vanuatu; and Anuradhapura (North Central Province), Puttalam (Northwest Province), Vavuniya, (Northern Province), Sri Lanka. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions improve the ability of providers and subject matter experts from the United States working side-by-side with counterparts from other countries to prepare for and better respond to disasters, such as pandemic illness, typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. In 2018, Pacific Partnership supporting partners included more than 800 military and civilian personnel from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, Peru, and Japan. Pacific Angel missions have in the past involved military personnel from New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. PASOLS aims to promote open dialogue for military logistics chiefs in the Asia-Pacific region to further build Supply Chain networks and enhance cooperation towards a more consolidated response to common security challenges, particularly peacekeeping missions. PASOLS’ regional presence and logistics focus is an ideal platform for ARF Participants to continue dialogue and strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration of disaster response efforts.

v. Maritime security

The Indo-Pacific region and its maritime waterways are critical to U.S. security. Together with our interagency colleagues and regional allies and partners, the United States strives to ensure that the Indo-Pacific will remain open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. To protect free and open access, the United States focuses on three objectives: safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards.

The United States has, throughout its history, advocated for the freedom of the seas and sky. Freedom of the seas includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to transit through international waterways. It also includes all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace for military ships and aircraft as set out in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces currently do all around the world.

For 70 years, U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific region has played a vital role in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security. We note several continuing trends, including rapid military modernization, growing resource demands, and territorial and maritime disputes, that have the potential to create instability. Many countries across the region are significantly enhancing their naval and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capabilities. Although most nations are using
these capabilities in a responsible manner, ongoing provocative actions continue to heighten tensions in the region and raise concerns. Actions such as the use of MLE vessels to coerce rival claimants, and unsafe air and maritime behavior raise the risk of miscalculation or conflict.

The tensions arising from maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific are deeply concerning to the United States. The Indian Ocean, East China Sea, and South China Sea are all vital thoroughfares for global commerce and energy. Well over half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world’s largest economies – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China. A miscalculation of an intended action, an unintended action or incident could touch off an escalatory cycle. Escalatory actions, such as the landing of military and civilian aircraft or surface vessels at a disputed feature, greatly increase the possibility of these miscalculations and further destabilize the region. Additionally, confrontations between fishers and even law enforcement patrols are not unusual in these waters. Through all of this, it is important to lower tensions, turn down the rhetoric, and exercise caution and restraint in these sensitive areas. In the South China Sea, we encourage ASEAN and China to implement the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea and to complete negotiations on a meaningful and effective Code of Conduct and press for further clarification of claims in a manner consistent with international law, particularly, for maritime claims, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. In the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the degradation in China-Japan maritime security relations. We support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid a miscalculation or a dangerous incident.

Multilateral cooperation remains an important tool for ensuring stability and peace in the region. The 2002 DoC provided a framework for reducing tensions in the region. However, engagement through that process has been inconsistent, and friction over disputed claims to South China Sea territory and maritime space has further increased in the last few years. Although the United States takes no position on sovereignty over disputed land features, we take a position around the world that disputes should be resolved peacefully, without the use of force or coercion, and in accordance with international law. To that end, we urge claimant countries to conform all of their maritime claims to international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. As noted above, the United States supports the DoC and its collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve and peacefully manage their disputes. The United States encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolving disagreements, including the use of third party dispute settlement, such as arbitration, negotiation, multilateral fora, or other peaceful international mechanisms. We further believe the ARF can help put in-place supportive diplomatic structures that lower tensions and help claimant States manage these disputes peacefully. This forum needs to play an increasingly important role in reinforcing international law and practice and in building practical cooperation among member states.

The United States is not standing still in light of the challenges we face in the maritime domain. There should be no doubt that the United States will maintain the military presence and capabilities to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners against potential threats in the maritime domain.

The U.S. Navy is pursuing a comprehensive strategy focused on four lines of effort:

i. Strengthen U.S. Naval capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed.

• The U.S. Navy is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely
across the region.

- The U.S. Navy will increase the size of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent over the next five years to maintain a higher tempo of routine and persistent maritime presence activities across the Pacific region.

ii. Work together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity.

- The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are building greater interoperability and developing more integrated operations, actions, and activities with our regional allies and partners.

- The U.S. Pacific Fleet is increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of their regional exercise program, with a particular focus on increasing the operational exercise complexity with Southeast Asian partners and expanding the multilateral exercise program.

- The U.S. Navy has also implemented a Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2015. The initiative increases training and exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain awareness capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia.

iii. Leverage defense diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road.

- The U.S. Navy is actively seeking to mitigate risks in the Indo-Pacific region, both through bilateral efforts with China, as well as region-wide risk reduction measures.

- Recently, the U.S. Navy and China’s Ministry of National Defense concluded an historic Memorandum of Understanding on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. This MOU currently includes annexes on ship-to-ship and air-to-air encounters.

- U.S. Navy and People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) vessels have also successfully employed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) during recent interactions, which reduce risk in the region and demonstrate cooperativeness on the seas.

iv. Strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture.

- The United States is enhancing its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and the EAS. The United States promotes candid conversations about ongoing challenges in the maritime domain, and encourages greater information sharing and cooperative solutions.

In addition to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard lines of efforts on the seas, the United States regularly conducts maritime exercises with regional partners to build confidence and to enhance regional maritime readiness. Cooperative activities such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. In February 2017, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) participated in the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) with the U.S. Coast Guard’s 14th District in the western Pacific Ocean. OMSI is a joint maritime security operation designed to enhance maritime domain awareness, increase law enforcement presence, and expand at-sea law enforcement capabilities throughout Oceania. During the exercise, sailors had the privilege of working side by side with an elite Coast Guard Law Enforcement team. The team provided invaluable training to Murphy’s Visual Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) team to include tactical team movements, tactical combat casualty care, and safe boarding techniques. These are just a few of several engagements aimed to develop cooperation, promote common seafaring practices, and enhance mutual trust.
Additionally, the United States participated in its fourth Governors’ Council meeting with the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) since becoming the organization’s 20th contracting party (member) in 2014. The United States has been proactive in assisting the development of a ten-year strategy plan for the future of ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) to become a Centre of Excellence by 2020. The United States is also working with regional partners to improve the safety and well-being of mariners through the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training on Counter-Piracy (EAST-CP) program. The United States is enhancing the capacity of the coast guards, navies, and law enforcement and judicial sectors of partner nations to address not only piracy, but also the broad scope of illicit maritime activity ranging from illegal fishing to the trafficking of arms, narcotics, and people. Training and technical expertise are delivered through a variety of cooperative training programs supported by the U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and USAID, as well as the Safe Ocean Network initiative to counter IUU fishing. The workshops incorporate the knowledge of technical experts in the maritime transport sector and regional survivors of piracy to address issues ranging from preparedness and survival, ransom negotiations, to post trauma care upon returning home.

v. Information and communications technologies

The speed and efficiency of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are of great benefit to commerce and development. At the same time, ICTs introduce vulnerabilities that countries must proactively address, as the risks can impact national and regional security and economic prosperity – especially in Asia, where e-commerce is a significant and increasing portion of many developing countries’ economic growth. In a cyber incident of national significance, the unique nature of the ICTs, including the lack of external observables of ICTs and the difficulty in determining the nation or entity responsible, may lead states to act precipitously, with significant consequences for strategic ICT stability and international security. To reduce the risk of conflict stemming from ICT incidents, practical confidence building measures (CBMs) are needed to enhance the predictability of state activities and reduce national security risks. This can be achieved by fostering transparency, increasing cybersecurity cooperation, and developing incident response capacity within and among states. These practical measures in the form of CBMs can help reduce the risk of conflict.

In the interest of increasing ARF’s budding Preventive Diplomacy role and promoting regional cyber stability, the United States welcomes the establishment of the ISM on ICTs Security and supports continued ARF dialogue on enhancing international ICT stability via the 2015 ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs. We support further institutionalization of cyber work within the ARF, the development and implementation of cyber CBMs in the ARF and continued ARF discussion on preventive diplomacy’s role in cyberspace. The United States will cooperate with other ARF Participants on the development of relevant cyber workshops and projects in 2018 to support the ARF Work Plan.

IV. Role of the ARF

a. National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

The United States remains committed to building institutional capacity in the ARF and strengthening its role in the regional security architecture. Besides the many projects mentioned above, the United States seeks to increase the ARF’s capacity to serve as a Preventive Diplomacy mechanism and action-oriented forum aimed to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Demonstrating U.S. commitment to ASEAN and to the ARF, the United States established a U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2011, and was the first ASEAN Dialogue Partner to create a dedicated mission to better assist and support this important security platform. The elevation of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship to a strategic
partnership in 2015 and the Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summit in California in 2016 further demonstrate the strong U.S. pledge to advancing engagement with ASEAN and the ARF. The United States will also continue to work with ASEAN to strengthen and build capacity in the ARF Unit – a critical element of process sustainment and administrative protocol. A reinforced ARF Unit will benefit ASEAN members and all ARF dialogue partners as the engine of a credible and results-oriented organization.

b. Future of the ARF

The ARF serves as a useful and increasingly capable venue for broad, multilateral cooperation; and dialogue on a number of security issues. The ARF’s inclusiveness, maturing commitments, and growing experience position it to achieve success on a targeted agenda that addresses common issues of interest for all ARF participants. Since the ARF’s inception in 1994, the confidence building measures that have characterized ARF engagement have facilitated greater trust and confidence among its participants. However, its participants now should take deliberate steps toward shaping the ARF into an institution that faces important security challenges head-on, with the capability to conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Furthermore, the escalation in coercion and the militarization by ARF participant governments highlight the urgent need for the ARF to go beyond just providing confidence-building measures. In this regard, the United States supports efforts to develop the ARF’s Preventive Diplomacy capability together with the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), which would move the ARF one step closer toward its ultimate goal of becoming a regional Conflict Resolution body.

As stated in the opening paragraph, ASEAN centrality and leadership are critical to the future of the ARF. As ASEAN achieves greater integration, it will play an even more influential role in solving regional and global political-security issues. Although ASEAN already demonstrates leadership on many issues, such as pandemic disease, climate change, IUU fishing, foreign terrorist fighters, and peacekeeping operations, it will need to continue to shape the ARF into a robust institution capable of addressing many of the pressing security needs in the region.

It is important to highlight the context of the ARF as one element of a broader regional security architecture that includes the EAS, ADMM-Plus, and EAMF. The United States is committed to continuing its engagement to help shape a robust and coherent architecture in the Indo-Pacific region – including a key role for the ARF in promoting stability and prosperity – through a transparent and inclusive process. Developing rules-based frameworks for dialogue and cooperation will help maintain stability and economic growth while resolving disputes through diplomacy are especially important in a region facing territorial and maritime disputes, political transformation, political and civil unrest, the challenges of climate change, and natural disasters. The United States is committed to building on its active and enduring presence in the Indo-Pacific region and working with its partners to support the ARF as an effective mechanism for confronting transnational security issues troubling the region today.
I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

In 2017 and the first half of 2018, the world continues to undergo complicated and fast-changing developments, with lots of uncertainties. The Asia-Pacific remains generally peaceful and stable yet, challenges and potential risks are on the increase. A number of hot spots continue to emerge, including the Taiwan Strait. The situation in Korean Peninsula has been changing rapidly and recently shown positive developments, however uncertainties remain. Moreover, the region is facing various challenges, including domestic instability, competition among major powers and non-traditional security challenges such as natural disaster, piracy and terrorism. These have pose serious threats to regional peace, stability and prosperity.

In this context, Southeast Asia has managed to maintain a peaceful and stable environment. The sustained socio-political stability has continued to facilitate economic growth, regional integration and cooperation within and without the region. Multilateral cooperation continues to be maintained and expanded in all fields through various ASEAN mechanisms. At the same time, the region is confronted with numerous security challenges, especially non-traditional ones. Although ASEAN and China have reached the agreement on the Framework of COC and officially kicked off the COC negotiation process, at the same time, the region is confronted with numerous security challenges, especially non-traditional ones. Although ASEAN and China have reached the agreement on the Framework of COC and officially kicked off the COC negotiation process, the territorial disputes in the East Sea (South China Sea) continue to be the potential hot spot of the region. It is our belief that such disputes must be settled by peaceful means in accordance with international laws, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

II. National Defense Policy of Viet Nam

a. Overview of national defense and security policy

Viet Nam advocates the synergy of national power and the whole political system to implement the objectives and mission of national defense and security to safeguard independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, maritime and islands sovereignty, border and airspace; to firmly maintain political stability, order and safety; to proactively prevent and dismantle all plots and acts of sabotage of hostile forces; and to be prepared to deal with global non-traditional security challenges with a high-readiness manner. Viet Nam respects other countries’ independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national interests and demands the reciprocal respects from others.

Viet Nam consistently pursues a peaceful, self-defense policy and expands international relations to promote mutual trust and understanding among all nations and governments, to create the foundation to enhance cooperation, settle differences, prevent and mitigate the risk of conflict thus as well as contributing to peace and stability in the region and the world over.

Viet Nam is against arms races. It is our policy to pursue gradual modernization of Viet Nam People’s Army (VPA) and increasing defense power to the level that is necessary for successful self-defense.
b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

i. Total defense expenditure on annual basis

Viet Nam allocates a necessary portion of the State budget for defense expenses in general and for maintaining weapons and equipment for armed forces in particular. Currently, annual average defense expenditure is about 2.1 percent of GDP.

ii. Military personnel

The total strength of VPA including regular forces and local forces is about 450,000. The regular forces consist of three services: Ground force, Air Defense – Air Force and Navy. In addition, VPA maintains the Border Guards and Militia Force. The Ministry of National Defense of Viet Nam administratively manages the Viet Nam Coast Guard on behalf of the Government of Viet Nam.

III. National Contribution of Viet Nam to the Regional Security in ARF Framework

i. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Viet Nam has actively sent delegations to participate in relevant conferences and workshops. At the ARF DOD held on 7 May 2018 in Auckland, New Zealand, Viet Nam delegation has made positive contribution to the topic ‘Controlling CBRN’.

ii. ICTs cooperation

Cooperation in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) security is a relatively new priority area of ARF. Therefore, there have been not many cooperative activities that Viet Nam and other ARF participants could participate in. At the national level Viet Nam has been actively building the capacity and contributing to the common efforts of maintaining ICTs security, including through the development of its own legal framework regarding cyberspace, including the Law on Cyberspace Information Security passed in 2015 and the Law on Cyber Security passed in 2018). The Ministry of National Defense of Viet Nam supported the initiative of establishing the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group (EWG) on Cyber Security and has been participating in all activities of the EWG since it was inaugurated in 2017.

IV. The Role of ARF

ARF DOD continues to be an effective interactive channel in facilitating and promoting confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. The ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) is a forum for the ARF participants to present their views on regional security threats. However, to maximize the effectiveness of ARF and to reduce costs and capitalize on resource, it is necessary to avoid the overlap between ARF cooperation areas and activities with those in other security mechanisms, especially the ADMM and ADMM Plus activities.