




ASEAN 50

PHILIPPINES 2017



**PARTNERING FOR CHANGE,
ENGAGING THE WORLD**



ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 2017
ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK



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ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK



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FOREWORD




The world is rapidly evolving and changing. Opportunities and challenges abound as complex developments confront the world. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the premiere platform for dialogue and consultation among the 27 participants on geostrategic, political and security issues across the Asia-Pacific region.

Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has made practical contributions in areas such as disaster relief, non-proliferation and disarmament, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, maritime security, and preventive diplomacy. To date, the ARF remains committed to promoting peace and stability in the region and beyond, through confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy.

As Chair of the 24th ARF, it is my honor to present the ARF Annual Security Outlook 2017. Consistent with President Duterte's pursuit of an independent foreign policy for the benefit of the Filipino people, this publication puts together the ARF Participant's views on current politico-security developments in the region, our national efforts to help promote regional peace, security and stability and how we are interfacing with the rest of the world to address both traditional and emerging regional and global security threats.

The ARF Participants' contributions to this publication demonstrate our recognition that promoting regional and global peace and stability is a collective effort that requires everyone's active participation. It is also a reflection of a tacit understanding that one way of promoting peace and stability is through States agreeing to a framework of transparency which in turn encourages an environment of mutual trust and understanding.

As Chair of the 24th ARF, the Philippines seeks the aid of the Almighty and is hopeful that the ARF will be a guiding light in the area of dialogue and understanding. We are grateful to everyone that heeded this call to action.


ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO
Chair of the 24th ASEAN Regional Forum
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Republic of the Philippines

Manila, 7 August 2017



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook (ARF ASO) 2017 features submissions from 20 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) participants in which they shared their perspectives on the current state of the regional security environment, and presented their respective efforts at the national, regional, and global levels – including contributions to the ARF process – in addressing various security challenges.

The different submissions to the ARF ASO reflected three dominant themes and narratives of Change, Connectivity, and Cooperation:

CHANGE. The rapid economic rise and dramatic social transformation in Asia have generated increased interest among major powers and have placed the region at the center of global political and economic developments. This has resulted in shifting power relations and even an emerging competition for influence among the major powers. Juxtaposed with existing geopolitical concerns such as the territorial and maritime disputes or the nuclear and missile issue in the Korean Peninsula, this brings uncertainty and volatility which may in turn undercut the significant gains attained by the region over the years.

The ARF ASO submissions also highlighted how the concept of security in the region has changed to transcend traditional military issues. Challenges confronting the region now span terrorism, transnational crimes, proliferation of nuclear weapons, pandemics, cybercrimes, degradation of the marine environment, and natural disasters, among many others.

This leads to another change which is the ongoing modernization of armed forces

and the updating of defense policies and military doctrines among many countries. While enhancing military capabilities may naturally come as a country becomes more economically prosperous, the ARF ASO submissions also highlighted the need for armed forces to robustly and effectively respond to non-traditional challenges, contribute more to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and collaborate efficiently with regional counterparts. In addition, many countries in the region are also upgrading the capabilities of other national law enforcement agencies such as coast guards and police forces. This is in recognition of the reality that security concerns can no longer be addressed from a purely military-strategic approach.

Upgrading the capabilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies can open opportunities for more effective regional cooperation in dealing with common security challenges. However, it can also create mistrust about each country's intentions which in turn can heighten political tensions and raise the risk of incidents on the ground or at sea. This is reflected in the concern raised by some ARF participants on the deployment of strategic assets and increasing military activities in the region. However, this also highlights the importance of enhancing transparency and dialogue, to which the ARF ASO seeks to contribute to. By encouraging ARF participants to voluntarily report on their respective national defense policies, including defense budgets and composition of armed forces personnel, the ARF ASO serves as a platform for fostering mutual confidence on defense issues.

CONNECTIVITY. Globalization and regional integration have benefited many countries and have fostered greater

connectivity in different aspects: physical, economic, cultural, and people-to-people. However, the same interconnectedness has also resulted in security challenges transcending state boundaries. The same tools for connectivity are also being used as conduits for new forms security threats. For instance, social media and the internet have provided a platform for terrorist groups to spread propaganda and promote extremist ideologies. The growing dependence on cyberspace meanwhile increases the vulnerability of governments and communities to hacking, cyberattacks, and other crimes.

Current security challenges are not only transnational but are also interconnected. Production and trade of illicit drugs can fund other criminal activities such as human trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. Weapons of mass destruction can be proliferated to terrorist groups and organized criminal groups and cause havoc to communities. Terrorism can also feed on ongoing sectarian and ethnic conflicts, and can contribute to rising criminality or refugee crises. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) can threaten food security and economic sustainability of many coastal communities. As a result, countries can no longer ignore developments taking place in other parts of the world as these can now have an indirect and long-term impact on their own security. In addition, it becomes imperative that countries formulate holistic and synergistic solutions to security challenges.

COOPERATION. Despite the abundance of challenges and the volatility in the security environment, there is no shortage of enthusiasm and goodwill among ARF participants to contribute to regional security. The submissions to the ARF ASO presented the many national initiatives and policies as well as bilateral and multilateral activities being undertaken to address different security

concerns. Countries are cognizant that security challenges can no longer be dealt with by themselves but would require working with regional partners through platforms such as the ARF.

On terrorism, the ARF ASO submissions affirmed that it is a concern for all and that intensified cooperation is necessary to deal with this global threat. This includes enhanced information sharing and capacity-building for military forces and law enforcement agencies. The submissions also emphasized that security operations must be complemented by counter-radicalization, addressing the lack of education and economic opportunities, and promoting moderation, inclusivity, and mutual understanding in the society. Preventing the rise of extremism therefore requires participation by and engagement with local communities and other stakeholders. Furthermore, ARF participants cooperate in enhancing institutions and the capabilities of countries that are vulnerable to terrorism toward a more responsive governance.

On nuclear non-proliferation, a majority of the ARF ASO submissions emphasized the threat that nuclear and other WMDs pose to regional and international security. Several countries expressed concern about the continued nuclear and missile tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and reiterated calls for full compliance with international regimes and treaties on non-proliferation. Meanwhile, DPRK, in its ARF ASO submission, stressed that the root of the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula is the hostile policy of the United States and the deployment of military assets. The contrasting views and deep distrust necessitate continued confidence-building and dialogue among all parties – including through the ARF process – toward overall regional peace and stability.

Meanwhile, efforts by ARF participants to counter proliferation of WMDs and combat different transnational crimes include ratification of relevant international agreements; updating national laws and policies to align with treaty commitments; enhancing capabilities of law enforcers through education and trainings supported by regional partners; building necessary support infrastructure such as rehabilitation centers in the case of drug addicts or victims of human trafficking; and enhancing intelligence and information sharing.

On disaster relief, the ARF ASO submissions noted the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters which require immediate cooperation and assistance to affected communities. These include providing relief and medical support, dispatching police and military personnel to assist in search and rescue, victim identification, and recovery and rehabilitation. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is also becoming a key component of the work of armed forces as well as their engagement with regional counterparts. More importantly, the submissions also stressed that building preparedness and resilience is crucial to preventing loss of lives and severe economic and social disruption brought by natural disasters.

On maritime security, the ARF ASO submissions offered different assessments on the situation in the region. On the one hand, some ARF participants expressed concern about land reclamation and military activities that erode political trust and increase tensions. On the other hand, some noted the stable and even improving maritime security situation in the region due to efforts among littoral states to enhance relations and pursue practical cooperation. Nonetheless, the ARF ASO submissions reflected a broad agreement among countries about the importance of maritime areas to regional security


and economic growth, and about how disputes should be managed and resolved through negotiations, consultations, and respect for international law.

The submissions also affirmed the need for cooperation to address issues such as piracy, kidnappings, and armed robbery at sea, trade of illicit drugs, human smuggling and trafficking in persons, and IUUF. These are pursued through information-sharing, coordinated and joint maritime patrols, capacity-building and trainings for personnel from navies and maritime law enforcement agencies, and conduct of workshops and forums to exchange views on maritime security issues. Countries are also actively pursuing confidence-building measures, such as adoption of mechanisms to prevent incidents at sea and mitigate incidents through the adoption of protocols for unplanned encounters and the establishment of hotlines among government officials.

In summary, the ARF ASO submissions noted that cooperation in different areas should be rooted in respect for international law and should uphold the norms and principles espoused by ASEAN such as peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force, and the consensus decision-making process.

Perspectives on the ARF

The ARF ASO submissions credited ARF as the most inclusive security forum in the Asia Pacific and affirmed its significant role in promoting constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has succeeded in bringing together all relevant players in the region and in providing a platform for the dynamic interface between military and civilian actors. ARF has also actively promoted



functional cooperation and dialogue on countering terrorism and transnational crimes, disaster relief, non-proliferation and disarmament, and maritime security.

But as security concerns continue to evolve, there is a need for the ARF process to become more responsive and adaptive. Several ARF participants noted the need for improved synergy between ARF and other ASEAN-led platforms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). There are also calls for the ARF Unit under the ASEAN Secretariat to be strengthened. A number of participants also noted that ARF should go beyond confidence-building toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, and

adopt a more action-oriented agenda. In addition, ARF should complement bilateral and multilateral efforts, and vice versa, in addressing security challenges in the region.

As ASEAN marks its 50th founding anniversary, the continued vitality of the ARF and other ASEAN-led mechanisms stands as a testament to its leading role in promoting regional cooperation toward an inclusive and rules-based security architecture. The ARF process is indeed one way by which ASEAN is “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World”, and its ability to maintain this role in the succeeding decades will hinge on its ability to respond to new and continuing challenges and muster active support and participation by all regional partners.



AUSTRALIA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Introduction

Peace and stability are critical to the continued development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. However, regional security challenges are mounting. These challenges include nuclear and missile proliferation, unresolved territorial disputes, changing power dynamics, terrorism and returning foreign fighters, and the impact of transnational crime. Other challenges include natural disasters, pandemics, and energy and food security.

Australia approaches these security issues through appropriate domestic policy settings, strong bilateral ties with regional countries, including an alliance with the United States, and a commitment to working cooperatively through regional and international forums, and in accordance with international law.

ASEAN's leadership in establishing and advancing regional frameworks is greatly appreciated by Australia. ASEAN-centred institutions, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), play a valuable role in building trust and habits of cooperation amongst countries in the region. With its well-established program of activities focused on confidence building measures and a growing preventive diplomacy agenda, the ARF can help manage tensions, set the

norms of acceptable strategic behaviour, and create and maintain a resilient regional order.

Countering Violent Extremism

Australia is actively engaged in regional and multilateral efforts to meet the shared challenge of countering violent extremism (CVE). We are working with ARF members and through multilateral forums, including the Anti-ISIL Coalition, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), on programs to strengthen regional cooperation on CVE.

Australia co-leads with Malaysia on Priority Area Four of the ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Work Program, Counter-radicalisation. In February 2017, with the Philippines and the European Union, we co-hosted a workshop on mainstreaming the prevention of violent extremism in the ARF Region. In July 2017, with Malaysia, we co-hosted a workshop on countering online extremist messaging. These workshops seek to increase the institutional and other capacities of ARF members to build resilience against violent extremism.

Australia strongly supports the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) and encourages regional efforts to implement national action plans on PVE, in line with national priorities.

South China Sea

Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Australia does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, but also does not accept the assertion of maritime rights that are not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Australia strongly opposes the use of intimidation, aggression or coercion to advance any country's territorial claims or unilaterally alter the status quo.

The prosperity our region has enjoyed for decades is underpinned by a rules-based international order. Noting the ruling in the Philippines–China South China Sea arbitration of July 2016, which is final and legally binding on both parties, Australia welcomes dialogue between claimants based on international law, which reduces tensions and avoids miscalculation. It is important that all activities and any agreements are consistent with international law. Australia encourages ASEAN members to push for a binding and substantive Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, to help ensure the security and stability of our region.

Korean Peninsula

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) behaviour continues to pose a serious threat to regional and international security. Australia is deeply concerned about the increased tempo of the provocative and dangerous conduct of the DPRK throughout 2016 and into 2017. The DPRK continues to contravene unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions by developing and proliferating weapons of mass

destruction. It conducted two nuclear tests (6 January and 9 September), some 24 ballistic missile launches in 2016, and has since undertaken further such launches.

Australia condemns DPRK's continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs and the conduct of all testing. Australia calls on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions, including UNSC resolutions 2270 (agreed 2 March 2016) and 2321 (agreed 30 November 2016). Australia is focused on encouraging full and thorough implementation of UNSC resolutions to address the security threat as well as utilising its autonomous measures and diplomatic engagement.

Middle East

The Middle East and North Africa continues to face significant political and security challenges. With Coalition support, Iraq has made major military progress in the fight against ISIS. In 2016, two million people were liberated. The return of foreign terrorist fighters to our region will be a key challenge as ISIS loses its strongholds in Iraq and Syria. We will be intensifying cooperation with our Southeast Asian partners to combat ISIS' efforts to establish a presence, incite and conduct attacks in our region.

The Syrian regime and others have committed terrible atrocities against the Syrian people and the conflict has created an appalling humanitarian crisis. Australia condemns all violations of human rights and calls for a political solution to the Syria conflict. The political situations in both Libya and Yemen also remain unstable, creating opportunities for terrorist groups to thrive and further destabilise the region.

Australia continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

nuclear deal as a mechanism to ensure Iran's nuclear activity is constrained and peaceful. While the IAEA continues to report that Iran is meeting its obligations under the deal, Iran's regional behaviour and missile testing remains a problem. Tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia remains heightened, and is an impediment to peace in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Australia remains committed to a two-state solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and continues to call on both sides to take the courageous steps needed to return to negotiations towards this goal.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

A. Overview of national security and defence policy

Australia's national security and defence policy is articulated in the 2016 Defence White Paper, which comprehensively aligns our strategy, capability and resources. It highlights strong bilateral ties with countries in the region, including our alliance with the United States, and the need to strengthen multilateral engagement through regional and international forums. In the face of greater uncertainty and complexity in the Indo-Pacific region, effective regional and international partnerships will continue to be crucial for Australia's security and how we address the complex array of security challenges facing us. Australia will deepen its commitment to bilateral defence relationships with partners in the region over coming years. We will also build shared approaches to security challenges through the EAS, the ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) to enhance peace and prosperity in our region. Core to its future defence policies, Australia's 2016 White Paper commits to exploring opportunities for further international engagement.

Australia has been actively engaged in joint approaches on shared strategic interests and practical military cooperation at the highest level. The ADMM-Plus is Australia's highest priority for multilateral defence engagement in the region. In April 2017, Australia and Singapore concluded a successful three-year term as co-chairs of the Experts' Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. Peacekeeping remains an important avenue for cooperation. Australia is pleased to co-chair the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations with Indonesia for the 2017-2020 term.

B. Data contributions to ARF Arms Register

Australia's 2015-16 fiscal year military expenditure, as provided to the United Nations in accordance with UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures Guidelines under the UNGA Resolution 35/142B, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Countering terrorism

International terrorism is a major challenge for regional and global security. Australia works with, and through, the United Nations and regional forums to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities. These include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international counter-terrorism instruments and UNSC resolutions related to terrorism.

As a member of the Anti-ISIL Coalition, the GCTF, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Australia has contributed across multiple work

streams to disrupt and degrade ISIL's activities, including foreign terrorist fighter travel, financing and counter-messaging. Australia serves as co-chair with Indonesia of the GCTF Detention and Reintegration Working Group and co-sponsored the Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program. In December 2016, Australia sponsored a workshop for ASEAN corrective service officials on the management of violent extremist prisoners. As chair of APEC's Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), Australia seeks to build regional security and capacity in secure financing, secure infrastructure, secure trade and secure travel.

Australia continues to deliver practical assistance and training to regional countries on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism issues. In May 2016, Australia hosted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism tabletop exercise, Kangaroo Harbour. The exercise demonstrated best practices in issuing and responding to notifications and assistance requests involving a terrorist attack using radiological materials. In October 2016, Australia hosted the UN Secretary General's Special Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons in terrorist attacks. In March 2018, ASEAN-Australia Special Summit events will include a Counter-Terrorism Conference designed to promote collective actions to combat terrorism.

Australia's international and regional efforts have been complemented by a broad range of domestic measures. These include strengthening counter-terrorism laws and border controls, cutting off funds to terrorists and those who support them, and implementing CVE programs.

B. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Australia is a strong supporter of international arms control regimes. We are committed to preventing WMD proliferation, particularly in our own region, and in this context we welcomed the 2016 EAS Leaders' Statement on Non-Proliferation. We encourage regional countries to adhere to and implement effectively the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and all relevant UNSC resolutions, including UNSC resolutions 1540, 2270, and 2321. Australia, particularly in our role as permanent Chair of the Australia Group, engages actively with ARF partners on enhancing strategic export control measures. Comprehensive implementation of strategic export controls will help countries fulfil their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540, as well as those under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Australia initiated the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network which seeks to strengthen safeguards capabilities among regional organisations and practitioners.

Nuclear weapons present a particularly difficult challenge. Australia supports the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the absolute bedrock of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. By controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and their related technologies and providing the foundation necessary for all states to work together on the elimination of nuclear weapons, the NPT enhances both regional and global security – as acknowledged in the 2016 EAS Leaders' Statement on Non-Proliferation. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia also actively promotes the development and sharing of

the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. With the start of the 2020 NPT Review Cycle, it is crucial that all States Parties engage constructively to strengthen the review process and work towards a positive outcome

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is an enduring challenge both globally and for our region. The appropriate regulation of trade in conventional weapons is essential to detect, deter and prevent the illicit trade in arms and reduce the suffering and death associated with it. Australia is a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and we urge countries in our region that are signatories to move towards ratification and encourage all other countries to consider accession to the ATT. Australia is willing to work with regional countries to help develop national systems for the control of the conventional weapons trade.

Australia has been a leading donor in the clearance of unexploded ordnance, risk education, victim assistance and capacity building. Australia, along with many other States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention, have made tangible gains towards reducing the prevalence of these weapons and the indiscriminate suffering they cause.

C. Transnational Crime

i. People Smuggling and Human Trafficking

Australia is playing a leading role in our region to manage irregular migration and to combat people smuggling and human trafficking. The Bali Process,

co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia, brings together the governments of 45 countries in the Indo-Pacific (covering 4.5 billion people) and three UN organisations to work to combat people smuggling, human trafficking and related transnational crime. The Bali Process Government and Business Forum will be launched in Perth on 24-25 August 2017 as a permanent part of the Bali Process to provide a mechanism for private sector participants to advise government on the prevention and combating of human trafficking, slavery and forced labour.¹

Australia's generous humanitarian resettlement program, together with its border protection policies, aim to provide safe and legal migration pathways to those in need and to discourage people from falling prey to people smugglers. Australia is increasing the number of refugees accepted under its humanitarian resettlement program from 13,750 places this year to 18,750 places in 2018-19. Australia is also welcoming an additional 12,000 people displaced by the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, while providing substantial humanitarian assistance to Iraq, Syria and neighbouring countries.

A core objective of Australia's ASEAN and Mekong Program is to combat human trafficking and the exploitation of migrant workers. Australia is providing \$AU50 million to the Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP, 2013-2015). AAPTIP builds capacity and facilitates cooperation within and between ASEAN countries to support effective investigation and prosecution of human trafficking crimes. The Tripartite Action to Enhance the Contribution of Labour Migration to Growth and

¹ Human trafficking, slavery and forced labour are closely related crimes. They are defined differently across jurisdictions, but broadly refer to situations of exploitation that a person cannot refuse or leave, because of coercion, threats or deception. In this note, 'human trafficking and slavery' refers to all such abusive practices.

Development in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (TRIANGLE in ASEAN, \$AU20 million, 2015-2025) provides information and services to migrant workers on their rights and promotes stronger labour migration legislation. Australia is also providing \$AU2 million to the Preventing the Exploitation of Migrant Women Workers in ASEAN project (2014-2017) by making evidence based policy options on the exploitation of women migrant workers available to ASEAN policy makers.

ii. Organised crime

Rapid economic growth and enhanced physical and digital connectivity across the Indo-Pacific have created significant opportunities throughout the region, but have also exacerbated its vulnerability to organised crime. Organised criminal networks engage in a broad range of criminal activities, including human trafficking, money laundering, corruption, illicit drug and tobacco trafficking, illegal fishing and wildlife smuggling. Australia works at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels to enhance resilience and strengthen our collective capacity to respond to transnational organised crime. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), including its operational arm the Australian Border Force (ABF), work to enhance information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation through the region, and deliver a broad range of training and capacity building programs. Australia's efforts span the prevention, investigation, prosecution and asset recovery stages of transnational crime cooperation.

Additionally, the AFP's international relationships form an integral component of broader government efforts to strengthen engagement with regional and international partners to address

shared security challenges, promote global order through collaboration and enhance regional security and stability. Australia's efforts are particularly salient in the Pacific region where we provide ongoing support for the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, consisting of 24 individual Transnational Crime Units operating across 16 Pacific Island countries.

iii. Illicit drugs

Illicit drugs are among the highest-value criminal commodities produced and trafficked in the Asia-Pacific region. The illicit drug trade in the Asia-Pacific is estimated to be worth over \$US30 billion per year – creating major public health, social and criminal justice challenges. Australia works closely with law enforcement partners in the region to counter narcotics trafficking, including through cooperative transnational investigations, exchanges of information and capacity building activities. Australia is also a strong supporter of multilateral efforts to combat cross-border trafficking and smuggling, including of illicit drugs, in Southeast Asia. Australia has been a top ten donor to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime since 2005, and has been a contributor to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs for over 40 years.

Illicit drugs, particularly crystal methamphetamine ('ice') are a serious problem in Australia and across the Asia-Pacific. The Australian Government has developed a national strategy to reduce the harm caused by ice in Australia, including initiatives to strengthen law enforcement cooperation with international partners. Australian agencies such as the AFP, DIBP and the ABF engage and cooperate with international partners to disrupt the supply of ice and precursor chemicals to Australia.

Following the establishment of a joint task force between the AFP and China's National Narcotics Control Commission (Taskforce Blaze) in 2015, Australia significantly enhanced the exchange of intelligence crucial to the identification of individuals and syndicates responsible for the trafficking of ice from China to Australia. Two task forces in Thailand and Cambodia, Taskforce Storm and Strikeforce Dragon, have been established to combat narcotics trafficking and associated money laundering. Australia also continues to work cooperatively across the region to counter the illicit trafficking of new psychoactive substances and opium products.

iv. Cyber issues

A priority for Australia in the ARF is enhancing the region's capacity to manage and respond to cyber events that raise significant regional security concerns. There is a need for measures between states to address misperception, prevent miscalculation, and facilitate de-escalation. We are helping to build regional mechanisms for effective incident response, crisis management and risk reduction through initiatives such as the ARF Directory of Cyber Points of Contact. We support the establishment of a new cyber intersessional meeting in the ARF, a regional platform for strategic level consideration of cyber issues. We also support the implementation of the open-ended Study Group on Confidence Building Measures, agreed to by ARF Ministers in adopting the Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs in August 2015.

As the current Chair of the Steering Committee of the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT), a critical regional institution for operational cyber security and CERT information sharing and collaboration, Australia is working to enhance effective incident response.

Australia adopted its new Cyber Security Strategy in April 2016. Under the Strategy, the Government has appointed an Ambassador for Cyber Affairs, Dr Tobias Feakin, who is leading the development of Australia's International Cyber Engagement Strategy, to be released in 2017. The Strategy will prioritise and coordinate Australia's whole of government international engagement on cyber issues and will ensure stakeholders understand Australia's key positions on cyber issues. The Ambassador will also oversee a cyber-cooperation program to assist countries in the Indo-Pacific to develop their institutional capacity to address cyber security threats and combat cybercrime.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The region faced many disasters again in 2016 reinforcing the importance of nationally led responses with regional assistance tailored to needs and context. Investment in disaster preparedness by ARF countries is paying off: countries have responded to most disasters without large-scale international assistance; and the impact of disasters has been reduced through early warning, and precautionary steps such as evacuations and early release of emergency assistance.

Australia provided \$AU500,000 in water and sanitation assistance to support the Government of Sri Lanka's response to widespread flooding and landslides in May 2016. In December 2016, Australia assisted the governments of the Philippines and Indonesia in responding to disasters by providing emergency supplies to the Philippines Red Cross for its response to Typhoon Nock-ten, and providing \$AU1,000,000 in assistance to the Indonesian Red Cross following the earthquake in Aceh.

Australia's assistance to first responders and local organisations helps to fulfill global commitments to humanitarian assistance that is accountable to affected populations. Promoting the use of cash assistance, strengthening civil-military coordination, and harnessing the role of the private sector and innovation provide vital opportunities for the region to continue to improve disaster preparedness, response, and early recovery.

Regional cooperation and preparedness remain essential to ensure coordinated international assistance that effectively augments nationally-led responses. Australia is working with countries in the region to expand the use of the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit, a regional resource on arrangements for sending and receiving international disaster assistance. Australia and Indonesia co-hosted a tabletop exercise in Ambon in November 2016 to test the toolkit, at which 15 regional countries participated, as did Fiji. Australia continues to provide technical assistance in disaster preparedness through the deployment of Australian disaster management specialists to government and humanitarian agencies in the region. Australia is providing \$AU6.18 million over three years to United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction to support the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Asia Pacific region and will invest over \$100 million through bilateral partnerships for disaster risk reduction programs.

E. Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Australia is committed to comprehensive maritime security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. We work closely with regional partners and through international forums to enhance maritime security and promote habits of cooperation. Australia looks forward to hosting the 2018 ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS), where we will continue

to promote regional stability and security through adherence to a rules-based regional order and a strategic culture based on global norms and international law. Australia is pleased to support the ARF's central role in addressing regional maritime challenges and is proud to be an active contributor to its maritime security agenda. In partnership with ARF ISM-MS co-chairs, Vietnam and the European Union, Australia will develop a new ARF Work Plan for Maritime Security, which ARF members will be asked to endorse in 2018.

Australia was pleased to work with Vietnam and the European Union in 2016 on the ARF Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies. This statement provides a solid basis for the development of new cooperation mechanisms among maritime law enforcement agencies in the region to address issues of mutual concern, such as combatting piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea, and the promotion of safe and secure sea lines of communication. We look forward to giving effect to this statement by working with Vietnam and the European Union to develop and hold an ARF workshop on the same theme in the 2017-18 ARF year.

In 2016, Australia, the Philippines, and the United States held an ARF workshop on National Maritime Single Points of Contact. Australia is pleased to be a co-chair, alongside Malaysia and the United States, of two more workshops to further define and test the concept of single points of contact for maritime law enforcement as a model that can be used for effective national and international coordination.

The transnational nature of civil non-traditional security issues requires multilateral cooperation and collaboration; they cannot be solved unilaterally. These include issues such as terrorism, natural disasters and extreme weather events,

illegal fishing, piracy, the smuggling of drugs, people and goods, and looming security challenges associated with global climate change. To this end, Australia was pleased to work with Indonesia in 2016 on delivering an EAS Seminar in Sydney on Maritime Security Cooperation, which addressed how regional countries could share information more effectively in responding to such threats.

Regional efforts have been effective in reducing the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea in South-East Asia. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which Australia has been a member of since 2013, has supported this work. Australia will utilise its Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) membership to shape and influence the direction of regional civil maritime security by building mutual understanding with counterpart agencies. Through our membership, Australia intends to formally promote and influence greater agency-to-agency cooperation and demonstrate the importance of information sharing to achieve outcomes.

Australia greatly values the constructive engagement that has been achieved through the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security. The successful conduct of the combined Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise in May 2016 demonstrated the significant progress that has been made in achieving practical cooperation under the ADMM-Plus framework. This Working Group will continue to present valuable opportunities to enhance regional coordination and cooperation on maritime security and further build people-to-people linkages between regional militaries.

IV. Role of the ARF

The ARF is a key part of Australia's engagement in the region's security architecture. We see the foreign minister-led ARF – with its well-established program of confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy activities – as complementary to the leader-led EAS and the defence minister-led ADMM-Plus. Other ARF members share our interest in the maintenance of a rules-based international order, and the ARF provides a platform for frank and constructive dialogue on important regional security challenges.

Australia will continue to engage in the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue and the ARF Security Policy Conference. These meetings foster civil-military cooperation with the ARF framework and offer opportunities for coordination between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus.

Australia will continue to make a significant contribution to the ARF across a range of areas including roles as co-chair of work streams and workshops. In addition to the contributions outlined throughout this entry, in February 2017, Australia and Vietnam co-chaired the 11th meeting of the Experts and Eminent Persons Group (EEP) in Canberra. We welcome the meeting's recommendations, including the endorsement of the report of the EEP Working Group on Preventing and Managing Maritime Incidents, the most significant body of work carried out by the EEPs group to date. It is a timely contribution to the advancing the ARF's maritime security agenda and the ARF's increasing preventive diplomacy focus.



United Nations Report on Military Expenditures

Standardized reporting form

Resource costs / Force groups	(1) Strategic forces	(2) Land forces	(3) Naval forces	(4) Air forces	(5) Other military forces (d)	(6) Central support administration and command	(7) UN peace-keeping (e)	(8) Military assistance and cooperation	(9) Emergency aid to civilians (f)	(10) Undistributed	(11) Total military expenditures
1. Personnel (g)	0.00	6,760,374.00	3,516,345.00	3,598,966.00	0.00	3,101,636.00	0.00	0.00	10,895.00	0.00	16,988,216.00
1.1 Conscripts	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1.2 Active military personnel	0.00	3,108,119.00	1,672,878.00	1,628,050.00	0.00	1,496,183.00	0.00	0.00	10,430.00	0.00	7,915,660.00
1.3 Reserves	0.00	179,088.00	34,567.00	67,658.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	465.00	0.00	281,778.00
1.4 Civilian personnel	0.00	205,823.00	154,792.00	142,627.00	0.00	1,605,453.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,108,695.00
1.5 Military pensions	0.00	3,267,344.00	1,654,108.00	1,760,631.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6,682,083.00
2. Operations and Maintenance	0.00	1,451,986.00	2,063,874.00	1,951,842.00	0.00	6,571,584.00	0.00	0.00	20,431.00	0.00	12,059,687.00
2.1 Materials for current use (h)	0.00	29607.00	67097.00	62764.00	0.00	212766.00	0.00	0.00	6539.00	0.00	378773.00
2.2 Maintenance and repair (i)	0.00	985879.00	1591488.00	1403476.00	0.00	1636326.00	0.00	0.00	520.00	0.00	5617689.00
2.3 Purchased services (j)	0.00	344583.00	191742.00	338551.00	0.00	2979445.00	0.00	0.00	9724.00	0.00	3864045.00
2.4 Other	0.00	91917.00	213547.00	147051.00	0.00	1743017.00	0.00	0.00	3648.00	0.00	2199180.00
3. Procurement and construction (Investments) (k)	0.00	1488895.00	1053999.00	1432683.00	0.00	1707658.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5683235.00
3.1 Procurement	0.00	1488731.00	1053986.00	1432189.00	0.00	691012.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4665918.00
3.1.1 Aircraft and engines	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.2 Missiles, including Conventional warheads	0.00	0.00	34567.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.3 Nuclear warheads and bombs	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.4 Ships and boats	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00



United Nations Report on Military Expenditures

3.1.5 Armoured vehicles	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.6 Artillery	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.7 Other ordnance and ground force weapons	0.00	335168.00	122409.00	404918.00	0.00	309236.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1171731.00
3.1.8 Ammunition	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.9 Electronics and communications	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.10 Non-armoured vehicles	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.1.11 Other	0.00	1153563.00	931577.00	1027271.00	0.00	381776.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3494187.00
3.2 Construction	0.00	164.00	13.00	494.00	0.00	1016646.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1017317.00
3.2.1 Air bases, airfields	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.2.2 Naval bases and facilities	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.2.3 Electronics facilities	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.2.4 Personnel facilities	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.2.5 Training facilities	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.2.6 Other	0.00	164.00	13.00	494.00	0.00	1016646.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1017317.00
4. Research and development	0.00	19284.00	16442.00	19721.00	0.00	108667.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	164114.00
4.1 Basic and applied research	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
4.2 Development, testing and evaluation	0.00	19284.00	16442.00	19721.00	0.00	108667.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	164114.00
5. Total (1+2+3+4)	0.00	9720539.00	6650660.00	7003212.00	0.00	11489515.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	31326.00	34895252.00



United Nations Report on Military Expenditures

Explanatory notes:

- d. Any State's military forces not included in columns 1-4 and other armed forces of that State which, due to their structure, equipment or mission, are able to conduct military operations.
- e. Should include both missions mandated and led by the United Nations and other missions mandated by the United Nations.
- f. Engagement of a State's military troops and equipment in activities to aid civilians in the case of natural disaster and other non-military emergency, if they are a part of military spending. As part of these expenditures can be also reported under other "Force groups", additional explanations are encouraged under "Explanatory remarks".
- g. Should include direct payments for current and future services made to personnel as well as other personnel compensation expenditures made by the employer such as taxes, as appropriate, pensions (if they are a part of the military budget) and other contributions.
- h. Should include purchase of food, clothing, petroleum products, training materials (excluding ordnance and ammunition) and medical supplies.
- i. Should include both contract services and purchases of parts, tools and materials for the repair and maintenance of military equipment and facilities, including warehouses and depots.
- j. Should include expenditures for various kinds of purchased services such as travel expenses, postal charges, printing expenses and other expenses, as well as civil and private contractors.
- k. Should include substantial investments in the procurement of arms and military equipment and construction and substantial modernization of military facilities that increase combat capabilities, improve quality and modify performance.
- l. Should include total expenditures for other military forces, central support administration and command, military cooperation, aid to civilians and undistributed spending.



BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region, marked by its diversity in geographical landscapes, political systems and socio-economic environments have brought along a myriad of transnational security challenges for the region to address collectively, both traditional and non-traditional in nature. The magnitude and the cross-cutting nature of security challenges today have called for more multilateral responses in order to better address and manage them.

In this regard, the increasing profile of multilateral defence and military cooperation in the region accentuated by the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), as well as subordinate multilateral cooperative platforms of dialogue and practical cooperation, have contributed to confidence-building efforts and enhanced the level of trust and confidence among countries and the region's preparedness in facing the current and emerging challenges.

Many countries in the region have also undertaken modernisation programmes for its respective armed forces. While to an extent this causes concern for neighbouring countries, the trend also poses an opportunity for defence and military cooperation between and among regional counterparts. The effort

by the defence and military would also complement the existing cooperation in other sectoral bodies such as law enforcement.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

A. Overview of national security and defence policy

Brunei Darussalam's national security and defence policy has remained consistent in ensuring that efforts are comprehensive, robust and integrated to protect and promote the nation's security. Apart from collaboration with local agencies to support each other's capabilities, Brunei Darussalam seeks to improve the level of preparedness of its military capacity to address various challenges, as well as continued commitment to defence diplomacy.

B. Data contribution to the ARF arms register

Total number of personnel in armed forces

Service Branch	Number (Estimates)
Army	4000
Navy	1200
Air Force	1200

C. Defence expenditure

For the fiscal year 2017/2018, the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam's approved budget is set at BND 451,790, 210.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Defence Diplomacy: As part of its continuous efforts in promoting regional security and stability, Brunei Darussalam actively participates and remains steadfast in committing to regional defence and security cooperation architecture, namely through ADMM, ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Officials Dialogue (ARF DOD).

Practical Cooperation in the ADMM and ADMM-Plus

Establishing a Direct Communications Link (DCL) in the ADMM Process: Brunei Darussalam has undertaken the initiative of establishing a Direct Communications Link in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Process in 2013. The DCL aims to be a key confidence-and-security building measure to be established bilaterally between the ten (10) ASEAN Defence Ministers. This initiative would complement the existing bilateral naval initiatives or procedures, and add value to the existing information-sharing mechanisms in the region, as well as enhance coordination and cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges.

Logistics Support Framework (LSF): An initiative championed by Brunei Darussalam during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2013, the LSF is aimed at promoting and achieving effective cooperation among ASEAN defence and military establishments in areas of common interests. There is much potential in the

LSF to strengthen logistics cooperation that will enable the military forces in the ASEAN region to address non-traditional security challenges in a coordinated and effective manner.

ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group: Under the ADMM-Plus, Brunei Darussalam has also taken the initiative to co-chair the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security (ADMM-Plus EWG on MS) for the 2014-2016 cycle with New Zealand. As co-chairs, Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand worked together to host several activities under the EWG on MS, one of which is the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise from 2 to 12 May 2016 where the MS phase took place in Brunei Darussalam. Such efforts have promoted trust and confidence-building through various platforms of dialogues and practical cooperation.

Brunei Darussalam's Involvement in Other Multinational Efforts

Contributions in Peacekeeping and Peace Monitoring Initiatives: Brunei Darussalam is now in the 9th year into being embedded in Malaysia Battalion 850-3 (MALBATT 850-3) serving in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the 13th mission of International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao, Southern Philippines.

For the mission 2016-2017, there are thirty (30) Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) personnel participating in UNIFIL, and eight (08) RBAF personnel and one (01) Royal Brunei Police Force personnel for the purpose of IMT. These missions provide exposure and knowledge in operation in conflict environments for the personnel involved, as well as contributes to efforts in enhancing defence diplomacy with other military contingents. Additionally, it contributes

to enhancing the image of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces' not just in the immediate region but also beyond.

Contributions in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADR): Brunei Darussalam continues to engage in HADR activities around the region. In 2013, Brunei Darussalam deployed its CN-235 aircraft, KDB Darulaman and KDB Darussalam to Tacloban, Philippines, after a typhoon hit the city. Relief items and necessities such as food, water and medical supplies were distributed to the affected population.

Additionally, in 2015, one (01) RBAF medical officer, four (04) RBAF paramedics and three (03) Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) personnel joined the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel from the Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) to Nepal for "Operation Kukri" in support of the HADR efforts after a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck in April 2015.

The quick response is a result of the familiarity and maturity of RBAF in providing relief assistance in areas hit by natural disasters. In addition to various involvement of practical cooperation within the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting framework, the RBAF's relief efforts were greatly aided by interoperability, a key component that continues to be emphasised in many of the military cooperation undertaken by Brunei Darussalam with its counterparts.

Contributions in other regional multinational initiatives: Brunei Darussalam continues to send a representative to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore and still retains a membership at the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) in the southern Philippines.

IV. Role of the ARF

The ARF complements the work undertaken by various existing regional security architecture under ASEAN, such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting. As a platform to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, the ARF should continue with efforts to make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

For the defence sector, the ARF DOD, ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference (ASPC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting (ARF HDUCIM) continue to play significant part in fostering confidence-building and cooperation among defence officials of regional countries. Of great valuable and importance is the interaction of Brunei Darussalam's defence officials with their counterparts from ARF participants. Alignment efforts as well as synergy between the ARF and the ADMM will certainly foster complementarity towards building effective regional architecture for ASEAN as a whole.



CAMBODIA

I. Assessment of the Regional Security Environment

The security situation of the world and the region in the 21st century has seen complicated changes. However, peace and cooperation for mutual development has been the mainstream. Although a world war or a war in which weapons of mass destruction (WMD) might be used is unlikely, local wars and armed conflicts among countries or within a nation originating from national, ethnic and religious contradictions, terrorism, interference, subversion, separatism, disputes over territory, natural resources, and national interests have been on the rise, deeply affecting peace and security of all nations.

The world situation has changed rapidly and unpredictably. The re-allocation of military and economic power worldwide has profoundly changed the world's political environment with the emerging trend of multipolarity. Several new powers and power centres have emerged, playing a more important role in the world and regional affairs. The competition for influence among powers and power centres has risen fiercely.

Energy security and food security have become increasingly important issues to the whole world. Apart from these, other global non-traditional security issues have been of major concern to all countries. Addressing the abovementioned issues is the responsibility of the international

community because no single country or region can solve them by itself.

The influence of defense-security issues on international relations has been on the rise. The new revolution in military affairs has been greatly changing the defense and military strategies of all countries. The military power competition around the world has led to the risk of arms races, especially at sea and in space. Many major powers have adjusted their military strategies, increased their defense budgets, speeded up the armed forces modernization, and developed advanced weapons and equipment, and military technologies. These developments have affected not only the relations among major powers but also the national defense of all countries.

The gap of military strength between major powers and the rest of the world has widened. In some regions, the enhancement of military strength has made the situation more complicated. The mechanism of arms control and non-proliferation of WMD has faced huge challenges.

The Asia-Pacific region, with its dynamic developing economies, has taken on an increasingly important position in the world, attracting the interest and competition for influence among the major powers. The regional cooperation mechanisms in various fields have developed. However, this region also poses potential threats to security. In many hotspots, tensions which

may lead to armed conflicts and wars have remained unsettled. Disputes over territory and natural resources in land and at sea have been on the rise. The Asia-Pacific region has confronted the increasingly serious impact of many non-traditional security challenges.

In spite of the basically stable security situation in Southeast Asia, potential risks of conflicts still remain. The global economic recession has heavily affected the regional economy, worsening the domestic unstable situation in some countries. Southeast Asia suffers heavily from frequent natural disasters such as cyclone, floods, and tsunamis. To some extent, terrorism has been restrained; they still pose potential menaces to the regional security situation and are a common concern of Southeast Asian countries and many others. Climate change, natural disasters, epidemics, and trans-national crimes have a great impact on the security of regional countries.

ASEAN member-states have strengthened cooperation and integration in order to turn Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability, and development. The ASEAN Charter has come into effect, opening a new era of regional cooperation. This is an important legal framework promoting the successful building of the ASEAN Community with three pillars, namely, Political-Security, Community, Economic Community and Socio – Cultural Community. The cooperative relations between ASEAN and outside partners along the line of peace, stability, and development have been strengthened. On the basic principles of “volunteering, consensus, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”, ASEAN continues to take a leading role in the motivation and development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Summit (EAS), and other regional security mechanisms.

II. Cambodia’s National Security and Defense Policy

In response to the fast changing national, regional, and global security environment, Cambodian security and defense strategy have also been continuously redefined and revised. The Defense Strategy Review 2013 was released in addition to the Defense White Paper 2006 for Cambodia’s defense policy and security strategy within these emerging new security paradigms in region and world at large. Those include the key areas of strengthening border defense measures; PKO capability building, counter-terrorists and counter-transnational crimes capabilities, maritime security initiatives, disaster response capability building, and others. These changes have resulted in the justification of principles more realistic features, that is, they have been aligned more closely with the situation and practical needs. This has enabled the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to overcome various obstacles. To realize the national goal, specific policies and measures have been implemented as follows:

- Contribute to external security and guarantee national unity and political stability for economic growth;
- Contribute to peace operation and building around the world. For instance, since April 2006, under the United Nations framework, Cambodia has sent its peacekeeping forces to several zones of conflict in Africa and the Middle East;
- Strengthen border protection capability to prevent transnational crime and infiltration of terrorists and to increase contributions to infrastructure and community development along the border;

- Expand reform measures, especially demobilization, raising the living standard of the defense force, reorganizing units and restructuring training systems;
- Set up force development mechanisms as quickly as possible to ensure the sustainability and quality of the defense force;
- Increase participation in national development, especially in the field of engineering, relief operations, suppressing and elimination circulation of illegal small arms, environmental protection particularly preventing deforestation, replanting trees, and other humanitarian activities;
- Cooperate with the community and fellow countries in combating terrorism and transnational crimes, Maritime Security, and natural disaster management.

Cambodia plans to publish a new Defense White Paper in 2020 which will reflect the importance of security, stability and cohesion both in Cambodia and the region, and promote a stable, rules-based order. The White Paper will set out planned capability acquisitions and reform for the next 10 or 15 years. Priorities in the next White Paper will include addressing the transnational and interconnected nature of national security threats as well as dealing with non-traditional national security challenges.

III. Cambodia's Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC)

Cambodia has clearly shown its commitment to joining the world to combat international terrorism. Cambodia has been strengthening and improving the RCAF's capability in preventing, deterring and fighting against terrorism to maintain peace, stability, security and promote cooperation in the region and the world.

To respond to the above-mentioned perspectives, Cambodia has conducted international cooperation as a priority and the active participation from relevant inter-ministries and institutions for timely deterrence, prevention and recovery. The National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC) is the top institution for command and control in the fight against terrorism and its secretariat is to serve as a coordination mechanism in compliance with the Counter-Terrorism Planning Book and Cambodia's Counter-Terrorism law, which was signed and come into effect on 20 July 2007.

B. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Cambodia is committed to non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been actively engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of Nuclear weapons. To support the global movement on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Cambodia ratified the NPT in 1972. Cambodia resumed its membership with IAEA in 2009 and ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of nuclear Material in 2006.

Furthermore, in November 2012, the National Assembly of Cambodia ratified two international conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and Nuclear Safety to maintain peace, security, safety and to prevent nuclear proliferation. At the regional level, Cambodia acceded to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-weapon-free Zone Treaty in 1997. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012, Cambodia successfully convinced the five nuclear weapons states to sign the protocol to the treaty.

The constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia Article 54 meaning that the production, use the storage of nuclear, chemical weapons, veatrano is strictly prohibited. Moreover, in order to effectively implement the constitution Article 54 as well as to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution No.1540, relevant laws and regulations were established under the constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, namely:

- Law on Management of Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition
- Law on Anti- Money Laundering and combating the Financing of Terrorism
- Law on Customs
- Law on Biosafety
- Law on Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons.

In term of disarmament policy, 200,000 converted weapons were annihilated and made the first report on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2005, and the commission fulfilled the matrix table in 2016. To execute better and effective National Authority for the prohibition of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Weapons to prepare a draft action plan relevant to the United Nations Security Council decision.

The National Authority for prohibition of CBRN weapons (NACW) was established under the Royal Degree No. 0606.275 on 27 June 2006, in order to fully contribute to the government's efforts on prohibition of CBRN weapons. The core function of this institution is to serve as a national central point for effective liaisons with other organizations and states party and to control and prohibit the proliferation of CBRN Weapons.

C. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

As we are all aware, globalization has brought about new opportunities and challenges to the global environment which eventually influences the world's political, economic, and security stability. Over the years, complexities from these changes have brought about a growing competition in the region. Compounded with environmental degradation, technological advancement, cyber security, socio-cultural and geopolitical changes have created even a greater uncertainty and complexity to our global environment.

Non-traditional threats both man-made and natural disasters have been increasingly prevalent in our global environment. As far as natural disasters are concerned, relentless typhoons, cyclone, landslides, and massive earthquakes in our region have increased in frequency at an alarming rate possibly due to the impact of climate change. For the heavily-impacted countries and region, the damage caused by these man-made and natural disasters often outweigh the abilities of governments to quickly respond and assist.

The Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia has been working tirelessly with its ASEAN member states, civil societies, and non-governmental organizations to establish and ratify new concepts, procedures, guidelines, and regulations on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation emergency responses. Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie (RCG) have been implementing exercise activities on disaster relief operations with ASEAN as well as foreign partners in line with the ASEAN charter and other existing mechanisms; and is committed to support all defense cooperative activities conduct in the framework of ASEAN. These activities are the integral part in turning vision into reality through forming partnership and collaborative engagement.

Therefore, disaster preparedness and readiness is the key element to the strategic blueprint for the ASEAN Community to hedge against this uncertainty as well as the key element to promote a successful outcome and turning vision into reality. Cambodia believes that through continued effort to strengthen relationship and closer cooperation while implementing more frequent pragmatic defense cooperative activities among the ASEAN militaries will, undoubtedly, build trust, confidence, professionalism and partnership. In addition, our ASEAN militaries will possess the capabilities, skill sets, and intellectual knowledge to respond to these challenges while anticipating and preparing for those of tomorrow. To succeed, we must harness and integrate all aspects of our capabilities, skill sets, intellectual knowledge, and work closely with allies, friends, and strategic partners.

To contribute to national, regional, and the world security, the Royal Cambodian Government, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie have carried out a lot of measures to counter both traditional and nontraditional threats as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations through the implementation of national legislation, and national policy such as Law on Disaster Management, as well as through the establishment of National Committee for Disaster Management (NCDM). Additionally, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmerie will increase its participation in both bilateral and multilateral defense cooperative activities; particularly in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HA/DR).

D. Maritime Security

Regional dynamic and ASEAN's development have been highly evaluated as ASIA's central economic growth, peace and stability, whilst remarkable developments ASEAN has also been facing variety of challenges especially piracy, sea robbery, human and drug trafficking and other non-traditional threats.

In order to properly respond to these threats, appropriate maritime policy has been developed and put in the place by taking into account the constitutional provisions, and national strategy and vision. Cambodia has actively taken part in a number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, Cambodia is a party to the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, a party to the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 1970 and a signatory to the 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1983. Cambodia has participated in almost all forms of

maritime security fora including ARF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, ACDFIM, WPNS and ANCM. In addition, Cambodia is also an active member of a sub-regional organization namely Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Interoperability Initiatives.

The Royal Cambodian Navy (RCN) plays a pivotal role in protection Cambodia's maritime coastline, islands and territorial waters, monitoring the security of its main deep-water ports and major waterways. Moreover, the RCN has been carrying out its international missions under the framework of ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) and spirit of ADMM, as a compass and an integrated approach in maintaining peace security and stability in the region and the world. As a result, The RCN has been enhancing its capabilities internally and internationally through exercising, training, experiencing and joining patrol best practices in order to upgrade human resources capability for interoperability.

All things considered, Cambodia has developed maritime security policy and Cambodia has taken part in a number of initiatives to develop the world maritime policy. In particular, the RCN expresses its fullest commitment and support to any effort or initiative with the objectives to promote cooperation within ASEAN Community and maintaining regional maritime peace, security and stability.

IV. Role of ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF as the most inclusive and influential security forum in the Asia-Pacific has played an indispensable role in enhancing mutual trust among Asia-Pacific nations and shaping a harmonious regional environment. The principle and modalities of dialogue and

cooperation fostered by the ARF, such as mutual respect, dialogue on an equal footing, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and accommodating each other's comfort level, together with the cooperative security concept, are increasingly accepted by country in the region.

The uniqueness of the ARF as a forum where the regular collaboration and meeting between military and civil elements in the Asia Pacific region take place should be utilized as the pulling factor and not as the dividing factor. To ensure that ARF could serve its tasks, we know that as an inclusive forum, the ARF depends entirely on its participants. It is therefore in our interest to see a more robust, substantive, proactive and action-oriented ARF to maintain peace and stability all participants have to renew their commitment. For its part, Cambodia will continue to make its valuable contribution to the ARF through active participation, ideas and initiatives in various ARF activities.

As the main political and security forum in the region, the ARF should continue to strengthen its role and contribution in a complementary manner with other existing mechanisms, such as the ADMM Plus and the East Asia Summit. Apart from strengthening complementarities and respective comparative advantages, each process can promote better synergy and coordination. One important ingredient that should remain in each process and mechanism is that ASEAN centrality has to be maintained.

More importantly, the ARF needs to improve its institutional capacity building including the ARF Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat. More substantive interaction and linkages between Track I and Track II should be promoted.



CANADA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Greater economic integration in the Asia-Pacific is creating prosperity and new opportunities for development but also challenges to the region's security as potential shifts in the dynamics of power may contribute to conflict. The use of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy, based on strengthened cooperation, dialogue and a commitment to human rights are essential to prosperity and stability. As an Asia-Pacific country with extensive and expanding relationships within the region, Canada is invested in the region's peace, security and prosperity.

This year Canada celebrates its 40th anniversary as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner. This is an important milestone to reflect on our past cooperation and an opportunity to further strengthen the Canada-ASEAN partnership in support of regional peace and security priorities. Central to that partnership is Canada's commitment to further strengthening its engagement within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as with our partners.

The ARF plays an important role in facilitating political-security cooperation by providing opportunities for security dialogue and collaboration among practitioners, experts and policy-makers. The

ARF's role complements that of other regional fora such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Plus (ADMM+). Together these forums are essential in addressing the broad range of traditional and non-traditional security threats and challenges facing the region, including: the risk of inter-state conflict; terrorism; nuclear proliferation and instability, irregular migration; human trafficking; drugs and organized crime; cyber security; piracy; maritime boundary disputes; and, humanitarian crises. The importance of coordinating the activities of these three fora in support of regional peace and security is crucial for the efficient use of member state resources.

The resolution of intra-state conflicts, given ARF's non-interference in the internal affairs of states, is generally addressed through nation- and state-building measures, improving institution-building within ASEAN, and stabilizing the distribution of power.

Korean Peninsula

Canada is gravely concerned by North Korea's continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, and its provocative behaviour which poses a threat to

both regional and international peace and security. Its continued flouting of international obligations must be met with a firm and determined response within the ARF and from the wider international community.

Canada has in place comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea and supports imposing additional sanctions. In November 2016, Canada co-sponsored UNSC Resolution 2321 – the second focused on North Korea in 2016 -- which demonstrates the unequivocal resolve of the international community to halt North Korea's reckless and illegitimate pursuit of nuclear weapons. Canada is now taking the necessary steps to implement into our domestic law the new elements of the UNSC's latest sanctions against North Korea.

Coordinated international pressure will be needed to compel North Korea to abandon its current course and to resume dialogue aimed at achieving a peaceful diplomatic and political solution. Canada is committed to working with ARF members and the broader international community to ensure effective and coordinated implementation of sanctions against North Korea. Canada calls on North Korea to resume adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, respect its comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to fulfill its commitments under the Six-Party Talks.

Terrorism

All ARF members have a stake in the fight against terrorism. The brutal murder of two Canadians in Spring 2016 by the terrorist network Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, as well as the death of a Canadian in January

2016 in a terrorist attack in Jakarta, are a sad reminder of the impact of violent extremism.

Kidnapping for ransom is a significant source of terrorist funding, fueling violence and instability. Paying ransoms perpetuates the actions of these groups, encouraging terrorists to put new victims and their loved ones through similar ordeals. Canada does not and will not pay ransom, either directly or indirectly, to terrorists, and the international community must be united around this approach.

The surge of Southeast Asian fighters travelling to the Middle East has reinvigorated regional extremist groups and is a concern for all ARF members. Canada will continue to work with ARF members to address the threat of foreign fighters, including supporting regional efforts to detect, deter and interdict fighters at the source, destination and transit points.

Addressing the underlying conditions conducive to violent extremism and terrorism is essential to combatting the expansion of terrorist movements. Canada is committed to international efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and we continue to contribute to the degradation and defeat ISIL at its core in Iraq and Syria, actively participating in military and non-military efforts.

South China Sea

With an estimated US \$5 trillion worth of the world's trade passing through the South China Sea, tensions there have the potential to have disruptive effects on the global economy and undermine regional peace and security. Canada opposes the use of coercion or threat of force in advancing claims

and is of the view that all claimants must refrain from land reclamation, militarization and other actions that can jeopardize freedom of navigation and overflight exercised in accordance with international law, maritime security or international trade. Canada is also concerned that tensions have impeded regional cooperation in the protection of the marine environment in the South China Sea.

We strongly support efforts to seek the peaceful management or resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. Canada also continues to call for de-escalation of any activities that could destabilize the region. Increased tensions can lead to misinterpretation or accidents that undermine the promotion of regional trust and security.

We continue to urge that China and ASEAN members make concerted efforts to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and to expeditiously agree to a binding Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that reflects the spirit of what was agreed to in the DOC.

Canada's position on various aspects of South China Sea issues can be found in Canada's July 21, 2016 statement on the South China Sea Arbitration (available on-line at: <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1102379&tp=1>), in the September 2016 G7 Foreign Ministers Statement on Recent Developments in Asia, and in the Joint Communiqué from the April 2017 G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting. (available on-line at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/170411-communication.html>)

II. National Security and Defence Policy

A. Overview of national security and defence policy

Canada is committed to strengthening peace and security and to enhancing our defence relations and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. From our commitment of resources towards humanitarian and relief efforts and our support for capacity building projects, to our participation in regional military exercises and high-level defence forums and our efforts to enhance Canada's bilateral defence relations with key regional partners, Canada has taken a number of steps in recent years to strengthen defence relations and cooperation with our partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Department of National Defence (DND) Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) supports cooperative training and military professional development projects across the region that enhance interoperability, expand and reinforce Canadian bilateral defence relations, and promote Canadian democratic principles, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. In 2016-17, DND contributed approximately CAD\$3.14 million in support of MTCP activities in Asia-Pacific and trained 297 personnel. Looking ahead, DND will continue using MTCP to build and reinforce partnerships with Asia-Pacific countries and to support Canada's engagement objectives across the region.

Over the last decade, the strategic context in which DND and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operates has shifted, in some ways significantly. Like our ARF partners, Canada is facing a range of new

challenges, from the rise of terrorism in ungoverned spaces, to the expanded use of hybrid tactics in conflict, to new opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with the space and cyber domains. To ensure that DND and the CAF have the tools needed to confront new threats and challenges in the years ahead, Canada has committed to releasing a new defence policy in spring 2017.

To deliver on this, extensive public consultations were held with Canadians, defence experts, allies and partners, and Parliamentarians in the spirit of openness and transparency. A renewed defence policy is required to ensure the Canadian Armed Forces are prepared to meet both traditional and emerging security challenges and are equipped with robust, modern capabilities.

The new defence policy will be aligned to key Government priorities and policy initiatives, and takes into consideration ongoing reviews across government, including that on national security. National security and defence policies must be complementary in a complex security landscape in which threats transcend national borders. Cooperation with partners on shared threats is crucial to the security and well-being Canada and Canadians.

Canada has developed and implemented Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy (2012), which sets out how the Government of Canada

organizes its efforts to prevent, detect, deny and respond to the threat of terrorism, and provides a framework to guide future efforts. The Strategy has a focus on building resilient communities that challenge and reject the ideas and values associated with violent extremism and work together to mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack.

Recognizing that Canadians continue to embrace the many advantages that cyberspace offers, Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides a roadmap to comprehensively address cyber security risks and tackle cybercrime. It also provides the basis as for our engagement with international partners on shared cyber security concerns. The development and implementation of multilateral initiatives aimed at fighting cybercrime help to ensure that the internet remains free and open.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

In keeping with the important advances in promoting transparency in conventional arms, including through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNCAR) and the instrument of Standardized Reporting on Military Matters, which includes transparency on military expenditures, Canada supports the sharing of information about national security and defence programs and policies. Information on Canada's military expenditure return is available below.

Canada

 [Original: English]
 [1 May 2015]

Fiscal year: 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014

National currency and unit of measure: millions of Canadian dollars

Resource costs/Force groups	(1) Strategic forces	(2) Land forces	(3) Naval forces	(4) Air forces	(5) Other military forces	(6) Central support administration and command	(7) United Nations peacekeeping	(8) Military assistance and cooperation	(9) Emergency aid to civilians	(10) Undistributed	(11) Total military expenditures
1. Personnel		2 947.6	1 404.7	1 505.4	3 639.3	2.0	3.4				9 502.4
1.1 Conscripts											
1.2 Active military personnel		1 796.2	716.3	997.4	1 812.7	2.0	0.1				5 324.8
1.3 Reserves		318.3	133.8	80.6	90.5						623.2
1.4 Civilian personnel		334.3	350.4	149.6	1 298.9		3.3				2 136.5
1.5 Military pensions		498.7	204.1	277.8	437.3						1 418.0
2. Operations and maintenance		1 397.1	839.8	1 667.2	2 322.1	3.1	12.2				6 241.4
2.1 Materials for current use		667.1	297.1	509.5	11.6	0.7	0.9				1 487.0
2.2 Maintenance and repair		210.8	62.3	661.7	66.6	0.5					1 001.8
2.3 Purchased services		404.4	428.7	423.9	1 380.1	1.3	1.2				2 639.6
2.4 Other		114.8	51.7	72.1	863.7	0.5	10.1				1 112.9
3. Procurement and construction (investments)		960.0	766.6	805.5	330.7						2 862.7
3.1 Procurement		817.5	628.5	642.2	180.3						2 268.5
3.1.1 Aircraft and engines			1.6	493.5	0.1						495.1
3.1.2 Missiles, including conventional warheads			10.2	2.2							12.4
3.1.3 Nuclear warheads and bombs											
3.1.4 Ships and boats			376.4								376.4
3.1.5 Armoured vehicles		413.7									413.7
3.1.6 Artillery		7.5									7.5
3.1.7 Other ordnance and ground force weapons		32.1	0.2		5.5						37.8

<i>Resource costs/Force groups</i>	(1) <i>Strategic forces</i>	(2) <i>Land forces</i>	(3) <i>Naval forces</i>	(4) <i>Air forces</i>	(5) <i>Other military forces</i>	(6) <i>Central support administration and command</i>	(7) <i>United Nations peacekeeping</i>	(8) <i>Military assistance and cooperation</i>	(9) <i>Emergency aid to civilians</i>	(10) <i>Undistributed</i>	(11) <i>Total military expenditures</i>
3.1.8 Ammunition	40.4	175.5	14.7	1.1							231.7
3.1.9 Electronics and communications	119.6	29.8	87.5	60.4							297.3
3.1.10 Non-armoured vehicles	101.8		0.2								102.0
3.1.11 Other	102.3	34.9	44.2	113.2							294.6
3.2 Construction	142.5	138.1	163.2	150.4							594.3
3.2.1 Air bases, airfields			125.4	0.2							125.5
3.2.2 Naval bases and facilities		86.9									86.9
3.2.3 Electronics facilities	1.1		3.9	2.0							7.0
3.2.4 Personnel facilities	27.3	4.4	0.8	42.2							74.8
3.2.5 Training facilities	10.5	0.3	4.2	20.0							34.9
3.2.6 Other	103.5	46.5	28.9	86.1							265.1
4. Research and development						157.8					157.8
4.1 Basic and applied research						5.4					5.4
4.2 Development, testing and evaluation						152.4					152.4
5. Total (1+2+3+4)	5 304.6	3 011.1	3 978.0	6 449.9	5.1	15.7	5.1	18 764.4			

* Due to rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

The global terrorist threat is diverse and complex. It demands a comprehensive and coordinated international response based on common goals, values and institutions. It also demands a response that is consistent with international legal obligations, including international human rights and humanitarian law. Canada's multi-pronged approach to counter violent extremism and terrorism includes diplomacy, intelligence, security and law enforcement, customs and immigration, transportation, justice and finance expertise.

Canada is of the view that global counterterrorism efforts must put more emphasis on preventing and countering the spread of violent extremism, rather than only reacting to the actions of terrorists. The UN Secretary-General is seeking to drive forward the international community through his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Canada supports this initiative both domestically and internationally.

Canada takes a multi-faceted approach to prevent violent extremism domestically and is currently working to establish an Office for community outreach and countering radicalization to violence. This Office will provide leadership on Canada's response to radicalization to violence, coordinate domestic and international initiatives, and support community outreach and research. Canada is also working to raise awareness of the various drivers and forms of radicalization to violence; equipping prevention practitioners with the tools and knowledge required to identify and respond to radicalization to violence; enhancing engagement with the public to strengthen the resilience of individuals

and communities against all forms of radicalization to violence; and, sharing good practices and lessons learned in early intervention programming.

The security of the Asia-Pacific region is inextricably linked to that of ARF partner countries, and Canada is committed to working with those partners to counter terrorist activity.

Southeast Asia therefore continues to be a priority region for Canada's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP). Since 2005, the CTCBP has provided counter-terrorism training, equipment, and technical legal assistance to ARF members so that they can prevent and respond to terrorist activity. Significant CTCBP investments are being made in Law Enforcement and Military Intelligence (LEMI), Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Since 2014, the CTCBP has contributed over CAD\$5 million to projects seeking to build community resilience and counter violent extremism abroad, with a specific focus on reducing recruitment and helping countries reintegrate former terrorist fighters.

The CTCBP supports the delivery of a multiyear C-IED training program for Indonesia and the Philippines, with implementation to continue until 2017. This project builds on the longstanding work of the CTCBP in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) incident management. The CTCBP has trained approximately 4,000 first responders in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) incident response, as well as in the area of Chemical and Explosive Systems Exploitation. As a result, local trainers in those countries can now independently deliver this training.

In 2014, Canada provided additional funding of CAD\$14 million to address the region's security concerns and to enhance the ASEAN connectivity agenda. This additional funding supported CTCBP programming, including efforts to mitigate biological and nuclear threats, disrupt illicit flows while protecting legitimate trade, combat human smuggling activities, improve regional cyber-security tools, and work with ASEAN partners to address the "foreign fighter" phenomenon and radicalization.

Law enforcement and military assistance programming is also an area of focus for the CTCBP in Southeast Asia. The Royal Canadian Military Police (RCMP) placement project at the Indonesia-based Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation enabled extensive training throughout the region, building the skills of more than 900 law enforcement officers from throughout the region. The CTCBP currently has four ongoing projects at the Centre.

Multilaterally, the CTCBP also has a number of initiatives that include INTERPOL Special Notices training, as well as investigation, forensic collection skills building, and identifying and tracking foreign fighters moving to conflict areas. In addition, the CTCBP funds a multi-year port security project in the Philippines through INTERPOL. Canada is also supporting the cyber security work of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore.

In the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, Canada is working with both the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and the World Bank. CTCBP projects aim to strengthen the legislative frameworks of beneficiary countries, strengthen the supervisory capacity of financial sector supervisors and increase the capacity of law enforcement agents

to strengthen money laundering and terrorism financing investigation, prosecution, and conviction.

Aviation security also remains a priority for Canada given the direct air links to the region. Through the CTCBP, Canada continues to support global aviation projects with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Canada works actively within a number of international arenas addressing new and emerging challenges and developing best practices and international standards to combat terrorism. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC); the G7; the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), where Canada co-chairs with Algeria the Sahel Region Capacity-Building Working Group; the Organization of American States (OAS), where Canada chaired the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism from 2014-2015; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the United Nations. Canada also has strong bilateral relationships with a number of key partners to address critical issues related to terrorism.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD)

Canada is committed to a pragmatic and progressive step-by-step process towards non-proliferation and disarmament, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the effective control of their means of delivery. Current Canadian efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are focused on advancing toward a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and on developing measures for disarmament verification through the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).

Canada is an active State Party to all major international NACD treaties, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is the only international treaty that prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and includes a commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. Canada supports the effective implementation and improvement of the NPT and considers each of its three main pillars – non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – as equally important, interconnected and mutually reinforcing.

Canada remains committed to supporting the implementation of the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, particularly in collaboration with Australia, Japan, the Philippines and other members of the cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDII).

Recognising weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism as grave international security threats, Canada strongly supports efforts and strategies to address WMD proliferation challenges affecting the Asia-Pacific region and the international community as a whole. Believing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and its successor Resolutions to be critical tools for addressing WMD proliferation threats involving non-state actors, Canada works with the other UN Member States, regional, and sub-regional bodies to further 1540 implementation and advocates for increased regional action and cooperation to promote its full implementation by ARF partners. Similarly, Canada strongly supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an important tool for addressing WMD proliferation challenges posed by states

and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Canada promotes strengthened regional cooperation within PSI and continues to encourage ARF partners to endorse the PSI's Statement of Interdiction Principles. In leading the PSI Critical Capacities and Practices Review Team in 2016/2017, Canada is working to expand PSI's capacity to serve as a vehicle for the diffusion of proliferation security norms and standards of practice.

Under Canada's leadership, in 2002 the *Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction* (Global Partnership) was launched to help prevent terrorists or states that support them from acquiring or developing WMDs and has grown into a multi-country partner program. With nine ARF members¹ also members of the Global Partnership, the ARF can play an important role in coordinating efforts to address the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Acknowledging the role of nuclear energy to meet the increasing energy demands of states, Canada supports the peaceful uses of nuclear power in a safe and secure manner, notably through full cooperation with the IAEA. Canada strongly believes that implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol constitute the new universal safeguards verification standard. Through signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, ARF members and dialogue partners can support transparency and confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. Canada has consistently supported efforts to assist states in building capacity to fully implement the Protocol and believes that the ARF can also work to promote its universal implementation in Asia-Pacific.

¹ The nine ARF members that are also Global Partnership members are: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.

Canada is committed to working with ARF partners to develop practical measures and national instruments to universalize key international NACD treaties, norms, and instruments such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other arrangements such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Canada also continues to lead international efforts toward the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) by chairing the High-level FMCT Experts Preparatory Group in 2017-18. An FMCT remains a widely shared international priority for achieving both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. Cross-regional groups like the NPDI, which includes Asia-Pacific countries (Canada, Australia and Japan), are playing an important complementary role by fostering cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals, including an FMCT and the universalization of the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

Canada supports Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) as an important regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and as a confidence-building measure. Canada, along with its NPDI partners, welcomes efforts to resolve remaining concerns and reservations regarding certain NWFZs treaties, including the Bangkok Treaty, with a view to securing ratifications of protocols for these agreements by all Nuclear Weapon States.

Canada's Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Reduction Program (WMD-TRP), formerly the Global Partnership Program, is the main funding mechanism

by which Canada supports projects to reduce the threat of CBRN proliferation and terrorism. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada announced a further WMD TRP contribution of CAD\$42 million to improve nuclear and radiological security world-wide. That investment will support: efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material; the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; enhancing the physical security of nuclear facilities; promoting the security of radioactive sources; improving transportation security; and other multilateral initiatives. That same year, Canada announced up to \$20 million in programming to support 15 countries to fulfill their commitments under the GHSA. ASEAN member states will benefit from both these initiatives.

Since 2012, Canada's WMD-TRP has delivered over CAD\$27-million in security-related assistance to ASEAN partners and has collaborated with ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to further strengthen WMD threat mitigation measures in the region.

Canadian contributions through the WMD-TRP include CAD\$7-million towards enhanced physical security of nuclear and radiological facilities in ASEAN countries. This includes ongoing assistance to the ASEAN Centre for Energy (2016-18) to coordinate the ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network, and support activities, measures, and frameworks related to enhancing nuclear security in the region. The WMD TRP has also supported regional training on radiological source security; contributions helped INTERPOL establish counter-nuclear smuggling teams in ASEAN member countries, and helped ASEAN member states track cross-border movements of known traffickers of nuclear material.

Through the WMD-TRP, Canada has collaborated with ASEAN member states to strengthen regional implementation of obligations pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts. In this regard, Canada has contributed over CAD\$7.5-million towards: 1) the enhancement of regional capacities for border security and container control measures; 2) the provision of CBRN legislative assistance; and 3) training to first responders. The WMD-TRP support for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Container Control Programme in Malaysia resulted in the seizure of three sea containers bound for Syria containing strategic trade items. In addition, Canadian-trained responders were actively involved in Malaysia's response both to an incident involving theft of radioactive materials and in the airport sweep at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, where traces of a chemical weapon were detected following the assassination of North Korean Kim Jong Nam.

The WMD-TRP also actively cooperates with the ASEAN Secretariat and all 10 member states to mitigate biological threats in the region and is implementing CAD\$11.6 million in projects to: strengthen laboratory and response capacity for emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases; enhance biosecurity and biosafety; and improve disease surveillance and regional interconnectivity capabilities in the ASEAN region.

Canada will continue to work actively within the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament to support regional NACD cooperation and was a co-chair of these sessions with Malaysia and New Zealand in 2015–2017.

C. Transnational Crime

Canada is committed to working with Asia-Pacific partners, including through the ARF, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOM-TC), and the Bali Process, to counter threats to governance and stability arising from the activities of transnational organized crime groups in the region, including cybercrime. Frequently linked to organized crimes are trafficking networks, including illicit drugs, migrant smuggling, money laundering, and wildlife trafficking, which underscore the transnational dimension of these challenges.

Migrant smuggling is a particular area of concern. Canada works with regional partners to address this issue, often in coordination with global organizations like the UNODC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and INTERPOL. Since 2011, Canada's Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program's (ACCBP) has provided approximately CAD\$20 million in security capacity building assistance in the region. The majority of this support has focused on strengthening the capacity of authorities to prevent, deter, and respond to human smuggling networks in Southeast Asia. This includes assisting countries in the region to strengthen border security through enhancing the capacity of front line officials to identify fraudulent travel documentation, as well as to improve regional collaboration on border management.

In addition to countering human smuggling, Canada is providing capacity building assistance to mitigate the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Canada is also a regular contributor to the annual International Narcotics Control Board Conference on Precursor Chemicals and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). This conference is focused on practical measures countries can take to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals and trafficking of NPS. The Conference is held annually in Thailand, which recognizes the specific challenges faced by the region with respect to NPS trafficking and precursor diversion.

Canada is working with the ARF and individual members to improve cyber security and combat cybercrime. Communications infrastructure and increased connectivity has advanced knowledge-sharing and wealth creation among Asia-Pacific countries. At the same time, greater reliance on cyberspace among countries in the region can increase vulnerabilities, from which Canada is not immune. Canada encourages countries in the region to take steps to foster dialogue and cooperation to tackle cyber threats and cybercrime through information sharing and capacity building. This will not only create a safer digital environment but also support efforts to maintain an open, safe and accessible Internet.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The increasing intensity and frequency of natural disasters underscores the importance of strengthening practical cooperation among Asia-Pacific partners on disaster preparedness and response. Canada continues to be an active contributor to humanitarian relief efforts in the region, by providing timely, effective, coordinated and needs-

based assistance, and working closely with partners in the region to enhance cooperation, coordination, and awareness.

Canada takes an active part in the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief (ARF ISM-DR) and has had meetings with both the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA Centre) early in 2017 to explore avenues of potential cooperation and support to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme 2016-2020. Canada also intends to contribute to the new ARF Disaster Response Work Plan in 2018 and considers participating in the next iteration of the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DirEX).

Moreover, Canada is pleased to be a member of the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia-Pacific and considers that the Group represents a valuable forum to share best practices on civilian-military cooperation in disaster response and to improve predictability and interoperability in the region. Canada looks forward to the next RCG meeting, to be held in Singapore in December 2017.

In addition to the ARF ISM-DR and RCG, Canada has also agreed to join an Advisory Group convened by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) to develop common humanitarian civil-military coordination standards; Canada believes that establishing such international standards will have a positive impact for disaster response in the region and is pleased to work with ARF members on this important issue.

In addition to our development efforts, disaster risk reduction is a key component of Canada's advocacy work on

humanitarian affairs and disaster response. Canada strongly supports disaster risk reduction measures that aim to enhance resilience to all hazards and reduce vulnerability of individuals, communities and countries, and has advocated for the integration of risk considerations into long-term sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies.

With the number of engagements related to disaster response in the region, Canada looks forward to working with ARF partners to better assess opportunities for synergies between the ARF and other mechanisms, including the RCG, EAS, and ADMM+, that strengthen ASEAN capabilities and advance local approaches to disaster response and risk reduction.

E. Maritime Security

Canada strongly supports continued ARF engagement on maritime security, including with respect to countering WMD proliferation and illicit trafficking. ARF cooperation on maritime security issues will continue to support the region's security and prosperity objectives by ensuring the efficient and secure movement of goods and people through strategic corridors.

Since the identification of maritime security as one of ARF's four key areas, ARF members, including Canada, have developed projects focused on enhanced information sharing and best practices, confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, and capacity building support to regional maritime law enforcement agencies. Canada regularly participates in the US-hosted multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises that take place biennially, assuming a substantial leadership role during the last two iterations (2014 and 2016) of the exercise.

Canada views the Western Pacific Naval Symposium's (WPNS) "Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea" (CUES) as a means by which navies may develop mutually rewarding international cooperation and transparency, and provide leadership and broad-based involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea. Canada was pleased to be involved in the development of this code.

Operation ARTEMIS is Canada's contribution to Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), a multinational effort to combat terrorism in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. It demonstrates Canada's solidarity with partners and allies that are working for peace and security in the maritime environment of the greater Middle East region. In 2016-2017, as part of the CTF-150, Canada participated in the tactical control of 14 frigates, destroyers and patrol craft from different nations. Following a five-month Canadian command from December 2016 to April 2017, Canada handed over command to France.

More broadly, Canada is committed to working with international organizations to meet the security challenges of a complex maritime environment and recognizes the importance of broadening international consensus when addressing these challenges. We are actively engaged in a number of international forums, including the International Maritime Organization. Canada is also an active member of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum – which brings together experts from maritime safety and security agencies in Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States. The Forum fosters multilateral cooperation and best practices through information sharing on matters related to fisheries enforcement, maritime security, illegal migration, illegal drug trafficking and combined operations.

Civil society and Track II initiatives can also make a useful contribution to developing informed options for regional partners in areas such as regional connectivity and preparedness to address incidents at sea. Canada will continue to support initiatives to organize workshops and seminars in ARF countries on these themes, and will encourage civil society, academics and others to contribute to the discussion by submitting constructive original, and non-zero-sum proposals, that can advance solutions for peaceful resolution.

IV. Role of ARF

The ARF is a key security forum within the Asia-Pacific region and an important component of Canada's engagement in the region's security dialogue. We will continue to engage constructively with our partners to build capacity and ensure that the ARF continues to contribute to security and stability in the region.

Canada has expanded its diplomatic presence across the region and since 2015 has a resident diplomatic presence in all 10 ASEAN member states. Further, Canada's appointment of its first dedicated ASEAN Ambassador in 2016, as well as the expansion of its mission to ASEAN the year before, demonstrates our strong commitment to ASEAN and engagement with the ARF and our partners in the region.

In the 2016-2017 inter-sessional year, Canada continued to participate in and make significant contributions in a wide range of ARF meetings and events. As noted previously, we are co-chairing with Malaysia and New Zealand the 2015-2017 ARF inter-sessional Meetings on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Furthermore, Canada's on-going contributions for ASEAN regional security and disaster relief programs amount to

more than CAD\$37 million. Canada also hosted the Intersessional Support Group (ISG) meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventative Diplomacy and Defence Officials Dialogue (DOD) in May 2017 in Ottawa.

The regularity of exchange facilitated through the ARF will be increasingly important to sustaining an atmosphere of cooperation in a region of global strategic importance. In this respect, Canada encourages a pragmatic and cooperative approach to ARF's work. By delivering concrete initiatives we can demonstrate the constructive role played by ARF in the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture.

Like many of our partners, Canada believes that it will be important to build on the ARF's existing work in order to bring greater focus to addressing the region's security challenges. As a mature organization and in the spirit of Preventive Diplomacy, the ARF can provide a forum for active discussion of issues and perspectives without jeopardizing the activities and exchanges that members support. The ARF has been most successful in bringing together policy practitioners and experts to address specialized security issues that require interagency cooperation across borders. Its inclusive membership highlights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and the interconnected nature of the global security environment. As such, future activities should take heed of other relevant regional and global efforts.

The ARF's success as a convener of security dialogue and cooperation among interagency communities of practitioners, experts and policy makers, is complementary to the roles of newer bodies like the East Asia Summit and the ADMM+. These forums offer positive opportunities for complementary regional dialogue and cooperation, in keeping

with the spirit of ASEAN-centrality, which Canada continues to support. Canada remains keenly interested in joining the East Asia Summit so that we can better contribute to advancing common approaches to shared security concerns. Canada also continues to explore ways to increase its contributions to regional defence and security and is interested in eventual membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

Since its inception in 1994, the ARF has become a cornerstone of a burgeoning security community that works together to protect the region's vitality and continued economic growth. Through the consistent efforts of its members, the ARF can continue to grow and evolve, and Canada is committed to playing a positive and constructive role in that evolution.



CHINA

I. Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region

In 2016, the Asia-Pacific region maintained the momentum of stability and development with its global importance further enhanced.

With overall peace and stability, Asia-Pacific has been a stable region in the global landscape. The Asia-Pacific countries have enjoyed political stability and social progress on the whole. They have strengthened political mutual trust and become increasingly interdependent. Regional hot-spot issues and disputes are basically under control. There is growing consensus that differences and disputes should be settled through dialogue and consultation. With a strong momentum of development, the Asia-Pacific region remains one of the most dynamic and promising regions in the world. Most of the Asia-Pacific countries have adopted proactive and flexible monetary and exchange rate policies in response to risks while deepening structural reform to vigorously improve people's livelihood, efficiency of economy and potential growth. New progress has been made in regional integration, and regional cooperation has flourished. Sub-regional cooperation mechanisms have progressed in parallel, and free trade negotiations have made steady headways. Concrete actions have been taken to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, injecting a strong impetus into economic development, transformation and upgrading as well as

win-win cooperation among countries along the routes of the Belt and Road.

At the same time, Asia-Pacific still faces uncertainties and destabilizing factors. Imbalance of development within the region and between the “two wheels” – the economic and security areas – has become more prominent. Hot-spot issues such as the Korea Peninsular and Afghanistan, which kept heating up from time to time, are complicated and sensitive. Some countries out of the region have increased military input and deployment in the region, and certain individual countries seek to shake off military constraints. Lack of mutual trust still exists among some countries. Non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, natural disasters and trans-national crimes have become more acute. Some countries have encountered serious “bottlenecks” in their economic structural reform and political-social transformation.

II. China's Defense Policy and Military Diplomacy

A. China's Defense Policy

China pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. In accordance with its Constitution and relevant laws, the armed forces of China undertake the sacred duty of resisting aggression, defending the motherland, safeguarding overall social stability and ensuring that the people can live and work in peace.

China is firmly committed to the road of peaceful development, strives to build a harmonious socialist society at home, and promotes the building of a harmonious world with lasting peace and common prosperity externally. The goals and tasks of China's national defense in the new period are mainly to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, maintain social harmony and stability, push forward the modernization of national defense and armed forces, and preserve world peace and stability. China advocates common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and commits itself to a security path featuring joint contribution, shared benefits and win-win outcomes in the Asia-Pacific.

China's national defense budget in 2017 is 1044.397 billion yuan, increased by 7% over the actual expenditure of the previous year. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping announced that China will downsize its forces by 300,000 and bring the total size down to 2 million. This move, which targets troops equipped with outdated armaments, administrative and non-combatant staff and the structure of the Chinese forces, is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2017.

Since 2016, China has made major breakthroughs in important areas and key links in the reform of national defense and the armed forces. The reform started from the leadership and command system. The Command of the PLA Army, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force have been established. The original four general departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC) have been replaced by 15 functional sections. Seven military areas have been adjusted into five theater commands. The navy, air force, rocket force and people's armed police force have been reorganized. The joint logistics force has been established. With that, a new military structure has taken shape under which the CMC sets

overall policies, theater commands focus on combat, and various military services are responsible for force development. Reforms have been launched to make the armed forces leaner in size, optimal in composition and better deployed. At present, reforms are progressing steadily as planned.

B. Military Diplomacy

China's armed forces advocate international security cooperation and have contributed to and taken part in such cooperation. In 2016, committed to openness, pragmatism and cooperation, China's armed forces increased interactions and cooperation with the militaries of other countries.

China-US military relations maintained a momentum of steady progress on the whole. New progress has been made in such areas as high-level visits, institutionalized exchanges, professional communications and joint exercises and training. Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC General Fang Fenghui and his American counterpart, the newly appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, had a video call for the first time. US Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson visited China. Commander of the Western Theater Command General Zhao Zongqi visited the United States. The two sides sent high-level representatives to the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and the Strategic Security Dialogue and intersessional meetings. The annual meeting of the US-China Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism was held in the United States for the first time. China was once again invited to send warships to participate in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2016. General Robert Brown, commander of US Army Pacific Headquarters, came to China to observe the U.S.-China Joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Field

Exercise and visited the Southern and Western Theater Commands of China. The two sides had sound interactions on the sidelines of multilateral occasions such as the Shangri-La Dialogue and ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+). China sent a delegation to participate in the Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference 2016 and Pacific Armies Management Seminar hosted by the United States.

China-Russia military relations have been broadened and lifted to a new height. High-level exchanges were frequent. China's State Councilor and Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan went to Russia for the Fifth Moscow Conference on International Security (MCIS), and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited China. Anti-missile cooperation made progress as evidenced by the First Joint Computer-Assisted Simulation Drill on Anti-Missile held in Russia in May, and two the sides held the first joint press briefing on anti-missile issues in Beijing in October. Practical exchanges on military training yielded rich results. The Chinese military delegation went to Russia for the International Army Games from July to August. The two navies held the "Joint Sea-2016" naval drill in China's South China Sea waters in September.

China maintained high-level military-to-military mutual visits, defense and security consultation, and exchanges and cooperation in such fields as joint military training and exercises with other Asian countries. On the Chinese side, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang visited Myanmar; State Councilor and Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan paid visits to Viet Nam, Laos, Kazakhstan and Iran; Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC General Fang Fenghui visited Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Malaysia. High-level military leaders from India, Laos, Viet Nam, Timor Leste, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Pakistan,

Afghanistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and other countries visited China. China held defense and security consultation and dialogue with India, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Mongolia, convened high-level border meeting with Viet Nam, and signed a *Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation* with Malaysia. In addition, China also held joint training and exercises with the militaries of Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan and other countries.

China continued to take an active part in regional multilateral defense and security dialogue and cooperation. The official delegations of 59 countries and 6 international organizations participated in the Seventh Xiangshan Forum hosted by China. State Councilor and Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan attended the China-ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting and the defense ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. Deputy Chief of Joint Staff Department of the CMC Admiral Sun Jianguo attended the Shangri-La Dialogue and the Chief of Defense Conference. China also sent delegates to the ARF Security Policy Conference, Heads of Defence Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting, the Defense Officials Dialogue and other activities under the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

China remained fully engaged in the practical cooperation in various fields under the ADMM+ framework, and sent troops to participate in all the four joint military exercises on peacekeeping and demining operations, anti-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and military medical science, and maritime security. Besides, China sent troops to take part in the multinational peacekeeping exercise "Khaan Quest" in Mongolia, the Annual Meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium

and joint exercise “Komodo 2016” in Indonesia, the “Peace Mission 2016” joint anti-terrorism military exercise of the SCO in Kyrgyzstan, and the multilateral joint military exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand. In addition, China put forward the initiative to hold joint exercise on the China-ASEAN Code on Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), maritime search and rescue as well as disaster relief. The Chinese military also actively promoted regional counter-terrorism cooperation, and hosted the Inaugural High-level Military Leaders’ Meeting of the Coordination Mechanism on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation by Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan Armed Forces in Urumqi, Xinjiang in August, marking the formal establishment of the mechanism.

III. China’s Efforts to Promote Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

China has been committed to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It follows the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening up, and pursues friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It has participated in regional cooperation in an all-round way and taken active steps to tackle both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, contributing to an Asia-Pacific region of lasting peace and common prosperity.

In January 2017, the Chinese government for the first time issued a white paper titled *China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, which gives a comprehensive introduction to China’s policies and concepts on security cooperation as well as practices in recent years in the Asia-Pacific region. It shows that China attaches great importance to and takes a positive stance on enhanced regional security

cooperation, and is firmly committed to follow the path of peaceful development and safeguard stability and prosperity of the region. China looks forward to joining hands with regional countries to steadily move forward security dialogue and cooperation in the region and make greater contribution to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

A. Relations with Major Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region

China-US Relations

Since 2016, the overall relationship between China and the United States has maintained steady progress. The two countries had frequent exchanges at the leadership and other levels. President Xi Jinping met with US President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit in the US on 31 March, the G20 Hangzhou Summit in China on 3 September, and the APEC Informal Leaders’ Meeting in Peru on 19 November. On 19 September, Premier Li Keqiang met with President Obama during the high-level meetings of the UN General Assembly in New York.

President Xi made a phone call to congratulate president-elect Donald Trump on 9 November 2016 and had a phone conversation with him on 14 November. On 8 February 2017, President Trump sent a letter to President Xi to wish him and the Chinese people a happy Lantern Festival and a prosperous Year of the Rooster. On 10 February, President Xi had a phone call with President Trump at invitation. From 6 to 7 April, President Xi had a successful meeting with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago in Florida at invitation, during which the diplomatic and security dialogue and the comprehensive economic dialogue were launched. President Xi had two additional phone conversations

with President Trump at invitation on 12 and 24 April. State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited the United States on 27 February 2017. Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bonn, Germany on 17 February. Secretary Tillerson visited China from 18 to 19 March.

Cooperation between the two sides at bilateral, regional and global levels has been productive. In 2016, bilateral trade in goods reached US\$524.3 billion, trade in services exceeded US\$110 billion, and two-way investment accumulated to over US\$200 billion. Cultural exchanges continued to flourish: 47 pairs of sister provinces/states and 215 pairs of sister cities have been established. More than 5.3 million visits were made by the people between the two countries in 2016. The two sides have maintained close communication and coordination on major regional and global issues such as the Korean nuclear issue, the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue.

The two sides have kept in close contact on the Asia-Pacific affairs and are dedicated to sound interaction and inclusive cooperation in the region. They have enhanced communication and cooperation on various affairs, including counter-terrorism, disaster prevention and mitigation, fight against transnational crimes, and prevention and control of infectious diseases under multilateral frameworks such as APEC, the East Asia Summit and the ARF, and pushed forward trilateral cooperation projects in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste.

China stands ready to work with the United States to implement the consensus reached by the presidents of the two countries and push for greater progress in China-US relations for the benefit of the people of the two countries and beyond.

China-Russia Relations

Being each other's largest neighbor, China and Russia are strategic partners of coordination and regard each other as diplomatic priority. The comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between the two countries, which is already operating at a high level, has shown a stronger momentum of growth.

In 2016, President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin five times. During President Putin's state visit to China in June 2016, the two presidents signed and issued the *Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation*, the *Joint Statement on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability*, and *Joint Statement on Cooperation in Information Space Development*.

The two sides view it as a priority in their foreign policy to grow their relations, and have stepped up mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests. Carrying forward the concept of ever-lasting friendship set by the *Sino-Russian Good-Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*, the two sides have worked actively for synergy between their development strategies and between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union, and coordinated closely on regional and international issues, injecting new impetus into the growth of their bilateral relations.

China and Russia have maintained sound cooperation on the Asia-Pacific affairs. They have strengthened cooperation under the regional multilateral framework, steadfastly upheld the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and universally recognized norms governing international relations, safeguarded the outcomes of World War II and international equity and justice,

and worked for political settlement of regional hotspots, injecting positive energy into peace, stability, development and prosperity in the region.

China-India Relations

Since 2016, the China-India strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity has maintained the momentum of steady development. The two countries have made continuous progress in exchanges and cooperation in various areas and maintained sound communication and coordination on regional and international issues.

The two countries had frequent exchange of high-level visits with political mutual trust further enhanced. President Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi three times during the SCO Summit in Tashkent in June, the G20 Hangzhou Summit in September and the 8th BRICS Summit in October. In late May, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee paid a state visit to China. Practical cooperation between the two countries made concrete progress in various areas, defense and security cooperation was further enhanced, and cultural exchanges achieved positive results. China and India have common interests on international issues such as climate change, energy and food security, reform of international financial institutions and global governance, and maintained good coordination and collaboration on regional and international affairs.

China-Japan Relations

In 2016, the overall relationship between China and Japan remained stable with further improvement in some areas. President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the G20 Hangzhou Summit and the ASEM Summit in Mongolia respectively,

during which the leaders of the two sides reached important consensus on further improving China-Japan relations. The two sides have maintained dialogue between governments, political parties and legislatures and at other levels. Japanese Foreign Minister paid a visit to China. The Third China-Japan High Level Political Dialogue was held, and orderly progress was made in exchanges and cooperation in various areas. All this added to the positive factors for further improvement of the bilateral relationship.

At the same time, the China-Japan relations, affected by negative factors on the Japanese side from time to time, remained fragile and complex. Facing Japan's negative moves on maritime, Taiwan, history and other major sensitive issues, China has upheld principles and urged Japan to abide by the four political documents and the four-point principled agreement to deal with related issues properly.

B. Regional Cooperation

China-ASEAN Cooperation

China regards ASEAN as a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy, and firmly supports ASEAN Community building, ASEAN's centrality in regional cooperation and its greater role in international and regional affairs. Following the principles of mutual respect, equality, good-neighborliness and win-win cooperation, China and ASEAN have further strengthened strategic dialogue, enhanced political mutual trust, and deepened practical cooperation in various fields, making continuous progress in their relations.

The year 2016 marked the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations and the Year of China-ASEAN Educational Exchanges. On 19 July, Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister

Thongloun Sisoulith of Laos, rotating chairman of ASEAN, exchanged congratulatory messages to celebrate the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations. On 7 September, the 19th China-ASEAN Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations was held in Vientiane, Laos. Recalling the remarkable progress in China-ASEAN cooperation since the establishment of the dialogue relations 25 years ago, Premier Li Keqiang put forward five proposals for deepening China-ASEAN cooperation in the next stage, including making people-to-people exchanges a third pillar for China-ASEAN relations, in addition to the two pillars of political and security cooperation and business cooperation, which won active response from ASEAN countries. The summit reviewed and adopted the *Joint Statement of the 19th China-ASEAN Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations* and other three outcome documents. The two sides also organized the Reception in Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations and other commemorative events. On 14th June, the Special China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, China.

In 2016, China-ASEAN trade volume totaled US\$452.21 billion. The two sides continued to make progress in cooperation in various fields and held multiple meetings, including the 15th AEM-MOFCOM Consultations, the 15th China-ASEAN Transport Ministers' Meeting, the 11th China-ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers' Meeting, the 10th China-ASEAN Prosecutors-General Conference, the Fifth China-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the Second China-ASEAN Education Ministers Roundtable Conference, the Third Meeting of China-ASEAN

Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts, the First China-ASEAN Forum on Agricultural Cooperation, the First China-ASEAN Forum on Health Cooperation and the First ASEAN-China Friendship Organization Leaders Meeting.

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Cooperation

As the main vehicle for East Asia cooperation, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation made fresh progress in 2016. China called upon all parties to increase their input in implementing the *Report of the East Asia Vision Group II* and the cooperation work plan. China worked actively to advance the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) process, and supported greater readiness and effectiveness of the CMIM and capacity building of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office after its upgrading to an international organization, so as to contribute to economic and financial stability in East Asia. China has also worked to advance negotiations on trade in goods and services, and the model of access to investment markets under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and facilitated the issuing of the *Joint Statement on RCEP Negotiations*.

On 7 September 2016, the 19th ASEAN Plus Three Summit was held in Vientiane, Laos. Premier Li Keqiang made six proposals on enhancing APT cooperation: to step up financial security cooperation, to deepen trade and investment cooperation, to advance cooperation in agriculture and poverty alleviation, to advance connectivity building, to create new models for production capacity cooperation, and to promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

In 2016, China vigorously promoted practical cooperation within the APT framework, and held a series of

events, including the 10th Workshop on Cooperation for Cultural Human Resource Development, the Second East Asia Modern Agricultural Workshop, exchange activities for young scientists and the Fourth ASEAN Plus Three Village Leaders Exchange Programs.

China-Japan-ROK Cooperation

As major countries in East Asia, China, Japan and the ROK are the main drivers of East Asia economic integration. A stronger trilateral cooperation will be conducive not only to the development of the three countries, but also to regional stability and prosperity.

On 24 August 2016, the 8th China-Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Tokyo, Japan. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that in the spirit of "facing history squarely and working together for the future", the three countries need to overcome difficulties, remove obstacles, build consensus and focus on cooperation to make sure that trilateral cooperation develops steadily in the right direction. In the next stage, the three countries need to build political mutual trust, conduct practical cooperation, enhance people-to-people exchanges, advance sustainable development and deepen trilateral cooperation so as to give fresh impetus to East Asia Cooperation.

Since 2016, China has actively held or participated in a number of events, including the 16th Trilateral Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meeting, the 18th Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting, the 11th Economic and Trade Ministers Meeting, the 8th Central Bank Governors Meeting, the 16th Trilateral Policy Dialogue Meeting between SIPO, JPO and KIPO, the 7th Trilateral Meeting on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation, the 1st China-Japan-ROK Education Ministers Meeting, the

First China-Japan-ROK Sports Ministers Meeting, the 11th Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum and the First China-Japan-ROK Public Diplomacy Forum, the 4th China-Japan-ROK Counter-terrorism Consultation.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a "leaders-led strategic forum". At the 11th EAS held in Vientiane, Laos on 8 September 2016, Premier Li Keqiang pointed out that economic development cooperation and political and security cooperation are the two wheels driving EAS forward. They should reinforce each other and advance in parallel. In economic development, we need to vigorously support connectivity building in the region, speed up the building of FTAs, and strengthen cooperation in areas related to people's well-being. In the political and security area, we need to champion a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, enhance non-traditional security cooperation, explore building of the regional security architecture, and properly handle hotspot and sensitive issues.

China actively promotes cooperation in various areas of the EAS. Since 2016, China has hosted the EAS Track II Seminar on Maritime Cooperation for Security in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the Fifth EAS Workshop on Regional Security Framework and the Fifth EAS Earthquake Search and Rescue Exercises.

Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)

The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism aims to enhance good-neighborly friendship and practical cooperation between China and Mekong River countries, promote economic and social development of the sub-region, boost ASEAN community

building and regional integration, and forge a community of shared future for solidarity, mutual assistance, equal-footed consultation, shared benefits and win-win cooperation in the sub-region. By December 2016, a number of meetings were held, including one leaders meeting, two foreign ministers meetings, four senior officials meetings and five working group meetings.

On 23 March 2016, the 1st LMC Leaders Meeting was held in Sanya, Hainan Province, China, officially launching the LMC mechanism and producing a series of outcomes. Leaders of the six countries reviewed the progress and shared their vision on the future of the LMC, endorsed the “3+5” cooperation framework, and issued the *Sanya Declaration of the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders Meeting and the Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation Among the Lancang-Mekong Countries*. A joint list of early-harvest programs was adopted, including 45 projects in such areas as connectivity, water resources, public health and poverty reduction.

On 23 December 2016, the Second LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, marking a new stage of full implementation for the LMC. The parties agreed that in 2017, joint working groups in five key priority areas will be fully established and put into operation, a national secretariat or coordination unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or as appropriate to each country will be set up, all the 45 early-harvest programs will be completed or make solid progress, and the LMC five-year action plan and a list of new cooperation programs will be formulated.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The year 2016 marked the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the SCO. The SCO maintained sound and steady development. New progress was made in political, security, economic and cultural cooperation, leading to rising international standing and greater influence of the SCO.

From 23 to 24 June, the 16th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the SCO member states was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. President Xi Jinping attended the meeting. The heads of state signed the *Tashkent Declaration on the 15th Anniversary of the SCO, approved the Action Plan for 2016-2020 on Implementation of the SCO Development Strategy Toward 2025, and adopted the Memorandums of the Obligations on the Entry of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the SCO*.

From 2 to 3 November, the 15th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO member states was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Premier Li Keqiang attended the meeting. The meeting approved a number of documents, including the *List of Measures by the SCO to Further Promote Project Cooperation 2017-2021 and SCO Scientific and Technological Partnership*.

Meetings of heads of various departments including security council secretaries, prosecutors-general, chief justices, foreign ministers, defense ministers, chiefs of staff, education ministers, science and technology ministers, ministers of justice, finance ministers, central bank governors, economic and trade ministers and culture ministers were held. SCO forums and Peace Mission-2016 joint anti-terror military exercise were organized. China actively promoted and participated in

SCO cooperation across the board. China's bilateral relations with other SCO member states, observer states and dialogue partners continued to grow.

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)

In 2016, rapid progress was made in CICA cooperation. Confidence building measures in the areas of military affairs and politics, new threats and challenges, economy, the environment and culture were advanced. External exchanges continued to expand, and institutional development was gradually improved.

From 27 to 28 April 2016, the Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CICA member states was held in Beijing. President Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony and delivered an important speech, calling for adhering to and following through the vision on common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia and fostering a security governance model with Asian features. Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired the meeting and delivered a keynote speech. The meeting adopted the *Declaration on Promoting Peace, Security, Stability and Sustainable Development in Asia Through Dialogue*.

Four meetings of Special Working Groups and Senior Officials Committee of the CICA were held respectively in Beijing, China, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt and Astana, Kazakhstan. The *2016-2018 Cooperation Initiative of the CICA Member States for Drug Control and the 2016-2018 CICA Initiative for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises* were adopted.

In 2016, China faithfully honored its responsibilities of the presidency, and in April, its presidency was extended to 2018. China actively implemented the confidence-building measures of CICA in various fields and acted as a coordinator of confidence building measures in CICA financial and agricultural areas and a joint coordinator of confidence building measures in CICA environmental area. A number of events were organized in China, including the Fifth CICA Third Think Tank Round-table and the reception for the "CICA Day", giving strong impetus to CICA's further development.

C. Regional Hot-spot Issues

Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue

The overall situation on the Korean Peninsula remains complex and sensitive. In 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted two nuclear tests and launched satellites and missiles for multiple times. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 and 2321 on sanctions against the DPRK. In 2017, DPRK conducted several missile launch tests and a ground test of new heavy-life rocket engine, and openly declared that it would take preemptive measures for self-defensive. The US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held large-scale joint military exercises and advanced the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the ROK. Uncertainties grew on the development of the situation on the Peninsula.

China is firmly committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its peace and stability, and resolving the issue through dialogue and consultation. Over the years, China has made tremendous efforts to promote denuclearization of the Peninsula, uphold peace and stability

there, and facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. China urges relevant parties to avoid mutual provocation and focus more on easing tension in a concerted effort to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.

The DPRK's nuclear tests and missile launches violated relevant resolutions of the Security Council. China supports the adoption and strict implementation of Resolution 2270 and 2321 by the Security Council to contain DPRK's development of nuclear and missile programs. At the same time, China actively engaged in mediation and pushed for peaceful settlement through talks. Focusing on key problems of the Peninsula, China proposed the dual track approach of denuclearization on one hand and replacement of armistice with a peace treaty on the other, and the suspension-for-suspension approach that calls for the suspension of nuclear and missile activities by the DPRK and the suspension of military exercises by the US and the ROK. China hopes that relevant parties will respond actively to ensure that the Korean nuclear issue will enter a sustainable, irreversible and effective dialogue process.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Issue

The anti-ballistic missile issue concerns global strategic stability and mutual trust among major countries. China believes that the anti-ballistic missile issue needs to be handled prudently. Forming Cold War style military alliances or building global or regional anti-ballistic missile systems will be detrimental to strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as to the development of an inclusive global and regional security framework. Each country should respect other countries' security concerns while pursuing their own security interests, observe the principle of upholding global strategic stability and the principle of undiminished

security for all, and work together to create a peaceful and stable international security environment featuring equality, mutual trust and win-win cooperation.

Despite explicit opposition from China and other relevant countries, the US and the ROK announced the decision to start and accelerate the deployment of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system in the ROK. Such a move seriously damages regional strategic balance, undermines the strategic security interests of China and other relevant countries in the region, and is detrimental to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China firmly opposes the deployment of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system in the ROK by the US and the ROK, and strongly urges the US and the ROK to stop this process.

Afghan Issue

China supports the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan, and hopes to see a united, stable and prosperous Afghanistan living in peace with its neighboring countries. Since 2016, China has increased assistance to Afghanistan in support of the government's capacity building. China believes that only an inclusive reconciliation process that is "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned" can provide the ultimate solution to the Afghan issue. China will continue to play a constructive role in advancing the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

D. Non-traditional Security Cooperation

Cooperation on Disaster Relief

Since 2016, the Chinese government has actively involved in cooperation on disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region. China participated in the consultation on the *Action Plan for Asia to Implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk*

Reduction 2015-2030, attended a number of global or regional meetings and events including the Asia Conference on Disaster Reduction, the Meeting of the BRICKS Ministers for Disaster Management, the 10th APEC Senior Disaster Management Officials Forum, the first World Humanitarian Summit, the first Meeting of Asia Disaster Reduction Through Science and Technology, the 4th China-Japan-ROK Disaster Relief Tabletop Exercise, the Northeast Asia Disaster Management Meeting, the China-ASEAN Seminar on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the Seminar on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Management, and the East Asia Summit Workshop on Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. China actively carried out humanitarian emergency assistance for other countries, offered disaster relief supplies to the earthquake-stricken area in Ecuador and the flood-hit area in Sri Lanka, and sent expert teams to Ecuador and other countries to assess the damage caused by earthquakes.

In the next stage, the Chinese government will continue to work with relevant parties to establish and improve mechanisms of mutual visit of officials, information sharing, personnel training, technological exchanges, simulation exercises, scientific research cooperation, material reserves and emergency aid, in an effort to enhance bilateral and multilateral practical cooperation in disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region, and jointly improve disaster prevention, mitigation and relief capacity.

Counter-terrorism Cooperation

In recent years, counter-terrorism situation in the Asia-Pacific region is sound on the whole and positive progress was made in the regional anti-terrorism

drive. However, terrorism remains the major security threat facing the Asia-Pacific region and the regional anti-terrorism campaign remains a daunting task. China is a victim of terrorism, and faces the immediate threat posed by the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces represented by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The fight against the ETIM is an important part of the international counter-terrorism campaign.

China opposes terrorism in all forms and calls for strengthening cooperation to form synergy in fighting terrorism on the basis of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. Meanwhile, all parties need to actively facilitate political settlement of regional hotspot issues, promote common development and prosperity of all countries, enhance dialogue and exchanges among different civilizations, and eliminate the breeding grounds for terrorism. China rejects “double standards” in fighting terrorism and opposes the act to link terrorism with any particular country, ethnic group or religion.

China attaches great importance to and takes an active part in counter-terrorism cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2016, China carried out counter-terrorism consultation and exchanges with the US, Russia, Australia, Canada, the ROK, Japan and other countries, and advanced practical cooperation in counter-terrorism. At the same time, China actively participated in the counter-terrorism exchanges and cooperation under such multilateral frameworks as the APEC, BRICS, ARF and the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF), and successfully hosted the 2nd GCTF Symposium on Fighting Cyber Terrorism and the 2nd China and Neighboring Countries Counter-terrorism Conference. China stands ready

to work with other Asia-Pacific countries, in the principle of mutual respect, equality and cooperation, to jointly address terrorist threat and safeguard peace and stability in the region.

Cooperation on Combating Transnational Crimes

The Chinese government places high importance on combating transnational crimes and is committed to the comprehensive and earnest implementation of the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. China is actively involved in international cooperation on combating transnational organized crimes and maintains sound cooperation with the United Nations and other international and regional organizations. China has promoted security and law enforcement cooperation in the Mekong sub-region and conducted several joint operations with relevant Southeast Asian countries in combating transnational organized crimes, waging an effective fight against human trafficking, telecom fraud, economic crimes, drug-related crimes and other acute crimes in the region.

Since 2016, China has partnered with Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos to combat telecom and cyber frauds, and successfully busted around a dozen of criminal groups, arrested over 320 criminal suspects and solved over 3,000 cases, effectively curbing rampant criminal activities of telecom and cyber frauds. China has also sent delegations to Thailand, Singapore, Japan and other countries to attend conferences of fighting against transnational telecom and cyber crimes and share China's experience. On the front of combating human trafficking, China, along with Vietnam and Myanmar, carried out the annual special campaign of fighting human trafficking, signed the *Agreement on Strengthening Cooperation to Prevent and Fight Human*

Trafficking with Cambodia, held the core group meeting of Mekong River Sub-regional Cooperation on Fighting Human Trafficking, and participated in the second round of consultations for China-Thailand Cooperation against Human Trafficking Agreement. All these efforts yielded fruitful results.

In March, China co-hosted the ARF Workshop on Strengthening Management of Cross-border Movement of Criminals with Thailand and had in-depth discussions on working together to address cross-border terrorist activities, human trafficking, drug-related crimes and other challenges. In December, China held the Ministerial Meeting of the Fifth Anniversary of Mekong River Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation Mechanism and worked to upgrade Mekong River law enforcement and security cooperation.

China stands ready to further enhance judicial and law enforcement cooperation with relevant countries in a joint effort to fight transnational crimes, promote cooperation under the framework of the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, including extradition on the basis of the UN Convention, provide most extensive possible judicial assistance, and cooperate on the recovery and sharing of criminal proceeds.

Cooperation on Cyber Security

In recent years, cyber security, a comprehensive security challenge facing all countries, continues to be an issue high on the international agenda. As the builder, defender and contributor of the cyberspace, China has vigorously promoted and actively participated in international efforts to strengthen cyber security.

In March 2017, China released the *International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace*. The Strategy themes on peaceful development and win-win cooperation, sets out the goal to forge a community of shared future for cyberspace and calls on the international community to follow the principles of peace, sovereignty, shared governance and shared benefits, and jointly build a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative and orderly cyberspace and a multilateral, democratic and transparent Internet governance system. This is the first international strategy on the cyber issue released by China, offering a Chinese proposal for promoting international exchanges and cooperation on cyberspace and contributing Chinese suggestions to resolving the governance challenge in global cyberspace.

Since 2016, China has been strengthening bilateral dialogue and cooperation on cyberspace with countries such as the US, Russia, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the ROK, continuously enhanced mutual trust and expanded practical cooperation. At the same time, China continued to actively promote and participate in multilateral process and regional cooperation mechanisms of cyber security, engaged in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security and the UN Internet Governance Forum, and co-hosted with the UN the 2nd International Workshop on Cyber Security which took place in China. China promoted the process of cyber security under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICKS and worked for the establishment of a China-Russia-India consultation mechanism on cyber security. At China's initiative, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization held the first Working Group Meeting of International Law in Cyberspace during its 55th Annual Conference. To build international consensus on the issue,

China hosted the Workshop on Fighting Cyber Terrorism under the framework of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum and the 3rd World Internet Conference. China also played a constructive role for the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Cyber Security, promoted the fight against cyber crimes under the ARF, and called on countries in the region to strengthen cooperation in capacity building, international rules regarding cyberspace, and combating cyber terrorism and cyber crimes.

Cooperation on Maritime Security

The maritime situation in the Asia Pacific is generally stable. However, non-traditional security threats at sea are on the rise, and misunderstanding between some countries on traditional security issues also poses risks to maritime security.

It is the common responsibility of regional countries to safeguard maritime peace and security and it serves the common interests of all countries. China advocates, as always, equal-footed, practical and win-win maritime security cooperation and is committed to jointly responding to traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats and maintaining maritime peace and stability.

China has taken an active part in and promoted bilateral, regional and international cooperation on maritime security. In 2016, the China-US coast guard consultation on *Maritime Safety Code of Conduct*, the High-level Consultations on China-Japan Maritime Affairs, the China-Pakistan and China-India Dialogues on Maritime Security Cooperation were held; Russia, Vietnam, the ROK, the US and Australia sent coast-guard delegations to visit China. In June, the coast guards of China and the ROK held the first regular meeting; the China-Vietnam steering committee for cooperation held the

9th meeting; the Commands of China Coast Guard and Vietnam Coast Guard signed an MOU on cooperation. In July, the NOWPAP China-ROK oil spill emergency drill was successfully held in Shandong. In September, China hosted the 3rd Asia-Pacific Rescue and Development Conference and the 9th China International Rescue and Salvage Conference, engaging in technical exchanges and discussions on China-ASEAN cooperation in maritime search and rescue and the search and mass rescue operation by the International Maritime Organization. In October, the China Coast Guard and the Philippine Coast Guard signed the *Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Joint Coast Guard Committee on Maritime Cooperation* and two sides held the First Organizational Meeting in December, and the Second Organizational Meeting as well as the Inaugural Meeting of the Joint Coast Guard Committee in February 2017. In December, China and Cambodia held talks on a Maritime Emergency Hot-line. In addition, China held the first China-ASEAN Exchange Program for Middle-level Officials of Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, the Training Program for Managerial Personnel of Navigation Mark and the Exchange Program for Oil Spill Response Personnel, and continued to send ships to the search of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370.

As a founding member of the *Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia* (ReCAAP), China remains a staunch supporter of the capacity building and development of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), contributing its share to fighting piracy and armed robbery and safeguarding maritime navigation safety in the region. China has taken an active part in the senior officials' meeting organized by the ISC, capacity building activities as well as the formulation of the

guidebook of ISC focal points, sailing guidelines for small and medium-sized oil tankers and other relevant documents and rules. China also attended the Annual Conference of the ISC Governing Council and the celebrating activities for the 10th Anniversary of the ISC, and increased its donation to the ISC up to US \$80,000.

China's position on the South China Sea-related issues are consistent and clear. China supports and advocates the "dual-track approach" put forward by ASEAN countries, namely, relevant disputes should be resolved through negotiation and consultation by countries directly concerned, while peace and stability in the region should be safeguarded by China and ASEAN countries working together. Meanwhile, China advocates "shelving disputes while seeking joint development."

In 2016, China and ASEAN countries, under the framework of the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), pushed forward maritime practical cooperation and built more consensus on jointly managing the South China Sea situation. China and ASEAN countries held three senior officials' meetings and three joint working group meetings on implementing the DOC. A *Joint Statement on Full and Effective Implementation of the DOC* which reiterated that disputes should be resolved through negotiations and consultations by countries directly concerned, as well as two outcome documents, i.e. *Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of China and ASEAN Countries in Response to Maritime Emergencies* and *Joint Statement on the Application of the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea* were released, sending a positive signal to the international community. In 2017, China and ASEAN countries have had two joint working group meetings on implementing

the DOC and will continue to advance the consultations on a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, seeking for a COC framework draft before the mid-2017. In September 2016, China, along with ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Myanmar, successfully carried out the Joint Maritime Search and Rescue Sand Table Exercise under the framework of implementing DOC and planned to jointly hold a muster drill in China in October 2017.

Cooperation on Non-proliferation and Disarmament

China has, as always, supported and taken an active part in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and called for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China attaches great importance to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the bedrock of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation system. It has earnestly implemented the provisions of the final document of the 8th NPT Review Conference, and was actively involved and played a constructive role in the 9th NPT Review Conference and the P5 Conference on Implementing the NPT. China will take an active part in the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 10th NPT Review Conference to be held in May 2017, and work in concerted effort with all relevant parties toward the successful 10th NPT review process. China stands ready to work with all parties to achieve the three NPT goals of “nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy” in a balanced manner and to strengthen its authority, universality and effectiveness.

China is committed to upholding the purposes and goals of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), honors the commitment to suspend nuclear tests, pushes forward the preparations for CTBT implementation and lends active

support for all the work by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTCBO). In May 2016, China co-hosted with the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat the Asia-Pacific Workshop of Data Centers of Nuclear Test Ban Countries in Beijing.

China consistently and firmly supports the efforts of ASEAN countries to establish a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and stands for the early signing and taking effect of the protocol to the *Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone*. China has solved all the remaining issues concerning the protocol with ASEAN, and looks forward to the signing of the protocol at an early date.

China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, opposes the development, stockpiling and the use of biological and chemical weapons by any one, and supports strengthening the effectiveness, authority and universality of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. China attaches great importance to and supports international exchanges and cooperation under the Conventions. In June 2016, China and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) co-hosted the Workshop on Chemicals Trade Policies and Export Control. In September, China, Canada and the BWC Implementation Support Unit co-hosted the International Seminar on BWC Implementation.

China supports UN's important role in the field of non-proliferation. In 2016, China participated in all the work concerning the full review of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in a constructive manner. China stands ready to work with the Security Council 1540 Committee and other relevant parties to

continuously improve the capacity of Asia-Pacific countries in implementing the Resolution.

IV. China's Observations on the Future Development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF is an influential and inclusive official platform for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Focusing on confidence-building measures, ARF members are committed to steadily promoting preventive diplomacy based on consensus and substantiating cooperation on non-traditional security. Looking forward, it would be advisable that the ARF take into account the following principles:

First, the ARF need to uphold the concepts and principles already established, stick to the effective principles of seeking consensus through consultation, making incremental progress, accommodating the comfort level of all parties, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, stay committed to ASEAN centrality, promote dialogue and cooperation in the "ASEAN Way", and properly balance the concerns and interests of all parties. In the meantime, efforts should be made to further enhance the effectiveness of the ARF and strengthen coordination with other regional mechanisms. All parties concerned should embrace a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, embark on a security path of joint contribution, shared benefits and win-win outcomes, and work in concerted effort to build a regional security architecture that is in line with the regional realities and meets the needs of all parties involved.

Second, the ARF need to make confidence-building measures the running theme throughout its development. In conducting preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than rushing for quick success,

the ARF should emphasize consensus-building, take into full account regional diversity and complexity, and respect the realities and practical needs of all members. The ARF should abide by the *2001 ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy*, stick to the principles of non-coercion and non-interference in others' internal affairs, and try to find a way of preventive diplomacy that fits the conditions of the region.

Third, cooperation in non-traditional security field need to be further substantiated. As non-traditional security challenges such as natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes become more serious, to tackle these challenges serves the common interests of regional countries. The ARF should make use of its military-civilian characteristic, deepen non-traditional security cooperation on disaster relief, combating terrorism and transnational crimes, and maritime and cyber security so as to continuously inject new vitality into its development.

As a founding member of the ARF, China has taken an active part in its development and played a constructive role in ensuring its sound progress by promoting practical cooperation in various sectors. In recent years, China has organized more than a third of the total cooperation programs under the ARF framework every year, making great contribution to promoting ARF practical cooperation. Since 2016, China has held the Workshop on Strengthening Management of Cross-border Movement of Criminals, the Workshop on Green Shipping, the Workshop on Urban Emergency Rescue, the Workshop on Management of Asia-Pacific Maritime Disasters, the Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in Non-traditional Security Issues, etc.

Going forward, China stands ready to work with other members to deepen dialogue and cooperation in various areas, promote sound and steady development of the ARF, and contribute more to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.



DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The situation in the Asia-Pacific region for the past year remained unstable.

While veiled rivalry and confrontation intensified between powers contending for political and military supremacy in the region, threatening and provocative words and actions have become more pronounced than ever.

Increased deployment of strategic assets, incessant military exercises, strengthening of military alliances, escalation of territorial disputes and other factors aroused distrust and increased vigilance between regional countries, propelling them to an arms race.

The outrageous moves of the US for domination and intervention reached an intolerable degree.

The Trump administration, with its policies centred on “America-first” and “peace through strength”, did not hesitate to pursue all manner of high-handed and arbitrary practices with the intent to transform and change political, security and economic structure of the Asia-Pacific region in the interest of the US.

It violated the fundamental principles of international relations and created double standards by making physical nuclear threats to and mounting missile attacks on independent countries while conniving at the launches of missiles and spy satellites by its allies.

It is not without reason that several countries have taken tough countermeasures to cope with destabilization of regional strategic balance and infringement of their national interests caused by the US.

The reality of the situation proves that those with power will be winners while those without strength will end up losers no matter how just and righteous they are.

II. Situation on the Korean Peninsula and National Security Policy

A. Situation on the Korean Peninsula

A touch-and-go crisis is created in the Korean Peninsula where military forces of the DPRK and the US, both nuclear-armed, face each other in direct confrontation. Clashes of arms and nukes are likely to take place at any moment.

The Korean Peninsula is a place with no proper institutional peace mechanism.

The ever precarious situation of the Korean Peninsula, trapped in a vicious circle of escalating tension for over 60 years since the armistice of Korean War, has reached such a pass that it cannot be overlooked any longer.

Every year and every season, massive strategic assets and armed forces are assembled in and around the Korean Peninsula to take part in ferocious war exercises aimed at sudden invasion and system overthrow of the DPRK.

This year's joint military exercises were staged by the US again in South Korea through March and April. Over 300,000 troops and all sorts of war hardware including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers have been mobilized. The exercises were conducted in an actual war mode with the aim of mounting a preemptive nuclear strike against the DPRK.

The US threw off the deceptive mask that the exercises were “defensive”; this time it did not bother to hide the fact that the exercises were aimed at carrying out the “beheading operation” for “eliminating the headquarters” and the “preemptive attack” operation designed to destroy the nuclear and rocket bases of the DPRK.

The Trump administration revealed its real intention to isolate and stifle the DPRK by force of arms when it shaped the DPRK policy of “maximum pressure and engagement”, showing it is not different from the preceding US administrations in pursuing the policy of pressure.

The US seeks to convince the public that the current tension and the joint military exercises are ascribable to the DPRK's access to nuclear weapons, but the US has conducted aggressive war exercises and posed nuclear threats long before the DPRK possessed nuclear weapons.

Its explanation that the joint military exercises were conducted regularly for 40 years only serves as a proof that how long the US persisted with its nuclear war moves and how much patience the DPRK has exercised so far.

The extreme hostile policy of the US, the persistent nuclear threat and blackmail, and the heavy concentration of nuclear weaponry that are continued beyond the century compelled the DPRK to possess nuclear strike capability for self-defence and bolster it steadily.

This is the root cause and the essence and the truth of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

As the US nuclear threats and aggressive war exercises are constant and non-stop, the countermeasures of the DPRK to bolster its nuclear forces and conduct counterstrike exercises would also be constant and on a regular basis.

The security balance on the Korean Peninsula is being maintained thanks to the DPRK's access to and build-up of a powerful nuclear deterrence.

B. National Security Policy

Living under constant nuclear threats of the US, the world's biggest nuclear weapon state, a solid guarantee for safeguarding national sovereignty and the right to existence, achieving development and prosperity of the nation and ensuring peace is in building up the nuclear forces.

Nuclear armament is the state line of the DPRK. The DPRK will continue to bolster its self-defence capability, the pivot of which is the nuclear force, and the capability for a preemptive strike as long as the US keeps on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as the US does not stop conducting aggressive war exercises at the DPRK's doorstep.

The nuclear force of the DPRK is, to all intents and purposes, a powerful deterrent of justice for self-defence and development; it is not intended to invade or threaten others.

The DPRK is a nuclear power capable of countering any option and means of the US, and will not avoid any option made by the US.

It is the firm stand and unwavering will of the DPRK to go to the end if the US wants to remain unchanged in its confrontational stance.

Peace should be safeguarded by one's own strength; the truth of history serves as a reminder that the DPRK made a right choice when it decided to build up the nuclear forces while tightening its belt.

The DPRK wishes for peace more than any other but will never beg for it. Should anyone dare to provoke it, the DPRK would employ every means of strength for counteraction and safeguard peace and security on the Korean Peninsula without fail.

C. National Reunification Policy

The reunification issue of Korea is essentially a matter of putting an end to domination and intervention of the outside forces and achieving full independence of the nation on a nationwide scale.

The DPRK remains unchanged in its position to settle the national reunification issue "By Our Nation Itself" through achievement of national independence and great national unity, and ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

The improvement of inter-Korean relations is not only the starting-point for peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula but also a pressing demand of the whole nation.

The South Korean authorities should not aggravate the situation by finding fault with the DPRK's exercise of right to self-defence, but respond positively to its

sincere efforts to prevent military conflict between north and south and ease the tension.

Well aware of the will of the Korean nation to reunification, the US should no longer cling to the scheme of whipping up national estrangement by inciting the anti-reunification forces in South Korea to a confrontation with the fellow countrymen and war.

Japan should give up a wild ambition of reinvasion on the Korean Peninsula, and reflect on and apologize for its past crimes to the Korean nation and should not disturb the reunification of Korea.

Neighbouring countries should the respect sovereignty of the DPRK and play a positive role in settling the reunification issue independently and peacefully in accordance with the will and demand of the Korean nation.

The recent massive anti-"government" struggle which spread far and wide in South Korea was an outburst of pent-up grudge and indignation against Park Geun Hye and the conservative regime that had been resorting to fascist dictatorship, anti-popular policy, sycophantic and traitorous acts and confrontation with the compatriots.

The improvement of inter-Korean relations is the requirement of the times that should be delayed no more.

III. Role of the ARF

As a primary forum for dialogue and cooperation among countries that have a common interest in maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional Forum has contributed significantly to securing regional peace and stability through enhancement of mutual understanding and trust with the ASEAN at its centre.

The ASEAN celebrates the 50th anniversary of its founding this year. For the past five decades, the ASEAN has maintained the principles of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of others and equality in its external relations, enabling it to improve relations with all countries in the region on the basis of friendship and cooperation, mutual benefit and common prosperity.

The ARF's past achievements and experience are largely attributable to these principles; its future development also depends on them.

The DPRK is developing good-neighbourly, friendly and cooperative relations with the countries championing independence in accordance with the ideals of its foreign policy of independence, peace, and friendship.

It is the position of the DPRK to improve relations, despite the differences in ideologies and social systems, with all countries that respect its sovereignty and are friendly to it, and promote diversified exchange and cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, and culture.

The DPRK will further develop friendly and cooperative relations with other ARF participants including the ASEAN and make sincere efforts for common development and prosperity on the principles of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in the other's internal affairs and equality.



EUROPEAN UNION

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The inter-sessional year 2016 to 2017 was a milestone for the EU and ASEAN since 2017 marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Dialogue Relations between the EU and ASEAN, the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN and the 60th of the Treaties of Rome. The EU's objectives continue to be its engagement with its current strategic partners in Asia (China, India, Japan, South Korea), to enhance its presence in the emerging regional security architecture and to launch policy initiatives concerning the EU's future cooperation with ASEAN, as confirmed also at the 21st ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting that took place in Bangkok in October 2016 and which reconfirmed the joint objective of the EU-ASEAN relationship to be elevated to a strategic partnership.

EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on global challenges, from crisis management to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance. The EU's actions are framed by the core tenets of the Lisbon Treaty and the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The EU aims to contribute to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, development of international law and promotion of peaceful solutions to conflicts.

On the basis of its own experience, the EU is a natural supporter of efforts aiming at building a robust multilateral and rule-based, cooperative security order in Asia. Since its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012 the EU has intensified its engagement with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); EU leaders have attended key high-level multilateral meetings on security in the region, from the Shangri-La Dialogue on Security in Asia to annual ARF Ministerial Meetings. This year, the EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Ms Federica Mogherini will join the ARF leaders for the Ministerial Meeting in August in Manila.

Since 2014, EU-ASEAN cooperation has been further strengthened thanks to the implementation of the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU enhanced partnership (2013-2017). The EU and ASEAN are currently working towards a new Plan of Action, which will replace the current one as of January 2018.

EU-ASEAN political partnership is undergoing a positive momentum. Both sides agreed at the latest Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok to work towards the upgrading of the partnership to a strategic one. The EU is committed to support ASEAN, including on security-related issues, as confirmed by the several ARF activities organised or co-chaired by the EU in recent years. This is an important

ingredient for the upgrading of EU-ASEAN relations, an objective that the EU continues to consider a priority in the region.

Based on its 2015 strategy “The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with strategic purpose”, the EU has significantly strengthened its cooperation with ASEAN; a dedicated EU Ambassador to ASEAN was appointed; EU assistance has been increased to €170 million (from €70 million) and to €3 billion (from €2.2 billion) to ASEAN countries eligible for EU development assistance (2014–2020).

II. National Security and Defence Policy

2016 was another decisive year for the European Union’s external action, thanks to the publication, in June 2016, of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The strategy outlines the EU’s immense potential as a global player and draws attention to priority areas like resilience building, integrated approach to conflicts and crises and an enhanced link between internal and external policies, with attention, inter alia, to migration, as well as to counter terrorism. Efforts to improve communication and public diplomacy aim to increase awareness of the EU and the role it plays in global issues.

In 2016, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy focused principally on the acute crises in the EU’s neighbourhood, whilst defending human rights, and strengthening peace and stability globally, also through missions and operations under its Common Security and Defence Policy. To the east, Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, challenge the European security order at its core. To the south, efforts will continue to focus on

bringing the conflict in Syria to a close. In addition to deepening regional instability and insecurity, the crisis in Syria also has an impact on the EU internally – both as a major security risk and in terms of a mass movement of people fleeing to safety.

In terms of defence policy, the EU Global Strategy includes proposals to strengthen civilian and military capabilities, to deepen defence cooperation, to improve the EU’s rapid response to crises, to establish a permanent planning and to conduct capability at the strategic level for non-executive military missions; the EU will also explore the potential for greater cooperation with partner countries on security and defence. The Strategy also includes the new **EU Defence Package and a Defence Action Plan**, which, inter alia, aims to set up a European Defence Fund to support investment in joint research for defence equipment and technologies. It also proposed measures for a strengthened Single Market for defence and steps to develop defence capabilities and concrete actions for the EU-NATO areas of cooperation. In that regard, following the June European Council and July Warsaw NATO Summit and including the Joint Declaration by the leaders of the institutions of EU and NATO, the EU is looking at ways to demonstrate ongoing broad cooperation as well to translate the wish of EU Member States and NATO nations to take the partnership further (in theatre, cyber-, maritime and capabilities development) as well as to prepare the ground for further strengthening of the partnership, notably on hybrid threats.

In April 2016 EU Member States agreed on greater coordination to strengthen the EU’s response to hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, the disruption of energy supplies or financial services, the undermining of public trust in government institutions and the exploitation of social tensions.

Throughout the year, the EU coupled diplomacy with new and existing fifteen Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations on the ground such as EU NAVFOR Somalia, missions in Kosovo (EULEX), Mali (EUTM Mali), Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) or the EU naval operation against human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean called EUNAVFOR MED Sophia.

As set out by the EUGS, none of these conflicts can be solved by the EU alone. For that reason, these missions have incorporated third countries from the earliest stage. 18 non-EU countries are now able to share the EU engagement for peace and security, thanks to the permanent Framework Participation Agreements they have signed and ratified. For that reason as well, the EU will continue to promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, and invests in cooperative relationships to spur shared global responsibilities.

Internationally, the EU used its diplomatic and economic influence to press for political solutions to conflicts in Syria, Libya and Ukraine. It continued to work intensively to foster the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

In regard to **Syria**, in 2016, the EU played a crucial role in gathering regional actors, international organisations and civil society to give an extra-push to end violence in Syria, to reaffirm support for the political talks in Geneva and to start preparing the post-conflict situation with a collective pledge of humanitarian aid. In April 2017 the EU organised and co-

chaired a “Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” with the United Nations and the governments of Germany, Kuwait, Norway, Qatar and the United Kingdom.

Concerning **Iran**, the EU will continue its work on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on renewing bilateral relations. Other priorities include taking forward the EU’s work in Libya. Building on an already active role in Africa the EU will continue strengthening peace and resilience including through CSDP missions and operations. The EU will also continue developing strong working partnerships in **Central and Southeast Asia**. The Brussels **Afghanistan** Conference in October 2016 was an important opportunity to foster peace, stability and security. In this framework, the EU will continue working with the United Nations, acknowledging the importance of an international system based on multilateralism. A sum of US\$15.2 billion (+/- €13.6 billion) billion was pledged by the international community for Afghanistan at the Conference. The EU and its member states committed to US\$5.6 billion (+/- €5 billion).

Moreover, throughout the year the EU continued to seek a path to manage **migration** better in all its aspects. Numerous new measures were introduced in 2016 in order to deal with the situation. The most important priority is saving more lives at sea, and then concerns focus on rescue operations and border surveillance with the support of EU. In this regard, securing the EU’s external borders, notably through the ‘hotspot’ approach¹ is of great importance.

¹ As part of the immediate action to assist frontline Member States which are facing disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders, the European Commission proposed the “Hotspot approach”. This measure consists of gathering together The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the EU Border Agency (Frontex), EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) and the EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust) to work on the ground with the authorities of the frontline Member States to help them fulfil their obligations under EU law and to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants.

Stepping up efforts in the relocation and resettlement of people in need of protection and developing new measures in the fight against migrant smuggling are also matters where the EU is further working. The EU also focused on opening new channels for legal migration and on increasing cooperation with countries of origin and transit to help them effectively to address the root causes of irregular migration.

Ultimately, the EU's biggest added value is its wide range of tools – political, economic and humanitarian – to tackle important foreign policy challenges. In a world where security challenges are becoming ever more complex, the EU's approach to external action adds particular value by addressing all dimensions of a crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation. The EU Global Strategy acknowledges this dimension by putting forward a concept of “**integrated approach**” whereby the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts. The EU's approach to global challenges, working closely with international and regional partners brings collective efforts and can deliver results, such as climate change, sustainable development, and disaster risk management and relief. As part of this comprehensive approach, joint conflict and crisis analysis will continue to support the formulation and review of the EU strategic approach to conflict-affected and fragile contexts. The EU will continue to implement its policy commitment to establishing and promoting the use of **mediation** as a ‘tool of first response’ to emerging and ongoing crisis situations. In this regard, the Union continues to support specific peace processes for example in Libya, Syria, Colombia, Myanmar/Burma and the Philippines.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

The fight against terrorism continued to take centre stage in the work of the EU during the year. Counterterrorism is a priority for the EU and ASEAN member states and it needs to be approached strategically from a civilian and criminal justice perspective with emphasis on human rights and the rule of law.

The EU's key objectives at global level remain to deepen the international consensus and to enhance international efforts to combat terrorism, including in the framework of the ARF and its ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, with its latest meeting taking place in April 2017 in Semarang (15th ARF ISM on CTTC).

Moreover, the EU will work to strengthen its response to international terrorism through multilateral cooperation, political dialogue and concrete support to third countries. The EU supports the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism presented by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) in early 2016 and supports work to mainstream Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in counter-terrorism and related efforts, including in respect of strategic communication, radicalisation and foreign terrorist fighters.

Concerning CVE in the whole ASEAN region, the EU successfully organised an **ARF workshop on CVE** in the ARF region, together with current ASEAN-chair the Philippines and ARF-partner Australia. The workshop was aimed at taking stock of relevant P/CVE initiatives in the concerned regions, shared lessons learned, good practices, and to identify areas for possible cooperation in support of the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

2015–2017, which specifically identifies CVE as one of its four priority areas.

At a global level, the EU strongly emphasises concerns over the Syria/Iraq related Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) phenomenon, their possible return to their regions of origin, and the spread of ISIL/Da'esh in the ASEAN region as well as beyond. Both ASEAN and the EU share this concern, which reaffirms EU commitment to intensify cooperation with ASEAN member states and within the framework of the ARF in combating terrorism.

The EU actively promotes a criminal law approach in CT. The respect for the rule of law and human rights is fundamental for this. The EU promotes law enforcement and judicial cooperation, addresses the conditions conducive to terrorism, strives to block terrorist financing and counter-radicalisation as well as recruitment for extremists and terrorists.

The terrorist threat is now more diffuse, helped by globally accessible internet propaganda and the FTF and returnee FTF phenomena. The EU wishes stronger cooperation with ASEAN partners to the very important issue of addressing terrorism.

Concerning EU's involvement in CT in the region, and within the framework of the Brunei Plan of Action (2013–2017), in June 2015 the 1st ASEAN–EU counter-terrorism dialogue took place (with Cambodia as ASEAN partner). This dialogue addressed issues of common concern such as violent extremism and foreign terrorist fighters as well as exploring venues for further cooperation, including in the **UN Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF)** and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) frameworks.

In this context the EU considers the GCTF as an excellent multilateral platform connecting the ASEAN region in a complementary way to the UN system. It specifically addresses capacity-building measures in Southeast Asia through the working group co-chaired by Indonesia and Australia. In addition, trans-regional CT cooperation between EU and ASEAN can clearly benefit from the networks entertained through the GCTF and its various partners in the regions.

In this matter, the EU has taken the role to include trafficking in persons, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation as a part of the ARF CTTC Work Plan (2015–2017). Its review and a new plan stay among EU's priorities.

Last, but not least, the EU remains actively involved in the region through capacity building efforts. The EU is involved in political dialogues on counter-terrorism with ASEAN and security dialogues with ASEAN-partner Indonesia; the EU, inter alia, holds regular consultations with ASEAN-partners on CT and transnational crime, the latest consultations on transnational crime took place in Jakarta in May 2016 and were chaired, from the EU side, by the head of the EEAS counter-terrorism division. In the next Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime Consultation, to be held in May 2017 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, the EU will be represented by the EU Ambassador to ASEAN.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Non-proliferation and disarmament continued to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy in 2016. In summary, the EU in 2016 continued to support universal accession to relevant international treaties and instruments as well as their full and

effective implementation, particularly with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Arms Trade Treaty. EU's support for the CTBT remains strong and universal.

The EU will maintain its policies aimed at strengthening the global disarmament architecture and the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. This includes continued diplomatic efforts towards the goal of achieving a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. The threat from illicit small arms and light weapons will continue to be addressed through international cooperation and support for concrete projects in third countries. Highlights of 2016 on this field were the EU's presence on 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in November 2016 and 5th Review Conference on the Convention on Conventional Weapons in December 2016, both in Geneva. The EU will also support international efforts to enhance outer space security.

Concerning recent developments, the EU took part in the 9th ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NP and Disarmament), in Auckland (8-9 March 2017). In this regard, the EU emphasized the importance of the peaceful applications of the CTBT and the role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its International Monitoring System (CTBTO IMS), especially on its commitment to nuclear safety and contribution to nuclear security.

In fact, the EU is a natural partner in the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the best safety,

security and non-proliferation conditions. For instance, the EU contributes to the ITER2 project, demonstrating the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion as a safe, environmentally responsible and abundant energy source where ARF partners also participate. The EU has substantial experience in nuclear safety and is happy to share it within the ARF framework. The EU regards nuclear security as an enabler of peaceful uses and it is aware that the implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material may require capacity building; the EU is ready to provide assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The EU also encourages a revision to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its civil applications, where the EU is willing to organize an event on this topic in the region.

On substance, the EU reaffirm its commitment to preserve the Southeast Asia region free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction by strengthening cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promoting relevant international instruments; this includes the entry into force and universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the commitment to fight against the illicit trade in conventional arms, including through the Arms Trade Treaty.

C. Transnational Crime

Serious and organised crime represents an underestimated threat globally. It remained on the agenda of EU political dialogues with many countries and

² ITER ("The Way" in Latin) is one of the most ambitious energy projects in the world today. Members collaborate to build a magnetic fusion device designed to prove the feasibility of fusion as a large-scale and carbon-free source of energy. The ITER Members—China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States—are now engaged in a 35-year collaboration to build and operate the ITER experimental device, and together bring fusion to the point where a demonstration fusion reactor can be designed.

regional and international organisations, in particular in relation to drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. EU-funded assistance programmes and CSDP missions contributed to translating political orientations into practice. These actions also seek to complement the EU (internal) Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime 2014–2017.

In the region, the EU remains actively involved through capacity building efforts and through political dialogues on transnational crime with ASEAN. The EU holds regular consultations with ASEAN-partners on the topic, being the latest consultations in Jakarta in May 2016.

The **5th ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime Consultation** was co-chaired by Pol. Maj. Gen. Apichat Suriboonya, Head of NCB-INTERPOL, Foreign Affairs Division of the Royal Thai Police and Mr. John Gatt-Rutter, Head of Counter-Terrorism Division, EEAS. The Consultation was attended by Senior Officials from ASEAN Member States, the European Union and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat.

The EU side believes that the security of the EU is also intertwined with the security in the ASEAN region, especially in addressing the threats posed by terrorism and transnational crime. As such, the EU further highlights that combating terrorism and transnational crime is one of the main areas of ASEAN-EU cooperation as reflected in the **Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership 2013–2017 and the ARF Work Plan to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime 2014–2017**.

In the eyes of the EU, economic and trade connectivity is a priority, yet connectivity also facilitates security challenges like

transnational crime, which undermines nation-states' capability in addressing threats to security. To counter this danger, greater cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, particularly with the Europol could be further explored, such as through exchange of information and other practical activities to help identifying and countering transnational crime networks, especially those ones on **trafficking in people and drugs**. To this end, the EU is delighted to host a Europol office within its delegation in Singapore.

Ultimately, the EU also attended the 15th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) **Intersessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CTTC)**– on the 6 and 7 April in Semarang, Indonesia. In this meeting, the EU underpinned again the importance of setting mechanisms to improve connectivity and coordination between the many civil society and community-based initiatives working in the subject, seen that improving the link between the internal/external and the national / regional policies tackling this threat is the backbone to succeed in countering transnational crime networks worldwide.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

In 2016, the EU continued to support the development of regional capabilities in the ARF/ ASEAN framework in the specific field of disaster response. The EU remained a significant actor in the field of international disaster relief, where it has an interest in shaping the process of fostering cooperation at a regional and international level.

The EU acknowledges that Southeast Asia is amongst the regions most affected by disasters around the world. Therefore, through the disaster preparedness program (DIPECHO) and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the EU has a

strong track record of supporting ASEAN and its Member states, and is increasingly engaging in more disaster management activities and policy related issues with ASEAN.

The Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid department has been engaging with the ASEAN Secretariat on the future development of the "ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (AADMER) post 2015 as well as reinforcing operational links and mutual exchange of information with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre).

The EU supports financially the Integrated Programme in Enhancing the Capacity of AHA Centre and ASEAN Emergency Response Mechanisms (EU-SAHA).

Cooperation on disaster management is a positive contribution to the strategic aims of ASEAN sustainable development and to the regional integration process; it reinforces the "centrality" of ASEAN structures in Southeast Asia, facilitating ASEAN Leadership to "Respond-As-One."

It is important to stress the progress made by the EU and its continued commitment at political level, being aware that further cooperation in the years to come and development of mutual solidarity mechanisms are much welcome. The EU stands ready to help as a humanitarian assistance partner of ASEAN when disasters strike and national response capacities are overwhelmed.

Furthermore, the EU welcomes the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management and the "ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (AADMER) Programme for 2016-2020 and is keen to further strengthen cooperation on Disaster Management notably by: supporting

AADMER; the ASEAN Secretary General in his role of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator; or by reinforcing operational links and mutual exchange of information with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). Experience shows that better results come from promoting exchanges of expertise on trainings with the ASEAN Emergency Response Team (ERAT), and by facilitating mutual participation in exercises.

In addition, the upcoming project financed by the EU, the "Integrated Programme in Enhancing the Capacity of AHA Centre and ASEAN Emergency Response Mechanisms (EU SAHA) will be a major contribution in this regard.

Lastly, the EU presence in the latest edition of the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on Disaster Relief) in Bangkok was a tangible sign of the EU's commitment towards ARF and ASEAN in this topic.

E. Maritime Security

Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific region is crucial to worldwide prosperity and to the EU's growth prospects. Southeast Asia buys almost a quarter of EU exports and it is among the fastest-growing export markets, being also home to the fastest-growing economies. In addition, the European Union has a strategic interest in regional security and stability in Asia. Almost 50% of world shipping by tonnage transits the South China Sea.

Europe and Asia are connected with a trade route crossing the Indian Ocean and passing the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca straits - two piracy prone areas. Energy supplies, raw materials and goods transiting these waters are of vital importance to most economies

worldwide. Maritime transport carries 90% of world trade and over 40% of the world's merchant fleet is EU/EEA-controlled.

Therefore, the EU is engaged in promoting maritime security in the region. Indeed, the EU has a long history of engagement helping East African countries upgrade the level of their capacity at sea (antipiracy or by fighting against drug smuggling and human trafficking), something which also benefits Asian trade with Europe.

In line with trade and trafficking flows between the EU and the rest of the world, the EU intends to focus more of its financial instruments over the coming period in the Central and Eastern India Ocean. The EU seeks to export its experience in maritime security with regional actors through seminars or high level dialogues.

Taking into account the above, the EU is actively engaged in fostering closer relations with ASEAN region, building on the achievements of the ongoing **High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security** between the two regions and under the framework of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). The High-Level on Maritime Security (HLD on MS) will undergo its 4th edition in 2017, showing that this type of activity provides useful examples and takes the EU and ASEAN cooperation in security matters one step further.

In this path, the EU intends to make best use of its **co-chairing** position in the next three years cycle of **ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime Security** (ARF ISM on MS), with Vietnam and Australia, to ensure consistency and synergy with the EU-ASEAN HLD on MS. Future meetings of the HLD shall take into account this potentiality for the EU and ASEAN to factor their common concerns/intentions in the ARF ISM and vice versa.

In the context of the ongoing EU-ASEAN cooperation on Maritime Security, the EU's interest lies in achieving a more substantive strand of EU-ASEAN cooperation, including a permanent forum dedicated to maritime security. Areas of cooperation previously identified would include sharing regional best practices, port security, maritime situation awareness (technology and information sharing), possible civil and military staff exchanges (Coast Guards and Navies) or training.

At international level and in particular in International Maritime Organization (IMO), the EU is willing to cooperate with the ASEAN countries and work together, to enhance maritime security through new common rules, in important areas such as the deployment of armed guards to deter piracy, or other sensitive issues.

Piracy attacks have substantially decreased over recent years in the case of the Western Indian Ocean, following the deployment in 2008 of EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and other similar naval deployments, although challenges remain. This mission, in combination with the wider international response and the implementation of the Best Management Practices by commercial ships and the provision of private armed guards on board ships have proved successful to considerably reduce the attacks.

Yet, the number of piracy incidents and attacks in Southeast Asia has recently increased, becoming a subject of growing concern. To this respect, the EU is willing to learn about positive experiences, by expressing support to positive steps to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea taken in Southeast Asia. The EU welcomes programmes such as the Information Sharing Centre (ISC) under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (**ReCAAP**) framework, or

the **Critical Maritime Routes (CMR)** programme. This initiative was funded by the EU and focused, since 2009, on the security and safety of essential maritime routes in areas affected by piracy, helping to secure shipping and trading lines of communication.

Finally, it has also been decided to focus the 3rd CSDP Orientation Seminar with a focus on EU-ASEAN relations – to be held in Rome on 5-9 June – on maritime security and to extend the invitations to Coastguards from the ASEAN MS.

IV. Role of ARF

In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, continued to address regional and international security issues. The HR/VP will take part in the 24th ARF Ministerial in Manila on 7 August 2017, setting out the EU's stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. The EU contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum is a tangible demonstration of its willingness to support the ASEAN-led security architecture in Southeast Asia. As stated on numerous occasions, the EU looks forward to making this interaction deeper and wider and is ready to make a significant contribution to all ASEAN-led processes, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting – Plus.

The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a long-standing and active ARF member, the EU is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules-based regional security order. The ARF offers a valuable platform for the EU and its Asian partners to engage on a broad range of issues such

as maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Drawing on its comprehensive approach, the EU has engaged actively with ARF partners at various levels, e.g. through Intersessional Meetings, the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) and the related Defence Officials' Dialogue, the Senior Officials' Meeting and the ARF Ministerial. The EU respects the central role of ASEAN in the emerging regional architecture and believes in the need to ensure transparency and synergy between ARF and other regional fora such as the ADDM+ meetings and the East Asia Summit.

The EU is keen to make the ARF, in line with ARF Ministerial Guidance, more 'action oriented'. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of strengthening the organizational and institutional structures of the ARF, including the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat.

The EU is also keen to strengthening the quantity and quality of the EU engagement in ARF and ASEAN security-related activities. In this respect, the EU has been active in the area of **Maritime Security** (High Level Dialogues in Jakarta 2013, Kuala Lumpur 2015, Bangkok September 2016 and the 4th one to take place in October 2017 in the Philippines); **Preventive Diplomacy** (ARF trainings in Brunei 2014, Indonesia 2015 and the next workshop to take place in Myanmar in June 2017); **CBRN** (EU-funded Centre of Excellence plus ARF workshop in Manila in 2015); **Disaster Management and Crisis Response** (dedicated EU support for AHA Centre), **Cyber security** (Kuala Lumpur 2015 and 2016 with Malaysia), ARF Workshop on **Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism** (with the Philippines and Australia in February 2017) or the Workshop on Trafficking in **Persons with Indonesia** (in April 2017)



INDIA

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

The strategic landscape and security environment around the world has evolved considerably over the last decade. In the present scenario, focus of the international community is slowly shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific is a heterogeneous region with a diversity of political systems, security perspectives and developmental choices. There are large and vibrant pools of progress and prosperity that spread across the landscape of this region and it is likely to remain driver of global prosperity for decades to come. However, rising ambition and rivalries are generating visible stress points. Coupled with this, the steady increase in military power, resources and wealth in the Asia-Pacific has raised the stakes for its security.

The maturation of the world in the direction of globalisation has weakened State borders but also increased insecurity among States with regards to territory, sovereignty and jurisdiction. No significant part of the world is self-contained or unaffected by forces beyond it. In the unfolding scenario, no country can tackle these challenges in its individual capability or capacity; States need to collectively develop solutions to deal with the trans-national and global character of these problems.

The traditional challenges of territorial integrity and maritime security are specifically pronounced in the region. States have strong trade links with each other but are wary of losing their sovereignty and hence are sensitive to issues related to borders and dominion. The significance of maritime security has increased exponentially in the past few years and maritime domain is witnessing increased sovereignty claims and conflicting interests.

Apart from traditional security challenges, the region increasingly faces non-traditional challenges that are transnational in character. These non-traditional challenges emanate from terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), arms and drug trafficking, humanitarian disasters, environmental degradation and cyber crime. These threats do not respect states' sovereignty and transcend national boundaries. The recent incident in cyber domain such as the ransomware is a manifestation of potential damage that can be inflicted on the global stage.

On the positive side, regional groupings have emerged as one of the building blocks of global order. The primary driving force of these groupings is their commonality. ASEAN is an apt example which has long functioned as an anchor of stability in the region and its continuance in that role has become critical. In a similar vein, ASEAN led ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has emerged as an important initiative for developing pluralistic, cooperative

security order reflective of the diversity of the Asia Pacific region. ARF can play a critical role in warding off the daunting challenges posed by the traditional and non-traditional threats standing dangerously at the door step and help in developing open, transparent, balanced and inclusive security architecture in the region.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

India's core values based on its enduring social, moral and ideological principles date back to more than 5000 years. These are best reflected in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, which are, sovereignty, socialism, secularism, democracy, republican character, justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, human dignity, unity and integrity of the Nation, respect for diversity, peaceful co-existence, pluralism, tolerance and international peace defined by a just international order.

India's strategic intent is shaped by its civilizational ethos of realism, co-existence, cooperation and partnership. This finds expression in a clear and responsible articulation of its national interests. The prosperity of Indians, both at home and abroad, and security of its citizens are of paramount importance. Our actions and aspirations, capacities and human capital, democracy and demography, and strength and success will continue to be a pillar of all round regional and global progress. The economic and political rise of the country represents a regional and global opportunity of great significance. It is a force for peace, a factor for stability and an engine of growth for regional and global prosperity. This is in line with the Indian ethos of Vasudev Kutumbakam, i.e., the World is One Family.

In line with its national values, the government has continued to accord high priority to relations with countries in Asia. In general, India's approach of seeking closer ties, building stronger connectivity and expanding cooperation has seen greater support and acceptance among our partners in the larger neighbourhood.

India is pursuing greater cooperation on political and security matters with countries of the region in pursuance of its "Act East Policy". Since May 2014, India's President, Vice President and Prime Minister have, among them, visited nine out of ten ASEAN countries. The Prime Minister's presence at the three East Asia Summits from 2014-2016 and his visits to EAS participating countries like the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Australia brings out new salience of the Asia-Pacific in the India's foreign and security policy paradigms. India's cooperation remained focused on implementing projects related to connectivity, developing contacts and stronger integration with the region as well as building partnerships with ARF member states on security and defence focussing on various traditional and non-traditional security threats in the region.

India has also pro-actively engaged with the various other ASEAN centric organizations, notably the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), in shaping the regional discourse on Counter Terrorism, Disaster Management and Maritime Cooperation.

A. Counter Terrorism

Terrorism remains the most pervasive and serious challenge to international peace and security. India strongly condemns terrorism in all forms and manifestations and emphasises that no cause or grievance can ever justify acts of terrorism, whether based upon ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic or any other reasons.

India firmly believes that unprecedented spread of terrorism mandates decisive and collective response on part of the entire community, without double standards and selectivity, in accordance with international law and the UN Charter. India urges all countries and entities to work sincerely to disrupt terrorist networks and their financing, and stop cross-border movement of terrorists.

Multilateral and regional forum like the ARF becomes instrumental in tackling this challenge as it brings together the key States in the region to combat terrorism. India has played an active role in forging regional cooperation to combat terrorism. The ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Counter Terrorism and Trans-national Crime (CTTC) is the flagship event of the ARF on counter terrorism. The ISM on CTTC is in its 15th year and one of its significant achievement has been the ARF Work Plan on CTTC 2015-17 along with its effective implementation. In support of ARF initiatives related to counter terrorism, India has participated in a number of counter-terrorism workshops and seminars in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios. India recently co-chaired, along with host country Indonesia, the ISM on CTTC in April 2017.

India has been actively pursuing the cause of counter terrorism, not only at regional forums such as the ARF but also at national and international forums. India organized a conference on Counter Terrorism from 14 to 16 March 2017 titled 'Terrorism in the Indian Ocean Region'. India has also welcomed the UN initiative to build a counter terrorism office and has been actively pursuing the development of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the United Nations. More importantly, India is also pushing for disqualification from the Commonwealth, member states supporting "terrorism and radical extremism" and seeking to develop counter terrorism cooperation at other regional groupings such as BRICS. A global counter terrorism conference is being organised this year in India with the aim to strengthen the global counter-terrorism normative to combat this scourge.

India continues to hold structured consultations through Joint Working Groups on Counter Terrorism (JWG-CT) with various partner countries. The JWGs provide a forum for counter-terrorism cooperation and enable sharing of information, experience and assessments regarding global terrorism, training and capacity building including in relevant technologies and equipment, countering terrorist finance, strengthening of multilateral efforts in the area of counter-terrorism, and facilitating agency-to-agency cooperation. It has served as a useful platform in addressing common concerns such as growth of regional and international terrorism, drug-trafficking, financing of terrorism, cyber security, use of Internet by terrorists, border security, law enforcement, mutual legal assistance and extradition.

B. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The twin goals of containing nuclear proliferation and developing a global agenda on disarmament continue to engage States of the ARF. The growing arms race between states has been counterproductive to the development of a comprehensive Non-Proliferation agenda.

India has an unwavering commitment to global efforts for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. India as a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) continues to support global and non-discriminatory international conventions encouraging efforts for strengthening their implementation.

India has participated actively in the ARF ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and related workshops and seminars. India also participates actively in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and in the UN Plan of Action to Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects. India has a robust system of export control to prevent chances of proliferation and has aligned its export controls in line with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and Australia Group (AG).

India remains committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. India's nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against

non-nuclear weapon states. India believes that nuclear disarmament can be achieved in a step by step process endorsed by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. All states possessing nuclear weapons need to make a contribution by engaging in a meaningful dialogue to build trust and confidence which would reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. Progressive steps, such as supporting multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are needed for the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons paving the way for their complete elimination.

India attaches importance to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. India has stated its willingness to participate constructively in the Fissile Missile Cut Off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the CD as part of its Programme of Work as outlined in the Shannon Mandate. India is a responsible nuclear member of the world community, and would approach these negotiations as such.

India also places great value on the role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating expansion of nuclear energy to meet global energy needs in a clean and sustainable manner. All states have a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the obligations they have undertaken. A number of agreements and reciprocal commitments have been concluded as part of the India's civil nuclear initiative.

The global concerns regarding nuclear terrorism and clandestine proliferation, which continue to pose serious threats to international security, are followed

closely by India. Nuclear terrorism will remain a potent threat as long as there are terrorists seeking to gain access to nuclear material and technologies for malicious purposes. In this regard, India has contributed actively to the Nuclear Security Summits (NSSs) and has also participated in various endeavours aimed at strengthening the nuclear security architecture at the global level.

India believes that the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 is a very important mechanism to ensure that non-state actors do not get access to nuclear material and nuclear technologies. In consonance with this belief, India's Ministry of External Affairs, in coordination with the Indian Department of Atomic Energy hosted 152 technical experts and policy representatives from 41 partner nations of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) along with 4 of its official observer international organizations for the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) meeting in February 2017 in New Delhi.

C. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Over the centuries, natural disasters have wreaked havoc in various parts of the world, resulting in large scale loss of life, livelihoods, infrastructure and public utilities. Disasters have the destructive potential to reverse years of development in a matter of minutes. There is, therefore, a critical need to cooperate closely with each other and share experience and expertise on disaster management and mitigation, building rescue and relief capacities, and disseminating more widely technologies and innovations in rescue equipment and techniques amongst stakeholders.

The states of Asia-Pacific are more prone to natural disasters due to the geographical location. Their vulnerability is accentuated by the relatively poor socio-economic conditions that prevail in some parts of the region. Initiatives taken by ARF to combat disaster relief have been successful in tackling this grave challenge. India actively participated in the last ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiRex15) in Malaysia by deploying one Naval Ship and personnel from military and National Disaster Response Force. Also, India participates in the ARF ISM on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and all the ARF activities related to Disaster Relief.

India itself is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world. About 58.6% of the Indian landmass is prone to earthquakes; over 12% is prone to floods; 68% of the cultivable area is susceptible to drought and out of the 7,500 km long coastline, about 5,700 km is prone to cyclones.

In recent times, India has made strides in improving its disaster related capabilities and taken on the mantle of first responders to HADR situation. Building on the 2004 tsunami relief experience, India has undertaken a wide range of HADR operations, from major evacuation in Yemen and South Sudan to supply of drinking water to the Maldives and providing relief supplies by air to Fiji and Sri Lanka. It has garnered significant appreciation in its efforts aimed at minimising damage from Cyclones Phailin and Hudhud in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Another example of recent Indian cooperation in disaster response is the Indian rescue and relief assistance mission during the Nepal earthquake. Indian assistance reached Nepal within six hours of the 25 April 2015 earthquake. Indian military

aircraft, helicopters, commercial flights, cargo trucks and trains carried relief material and rescue teams to Nepal. National Disaster Response Force of India worked in coordination with Nepalese security agencies to help rescue victims and clear debris. Support was extended to the Nepal electricity authorities in restoring power in different parts of Nepal.

In the most recent event in May this year, India rushed relief materials and deployed rescue personnel to Sri Lanka as the country recently faced floods that claimed the lives of 122 people and displaced half a million. India was the first country to respond and dispatched three Naval ships (INS Kirch, INS Shardul and INS Jalashwa) with emergency supplies to help Sri Lanka in the rescue and relief operations. It also delivered medical and diving teams along with boats and helicopters to Sri Lanka.

D. Maritime Security

Although Asia-Pacific has a large land mass to its credit, the water bodies offer critical connecting routes to the region. A number of island states inhabit the region. In this era of global connectivity and economic interdependence, all nations have a stake in maritime security and ocean governance both for trade and resource. This is an issue of significant relevance to the growing economies of Asia Pacific Region as economic growth of the region remains critically dependent on oceanic connectivity and stable maritime environment. It is a fundamental factor in ensuring the welfare and economic security of the region.

Maritime security environment in the Asia-Pacific region continues to be fragile. The threat of 'intra-State' as well as 'inter-State' conflict remains a

grim reality in the maritime security environment. Non-state threats to maritime security are also on the rise from maritime terrorism, smuggling, transnational crimes, drug-trafficking, piracy, unregulated private maritime security companies, and proliferation of sensitive items. In the recent time, of all the threats to Maritime Security, Maritime Terrorism has emerged as a formidable challenge. India has been a victim of this scourge when terror visited it from sea in November 2008.

India's central peninsular position in the Indian Ocean and geopolitical circumstances makes it reliant on the seas. India's economic resurgence is directly linked to its overseas trade and energy needs, most of which are transported by sea. Mercantile trade constitutes more than 40% of India's GDP, and is likely to increase in the future. India's oil imports have risen to nearly 80%, almost all of which is transported by sea. 95% of India's total overseas trade by volume is through shipping and one third of the world's bulk cargo and half its container traffic passes through the Indian Ocean. The security of trade and commerce is, therefore, of utmost primacy and importance for India. The location of choke points such as Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and others and the presence of multinational maritime forces makes maritime security even more relevant today. A secure maritime environment, which enables unhindered pursuit of economic activities, is, therefore, essential for the overall economic development and prosperity of the country.

India has a long history of being a maritime nation and its maritime interests are strategic and significant in all directions. The arc of influence of Indian Ocean extends well beyond its littoral limits. Its initiative of

SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region – is not just limited to safe-guarding mainland and islands and defines efforts to deepen economic and security cooperation in maritime relationships. Convergence, cooperation and collective action will advance economic activity and peace in maritime region of India. The primary responsibility for peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean rests with those who live in the region. India's approach is not exclusive and aims to bring countries together on the basis of respect for international law.

India supports peace, stability, security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, and unimpeded commerce, based on principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. All states should resolve their disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability, respect the diplomatic and legal processes.

India also recognizes that the sea lanes of communication passing through the South China Sea are critical for economic growth in the larger and inter-linked marine geography of the Asia-Pacific and urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans and fully observe the Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and finalize the Code of Conduct (CoC).

India has been highly conscious of its responsibility to the safety and security of the Indian Ocean and has been active in promoting maritime domain awareness, concluding White Shipping Agreements, ensuring coastal surveillance and conducting hydrographic services.

According high importance to the developments in maritime domain, ARF organizes ISM on Maritime Security which deals extensively with the issues of piracy, trafficking of drugs and humans and unregulated fishing. India regularly participates in the ARF events to promote maritime security initiatives. India will be partnering with ARF Chair-Philippines in organization of a workshop on Best Practices in Implementing Safety of Navigation Instruments scheduled to take place from 11-12 July 2017 in Manila, Philippines. India is also part of various other multilateral institutions which are actively deliberating maritime security issues in the region and include ADMM Plus, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ship in Asia (ReCAAP) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum. India also took an active role in fighting piracy, both to its west and east. Since 2008, the Indian Navy has undertaken more than 50 anti-piracy escort missions in the Gulf of Aden contributing to greater maritime security in the region.

Floating Armoury is another issue which has exposed a nebulous area in the rapidly growing practice which is substantiated by recent events. Taking cognisance of this issue, India introduced a paper proposing development of an international regulatory framework for floating armouries at the 97th session of the Maritime Safety Committee of International Maritime Organization held in London this year. India has also actively participated in arrangements like the SOMS (States of Malacca and Singapore) mechanism for maritime safety.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

India, along with Vietnam, co-chaired the Executive Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) for 2013-2017 under the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meet Plus (ADMM+). Last year, Indian Army hosted all members of ADMM+ for a field training exercise. The exercise was themed on humanitarian mine action and UN peacekeeping operations and had 361 participants and observers. Additionally, a number of mutually beneficial initiatives have been undertaken wherein Indian Army training team imparted training to the Cambodian Armed Forces in Demining Operations and recovery of unexploded munitions and in UN Peace Keeping Operations. India is currently co-chair, along with Vietnam, of an Expert Working Group on Military Medicine (EWG on MM) for 2017-2020 work cycle.

IV. Role of ARF

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994, including in cooperative activities in the area of non-traditional security challenges. It has emerged as an open and inclusive forum for Asia-Pacific nations to have dialogue and cooperation on important political and security issues. The ASEAN way of “dialogue and consensus” have served the grouping well and should remain ARF’s guiding principles.

ARF provides a valuable platform in which practical cooperation can be forged amongst the member States in addressing various challenges of different hue and colour. Regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. This is in line with India’s values and culture and India actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including the ASEAN led forums. All aspects discussed in the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) such as cyber security, de-radicalization, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises are facets India is keen to contribute to and collaborate with other ARF members. India hosted the sole Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) meeting from 11-12 April 2016 in New Delhi.

In synchronization with the changing regional security landscape, ARF should further strengthen its activities on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy. Operationally, India also hopes that there should be greater synergy between ARF and other forums such as EAS and ADMM Plus. India remains fully supportive of the ARF process and its role as a key pillar of the Asia-Pacific security architecture. India is committed to the multi-layered ARF mechanisms, in accordance with the spirit outlined in the ARF 2020 Vision Statement and the Hanoi Plan of Action.



INDONESIA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Since its establishment in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been engaging in confidence building measures that have contributed to the creation of a political and security environment conducive to peace and stability in the region. In the light of its main objective to “develop a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations for the Asia-Pacific region” as well as to address various security challenges, the ARF should be more proactive in playing its role by enhancing its civil-military cooperation and coordination.

In the context of inter-state relations, Indonesia underlines the importance of the ARF to upholding the ASEAN Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations, and universally recognized international law thereby enhancing regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity as well as promoting mutual confidence and trust.

The year 2017 marked the 50th anniversary of ASEAN, which raises an expectation for ASEAN becoming a more mature, united, resilient, and relevant association. This would be timely, since the situation of peace and development in the region that has lasted for five decades has been challenged by both traditional and non-traditional security threats.

In the maritime aspect, Indonesia’s view of the regional security outlook is consistent with its strategic geographical location, its nature as the largest archipelago in the world, and its vision to be the global maritime fulcrum. We therefore deem maritime security in the region as top priority. The 2003 Declaration on ASEAN Concord II stipulates that maritime issues are transboundary in nature and that they should be addressed in a comprehensive and integrated manner. Southeast Asian waters and the surrounding area are vital to the region’s economy, trade, transportation, and communication. Moreover, the region also has unresolved maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes as well as non-traditional maritime security threats.

The situation in the South China Sea continues to be in the spotlight in the international community. Even though Indonesia is not a claimant state in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Indonesia attaches great importance to peace and stability. The recently agreed framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea demonstrates the commitment shared between ASEAN and China to safeguard peace, security, and stability in the region. However, it is understood that the COC Framework is by no means the final product. Hence, Indonesia believes that expediting the COC negotiation process is essential to achieve the main objective: the adoption of the COC.

Disputes generated from overlapping claims in the area underscores the necessity for the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Observing international law will also reduce the risk of an open conflict that could have a detrimental effect on the region and beyond. Therefore, it is crucial for all parties to refrain from activities that may escalate tensions, as well as fully and effectively implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

Maritime security is not limited to discussions on the South China Sea issue, but also extends to discussions on non-traditional maritime security issues relevant to the region. Important issues that need to be addressed in this perspective, among others, are piracy, armed robbery at sea, terrorism, illicit drugs trafficking, illicit small arms trafficking, and trafficking in persons. The nexus between crimes at sea and maritime activities was one of the main topics discussed during the 15th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CTTC) in Semarang, 6-7 April 2017, in which Indonesia acted as both host and co-chair together with India. Prior to the 15th ARF ISM on CTTC meeting, with focus on the issue of trafficking in persons, Indonesia and the European Union co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Trafficking in Persons that underlined the urgent need to enhance cooperation among ARF Participants to combat TIP.

In the case of Indonesia, the efforts to eradicate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing have been highlighted in the past several years due to its impact not only on the economy and environment, but also on the political, security, and social situation.

Measures have been taken in order to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing, including initiatives for closer regional cooperation and strengthening national law enforcement to safeguard Indonesia's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with the principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.

In the context of the ARF, Indonesia's effort to mainstream the issue of IUUF is reflected through conducting/co-chairing workshop on this issue as well as taking the lead in the drafting of the draft ARF Statement on Cooperation to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing, which has been completed at the working to the ministerial level.

Aside from maritime security, one of the main concerns in the region comes from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Indonesia believes that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threatens the existence of every nation in the world, humanity, as well as peace, security and stability of the world at large. We believe that the world will never be safe from the threat of nuclear catastrophe until nuclear weapons are totally eliminated.

The growing crisis in the Korean Peninsula is alarming, as it puts nations on the verge of nuclear conflict. It is imperative for all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint to de-escalate tension and refrain from taking any actions that may aggravate the situation on the ground. It is also of highest importance to fully comply with and fulfill obligations under all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, international laws, for the sake of peace and security of the international community. Indonesia also calls for the resumption of the dialogue and diplomatic process to create conditions conducive to peace and stability, and stands ready to play its part in the process.

While it is true that the world today has a large body of treaties, commitments and fora to advance non-proliferation, there are still thousands of nuclear warheads on stockpile. In this regard, Indonesia alongside ASEAN fully supports the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/258 on Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which calls on member states to participate in the 2017 UN Conference to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons including their total elimination. Indonesia also continues to consider the CTBT as a key element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

To safeguard the region from the threat, Indonesia has always been committed to intensify the ongoing efforts of the State Parties of the Treaty of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and the Nuclear Weapons States to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the early signing and ratifying of the Protocol to that Treaty, as reflected in the ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.

Indonesia believes that there is room for the ARF to be more active on the issue of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (NPD). In this regard, Indonesia is looking forward to working with Japan and Republic of Korea to co-chair the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on NPD in the inter-sessional year 2018–2020.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

A. Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

The impact of globalization has prompted more dynamic interstate relations in the geopolitical constellation. The consequences of this development have

increased mutual and common challenges faced by many nations, including Indonesia. Several key concerns of Indonesia's security and defence policy are translated into classification of threats, among others: terrorism, radicalism, separatism and armed rebellions, natural disasters, border violations, sea piracy and natural resources theft, epidemics, cyber attacks and espionage, trafficking and drug abuse, and conventional war or armed conflicts.

Indonesia will continue to cooperate with every nation based on the values of equality and mutual respect, since those challenges are cross-cutting in nature. Indonesia is in the process of modernizing its defence posture. This effort is aimed at securing its territory and contributing to world peace.

Indonesia adheres to a doctrine of national defence that has been crafted on the basis of the Pancasila, the national ideology, and the 1945 Constitution, and involves all stakeholders, territories, and other national resources as a system to protect and defend the people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. It also aims at contributing to regional peace and security.

Indonesia has actively contributed to the progress of ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus in promoting regional peace and security through dialogue and cooperation. One of Indonesia's notable contributions include the hosting of Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institution (NADI) Workshop on "Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation in order to prevent Transnational Crimes in the Region" on 20–23 November 2016 in Bali, Indonesia. The Workshop served as an important forum for discussing the principles of defence diplomacy in addressing existing and future security challenges as well as crises and potential conflicts in the region.

The 2016 NADI Workshop last year discussed national policies and perspectives of ASEAN Member States on maritime security in Southeast Asia, especially ways to cooperate in combating transnational crimes in the region to ensure the safety of sea lanes and ports. Establishment of national response centers was suggested during the Workshop to effectively deal with transnational crimes in the maritime domain.

Within the framework of ADMM-Plus, in 2016, Indonesia participated in four regional exercises, namely: the ADMM-Plus Joint Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Exercise in Pune, India on 23 February–8 March 2016; the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security (MS) and Counter Terrorism (CT) Exercise in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore on 2–12 May 2016; the ADMM-Plus Joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Military Medicine (MM) Exercise in Chonburi Province, Thailand on 1–11 September 2016; and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) EWG on Maritime Security Exercise “Mahi Tangaroa” in Auckland, New Zealand on 13–17 November 2016. In the said exercises, Indonesia contributed defence personnel, equipment and ships.

Beyond the region, Indonesia is also duty-bound to contribute to world peace in accordance with the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This is the rationale behind Indonesia's involvement in peacekeeping operations, as the country's contribution to the shaping of a better world of peace and social justice as well as equitable prosperity.

Indonesia has actively participated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1957 through its contributions to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East.

Indonesian contingents have been among the peacekeeping forces sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Sinai, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Bosnia, Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti, and Central African Republic. Indonesia sent its largest contingent to Cambodia in the early 1990s. It is currently the top contributing country to UNIFIL (Lebanon), where the Indonesian contingent stands at 1,296 personnel, including one navy-ship deployed with the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. Furthermore, three Indonesian officers have been assigned to hold leadership positions as Force Commanders/Chief Military Observer in three United Nations Peacekeeping missions, namely UNEF (Major General Rais Abin, 1976–1979), UNPROFOR (Brigadier General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 1995–1996), and MINURSO (Major General Edy Mulyono, August 2013–September 2015).

As of March 2017, there were 2,727 Indonesian military and police personnel participating in nine United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, namely MINURSO (Western Sahara), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNISFA (Abyei, Sudan), and UNMISS (South Sudan). The number places Indonesia in the 11th rank among Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), and also the biggest T/PCC in South East Asia. Previously, during the month of February 2017, Indonesia deployed 2,871 personnel and was in the 8th rank among 124 T/PCCs.

In recent years, Indonesia has fulfilled its sustained and firm commitment to step-up its presence in UN peacekeeping. In this regard, the Government has formulated a “Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015–2019” as a strategic

guidance that underpins Indonesia's effort to becoming a top ten T/PCCs through the deployment of 4,000 personnel by 2019.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia established in West Java Province the Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in December 2011. The Center, which also includes a Peacekeeping Training Center, serves as a venue for pre-deployment trainings, joint exercises, as well as regional and international peacekeeping workshops and seminars, and for improving the capacity and professionalism of Indonesian peacekeepers, to prepare them for the multidimensional and increasingly complex demands and mandates of UN PKOs.

At the regional level, Indonesia has played an active role in strengthening ASEAN cooperation in the field of peacekeeping, through its initiative to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network (APCN) within the framework of the ADMM. The initiative is aimed at promoting and enhancing cooperation among defence and armed forces of ASEAN Member States through sharing of experiences, expertise and related capacities in peacekeeping. In 2013, Indonesia hosted the second meeting of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network from 2 to 5 September 2013 at the IPSC, Bogor, West Java Province. Indonesia also hosted the Asia Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations in July 2015, aimed at strengthening support from countries in the region to UN Peacekeeping. As a further contribution, Indonesia will host the 5th APCN meeting on 6-8 November 2017. In the framework of ADMM-Plus Country, Indonesia will lead as co-chair with Australia in the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) as the Working Group implements the three-year working program for the period 2017 to 2020.

Indonesia co-chaired the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, on the sidelines of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly. In the Summit, the Vice President of Indonesia conveyed Indonesia's pledges and commitment to deploy one Military Composite Battalion, one Formed Police Unit, and 100 Individual Police Officers, including 60 female officers, to the UNIFIL in Lebanon. Indonesia also reiterated a commitment to deploy civilian experts to UN missions, in line with the Roadmap Vision 4000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019.

Additionally, Indonesia has actively participated in the follow-up to the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, namely the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Meeting, London, September 2016, and the Peacekeeping Meeting in the Francophone Environment, Paris, October 2016. Indonesia also hosted an event on "The Role of Women in UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned From Women Peacekeepers in UN Peacekeeping Operations," on the Sidelines of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Meeting (C-34), at the UN Headquarters, New York, February 2017. Furthermore, Indonesia will participate in the upcoming UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Meeting, in Vancouver, Canada, 14-15 November 2017, which is crucial to the advancement of peacekeeping reform through the efforts of Member States and the UN as well as to the fostering of innovative solutions to make peacekeeping more effective.

In the future, Indonesia expects to enhance its contributions in response to UN requests. As Indonesia is aware that peacekeeping is not only about military operations, each Indonesian peacekeeping team will include a diplomat, a peace worker, and a trusted person to implement the UN mandate. Indonesia will also

enhance its peacekeeping professionalism, modernize its equipment and increase the number of its women peacekeepers.

B. Total Defence Expenditure on Annual Basis

Development of Indonesia's defence capacity prioritizes the defence posture and advancement of the professionalism of its armed forces, supported by the availability of weapon systems capable of instant deployment mobility. In that context, it is paramount to meet the requirement of the minimum essential force (MEF). To achieve this goal, the projected defence budget is expected to be above 1% of GDP, and will steadily increase in the next decade.

The need for a gradually increased defence budget is in response to complicated threats. This will include allocations needed for maintenance and operation of the modern weapon systems. The size of the budget will increase in proportion to national economic growth. The proportional budget allocation for state defence will strengthen the national capacity in defence, national resilience and stability, and will also support national development.

C. Defence Expenditure and Its Percentage of Domestic Product (GDP)

In the year of 2016, the defence budget and expenditure amounts to 99,5 trillion Rupiah. This represents an increase in defence expenditure to 0.89% of Indonesia's GDP.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counter-terrorism

Terrorism remains a major threat to national, regional and global security, and has undermined political and economic stability as well as social welfare of nations. Indonesia's battle against terrorism continues in the face of terrorist attacks on Thamrin street in Jakarta on 18th January 2016, the Samarinda Church Bombing in November 2016, and the latest suicide bombing in Kampung Melayu, Jakarta on 24 May 2017. The swift response of the law enforcement authorities and the unwavering display of public support have strengthened Indonesia's commitment to fight against terrorism.

The counter-terrorism efforts have become more sophisticated following the emergence of new forms of terrorist threats, coupled with an increase in the number of new terrorist recruits radicalized by convicted terrorists; more frequent terrorist attacks against public officers and infrastructures; and more extensive radicalization associated with religion or ethnic conflict. The terrorist group activities have also changed, especially in their methods of operation, communication and funding.

Therefore, Indonesia believes that strengthening national efforts and international cooperation to address the issue of terrorism should be done continuously by engaging all relevant stakeholders in both government and society. A comprehensive strategy of counter-terrorism is required with respect to due process of law and human rights. The strategy should be people-centered and include inter-civilization dialogue, information sharing and exchange of intelligence, cooperation in document integrity and security, joint counter-terror action in the border areas, and

measures against terrorist financing. To implement such a strategy, it is important to emphasize that terrorist groups cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nation, culture or social or ethnic group. Considering the complex and changing nature of terrorism methods, regular assessment of counter terrorism measures, should be undertaken to formulate new measures adjusting to any given situations.

Indonesia applies a two-pronged approach in countering terrorism i.e. hard and soft approach. In terms of the hard approach, Indonesia has issued Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Combating-Terrorism and Law No. 9 Year 2013 on the Prevention and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. In addition, to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing, Indonesia has issued a Joint Regulation on the Listing of Identity of Persons and Corporations in the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations and Freezing, Without Delay, Funds Owned by Persons or Corporations Listed in the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations. Indonesia is amending its Law on Combating Terrorism, in order to take into account respect for human rights.

Furthermore, as terrorism keeps evolving in terms of its strategy and methods, Indonesia has established a Coordinating Team on the Implementation of the Counter-Terrorism Program, which consists of all agencies covering a broad range of issues related to counter-terrorism. Indonesia is also amending its current CT Law in response to the emergence of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF).

In terms of the soft approach, Indonesia has conducted de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs as well as interfaith dialogues. The de-radicalization program consists of two main elements.

First, the rehabilitation program aimed at the terrorists during police detention and imprisonment to transform them into law-abiding citizens. Under this program, Indonesia has applied religious and psychological approaches. The second element is the reintegration program aimed at helping the former-terrorists after serving their punishment in prison to break ties with their old terrorist cells and join the community. The program is also aimed at the families and friends of former-terrorists to prevent them from re-joining the terrorist and violent extremist groups. Moreover, to some extent the family and the neighborhood community of the former terrorist also have a crucial role in determining the success of de-radicalization programs.

The counter-radicalization program is also aimed at increasing the awareness of society on the danger of violent radicalism and extremism whilst at the same time empowering communities to be more resilient against radical and extremist propaganda. Indonesia's strategy in implementing the counter-radicalization program is to build close partnership with all stakeholders and all elements of society including religious organizations, such as the Nadhlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, and the media. It is also designed to foster coordination among government ministries and agencies to maximize the use of government resources and capabilities in providing a counter-narrative to terrorist ideology and promoting the value of peace, tolerance, and moderation.

At the ASEAN level, Indonesia has been serving as the Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) voluntary lead shepherd for counter terrorism and as Chairman of SOMTC Working Group on Counter Terrorism. From May 2016 to May 2017, Indonesia served as the Chair of SOMTC and proposed to update the existing ASEAN

Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-terrorism (ACPoA on CT), taking into account the changing trends of terrorism in the world, including the rise of radicalization and violent extremism globally. Indonesia sees the great importance of ASEAN taking into consideration these new trends in implementing the existing ACPoA on CT. Indonesia has introduced new action lines under point 5, addressing the root causes of terrorism and the factors that promote its spread, focusing on efforts to prevent and counter radicalism and violent extremism. The Updated ACPoA on CT is currently under consideration by the SOMTC.

At the international level, Indonesia has conducted robust efforts to support counter terrorism measures within the United Nations framework. In this regard, Indonesia has engaged in various cooperation mechanisms with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the Terrorism Prevention Branch-United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (TPB-UNODC), and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED). Furthermore, Indonesia also undertakes efforts to implement the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS). The important role of Indonesia in countering international terrorism has been acknowledged by the United Nations through the re-election of Indonesia as a member of the Advisory Board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Center (AB UNCCT) for 2015-2018.

To continuously support the United Nations measures against terror, Indonesia also actively participates in the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as co-chair of the Southeast Asia Capacity Building Working Group (SEAWG) with Australia in 2011-2013 and as co-

chair of the Detention and Reintegration Working Group (DRWG) for the period of 2014-2016 and 2016-2017. The establishment of this working group was proposed by Indonesia to strengthen capacity building for stakeholders who deal with the management of violent extremist offenders in the corrective services, as well as to address the need to share information and good practices on this issue. In this regard, Indonesia hosted the Third Plenary Meeting of the GCTF DRWG in Batam on 1 and 2 December 2016, which adopted the DRWG Work Plan that is in effect until 2017.

In addition to that, within the framework of DRWG as well as in cooperation with the Global Center on Cooperative Security (GCCS), Indonesia convened the “Countering Violent Extremism Training in Correctional Institution” in Cilacap on 23-25 May 2016 and the “Workshop on Developing Effective Intake, Risk Assessment, and Monitoring Tools and Strategies for Incarcerated Terrorist Offenders” on 28-29 July in Manila, Philippines. These meetings focused on prison management and security, rehabilitation and reintegration programs, as well as capacity building programs for corrective services.

Moreover, Indonesia contributes to capacity building for law enforcement officers on the issue of terrorism and transnational crime. In this regard, Indonesia has established the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in cooperation with Australia. Since its establishment in 2004, JCLEC has become a major center of excellence in the region. As of December 2016, JCLEC had organized 837 training programs involving 20,441 participants and 4,788 trainers from 70 countries.

The Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) hosted the APEC Workshop on Strengthening

Tourism Business Resilience Agreement of Impact of Terrorist Attack, in Nusa Dua-Bali, 9-10 May 2017. The workshop was attended by 63 participants from 15 APEC members, namely Australia, Canada, Chile, PRC, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, USA, Thailand and Vietnam. (Note: APEC members who did not send delegates to this workshop were: Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Russia and Singapore).

Important matters that were discussed include:

1. Views on the possibility of selling terrorism insurance products to tourists. Workshop participants mostly argued that this type of insurance was not necessary because it would make tourists more tempting targets for terrorist for extortion and kidnapping for ransom; and
2. Proposals on issuance of travel guidance or travel advisories and guidelines by local authorities for tourists to provide an overview of the situation in the tourist destinations that they are visiting.

The workshop produced a concept paper on a set of Policy Recommendations initiated by Indonesia as the host. The concept paper has been distributed by APEC Secretariat to get responses from APEC members of the Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG). The results of this Workshop will be reported at the APEC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) meeting in Viet Nam in August 2017.

As the country with the largest Moslem population, Indonesia has actively played a significant role in promoting tolerance and mutual understanding among different religious and ethnic groups, at national, regional, and international level.

i. Promoting a People-centered Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Indonesia believes that promoting a people-centered approach is essential to success in countering terrorism. Indonesia is a country with a huge population spread out in thousands of islands. Therefore, it will not be effective and almost impossible if it is only the government that conducts counter terrorism. In this regard, Indonesia has maximized the involvement of citizens in tackling violent extremism in their communities through close partnership with the police at the precinct level under the community-policing program. The program is aimed at building trust and mutual understanding between the police on the ground and the members of the community in general so that intensive communication can be developed to detect early signs of terrorism in the community. The government has also organized capacity building programs at the village level involving village supervisory non-commissioned officers (Babinsa) as well as the heads of villages to raise awareness on the threats posed by terrorists.

ii. Promotion of Inter-Civilization Dialogue

The promotion of inter-faith dialogue provides an avenue for fostering tolerance and mutual understanding within pluralistic communities. This effort is carried out in tandem with empowering moderates in support of counter-radicalism actions. Thus, Indonesia is actively promoting dialogue or exchange of views among different religious and ethnic groups at the international level. In this regard, Indonesia hosted the UN Alliance of Civilization in Bali in August 2014 with the theme “Unity in Diversity”, and The 9th Bali Democracy Forum on 8-9 December 2016 in Bali.

To promote an understanding of Islam as a tolerant, peaceful and moderate religion, the Government has organized seminars, workshops and training sessions in cooperation with the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah. Indonesia has also recognized the significant role of civil society in countering terrorism through campaigns for a peaceful, tolerant and harmonious nation. In partnership with civil society organizations, the Government has organized a capacity building program to develop a community empowerment program and other activities aimed at neutralizing terrorist propaganda. The Government has set up a special task force to maximize the utilization of the media and has developed long term-media strategies to neutralize radical media campaigns, including through launching of special websites by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency.

iii. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes

Information sharing and intelligence exchange among countries plays a key role in countering-terrorism, particularly in stopping the flux of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. In this regard, Indonesia has strengthened its cooperation with other countries, including with ASEAN countries. In 2016, there were 36 Indonesian citizens who were deported as they had attempted to go to Syria. Some of them used ASEAN countries as transit points before traveling to Turkey and ultimately to Syria.

Indonesia also maintains good cooperation with Middle East countries, including the Government of Syria and

Iraq in monitoring Indonesian citizens in conflict zones, as well as collecting evidence for the prosecution of Indonesian citizens who are suspected to be involved in terrorist groups as FTFs.

In response to the growing threat of cross-border movement of terrorism including FTFs, Indonesia initiated the International Meeting on Counter-Terrorism “Countering Cross-Border Movement on Terrorism” in Nusa Dua Bali in 9 August 2016. The meeting was attended by 23 countries and 3 international organizations (ASEAN, Interpol and UN) to discuss ways to counter cross-border terrorism with a comprehensive approach and unprecedented international cooperation covering the aspects of human welfare, information, financing and security of dangerous materials.

iv. Measures Against Terrorist Financing

To fully support international counter-terrorism, particularly its efforts to fight terrorist financing, Indonesia actively participates as a member of Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML). By virtue of Indonesia’s active diplomatic and domestic efforts, Indonesia has been delisted from the International Cooperation Review Group–Financial Action Task Force (ICRG-FATF). Furthermore, Indonesia through the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of 52 countries to strengthen the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regime. In 2016, Indonesia and Australia hosted the Counter Terrorism Summit in Bali that produced the Nusa Dua Statement. To further its efforts at combating money laundering and terrorism financing, Indonesia is in the process of applying to become a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member.

INTRAC and Australia Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) co-hosted and founded the first Counter Terrorism Financing Summit (CTF Summit) in Sydney in 2015. The Second CTF Summit was held in Nusa Dua Bali and was attended by officials from 35 countries and 2 international organizations. The Second CTF Summit provided an opportunity for CTF Leaders and expert to work together to identify and understand the full extent of threats posed by terrorism financing, collaborate and share financial and other intelligence to identify and counter the threats of terrorism financing and share effective techniques deployed in relevant jurisdiction to counter terrorist revenue and funding streams entering formal financial markets. The Second CTF Summit issued the Nusa Dua Statement, which outlines the road map for action ahead of the next summit in Malaysia in 2017.

Indonesia and Australia in 2016 also co-lead the research and development on regional risk assessment, with contributions from the FIUs of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The assessment will support future efforts to understand our region's terrorism financing risks and, where appropriate, coordinate the region's responses. The regional risk assessment identifies primary terrorism financing risks across a broad spectrum of risks assessed.

v. Measures against Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

In order to create a more effective surveillance and detection system and to promote better understanding of the CBRN challenges, international cooperation and multilateral framework must be strengthened through fair, transparent, and mutually beneficial arrangements. At the national level,

Indonesia has established a CBRN National Team, which consists of 18 (eighteen) agencies, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as coordinator. Since 2013, Indonesia has a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on CBRN Terrorism which functions as a systematic operational guideline in managing incidents/crises/terrorist attacks involving CBRN materials.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

i. Supporting National Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

Indonesia has taken necessary measures to comply with Security Council Resolution 1540, including cooperation with neighboring countries. Indonesia has always been constructively participating in multilateral negotiations to strengthen non-proliferation and achieve disarmament of WMD in all its aspects.

On legislative actions, Indonesia has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1978; the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1998; the Biological Weapons Convention in 1991; the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in 1986 and its amendment in 2009; the Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 1993; the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in 1997; the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency; the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2001; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2012; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2014.

The Government in 2016 proposed the amendment of the Law No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy which will stipulate three main issues under the National Policy and Strategy of Nuclear Security as well as the penalty that has not been provided by current national law. The three main issues are as follows:

1. Developing the integrated information system to support nuclear security;
2. Increasing coordination related to nuclear security by synergizing the duties and functions of relevant Government authorities; and
3. Strengthening the infrastructure of nuclear security.

On 22 February 2017, Presidential Decree No. 19 Year 2017 on Indonesian National Authority on Chemical Weapons, finally entered into force. With this Decree, Indonesia has a strong legal framework for our National Authority on Chemical Weapons, and proper modalities for enforcing all obligations of the chemical weapons convention.

With regard to enforcement actions, the Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency and relevant agencies conduct monitoring/control on the issuance of regulations and permits, carries out inspections, and implements procedure of the nuclear material inventory accounting system. The verification of inventory is managed by routine inspection, which involves the monitoring of the quantity, location and ownership; movement of materials from one installation to another; and export and import of nuclear materials. Routine inspection also includes monitoring waste management.

In addition, Indonesia has installed seven RPMs (Radiation Portal Monitors) in main harbors (Batam, Balawan, Makassar, Bitung, Tanjung Priuk, Tanjung Perak, and Semarang) to strengthen the nuclear security detection capacity.

ii. NPT Regime

Based on Indonesia's commitment to nuclear disarmament, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of multilateralism as "the core principle" in meetings on non-proliferation and disarmament. In line with this, Indonesia underlines that the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament should be achieved by lawful methods pursuant to the prevailing international law and within the framework of the United Nations.

Indonesia advocates that the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be made a priority and urges states, which are not yet parties to immediately accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states. All pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and comprehensive manner.

Indonesia consistently calls on the nuclear states to fulfill their obligation to reduce their nuclear weapons as part of the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, with a clear time frame. In addition, Indonesia desires that the process of nuclear disarmament be carried out in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner. On the other hand, the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to pursue their national choices in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be upheld. It is our strong belief that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will ensure the survival of humankind in a regime of sustainable development.

At the 1st Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT, which was held in Vienna, Indonesia worked actively toward a constructive recommendation

for the Review Conference 2020. This 1st Preparatory Committee is vital to the recovery of the momentum lost in the 2015 Review Conference, as it was the building block of the 2020 Review Conference. The world cannot afford to have another failed Review Conference.

Noting the slow progress towards Nuclear Disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States, Indonesia totally supports current negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination. Indonesia agrees with ASEAN that the instrument could potentially break the ongoing impasse in nuclear disarmament. Indonesia believes that such instrument will not undermine the NPT regime, but on the contrary, it will complement and strengthen the NPT, especially the disarmament pillar.

Indonesia is among the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Treaty, having signed it on the same day it was opened for signature, on 24 September 1996. Since then, Indonesia has consistently held that the CTBT is a key element in the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As an Annex II country, Indonesia has ratified the CTBT through Law No. 1 year 2012, a very timely initiative as it was taken soon after ASEAN Member States concluded negotiations with Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) on the latter's accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011.

Indonesia, together with Hungary, assumed Co-presidency of Article XIV Conference in 2013–2015. Both countries promoted “CTBT-awareness” and pushed for universalization and the earliest entry into force of the CTBT, strengthened their engagement with interested countries and signatories to

expedite the process of their inclusion in the CTBT, and ensured that high-level focus on the urgent need for the early entry into force of the CTBT.

As a useful reference for countries striving to enhance safety and security in accordance with their respective national processes and legal systems, Indonesia launched the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. The said Kit is aimed at helping states develop a more comprehensive national legislation on nuclear security and providing states with a reference in nuclear security representing consolidated elements and provisions from different conventions/treaties, international legal instruments and frameworks on nuclear security.

In the regional context, there is a need to create a systematic and strategic approach through cooperation among ASEAN-led mechanisms with CTBTO, IAEA and other relevant organizations. The synergy between global and regional mechanisms is needed to strengthen nuclear security, safety, and safeguards in Southeast Asia and in particular to ensure the realization of nuclear weapons-free zones.

Indonesia, in line with the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint 2025, envisions a Southeast Asia that is not only a nuclear weapons-free zone but also a region that is free of all other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, Indonesia stands ready to intensify the ongoing efforts between ASEAN and NWSs to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty with a view to the signing and ratifying of the Protocol of SEANWFZ by the NWSs at the earliest.

Indonesia is also of the view that the intention of China to sign the Protocol without reservations must be seized by ASEAN. The early signing of the Protocol of the Treaty of SEANWFZ by China will send a positive signal to the international community that ASEAN is actively contributing to global efforts at disarmament and non-proliferation.

Within the ARF framework, Indonesia supports the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament of biological and chemical weapons through its active participation in the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. While committed to support the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Indonesia also encourages all ARF participants to be part of global efforts at creating a world free of Weapons of Mass Destruction through the ratification of CTBT as well as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention.

C. Transnational Crimes

i. Promoting Collaboration in the Prevention of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit Drug Manufacture

Abuse and illicit trafficking of narcotics are extraordinary crimes that threaten the world and can also be used as a weapon in a stealthy war to paralyze the power of the nation. Therefore, these crimes must be eradicated and dealt with comprehensively. As a country that has become one of the biggest targets for narcotics distribution by national and international networks, Indonesia has taken a firm step in dealing with this modern form of war.

At the beginning of his leadership, President Joko Widodo proclaimed that Indonesia was in a drugs emergency

situation and called for a major war against all forms of narcotics-related crimes. As a strong assertion of the state's commitment to protect the nation's younger generation from the threat of narcotics, President Joko Widodo has ordered the execution of convicts who had been meted the death penalty due to narcotics-related offenses. Despite the controversy stirred by foreign parties, as many as 15 narcotic death convicts, both foreigners and Indonesian nationals, have been executed. One of them was Freddy Budiman, an Indonesian high player in narcotics, who was often involved in narcotics smuggling cases even when he was behind bars.

In tackling drug trafficking, the main focus of Indonesia is to prevent the inward and outward flow of drugs and their precursors. Indonesia adheres to the principle of a balanced approach between "supply and demand reduction" in a comprehensive and integrated manner. "Demand reduction" is to apply necessary measures to prevent people from having access to narcotics, while "supply reduction" involves strict and effective law enforcement against narcotics syndicates.

Various efforts have been carried out by the Government of Indonesia by itself and in collaboration with various national elements and components, including the private sector, the police, the military, NGOs, the education sector, and the community. These efforts require new approaches and cooperation across programs and cross-cutting issues in order to provide people with knowledge and understanding that will increase deterrence and ability to resist drug abuse.

Indonesia has also held a series of activities to strengthen the prevention approach through information dissemination and advocacy programs. The Program of Preventing and Combating Ilicit Drug

Abuse and Trafficking (P4GN) has been finalized and will be used as an instrument to address bigger and more complex challenges and problems as a result of rapid globalization and technological development in various fields.

Indonesia's prevention efforts has also been strengthened by providing treatment and rehabilitation for drug abusers. Pilot projects related to education, employment and family interventions have been implemented in various cities in Indonesia since 2014. By 2019, it is expected that all provinces in Indonesia are capable of implementing these programs.

Another approach that has been undertaken in this prevention effort is empowering women's role through family based drug abuse prevention program. This prevention program, which provides training for mothers, is carried out by the Government with the support of various stakeholders. The idea is to enlist mothers as facilitators in the family to serve as the main implementors of the program.

Building an individual's awareness of the dangers of drug abuse starts at an early age. In every stage of education, there is an integrated curriculum which stresses prevention in the face of the dangers of drug abuse. These curriculum materials can also be used in early childhood education, elementary education, and secondary education, and can be accessed on <https://aseannarco.oncb.go.th>.

In addition to eradication, rehabilitation is one of the important ways of reducing the prevalence of narcotics abuse. A series of rehabilitation programs can prevent abusers from falling deeper into addiction and prevent them from relapsing. By the end of 2016, BNN had rehabilitated 16,185 narcotics abusers, both in rehabilitation centers and in prisons, and has provided post-rehabilitation services

to 9,817 ex drug abusers. To optimize the rehabilitation program, BNN has 4 (four) Rehabilitation Centers: in Lido - West Java, Baddoka - South Sulawesi, Tanah Merah - East Kalimantan, and Batam - Kepulauan Riau, and has added two more Centers in 2016 (Kalianda - Lampung and Deliserdang - North Sumatra).

To improve the facilities of rehabilitation institutions, BNN maximizes the reach of the rehabilitation program by providing support to rehabilitation agencies of government and community facilities scattered throughout Indonesia. Going forward, BNN will remain focused on narcotics management strategies by preventing mass drug abuse and increasing national and international cooperation in P4GN. With strong commitment and cooperation, BNN is optimistic that the abuse and illicit trafficking of narcotics can be eradicated, including their root causes.

Although the countermeasures to illicit drug trafficking are becoming more and more intense, the narcotics syndicates are still trying to find a way to infiltrate the country with new types and forms of narcotics to avoid detection. BNN continues to raise awareness of new types of narcotics threats or New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). As of May 2017, BNN had identified 65 NPS. Of these, 43 have been included in the attachment of the Regulation of the Minister of Health No.13 year 2014, while the rest are still in the discussion phase and will soon be included in the attachment to make them illegal.

The growth of NPS varieties in Indonesia is quite alarming. In January 2017, Indonesia's Minister of Health issued Regulation No. 2 of 2017 on Revision to the Classification of Narcotics Appendix that includes 27 new types of NPS. As a member of the United Nations' Commission on Narcotic Drugs,

Indonesia has played an active role in combating amphetamine-type stimulants, including NPS, as well as the prevention of the diversion of their precursors.

It is imperative for countries exposed to drug problems to engage and participate in initiatives taken by regional, interregional and international counter drug agencies. Indonesia strongly supports the outcome document of the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem in 2016 (UNGASS) that was held in New York, USA on 19-21 April 2016 as a global initiative to address the world drug problem. Indonesia is of the view that in addressing the world drug problem, several factors should be taken into account, such as a zero-tolerance stand against drugs, a comprehensive and balanced approach, and the sovereign rights of each country. To this end, Indonesia welcomes the adoption of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025 to address illicit drug activities and mitigate their consequences on society.

ii. Trafficking in Persons

Indonesia is firmly committed to addressing the issue of Trafficking in Persons at all levels. At the national level, the issue of trafficking in persons is addressed by the Task Force on combating trafficking in persons. The work of the Task Force is based on the National Action Plan on Anti-Trafficking in Persons 2015-2019, which guides the formulation of strategies, measures, programs and activities to combat TIP. Its activities include: prevention and child participation; health rehabilitation; social rehabilitation, repatriation and social integration; legal norms development; law enforcement; and coordination and collaboration.

Indonesia continues to put emphasis on regional mechanisms to address the issue of TIP. Along with other ASEAN Member States, Indonesia has established the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), as the legal basis for enhancing regional cooperation. It is noteworthy that the convention entered into force on 8 March 2017. Indonesia looks forward to joining other ASEAN Member States in ratifying the ACTIP and reiterates its commitment to fully implement the Convention and its Plan of Action.

At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a broader regional mechanism, Indonesia and the European Union are the lead shepherds for TIP, which is a priority area in the Forum, after they successfully incorporated the issue to the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) field of cooperation in 2015. Maintaining their momentum, with the support from the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the three parties convened a Workshop on Trafficking in Persons in Semarang, Indonesia on 4-5 April 2017. It is the first ever workshop on TIP in the ARF, and it served to create a common ground in the region, as well as to provide a forum for the sharing of views on the urgency of strengthening cooperation to address TIP.

Indonesia is the Co-chair of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Organized Crime. Now with 48 members, the Bali Process has become the largest cooperation framework in the region. The Bali Process is a unique regional cooperation on migration: it is the largest regional consultative process that involves countries of origin, transit and destination. The Bali Process works is comprehensive in its approach and is based on the principles of burden sharing and shared responsibility.

On 23 March 2016 Indonesia and Australia held the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crimes (BRMC VI) in Bali, Indonesia. The conference produced two outcome documents, the Co-Chairs' Statement and the Bali Declaration.

As stated in the Bali Declaration, Ministers agreed to have a mechanism, which would authorize the Co-chairs to consult, and if necessary, convene future meetings to discuss urgent irregular migration issues with affected and interested countries. The consultations may be in response to current regional issues or future emergency situations. The Bali Process Consultation Mechanism was established to enable more agile and timely responses by Bali Process participants in cases of emergency irregular migration situations.

The Consultation Mechanism has been supported with the establishment of a Task Force on Planning on Preparedness (TFPP), comprising operational level governmental officials who are responsible at national level for dealing with trans-border large movements of migrants and refugees. The Task Force will serve as the operational arm for the Consultation Mechanism. The Task Force has held two meetings in 2017.

Related to the issue of TIP, Indonesia deems the issues of irregular movement, people smuggling, migrant workers, as well as asylum seekers as important matters to be discussed in existing bilateral, regional, or global mechanisms.

In 2016, there were 615 Indonesian workers who became victims in Trafficking in Persons cases which had been discussed since 2009. Indonesia views the issue of migrant workers and irregular movement of persons in Southeast Asia as a regional problem that requires a regional solution through

ASEAN. Such a solution must reflect the spirit of ASEAN solidarity based on the principles of burden-sharing and shared responsibility as well as a balanced approach between law enforcement and urgent humanitarian response.

Even though Indonesia is not a state party to the Refugee Convention 1951 and its Additional Protocol 1967, it has become host country to 14,499 asylum seekers and refugees from 47 countries. These asylum seekers and refugees are hosted in 38 detention centers and temporary shelters located all over Indonesia. Nationally, in 2016 a Presidential Regulation was enacted to provide operational basis for attending to refugees, including rescue operations in situations of emergency.

Indonesia believes in the importance of cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination in the search for comprehensive, long-term, and durable solutions, and in addressing the root causes of refugees and asylum seekers flow. Indonesia further highlights the pressing need for countries to respect and address the refugees and asylum seekers crisis, based on international obligations that each country is bound with (the Refugee Convention 1951 and Additional Protocol 1967).

iii. Cyber Security

One current global trend is the rapid advance of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The world is facing a serious problem in the misuse of ICT utilization in the form of: (a) false and irresponsible news and information (hoax); (b) cyber sabotage; and (c) violation of privacy and private confidentiality threats of strategic stakeholders in the course of cyber espionage.

Those anomalies of ICT utilization can lead to cyber terrorism; hence, the world

has to pay full attention and strengthen comprehensive and collaborative efforts against this threat. Therefore, there is a dire need to build a new awareness of significant efforts at a variety of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). The urgency is due to its widespread impacts of the threat on political, economic, and social stability.

In addressing cyber terrorism, Indonesia believes that all fora should be utilized to formulate cyber security strategies to ensure integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data and information, especially those classified as strategic. Indonesia underscores the importance of intensifying cooperation in the ARF to promote new and strategic initiatives to address the issue of cyber security. This is in line with the Chairman's Statement of the 23rd ASEAN Regional Forum in Vientiane, the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 2016, particularly on the establishment of a Cyber Security Crisis and/or Coordination Center at the ASEAN level or an ASEAN Agency for Network and Information Security.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The concept of disasters risk reduction (DRR) is a very important part of Indonesia's sustainable development program, since Indonesia is located in an approximately 80% disaster-prone area. Indonesia has learned to be vigilant and to continue strengthening its resilience to natural disasters, especially in the face of 12 common natural hazards. Disasters are a fact of life in the region and Indonesia understands that many regional countries have to live and cope with disasters. Because of that, DRR will save more people than just responding when disaster has occurred.

Indonesia sees the following points as of great importance to making sure

that national and regional resilience is effective in the face of disasters that may come upon the region each year.

First, having a clear and specific regulation on disaster management is crucial. In 2007, three years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, Indonesia enacted the law on disaster management. This law provides basis for the establishment of a National Disaster Management Authority and a Local Disaster Management Agency.

As a country, Indonesia has experience in both accepting and extending humanitarian assistance. It is in line with the Government Regulation Number 23 Year 2008 concerning participation of international institutions and foreign non-government organizations (NGOs) in disaster management and Head of BNPB' Regulation Number 22 Year 2010 concerning guidelines on the role of international organizations and international NGOs during emergency response with regard to accepting humanitarian assistance.

Second, the involvement and contributions of all partners in DRR efforts are also very important. The principle of relations in disaster management is based on a concept of a triangular partnership: the government, the communities, and the private sectors. Strong coordination has to be built either through MoUs, letters of agreement, working group platforms, or other mechanisms. Managing resources effectively through multi-stakeholder partnership can speed up effective resources mobilization.

Third, having disaster risk assessment documents and early warning systems are important for ensuring resilience in disaster-prone countries. In this regard, Indonesia has mapped out areas based on disaster risk assessment, made disaster

contingency plan documents, arranged preparedness profiles, etc. Many cities in 34 provinces already have their own disaster risk contingency documents. These documents pave the concept of disaster management planning based on local wisdom, community capacity and local policy.

Fourth, having ‘disaster operation control centers’ and ‘preparedness and mitigation centers’ will result in a more accurate assessment system. In this regard, some regencies and provinces in Indonesia have installed the relevant modern technology facilities. Apart from that, Indonesia has also developed resources platform technologies that give effectiveness, convenience, and efficiency in distribution and information accessibility to all partners, such as the Indonesian Disaster Database (Data dan Informasi Bencana Indonesia-DIBI).

Fifth, it is also important to have logistic warehouses in some strategic areas for effective distribution of aid, tools, and other resources. Indonesia has a national logistic warehouse located at Sentul and having local warehouses for logistic buffer stock.

Sixth, having a training center of excellence on disaster risk reduction is vital to building strong capacities of human resources in disaster management. The Indonesia Disaster Relief Training Ground (INA-DRTG), in Sentul, West Java, was built as a training ground for disaster risk management. Disaster management certification agencies (LSP PB) and Indonesian disaster expertise associations have also been established.

There are now 501 local disaster agencies in Indonesia. Based on the medium term development program (RPJMN), Indonesia aims at reducing by 15 percent the disasters risk index in 136 development priority regencies by 2019.

According to the National Agency for Disaster Management, although disasters impact decreased in 2015 compared to the previous year, various types of disaster still affected more than 1.2 million citizens who were forced to evacuate. The Agency estimated that there are at least 63.7 million people who are vulnerable to floods and 40.9 million who are vulnerable to landslides.

In recent years, Indonesia established a comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) governance system through the Disaster Management Law and its subsidiary regulations and policies, Disaster Management Agencies at the national and local levels, risk analysis and Disaster Management plans, partnership and coordination with DRR stakeholders, and all relevant bureaucratic instruments. Considering its importance, commitment to DRR has increased significantly with the passing of the new National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2015–2019, in which disaster management and risk reduction are among priority development programs, particularly as investment to protect economic growth and human development.

At the global level, Indonesia has actively contributed to various frameworks concerning disaster management, including the Third United Nations World Conference on DRR held in Sendai, Japan on March 2015, where the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015–2030 was adopted to replace the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015.

The Framework then serves as a guideline for Indonesia in developing its own suitable national action plan for addressing the disaster management issue. In line with existing global frameworks, Indonesia has initiated a set of policies, as well as programs, to address the problem of disasters within the country. Programs

like “Kota Tangguh” (resilient city), “Sekolah Aman Bencana (safe school)”, and a “community based early warning system” are some of the many initiatives made by the government in response to the growing need for disaster-aware policies.

The resilience of the region is crucial to Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesia has to actively share its best practices and experiences and help build the capacity of other ASEAN Member states. Indonesia’s contributes through its efforts at improving the preparedness of the stakeholders within ASEAN. In this regard, several initiatives have been undertaken, such as Indonesia’s active involvement in the formulation of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), and its active participation in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) by being co-chair for 2 (two) working groups namely the ACDM Working Group on Recovery and ACDM Working Group on Knowledge and Innovation Management.

Under the ACDM Working Group on Knowledge and Innovation Management, Indonesia serves as the lead country for Programme of Standardisation and Certification System to Build Professionalism in Disaster Management. To implement this programme, Indonesia is now developing ASEAN Standardisation and Certification for Experts in Disaster Management (ASCEND).

In 2016, Indonesia became the chair of ACDM and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM). Under the chaimanship of Indonesia, the ADMMMDM achieved the following:

- 1.) ASEAN Leaders signed the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, One Response: ASEAN Responding to Disasters as One in the Region and Outside the Region.
- 2.) The Host Country Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was signed on 23 February 2016 in Jakarta.
- 3.) The Concept Note on Joint Operations and Coordination Centre of ASEAN (JOCCA) as a coordination platform and home to ASEAN on the ground was endorsed;
- 4.) The ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP) Chapter VI, which regulates Facilitation and Utilisation of Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), was adopted.
- 5.) The ASEAN Joint Disaster Response Plan (AJDRP) to implement the One ASEAN One Response Declaration was endorsed.
- 6.) ASEAN was actively involved in the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and issued the ASEAN Joint Statement for World Humanitarian Summit and Side Event at WHS entitled “ASEAN-UN Partnership Moving Forward” in May 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey.
- 7.) ASEAN’s actively participated in the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) on 3-4 November 2016 in New Delhi, India and was a signatory to the Joint Statement issued on that occasion.

In the East Asia Summit (EAS) cooperation framework, EAS Leaders endorsed the Indonesia–Australia Paper: ‘A Practical Approach to Enhance Regional Cooperation on Disaster Rapid Response’ (November 2011), which lays the foundation for many EAS activities aimed at enhancing collaboration in disaster response and resilience in the region. Indonesia has initiated various significant activities, including:

- a. The Indonesia–Australia EAS Rapid Disaster Response Workshop (Darwin, Australia, 2013);
- b. The Mentawai Megathrust Disaster Response Exercise (Padang, Indonesia, 2013 and 2014); and
- c. The Indonesia–Australia EAS Rapid Disaster Response Workshop (Bali, Indonesia, June 2014 and June 2015).

Indonesia and Australia have developed the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit (EAS Toolkit) to enhance the capacity of EAS participating countries for responding to disasters. It is hoped that the EAS Toolkit can be a practical platform for technical cooperation in the field of disaster management, which is in line with other ASEAN mechanisms to support the One ASEAN, One Response vision.

To validate the EAS Toolkit, Indonesia hosted the Ambon Disaster Response Exercise (Ambon DiREx) 2016: Tabletop Exercise (TTX) on EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit on 15–17 November 2016 in Ambon with the theme: Promoting the EAS Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit as a Regional Protocol in Strengthening Effective Collaboration in Disaster Response and Resilience in the Region.

The ASEAN Joint Statement on that occasion underscored the critical importance of the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and emphasized the need

for better interlinkage between the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the other post-2015 outcomes, such as the Sustainable Development Goals 2030, the Paris Agreements on Climate Change, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, and the New Urban Agenda. It also stressed the importance of the AHA Center to regional networking in the area of disaster management. Moreover, the Joint Statement also highlighted three key elements in shaping the policies on the issue of disaster risk reduction and disaster management. Those are: (1) Improving endurance in the face of disaster; (2) the multilayered approach to local and national initiatives, which enjoy the support of international organizations and the international community whenever it is needed; (3) realizing that change should be led by the national leadership.

E. Maritime Security

The seas make possible regional and international trade, global security, as well as the reservoir of the world’s marine and mineral resources. At the same time, maritime issues are trans-boundary and transnational in nature. Thus, maritime security as well as the exploration and exploitation of marine resources become our collective responsibility. As an archipelagic nation, Indonesia places maritime security at the heart of its domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, Indonesia has the obligation to secure the international shipping lanes by observing international laws and regimes such as the regime of maritime domain, the regime for the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passages (ASLP), Innocent Passage, Sea-lanes of Communications (SLOC) and Sea-lanes of Trade (SLOT).

As an archipelagic country, Indonesia is imbued with the maritime spirit. Accordingly, Indonesia intends to manage its maritime resources in a sustainable

way, to build and develop maritime infrastructures and connectivity, and to pursue maritime diplomacy and defense. Therefore, Indonesia encourages the enhancement of maritime cooperation in the region, as that is in line with its focus on maritime diplomacy, which is based on sovereignty, security, and prosperity approaches. In this regard, Indonesia identifies five pillars of such cooperation: 1) Maritime Culture; 2) Maritime Resources (food sovereignty); 3) Maritime Infrastructure (maritime connectivity and infrastructures development); 4) Maritime Diplomacy (strengthening Indonesia's role on maritime issues such as illegal fishing, maritime delimitation, territorial violation, sea piracy, and sea pollution); and 5) Maritime Safety, Security, and Defense.

In this sense, the ASEAN Regional Forum has rightly decided on maritime security as one of its main concerns. The range of maritime security issues is not limited to traditional security issues, but also extends to the discussion of non-traditional maritime security issues relevant to the region. Important issues that need to be addressed in this regard are, among others, piracy; armed robbery against ships; terrorism; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; transnational crimes related to the fishing industry; illicit drugs trafficking, illicit small arms trafficking, and trafficking-in persons.

Indonesia believes that it is our responsibility as a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, not only to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and its maritime resources, but also to ensure the safety of shipping and navigation as well as the security of the seas. As a way of complementing its national efforts, Indonesia has participated and will continue to actively participate in various bilateral, regional and multilateral forums. Indonesia stresses the importance of sharing best practices, developing

confidence building measures and capacity building programs in order to enhance our respective capabilities in dealing with maritime security issues.

For that purpose, Indonesia has concluded a number of bilateral agreements and has been part of regional or international arrangements for managing issues of common concern, such as combating illegal activities at sea, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal fishing. Indonesia has arranged for separate coordinated patrols with almost all countries sharing maritime boundaries with Indonesia.

The ASEAN sub-region of the Sulu Sea, where Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have common borders, is facing increasing threats from the Abu Sayyaf Group. It is imperative to counter these threats within the ASEAN framework and other sub-regional mechanisms. In order to effectively address the issue, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines will conduct Trilateral Patrols in the Sulu Sea. Meanwhile, together with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia continues to secure the busiest sea passage in the region by carrying out the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), comprising of coordinated sea patrols, combined maritime-air patrols as well as intelligence and information sharing activities. In addressing widespread maritime threats such as armed robbery at sea, kidnapping, piracy, especially in the ASEAN sub-region of the Sulu Sea, Indonesia has initiated Trilateral Cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines. The trilateral cooperation established among Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, has underlined the commitment to increase patrols, establish national focal points and set up hotline communications. To support this effort, Defence Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines agreed to implement a set of standard operating procedures.

Indonesia puts great emphasis in preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU Fishing. Indonesia observes that IUU fishing is a crosscutting issue, closely related with other crimes, such as people smuggling, human trafficking, forced labor, drugs trafficking, and violation of sanitary and environmental protection regulations. In this regard, Indonesia is of the view that IUU fishing should be dealt with in a comprehensive and holistic manner with emphasis on law enforcement and security aspects. Thus Indonesia welcomes closer cooperation to deal with this issue in the region in years ahead.

In this regard, after two ARF workshops in Honolulu and Bali in 2016, Indonesia urges that ASEAN cooperation be enhanced in combating IUU Fishing. Indonesia holds that, as stipulated in the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint 2025, the crimes related to IUU Fishing is a form of transnational organized crime and is related to other transnational crimes. Hence the commitment to fight IUU Fishing crime should be at par with the responsibility to address other forms of transnational crimes as defined by the UNTOC. The Workshops acknowledged that there is significant link between IUU Fishing and other forms of transnational organized crime, such as money laundering, drug trafficking, forced labor and trafficking in persons.

Indonesia held the 2nd Regional Conference on the Establishment of Regional Convention against IUU Fishing and its Related Crime on 13 October 2016. The Purpose of the Conference was to discuss the inputs from participating countries on the initiative to establish a regional convention. Participants welcomed the initiative and supported the continuation of the discussion to establish a regional cooperation agreement against crimes

related to fisheries. A technical working group has been established to follow this up.

Maritime security cooperation can be greatly enhanced through capacity building. To ensure that maritime security issues are dealt with effectively in the region, the countries of the region should engage in sharing best practices and experience.

For its part, Indonesia has conducted capacity building initiatives with countries and mechanisms such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agencies Meeting (HACGAM), ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum (AFCF), the South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), the Maritime Law Enforcement Training sponsored by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Indonesia-US Coastguard Joint Training, and the Indonesian-Korean Water Police Bilateral Annual Meeting.

E. Mediation and Conflict Prevention

Indonesia is a passionate advocate and a pioneering champion of dialogue and mediation as its preferred choice for conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, Indonesia has a long history of involvement in conflict mediation in the Southeast Asian region. In the late 1980's, Indonesia played a key role in mediating the protracted civil war in Cambodia. For this purpose, Indonesia convened the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I and II). The achievements of these two meetings paved the way for the Paris Peace Accord of 1991, which mandated the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Furthermore, from 1993 until 1996, Indonesia facilitated the peace process between the Philippines Government

and the separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The successful conclusion of the peace process yielded the Final Peace Agreement of 1996 between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and MNLF. In relation to this process, under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Indonesia sent a Garuda Contingent (Konga XVII) to Southern Philippines. Later, in the course of a peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Indonesia responded to a request that it participate in the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Southern Philippines. Indonesia has deployed both civilian and military observers as part of the Team since 2012.

In 2011, as Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia played a key role as mediator in the efforts of the Governments of Cambodia and Thailand to manage their dispute over the site of the Temple of Preah Vihear. These ASEAN efforts succeeded in reducing tensions and encouraged the two parties to seek arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The role of ASEAN in reducing tensions between the two neighboring countries was commended by the UN Security Council and the ICJ.

A firm belief in the value of conflict management was the main reason behind Indonesia's proposal to establish the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), which was established in 2011. The AIPR was designed to serve as a center of excellence that could support and complement ASEAN's work for peace and stability by conducting studies on how to achieve peace, conflict management, conflict resolution and reconciliation at the regional and global levels. Indonesia now serves as host to the AIPR Secretariat and is at the moment about to launch the operationalization of AIPR Secretariat.

Indonesia also has been playing instrumental role to diffuse tension over the South China Sea, largely by turning the potential conflict into actual cooperation for mutual benefit through a series of annual workshops that has been ongoing since 1990. Indonesia is also actively participating in the negotiations toward a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). As ASEAN and China have come to an agreement on the COC Framework in mid-2017, Indonesia urges that the negotiations toward a legally binding COC be expedited with a clear timeline so as to ensure its early entry into force.

Indonesia supports the promotion of a culture of peace in the region, including through the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, which stresses the significance of mediation, as one of the preferable modes of peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the work of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), which provides advice and counsel on conflict prevention, management and resolution in order to promote peacebuilding and reconciliation in the region. Indonesia also contributes to the creation of a regional architecture in Southeast Asia that fosters the peaceful settlement of disputes through adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the 2011 Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations.

IV. Role of the ARF


The Chairman's Statement of the 23rd ARF in July 2016 provides guidance for the future direction of the ARF process, which requires, among others, improving civil-military coordination and cooperation, becoming a more "action-oriented" forum, and enhancing coordination and synergy between the ARF and other ASEAN-led mechanisms.

The relevance of the ARF has been somewhat questioned in recent years, particularly since ASEAN has expanded its cooperation and established seven other sectoral bodies and various mechanisms on APSC Pillar in Annex 1 of the ASEAN Charter. The establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in mid-2000s, as a leaders-led meeting for discussion of common strategic concerns in the region, has further eclipsed the ARF as the main platform for such dialogues. The ARF should therefore respond by fully realizing its potential in order to avoid criticisms that there are more political security institutions or mechanisms in the region than are deemed necessary.

One of the strong points of the ARF is that it has built a foundation for political security dialogues that encompasses both civil and military elements. The idea that the ARF could cover the niche on civil-military cooperation has been highly supported by ARF Participants. Even so, the cooperation between the two elements should not stop at disaster relief training/operations or holding regular ARF meetings exclusively attended by military representatives. Instead, the ARF should foster interaction between the civil and military sectors by increasing military representation in all ARF meetings. Combining constructive ideas from the two perspectives is the formula for the ARF to maintain its relevance.

Subsequently, the ARF could also optimize various tools already provided in the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement. These tools empower the ARF to expand and enhance its institutional effectiveness in order to ensure the implementation of the Plan of Action. Those tools include the promotion of the role of the ARF Chair, the activation of the Friends of the ARF Chair, the strengthening of the ARF Unit, the enhancement of the role of the ARF EEPs, and the expansion of ARF partnerships with other regional and global institutions.

It is essential to understand that the ARF is not only an institution, but also a process through which countries in the Asia Pacific region strive to maintain dialogue and carry out activities to promote CBMs, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution mechanisms. A more robust, substantive, proactive, and action-oriented ARF is therefore instrumental to the process. Indonesia is strongly committed to contribute to this cause by continuously generating initiatives and actively participating in the work of the ARF.



JAPAN

I. Japan's Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Rapid shifts in the global power balance after the end of the Cold War have enhanced the significance of the Asia-Pacific region, while deepening the relationships of security interdependence and providing opportunities for cooperation across the region. At the same time, these changes have caused problems and tensions in the region and made its security environment even more severe. Large-scale military forces remain concentrated in the areas surrounding Japan. Some actors possess nuclear weapons or continue their development. Meanwhile, the region sees the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, etc. Risks that could hinder open access and free use of various domains such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace are increasing than ever before. In addition, there are growths of international threats, large-scale natural disasters and transnational crime in the regions. Under these circumstances, no single country can any longer secure its peace and security by its own power. It is essential for countries to work together to ensure the peace and security of the international community.

Against these backgrounds, the Asia-Pacific region is making progress cooperating in the field of non-traditional security issues through confidence-building measures, not only in bilateral

and trilateral frameworks but also in multilateral security frameworks, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Japan welcomes these developments, as these efforts contribute to creating a better regional security environment. Japan is eager to further promote and develop these multi-layered initiatives through the above-mentioned regional frameworks securing peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are major issues that can destabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. It is essential to continue discussing these issues at the ARF.

Maritime issues including those surrounding the South China Sea are directly linked to the peace and stability of the region and the international community as a whole. The international community pays attention to these issues in the context of thorough respect for the rule of law and securing the freedom of navigation and overflight. In the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated the "Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea": (i) states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law; (ii) states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (iii) states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means.

These three principles gained support from many countries, and Japan will consistently support actions based on these principles. In this context, Japan strongly hopes for full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) of 2002, and the early conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

On the other hand, Japan has serious concerns that unilateral actions, including large-scale and rapid land reclamation, the building of outposts as well as their use for military purposes, are continuing in the South China Sea, which could change the status quo and raise tensions in the region. Each state needs to refrain from unilateral actions and acts based on the universally-recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in light of the final award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS on July 12, 2016, which is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute. In particular, coastal states need to recognize that in maritime areas pending final delimitation, they are obliged by international law to refrain from unilateral actions that would cause permanent physical change to the marine environment, be it for military or civilian purposes. Japan strongly expects that the parties' compliance with the award will eventually lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

On the occasion of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April 2016, the foreign ministers issued the "G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement on Maritime Security", underlining the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, compliance with international law, peaceful resolution of maritime disputes and the importance of international

cooperation and marine science and technology cooperation, including an effective Maritime Domain Awareness, with a view to fighting illegal maritime activities, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, that threatens the stability, security and prosperity of the international community. Furthermore, at the occasion of G7 Ise-shima Summit in May 2016, the importance of "Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea" was highlighted among the leaders. In September 2016, the G7 issued the "G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement on Recent Developments in Asia", where the July 12, 2016, award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS is considered as a useful basis for further efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in the South China Sea. In addition, Japan hosted the 2nd G7 High-Level Meeting on Maritime Security, with the participation of some ARF member states as observers, in Tokyo in December 2016, where the participants discussed how to address common challenges on maritime security. In 2017, G7 leaders sent a strong message on maritime security to the international community through Foreign Ministers' Joint Communique and Leaders' Communique, which, for instance, urged all parties to pursue demilitarization of disputed features.

ARF can play an important role in ensuring the rule of law at sea, the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law. In this context, Japan welcomes many initiatives that have been made at ARF for official events aimed to discuss maritime security issues in the region. Japan, for its part, organized the ARF Seminar on Regional Confidence Building and the Law of the Sea in December 2015 in Tokyo. With the participation of renowned experts in the law of the sea, this seminar, which was co-chaired by Japan, Viet Nam,

and India, successfully offered an opportunity for participants from ARF member states to better understand the international legal regime of maritime areas pending delimitation and share their views on the importance of the rule of law. Japan will continue to proactively contribute to these efforts.

North Korea continues development of nuclear and missiles program. The threat has entered a new level. It is a serious threat to international peace and security and totally unacceptable. North Korea conducted nuclear tests in January and September 2016. North Korea has also launched more than 30 ballistic missiles since 2016. Even after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2321, North Korea repeatedly launched ballistic missiles. These acts constitute one of the serious destabilizing factors for security in the region.

North Korea's nuclear and missile development, including its uranium enrichment activities, violates the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks. The international community must continue to strongly urge North Korea in a concerted manner to fully comply with the relevant UNSCRs and refrain from any further provocation. To this end, it is imperative for each country to steadily implement measures against North Korea pursuant to the relevant UNSCRs. On top of these measures, Japan will also continue to steadily implement measures of its own. It will continue to closely coordinate with countries concerned, including the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia, strongly urging North Korea to refrain from any further provocations and comply with the relevant UNSCRs.

With regard to Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will continue to make its utmost efforts toward comprehensive

resolution of the outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration under the policy of “dialogue and pressure,” and “action for action.” In its Government-level Consultations with Japan in May 2014, North Korea promised to conduct comprehensive and full-scale investigations on all Japanese nationals, including abductees. Nevertheless, no abductee has yet returned home. The abduction issue is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and the safety of Japanese citizens. Japan will continue to urge North Korea to take concrete actions in order to achieve the return of all the abductees at the earliest possible time while urging North Korea to implement the agreement made in Stockholm.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

A. Japan's Security Policy

i. “Proactive Contribution to Peace”

The security environment surrounding Japan has become even severe due to the dramatic change in the global power balance and the emerging threats that extend beyond national boundaries. No nation can maintain its own peace and security by itself. Being well aware of this, and under its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will contribute even more actively to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as a control tower, and in accordance with the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will continue its path as a peace-loving nation, work in close cooperation with the U.S. and other partners as a major global player in the

international community, and implement its national security policies in a steadfast manner, thereby making a more proactive contribution to peace and stability in the region and the world more than ever.

ii. Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security

Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security took effect in March 2016. The legislation is designed for Japan both (i) to make a seamless response to any situation amid an increasingly severe security environment surrounding the country, and (ii) to put into concrete practice its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, and thereby administer more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community.

Now that the Legislation for Peace and Security has taken effect, Japan's "use of force" will be permitted, under the Constitution, to exercise the right of collective defense in a limited manner in addition to the right of individual self-defense if the "Three New Conditions," which are unmatched worldwide in terms of stringency, are met.

The legislation has expanded the range of activities in which Japan can engage in during U.N. PKOs. It also allows Japan to participate in internationally coordinated operations for peace and security that are outside the U.N. PKO framework. Furthermore, the legislation allows Japan to engage in cooperation and support activities, such as supply and transportation under certain conditions, when the peace and security of the international community are threatened including those concerning U.N. resolutions. By allowing these activities, the legislation enables Japan to better contribute to the peace and stability of the international community.

However, Japan's postwar posture as a peace-loving nation has not been changed for more than 70 years. Japan has taken various opportunities to explain both its policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" and the Legislation for Peace and Security to the countries concerned in a transparent and sincere manner, winning support and understanding from countries around the world.

B. Japan's Defense Policy

i. National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY2014 and beyond sets forth the basic principles for Japan's national defense, explains the significance and role of its defense capabilities, and on the basis of these provides fundamental guidelines for future capability development, including the specific architecture of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the target level for main equipment improvement. In light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan since 2010 when the previous guidelines were drawn up, the Government made a Cabinet decision on the new NDPG in December 2013, taking the NSS into account.

The new NDPG sets out the following three points: (i) Japan's own efforts, (ii) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and (iii) active promotion of security cooperation, as the pillars for the essential defense of the lives and property of Japanese people as well as the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace. The NDPG calls for the building of a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" that will enable the JSDF to conduct a diverse range of JSDF activities seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as demanded, under the increasingly severe

security environment surrounding Japan. It also calls for promoting a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) is, on the other hand, the first five-year defense buildup program laid out to achieve the target level for defense capabilities set forth in the NDPGs. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately 24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately 700 billion yen will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform.

ii. Defense-Related Expenditures

In addition to the cost of maintaining and operating the JSDF, defense-related expenditures in Japan include the cost of improving the living environment in the vicinity of defense facilities and support for US forces stationed in Japan.

As the budget based on the new NDPGs and MTDP mentioned above, the FY2017 defense-related expenditures budget includes an array of projects aimed at the establishment of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.

Excluding the costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO (the cost of implementing the SACO Final Report to mitigate the impacts on people in Okinawa), the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and the expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft, the expenditure budget for FY2017 has been increased by

38.8 billion yen (or 0.8% growth rate) from the previous fiscal year to 4,899.6 billion yen, marking the fifth consecutive year of growth. Major factors behind the growth include additional JSDF activity expenses needed to respond to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, as well as personnel expenses resulting from requests relating to organizations/personnel and compensation system review, and obligatory outlay expenses relating to equipment, etc. on past contracts.

Including 2.8 billion yen in SACO-related expenses, 201.1 billion yen in the U.S. forces realignment related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), and 21.6 billion yen in expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft, Japan's total defense-related expenditure budget for FY2017 amounts to 5,125.1 billion yen, an increase of 70.9 billion yen, or growth rate of 1.4% from the preceding fiscal year.

The FY2016 defense-related expenditure is 0.89% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), SACO-related expenses, U.S. forces realignment related expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft excluded, and 0.93% with the above three included.

C. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Given an increasingly severer security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, securing the forward deployment of U.S. forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance are essential not only for the security of Japan but also for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In order to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance, the two countries are

expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including ballistic missile defense, cyberspace, outer space, and maritime security, as laid out in the 2015 Defense Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security.

In light of the recent security environment, the United States will strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the alliance. The United States and Japan will further enhance cooperation with allies and partners in the region.

III. Japan's Contributions to Regional Security

A. Maritime Security

Securing the safety of navigation is indispensable for the international community as a whole, and international coordination and cooperation are crucial to maintain it. "Open and Stable Seas" underpinned by a maritime order that is governed not by force or coercion but by laws and rules that constitute global commons essential for peace and prosperity of the entire world. It is necessary to maintain and develop them. From this perspective, Japan has been striving to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight through various initiatives such as counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close coordination and cooperation with other countries.

As part of its efforts to secure the safety of navigation in Asia, Japan has advocated the establishment of a forum to provide EAS member countries with the opportunity to discuss maritime cooperation and maritime issues in the region, which has borne fruit in the form of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). At the third EAMF held in Viet Nam in 2014

and the fourth EAMF in Indonesia in September 2015, Japan underscored the importance of the rule of law at sea, while referring to the "three principles of the rule of law at sea" mentioned above. At the same time, Japan proposed to establish a mechanism to reflect the outcome of EAMF upon EAS.

In addition, Japan took the initiative in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Japan has been actively contributing to the implementation of the ReCAAP by making financial contributions to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) and supporting ReCAAP ISC's efforts in the area of information sharing and capacity building assistance.

In ARF, Japan has been co-chairing the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS) with the Philippines and the United States since August 2014. Together with the co-chairs, Japan has worked on revising the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. With a view to further promoting cooperation on maritime security, Japan hosted the 9th ARF ISM on MS in February 2017, where the Japanese delegation stressed the importance of ensuring free, open and stable seas and rule of law at sea as well as free and open Indian and Pacific Oceans. The common understanding reached among the participants in the meeting included (i) the importance of enhancing international and regional cooperation, (ii) cooperation should be based on the regional ownership and responsibility, including, for instance, ASEAN unity and centrality, (iii) the importance of securing the compliance with international law including UNCLOS in the conduct of concrete action and cooperation, (iv) the importance of enhancing cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities in

order to facilitate capacity building on law enforcement and environment conservation capability. Furthermore, Japan serves with Malaysia as the lead countries for “confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements, and cooperation,” which is one of the priority areas for the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security. In this context, Japan hosted the ARF Seminar on Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia, in Tokyo in March 2015 (co-chairing with the US, Malaysia, and India), and ARF Seminar on Regional Confidence Building and Law of the Sea, in Tokyo in December 2015 (co-chairing with Vietnam and India).

B. Disaster Relief

Japan has provided active support in responding to large-scale natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. In November 2016, a Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) JSDF Unit consisting of one P-1 patrol aircraft conducted emergency relief operations over earthquake-stricken New Zealand for emergency relief operations. During FY2016, Japan extended emergency assistance to ARF members through the provision of emergency relief goods in three cases and emergency grant aid in two cases to assist the people affected by major natural disasters, such as the heavy rainfall in Sri Lanka and the earthquake in Indonesia.

Japan also co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) together with Myanmar and China (from July 2013 to July 2016). In February 2016, it co-chaired the 15th ARF-ISM on DR in Nay Pyi Taw. The meeting was attended by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Authorities, and Disaster Relief Agencies from ARF member states as relevant international organizations. The meeting discussed regional frameworks, activities,

and cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, from both civil and military perspectives in light of the latest initiatives taken by these countries. As Myanmar has often been hit by floods and cyclones in recent years, the participants generally seemed to have much interest in disaster risk reduction (DRR). In fact, many questions were asked in relation to the capacity-building assistance that Japan has been providing to ASEAN, as JICA has already extended assistance in Myanmar of various kinds in this sector. Japan will work with other ARF participants and contribute to ARF activities in order to make regional disaster relief cooperation more practical and effective.

In addition, Japan is an active player in other regional frameworks as well. For example, Japan proactively participates in EAS initiatives that address disaster risk reduction as a priority area. In the framework of Japan-China-ROK trilateral cooperation, the three countries hold a regular table top exercise on disaster management, whereby they discuss the humanitarian assistance and disaster management mechanisms of each country in order to enhance mutual understanding. Within the framework of Japan-ASEAN cooperation, Japan provides three types of assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). The first type of assistance concerns the development and operation of an ICT-based disaster management system. This has helped facilitate timely information-gathering and responses, and international rescue and relief operations. The second type concerns the development and operation of the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA). DELSA has been developing a framework for stockpiling emergency relief supplies at specific locations and transporting these items to disaster-hit areas. The third type of Japan’s assistance

through the AHA Centre concerns a human resources development project in DRR. This project involves a six-month training program for officials at the DRR organization in the ASEAN Member States. In June 2016, Japan offered its knowledge and experience in DRR to the program participants when they visited the country.

C. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

In the field of counter-terrorism, Japan continues to make efforts against international terrorism and violent extremism in cooperation with the countries and the regional and international organizations concerned. In this regard, at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Vientiane, Laos on September 7, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan would provide approximately 45 billion yen over the next three years for Asia as comprehensive counter-terrorism measures consisted of (i) improvement of counter-terrorism capacity, (ii) measures to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism, and (iii) social and economic development assistance for creating a foundation for a moderate society. He also stated that Japan would help develop 2,000 personnel for counter-terrorism over the next three years. In February 2017, Japan decided to contribute approximately 35 million US dollars for enhancing counter-terrorism and violent extremism measures in Asia.

Specifically, Japan has continuously held multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. To help build anti-terrorism capacity, Japan supports projects in such areas as immigration control, aviation security, maritime and

port security, and law enforcement under a number of frameworks, which include the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue (AJCTD), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (AMMTC+Japan), and the Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime plus Japan (SOMTC+Japan). The 17th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in Myanmar in November 2014 adopted the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The participants agreed to strengthen cooperation in countering terrorism and violent extremism between Japan and ASEAN and to expand its scope to include international organized crime. AMMTC + Japan in October 2015 took note of the SOMTC + Japan Work Plan for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime (2015-2017), which is designed to promote the implementation of the Joint-Declaration. In January 2017, Japan hosted a Workshop for Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Asia, attended by representatives from some Southeast Asian nations.

Japan has also been stepping up its efforts to combat transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region in three major aspects. The first aspect is strengthening transnational legal frameworks. For example, Japan has been tackling drug problems in alliance with ARF member countries through measures such as the exchange of information on synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances (NPS), and investigative cooperation in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and other drug-related treaties. The second aspect is supporting local initiatives designed to combat illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, and corruption in the Southeast Asia

through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). For example, Japan has dispatched an expert to Myanmar to help improve the management of prisons in cooperation with UNODC. Specific follow-ups include the compilation of a handbook on international cooperation regarding cases of bribery of foreign public officials, which is designed to address the challenges in Southeast Asia. The third aspect is promoting policy coordination with various countries and international organizations. Japan actively participates in multilateral frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and the Bali Process, which involves consultations on irregular immigrants and trafficking in persons.

D. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The schism on approaches towards a world free of nuclear weapons has become salient among nuclear-weapon States, between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, and even among non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, the international community is facing a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as highlighted by North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. In spite of the severe security situation which the international community finds itself in, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, will continue to take concrete and practical steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons, believing that only the promotion of cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States will lead to a world free of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, Japan is committed to maintaining and enhancing the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has been engaging in various diplomatic efforts. These efforts include the contribution to the three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) through the NPT Review process, as well as the submission of resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly, the activities through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the contribution to the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD). In addition, Japan has been engaged in efforts for early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the co-chair of the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT for a two-year term since September 2015. Also, Japan is currently contributing to the creation of the necessary dynamism and momentum for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiation as Members of the high-level expert preparatory group.

Taking into consideration serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and launch of ballistic missile launches, Japan is engaged in outreach activities in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of achieving three key objectives: (i) promoting the universalization of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and reinforcing their implementation at the national level; (ii) establishing and strengthening export control systems; and (iii) raising awareness of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and enhancing related efforts. As part of these activities, Japan

has been hosting a range of meetings each year, including the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and Asian Export Control Seminar.

E. Cyberspace and Outer Space

Cyber attacks are becoming increasingly diversified and sophisticated. Some attacks target critical infrastructure as seen in attacks against the Deutsche Telekom in November 2016, as well as attacks that resulted in the leakage of personal information of some 1.2 million people from the Japan Pension Service in May 2015. How to develop systems and capabilities to protect states and the lives and property of the citizens from such cyber attacks constitutes a major challenge from both national security and economic perspectives. To this end, Japan is working with other countries concerned to promote a mutual understanding of these issues in a number of areas. One such area is deliberating international rules, including those on how to apply existing international law to acts in cyberspace as well as developing international norms. Other areas include supporting capacity building and developing confidence-building measures.

Countries in Asia-Pacific Region are discussing cyberspace issues under frameworks such as ARF and ASEAN+3 meetings. The ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), which was endorsed at the 22nd ARF, calls for confidence-building measures, awareness-raising, capacity building support, and crime control regarding cybersecurity. Japan is proactively participating in international meetings on these issues to boost cyber security in the region. From the viewpoint of the increasing importance of the situation surrounding cyberspace, ARF recognizes the value of continuing

to exchange views from a comprehensive standpoint with the aim of promoting a peaceful, safe, open, and coordinated ICT environment, and preventing conflicts and crises through capacity-building assistance while building confidence among nations. In July 2015, Japan sent a study mission on cybersecurity to Viet Nam to promote cooperation in this sector. Going forward, Japan will increase its support for capacity building in cyber security with a focus on ASEAN countries according to the “Japan’s Basic Strategy of Cybersecurity Capacity Building.”

Japan’s bilateral initiatives include discussions and dialogue on cyberspace with the U.S., Australia, the U.K., France, India, Russia, Israel, Estonia, Germany, ROK and Ukraine. Japan has also been holding trilateral talks involving China and ROK, and exchanging views with such international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe (CoE).

In addition to these initiatives, Japan will accelerate ties with ASEAN countries and public/private-sector collaboration to reinforce its efforts to address cyber security issues.

In order to deal with issues pertaining to the increase of congestion in outer space and threatening space activities of other countries to secure the safe and stable use of outer space, Japan has been proactively engaged in building a safe space environment and promptly developing international rules. Within the framework of the ARF, Japan has been playing a leading role, as it hosted the second ARF Workshop on Space Security, which was held in Tokyo in 2014, promoting the common understanding of the member states with regard to the current situation of space environment and the importance of prompt development of international

rules. Japan also has been conducting bilateral consultations and cooperation with various countries focusing on space issues. Japan has been committed to the establishment of the rule of law in outer space. For this purpose, Japan has been actively engaged with discussions in multilateral fora including establishing the “Guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the United Nations, as well as strengthening norms of responsible behavior for all space activities, as mentioned in the joint statement of G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in April 2017.

E. Preventive Diplomacy

Japan believes it is important for ARF to make steady progress from the first stage of the “promotion of confidence-building measure” to the second stage of “development of preventive diplomacy” and further to the third stage of “approaches to dispute settlement.” However, despite the cumulative efforts of the ARF countries have so far succeeded in facilitating confidence-building measures to a certain extent, progress toward the development of preventive diplomacy has only just begun. In this context, Japan welcomes the approach taken in the ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Training, held in Yogyakarta in November 2015, and the ARF Training Course on Preventive Diplomacy, held in Hanoi in March 2016; that is, the approach of analyzing case studies in the region while sharing the understanding of the concept and modus operandi of preventive diplomacy among the ARF participants in order to promote preventive diplomacy. Japan has long been committed to conflict prevention and peace-building through human resources development and other modalities. Japan will take advantage of its expertise in these areas to further

contribute to the ARF’s efforts to promote preventive diplomacy.

G. ADMM-Plus Initiatives

The ADMM-Plus provides a framework for addressing a wide range of security issues common to the region. Japan is committed to this framework with the aim of developing the forum into a key pillar of regional security cooperation. Within the ADMM-Plus, seven Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) have been established to increase concrete military-to-military cooperation in handling security issues common to the region: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counterterrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian mine action and cyber security. Japan is taking part in each EWG to further enhance regional security cooperation by actively exchanging views with other countries and making proposals.

Japan had helped to intensify cooperation with other member countries in military medicine areas by acting as co-chair of the EWG on military medicine along with Singapore, conducting field training exercises on HA/DR and military medicine in Brunei in June 2013. From 2014 to 2017, Japan co-chaired the EWG on HA/DR together with Lao PDR. Efforts were made to formulate a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the establishment and management of a Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) so as to amplify the activities of assisting foreign forces that are accepted by disaster-affected countries in the event of natural or other disasters. In August 2015, for example, a table-top exercise (TTX) was conducted in Lao PDR. In September 2016, exercises on HA/DR and military medicine, AM-Hex 2016, were conducted in Thailand in order to test the final draft of the SOP. At the 9th EWG meeting on HA/DR in December 2016,

the SOP was adopted and it has been on the track of discussion in the framework of ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) since then.


The ADMM-Plus is a vital framework providing the member countries with opportunities to conduct multilateral talks on a wide range of regional security issues in an open manner. Japan believes it is important to keep this framework open without putting any restriction on the issues to be addressed in the forum while allowing the participating countries to discuss a wide range of issues in a candid manner.

IV. Japan's Future Contribution to Enhance Capability of ARF

As a framework for candid discussion on the political and security issues of the entire Asia-Pacific region, ARF has steadily contributed to confidence-building in the region. In recent years, various initiatives have been put forward in a wide range of areas, including maritime security, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, preventive diplomacy, cyberspace, and outer space. Some of these initiatives have been translated into exercise-type activities, such as the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx). During the inter-sessional year of 2015-2016, Japan played a leading role in animated discussions within the ARF by exercising initiatives in such areas as maritime security, disaster relief, outer space, and counter-terrorism.

To further develop ARF as an action-oriented framework instead of making it serve merely as a forum for dialogue, ARF countries that co-organize each initiative need to establish practical agenda items and programs with the cooperation with stakeholders, including relevant international organizations and experts. Also, member states need to work more closely with one another to avoid duplications among initiatives and produce favorable outputs. In addition to these efforts to improve ARF functions, it is also important to strengthen cooperation with other regional security frameworks in pursuing effective synergy. The edge of the wedge is the area of disaster relief. In this particular area, similar exercises are increasingly conducted under different regional frameworks such as ADMM plus. Member states need to streamline such exercises from the viewpoint of reducing personnel and financial costs for participating countries and pursuing practical initiatives. The ARF Multi-Year Strategic Exercise Plan Workshop, held in April 2015, discussed how to optimize disaster relief exercises. Such discussions are in line with this awareness. They give a hint as to how the effectiveness of the ARF can be ensured in the future.

Japan will proactively contribute to improve ARF functions and coordinate among different regional frameworks while continue to exercise initiatives in various areas.



MALAYSIA

I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

The current geopolitical landscape remains fluid especially with the emergence of new sets of security challenges. These generate genuine interest to increase security cooperation. Exacerbation of issues such as the rise of violent extremism at a scale never seen before across the region, the volatility of the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula, and developments in the South China Sea continue to challenge the preservation of regional stability at the expense of accelerated economic development.

Malaysia, in this regard, remains committed in giving high priority to the effort in ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. Malaysia maintains strong defence cooperation with other ASEAN Member States, as well as dialogue partners, by playing an active part in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS). These fora are important elements of the strategic regional architecture, vital for the security of the region.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

The primary objective of the National Defence Policy is to protect and defend

national interests which form the foundation of Malaysia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable economy. Through self-reliance, Malaysia is committed to developing the Malaysian Armed Forces' (MAF) capability and the dependency on its own resources through the defence industries to support and sustain MAF operations. This is coupled with a total and integrated approach of total defence which involves all levels of community, from individual citizens to private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government agencies in sharing of responsibility to defend the country.

As ASEAN is the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy, defence relations with other ASEAN Member States are of primal importance to Malaysia. A key framework of the regional security architecture is the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus (with eight Dialogue Partners). The establishment of the ADMM in May 2006 was mandated by the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action of 2004. As the highest defence mechanism within ASEAN, the annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN Defence Ministers' discussions and exchange of views on current defence issues and security challenges.

As a member of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) since 1971, Malaysia is committed to it as an effective tool which has contributed towards the military's development and enhancement

of its professionalism. With this in mind, Malaysia recognises defence diplomacy as an important effort towards conflict prevention and escalation which could undermine peace and stability. Malaysia believes that the appropriate if not the best tools to resolve traditional security issues are through confidence-building measures, transparency and construction of positive norms, and the establishment of the channel of communication.

Malaysia believes that comprehensive actions developed from its national security, defence policy are important to address traditional, new and emerging threats. This encapsulates Malaysia's full support of the United Nations and the international community's efforts to preserve universal peace and security, and part of Malaysia's proactive approach in addressing global issues in line with its foreign policy.

A. Total defence expenditure on an annual basis

Malaysia's total defence expenditure for 2016 was about RM17.3 billion. Defence expenditure for 2017 is capped much lower at RM15.05 billion or equivalent to 5.76 percent from Malaysia's overall budget for 2017.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

Malaysia shares the concern of the international community that there is an urgent need to accelerate global efforts to combat terrorism. In this connection, Malaysia is committed to tackling the threat of terrorism, especially by Daesh, by fully supporting the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, namely, 2349(2017), 2322(2016), 2309(2016),

2253(2015), 2249(2015), 2199(2015), 2195(2014), 2178(2014) and 2170(2014), and in ensuring that appropriate national measures are taken to implement these resolutions.

On 27 October 2016, the Prime Minister of Malaysia officiated the establishment of the National Special Operations Force (NSOF) as the country's security forces' first responder to non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, under the purview of the National Security Council and co-chaired by the Inspector-General of Police and Chief of Armed Forces. As an integrated force, NSOF is a combination of the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.

On countering the narratives put forth by Daesh, Malaysia has moved forward by establishing the Digital Strategic Communications Division (DSCD) under the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), and the Counter Messaging Centre (CMC), which is operated by RMP. The DSCD commenced its operation on 1 August 2016 and presently has produced a number of digital banners which have been uploaded on social media platforms. The CMC, with enforcement elements, helps to synchronise efforts to counter radical social media messages and present the true image of Islam. Following the King Salman of Saudi Arabia's visit in March 2017, Malaysia is currently working on the establishment of the King Salman Centre for International Peace in University Science Islam Malaysia, designed to counter radical ideologies and promote Islam as a religion of peace and moderation.

i. Promoting a People-Centred Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Malaysia believes that terrorism needs to be addressed in a more comprehensive manner, and not through military means alone. Malaysia is of the view that winning the hearts and minds of the people is more effective than other measures combined. Apart from strict legislative and enforcement measures, Malaysia adopts a multifaceted approach focusing on the underlying contributing factors that breeds terrorism, principally the social and economic problems of the society.

Malaysia has also incorporated the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme towards changing the mindsets of radicalised extremist individuals. The Malaysian Government employs a strategy that places importance on collective and inclusive participation of all relevant entities involved in the programme, such as clerics or ulama' who have better influence over local communities and are considered to be more authoritative in giving the correct explanation of *jihad* or struggle from the religious perspective; former terrorists or rehabilitated persons who could be good role models and able to persuade former comrades to leave their misconceived struggle, as they would be able to point out, with more credibility, any crucial factual misrepresentation and misconceptions which are linked to radicalism; family members, who could assist to persuade terrorists to leave their misguided struggle both psychologically and spiritually; and non-governmental organisations who could assist in creating awareness to society of the negative consequences of terrorism and violent extremism. The programme, complemented by various forms of humanitarian assistance to facilitate their reintegration into society, has shown a success rate of 97.5 percent.

Besides, the Malaysian Institute for Research in Youth Development conducted a research to identify the potential level of understanding and acceptance/rejection of Daesh among students of higher education institutions in Malaysia. The outcome of the research has helped to assess the seriousness of the threat to the national security and in planning counter radicalisation efforts among youth in Malaysia. This project, led by the Ministry of Youth and Sports, has come out with informative brochures on Daesh, for circulation among the students and/or youths.

ii. Promotion of Inter-Civilisation Dialogue

The Global Movement of the Moderates (GMM), a brainchild of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, calls for countries to censure and reject extremism and support moderation. Moderation is an all-encompassing approach that emphasizes the values of understanding, tolerance, mutual respect and inclusiveness in resolving differences and conflicts peacefully. These are the very noble values that are non-existent in the wayward ideology of Daesh. Retelling the narrative of true Islam that embraces these virtues is as vital in countering extremism as it is in putting a stop to the barbarities perpetrated by these misguided people.

The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) is also involved in efforts through its public awareness programmes. The programmes include SEARCCT's officials engaging with university and college students on the dangers of terrorism and extremism. Essentially, it aims to create 'mental firewalls' in the minds of youth, particularly local undergraduates, to counter radical ideology or narratives propagated by terrorist organisations. Since the introduction of this programme in 2011,

more than 6,000 students from various public and private higher institutions have benefitted from this programme.

Over the months of September 2016 to March 2017, SEARCCT has also organised six workshops, entitled ‘*Developing a Whole-of-Government Soft Power Response to Terrorism and Extremism*’. Almost 600 participants from all over Malaysia attended the workshop. The aim of the workshop was to bring together civil servants from different backgrounds, schemes and services, and provide them with insights on the current terrorism and extremism situation in Malaysia and to impress on them the importance for all parties to play a role in countering these threats. The workshops are the first step to equip civil servants with sufficient knowledge and understanding as a safeguard against the influence of extremist ideology in the country.

Malaysia believes that the acceptance of the concept of moderation in international politics would impose to all parties, state and non-state actors, a responsibility to conduct relations and interactions in the manner that helps to diffuse possible tension and conflict. In line with this, Malaysia has always encouraged and welcomed initiatives on interfaith dialogue by participating in the Alliance of Civilisations, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Inter-faith Dialogue, and Asia-Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue on an annual basis. Those initiatives are important dimensions towards the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation through inter-cultural, inter-civilizational and inter-religious programmes to achieve global peace.

At the national level, Malaysia continues to promote mutual understanding and tolerance among the multiracial and multi-religious society by organising inter-religious dialogues, educational and community programmes.

iii. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security Exchanging Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes

At the regional level, Malaysia together with ASEAN Member States have implemented practical measures to enhance counter terrorism cooperation, which include working with external partners. ASEAN cooperation in combating terrorism primarily takes place within the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Malaysia, through SEARCCT, has also conducted various capacity-building courses for both local and foreign participants, published articles and monographs, and is involved in delivering papers and lectures at the local, regional and international levels. SEARCCT also works closely with various countries and organisations in conducting its capacity-building programmes and research activities. Since its establishment in 2003 until the end of March 2017, SEARCCT has conducted 204 capacity-building programmes, attended by more than 7,400 local and foreign participants. These programmes were conducted with the cooperation of SEARCCT’s local and international collaborators.

In 2016 alone, SEARCCT organised 27 capacity building programmes. Out of the 27 programmes, five (5) were conducted with foreign collaborators, while nine (9) were with local partners. Among the major programmes held in 2016 were: (i) “Regional Workshop on Preventing the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) through Strengthened Immigration

Security and Border Control” held on 15-16 March 2016 with the cooperation of the Embassy of the United States in Kuala Lumpur; (ii) “Regional Workshop on Undergraduates and Radicalisation” on 30-31 March 2016 in Kuala Lumpur with the cooperation of Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) and ASEAN Secretariat; and (iii) “Regional Workshop on Countering Daesh Narratives” from 28 November to 1 December 2016 in Kuala Lumpur.

On security cooperation, Malaysia had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with most of its ARF partners¹, namely in the field of transnational crime, Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Terrorism Financing, as well as cyber security.

Malaysia continues to exchange information and financial intelligence with more than 150 members of Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and 34 countries including ASEAN countries that Malaysia has signed MoUs with. Malaysia also plays a leading role in Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), through provision of AML/CFT related trainings and technical assistance especially on the effective implementation of AML/CFT requirements and preparation for Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) to members in the region.

The major milestone for the region was the issuance of the Regional Terrorism Financing (TF) Risk Assessment (RTFRA) in August 2016 which was a joint effort between the FIUs in the region, namely the FIUs of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Among others, the RTFRA covers analysis of Counter Financing of Terrorism (CFT) legal framework,

sources, channels of movements of funds and sector vulnerabilities for TF. The 2017’s Regional TF risk assessment will focus on non-profit organizations (NPOs) and cross border movement of currencies.

On the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) front and since APEC considers terrorism poses a direct threat to its vision of secure, open and prosperous economies, Malaysia takes part in the annual APEC Counter Terrorism Group meetings, which discussed the grouping’s joint actions in addressing the terrorist threat and capacity- building programmes, to help secure the region’s people and its economic, trade, investment and financial systems from terrorist attack or abuse and trade-based money laundering.

Malaysia also engages and works closely with the UN. Malaysia had received visits from the Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning Da’esh and Al-Qaida on 10-12 August 2016, and the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and UN Counter-Terrorism Centre from 14-18 November 2016, to assist Malaysia in developing and implementing the Advance Passenger Information (API). The visits had enabled both sides to engage in fruitful discussions concerning the threat posed to Malaysia and the Southeast Asia by Da’esh and Al-Qaida, as well as Malaysia’s implementation of the operative provisions of Resolutions 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015).

On intelligence sharing, the Royal Malaysia Police continues to work closely with INTERPOL and its counterparts through the I-24/7 Global Police Communications System, for which crucial information on terrorist and terrorism activities can be communicated in real time. Such information sharing

¹ To date, Malaysia has signed MoUs with ARF Partners, namely with Australia, Brunei, China, Cambodia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam.

includes the reporting to INTERPOL of stolen and lost travel documents.

Malaysia's membership in the FATF, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Egmont Group also provides Malaysia with a platform to cooperate in various AML and counter financing of terrorism, especially in the areas of information sharing and capacity-building.

iv. Measures Against Terrorist Financing

Mutual Evaluation Exercise (MEE) conducted on Malaysia's Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime in 2014 recognized the high level of compliance to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations on preventive measures including suspicious transactions reporting (STR), customer due diligence (CDD) and wire transfers requirement. In addition, the assessors also acknowledged the reporting institutions' understanding on ML/TF risk, AML/CFT obligations and application of mitigating measures.

The National Strategic Plan on Anti-Money Laundering, Counter Terrorism Financing and Counter Proliferation Financing (NSP) for 2015–2020 was developed to address findings and gaps identified through risk assessment process, the MEE and other domestic needs. The following action plans have been initiated to ensure effective implementation of preventive measures against the risks of ML/TF:

- 1.) Continuing and intensifying guidance and outreach programs to reporting institutions including on sharing of risk information on TF threats, targeted financial sanctions (TFS) on TF and other compliance issues.

- 2.) Ensuring consistent application of AML/CFT measures across financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) through the establishment of Financial Sector Sub-Committee and DNFBP Sub-Committee, which consist of regulators and supervisors of financial institutions and DNFBPs.
- 3.) Strengthening the implementation framework on TFS on TF with the establishment of a working group led by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). The deliverables include refining parameters and procedures for variation of freezing order of listed entities, refining parameters for listing individuals and entities under the domestic list and strengthening engagement with relevant stakeholders affected by the TFS.
- 4.) Preventing the abuse of non-profit organizations (NPO) from TF's threat through greater coordination among NPO regulators in the area of risk information sharing, organising outreach and dialogue sessions and undertaking risk-based supervision on high risk NPOs.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Malaysia remains committed to pursue a nuclear weapon-free world. Achieving this goal rests on the fulfilment of the basic bargain embodied in the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Malaysia remains concerned on the slow progress in the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons by

the Nuclear Weapon States, the lack of transparency, the high alert status of nuclear weapons, the continuing pursuit of nuclear programmes by a few countries and the insistence of some others to remain outside of the NPT.

This notwithstanding, Malaysia will continue to play a constructive role in promoting international peace and security. Malaysia is of the view that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and the full and effective implementation of the NPT obligations, in particular by Nuclear Weapon States, plays a crucial role in achieving a nuclear weapon-free world. Malaysia regretted that no consensus was achieved during the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Malaysia hopes that the NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting that begins on 2 May 2017 in Vienna, Austria will mark a fresh start towards the 2020 NPT Review Conference and that all State Parties will work together under the three pillars of the NPT, which are disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In 2017, the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons Leading towards Their Total Elimination will begin its negotiation for a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. This conference is the result of various Non-Nuclear Weapon States working together since 2012, where an Open-Ended Working Group was tasked to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Malaysia looks forward to a fruitful discussion during both the 27-31 March and 15 June-7 July sessions.

Following the conclusion of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, D.C., Malaysia continues to work with all participating countries to

ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials, that it does not fall into the hands of terrorists or non-state actors. It is also crucial that all participating countries continue to support the endorsed action plans, to ensure that there will be continuity, even after the conclusion of the NSS.

In this context, Malaysia was supportive of the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) two resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2016. Resolutions 2270 (March 2016) and 2321 (November 2016) were adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear tests in January and September 2016. Malaysia, which was a non-permanent Member of the UNSC at that time, co-sponsored the resolution and voted in favour of resolution 2270 and resolution 2321.

i. Malaysia's involvement in activities related to NPD

Malaysia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 23 April 2014. Malaysia is committed to upholding the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and believes that it adds value to a country's existing arrangements and efforts to curb illicit trafficking of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Malaysia participated in several PSI workshops in 2015 and 2016, held in Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States. Malaysia also hosted a PSI Workshop and Table Top Exercise in August 2015.

The National Authority Chemical Weapons Convention of Malaysia (NACWC), which was officially established in September 2006 in conjunction with the promulgation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Act 2005, has served as the national focal point for effective liaison

with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to assist Malaysia in fulfilling its obligation under the CWC. In 2015, Malaysia hosted an OPCW programme on the “Assistance and Protection Course for Police Officer – First Responders” in Kuala Lumpur from 28 September to 2 October 2015. A similar programme entitled “Assistance and Protection for Police First Responders” was done in Kuala Lumpur in October 2016. Both programmes were conducted by NACWC in collaboration with the OPCW to enhance national capacity in Malaysia to meet its obligations under the Convention.

The Study Group on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (NPD) of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was held in Auckland, New Zealand on 6 and 7 March 2017. The Meeting was attended by representatives from CSCAP member committees and included Young Leaders from the Pacific Forum Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The group examined recent developments in non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology, biosafety and biosecurity in the Asia Pacific and the recent developments in the Korean Peninsula. It examined the ARF Work Plan on NPD and discussed future study group priorities, and focusing on capacity-building to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Malaysia continues to support activities under the ambit of the ARF relating to non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Pursuant to the decision of the 23rd ARF Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane in July 2015, Malaysia, together with Canada and New Zealand co-chaired the 9th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD) that was held in Auckland,

New Zealand on 8 and 9 March 2017. The deliberations of the ISM revolved around the three pillars of the NPT, namely disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Malaysia hosted the “Regional Training Course (RTC) on Developing a National Framework for Managing the Response to Nuclear Security” from 9 to 13 May 2016. The RTC assisted participants in preparing a response relating to nuclear security during Major Public Events. The programme is co-organised with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and drew participation from all ASEAN members.

Malaysia also hosted the Malaysia-Thailand Cross Border Nuclear Security Exercise from 31 October–4 November 2016. The cross border exercise, co-organized with the Thai Government and the IAEA was the first of its kind and saw both governments work together to prevent the proliferation of radioactive materials across the state border. Besides relevant agencies from both countries, members of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) were also invited as observers.

ii. Bioscience Technology

Given that the tremendous progress in the biosciences is increasingly more reachable through the medium of modern information technology, Malaysia strongly believes that there is a need to enhance scientific and technological cooperation between State Parties both for the social-economic progress of developing countries that are people-centred and socially responsible, and for the fight against infectious diseases and the threats of bio-terrorism.

Malaysia, through its Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), an Agency under the Ministry of Defence of Malaysia, has formed a technical cooperation programme in 2012 with the Cooperative Biological Engagement Programme (CBEP), Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the United States of America in the field of biosecurity. This initiative would enhance Malaysia's capacity to protect the country against biological threats and aims to prevent bio-crime through cooperation on safety working practices, accurate techniques and procedures for assessing risks of biological misuse.

After successfully hosting the First SEA Dragon Table top Exercise in October 2014, Malaysia in collaboration with CBEP once again, hosted the "SEA Dragons II: ASEAN Discussion on Preparedness against Chemical-Biological Threats" in Kuala Lumpur from 9-11 December 2015. The programme, which was participated by government and non-government representatives from all ASEAN Member States, highlighted the importance of balancing the advantages and risks related to the expansion of technological and scientific innovation. In 2017, the scope of the joint programmes is expanded to include agroterrorism threat. Three (3) programmes are planned to be held in Penang i.e. "National Bioincident Joint Investigation Workshop" from 6-10 March 2017, "National Seminar on Agroterrorism – Potential Threats and Biosecurity Preparedness: Are we ready?" from 24-25 April 2017 and "Regional Workshop on Agroterrorism – Potential Threats and Biosecurity Preparedness: Are we ready?" from 26-28 April 2017.

As a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Malaysia continues to fully adhere to its obligations under the Convention. Malaysia recognizes the importance for States Parties to

undertake necessary measures, including constitutional process, to implement the provisions of the Convention as stipulated under Article IV of the BWC. In demonstrating Malaysia's commitment to the BWC, Malaysia is in the process of finalising a comprehensive BWC Bill, which would reinforce the existing STA 2010 as well as other relevant legislatives such as Arms Act 1960 and Customs Act 1967.

iii. Arms Control

With regard to arms control, Malaysia had been supportive and constructive throughout the process of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Malaysia had voted in favour of all the resolutions related to the ATT and was seen by other Member States, as well as the Presidents of the July 2012 ATT Conference and March 2013 ATT Final Conference, as being a country that can bridge divides. Malaysia had signed the treaty on 26 September 2013 and is currently working towards the ratification to the treaty.

Malaysia was also the facilitator on the issue of transit or transshipment as well as a member of the Drafting Committee during the Final ATT Conference. In showing Malaysia's continuous support and commitment to the Treaty, Malaysia had attended the preparatory meetings as well as the First Conference of States Parties of the ATT in Cancun, Mexico from 24-27 August 2015. Malaysia had shared its views on the implementation of the Treaty and hoped that the Treaty would receive support from all states in order to achieve the Treaty's main objective to stem illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the region.

C. Transnational Crime

Malaysia believes that transnational crime needs to be addressed in a more comprehensive manner, including undertaking stricter enforcement measures, adopting and implementing legislative measures and enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies and inter-agency cooperation.

In its continuous efforts to combat organised crime in the country, Malaysia amended its Prevention of Crime Act (Amendment and Extension) 2015, which came into effect on 1 September 2015, to extend its applicability towards the States of Sabah and Sarawak.

Malaysia also amended the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007 which came into force on 18 November 2015 as a continued commitment to combating criminal activities and organised crime in the country.

i. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Transnational Crimes

Malaysia will continue to play its role in the implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Convention to Combat Transnational Crime which was adopted on 30 September 2015 during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (10th AMMTC) in Kuala Lumpur. The declaration, among others, recognises the continued need to be vigilant and to address the issue of transnational crime in a timely manner, reiterate ASEAN's commitment to combat transnational crime as specified by AMMTC, and endorse two (2) new areas of transnational crime, namely illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber as well as people smuggling.

On the ARF platform, Malaysia held the 22nd ARF on 6 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. Out of the five (5) priority areas, Malaysia has been tasked to lead two (2) Priority Areas, namely Priority 3: Use of Information and Communication Technologies with Russia and Australia, and Priority 4: Counter Radicalization with Australia.

Malaysia has been working collectively and in solidarity with ASEAN Member States to combat transnational crime. At the same time, Malaysia will continue to conclude security arrangements in the form of Agreements / Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with like-minded countries to forge strategic cooperation in eliminating and disrupt the commission of these crimes by criminal syndicates.

On the international fora, Malaysia attended the 8th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNCTOC in Vienna, Austria, on 17 to 21 October 2016. The Session, held every two years, reviewed the implementation of the UNTOC, presentations of reports from working groups and discussed on new forms and dimensions of TC. The Session took note on the views expressed by States that the issue of cybercrime is becoming a common concern which calls for greater engagement and international cooperation to combat cybercrime.

ii. Promoting Collaboration in addressing the issue of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants

Malaysia has ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC) on 24 September 2004 at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly. Subsequently, Malaysia acceded to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children on 26 February 2009. UNTOC is the

main international instrument to counter transnational organised crime, including Trafficking in Persons.

Malaysia also took part in the 6th Ministerial Conference on Bali Process on People Smuggling, TIP and Related Transnational Crime and Senior Officials' Meeting in Bali, Indonesia on 22 and 23 March 2016. The conference produced two (2) outcome documents, namely, the Bali Declaration on People Smuggling, TiP and Related Transnational Crime and Co-Chairs Statement.

iii. Amendments of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007

On the domestic front, Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007 (ATIPSOM) with the latest amendments in 2015. This is a manifestation of Malaysia's commitment to combat trafficking in persons. The most critical components of the amendments include the ability for victims to move freely, to reside outside the shelter homes and the ability to take up employment. This new transformational approach by Malaysia demonstrated Malaysia's political will and tireless efforts to address trafficking in persons.

Two (2) new regulations under ATIPSOM was enforced as follows:

- i) ATIPSOM (Permission to Move Freely and to Work) (Foreign National) Regulations 2016; and
- ii) ATIPSOM (Payment of Allowance to Trafficked Persons) Regulations 2017.

Malaysia, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, launched the National Action Plan (NAP) against Trafficking in Persons

for 2016 to 2020 on 16 August 2016. The NAP outlines the government-led transformation process following an amendment last year to the ATIPSOM 2007, aimed at strengthening victim protection by allowing free movement, employment and salary entitlement as well as expanding NGO's role.

iv. Promoting Collaboration in Addressing the Issue of Drug Trafficking

Malaysia has consistently called for stringent measures to be adopted in curbing illicit drug-trafficking. Priority should also be given to preventive programmes to curb drug abuse. Malaysia, through the National Anti-Drugs Agency, has taken the initiative on drug treatment measures by opening its 1Malaysia Cure and Care clinic to provide treatment and rehabilitation for drug abusers, drug users, co-dependent, employers and individuals without having to face the possibility of being charged with prevailing laws.

Malaysia participated in the UN Special Session on World Drug Problems, held in New York from 19 to 21 April 2016. It was the 30th Special Session convened to discuss pertinent issues of common concern and interest of UN Member States. During the meeting, Malaysia, in the capacity as the Chair of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters, delivered the ASEAN Position Statement on Drugs and Malaysia's National Statement.

On 10 March 2017, the Cabinet of Malaysia approved a new National Drug Policy. While retaining some of the elements in the previous policy, the all new National Drug Policy 2017 had incorporated new reforms to achieve a drug-free Malaysia with the aim to eliminate supply and demand for drugs. It also provides for a more comprehensive approach in dealing with drugs threats in the country.

Under the purview of the National Anti-Drug Agency (NADA), the policy is built on five (5) main fundamentals, namely,

- i) Prevention Education;
- ii) Treatment and Recovery;
- iii) Enforcement;
- iv) Harm Reduction; and
- v) International Cooperation.

Malaysia has participated in the 60th Session of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs, in Vienna, Austria from 13 to 17 March 2017. Malaysia delivered its National Statement during the meeting which includes our position on drug control policy, particularly on the demand and supply reduction approach.

In addition, the Royal Malaysian Police, through its Special Tactics and Intelligence Narcotics Group (STING), has been tasked to investigate and arrest the drug kingpins and drug smuggling syndicates. The squad is part of the measures in curbing drug related activities and crimes in the country.

v. Corruption

Malaysia's ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) reflects its commitment to promote and strengthen measures in combating corruption at the domestic, regional and international level. As a fully engaged member of the Convention and a proactive member of the global anti-corruption community, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) works closely with their local and international counterparts with regard to recovery of assets of illicit origin, which has direct linkages with money laundering and corruption activities.

The Malaysian National Key Result Areas (NKRA) placed combating corruption among the seven (7) key areas of priority of the Government and the initiatives in fighting corruption is to assist in the nation's transformational program, so as to turn Malaysia into a high income nation by 2020. This is done through addressing the root causes of corruption in promoting open and transparent governance in both private and public sectors. On domestic regulations, Malaysia has put in place several comprehensive laws such as the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (Amendments 2006), Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 and the Whistle-blower Protection Act 2010.

IV. Role of ARF

Since its inception 23 years ago, ARF has become an increasingly important platform for dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been agreed upon by participating countries that the ARF process would proceed in a three-stage evolution approach; from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and subsequently to conflict resolution.

Malaysia believes that in moving from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, it is important that for the progress to move at a pace comfortable to all on the basis of consensus. It goes without saying that preventive diplomacy can be carried out successfully when there is a strong foundation of trust and confidence among us. Malaysia is of the view that through years of our collective confidence building measures, this has generated the right momentum for us to advance to the next stage as envisaged in the founding document of the ARF.



MYANMAR

I. Security Concerns common to the ASEAN Community

The Asia-Pacific is a strategically important region in the world. As South East Asia is typically included in the Asia Pacific Region, some problems happening in the Asia Pacific Region have threatened the peace, stability and security in the region. Southeast Asia region is strategically located between Eastern and Western hemispheres of the world. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN Member States, through the political, economic and cultural sectors, have contributed much to regional security and stability. Yet, among ASEAN Member States, issues such as border, transnational crimes, people smuggling, and interface in the internal affairs of other nations continue to exist. These issues are contradictory to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and need to be tackled carefully.

The military power expansions of regional states, the disputed islands issues of East Asia and the power rivalry of super powers are the regional security problems which can transmute from the form of a spark to a flame at any time. If the problems are not peacefully tackled, they have the potential to impact to regional security. As mentioned above, there are not only the traditional security threats to the Asia-Pacific region, but also the non-traditional security threats to the region. The threats include international terrorism, arms smuggling, illegal drugs producing and trafficking, human

trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters, climate change, epidemic of infected diseases and illegal migration. As the consequences of technology developments, the momentum of Globalization contributes to the spread of non-traditional security concerns and such concerns will grow from regional to global level.

II. National Defence Policy of Myanmar

The Myanmar Armed Forces upholds the three main national causes as the national policy and always takes the responsibility of national security and defence. Regarding the Defence of the Union of Myanmar, the article 42 of State Constitution (2008) has clearly promulgated that:

The Union of Myanmar shall not commence aggression against any nation. No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of Myanmar.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar lays down the following National Defence Policies to safeguard the national interests of the Union as well as the citizens:

- (a) To prevent all acts detrimental to the three main national causes which are non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of the national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.

- (b) To formulate the National Defence with the People's War Strategy centered at Tatmadaw as pillar depending on the synergy of the entire people.
- (c) To valiantly and effectively prevent foreign aggression and interference in the internal affairs of the Union, deploying various ways and means while avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
- (d) To employ a defence system that has oriented towards friendly relations with other nations in accord with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
- (e) Not to permit forming military alliance with other nations and the deployment of any foreign troops in the territory of the Union.
- (f) To cooperate with international community in non-traditional security issues and anti-terrorist matters and to render assistance when calamities occur in the Union.

A. Defence Budget (Military Expenditure)

The Government of the Republic of the Union Myanmar allocated Defence Budget of about US \$ 2.3 Billion (3.4 % of GDP) for 2016-2017 fiscal year.

III. National Contributions to promoting regional security

Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 and has promoted regional cooperation. In the same year, Myanmar became a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative of Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and has promoted cooperation with South Asian countries. After becoming an ASEAN Member, Myanmar joined ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF), which is the most important political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region and has participated at the dialogues and workshops organized by the ARF.

Myanmar has commenced formulation of the bills for anti-terrorism since 2005. After carrying out the amending and adding the complements to the bills with regard to the funding and handing over of criminals, Myanmar signed the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among like-minded ASEAN Member Countries. Moreover, Myanmar also signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism-ACCT as member in 2007 and ratified the Convention in 2012.

Regarding anti-narcotic measures, Myanmar attended annual Meetings of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter-ASOD as an observer before joining ASEAN. After becoming a member of ASEAN in August 1997, Myanmar annually attends ASOD since its 20th meeting and has been implementing its resolutions.


Myanmar had successfully hosted the Myanmar-Singapore Intelligence Exchange-Intellex from 6 to 9 April 2016, ASEAN Air Force's Junior Officers Interaction Programme from 9 to 13 May 2016, 4th Myanmar-Thai Navy-to-Navy Talks from 16 to 19 May 2016, 30th Regional Border Committee-30th RBC from 20 to 22 June 2016, 4th Myanmar-Thailand High Level Committee Joint Secretariat Meeting from 25 to 27 August 2016, 5th ASEAN Navy Young Officers Interaction Program 2016-5th ANYOI from 16 to 19 October 2016, Technical Meeting from 30 to 31 January 2017, The 12th Myanmar-Laos Border Authorities at Central Level from 15 to 16 February 2017, 24th Annual Myanmar Military Medical Conference from 7 to 10 March 2017 and ASEAN-China Workshop on Regional Maritime Search and Rescue from 8 to 9 March 2017.

For regional cooperation, Myanmar signed the MOU for narcotic drugs control with China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia in 1993 and MOU for the Centre of Information Sharing in Asia-Pacific region was signed with ASEAN Member States and Republic of Korea in 2014. A 15-year project for total elimination of narcotic drugs was implemented from 1999-2000 to 2013-2014 through the adoption of five measures: the elimination of poppy cultivation; eradication of narcotic drug use; preventative measures; organizing local people to support the measure; and cooperation with international organizations. Anti-narcotic measures are also conducted in real time collaboration with adjacent countries in the region. In order to meet Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Project's requirements, another 5-year drug elimination plan for the fiscal years 2014-2015 to 2018-2019 is currently being implemented. For the effectiveness of anti-narcotic measures, the Department of Narcotic Drugs Elimination was reorganized into Myanmar Police Force Narcotic Drug Suppression Division in 2013.

In order to build regional security and friendly relations with regional countries, Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services, the Deputy

Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services and the Commander-in Chief (Army), Commander-in-Chief (Navy) and Commander-in-Chief (Air Force) have all paid goodwill visits to countries in the region. Reciprocally, Military Leaders from regional countries have also paid goodwill visits to Myanmar. Senior military officials, Union Ministers and deputy ministers from Myanmar have attended ASEAN defense-related meetings and participated in regional security activities, through the signing of the security agreements. Moreover, Myanmar has participated in regional security exercises.

Myanmar considers that ASEAN Member States should continue to cooperate in enhancing peace and stability of the region and contribute in a cooperative manner in order to encourage the Nuclear Weapon States to sign the protocol of the Southeast Asian Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), combat the rise of extremists and terrorists, combat climate change, protect epidemics like Zika, coordinate on disaster management and information security, prevent the illegal trade of wild life, combat drug trafficking, human and arms smuggling.



NEW ZEALAND

I. Overview of the regional security environment

The Asia-Pacific region is central to New Zealand's security and future wellbeing. New Zealand values its engagement with regional processes, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which promote the common goal of a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. New Zealand plays an active part in helping these fora realise their objectives. Sustained commitment to bilateral and regional relationships underlines the importance that New Zealand places on partnerships within the region and the wider global security environment.

New Zealand is strongly committed to an open, rules-based trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring longer term regional security and prosperity. New Zealand is committed to pursuing multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements that support this goal.

New Zealand attaches considerable importance to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which entered into force in 2010. The Agreement is undergoing a General Review, with the first stage of the review (a retrospective assessing the impact of the agreement to date) being discussed during the AANZFTA Joint Committee

meeting in May 2017. The second stage of the General Review will assess possible improvements to the agreement (building off the analysis that occurred during the first stage of the General Review) and will begin in 2018. New Zealand has other bilateral FTAs or Closer Economic Partnerships with China, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei. New Zealand is working with Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) signatories, including ASEAN members Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam, on ways to move forward with the agreement following the withdrawal of the United States in January. New Zealand has concluded negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but the agreement is yet to be signed or ratified. In early January the GCC Secretariat indicated that GCC member states are prepared to resume talks on the NZ-GCC FTA. New Zealand is actively participating in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and is currently progressing bilateral FTAs with other countries. The leaders of New Zealand and the European Union have agreed to seek mandates to negotiate an FTA.

New Zealand completed its two-year term as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the end of 2016. During the second year of its term, New Zealand focused on being a voice for the Asia-Pacific region in the UNSC and ensuring the views of partners

in the region were reflected in relevant discussions. New Zealand championed more meaningful engagement by the UNSC with troop-contributing countries to make mandates of UN peacekeeping operations better tuned to needs on the ground. New Zealand's priorities on the UNSC were aligned with issues that affect the safety and security of the Asia-Pacific region, including as a chair of the UNSC's key counter-terrorism related sanctions committees (ISIL/Al Qaida and Taleban). New Zealand also continued efforts to support the resolution of conflicts in Syria, the Middle East and elsewhere, and encouraged the UNSC to be more active in conflict prevention. With other Council members, New Zealand worked to improve the Council's efficiency and decision-making, aimed at making the UNSC more engaged in practical problem-solving.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates continue to pose a significant threat to international and regional security. Since the Counter-ISIL Coalition's military efforts began in 2014, ISIL has lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria and the battle to liberate its Iraqi stronghold in Mosul is progressing well. ISIL's financial reserves, systems for collecting revenue and numbers of foreign terrorist fighters have also significantly declined. The threat that foreign terrorist fighters currently in Iraq and Syria might pose upon their return home, or movement to other conflict zones, continues to galvanise the international community, including New Zealand.

As part of our Counter-ISIL contribution, New Zealand has a 'Building Partner Capacity' deployment to train Iraqi Security Forces in Taji. This is a joint deployment with Australia, and is mandated until November 2018. New Zealand has extended its training caveats to include the training of law

enforcement agencies in recognition of their role in support of stabilisation tasks, and have now trained over 2,000 Iraqi Federal Police. The NZDF have participated in mobile training operations in Al Taqqadum and Quarrayah West in conjunction with Australia. To date, almost 20,000 Iraqi personnel have been trained by the mission.

New Zealand has contributed around US\$17.9m (NZ\$26m) for humanitarian assistance for those affected by the violence in Syria and Iraq since 2012, including US\$1m to the Fund for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS) and US\$1.08m for humanitarian support to internally displaced people affected by the Mosul campaign within the last year.

We contribute to the work of the Coalition's Communications Cell and are also members of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Counter Finance Working Groups. We place particular emphasis on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, engaging regularly with partners through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and our regional body, the Asia Pacific Group.

While ISIL has continued to attract global attention, fighters and funds, Al Qaida and its affiliates have continued their terrorist activity (particularly in North Africa), highlighted by high profile attacks at a hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a United Nations police base in the Timbuktu, Mali and at a resort in Grand Bassam, Cote d'Ivoire.

ISIL's rise has seen a marked increase in the range of regional and international fora that are now deeply engaged with counter terrorism issues. These fora allow countries to exchange views, share information and address capability gaps to enable states to better address terrorism and collaborate on this issue. Many of the fora are established to address specific aspects of the threat

(e.g. the threat of radicalisation to extremism or the manner in which terrorist groups raise money) or are regionally based. The United Nations Security Council has continued to remain seized of the issue and is an important leader in the global response to the threat.

Addressing the drivers of extremist views and behaviour is taking on an increasing focus at global fora. New Zealand knows that the threat posed by violent extremism cannot be addressed by security measures alone. There is a need to balance security measures with greater community engagement and social cohesion to provide support for individuals and communities to disengage from violent extremist beliefs. A key tenet of New Zealand's domestic work to counter violent extremism is an honest, dedicated and long-term commitment to enhancing community engagement through policies and programmes based on inclusivity, respect and tolerance.

North Korea continued its provocative behaviour into 2017, after two nuclear tests and several dozen missile tests in 2016. Each of its tests is a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. New Zealand considers North Korea's continued defiance of the wishes of the international community to be deeply problematic. Its ongoing weapons development programmes have clear significance for security and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region. We continue to call on North Korea to comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to desist from further destabilising behaviour and to engage meaningfully and constructively with the international community on denuclearisation and human rights issues. New Zealand continues to support international efforts to ensure the effective implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, in the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the Korean peninsula situation.

New Zealand has consistently called on all parties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine to show restraint and refrain from any action that could intensify hostilities; and to respect and maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. New Zealand appeals to all parties to implement fully their commitments under the Minsk Agreements.

Prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region depend on a secure maritime environment and the peaceful resolution of disputes. All ARF members have an interest in avoiding miscalculations and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. New Zealand is concerned that activities such as land reclamation, construction and militarisation could escalate tensions and erode the trust and confidence that is needed to deliver solutions. It is important that all parties take steps to rebuild trust, avoid provocative actions and manage tensions. New Zealand encourages full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties and conclusion of a substantive Code of Conduct as a framework to manage the situation.

The security threats that countries face in the region continue to evolve as a result of both internal and external factors. One consistent external catalyst for change is the rapid growth of technology, and its use by both state and criminal groups. ISIL's unprecedented use of social media has challenged states to adapt, with many adopting sophisticated counter-messaging protocols and systems to enable them to convey another view to would-be terrorists. In this new environment, it is important for law enforcement to understand how criminal and terrorist groups are using cyberspace and to continue to develop the strategies to combat the threat as the mechanisms used by these groups evolve.

Security has long been recognised as a vital prerequisite for the sustainable development of the Pacific Islands region and accordingly remains an important aspect of the work of the Pacific Islands Forum. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Forum and is closely involved in initiatives to address regional security issues, such as counter-terrorism and transnational organised crime. New Zealand provides capacity-building support for law enforcement agencies in the region, particularly policing and border security.

II. New Zealand's security and defence policy

A. Overview of national security and defence policy

As a founding member of the United Nations, respect for the rule of international law is fundamental to New Zealand's approach to promoting security, stability and peace. While New Zealand's borders are distant from direct conflict, there are fragile states within the Asia-Pacific region. The threats of terrorism, arms proliferation, transnational crime and economic and environmental degradation show no respect for international borders. Recognising this, New Zealand is highly committed to multilateral, transboundary solutions to security threats and the promotion of effective international rules. New Zealand takes a multi-layered approach to security that includes strong bilateral relationships and regional partnerships.

Key relationships and partnerships are:

- New Zealand's bilateral alliance with Australia;
- the Five Power Defence Arrangements (New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom);

- close bilateral ties with Pacific Island neighbours, including those for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities;
- close and growing bilateral ties with Asia-Pacific partners; and
- Pacific and Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus processes.

The global strategic environment has evolved in the last five years. Some of these changes are positive, such as increasing economic interconnection. Others are increasingly challenging New Zealand's strategic interests. The 2014 Defence Assessment (www.defence.govt.nz/defence.govt.nz/defence-white-paper-2015.html) found that events far from New Zealand's shores are having a growing impact on its security interests, and that the rules-based order upon which it relies is being increasingly tested.

On the basis of the Defence Assessment, and building on the Defence White Paper 2010, the Government released a new Defence White Paper in 2016 (<http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/dwp-2016/defence-white-paper-2016.html>).

The White Paper describes the Defence contribution to New Zealand's security interests, sets out New Zealand's strategic outlook to 2040, and evaluates what this means for the roles and tasks of the Defence Force, where it operates, with whom, and under what circumstances. The White Paper also signals future capability development and investment decisions.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

The total appropriation for the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2016 was NZ\$3.017.011 billion, of which operating expenses were NZ\$2.578.031 billion and capital expenditure was NZ\$438.980 million.

III. New Zealand's contribution to regional security

A. Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

New Zealand is firmly committed to the international campaigns against terrorism and transnational organised crime. To counter these threats, New Zealand is engaged in the development of the international counter terrorism security architecture (at UN and regional levels) and continues to adopt a comprehensive, multi-layered and long-term approach to addressing these issues.

New Zealand actively engages in a number of regional fora, including the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on Counter-Terrorism and Trans-national Organised Crime (CTTC), the Pacific Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (co-Chaired by New Zealand), the Forum Regional Security Committee and the ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Experts Working Group (CT EWG).

New Zealand Co-Chaired the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) from 2014 – 2016, and in 2015 hosted the APG Plenary Meeting in Auckland. APG coordinates technical assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to combat transnational organised criminal and terrorist groups by targeting their financial systems and processes. Through APG, New Zealand has provided significant assistance to security partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

Following the 2013 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-produced assessment of the threat posed by transnational organised crime in the East Asia and Pacific region, New Zealand sponsored a UNODC-run regional workshop on foreign terrorist fighters, which noted that while members have made progress

in combatting the foreign terrorist fighter threat, participating states need to do more to comply with international obligations, particularly around the criminalisation of terrorist activities.

New Zealand and Australia also co-sponsored a standalone Threat Assessment for the Pacific, released in September 2016 to provide a better understanding of the nature of the threat posed by transnational criminal networks in the Pacific, and to enable more strategic targeting of capacity-building assistance.

To support the achievement of New Zealand's global security priorities, including assisting with capacity-building in neighbouring states, New Zealand has a number of specialised security funds, including dedicated Global and Pacific Security Funds. The specialised security funds assist New Zealand's achievement of its Work Plan with ASEAN, particularly in the area of border control; legislation; law enforcement; policy; countering people smuggling; and prevention/counter-radicalisation and countering the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters.

New Zealand engages bilaterally and regionally on counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia and over the past couple of years has partnered with the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Indonesia. New Zealand has funded and organised a number of regional capacity-building workshops for ASEAN countries on key issues, including anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing standards, cyber security, terrorist prosecutions, chemical and nuclear security, major event security, and maritime and aviation security. These efforts are complemented by significant bilateral work to build individual national capability, especially within law enforcement agencies.

New Zealand works with Pacific Island countries (PICs) to help strengthen their security and resilience to terrorism and trans-national organised crime. New Zealand has undertaken a number of initiatives through the Pacific Islands Forum, including an assessment of cybercrime vulnerability, enhancing airport and maritime security, drafting and implementing national counter-terrorism legislation and ratifying international counter-terrorism instruments. New Zealand works closely with and funds regional law enforcement agencies such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat, Oceania Customs Organisation and the Pacific Immigration Directors Conference, and contributes to their consideration and responses to regional security issues. New Zealand provides technical support and mentoring for law enforcement and border agency officials in the region. Funding is provided through the Pacific Security Fund and the New Zealand Aid Programme.

New Zealand is also an active member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). The GCTF is a forum which brings practitioners and policy-makers together to share counter terrorism experiences, expertise and strategies, and to deliver sharper, focused capacity-building activities. New Zealand has also recently provided financial support to, and become a constituency board member of, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), alongside Australia and Japan. The GCERF provides financial support and grants to community-based projects in the area of countering violent extremism.

Connectivity is a crucial driver of New Zealand's and the Asia-Pacific's economic growth. However, with increased connectivity comes increased exposure to cyber threats, including from transnational organised criminal and terrorist groups. Further, a lack of transparency

and confidence in cyberspace risks undermining the internet's economic and social benefits and increases the risk of miscalculation in cyberspace. As such, New Zealand considers that the ARF has an important role to play in raising cyber security capacity levels and sharing best practices. Effective implementation of the ARF work plan on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies will be valuable in building trust in cyberspace and lowering the risk of misunderstanding among states.

New Zealand is committed to building regional cyber security capacity, including through membership of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, with a particular focus on our Pacific and Southeast Asian neighbours.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to international disarmament and non-proliferation and plays an active role in a range of international arms control processes. It hosted the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Auckland in March 2017, which was co-chaired by Canada, Malaysia and New Zealand.

New Zealand is an active contributor to initiatives aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both state and non-state actors, in particular through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Global Partnership and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

New Zealand's involvement in the PSI, including its membership of the Operational Experts Group (the PSI

steering committee) and participation in exercises and capacity-building initiatives, has enhanced New Zealand's capabilities to prevent proliferation activity both nationally and in collaboration with partners. New Zealand has developed (and shared with PSI partners in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond) a Model National Response Plan, which provides clear, easy-to-follow guidance on the range of issues that need to be considered in developing a framework for responding to PSI/proliferation situations. As part of the agreed Asia-Pacific exercise rotation, New Zealand hosted a PSI table-top exercise in Wellington in 2015. New Zealand would welcome further adherence to the PSI throughout the Asia-Pacific as part of a coordinated effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.

New Zealand is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides the global focal point for nuclear cooperation and safeguards. New Zealand is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and supports international projects which make use of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

New Zealand joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in 2007, and is strongly committed alongside over 80 GICNT partners to preventing nuclear or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. New Zealand has contributed to the GICNT in the Asia-Pacific region by: developing a table-top exercise kit for use by other GICNT partners in testing their own national response systems; supporting radioactive source security projects in Southeast Asia; increasing its funding for the work of the IAEA to improve nuclear security in Southeast Asia; providing funding support to several GICNT workshops in the Asia-Pacific region; and helping its Pacific island neighbours address the risk of nuclear/radiological security.

Alongside a number of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand was an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summits held between 2010 and 2016. New Zealand has provided more than NZ\$4.5 million to nuclear security projects since 2010. In 2015 New Zealand hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. IPPAS assists states to strengthen their national nuclear security regime through provision of peer advice on implementing international instruments and IAEA guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities. In 2016, New Zealand ratified two key nuclear security treaties: the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In 2016, New Zealand also enacted the Radiation Safety Act to ensure its legislative framework for the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material meets current international best practice.

New Zealand also works to prevent proliferation by helping to develop and implement export controls as an active member of key multilateral regimes including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. New Zealand has in place a comprehensive national export control regime.

Given the role played by the unregulated global trade of arms in fuelling conflict, New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). New Zealand was among the first states to sign the Treaty in 2013 and ratified it in 2014. It sees the ATT contributing meaningfully to international and regional peace, security and stability. New Zealand has submitted its national implementation report and commenced annual reporting.

To support broader membership of the Treaty, New Zealand sponsored the development of ATT model legislation to assist countries to implement their domestic obligations under the ATT. New Zealand looks forward to working closely with its ARF partners to build a strong ATT regime.

New Zealand has continued its active promotion of nuclear disarmament including through its membership of the New Agenda Coalition and the De-alerting Group. New Zealand participated actively in the Open-Ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. It is also participating in the UNGA conference convened in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.

New Zealand is a strong proponent of nuclear weapon-free zones as a regional measure to reinforce nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. New Zealand is party to the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and has legislation in place since 1987 creating a New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone. New Zealand strongly encourages all Nuclear Weapons States to sign the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) without any reservations or interpretative declarations. This would be a welcome step in the development of nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.

New Zealand supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important contributor to regional and global security. New Zealand welcomed recent ratifications of the CTBT by Annex 1 and 2 states in the region and encourages further ratifications by ARF participants.

New Zealand is also a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. It has provided financial assistance for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to assist with the removal of chemical weapons materials in Libya and Syria.

New Zealand strongly supports the Cluster Munitions Convention (CCM) and the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC). New Zealand is currently the coordinator for national implementation measures in the CCM and has produced model legislation for use by small states with no history of use or contamination. New Zealand encourages other ARF participants that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to both Conventions.

C. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The Asia-Pacific region continues to be afflicted by natural disasters that underline the need to continue deepening practical and effective cooperation over disaster reduction, response, relief and recovery. New Zealand has been an active participant in ARF and EAS exercises to prepare and respond to regional disasters.

New Zealand is continuing to play its part in deepening regional capacity to prepare and respond to disasters, including drawing on lessons learned from the Christchurch Earthquakes. New Zealand is committed to further cooperation and implementation of work plans in the ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS contexts.

New Zealand has been a solid proponent of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre since its inception, and has trained ASEAN officials in disaster response leadership at the University of Canterbury and contributed technical expertise to the Centre.

D. Maritime Security

In 2008, ARF Ministers identified maritime security as one of the ARF's four key areas. New Zealand is actively involved in the implementation of the maritime security work plan, and in sharing its experiences on various maritime security-related issues, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and oil-spill response.

New Zealand co-hosted with Malaysia an ARF Capacity Building Workshop on Ship Profiling in Kuala Lumpur, 24 to 25 May 2016. The workshop improved the capacity of ARF participants in ship profiling, helping countries develop greater maritime awareness, which in turn contributes to regional maritime security.

New Zealand plays an active role on maritime security in associated fora. New Zealand is co-chairing with Brunei Darussalam the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Experts Working Group from 2014-2017. New Zealand has delivered a robust programme of activities, including a Counter Piracy Operations Workshop, and the inaugural Maritime Security Future Leaders' Programme. New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Australia, co-hosted the significant Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise in and between Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, 1 to 11 May 2016. The Maritime Security co-chairs also hosted the standalone Exercise Mahi Tangaroa in Auckland, New Zealand to coincide with the International Naval Review in November 2016.

IV. Role of ARF

A. New Zealand's contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

For New Zealand, the ARF is a key mechanism for security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. It contributes to building an environment of dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of regional security issues. The ARF is also contributing in an important way to the development of international norms and principles on security, which are directly relevant to this region. The large number and diversity of practical ARF projects under implementation in 2017 reflects the ARF's increasing ability to respond to contemporary security challenges facing this part of the world. New Zealand also attaches considerable importance to working with its ARF partners to advance the ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda, in line with the ARF's three-stage evolution.

New Zealand, along with other ARF partners, is actively involved in advancing the ARF's preventive diplomacy work plan. New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, China and the United States, hosted a roundtable discussion on preventive diplomacy training resources in March 2014; and, together with the United States and Thailand, conducted a Track 1.5 preventive diplomacy symposium in 2015.

In 2017 New Zealand, Singapore and Timor-Leste co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-conflict Environment, in Dili, Timor-Leste on 19-20 April. The workshop brought together over 80 participants from most ARF member countries to build regional preventive diplomacy awareness and capacity. It provided a platform for practitioners

and policy-makers to share knowledge and collaborate in the area of preventive diplomacy, with a focus on post-conflict contexts.

New Zealand is committed to working with its ASEAN partners to realise enhanced synergies between the ARF and other pieces of the regional architecture, in particular the EAS and ADMM-Plus. While the ARF and ADMM-Plus have their distinct mandates and different memberships, greater functional coordination between them on issues that straddle multiple fora, such as disaster relief/management and maritime security, would help to achieve streamlining and eliminate unnecessary duplication of activities. New Zealand actively supports efforts to strengthen the EAS.

B. Future of ARF

The ARF is a forum that was established with the aim of fostering habits of constructive dialogue on issues of concern. At the ARF's outset it was envisaged that the Forum would move as part of its evolution from a confidence-building phase to preventive diplomacy, and finally to conflict resolution. The ARF has made progress in the field of preventive diplomacy, but has yet to reach its potential. New Zealand supports the ARF in increasing its capacity and effectiveness in the preventive diplomacy space.



THE PHILIPPINES

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region are numerous and multifaceted. These challenges range from the changing power dynamics, geopolitical hotspots such as the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, the spread of violent extremist ideologies, the surge of transnational crimes such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons and illicit drugs trade, and natural disasters and the adverse impact of climate change. These bring about uncertainties in the regional security environment necessitating greater cooperation among regional states and external players, and other relevant stakeholders.

For the Philippines, regional cooperation on security issues should be deepened by building upon existing institutions and mechanisms anchored on the rule of law. This will be crucial to maintaining regional peace and stability that is conducive to economic development and progress. The Philippines reaffirms its commitment to the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, in particular to the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law.

Territorial and Maritime Disputes

Despite the economic interconnectedness and the growing regionalism in Asia, tensions persist due to unresolved territorial and maritime disputes. The South China Sea remains the most prominent given competing claims among Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and China; the complexity of the disputes to include sovereignty claims over land features and sovereign rights over maritime entitlements, and its potential to become a theater for major power competition. Other disputes include the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan in the East China Sea; the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories between Russia and Japan; the Takeshima/Dokdo islands between Japan and Republic of Korea; Kashmir between India and Pakistan; and the border territories between China and India. These disputes increase strategic distrust among states, drive military modernization and projection, stir strong nationalistic sentiments, and put the efficacy of diplomacy and international law to test.

Maritime Security

The seas are the lifeblood of the globalized economy, facilitating maritime commerce and connectivity, and at the same time serving as the conduit for new forms of cross-border and non-traditional security threats. Apart from the disputes over sovereign rights in parts of the

seas, maritime security concerns include illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorism, trafficking in persons, smuggling of illicit drugs, natural and human-induced disasters, and the destruction of the marine environment. Attaining maritime security through constructive dialogue and strong adherence to existing international law is imperative and should, therefore, be a priority for any regional cooperation.

The Korean Peninsula

There is heightened regional concern in the Korean Peninsula as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to disregard UN Security Council resolutions with its nuclear weapons tests and missile test-launches, and has stood immovable despite international pressure. This causes regional players – especially the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea – to adopt policies and undertake actions that may also contribute to the volatility of the situation in the Korean Peninsula. The incessant nuclear and missile tests by DPRK raise the risk of an armed conflict and undermine international regimes on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.

Regional Power Dynamics

The security environment in Asia is in flux with perceived shifts in the balance of power and emerging great power competition. Uncertainties abound on whether or not the United States, long acknowledged as a guarantor of security in Asia, will remain engaged in the region under President Donald Trump and his “America First” policy. Meanwhile, China is pursuing a more active foreign policy by deepening economic partnerships and promoting new multilateral initiatives. The increase in China's influence, however, has fueled concerns and

suspicious among many countries. This is due to the unresolved disputes that China has with its neighbors, as well as the view that the country is seeking to leverage its economic clout for strategic gains toward altering the regional order.

Other regional powers and players are likewise recalibrating their respective policies in response to the changing security environment. Japan is effecting changes in its defense and security policy, while Russia and India are demonstrating keen interest to become more engaged in the region. Middle-sized and small powers, including members of ASEAN, are also exploring new partnerships and building modest military capabilities to cope with regional uncertainties and to mitigate the impact of great power contests.

The future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific will be largely influenced by the dynamics among the major powers. However, peace and stability will also rest on the commitment and efforts by all states to a stable, open, and rules-based regional order.

Terrorism

While terror-related activities remain concentrated in the Middle East, terrorism is rapidly spreading worldwide, with Southeast Asia increasingly becoming an alternative sanctuary for jihadi expansion. As the Islamic State (IS) continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria since the first half of 2016, the risk of foreign fighters returning home propagating extremist ideologies to their respective local communities poses a great threat to the region. The spread of violent extremism therefore demands novel forms of national strategies and regional collaborations.

There is deepening concern over IS' use of social media to recruit new members, project their presence, and influence people into supporting extremist ideologies. This is evident in the increase in lone wolves' attacks by IS sympathizers such as the suicide bombing in Indonesia, bombings in Istanbul Airport and a central mosque in Pattani, Thailand, the killings in Paris, France, the grenade attack in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and the bombing in Davao, Philippines. There is also risk that IS will seek to establish a wilayat or a designated province or authority. The Maute Group's failed attempt to occupy Marawi City in southern Philippines in May 2017 is an example of how local terrorist groups claiming to be IS-inspired would try to capitalize on the idea of a wilayat.

Proliferation of Nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction

The use and spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can heighten geopolitical tensions, create large scale humanitarian crises, and cause long-term environmental devastation. Other risks include nuclear accidents and the access to WMDs and related material by non-state actors including terrorist networks and pirate groups. There is a need for a stronger global governance of nuclear weapons and WMD, and all countries should commit themselves to the global discourse and efforts toward this objective.

Cybersecurity

Cybercrime is a huge concern worldwide, given the growing dependence on information and technology, as well as the emergence of new hacking and scheming methods. Cyberattacks can compromise national security by paralyzing government functions and disrupting military technologies. They can also wipe out or steal billions of funds from financial institutions and business corporations, and endanger the lives,

privacy, and safety of ordinary citizens. Symantec's 2017 Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) reported that while the number of data breaches worldwide has remained stable in 2016 compared to the previous year, the total number of online identities stolen still reached 1.1 billion. The means being used in committing offenses relative to cybercrime are considered unique compared to ordinary crimes, therefore necessitating the government to undertake major changes in its approaches, including updating its technology and amending certain provisions of cybercrime-related laws.

Natural Disasters

A 2015 report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) noted that the Asia Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world, accounting for 40 percent of all natural disasters in the past decade, as well as 80 percent of all people affected. The Nepal earthquake (2015), India floods (2013), and super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) are only a few examples of disasters that caused severe economic damages and humanitarian catastrophe. These also highlight the need for all countries in the region to build national and collective resilience and response capabilities.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

A. Overview of National Security and Defense Policy

The Philippine National Security Policy (NSP) 2017-2022 envisions a "secure and prosperous nation wherein the people's welfare, well-being, ways of life and core values; government and its institutions; territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected and enhanced and confident of its place in the community of nations."

The Philippine government acknowledges the gamut of challenges and thus adopts a multi-dimensional approach to security. The NSP articulates a 12-Point National Security Agenda that encompasses human and political security, health security, economic and financial security, food and water security, military and border security, socio-cultural security, environment and disaster security, energy security, maritime and airspace security, international security, informational and cyber security, and transportation and port security.

Given the complexity of security concerns, the Department of National Defense (DND) has categorized issues as being a priority or as secondary.¹ Priority challenges include territorial integrity, maritime security, natural disasters, cyber security, internal security (i.e. communist insurgency, separatism in Mindanao, and violent extremism), and global and regional peace and security. Meanwhile, the second set of priorities includes food, water, and energy security, and proliferation of weapons/CBRNE. The identification of priority security challenges allows the government to improve policy direction and to efficiently mobilize resources given the internal and external constraints.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is also steadfast in its mandate to defend the country's territorial integrity and maritime domain and uphold the country's sovereign rights. The government remains committed to implementing the Revised AFP Modernization Program (Republic Act 10349) toward building a credible defense posture. This entails: a) effective force response; b) greater situational awareness; c) enhanced lift capabilities; and d) expedient and efficient response to untoward incidents

at sea. AFP modernization is being undertaken through the acquisition of new military materiel and technology, development of base support facilities, restructuring of the military organization and updating of doctrines, development of human resources, and enhancement of partnerships with allies, partners, and other like-minded countries.

The Philippine government also acknowledges the urgency of addressing domestic challenges such as internal armed conflict, the trade and use of illegal drugs, common index crimes, and terrorism. While the military has played a prominent role in internal security operations, the government stresses the importance of holistic, multi-sectoral, people-centered, enduring, and peaceful solutions to these issues.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

For the fiscal year 2017, the defense budget was PHP 137.18 billion (USD 2.76 billion) which was a 16.7 percent increase from the PHP 117.52 billion (USD 2.37 billion) allocation in 2016. The defense budget for 2017 also amounts to 4 percent of the total government budget.

III. National Contributions to Promoting Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

The Institute for Economics and Peace's 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), ranked the Philippines as among the countries most affected by terrorist activities. Although there has been no confirmed Filipino participation in the

¹ Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, "The 2017 Philippine Security Threat Outlook," Speech at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) Defense Forum "Threat Assessment: A 2017 National Security Outlook for the Philippines", 9 March 2017, NDCP, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

Islamic State or in IS activities in the Middle East, the threat posed by extremist ideologies exists in the form of local terrorist groups in Southern Philippines that are reported to have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. These groups have staged terrorist activities in the past, including bombing attacks, kidnappings, and beheading of hostages, including foreign nationals.

The Philippine government recognizes that terrorism is a serious threat to national peace, stability, and development, and as a result has intensified military offensives against terrorist groups. The AFP has attained significant progress in apprehending bandits, seizing high-powered firearms, and regaining areas previously held by rebels and terrorists. In April 2017, the AFP also successfully foiled an attempt by a local terrorist group to take hostages in a popular tourist spot in the country. The operation was successful after local residents alerted the government, highlighting the importance of an alert and vigilant citizenry in monitoring their respective communities. Meanwhile, military and police operations are being conducted in Marawi City to neutralize the remaining members of the local terrorist group and rescue civilians caught in the conflict.

The Philippines also emphasizes that counter-terrorism strategies are not only focused on hard targets and on military operations, but also on counter-radicalization and other preventive efforts. This is because extremist ideologies thrive in areas that are long afflicted by insurgency and poverty. Thus, counter-terrorism efforts should be complemented by progress in anti-insurgency, the peace process, and promoting economic and social development for every Filipino. The new anti-insurgency campaign of the AFP, the Development Support and Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan, which builds on the gains of the Internal

Peace Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, seeks to respond to the complexities and nuances of the issues of terrorism and internal security. At the regional front, the Philippines will host the 2nd Special ASEAN Ministers' Meeting on the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (SAMMRRVE) alongside the 11th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in 2017.

Moreover, the Philippines recognizes the importance of intercultural and inter-religious dialogues, both in the counter-radicalization process and in promoting other anti-terrorism initiatives in local communities. The Philippine government organized in March 2017 the first Mindanao Sultanate Summit on Peace and Security in which security officials had dialogue with Muslim and indigenous leaders in combating extremism. The Philippines is also employing a “whole of nation” approach, recognizing that the fight against terrorism is a fight of every member of the Philippine society and therefore must ensure that the programs employed are inclusive and united.

Apart from its national initiatives and policies, the Philippines is actively working with neighbors and with other international partners to address the threat of terrorism. In 2016, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia signed the Framework on the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement on Immediate Measures to Address Security Issues in the Maritime Areas of Common Concern (or Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement/TCA) with regard to practical cooperation against armed robbery against ships, kidnapping, transnational crimes, and terrorism. On 19 June 2017, the launch of the trilateral maritime patrol was held in Tarakan, Indonesia. On 22 June 2017, the foreign ministers of the three countries convened to discuss how to develop and implement counter-

terrorism measures and strategies, including the formulation of a Plan of Action.

In ASEAN, the Philippines calls for enhanced cooperation among the ASEAN Member States and the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. In February 2017, the Philippines co-chaired two ARF workshops on counter-terrorism: the ARF Workshop on Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violent Extremism held in Brussels, Belgium, and the ARF Workshop on Medium to Long Term Support for Victims of Terrorism held in Manila. The Philippines will also host a Conference on Peacebuilding and the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia in September 2017, as one of its commemorative activities for the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN.

B. Transnational Crimes

As an archipelago with porous borders, the Philippines is vulnerable to activities by international crime syndicates which include drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, poaching of endangered wildlife, piracy, arms smuggling and money laundering.

Curbing the use and spread of illicit drugs is a policy priority for the Philippines given the menace that these bring to the community. The government is targeting methamphetamine hydrochloride (locally known as shabu), marijuana, cocaine, and ecstasy – which are the most abused illegal drugs in the country. According to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the proliferation of illegal drugs and the extent of drug trade in the country are reflected in the increasing volume of seizures of illegal drugs over the past few years amounting to: PHP 5.44 billion (2013), PHP 6.18 billion (2014), PHP 5.42 billion (2015), and PHP 12.4 billion (2016).

The Philippines affirms the importance of inter-agency cooperation and having a holistic approach in its campaign against illegal drugs. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) serves as the strategy-formulating and policy-making body on drug prevention and control, while the PDEA serves as the implementing arm for effective law enforcement. The AFP, Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) also provide support through intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, investigations and arrest of personalities involved in manufacture, sale and distribution of prohibited drugs, and coordination with the INTERPOL Information Access System, an international database network on illegal drug traffickers and other crimes, among others. In addition, the Department of Health (DOH) is taking the lead in providing drug users and drug dependents access to in-patient or residential care through the new drug treatment and rehabilitation centers (DTRC) established by the government.

The Philippines is determined to pursue a proactive solution to the problem of drugs with emphasis on upholding the rule of law, due process, and observing the country's commitments under human rights conventions.

On cybersecurity, the Philippines is also vulnerable to online hacking, cyberattacks, and identity thefts, among others. In 2016, the Philippine National Police Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNP-ACG), received a total of 3,951 complaints for cybercrime and cyber-related offenses, which is 54 percent higher than the number received in the previous year, which was 2,567. These included hacking, data interference, fraud, identity theft, as well as content-related offenses such as child pornography and libel. Meanwhile, the severe and

transnational impact of cybercrimes was highlighted by the bank heist of Central Bank of Bangladesh in 2016 in which USD 81 million were funneled to various financial/banking institutions worldwide including those in Wall Street and in the Philippines. This stresses the importance of instigating robust cybercrime policies worldwide and enhancing partnerships among states, in cooperation with the private sector. This includes providing a solution to one of the general criticisms toward “cybercrimes” – that each state or organization has a different definition of what constitutes cybercrimes.

To better deal with the risks in cyberspace, the Philippines has the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Republic Act 10175). The Philippine government, specifically the PNP-ACG, is in constant collaboration with other relevant stakeholders both in the national and international levels. In the local level, the PNP-ACG’s partners include the Information Security Officers Group (ISOG), Bank Security Management Association (BSMA), Joint Anti-Bank Robbery Action and Cybercrime Committee (JABRACCC), Advisory Council – PNP-ACG, and other government agencies through the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC). At the regional level, the PNP ACG participated in the ASEAN Cyber Surge Operations targeting cyber actors within the region, particularly those responsible in attacking computer system and infrastructures itself with the intention of disrupting/affecting public safety, medical services, and businesses on a large scale by launching malicious malware attacks such as ransomware and web defacement.

In the international level, PNP-ACG’s partners include G7 24/7 High Tech Crimes, Interpol, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Federal Police, and ASEANAPOL. In addition,

the Philippines and New Zealand will be working together as co-chairs for the newly established ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Cyber Security from 2017 to 2020.

The Philippines stresses the need for strengthened cooperation between and among cyber law enforcement agencies in the regional, as well as in the international level. This include establishing 24/7 contact and other platforms of information exchange.

Trafficking in persons (TIP) is also a serious challenge for the Philippines, given the country’s porous borders and the presence of many of its nationals overseas. Significant efforts have been made by the Philippine government in prosecuting trafficking cases, protecting victims, and preventing future cases. The PCG, for instance, has intensified its efforts in securing ports and harbors against illegal recruitment and trafficking and has successfully rescued 213 illegally recruited/trafficked victims in nineteen operations, and has apprehended thirteen traffickers in the process.

The country’s efforts against TIP were recognized when it was upgraded from Tier 2 to Tier 1 in the 2016 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report. The Philippines has earned the distinction of being the first Southeast Asian country to receive the highest ranking tier placement.

The Philippines ratified the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) in February 2017, paving the way for the entry into force of the Convention on 8 March 2017. The Philippines, as the lead shepherd for TIP within the Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crimes (SOMTC) / AMMTC process, is actively involved

in ASEAN TIP initiatives such as the ASEAN Cross-Sectoral Collaboration against trafficking in persons toward the implementation of the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons (Bohol TIP Work Plan) and the ASEAN Plan of Action (APA); ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) regional workshop on strengthening national plans of action against trafficking in persons; ARF Meetings on Trafficking in Persons; and ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, to name a few. It has also participated in the launch of the regional review of laws, policies, and practices within ASEAN relating to the identification, management and treatment of victims of trafficking, especially of women and children.

Illegal wildlife trafficking is another major concern for the Philippines. The country's abundance of natural resources and rich biodiversity is threatened by the rise in wildlife trading for commercial purposes. In response, the Philippines has stepped up its efforts by engaging in capability trainings under the auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-Global Programme for Combatting Wildlife and Forest Crime. This has resulted in a number of successful operations against illegal wildlife trafficking by the PCG, particularly in terms of apprehending vessels with pangolins, sea horses, sea dragons, Malay scorpions, alligator pipefish, sea cucumber, sharks fin, and giant clams.

C. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The Philippines' commitment to a nuclear weapon-free world is rooted in its Constitution, which states that the country should be free from nuclear weapons in its territory. The Philippines is a State Party to several international treaties including

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and is also a participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). At the regional level, the Philippines is a party to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which marks the 20th year of its entry into force in 2017. Together with other ASEAN Member States, the Philippines has been calling on the 'P5' nuclear weapons states to accede to the said treaty in unison and without reservations. To strengthen the capacity of ASEAN nuclear regulation agencies, the Philippines is actively working with the experts of the ASEAN Member States on the establishment of a formal relationship between the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Despite the presence of agreements on arms control and non-proliferation, the Philippines emphasizes that these cannot be successful without the conscientious and effective implementation by all parties. The Philippines calls for the prompt entry into force of the CTBT as well as the accession to and full compliance by all countries with the NPT. The country also underscores the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons; in 2015 it endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge which calls on states to address the legal gap on the prohibition of nuclear weapons toward their complete elimination. The Philippines has also adopted the Information Circular 869 of the IAEA on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation toward improved nuclear governance. The Philippines is also actively involved in discussions at the UN in New York on the adoption of a Nuclear Ban Treaty.

Within the ARF, the Philippines, along with the United States in their capacity as lead countries for the Chemical,

Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) priority area of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ARF ISM on CTTC) for 2015-2017 cycle, have undertaken capacity-building exercises under the ARF Cross-Sectoral Security Cooperation on Bio-Preparedness and Disaster Response Project. The Project involved a series of workshops and activities designed to implement the best practices approved by the 20th ARF in 2013. In 2015, the Philippines hosted three (3) CBRN capacity-building workshops with a follow-up activity to be implemented in 2018.

The Philippines is also actively participating in the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT. The country calls for greater transparency on State Parties' implementation of their obligations under the treaty and encourages all parties to assess the factors that led to the failure of the 2015 NPT RevCon.

On the global governance of other WMDs, the Philippines is hosting the Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Southeast Asia which fosters regional cooperation on CBRN risk mitigation and first responders' capabilities. In 2016, the Southeast Asian CoE was named as among the most active of the 21 Regional Secretariats in terms of implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC). The Philippines, along with Morocco and Georgia, also initiated a UN Group Friends of CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance to support the work of CoEs and to promote best practices on governance of CBRN in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1540

on non-proliferation of WMDs.

On the issue of small arms trade, the Philippines was the first ASEAN Member State to sign the Arms Trade Treaty (still pending ratification). The country has hosted and participated in different capacity-building workshops in Southeast Asia on small arms control. In March 2017, the Philippines, with support from the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPPD) completed a capacity-building program in preventing the trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons.

On the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines joins ASEAN and the international community in expressing grave concern about North Korea's nuclear and missile tests as violations of existing UNSC resolutions. The Philippines calls for constructive dialogue to deescalate tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The country also actively reports on its national implementation of UNSC resolutions. In March 2016, PCG interdicted a cargo vessel with known links with North Korea, for inspection of possible WMD-related materials in compliance with UNSC Resolution 2270. During its ASEAN Chairmanship, the Philippines was able to issue four (4) ASEAN Ministerial-level statements on the continuing developments in the Korean Peninsula, only for the period covering January to April 2017.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The Philippines' location in the tropics and in the Pacific Ring of Fire makes it among the most vulnerable countries to natural hazards and extreme weather phenomena. The devastation caused by super typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines in 2013 was a stark reminder of how natural disasters constitute a

serious threat to human lives, properties, and livelihood, and can be an obstacle to both national security and economic development.

To effectively respond to natural disasters, the Philippines has put in place different policies and programs, including the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) 2011–2028. The NDRRMP implements Republic Act No. 10121 or the Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System toward the objective of having “safer, adaptive and disaster resilient Filipino communities toward sustainable development.” The NDRRMP seeks to strengthen the country’s capacity in four areas: disaster prevention and mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery and rehabilitation. The NDRRMP also promotes the mainstreaming of both disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA) in the planning and implementation of projects at the national and local levels; and the integration of science-based approaches with indigenous knowledge and local best practices.

The lessons of Haiyan and the implementation of RA 10121 have allowed the Philippines to better manage natural disasters. When super typhoons Meranti (Ferdie) and Haima (Lawin) hit the country in 2016, casualties and damage to properties were reduced due to increased preparedness and effective coordination among different government and non-government units, including the private sector.

The Philippine government is also building resilience and preparedness for earthquakes, following the warnings issued by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the West Valley and East Valley Faults –

which run through portions of Metro Manila and other heavily-populated neighboring provinces– is now ripe for another movement. The Philippines has developed a Valley Fault Atlas to identify all areas that are to be affected by the possible earthquake, while different sectors have been conducting regular drills and information dissemination about earthquake preparedness.

The Philippines also actively contributes to regional and international efforts on DRRM and HADR. It is fully committed to the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The country also supports the work of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) which coordinates and implements region-wide disaster risk reduction and management initiatives, and enhances collaboration between ASEAN Member States, Dialogue Partners, and other international organizations and institutions. The Philippines also contributes to the work of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) in providing relief to disaster-hit areas in the region.

HADR has also become an important aspect of the Philippines’ military engagements with other countries. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the Balikatan military exercises are geared toward enhancing interoperability and joint capability of the Philippines and the United States in responding to humanitarian emergencies, among others. In January 2017, the Philippines joined Singapore and the United States in the Exercise Coordinated Response (Ex-Coor) table top exercise on enhancing information sharing and coordination in times of natural disasters. While the Philippines–United States alliance remains

a cornerstone of Philippine defense posture, the country continues to engage other regional partners such as China and Russia toward practical cooperation in different issue-areas.

E. Maritime Security

The Philippines, as an archipelagic state, fully recognizes the importance of the seas to its security, economic development, and sustainability. The country affirms that freedom of navigation and overflight should be upheld; that disputes are managed peacefully through diplomacy and the rule of law; and that marine resources are conserved and protected. In its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2017, maritime security and cooperation was identified as one of the six thematic priority areas.

The Philippines also faces challenges in maritime domain awareness, particularly in its ability to patrol its maritime zones against unauthorized activities. The Philippines emphasizes that user states should give due regard to the rights of coastal states in their respective maritime zones, as accorded by international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

As a littoral state in the South China Sea, the Philippines contributes to the peaceful management and resolution of disputes through dialogue, and cooperation. In this regard, it reaffirms the importance of maintaining peace, stability, security, and freedom of navigation and overflight in and above the South China Sea and of the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities, and avoiding actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The country is committed to ASEAN-led processes,

primarily through the full and effective implementation of the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the expeditious conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC). The Philippines takes note of the progress made in the implementation of the Early Harvest Measures that ASEAN and China agreed to undertake in 2016. This includes, in particular, the successful testing of the Hotlines between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the ASEAN Member States and China. The Philippines looks forward to the operationalization of the other Early Harvest Measure, which is on the application of a Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Further, the Philippines welcomes the finalization by ASEAN and China senior officials of the draft framework of the COC and looks forward to participating in further consultations to start negotiations on the actual COC as soon as possible.

On broader regional cooperation, the Philippines has completed its co-chairmanship with Japan and the United States of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS) for 2015-2017. The Philippines hosted the 8th ARF-ISM MS in 2016 where it emphasized the need for a synergistic response to maritime issues through effective interaction and coordination within the ARF and other ASEAN-led mechanisms and relevant sectoral bodies. The country will also host the 2017 ARF Workshop on Best Practices in Implementing International Safety of Navigation Instruments, and an ASEAN-European Union High Level Dialogue (HLD) on Maritime Security in 2017. It will also co-chair with Indonesia, the 7th ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and 5th Expanded Maritime Forum (EAMF) in December 2017 in Jakarta.

The Philippines also recognizes that current maritime security challenges affecting the region include piracy and armed robbery against ships, kidnapping, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs, trafficking in persons, unsustainable fishing practices, natural and human-induced disasters, and marine environment degradation. The modernization of the PN, PCG, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and the PNP-Maritime Group, as well as their respective engagements with bilateral and multilateral partners, are therefore also aimed at enhancing interoperability and developing capabilities in responding to these concerns.

In 2016, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia signed the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) to deal with transnational threats in common maritime areas, through information sharing, joint trainings, and coordinated patrols. The Philippines is also receiving patrol vessels from Japan through official development assistance (ODA), for maritime domain awareness, combatting narcotics trade, and search and rescue. The PCG and the China Coast Guard also initiated the Joint Coast Guard Committee (JCGC) meetings in 2017 to promote mutual understanding and functional cooperation toward the enhancement of the overall relations between the Philippines and China. In addition, the Philippines actively supports the work of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).

The Philippines also emphasizes the need for inter-agency cooperation in attaining maritime security objectives, as exemplified by the work of the National Coast Watch System (NCWS) in coordinating agencies at the policy and operational levels. The country also

calls for enhanced interoperability among navies in the region given the differences in their doctrines, capabilities, and cultural foundations.

On the issue of marine environment protection, the Philippines promotes the work of institutions such as the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) and the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). The Philippines also initiated a Study Group on Marine Environment Protection at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as a Track Two platform for exchanging views on how to strengthen regional governance of the marine environment.

IV. The Role of the ARF

Since its creation in 1994, the ARF has significantly contributed to promoting constructive dialogue and consultation on security issues common to the region, toward confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. The creation of ARF inter-sessional meetings (ISM) on the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament, maritime security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, and disaster relief, facilitate more specialized regional discussions on these critical issues. The Work Plans of each ISM also provide opportunities for concrete projects and activities among ARF countries. The ARF also conducts workshops and seminars on new and emerging security issues such as climate change adaptation, cyber security, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This indicates the track record and the growing confidence in the ARF process in facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation.

ARF's diverse composition, which includes all relevant regional players, complements other ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN+1 Dialogue Partnerships, East Asia Summit (EAS), ADMM Plus, and

the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). This demonstrates ASEAN's centrality as the driving force of regional processes, while also emphasizing the importance of constructive engagement with extra-regional states in building an open, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture.

The Philippines is committed to streamline and rationalize meetings and activities to include platforms of dialogues for the defense sector under the ARF such as the ARF Defense Officials Dialogue

(ARF DOD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). There is a need to synergize the two platforms in order to arrive at an effective and efficient platform for defense dialogue within the ARF.

The Philippines strongly supports the ARF's continued role and contribution to confidence-building and preventive diplomacy toward regional peace and stability.



REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

From a political, economic and social perspective, the Asia-Pacific region has evolved as one of the most dynamic regions in the world. Sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific Region can only be achieved in a stable security environment. Therefore, our priority is to jointly address and respond to both emerging traditional and non-traditional security challenges including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issues, territorial disputes and issues of historical perceptions, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, transnational crimes, and natural disasters.

Over the past few years, the Republic of Korea has sought to put in place a framework for sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula by building trust between the two Koreas. However, Pyongyang's unprecedented level of provocations both in 2016 and 2017—two nuclear tests and 25 ballistic missile launches—has left the international community with no choice but to impose the strongest-ever sanctions against the DPRK. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolutions 2270, 2321, and 2356, and individual countries—such as the ROK, the US, Japan, and the EU—strengthened their already existing unilateral sanctions against the DPRK. In accordance with the international community's ongoing efforts, it is crucial to find creative and

fundamental ways to prevent the DPRK's provocations and resolve the DPRK issue. The ROK, as the main stakeholder, will seek bold and pragmatic approaches and will pursue all possible means including sanctions and dialogue in order to come up with groundbreaking solutions that will hopefully lead to permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Against this backdrop, the ROK government seeks to establish a framework sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. It aspires to promote regional multilateral cooperation by cultivating a practice of dialogue and cooperation. The ROK views multilateral security cooperation as a long-term national agenda indispensable to the peace and co-prosperity in the region. In this regard, it has consistently supported the regional multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. The newly inaugurated administration of the ROK also supports regional multilateral cooperation. Especially, it pursues cooperation in various issue areas including economy and security within the wider range of geographic area.

The DPRK's Nuclear Issue

In 2016, the DPRK conducted the fourth nuclear test in January and the fifth test in September, while launching 24 ballistic missiles of all types. In 2017, the DPRK continues to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, while claiming itself as a nuclear-weapon state. The

DPRK's leader said at the New Year's Address that the DPRK "entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile." And the regime has continued to conduct multiple launches using ballistic missile technology.

The DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs constitute a flagrant and clear violation of international obligations including relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as imminent and grave threat to the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the international community as a whole.

Based on the common understanding that it will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear-weapon state under any circumstances, the international community as a whole is firmly united to tackle this threat and achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear program. As a party directly concerned in issues relating to the Korean Peninsula, the ROK government is ready to assume a leading role in seeking to resolve the DPRK's nuclear issue, while closely coordinating with the international community.

Aiming at completely dismantling the DPRK's nuclear program, the ROK government will take all possible means including sanctions and dialogue. In order to bring the DPRK to path towards denuclearization, the ROK will continue to closely cooperate with the international community to implement sanctions against the DPRK and consult with relevant countries on bold and pragmatic ways for resuming talks on its denuclearization.

The Korean Peninsula

As the DPRK shows no sign of giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions and continues to threaten the region and the world with incessant provocations, inter-Korean relations inevitably remain stagnant. For inter-Korean relations to improve in any substantive way, the DPRK must show sincere willingness to denuclearize and stop firing missiles and conducting nuclear tests that threaten the ROK's security. Nonetheless, the ROK will not give up prospects for improved relations with the DPRK.

In the meantime, the ROK will continue to work with the international community to address the dire human rights situation in the DPRK which is a matter of upholding universal values of the mankind. Through multi-dimensional efforts based on close coordination with the international community, ROK's efforts will concentrate on comprehensively enhancing the civil and political rights of North Koreans as well as their economic, social, and cultural rights. At the same time, the ROK government will strive to induce the DPRK authorities to reform and upgrade its related policies and systems.

In the hopes of practically improving the lives of the North Korean people, the ROK is of the position that humanitarian assistance toward the DPRK should be independent from any political considerations. While responding sternly to the DPRK's military provocations, the ROK government will show flexibility in positively considering humanitarian assistance and exchanges, within the framework of the ongoing sanctions regime of the international community towards Pyongyang. More than anything, the ROK will actively push forward the reunion of separated families and find ways to solve the issues of abductees and POWs to relieve the humanitarian pain caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula.

Through such endeavors, the ROK aims at establishing lasting peace and achieving prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula will be an essential and integral part of peace and stability on the Asian region and beyond. The ROK, with such a vision, will continue to pursue peaceful and gradual unification on the Korean Peninsula.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

A. Overview of National Security and Defense Policy

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) is maintaining a robust military readiness posture which is the fundamental duty of the military. Furthermore, it is strengthening the fundamentals by establishing a barracks culture that the people understand and the service members appreciate. Moreover, while bolstering its future-oriented defense capacity based on a robust ROK-U.S. Alliance, the ministry is additionally creating a strategic environment favorable towards promoting national interest.

The National Defense Objectives are: “protecting the nation from external military threats and attack,” “supporting a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula,” and “contributing to regional stability and world peace.” These objectives are discussed below in detail: First, the constant military threats and provocations from the DPRK are the primary security threats the ROK faces today. In particular, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons including ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyber-attacks and terrorism pose major threats to our national security. As long as these threats persist, the DPRK regime and its military will remain an enemy insofar as they are the agents carrying out these threats. At the same time as contending with these threats, the ROK

will also continuously expand its capacity to respond to potential threats against its peace and security as well as transnational and non-military threats. Second, the ROK will achieve sustainable peace that is oblivious to the fear of nuclear proliferation. Third, within the framework of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, the ROK will promote common interests with regional neighbors and increase strategic cooperation to mitigate anxiety over security in the region. Moreover, by strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries around the world that share in the ROK strategic interests, the ROK will strive to broaden the scope of security cooperation.

B. Data Contribution to ARF Arms Register (as of 2016)

- i. Total Defense Budget: KRW 38,799 billions
- ii. Defense Budget-to-GDP Ratio: 2.4%
- iii. Defense Budget per Capita: KRW 0.8 million

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

Terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. Terrorist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko-Haram carry out devastating attacks, spreading fear in the world. Globally, through the internet and social media, terrorist groups are recruiting foreign terrorist fighters and inciting lone-wolves to launch attacks. No country is immune from terrorism and indeed East Asia also witnessed major terrorist attacks in 2016: in Jakarta, Indonesia (in January), in Puchong, Malaysia (in June), in Dhaka, Bangladesh (in July) and in Davao, the Philippines (in September).

The attack of February 13th, 2017 at Kuala Lumpur International Airport using VX nerve agent, strictly banned under international law, raises international concerns over the DPRK's involvement in terrorism. Since 2011, the DPRK has been subject to the Financial Action Task Force's "counter-measures" for its failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF "counter-measures" are the strongest measures under the FATF framework. FATF urges all jurisdictions to give special attention to business relationship and transactions with the DPRK and to apply targeted financial sanctions in accordance with the applicable UN Security Council Resolutions.

Commemorating the tenth anniversary of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereafter the GCTS) in 2016, the international community stepped up its efforts to address the growing threat of terrorism. In January, the UN Secretary General presented to the General Assembly a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (hereafter the SG's PVE Plan of Action) the focus of which is to deal with the conditions conducive to terrorism, an important part of the UN GCTS. In July, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution on the UN GCTS and called upon member states, the UN and other appropriate international and regional organizations to reinforce their efforts to implement the UN GCTS as well as the SG's PVE Plan of Action.

The ROK has thoroughly implemented international counter-terrorism obligations including the UN GCTS, and General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism. Furthermore, in accordance with the recommendations in the SG's PVE Plan of Action, the ROK is making its own National Action Plan,

taking all-of-government approach for preventing violent extremism. In addition, the ROK has actively taken part in such international counter-terrorism discussions as the 5th Review of the UN GCTS, Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism, OSCE Counter-Terrorism Conference and Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. The ROK's contributions to countering terrorism are also evident in its active roles in the Financial Action Task Force. As the FATF President from July 2015 to June 2016, the ROK not only held the Plenary Meeting in Busan, Korea in June 2016, but also contributed to adopting the FATF Consolidated Strategy on Combating Terrorist Financing.

Regional counter-terrorism cooperation is of great importance in the global fight against terrorism as emphasized by many international conferences and documents. The ARF has been serving as a valuable platform to facilitate regional counter-terrorism dialogue on best practices and policies and plays an important role in coordinating regional efforts. The ROK respects and is implementing the ARF Work Plan 2015-2017 and the ASEAN-ROK Plan of Action 2016-2020.

Among various counter-terrorism efforts, the ROK greatly values capacity-building measures and has made every effort to contribute to regional capacity building. These endeavors include raising public awareness, sharing good practices and providing humanitarian assistance to fragile countries with limited capacity to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In this respect, for the enhancement of Asian countries' capacity in the area of counter-terrorism financing, the ROK is willing to make the best use of the FATF TREIN (Training and Research Institute) established in Busan, Korea in 2016.

Moreover, as part of such efforts, the ROK organized the EAS Regional Seminar for Capacity-building to P/

CVE in cooperation with the Indonesian Government in December 2016. More than 80 government delegates and civil experts of the EAS member countries participated in this seminar where they discussed a number of issues such as the drivers of regional violent extremism, capacity-building for the vulnerable people in the region, and the role of education in fostering moderation.

In addition, in 2017, the ROK held in Jeju, Korea in May the ASIA ICT (Information and Communications Technology) and Counter-Terrorism Dialogue in cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. At this conference, a range of issues were discussed including good practices, the existing legislative and normative framework, and ways to strengthen the roles of the industry in addressing terrorist use of ICT. In addition, the ROK organized back to back a session on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism on the occasion of the Jeju Forum. It was a useful opportunity to discuss ways to develop effective counter-narratives to violent extremism.

Together with such regional and multilateral efforts, the ROK has since 2005 held bilateral and trilateral consultations with over 20 countries around the world to discuss effective counter-terrorism policy and share information and best practices. In 2016, the ROK held bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with Japan and China respectively and held a trilateral consultation along with Japan and China.

Domestically, the ROK strengthened its readiness and capacity to prevent and counter terrorism by enacting the Act on Anti-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security in March and establishing the Counterterrorism Center in June in accordance with the

Act. The Center serves as a control tower to coordinate comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts of the ROK Government. These measures will also serve to enhance the ROK's preparedness and capability to implement international and regional counter-terrorism duties.

B. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery continues to gravely challenge international peace and security, the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 and Resolution 2321 in response to the DPRK's fourth and fifth nuclear test in 2016. The international community is expected to work together for faithful implementation of aforementioned UNSCRs.

The Republic of Korea remains strongly committed to the non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The ROK will continue to contribute to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards system including through the universal application of the Additional Protocol (AP). Although the 2015 NPT Review Conference was unable to adopt the final document, the ROK will work with other State Parties to further the progress made during the Conference by actively participating in the 2020 NPT Review process. The ROK will continue to promote an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to call for the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

In response to the growing risk of WMD terrorism, the ROK is working towards the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Since preventing WMD and related materials from falling in the hands of terrorists is vital, the ROK has actively participated in promoting effective implementation of the resolution 1540, including by acting as the Chair of the 1540 committee for the 2013-14 term, and hosting the industrial outreach conference in September 2016.

As a member of all major multilateral export control regimes, and especially as Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the 2016-2017 term, the ROK has been endeavoring to contribute to enhancing multilateral export control regimes. Especially, the ROK hosted NSG Plenary meeting and MTCR Plenary meeting in June and October, respectively, 2016, thereby contributing to intensifying the efforts of partners to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery systems. The ROK, as Chair of MTCR, has also been undertaking outreach mission to non-Partners in order to keep them informed about the group's activities and to provide practical assistance regarding efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery systems.

The ROK is ready to join international efforts to reinforce the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) regime, and achieve universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) took effect in the ROK on 26 February 2017. It is the only legally-binding international treaty regulating the international trade of conventional arms. The ATT seeks to prevent and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms by establishing international standards governing arms transfers. As Party to the

Treaty, the ROK will actively participate in promoting transparent and responsible arms transfers.

The ROK has continually sought ways to boost global counter-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the ROK has actively participated in PSI-related international efforts. The ROK hosted the PSI Asia-Pacific Workshop in July 2015 to support the strengthening of the region's ability to fight the proliferation of WMD and related materials. In addition, the ROK has annually participating in the OEG (Operational Experts Group) meetings and APER (Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation) exercises. As such, the ROK will continue to reach out to PSI partners in the region to strengthen global counter-proliferation efforts.

The ROK annually hosts the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). At the 15th Conference in November 2016, about 60 experts and high officials discussed the implications of and possible responses to key issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation.

C. Transnational Crime

i. Cyber Crimes

There has recently been a significant rise in malicious cyber activities, which in many cases exploit the anonymous and cross-border nature of cyberspace. The ROK is often cited as being at the frontline of cyber threats, most of which have allegedly emanated from the DPRK. In particular, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd. was the subject of a cyberattack in 2014 and major Korean companies involved in the defense industry were hacked in June 2016. There is a shared regional concern over the DPRK's malicious cyber activities. The

DPRK is cited as having been involved in the hacking of Bangladesh Central Bank in February 2016 and, according to a security company, the identical source code used in this hacking was also discovered in the attempted hackings of other financial institutions in India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand.

As malicious activities in cyberspace have emerged as a common threat at the regional and international level, cyber security cannot be adequately addressed single-handedly by any nation alone. Recognizing this, the ROK places a great deal of importance on establishing mechanisms for cooperation and capacity building, as the ROK elaborated upon at the Fullerton Forum in January 2017.

The ROK has held a series of bilateral cyber policy consultations with a view to discussing potential steps for cooperation and strengthening the concerted response to cyber threat. To this end, assessment of cyber threats, including those emanating from the DPRK, is also covered in the consultations. In 2016, the ROK had consultations with the US, the UK, the Czech Republic, EU, Japan and Germany. Moreover, the ROK has worked to strengthen sub-regional cooperation through Korea-Japan-China trilateral consultations. In February 2017, the three nations met to hold the third consultations in Tokyo.

At the multilateral level, the ROK has been actively participating in regional cooperation since it held the ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in 2004, when the cyber issue came to the fore as an important issue on the regional agenda. During the ARF Workshop on Operationalising Cyber Confidence-building Measures for Cooperation during Cyber-incident Response in March 2016 and OSCE Asian conference on Strengthening Comprehensive Security in June 2016,

the ROK shared its cyber security policies and stressed the importance of establishing a regional confidence building mechanism, based on the common grounds among countries. In particular, the ROK suggested that the UN GGE report can serve as an important base to this end. The ROK has been participating in four rounds of UN GGE (2004-05, 2009-10, 2014-15, 2016-17) until now. In April 2017, the ROK also hosted, in cooperation with the OSCE, the Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security to discuss measures to enhance regional cooperation against cyber threats by sharing experience with the OSCE.

In addition, the ROK places great importance on bridging the gap in cyber security capacity among countries. Indeed, this was well reflected in the fact that the ROK newly included capacity-building as a major item on the agenda for the Global Conference on CyberSpace in Seoul in 2013. The ROK has implemented various capacity building projects with developing countries by establishing GCCD (Global Cybersecurity Center for Development) in 2015 and CAMP (Cybersecurity Alliance for Mutual Progress) in 2016. Through these, the ROK provides policy advice, consultations and training on cyber-security measures to developing countries. Furthermore, the SPO (Supreme Prosecutors' Office) participated as a partner in 'Combatting Cybercrime: Tools and Capacity Building for Emerging Economies', which ended in June 2016, along with the World Bank, the ITU, the UNODC, UNICRI, the AIDP, Oxford University amongst others.

The ROK's measures to address cyber security are consistent with recommendations elaborated in the 'ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications

Technologies,' adopted in August 2015. The ROK reaffirms its commitment to continuously play a valuable part in the establishment of regional Confidence Building Measures on cyber security.

ii. Human Trafficking

The ROK has been increasing efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under the criminal code, and to identify and protect victims of human trafficking. The ROK amended its Criminal Act in 2013 when it newly introduced a comprehensive provision for trafficking in persons as part of its efforts to meet UNTOC standards. In 2015, the ROK ratified UNTOC and the protocols thereto in addition to these legislative measures. In August 2016, the National Human Rights Commission developed 'Indicators for the Identification and Protection of Trafficking in Persons,' which was distributed to relevant government branches and recommended to be used as guidelines to identify and protect victims.

In 2016, the ROK attended the 6th Bali Process Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime in March, as well as the 16th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in May. The ROK also held the 4th Senior-level Workshop on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Asia and the Pacific in December with the aim to further strengthen network between practitioners. Through these meetings, the ROK reaffirmed its strong support for countering transnational crimes, including trafficking in persons, and strengthening cooperative efforts therein.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

International society is confronted with a serious refugee crisis. More than 60 million people have been forced to leave their homes due to life-threatening conflicts and violence, placing an increased burden on the countries that accept the refugees seeking safety. Amid this situation, the Republic of Korea is actively contributing to regional and international efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The ROK provides financial support to disaster and conflict-stricken countries, supports capacity-building activities in the area of disaster management, and assists the emergency response efforts of the United Nations.

In pursuing such humanitarian activities, the ROK government has followed the universal humanitarian principles of the international community. The ROK has also been actively engaged in international dialogue.

As a responsible member of international society, the ROK responded actively to increasing humanitarian needs caused by emergency disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, and infectious diseases, or by chronic disasters in conflict-stricken countries such as Syria and Iraq. Considering the urgent need for assistance to minimize damage from disasters, the ROK government provided approximately 63 million US dollars in response to more than 40 humanitarian crises in 2016.

Furthermore, the ROK government has steadily increased humanitarian assistance for refugees: humanitarian assistance to refugees has increased from three million US dollars in 2010 to approximately 51 million US dollars in 2016. At the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul on May 23 - 24, 2016, the ROK

pledged to increase its contribution to end conflicts and build peace, expand its contribution to education and capacity-building of women to at least 20 percent of its humanitarian assistance budget by 2020 in line with the “Better Life for Girls” initiative, and increase its contribution for refugees to respond to the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Along with the pledge made at the World Humanitarian Summit, the ROK announced it would offer 230 million US dollars in humanitarian assistance from 2017 to 2019, at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees which took place in New York City on September 20, 2016.

Moreover, the Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) is in place for overseas emergency relief operation. In 2016, the KDRT was re-classified as a “Heavy Team,” the highest grade attainable, in the accreditation administered by the INSARAG. With its internationally-approved capacity, the ROK will continue to contribute to disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region.

As a proactive supporter of regional disaster management, the Korean government has shown its commitment to disaster relief cooperation in the region through diverse approaches. In this regard, the ROK is serving as the Co-Chair of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) and presided over discussions on regional cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at the 16th meeting held in Bangkok on April 3, 2017. The ROK will host the 17th meeting next year and lead the discussion for further regional cooperation in the area of disaster relief.

E. Maritime Security

Among various maritime security issues, the Republic of Korea has played an active role in countering and preventing piracy. Joining the international efforts in the fight

against piracy in Somalia, the ROK has deployed the Cheonghae (meaning “pure sea”) Anti-Piracy Unit to the high seas off the coast of Somalia since 2009. The Cheonghae Unit has conducted convoy missions to protect vessels from pirates as part of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under the command of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Furthermore, the Unit assisted NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield to fight pirates off the Coast of Somalia and helped evacuate some 80 citizens of five European countries during NATO Operation Unified Protector. The Cheonghae Unit also took part in the EU Naval Force’s Operation Atlanta to combat piracy off the Somali Coast for the first time in February 2017.

The ROK has also played an active part in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) since 2009 and has made a financial contribution to the CGPCS Trust Fund and the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund to strengthen the judicial capacities and support good governance of the Government of Somalia and neighboring countries. In 2016, the ROK provided 200,000 US dollars to the CGPCS Trust Fund and 100,000 US dollars to the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund.

Since 2006, the ROK has been a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and sought to make a valuable contribution to the regional efforts to combat piracy. The ROK has actively taken part in the Governing Council Meetings of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center and supported the enhancing of work efficiency by seconding Korean staff to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center since 2007.

In regards to regional capacity building, the ROK has been doing its part by

providing a voluntary contribution for the work of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center. The ROK had contributed approximately 90,000 US dollars every year from 2008 to 2012 and increased its contribution by 50% in 2013. The ROK has been contributing about 130,000 US dollars annually from 2013 to 2016.

IV. Role of the ARF

A. National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

As a founding member of the ARF, the ROK is committed to its vision of promoting confidence-building measures, developing preventive diplomacy, and elaborating approaches to conflicts in the region. The ROK participated in the ARF's various CBMs and PD activities during the inter-sessional year of 2016-2017; these include the Inter-Sessional Support Group meeting, four Inter-Sessional Meetings and the meeting of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons, along with other CMBs and PD workshops and seminars.

The ROK will continuously enlarge and strengthen its engagement in the ARF's endeavors, and, in this vein, the ROK is co-chairing Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief with Thailand for the 2015-2017 term. In addition, the ROK would like to assume co-chairmanship of the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the next term with Indonesia and Japan. Moreover, the ROK would like to co-host several ARF Track 1 Activities for the Inter-Sessional Year 2017-2018, including ARF Workshop on Peacekeeping Operations proposed by

Vietnam. The ROK looks forward to working closely with ARF members in contributing to regional confidence building and cooperation on disaster management and non-proliferation and disarmament cooperation in the region.

The ROK will also continue to participate in the ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue and the ARF Security Policy Conference.

B. Future of the ARF

As a unique intergovernmental forum concerned with multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF functions as an effective venue for exchanging views on common security threats and seek common responses to them. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has played an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region, by facilitating dialogue among regional countries and providing opportunities to freely exchange views on various security issues. At the same time, the ARF has carried out a multitude of Track 1 activities as part of confidence-building measures. They include measures in response to new security challenges of non-traditional and transnational nature, including natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes, and cyber threats.

Within the evolving defense and security environment in the Asia Pacific region, the ARF needs to fully utilize its strengths and work towards building a complementary relationship with other regional operations and mechanisms, such as the ADMM+ and the East Asia Summit. The ROK notes that ARF process has been effectively reinforced through active negotiations among member states and hopes to further strengthen the ARF process through continuous discussions and cooperation within the ARF.



THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific is consolidating its position as one of the centres of global growth and multi-polar world order. The region is witnessing growing integration and seeking to link different formats of multilateral cooperation.

At the same time the conflict potential of the Asia-Pacific is rising, which can eventually undermine its stability and hamper its development in the future. The persistent security threats are becoming more acute while the emerging ones are multiplying. One of the most dangerous is the intensive military build-up by some States, disproportionate to the existing challenges. It is fraught with the escalation of the arms race and disruption of the regional and even global strategic balance.

The situation in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia in general remains complicated and unpredictable. One of the main causes of the continuing tensions is the nuclear and missile activities of the DPRK (the fifth nuclear test and launches of missiles of various ranges in 2016–2017).

Another factor that significantly complicates normalization in Northeast Asia is an extremely high degree of military activities within the US-led military alliances displayed by the joint military exercises in the Korean Peninsula and off its coast, unprecedented in their

scale. The accelerated deployment of the US THAAD missile defence system in the Republic of Korea is a matter of concern in the context of Washington's plans to establish a new positioning area of the global US BMD system in Northeast Asia.

It is necessary to get down to the practical establishment of multilateral security and cooperation mechanisms in Northeast Asia on the non-bloc, equal and non-discriminatory basis with the participation of all States concerned. The problems of the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear issue, must be addressed by defusing overall military and political tensions, abandoning the development of military infrastructure, reducing the scale of manoeuvres performed and building confidence between the States of the region.

Together with other partners involved in the Six-Party process, Russia continues to work towards normalizing the situation in Northeast Asia and creating an environment conducive to the early resumption of negotiations on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.

The effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue is an example of successful cooperative efforts. A key to success in this area is a strict adherence by all stakeholders to the spirit and letter of the agreements set out in UNSC resolution 2231. The proper implementation of the JCPOA will help to

achieve our common objective, namely to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which serves the security interests of the Middle East region and the international community as a whole.

The military and political situation in Afghanistan remains complicated with the increase in combat activities by groups of the armed opposition. The most numerous of them are still the Taliban movement and the Afghan branch of the so called Islamic State (IS).

Russia supports the efforts taken by the Afghan Government to achieve national reconciliation and stands ready to contribute to the advancement of the negotiations, in particular, by showing flexibility with regard to a potential easing of sanctions, provided that it is not contravening the national interests of Kabul. To that end Russia has initiated the Moscow Format of regional consultations on Afghanistan. We deem it promising in terms of brokering an agreement between the conflicting parties.

A dangerous trend is the increasing drug production in Afghanistan which also provides substantial financial resources for terrorist activities. Therefore, there is a need to combine efforts of the international community in combating illicit drug production, trafficking and abuse.

The situation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea requires constant monitoring. The parties to the territorial disputes should strictly respect the principle of non-use of force, continue to seek for political and diplomatic solutions to the current problems in conformity with the international law. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the instruments adopted by ASEAN and the People's Republic of China – the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the Guidelines for the

Implementation of the DOC agreed upon in 2011 – should serve as a basis for settling the differences in the South China Sea. Relevant consultations and negotiations should be held between the parties directly involved in the disputes in a format determined by themselves. The non-regional powers' attempts to intervene in the solution of territorial problems in the South China Sea only fuel tensions in this region.

The developments in Syria and a number of other Middle East countries, the increasing threat of international terrorism, primarily posed by the IS, negatively affect the situation in the Asia-Pacific. The scope of non-traditional security challenges tends to expand, encompassing illicit drug trafficking, cybercrime and other forms of transboundary crime, sea piracy, illegal migration and human trafficking, climate change and more frequent natural disasters.

II. Defence Policy of the Russian Federation

The main objectives of Russia's defence policy are determined by the President of the Russian Federation in the National Security Strategy until 2020 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved on 26 December 2014.

Russia ensures its national security on the basis of principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness and resorts to military measures only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information and other non-force instruments have been exhausted.

The activities of the Russian Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific are carried out in strict compliance with international norms and bilateral agreements, posing no threat to peace and stability in the region.

III. International Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

Russia is focused on the development of defence ties with Asia-Pacific countries in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. We cooperate in both multilateral and bilateral formats.

Russia attributes a key role in ensuring regional security to the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

In 2016, Russia and Thailand wrapped up the 3-year co-chairmanship of the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine which resulted in the establishment of ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine in Bangkok. The Centre showed its practical capability during the ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise (Am-HEX 2016) held in September 2016. The teams of military medical experts of the Russian Defence Ministry as well as the Irtysh hospital vessel of the Russian Pacific Fleet (altogether over 170 personnel) were engaged in these exercises.

Russia and Laos took up co-chairmanship of the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2017-2020. The implementation of its 3-year Work Plan will involve the capacity of the International Mine Action Centre of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In 2016, the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation participated in the ADMM-Plus Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Mine Action Exercise (Pune, India, 1-8 March) and the Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Exercise (Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, 2-12 May).

We are proactively developing bilateral defence interaction with Asia-Pacific countries, primarily with China, India and ASEAN Member States.

The cooperation mechanisms between Russia and China function effectively, including annual meetings of Defence Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff, command and staff negotiations, delegations exchange, as well as joint exercises of the armed forces.

India remains one of Russia's leading partners in the region in the field of military and technical cooperation. Russia assists the Indian side in developing its military-industrial complex. The India-Russia "Indra Navy" naval exercise and "Indra" joint anti-terrorist army training are held on a regular basis.

Legal framework for Russia's military cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries is consistently developing. In 2016, military cooperation agreements were signed with Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand. Preparations for conclusion of similar documents with Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines are underway.

High priority is attached to the friendly calls of Russia's Navy to the ports of Asia-Pacific countries. In 2016-2017, the Russian ships visited the ports of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.

Cooperation in personnel training at the Russian military universities is developing. Currently 1508 students from Asia-Pacific countries study at the educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The Russian Ministry of Defence annually hosts the Moscow International Security Conference. In April 2017, representatives of around 80 countries, including those from the Asia-Pacific region, participated in the forum. The International Army Games in July-August 2017 and the International Military and Technical Forum “Army-2017” in August are the substantial contributions to the further strengthening of ties with our partners in the defence area.

IV. Combating International Terrorism and Transnational Crime in the Asia Pacific

Given the growing terrorist threats everywhere, Russia pays special attention to developing practical cooperation in this field, both bilaterally and multilaterally, with Asia-Pacific countries, in particular to strengthening their counter-terrorism capacity. In view of the recent developments, emphasis is placed on countering the spread of IS influence, the cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters and terrorism financing.

Under the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership, mutual determination to enhance cooperation in combating terrorism, transnational organized crime and illicit drug-trafficking is reflected in the Sochi Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action to Promote Cooperation between ASEAN and the Russian Federation, adopted on 20 May 2016 at the ASEAN-Russia Summit.

Common approaches to consolidation of joint efforts to counter non-traditional security threats and challenges without politicization and double standards were agreed upon

at the ASEAN-Russia Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism meeting and ASEAN-Russia Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime (Jakarta, 22-27 May 2016).

Russia continues to provide technical assistance to ASEAN Member States, primarily in personnel training for the law enforcement agencies and special services. In 2016, the educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation hosted advanced personnel training for the experts of relevant agencies from ASEAN Member States on countering transnational crime (September) and cybersecurity (November).

In Russia’s view, a useful framework for anti-terrorism is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in particular the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group which gives a floor for promoting the basic approaches to international cooperation on countering the financing of foreign terrorist fighters and combating the IS terrorist threat. Russia (along with Peru, Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan) co-sponsored the 10th Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Conference (Peru, 20 August 2016) with a special focus to the counter-terrorism aspects of supply chain security in the Asia-Pacific.

Combating international terrorism was discussed at the relevant consultations on various levels and meetings of working groups with Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia and Japan.

We consistently build up partnership relations with Asia-Pacific countries within the FATF and the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to which Russia is an observer.

In the area of maritime security, including countering maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia, we attach special importance to efforts within the ARF, and participate in the relevant meetings in accordance with the ARF Work Plan on CTTC.

V. Nuclear and Missile Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Asia-Pacific

The Russian Federation makes a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament efforts. Our current priority is a sustainable implementation of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).

However, in view of the existing correlation between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, our great concern is the deployment of the US Global Ballistic Missile Defence System in the Asia-Pacific, which adversely affects the international situation, undermines strategic stability, regional and global security. Attempts to ensure security of certain States and groups of States at the expense of security of other States are unacceptable. The policy of all countries on this issue should aim at maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific and prevent escalating tensions or accelerating arms race.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important tool for strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime. The nuclear-weapon-free status of Southeast Asia has still not been formalized. Russia, along with other nuclear-weapon

States, reaffirms its readiness to immediately sign the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty, and is open to consultations with States Parties to the Bangkok Treaty to institutionalise this nuclear-weapon-free zone as soon as possible.

The Russian Federation is deeply concerned by the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq by the militants of IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and extremist groups affiliated with them. There is a danger that chemical terrorism could spread to other regions, including the Asia-Pacific. To counter WMD terrorism, Russia has proposed to elaborate in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism. The initiative has been gaining increasing support from Asia-Pacific countries. At the same time, consensus is still out of reach due to scepticism from countries such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, which align their positions on this issue with that of the US, while the latter is still in two minds.

The threat of an arms race in outer space causes growing concern in the region. The draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, proposed by Russia and China, as well as multilateral initiative on no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP initiative) aim at countering this threat. The NFP resolution that the UN General Assembly has been adopting for the third year running, has been co-sponsored by 10 countries of the region alongside Russia: Bangladesh, China, DPRK, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.

We call for further holding of ARF Workshops on Space Security. In this regard it is disappointing that the fourth such workshop, scheduled for October 2016 in Singapore, has been postponed for an indefinite period.

VI. Emergency Response in the Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific accounts for about 70% of the overall number of natural disasters in the world. In order to successfully deal with natural disasters, an effective regional emergency response system is needed. It could be built on an integrated international network incorporating national crisis management centres or their analogues.

The implementation of this initiative proposed by the Russian Federation would facilitate the exchange and analysis of operational data both on a day-to-day basis and while responding directly to serious catastrophes, improve the quality of international aid and accelerate decision-making. In order to promote this initiative within the Asia-Pacific, Russia is cooperating with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance in Jakarta, as well as with key partners in the ARF.

In this context, it is particularly important to implement recommendations of the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai, Japan, March 2015), as well as to develop practical cooperation within the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership, ARF and APEC. Russia has consistently made efforts to implement the ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief for 2015-2017 and supports the practice of organising relevant regional and international exercises, including the ARF DiREx. In order to improve preparedness and disaster response

in the Asia-Pacific, it is necessary to synchronise the activities of multilateral regional institutions working in this area and develop a consolidated region-wide plan of emergency response exercises.

Russia continues to provide practical assistance to Asia-Pacific countries affected by disasters and catastrophes, as well as to improve humanitarian emergency response systems to deal with large-scale emergencies in foreign countries, with special emphasis on the Asia-Pacific. To this end, in September 2016, the Siberian search and rescue team of EMERCOM of Russia based in Krasnoyarsk was certified by the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) as a search and rescue team of intermediate class.

VII. Regional Security Architecture and Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific

A durable solution to the security problems in the Asia-Pacific is only possible through a system of multilateral relations which would reflect present-day realities and common interests of all countries in the region. The establishment of such an architecture requires collective efforts; meanwhile its effectiveness may be achieved through non-bloc policy, principles of equality and indivisibility of security, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, and compliance with international law.

Such a process is already under way within the East Asia Summits (EAS) with ongoing dialogue on parameters of a reliable, open and comprehensive security architecture in the Asia-Pacific with potential elaboration of a legally binding document.

Following the five rounds of relevant EAS consultations, Jakarta has managed to draw together the initiatives in this area proposed by Russia, China, India, Indonesia and some other countries. The prepared consolidated document

seems to provide a good basis for further practical steps to agree on unified rules of conduct in the Asia-Pacific. Moving forward in this direction should be at a pace comfortable for all parties, with the central role of ASEAN.

Analysis of effectiveness of multilateral security institutions proposed by the Russian Federation would be instrumental, including for promoting synergies with the EAS and network diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific as a whole.



SINGAPORE

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Geopolitical dynamics in the region remain complex. While much progress has been made towards greater economic integration, this progress may be hampered by the major structural shifts taking place within the geostrategic environment. Stable relations among the major powers are essential for ASEAN's continued stability and development. We believe that ASEAN must maintain its unity and centrality in order to remain a neutral platform for its partners to engage the region and each other. This will ensure that ASEAN stays true to its *raison d'être* of maintaining peace and stability in the region.

ASEAN has made concerted efforts over the years to deepen and broaden its relationships with major partners – for example, through its network of Dialogue Partnerships and wider regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). These efforts have helped to engender mutual confidence among countries and promote regional peace, security and stability.

II. National Security and Defence Policy

Singapore's defence policy is based on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy. Singapore believes in the need for a strong defence, to ensure that we enjoy peace and security, and to provide us with the political space and freedom to act in the best interests of our people. This is why Singapore has invested steadily and prudently in defence over the years, to build up a professional and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Given our small population size and limited resources, Singapore focuses on force multipliers – technology, paired with a highly educated and technologically-savvy population – to overcome the limits of our small standing military. Singapore's defence expenditure in FY2016 stands at 3.4 per cent of our Gross Domestic Product.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

As a small country, Singapore's security and prosperity are greatly dependent on regional peace and stability. Singapore seeks to establish strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. Singapore also believes that regional security and stability are best served by a robust,

open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. As such, Singapore actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including the EAS, ASEAN, the ARF, the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus.

The ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN and a key component of the regional security architecture. Established in 2006, the ADMM aims to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and practical cooperation in defence and security matters with the view towards enhancing security cooperation. At the 10th ADMM in Vientiane in May 2016, the ASEAN Defence Ministers underscored the ADMM's resolve to cooperate internationally and regionally to combat the transnational threat of terrorism, as well as its commitment to practise and observe international protocols such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The ADMM has also played a key role in establishing the ADMM-Plus, a forum which was inaugurated in Hanoi in October 2010. The 3rd ADMM-Plus was held in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015. At the 3rd ADMM-Plus, the Defence Ministers affirmed the value of the ADMM-Plus in strengthening practical cooperation among Member States' militaries. The ADMM-Plus Ministers also agreed on the importance of establishing effective and practical measures to de-escalate tensions and prevent conflicts in the disputed waters of the region. In this regard, Singapore proposed for the ADMM-Plus to: (a) adopt the CUES; and (b) establish an air protocol to

guide behaviour for military aircraft, similar to the Supplement to the MOU on the Rules of Behaviour for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters between the US and China in September 2015. The ADMM-Plus remains a useful and valuable platform for ASEAN and the eight "Plus" countries to have open and constructive dialogue as well as to engender practical cooperation in common areas of security interest. The 4th ADMM-Plus will be held in October 2017.

Singapore is strongly encouraged by the good progress of the six ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) in the areas of maritime security (MS), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO), counter-terrorism (CT), military medicine (MM) and humanitarian mine action (HMA). At the 10th ADMM, a seventh EWG on Cyber Security was established. As then-co-chairs of the EWG-CT, Singapore and Australia sought to strengthen the ADMM-Plus countries' interoperability and collective ability to tackle the threat of terrorism. We worked closely with the co-chairs of the EWG-MS, Brunei and New Zealand, to organise the ADMM-Plus MS&CT Exercise which was held from 2 to 12 May 2016. This is the largest ADMM-Plus Exercise to date, involving some 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft, and 40 Special Forces teams. This Exercise built inter-operability amongst the militaries and deepened mutual trust and understanding on security issues of common interest for the region. Singapore will be co-chairing the EWG-MS with the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the third EWG cycle from 2017 to 2020. We aim to sustain the positive momentum of practical military-to-military cooperation, and promote maritime security norms based on respect for international law to underpin a stable international order.

The SLD is held annually in Singapore and organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Since its inception in 2002, the SLD has established itself as the foremost defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific region. It provides a useful opportunity for Defence Ministers, senior officials and prominent security experts of the region to meet and discuss important security issues of the day frankly. The 15th SLD was held from 3 to 5 June 2016, and was attended by participants from 35 countries and 31 Ministers from Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha delivered the keynote address, and participants exchanged candid views on pertinent security issues, including developments in the South China Sea, global terrorism, and the increasing prevalence of hybrid threats such as cyber attacks.

The SLD Sherpa Meeting, also organised by the IISS, serves to supplement and strengthen the SLD process by providing an inter-sessional platform for senior civilian and military officials to engage in frank discussions on current defence and security issues. The fifth SLD Sherpa Meeting was held from 22 to 24 January 2017, and was attended by over 70 delegates from 22 countries regularly represented at the SLD. Malaysian Minister for Defence Dato' Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein delivered the keynote address, and was the first foreign defence minister to speak at the Sherpa Meeting since its establishment in 2013. Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana also delivered a special address at the delegates' dinner to commemorate the meeting's fifth anniversary.

A. Counterterrorism

The threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region. Continued vigilance and cooperation by all countries will be needed to deal with

the complex and long-term challenges posed by terrorism and the ideologies that perpetuate it.

Since the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime, ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts have made much progress. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in 2007, is the first region-wide and legally-binding anti-terrorism pact. Singapore was one of the first ASEAN Member States to ratify the Convention. The ACCT entered into force on 27 May 2011, and has, since January 2013, been ratified by all 10 ASEAN Member States. Singapore welcomes these significant achievements on the Convention, which enhances regional cooperation against terrorism and affirms the region's commitment to the global strategy on counter terrorism.

In support of regional capacity-building, Singapore has hosted a number of counter-terrorism workshops and initiatives in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, as well as Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios, under the auspices of the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue.

B. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Singapore has a long history of working to combat the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). We ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1976 and concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. Singapore also ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and adopted the amended Small Quantities Protocol

in March 2008. Singapore supports the universalisation of both the CSA and the AP. Singapore works closely with the IAEA in the area of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hosted two IAEA outreach seminars on the Agency's Safeguards Systems for States in Southeast and South Asia in March 2011 and joined the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database in March 2012. Singapore also serves regularly on the IAEA's Board of Governors (BOG), and is currently serving a two-year term which began in September 2016. We are also party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and support efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Singapore joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in May 2010 and subscribed to The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in August 2011. In September 2014, Singapore acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and accepted the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM.

Singapore welcomes the EU's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CBRN CoE) initiative in Southeast Asia. The CBRN CoE aims to improve national policies and international cooperation to mitigate CBRN risks in the region. Our agencies and experts are involved in several CBRN-CoE projects and activities. For example, Singapore's National Experts from the Bio-Risk Association of Singapore (BAS), Dr Viji Vijayan and Dr Sabai Phyu, are assisting in the implementation of Project 46 over the next three years as International Short Term Expert and Regional Expert respectively.

Singapore strongly supports counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and recognises the importance of preventing rogue groups, such as terrorist

organisations, from acquiring WMD. Singapore has actively participated in the PSI since its establishment in 2003. Singapore is the only member from Southeast Asia to be in the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) and has hosted PSI exercises and meetings, such as Exercise Deep Sabre 2016 in September 2016. Singapore will also host the PSI OEG meeting in August 2017. In addition, Singapore has participated in PSI activities, including Exercise Maru in Wellington, New Zealand in November 2015, the Mid-Level Political Meeting in Washington D.C., United States in January 2016, and the PSI OEG Meeting in London, United Kingdom in April 2016.

Singapore fully supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)'s efforts to further develop capabilities and readiness against the threat of chemical weapons. We participated in the 21st Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 2016. Pursuant to Article X, Singapore has been conducting the Emergency Response to Chemical Incidents training course on a biennial basis since 2009. The fourth instalment of the course was conducted in March 2015, and the fifth instalment is scheduled for December 2017. The course has benefitted participants from more than 25 Customs authorities in Asia. The course has also encouraged a platform for the sharing of experiences on the management of hazards. In addition, Singapore values the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW as a participant of the Temporary Working Group on Sampling and Analysis and Verification. Singapore participated in the 2014 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has submitted returns on BWC Confidence-Building Measures annually since 2012.

Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally-binding international instrument that regulates the international transfer of conventional arms, on 5 December 2014. This reaffirmed Singapore's commitment to the elimination of the threat posed by the illicit arms trade, as well as international disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives that promote global peace and security. Singapore is laying the path towards ratification by studying the ATT to fully implement the obligations domestically.

As a reflection of our commitment to prevent WMD proliferation, Singapore adheres to a robust and enhanced export control regime. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act controls the transfer and brokering of goods capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, stockpile or acquire WMD, along with strategic goods and related software and technology. The Act's control list is regularly updated to ensure that it keeps abreast of technological developments and remains aligned with the four multilateral export control regimes. We launched a Secure Trade Partnership Programme with businesses in May 2007, which encourages companies to adopt robust security measures in their trade operations to improve the overall security of the global supply chain. Singapore also launched the Trade Facilitation & Integrated Risk-based System (TradeFIRST) in January 2011 to provide a single holistic framework to encourage a virtuous cycle of compliance. Under TradeFIRST, companies with more robust systems, internal practices and security measures are rewarded with a higher level of trade facilitation.

In January and September 2016, Singapore co-hosted the Joint Industry Outreach Seminars on Strategic Trade Management with the US State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) and

Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). This Seminar keeps the industry abreast of the latest developments in export controls and best practices for improved compliance. Since 2011, Singapore has participated in the Annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in Tokyo, which address domestic industry outreach and international collaboration and cooperation. Singapore also participates regularly in the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo, including the most recent meeting held in January 2017.

C. Transnational Crime

Regional security challenges are increasingly transnational and non-traditional in nature and cannot be adequately addressed by individual countries' domestic policies. Singapore therefore believes in a concerted regional effort in combating transnational crimes.

Under the aegis of the ASEAN Ministerial and Senior Officials' Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC & SOMTC), Singapore is the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd for two transnational crime areas – namely, cybercrime and international economic crime.

In our capacity as the ASEAN Voluntary Lead Shepherd on Cybercrime, Singapore has been working closely with other AMS to identify priority areas of common interest to harmonise ASEAN's competencies in combating cybercrime. Singapore has also collaborated with strategic partners like INTERPOL to have a clear understanding of the challenges we collectively face when tackling cybercrime, and to develop suitable programmes to enhance ASEAN's capabilities and capacity to combat cybercrime. We also work with close alignment to the objectives under the ASEAN Political Security Blueprint 2025.

In 2013, Singapore tabled a proposal for the establishment of the SOMTC Working Group on Cybercrime (WG on CC) which was unanimously supported by AMS. The WG on CC provides a platform for AMS to collaborate on capacity-building, training and sharing of information related to cybercrime. The WG on CC has been tasked to strengthen ASEAN's efforts and initiatives in the areas outlined in the SOMTC Work Programme for 2016–2018 namely: (i) information exchange; (ii) legal matters; (iii) capability-building and training; (iv) law enforcement matters and (v) extra-regional partnerships. The WG on CC is also a platform for AMS to (i) discuss and adopt a coordinated approach to deal with cybercrime; (ii) follow up on recommendations on cybercrime from other ASEAN-related fora; and (iii) engage Dialogue Partners on cybercrime collaboration. The third WG on CC successfully concluded in Jakarta, Indonesia on 23 May 2016.

Aligned to the focal areas of the Work Programme on Cybercrime, Singapore has developed/implemented the following deliverables:

i. Information Exchange and Awareness Building Efforts

In conjunction with the RSA Conference Asia Pacific and Japan (RSAC APJ) held in Singapore from 20 to 22 July 2016, Singapore organised a full week of cyber-related events for ASEAN officials. Aside from the annual ASEAN Senior Officials Roundtable on Cybercrime (SORC), Singapore also introduced new elements targeted at Ministerial-level representatives and cyber law enforcement practitioners to encourage more sharing of best practices and greater networking opportunities with global cyber Thought Leaders. The week of cyber events was as follows:

- Inaugural ASEAN Plus Three Cybercrime Workshop

Singapore organised the inaugural ASEAN Plus Three Cybercrime Workshop from 18 to 19 July 2016. Supported by the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Fund, the Workshop provided a platform for Heads of Cybercrime Units from the ASEAN Plus Three countries to discuss strategies to jointly combat cybercrime and exchange best practices for a more proactive response to fight cybercrime.

- 4th ASEAN Senior Officials Roundtable on Cybercrime (SORC)

The 4th ASEAN SORC was held on 19 July 2016. Similar to past editions of the SORC, the 4th ASEAN SORC featured two components – (i) industry briefings by experts and academia on the latest threats and challenges in cybercrime, as well as public-private collaboration in addressing cybercrime; and (ii) an exclusive closed-door session for ASEAN Member States to discuss the intelligence gleaned from the briefings, as well as regional cybercrime initiatives to increase cooperation, enhance capability development and capacity-building. The session in 2016 also introduced a new segment, where participants from the ASEAN Dialogue Partners, namely China, Japan and Korea, were invited to present on the cyber threat landscape and how they have responded to deal with these challenges.

- Forum on the Future of Cybercrime

Singapore also organised the “Forum on the Future of Cybercrime” on 20 July 2016. The Forum featured

presentations from speakers across academia, public and private sectors, as well as brought together Ministers from the ASEAN Plus Three countries, SOMTC leaders and C-level executives from the private sector to discuss future cybercrime trends, the role of law enforcement and transformative public-private cooperation models.

ii. Regulatory, Legal and Enforcement Matters

As part of the Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW), an inaugural ASEAN Cybercrime Prosecutors' Roundtable Meeting (ACPRM) was held on 11 October 2016. The ACPRM set out to equip ASEAN legal prosecutors with the requisite technical capabilities as well as identify a more coherent and collaborative legal response to prosecute cybercriminals and address cybercrime. The ACPRM proved to be a valuable networking opportunity for like-minded practitioners to exchange best practices and approaches in cybercrime prosecution and investigation.

iii. Regional Cooperation

In March 2016, the Government of Japan approved the "ASEAN Cyber Capacity Development Project" submitted jointly by Singapore and INTERPOL. The Project is funded by the Japan ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) and sets out to strengthen ASEAN Member States' capacity and capability to fight cybercrime, as well as to promote extra regional cooperation between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners. The Project leverages the presence of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation ("IGCI") and its state-of-the-art cybercrime fighting facilities in Singapore to conduct targeted assessment of each ASEAN Member States' cybercrime competencies and

infrastructure, to help ASEAN Member States better understand their position in terms of cybercrime response, as well as to establish how INTERPOL can provide support. The project commenced in September 2016 and will be implemented over the span of two years.

iv. Capacity-Building

Singapore has organised a number of training programmes to build up the capabilities and capacity of ASEAN law enforcement agencies to tackle the cybercrime threat. Singapore has continued to partner with the US to deliver cybercrime training at the 1st Southeast Asia Regional Internet Crime Investigation and Prosecution workshop held in Kuala Lumpur from 3 to 5 February 2016. Singapore also co-organised with the US, facilitated by INTEPROL through the IGCI, the 3rd Singapore-United States Third Country Training Programme (TCTP)/ INTERPOL Southeast Asian Workshop on Cybercrime from 3 to 6 May 2016. Under the ASEAN Cyber Forensic Investigation Capability Project funded by Canada, Singapore organised the 2nd Training Session on INTERPOL's Tools and Services and Cyber Forensic Techniques in Singapore from 1 to 5 February 2016.

These workshops, conferences and seminars serve as a platform for knowledge sharing and provides training in cybercrime investigations to law enforcement agencies in the region. It also draws on the expertise from more advanced ASEAN Dialogue Partners and INTERPOL to enhance ASEAN's competencies in combating cybercrime. Singapore's current legal framework for International Economic Crime (IEC) is relevant and effective. Offences such as the possession and use of counterfeit credit cards and counterfeit currency are

adequately addressed by various provisions in the Penal Code. The Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act also has adequate provisions to deal with criminals who commit online card fraud or make use of devices such as ‘skimmers’ and computers to steal data from genuine credit cards and provide them to counterfeit credit card syndicates. Recent amendments to the Penal Code also updated various technical definitions and references in offences related to card fraud in order to deal with the issue more effectively.

In terms of public education, the Singapore Police Force has forged a strategic partnership with the credit card industry to generate merchant awareness in credit card crime prevention. Singapore Police Force’s Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) is also represented at the Singapore Card Security Group (SCSG), which is made up of various card-issuing banks and companies. The SCSG meets frequently to share fraud-related intelligence and develop joint strategies to prevent and counter card fraud related activities. It has also conducted several joint merchant education programmes targeting specific retail sectors. In close consultation with the Monetary Authority of Singapore and other agencies, the SCSG was instrumental in recommending and implementing effective measures to enhance payment card security, including the implementation of smart chip technology on all Singapore-issued payment cards, the implementation of two-factor authentication, and card activation of new and replacement cards.

As SOMTC Lead Shepherd for IEC, Singapore has organised two ASEAN workshops for International Economic Crime, with the most recent workshop held from 14 to 16 November 2016. The workshops were funded by the ROK and was attended by representatives from all AMS and the ROK. The workshop aimed to create a platform for

ASEAN law enforcement agencies to exchange information and best practices on the trends, patterns and challenges in combating international economic crime. One of the key deliverables of the workshop was the compilation and distribution of a list of focal points to facilitate information exchange, law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building in combating international economic crime in the ASEAN region.

Singapore also conducts an annual International Economic Crime Course (IECC) to equip relevant investigators with competencies required for the investigation of commercial crime. This course reviews the latest trends, threats and challenges facing law enforcement agencies in the area of commercial crime and seeks to provide an update on the latest development on white-collar crime. Twenty-eight enforcement officers from Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, the ROK and Singapore participated in the most recent IECC which was conducted from 6 to 10 March 2017. ASEAN Member States are invited to send economic crime officers who are proficient in English for this course. The next course will be held in 2018.

Singapore takes a serious view of trafficking-in-persons (TIP) crimes. An inter-agency Taskforce co-led by Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Manpower was formed in 2010 to coordinate whole-of-government strategies to fight TIP. The Taskforce works closely with the law enforcement agencies and embassies of countries that victims may originate from. This close cooperation ensures that reports of trafficking are quickly and thoroughly investigated. Information sharing and upstream enforcement against human traffickers also prevent other innocent victims from being exploited. Since Singapore’s National Plan of Action (NPA) was launched

in 2012, much effort has been made to strengthen policies and systems along a four-pronged approach of Prevention, Prosecution, Protection and Partnerships. The NPA was completed in 2015, which served as a roadmap to build capabilities to deal with TIP in Singapore. In March 2016, the National Approach against TIP was launched to build on the success of the NPA. The National Approach sets out key strategies and the desired end outcomes to guide Taskforce agencies and stakeholders when developing their work plans to combat TIP.

Singapore supports regional and international efforts to combat TIP. Singapore cooperates with other ASEAN States through platforms such as the AMMTC, which oversees the region's effort to combat TIP, and the SOMTC and its Working Group on TIP. Beyond ASEAN, Singapore also works with partners such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as well as the Group of Friends (GoF) United Against Human Trafficking in New York and Geneva, to find better ways to combat TIP.

One international agreement that Singapore had been working closely with other ASEAN Member States on is the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) and Regional Plan of Action (RPA). The ASEAN Leaders signed the ACTIP at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015. Singapore is among the first AMS to ratify ACTIP. The Instrument of Ratification was deposited with the ASEAN Secretary-General by Singapore's Permanent Representative to ASEAN Mr Tan Hung Seng on 25 January 2016. ACTIP has since come into force on 8 March 2017, as the 6th ASEAN Member State, viz The Philippines, deposited its instrument of ratification with the ASEAN Secretary-General on 6 February 2017.

Singapore is a party to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol). The UN TIP Protocol is an optional Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). It seeks to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons while protecting victims and promoting cooperation among State Parties. Singapore deposited a signed copy of the instrument of accession at the UN Treaty Event held in New York on 28 September 2015.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Disasters can affect any country without warning. As a good neighbour and friend, Singapore provides assistance where we can, participating in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions where we can make contributions that are meaningful and within our means.

In 2015, Singapore's overseas deployments and assistance included contributing a team equipped with water purification system following the floods in Kelantan, Malaysia, and a Chinook with heli-bucket for aerial fire-fighting efforts in Chiang Mai, Thailand and Palembang, Indonesia. Singapore also provided assistance to Nepal following the April 2015 earthquake, deploying: (a) officers from the Singapore Police Force and Gurkha Contingent; (b) a Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) Search and Rescue Team; (c) a Combined Medical Team with personnel from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Medical Corps and the Ministry of Health; and (d) a Disaster Victim Identification Team comprising SPF and Health Science Authority personnel. The government also contributed a total of SGD\$250,000 through the Singapore Red Cross, as well as donated medical supplies and relief

goods (such as tents, blankets, food) to the Nepalese government. In December 2016, SCDF also deployed two officers as part of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) to support the disaster management efforts of the Government of Indonesia in response to the earthquake in Pidie Jaya, Aceh.

Beyond participating in overseas operations, Singapore seeks to build regional capacity for HADR. As foreign military assistance can make a valuable contribution to HADR efforts, Singapore launched the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) in September 2014, to provide a platform for military-to-military coordination in HADR, in support of the military of a disaster-affected State. The RHCC seeks to provide value in the following three areas: (a) providing partner militaries with a comprehensive situation picture of the disaster impact, assessed needs, requests and offers of assistance, in order to facilitate decision-making and minimise duplication or gaps; (b) enhancing information-sharing and operational coordination for a multinational military response via its linkages with partner militaries; and (c) deploying a forward coordination unit into the disaster-affected State, to support HADR efforts on the ground. The Changi RHCC's focus on military coordination complements existing disaster response institutions – such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) – that support the disaster-affected state's government in coordinating the overall relief efforts. With Nepal's consent, the RHCC was able to deploy an advance team to support the Nepalese military and authorities in the wake of the April 2015 earthquake. The RHCC helped to provide the Nepalese Multi-National Military Coordination Centre and other

assisting militaries and agencies with a comprehensive situation picture for monitoring the disaster situation, assessed needs and forces deployed across Nepal. It also coordinated with partner militaries such as Brunei, France and Thailand on airlift and deployment arrangements, through their International Liaison Officers (ILOs) at the RHCC. Singapore is appreciative of like-minded countries that have come on board to support and partner with the RHCC thus far. These countries include Australia, Brunei, China, France, India, Laos, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, the UK, and Vietnam, which have attached International Liaison officers (ILOs) to the RHCC or exchanged contact points for disaster relief, while the US Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding for bilateral cooperation with the RHCC.

From 23 to 25 January 2017, the Changi RHCC/Singapore Armed Forces partnered the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the US CFE-DM to co-organise a multinational HADR Table-Top Exercise, Exercise COORDINATED RESPONSE (COORES) 2017. The Exercise sought to build military linkages, enhance mutual understanding and interoperability, and strengthen military cooperation in disaster relief. The Exercise saw participants from 18 militaries from across the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, and observers from 12 international organisations, governmental agencies, and non-government organisations (NGOs).

To promote dialogue and enhance cooperation in HADR, Singapore has assumed the Chairmanship of the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific for 2017. The RCG was formed under the ambit of the United Nations World Humanitarian Summit process,

to strengthen engagements between regional civilian and military actors and foster discussions on enhancing civil-military coordination in disaster situations. We look forward to hosting the RCG Third Session meeting in Singapore in December 2017.

Singapore strongly supports the establishment and operationalisation of the AHA Centre in Jakarta as part of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER)'s mandate. As a hub for relevant information and expertise exchange, the AHA Centre is a key coordination centre for regional disaster relief efforts to facilitate effective and efficient ASEAN responses to disasters within the region. Singapore's Changi RHCC is working closely with the AHA Centre to ensure effective coordination between the two Centres when responding to disasters within ASEAN.

Since 2015, Singapore has been hosting the annual Strategic Policy Dialogue on Disaster Management (SPDDM) to chart the long term strategies for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), sharpen ASEAN's policy direction, strategic engagements and thought leadership in disaster management. Singapore also supports the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, One Response: ASEAN Responding to Disasters as One in the Region and Outside the Region, which was signed by the Leaders in September 2016 at the 28th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane. The declaration is based on the principle of harnessing the individual and collective strengths of different sectors and stakeholders in ASEAN to effectively respond to disasters inside and outside the region.

E. Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Singapore has a strong interest in keeping the international sea lines of communication open, safe and secure. Singapore takes a serious view of any threats to the freedom and safety of navigation. To this end, Singapore works with like-minded countries to uphold the sanctity of international law, including UNCLOS, and plays an active part in fostering regional maritime security cooperation and the enhancement of port security.

As a major hub port and one of the top ten ship registries in the world, Singapore is committed to the security of seaborne cargo. In 2002, Singapore was the first port in Asia to participate in the US-led Container Security Initiative. As one of the first States to implement the International Maritime Organization's (IMO's) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Singapore has contributed actively to capacity-building programmes at various regional forums to assist countries in their implementation of the ISPS Code. Singapore is also party to the IMO's International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).

Given the existence of vital sea lanes of communication in the region such as the SCS, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait, Singapore has been cooperating closely with key stakeholders to uphold maritime security and freedom of navigation. To this end, Singapore remains fully committed to the following three principles which have gained broad consensus amongst regional stakeholders: first, that primary responsibility for the security of the regional waterways lies with the littoral States; second, the international

community, including major user States and bodies like the IMO, have an important role to play; and third, new cooperative measures should be developed in line with UNCLOS and other international conventions.

Singapore is also supportive of ASEAN's approach towards maritime issues as encapsulated in the Bali Concord II, signed in October 2003, which reiterates the transboundary nature of maritime issues and the need to address them regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive way. We also continue to participate actively in various ASEAN fora such as the ARF and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)/Expanded AMF, the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meetings, to address maritime issues.

These principles have been translated into cooperative efforts at a regional level. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is a joint undertaking by the littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, to enhance maritime security in the SOMS. The MSP comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" maritime air patrols and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Since its inception in July 2004, the MSP has been able to substantially reduce the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in the SOMS. The MSP celebrated its 10th anniversary in April 2016. The 4th MSP Exercise was held in Singapore on 21 April 2016, where members reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring the MSP's operational effectiveness, and test out their processes and linkages for information-sharing and coordination.

Apart from air and sea patrols, Singapore also believes in enhancing maritime awareness and ensuring a systematic and timely exchange of information to keep sea lanes safe. In this regard, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC),

which was established in 2009, seeks to advance inter-agency and international cooperation in maritime information-sharing through its linkages to operations centres around the world, as well as a network of ILOs from regional and extra-regional countries. The IFC's partnerships and the pooling of various information-sharing and analytical systems in one location has enabled the IFC to cue operational responses to a wide range of maritime security issues, ranging from piracy, hijacking, Search and Rescue, weapons proliferation or human/arms trafficking and smuggling. The ASEAN ILOs in IFC also serve as the Permanent Secretariat of the ASEAN Navy Chiefs' Meeting. As of April 2017, the IFC had links with international maritime centres and 69 operational centres and agencies from 37 countries, and a total of 121 ILOs from 23 countries have been deployed at the IFC since its establishment. In May 2017, the IFC hosted the 2nd ASEAN Maritime Security Information-Sharing Exercise and the 2017 Maritime Information-Sharing Exercise to advance information-sharing and sense-making amongst navies, coast guards and other relevant maritime agencies and operations centres.

Singapore is a Contracting Party to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the first intergovernmental initiative that promotes and enhances cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia and the host country of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) since it was formed in 2006. As of March 2017, a total of 20 States had acceded to the ReCAAP, namely, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the UK, the

US and Vietnam. The ReCAAP's expanding membership and network of partner organisations over the years are testament to the increasing importance attached to strengthening cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. ReCAAP celebrated its 11th anniversary in March 2017. Over the years, the ReCAAP ISC has established itself as an authority on trends and analyses of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, and continues to play an instrumental role in disseminating timely and accurate information for governments and industry alike. The ReCAAP ISC has produced quality analyses of trends in the region and increasingly collaborated with partner organisations and the industry to produce useful practice guides for the maritime community, including the Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia launched in February 2016. The ReCAAP ISC has also supported numerous capacity-building efforts to improve the capability of regional governments to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. In 2009, the ReCAAP was held up by the IMO as a model for the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (GoA). These achievements speak volumes about the success of ReCAAP as an effective model of regional cooperation.

Beyond regional cooperation, Singapore also shares the international community's deep concern over the scourge of piracy threatening key sea-lines of communications like the GoA. To this end, Singapore has been contributing to the multinational counter-piracy efforts under the ambit of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 since 2009, to secure these sea lanes for

everyone's use. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has deployed five Task Groups, comprising either one Landing Ship Tank with two Super Puma helicopters or a Frigate with a Naval Helicopter, as well as a Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the GoA. At the request of the Combined Maritime Forces, Singapore has taken command of the CTF 151 in 2010, 2011, 2013, and completed our fourth command of CTF 151 from March to June 2016.

IV. Role of ARF

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994 as an open and inclusive forum for Asia-Pacific nations to discuss key political and security issues. The ARF's evolution from Stage I Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to Stage II Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) mechanisms, after more than 15 years, is a significant development. It is a reflection of the ARF's success in engendering greater comfort levels among its members, fostering closer collaboration and candid dialogue as well as its ability to respond to the complexities in the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific.

The implementation of the PD agenda, in accordance with universally recognised norms and principles of international law, and in tandem with the development of CBMs, will ensure that the ARF moves ahead to address the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the region. To this end, while we should accommodate the comfort levels of all ARF participants, Singapore remains fully committed to the implementation of the PD Work Plan. Singapore co-hosted a workshop on "Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Conflict Environment" with New Zealand and Timor-Leste in April

2017 as part of our continued efforts to implement the PD agenda. We welcome and support ARF members' various proposals in this regard. The ARF should also continue its work in enhancing linkages between the complementary activities of Track I and Track II, as the latter is a useful avenue to explore ways to promote the ARF's effectiveness.

While there will inevitably be overlap among various fora such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus, these overlapping structures, with ASEAN at the core, reflect the region's diversity. A loose, overlapping configuration will be more resilient to external shocks than an overly-neat architecture that could prove brittle. Nevertheless, to ensure

their continued effectiveness, we can explore practical ways to improve coordination and information-sharing, among the fora, while respecting their various mandates. It is important that discussions on security issues in ASEAN continue to involve the relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies made up of subject matter experts who will be responsible for implementation and ensuring consistency with international standards and obligations.

Singapore remains fully supportive of the ARF process and its role as a key pillar in the multi-layered regional security architecture.



THAILAND

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing two important but divergent trends. On the one hand, there is continued economic growth. The projections for future growth remain positive, with the region expected to continue to play its role as a key engine of the global economy. On the other hand, there are growing tensions in parts of the Asia-Pacific region. There continues to be rising interaction amongst the major powers in the Asia-Pacific regions. Some of these interactions have created some uncertainties. In addition, there continues to be challenges posed by various non-traditional security threats. These include transnational crimes such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking and people smuggling as well as extremism and threats to cyber security, pandemics and natural disasters. Moreover, issues relating to economic security, water security and food and energy security, have risen in prominence. These challenges could impact on human security and undermine ongoing regional efforts to achieve sustainable development.

Under such circumstances, it is important to maintain effective cooperative arrangements that are anchored on mutual respect, trust and confidence, the rule of law, and shared interests. This will help enhance regional peace and stability. To

achieve this goal, enhanced cooperation will be required from all stakeholders, from both within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

ASEAN-centered Regional Architecture and ASEAN Centrality

Given the existing multi-dimensional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, and growing uncertainties caused by change and rising tensions in some areas, the regional security situation is now more fluid and dynamic than ever. To address such challenges, all parties must ensure that the regional architecture is resilient and responsive. Given the history of the region and its great diversity, the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, based on ASEAN-led platforms and arrangements, remains the key framework of cooperation to help maintain regional peace and stability. Such an architecture needs to continue to be inclusive and rules-based, and anchored on mutual trust and interests. This will allow all States to benefit from the regional architecture which seeks to ensure the peaceful management of change in the region.

The ASEAN-centered regional architecture comprises the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Plus Ones and other ASEAN-led arrangements. These provide platforms for key players

to engage in dialogue for the promotion of trust, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, and the establishment of rules and instruments to manage change and situations in a peaceful and effective manner. At the same time, the ASEAN-centered regional architecture is supported by shared norms and principles of international law, as embodied in key instruments such as the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), amongst others.

A major undertaking of the ASEAN-centered regional architecture is thus the promotion of an equilibrium in relations within the region, which includes ASEAN and its Member States, the major powers and other external parties that interact with Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Although ASEAN will play a central role in this process, effective partnerships with and participation of major powers and external parties will also be important for the effective functioning of the regional architecture.

Regional Security Environment

An area which continues to create tension in the region is the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past year, nuclear tests and missile launches in the Korean Peninsula have heightened tensions and raised grave concern. As a result, the region has become increasingly exposed to uncertainty and instability. Thailand thus joined ASEAN in strongly urging the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations arising from all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and international law in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, and in urging the DPRK and all parties concerned to exercise self-restraint in order to de-escalate the tension and

refrain from actions that may aggravate the situation. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is critical to the peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the region. There should be resumption of meaningful dialogue on the Korean Peninsula to defuse tensions and create conditions conducive to peace and stability. The peaceful resolution of the situation on the Korean Peninsula is important to regional peace and stability. In this connection, the ARF has a role to play in helping pave the way towards the realization of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula that enjoys peace and stability.

Challenges in maritime areas including maritime security, safety and cooperation, have become a priority, given the significance of maritime connectivity to regional prosperity. Therefore, it is imperative that cooperation is enhanced to address and overcome maritime challenges, since they can have adverse impacts on regional growth and development. In particular, the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) is of vital interest to the region and beyond. To ensure peace, stability and prosperity, the SLOCs must remain safe and secure, and we must implement measures to deter and address transnational crime at sea, including piracy and armed robbery of vessels.

Moreover, efforts to maintain peace and stability in maritime areas should be supplemented by robust measures to promote enhanced maritime domain awareness, intelligence and maritime surveillance, and the promotion of effective search and rescue in response to maritime disasters. These should be pursued on the basis of mutual interest and respect. The ultimate goal is to have peace and stability in maritime areas in order to have effective maritime connectivity that will enable economic growth and development to continue.

In relation to the South China Sea, there appears to be reduced tensions, brought about in part by better relations amongst Claimant States. There is progress with regard to a framework of a Code of Conduct, the implementation of the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) and the development of hotlines between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the ASEAN Member States and China. The overall trends look positive.

To maintain this positive momentum, all parties concerned must continue to work towards the enhancement of trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint and promote peaceful resolution of disputes on the basis of international law in order to ensure peace and stability. Moreover, all parties must continue towards achieving the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and work towards the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Freedom and safety of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law remains a critical shared goal as it promotes peaceful maritime commerce that benefits all States.

In the long-term, the South China Sea should become a Sea of Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development in order for the region to benefit fully from this important maritime area.

Non-traditional security challenges remain a pressing challenge to regional security and to national socio-economic development. The establishment of the ASEAN Community has led to growing integration between countries in ASEAN as well as enhanced connectivity amongst countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, criminals have taken advantage of such connectivity to undertake their illicit activities and engage in transnational crime.

Border management has therefore become an area of increasing importance for the realization of an inter-connected, integrated and safe ASEAN Community. The ultimate objective is the realization of an ASEAN-wide border management regime that coordinates timely exchange of intelligence and sharing of information that will better safeguard the region from transnational crime and other cross-border challenges including pandemics.

Regional efforts to fight trafficking in persons have been boosted with the entry into force of the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), with the 6th ASEAN country depositing its instrument of ratification on 6 February 2017. The Convention contains provisions relating to the prevention, protection, law enforcement, policy mechanisms and partnership building aspects, thereby strengthening the regional capability, and allowing relevant agencies to directly combat this challenge.

In addition to the protection of victims of trafficking in persons, particularly women and children, efforts must also be strengthened to address issues concerning other vulnerable groups to reduce the humanitarian consequences for the region. Amongst others, this includes the issue of irregular migration, where cooperation within ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as SOMTC, AMMTC and the ARF, must be strengthened to protect people stranded at sea, and those victims of smuggling networks, and to enhance law enforcement cooperation to combat these crimes while addressing the root causes of such problems.

With regard to the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, ASEAN had established the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (AMMD) which was initiated by Thailand to provide the political drive and strategic

direction for enhanced cooperation on this important non-traditional security challenge. In combatting this challenge, enforcement agencies must engage in regional and global collaboration to disrupt the operations of drug syndicates across borders in the region. In strengthening collaboration within ASEAN and with other partner countries, emphasis must be given towards further cooperation in gathering intelligence and conducting joint operations.

Another area which requires urgent action and commitment at all levels is the threat of terrorism and extremism. All parties concerned must continue to utilize various instruments, such as the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), to enhance regional cooperation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism within the region, address their root causes and promote the norms of tolerance, moderation and respect for diversity.

Furthermore, in this inter-connected world, terrorism and violent extremism and various transnational crime are systematically propagated through social media, attracting disaffected individuals from various regions, the Asia-Pacific being no exception. Therefore, it is imperative that regional cooperation is enhanced to combat the growing threat of cyber-terrorism and cybercrime. Emphasis should be given towards the enhancement of cyber security through an increase in networking and cooperation amongst relevant agencies to improve the cyber monitoring systems, the facilitation and sharing of information and technology, and the enhancement of the rules and regulations to equip law enforcement agencies with effective powers.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

In relation to Thailand's national security and defense policy, the Ministry of Defense has published its policy statement in an effort to promote transparency, and to enhance trust and confidence between Thailand and ASEAN Member States, as well as with other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region. According to the policy statement, the missions of the Ministry of Defense are outlined as follows:

- (1) To safeguard and uphold the institution of the Monarchy with His Majesty the King as the Head of State and the Highest Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, so that the Institution of the Monarchy remains as the center that harmonizes hearts and souls of the Thai people, and as the most important institution of the nation, and to accomplish this through making every effort in cooperation with other government agencies.
- (2) To enhance defense cooperation with neighboring nations, ASEAN Member States, friendly nations, and international organizations, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to support the arrangement of the security environment, the collective building of confidence, peace and stability, with focus on the prevention and reduction of conflict with neighboring nations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense aims to maintain a positive image of the nation within the international arena, and seeks to strengthen defense cooperation with the international community

through support for peace and humanitarian missions under the UN umbrella. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will initiate and develop a wider scope of military cooperation, and maintain the balance of relationships between nations in the region, and will seek to expedite the process of activities under cooperation frameworks between Thailand and neighboring countries for the survey and demarcation of boundaries, as well as support the integration of the ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN-Political Security Community.

- (3) To enhance the integration of strengths and capabilities with every sector by incorporating every aspect of national powers to support national defense. During peace time, the Ministry of Defense will utilize all resources for the benefit of the country, through a comprehensive approach in enhancing every aspect of national powers to support all operative missions for the security of the nation. This can be achieved by prioritizing support towards the urgent policies of the Government and the National Council for Peace and Order, especially on national reformation, the arrangement of social discipline, the restriction of illegal activities and the reconciliation of the people in the nation. Moreover, emphasis will also be given to accelerating the restoration of peace and safety for the lives of the people in the southernmost provinces, and for the security of their assets.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will utilize all resources to support the safeguarding of national interests, the national development for security purposes, and the provision of assistance to the people, especially on problems arising from disasters, epidemic and communicable diseases. Also, focus will be given to solve problems relating to natural resources and environment, water resource management, illegal immigration and other transnational crimes including arms, drugs and human trafficking, piracy, computer crimes and international terrorism.

- (4) To enhance the capability of the armed forces and the national defense system to ensure readiness for safeguarding the independence, sovereignty, security and national interests through both the preparation of force, and the use of force, by adhering to the principle of the maintenance of forces for self-defense purposes. Priorities will be given to the deployment of forces for joint operations, and the development of personnel for combat readiness. Moreover, efforts will be made towards improving proactive intelligence gathering to ensure timely strategic warnings and the provision of information for decision making. Furthermore, in enhancing the capabilities, emphasis will be given to improving joint logistics by utilizing the standard platform of military equipment, as well as other equipment with potential for effective utilization by each service, and also by

strengthening cooperation with the people to ensure that military missions are supportively carried out during peace time. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will seek to develop the reserve systems in accordance with military necessities, those of which include development of reserve forces for mobilization, military equipment and energy to ensure preparedness in responding to the nation's security needs.

- (5) To strengthen the defense industry through the integration of capabilities from both public and private sectors, and to capitalize on the cooperation between ASEAN Member States and work towards becoming self-reliant with regards to the production of the necessary military equipment. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense seeks to strengthen the scientific and technological aspects of its defense industry in order to achieve equal standards with those of other nations in the region, and to work with all sectors at both the domestic and international levels. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense aims to enhance the standard and the secureness of its information technology and communication systems, and to improve its ability to respond to the threat of cyber warfare.
- (6) To give priority to the provision of assistance to war veterans and their families to enable them to live in society with honour and dignity, and to enhance the morale of all personnel who had served to defend the nation. Also, efforts will be given to the

enhancement of the capabilities of war veterans so that they can contribute further towards national security.

- (7) To establish the appropriate structure for the Armed Forces and work towards the enhancement of the quality of personnel within the Ministry of Defense, through increasing their knowledge, skills, sets of morals and ethics, and to ensure that all personnel are equipped with physical and mental preparedness in carrying out their duties. Also, appropriate work will be given towards the improvement of the benefits of its personnel to give a morale boost for their work. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will ensure professionalism from its personnel, and support further integration with the population in all aspects in order to maintain national security.

In an effort to promote military cooperation and mutual trust and confidence, the Ministry of Defense has set out its immediate policies to use all existing security mechanisms at all levels to contribute towards regional security. With regards to its Immediate Policies for the 2017 Fiscal Year (1 October 2016 – 30 September 2017), the Ministry of Defense has set out to ensure regional peace, stability and security through implementation of the following policies:

- (1) To restructure and better the composition and deployment of troops along the borders in order to support the launch of the ASEAN Community and the establishment of the Special Economic Development Zones. Here, emphasis will be given towards the collective

readjustments of troop deployments, enhancement of the command and control systems, and the strengthening of the legal system by all authorities concerned.

- (2) To maintain and strengthen military cooperation with neighboring countries, ally nations and major powers, and to reinforce the strong ties with international organizations in order to address international threats through collective efforts. Amongst others, this includes ensuring preparedness for participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN framework.
- (3) To support the Government's undertakings to realize the priorities set out in the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, with particular focus on the political-security pillar of the ASEAN Community. The Ministry of Defense will aim to support the Government by placing importance on the strengthening of military cooperation with ASEAN Member States and other partners within and beyond the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense seeks to maintain a leading role in developing relations within the security cooperation frameworks, and in particular, in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for peace, stability and security. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense will give importance to participation in cooperation

frameworks which will provide opportunities for the armed forces of the region to engage in practical cooperation to promote mutual interests of participating countries and enhance capacities for the future, such as the activities of the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Counter Terrorism (ADMM-Plus EWG on CT), which includes the expansion of cooperation with other civilian agencies and international organizations to confront non-traditional challenges in the region.

- (4) To support related government agencies in solving immediate problems while maintaining Thailand's commitments to the international community, such as in addressing issues relating to the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), issues concerned with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean, forest encroachment and preservation measures, problems of community wastes, spread of droughts and addressing problems from haze caused by forest fires.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

A. Joint Exercise

Cobra Gold is one of the largest multinational exercises in the Asia Pacific region which has been held annually in Thailand since 1982. For more than thirty years, the Exercise has served to build trust and confidence, develop and strengthen capacity to provide humanitarian

assistance and natural disaster relief, strengthen military to military relations, promote defense diplomacy and international cooperation and stability in the region.

The 36th edition of Cobra Gold focused on addressing regional and global security challenges. It was held on 14-24 February 2017 in Thailand. More than 8,000 military personnel from 28 countries participated, seven of which (Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) participated in the main exercises. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) was participated by ten countries (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Fiji, France, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United Kingdom) while another nine countries (Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam) participated in the Combined Observer Liaison Team (COLT). In all, nineteen countries from the ARF, including some Member States of the European Union, were involved at the Cobra Gold 2017 in Thailand, thus contributing to the building of trust and confidence in the region, and to better preparedness in facing shared challenges such as natural disasters.

B. Peacekeeping

Thailand continues to attach great importance to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, as an effective means to achieve sustained peace in fragile situations. As of May 2017, 28 Thai military and police officers are participating in three UN peacekeeping missions, namely, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

Thailand has a comprehensive approach towards UN peace processes. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, are important tools for achieving sustainable peace.

Guided by these goals, particularly the SDG 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, peacekeepers and other actors on the ground can better understand and make better efforts in integrating their works related to peace and security with development and human rights, in order to better meet the needs of local people. On this front, we share the view that there is no peace without development, no development without peace, and neither peace nor development without respect of human rights.

Thailand also believes that peacebuilding and development measures can and should be undertaken throughout the peace process, in the early stages of conflict prevention as well as during peacekeeping. Thai peacekeepers – male and female – while delivering stability and secure environment to the conflict-affected societies in various peacekeeping missions, have done and will continue to do their part to help improve their livelihood and attain sustainable development.

Thailand recognizes the linkage and complementarity between Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and continues to seek ways to further promote and enhance the role of women in peace processes, including in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations as well as in post-conflict reconstruction. Thailand has consistently sent female military and police officers to join UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. The contributions of these female officers have been valued

because of their cultural and gender sensitivity when engaging with local populations, in particular in assisting female victims of sexual harassment and abuse, and for carrying out development projects, which foster self-sufficiency in conflict-ridden communities.

The Thai military has also been active in promoting enhanced cooperation within ASEAN and with partner countries on peacekeeping training. In this regard, Thailand has initiated and supports the development of an ASEAN network of peacekeeping centres and an Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to promote training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel. Since 2014, Thailand has become a platform for exchanging of expertise in peacekeeping among ASEAN Member States and allies from outside ASEAN. International instructors and participants take part in peacekeeping training and exercise in Thailand while many Thai instructors and experts are sent abroad to share their knowledge and experience with foreign partners.

Thailand also invests in language proficiency, both English and French, for military and police officers in order to raise profiles for their applications and to further improve their performance when they are deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the British Council and the Alliance Française, have co-organized English and French language training courses for the past five years and two years, respectively. Most recently, the English language course was conducted during September-October 2016 for 65 Thai military officers preparing to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

C. Counterterrorism

Terrorism continues to pose a serious security challenge to Thailand. The Government reaffirms its commitment to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations. In 2016, despite the fact that the country is safe from attacks, Thailand still faces challenges of being used as a transit point by violent extremism supporters to other countries due to its central location and connectivity within Southeast Asia. It is therefore necessary for the regional and international community to strengthen further their cooperation in counter-terrorism by exchanging information and intelligence, sharing of best practices and enhancing capacity building of front line agencies.

Thailand stands ready to cooperate with the regional and international community in combatting terrorism and violent extremism. At the same time, the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, lack of education, spread of radical ideas via social media, must be addressed in a comprehensive manner. In tackling these challenges, community, civil society, private sector, former violent extremist offenders and victims should be engaged.

While effective law enforcement and enhanced security measures must be maintained, steps have been taken to ensure that Thailand's response to terrorism does not undermine the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms that Thailand seeks to uphold. Thailand supports regional and international instruments, such as the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and supports relevant UNSC resolutions. Thailand also participates actively in various regional and international counter-terrorism frameworks such as the ARF, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Global Counter – Terrorism Forum (GCTF). In 2016, Thailand and the Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA) – the OIC’s subsidiary organ co-hosted the International Symposium on Interfaith Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence in Multicultural Societies, in order to promote better understanding among diverse faiths and cultures, and enhance interfaith partnership, which contributes to stemming extremism.

D. Non-proliferation and Disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Thailand is fully committed to disarmament and non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the regional and international levels. We believe that confidence-building measures are key contributors to international peace and security. Thailand reaffirms its policy not to develop, acquire or proliferate any kind of WMD and their means of delivery, in order to achieve the global goal of total elimination of WMD, and reiterates its support for all nations to pursue this common endeavour together.

In 2016, the new legislations on WMD-related anti-money laundering and terrorist financing were enacted, which would help fulfill Thailand’s obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, the draft legislation on export control system for dual-use items was approved by the Cabinet. It is now under the review by the Office of the Council of State and expected to be promulgated at the earliest opportunity. Furthermore, the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act B.E. 2559 (2016), which includes provisions that facilitate Thailand to implement international legal instruments on nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation in a more comprehensive manner, has entered into force since 1 February 2017.

At present, relevant Thai authorities are working on the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts on Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), as well as the accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment.

At the regional level, Thailand is committed to cooperating with other ASEAN Member States in preserving Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and free of all other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter. This joint commitment and common position of ASEAN Member States also contributes to disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD at the international level.

Thailand also supports the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM)’s roles. From 2014, ASEANTOM has been designated as a focal point to coordinate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on relevant nuclear issues. Since 2013, the Office of Atoms for Peace of Thailand has organized workshops within the ASEANTOM’s framework in order to enhance cooperation among ASEAN members in nuclear safety area. In 2016, Thailand and the Korean Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) co-hosted a Regional Workshop on the Environment Radiation Monitoring and Measurement. On 6-9 March 2017, Thailand organized the ASEANTOM Workshop on Capacity Building and

Strengthening the Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Network in the ASEAN Region.

At the international level, as a State Party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Thailand attaches equal importance to the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, Thailand has been an active player in fulfilling international obligations and cooperating with other friendly nations in advancing nuclear disarmament as required under the Article 6 of the NPT, as well as promoting nuclear security, including through international fora such as the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Thailand also attaches great importance to preventing WMD-related materials from falling into the wrong hands and has been cooperating closely with the international community in line with UNSC Resolution 1540. Thailand supported the comprehensive review of 1540 conducted in 2016, and also joined the Group of Friends of 1540 to reiterate our commitment to the full implementation of this Resolution and to contribute to international efforts in this matter.

Thailand is a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament and the Humanitarian Pledge, adopted in Vienna in 2014, based on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Thailand believes that, in order to attain and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be pursued simultaneously, and a people-centred approach should be taken in our joint efforts towards this end, in order to ensure collective security for all. Thailand's

commitment to nuclear disarmament is also in line with Article 6 of the NPT and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

In 2016, Thailand chaired the Open-Ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which adopted the report with a recommendation for the UN General Assembly to convene “a conference in 2017, open to all States, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination”. This recommendation led to the adoption of the UNGA resolution 71/258.

In this regard, Thailand welcomes the latest progress in nuclear disarmament in the UN General Assembly, particularly the UN Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination and its first meeting during late March 2017. This instrument will set a new international legal norm to prohibit and delegitimize nuclear weapons, and ASEAN Member States share the same view on how to take forward this multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation.

E. Transnational Challenges

On human trafficking, Thailand recognizes that the evolving nature and various forms of human trafficking are intertwined with issues of forced labor and irregular migration. Noting the impact on human capital and socio-economic development, Thailand attaches high importance to resolving trafficking in persons and related crimes through ASEAN and other regional mechanisms.

As a reflection of Thailand's zero tolerance for human trafficking, important measures are being implemented. These include conducting legal reform to close loopholes in human trafficking; fostering coordination among law enforcement agencies to end impunity and bring big time traffickers and trafficking rings to justice; adopting a rights-based, victim-centered approach to trafficking victims; and regularizing migrant workers and their children to reduce their vulnerabilities and prevent them from falling prey to trafficking networks.

In the ASEAN framework, Thailand welcomes the entry into force on 8 March 2017 of the ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), the first regional legally binding instrument to combat trafficking in persons. The ACTIP will help strengthen national efforts and regional cooperation to fight trafficking in persons among ASEAN Member States. Thailand has amended its Anti-Human Trafficking Act (B.E. 2560), effective on 28 January 2017, wherein the scope of protection has been expanded to cover vulnerable groups such as disabled persons and children, in line with the ACTIP. The National Plan of Action on the implementation of the ACTIP has engaged all relevant agencies and will integrate with the broader national efforts to combat trafficking in persons. Thailand stands ready to cooperate with ASEAN Member States and ASEAN Partners, through ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the SOMTC, AMMTC and the ARF ISM on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crimes, to ensure an effective front against trafficking in persons.

On partnership, Thailand has been playing an active role in supporting existing international, regional and sub-regional frameworks including the Bali Process, ASEAN, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized

Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNTOC), The Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative (COMMIT) and the Australian Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP). Our active participation in these regional and international frameworks not only expresses our determination in combating human trafficking, but also helps Thailand build its internal capacity. Last year, Thailand contributed 100,000 USD to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to carry out its information campaign. This campaign will be carried out in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The campaign, through animation and multimedia, will help disseminate information concerning legal channels for migration and prevention from falling prey to human trafficking networks.

Furthermore, Thailand advocates Public-Private-Civil Society-Partnership (PPCP), which is aimed at raising awareness of the importance of the human trafficking as well as to strengthen collaboration among relevant partners to tackle the problem in a comprehensive and sustainable manner.

Thailand is of the view that irregular migration is the joint responsibility of the originating countries, transit countries and destination countries. Shared responsibility and firm focus on eradicating root causes is needed to address the problem. Key solutions include concrete measures to develop the quality of life and to lower economic disparities and eliminate injustice on a humanitarian basis and in line with human rights.

Thailand's initiatives in response to irregular migration were welcomed by participating countries and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and were also reflected in the Co-Chairs' Statement of the Bali Process Ministerial Meeting in Bali in March

2016. These initiatives by Thailand, as shared by representatives from Regional Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) during briefings with relevant Thai agencies on 16 February 2016, are among key factors that helped reduce the number of maritime irregular migrants in the Indian Ocean from 31,000 in the first half of 2015 to 1,600 in the second half. The cooperation on this issue should be continued, to prevent transit countries from becoming breeding grounds for human trafficking networks.

The ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network, the ASEAN-NARCO Website and the ASEAN Airport Interdiction Task Force are important supportive tools in tackling the problems. In 2016, the first publication of the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Report of 2015 was launched during the 37th ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting on Drug Matters (ASOD), hosted by Thailand on 24 August 2016 in Bangkok. On 9-11 March 2017, Thailand hosted the 3rd ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network Operational Workshop in Bangkok. The 4th ASEAN Drug Monitoring Network Operational Workshop will be held on 30 July-1 August 2017 in Khon Khaen, Thailand. The preparation of the second report of the ASEAN Drug Monitoring of 2016 has been carrying out and expected to be launched at the end of 2017.

Addressing illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals in the Golden Triangle is one of the Government's priorities. A joint cooperation in the Mekong Sub-region, or "the Safe Mekong Operation Plan", between China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, Viet Nam and Thailand, has been established to stop illicit flows of drugs and precursor chemicals. The Operation has yielded positive results.

Currently, Thailand is in the process of improving and integrating the drugs laws under a single code. The drug law reform

is to ensure penalties are proportionate to their offences and alternatives to punishment and diversion measures for minor drug offences are encouraged. Thailand promotes the implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development (UNGPs on AD). We recognize the nexus between alternative development and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs). Central to both is "people-centred" approaches in addressing problems and meeting the needs of the people.

Under the ARF Framework, in an effort to strengthen cooperation to address the growing challenge of transnational crimes, on 6-7 March 2017, Thailand and the United States, with the support of the UNODC, co-hosted the Workshop on the Concept Development of the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC). The workshop focused on exchanging ideas and experiences on best practices in data and information collection, law enforcement coordination designed to combat transnational crime, especially illicit drugs and precursor chemicals trafficking. The workshop was one of the activities under the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transitional Crime 2015-2018, endorsed by the 22nd ASEAN Regional Forum on 6 August 2015.

Enhancing cooperation on border management is another important tool to strengthen regional capabilities to fight transnational crime and other negative impacts of enhanced regional connectivity. Thailand also co-hosted the High-Level Conference on Enhancing Cooperation on ASEAN Region Border Management: Ensuring a More Interconnected, Safe and Secure ASEAN Community, with the UNODC on 1-2 May 2017 in Bangkok, which generated concrete steps on how the region can effectively conduct border management and curb transnational crimes. The

ultimate goal is the development of a region-wide arrangement that facilitates timely cooperation on border management.

Another increasingly important issue is the challenge of cybercrime and the need to ensure a safe and secure cyberspace. Since its foundation in 2000, Thailand Computer Emergency Response Team (ThaiCERT), a member under the Electronic Transactions Development Agency-ETDA (Public Organization) has effectively responded to cyber threats, especially intrusions, malicious code, fraud and web phishing. Recognizing the importance of having norms in cyberspace, Thailand organized a regional workshop on this issue in December 2016 to raise awareness among ASEAN members and the application of international law to cyberspace. Currently Thailand is in process of drafting the National Cyber Security Policy Framework to integrate the work of all stakeholders. This will lay the groundwork for the Cyber Security Bill and allow relevant agencies to collaborate effectively with ASEAN Member States in exchanging information and organizing trainings and workshops with regard to cyber issues. At the regional level, Thailand supports the ongoing efforts by ASEAN to develop a regional strategy and plan of action to promote cyber security cooperation in the region. Initiatives such as the development of an ASEAN Centre on Cybersecurity, initiated by Thailand, and others such as enhanced networking and cooperation among ASEAN CERTs, will continue to be promoted.

Thailand attaches great importance to preparing against Communicable Diseases, Non Communicable diseases, Emerging Infectious Diseases and Chemicals Diseases caused by occupations and environmental pollution as they are one of main threats to human security. Thailand has

joined the regional and international community in finding ways to prevent and tackle these problems by regularly and actively participating in related meetings and fora such as the Meeting of ASEAN Working Group of Health Cluster 1: Promoting Healthy Lifestyle on Health Priority 4: Occupational and Health Cluster 2: Responding to all hazards and emerging threats for the ASEAN Post 2015 Health Development Agenda, ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM), in which in 2016 the threat of Zika Virus in the region was addressed and the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED), organized by the Western Pacific Regional Office and the South East Asia Regional Office of the World Health Organization.

E Maritime Security and Maritime Cooperation

Maritime security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region has always been about building trust and confidence as well as addressing mutual concerns and advancing shared interests among stakeholders in the region. At national level, Thailand is in the process of upgrading the Thailand Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Centre (Thai-MECC) into a Maritime Laws Enforcement Administration Centre which will be a particular government agency under the Office of the Prime Minister with augmented roles and greater authority in the management of Thailand's comprehensive maritime interests. The upgraded Thai-MECC has been authorized to command and integrate responsibilities of agencies concerned in order to respond to maritime challenges, including maritime crimes, in a timely and effective manner.

Addressing the challenge posed by piracy and armed robbery against ships remains an

important priority. In 2016, Thailand co-chaired the meeting celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) with Singapore and co-hosted a Regional Maritime Security Conference with ReCaap ISC for member countries and coastal states to exchange best practices as well as to address the gaps in legal procedures and other challenges. Thailand continues to participate actively in the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol and “Eyes in the Sky” air patrols.

On 15–16 September 2016, Thailand and the EU co-chaired the 3rd High Level Dialogue on ASEAN-EU Maritime Security Cooperation in Bangkok. These frameworks are mutually supportive and could serve to promote confidence building, enhance transparency, develop shared rules of procedure, norms and values, as well as develop SOPs in areas such as Search and Rescue, and enhance maritime domain awareness.

Thailand reiterates its firm commitment to combatting IUU Fishing. The Command Center for Combatting Illegal Fishing (CCCIF), under the direct command of the Prime Minister, was established in 2015 to counter this challenge in an effective and comprehensive manner. Thailand also works closely with foreign partners and international organizations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the ARF and other regional institutions, such as the South East Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) based in Thailand, to enhance its cooperation to resolve the problem. In 2016, Thailand acceded to the FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and it is expected to associate with the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) in 2017. Thailand is also proposing the development of an ASEAN Common Fisheries Policy that will promote sustainable fisheries in the region.

G. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) remains one of the most urgent cross-cutting issues in our region which requires urgent collective efforts to address. One of the key challenges has been to promote closer integration of efforts across ASEAN sectoral bodies, as well as between ASEAN and other regional frameworks such as the ARF, EAS and ADMM Plus. Closer coordination of efforts on HADR has in part been integrated with the signing of “The ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, one Response” in 2016, which underscores the ASEAN commitment to establish stronger coordination to ensure ASEAN’s collective response to disasters. In addition to supporting such efforts, Thailand has also been supporting an active role of the ASEAN Secretary-General as ASEAN’s coordinator on HADR issues, as well as stronger capabilities for the AHA Centre and other ASEAN tools to deal with HADR challenges. These were among the many issues addressed by the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief co-chaired by Thailand and the Republic of Korea in 2–3 April 2017, which also laid the groundwork for the preparation of the ARF Disaster Relief Work plan 2018–2020.

Thailand also attaches importance to having effective standard operating procedures, enhanced capacities and possible regional stand-by arrangements and modalities, and guidelines, including the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response – AADMER, the ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation, and promoting training operations between civil and military in the region. During the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, Thailand joined ASEAN in presenting a joint statement on “National,

Leadership and Regional Partnership for Resilient ASEAN” to place an emphasis on the cooperation among ASEAN members in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters in the region according to AADMER. Thailand has also been selected as one of the locations for a new satellite warehouse under the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN or DELSA Project and is working closely with the AHA Centre, the primary regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response, on this matter. In addition, Thailand and the Russian Federation as Co-Chairs of the Experts’ Working Group on Military Medicine (EG on MM) and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Japan as Co-Chairs of the Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (EWG on HADR) within the ADMM-Plus framework, organized a Joint Exercise between the EWG on MM and EWG on HADR (ADMM-Plus Military Medicine – Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise 2016: AM – Hex 2016) during 1-11 September 2016 at Chonburi Province, Thailand. This is considered an important milestone of defence cooperation under the ADMM-Plus mechanism that has continuously progressed. AM-Hex 2016 is intended to foster cooperation and to share experience, information and skills among military medics of the ASEAN Member States and Plus countries, while fostering capabilities of military units in the region through the joint operations within the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In addition, the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (ACMM) continues to play a role in supporting regional HADR efforts.

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and relevant global agendas including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are key instruments for a future that is sustainable,

less vulnerable to disasters, and conducive for social and economic development. Thailand has integrated them into broader national development policy framework and effectively implemented them under the guiding principles of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) at the local and national levels.

Thailand has also been playing an active and major role in the regional Disaster Health Management and Emergency Medicine, through the convening of the International Conference on the Implementation of the Health Aspects of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, held in Bangkok on 10 and 11 March 2016. The Conference adopted the Bangkok Principles for the implementation of the health aspects of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Project for Strengthening the ASEAN Regional Capacity on Disaster Health Management (ARCH) has strengthened ASEAN cooperation in this area. The development of an ASEAN Learning Centre on Disaster Health Management will help create greater access to effective medical treatment for victims in times of disasters and emergencies.

IV. Role of the ARF

As one of the main ASEAN-led mechanisms and an important component of the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, ARF remains an important forum to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interests and concern in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF provides an inclusive platform to discuss the increasingly complex regional traditional and non-traditional security challenges. The Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement as well as other current work plans under the respective priority areas ultimately contribute to

confidence building efforts in the region. The advancement of the ARF process toward preventive diplomacy, in parallel with the strengthening of confidence building measures, remains a priority of the ARF. In recent years, there is a growing number of initiatives aimed at building regional preventive diplomacy capacities, which should help maintain momentum towards realizing preventive diplomacy in the ARF.

Thailand is of the view that it is also important for ARF to develop greater synergies with other ASEAN-led platforms such as the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, as well as exchange best practices with other regional security organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Innovative ideas and recommendations of the Track 1.5 and 2 entities in the region such as the ARF Experts and Eminent

Persons (EEPs), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) can well benefit the implementation of the work plans under the ARF. There should be more interactions and dialogues between ARF and these regional security organizations as well as the Track 1.5 and Track 2 bodies in the region to find better ways to enhance CBMs and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Ultimately, the ARF remains a key component of the evolving ASEAN-centered regional architecture that is inclusive and rules-based, committed to promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, Thailand continues to support a growing role of the ARF in addressing effectively the regional security challenges, in a manner that promotes mutual benefit and respect.



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

For well over 20 years, the ASEAN Regional Forum has worked to advance stability and cooperation within the Asia-Pacific using open dialogue, tangible cooperation, and results-driven initiatives to find common understandings and solutions to uncommon problems. Nonetheless, traditional and non-traditional security concerns pose a challenge to peace and stability in the region, making the work of the ARF ever-more urgent. Through our participation in the ARF, the United States affirms its commitment to seeking consensus solutions based on respect for international law and shared values. ASEAN centrality plays an essential role in the ARF process, and the United States fully supports a constructive, action-oriented ARF with ASEAN at its core. Furthermore, the United States believes that clearly defined, proactive approaches in the ARF process will yield the largest benefits to regional stability. Therefore, we support the ARF in advancing its goal of implementation of Preventive Diplomacy measures, including through empowering the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). The cooperative results from ASEAN-centered multilateral fora and the application of Preventive Diplomacy principles to date show promise for the Asia-Pacific region and are indispensable to U.S. security interests. The United States urges all ARF participants to engage with deliberateness,

understanding, and vision to deepen our cooperation and advance peace in the region for decades to come.

Of great concern throughout the region, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) UN-proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile programs are a serious threat to international peace and security. We condemn the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The DPRK's continued failure to comply with its international obligations and live up to its commitments gravely threatens international peace and security and seriously undermines the global nonproliferation regime. The United States has made it clear that we will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. The United States, our allies, and Six-Party partners remain committed to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, which will continue to be the paramount focus of our joint efforts. While the United States remains open to authentic and credible negotiations, the DPRK must abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date to comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We will continue to hold the DPRK to those obligations and commitments. It is important that the DPRK realizes its current path will not lead to its objective of security and economic development, which can only be achieved by denuclearizing. We

continue to call on all Member States to fully and transparently implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK, and to exercise strict vigilance against the DPRK's proliferation activities and any other dealings with the DPRK.

The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific. The partnership built under this treaty has promoted seamless cooperation on a wide range of regional and global security issues, leveraging the presence of U.S. forces to respond to security threats. The close cooperation between the Japanese government and the United States in quickly responding to natural disasters demonstrates the importance of our relationship and our exceptional capabilities to respond quickly. We have taken steps to expand our security cooperation by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to ensure that the bilateral alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. We are also moving forward with the Japanese government to implement our military base realignment and consolidation plan. Progress on force realignment will help us to establish a geographically distributed and operationally resilient force posture in the Asia-Pacific region – critical to U.S. national interests. We continue to work closely with the Japanese government to address emerging challenges in space and cyberspace, and to strengthen our missile defense capabilities to counter threats from the DPRK. The U.S. commends Japan for its strong commitment to add the collective voice of the influential G7 nations to discussions on maritime security challenges, humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, global economic resiliency, climate change, cyber policy issues, global health system improvements, and human rights policies of the Asia-Pacific.

Our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is evolving into a global partnership, while continuing to play a key role in deterring aggression from the DPRK. The United States remains steadfast in our commitment to the defense of the ROK, and committed to growing the Alliance into a comprehensive strategic partnership based on common values and mutual trust. This past year's conclusion of a bilateral information-sharing arrangement between the ROK and Japan will allow us to work trilaterally for a more effective response to a DPRK contingency. The United States and the ROK also established a new policy-level defense trade dialogue, the Defense Technology Strategy and Cooperation Dialogue. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks enhance our ability to counter the DPRK nuclear and missile threat. The United States and the ROK are working together, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia. This collaboration includes peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts.

We continue to enhance our alliance with Australia through greater cooperation on shared regional and global interests, including countering violent extremism. The United States and Australia continue to work towards full implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives announced by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard in 2011. Rotations of U.S. Marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft in Australia's Northern Territory improve interoperability and capacity through opportunities to train and exercise both bilaterally and multilaterally in the region. The U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) – which met at the minister level in July 2016 – also plays a positive role in enhancing regional stability and

security. Officials from Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Hawaii in October 2016 for the annual Security and Defense Cooperation Forum, where they signed a Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement and discussed defense and security policies, regional capacity development, peacekeeping operations, maritime security and trilateral training and exercises. In addition, New Zealand and Japan participated alongside 30,000 Australian and U.S. troops in the 2015 Talisman Saber exercise, a biennial joint military exercise that promotes civilian-military cooperation and operational integration.

U.S.-New Zealand relations are the best they have been in decades, having improved dramatically since the signing of the 2010 Wellington Declaration. The 2012 Washington Declaration, signed by then-Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman, allowed greater flexibility in terms of joint military exercises and military educational exchanges. The November 2016 visit of the USS Sampson, the first by a U.S. military vessel in three decades, marked a new stage in the normalization of defense ties. The annual Strategic Dialogue is the United States' top-level regular policy discussion with New Zealand, and we began holding formal defense policy dialogues in 2013. The United States values its partnership with New Zealand in advancing the ARF's capacity to address regional security challenges through Preventive Diplomacy; New Zealand's leadership on this issue is critical to maintaining the ARF's effectiveness and relevance as a regional security body.

The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty continues to promote stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, with particular focus in our bilateral cooperation in the areas of maritime security, disaster response, counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, and non-proliferation.

The U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, supports a joint commitment to advancing mutual security interests by increasing our interoperability, supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines' defense modernization plans, and improving our ability to respond to natural disasters. The United States will continue to advance this enduring strategic alliance through high-level dialogues, such as the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. Opportunities for progress also exist where we share a common interest in expanding regional defense and security cooperation through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and other vehicles. The United States supports Philippine participation in joint exercises with other partners in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions, and encourages the Philippines to invite participation by neighboring countries in bilateral military exercises, such as Exercise Balikatan.

The United States and Thailand have been treaty allies for over 60 years and we collaborate to address humanitarian and security concerns such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, disaster relief, nonproliferation, and maritime security. The combined U.S.-Thai response to the Nepal earthquake in April and May 2015 demonstrated the value of this alliance in responding to humanitarian crises. The United States notes Thailand's commitment to hold elections as soon as possible and looks forward to its return to inclusive democratic rule.

As two of the world's largest democratic countries, the United States and Indonesia share a responsibility and an abiding interest to address strategic challenges as partners. In this spirit, U.S. President Barack Obama and Indonesia President Joko Widodo committed to forging a Strategic Partnership in October 2015 and to expanding cooperation on shared

strategic interests in the region. The two presidents pledged to strengthen collaborative efforts to address non-traditional security threats, including terrorism and violent extremism, natural disasters, illegal trafficking of wildlife, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, water security, and health pandemics. They also agreed to expand cooperation and capacity building in cyber space. In October 2015, Defense Secretary Carter and Defense Minister Ryamizard signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation that serves as a guide to expand future defense collaboration. The statement covers five pillars of defense engagement: maritime, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, defense modernization, and countering transnational threats. To build bilateral and regional capacity, the U.S. and Indonesian militaries also conduct regular exercises, such as the multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo in Padang, Indonesia. This annual exercise commenced in April 2016 and included 15 nations to emphasize naval readiness and cooperation of security efforts.

Singapore is a strong partner of the United States to strengthen regional and global security. A rotational deployment of United States' Littoral Combat Ships and P-8 aircraft is a symbol of deepening ties and a long-lasting commitment to Singapore. Singapore has been an active participant in global efforts to ensure peace and stability including in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and Gulf of Aden counter-piracy, where Singapore has twice commanded Combined Task Force 151. Most recently, Singapore pledged medical teams to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq and was the first nation from Southeast Asia to join the multinational response effort. Our militaries have strong ties and participate in several bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. In 2015, we further broadened our relationship

by re-signing a memorandum of understanding for the Third Country Training Program (TCTP), a joint ASEAN capacity-building initiative which has provided technical assistance and training – including on non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity and cybercrime – to over 1000 officials through 30 workshops since its inception in 2012. In August 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong committed to broadening and deepening our cooperation on digital economy, cybersecurity, internet governance, internet freedom, cybercrime, cyber defense, and regional capacity building. Both sides also expressed strong support for the new U.S.-Singapore MOU on cooperation in the area of cybersecurity. As a co-chair of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Counterterrorism along with Australia, Singapore plays an important role in facilitating regional efforts against violent extremism. We work closely with Singapore – the world's largest transshipment port – on trade security and counter proliferation efforts; in January 2017, Singapore began a three-year trial of the Cargo Targeting System (CTS). Lastly, the U.S. and the Government of Singapore supported an Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) Centre for International Law-Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (CIL-ANCORS) Maritime Boundaries Workshop in Singapore June 6-8, 2017. The event advanced EAMF participants' understanding of maritime boundary delimitation through a robust platform of academic instruction and cooperative dialogue.

The relationship between the United States and Malaysia has reached new heights in recent years, and the U.S. is eager to continue working with our Malaysian partners to increase regional and global security. A robust slate of

bilateral and multilateral military exercises has enhanced our respective capabilities to promote regional security and respond to humanitarian disasters. The United States values Malaysia's past contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and we are working closely on counter terrorism issues, including stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL. Malaysia is also an important partner in stemming the proliferation of nuclear materials. The United States looks forward to working closely with Malaysia in its continuing role as the U.S.-ASEAN Country Coordinator to advance our shared priorities and interests in the context of promoting regional cooperation, respect for international law, ASEAN centrality, and maintenance of peace and stability. In the ARF, Malaysia has played an active and strong leadership role on ICT and cyber issues.

The United States' relationship with Vietnam continues to expand and deepen, guided by the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership launched in 2013. President Barack Obama visited Hanoi in May 2016, marking just the third visit by a U.S. President since 1975. Against the backdrop of today's dynamic security environment, this trip was a watershed moment for continued efforts to strengthen relations. Through a healthy set of annual dialogues spanning issues from human rights to security and defense relations, the U.S. and Vietnam are cooperating in areas such as security, trade, nonproliferation, health, the environment, science and technology, education, and human rights. The United States and Vietnam signed an MOU on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011, and have continued to be engaged through U.S. Navy port visits – including the first ever at-sea exercise in 2014. Furthermore, our strong relationship with Vietnam has supported reciprocal political and military leadership exchanges. This includes a

State Partnership Program between Vietnam and the Oregon National Guard to explore further collaboration on HA/DR and Search and Rescue. In May 2016, the U.S. signed a Letter of Agreement with Vietnam on rule of law and law enforcement, which will expand Vietnamese law enforcement capabilities and strengthen the Vietnamese criminal justice sector's capability to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes. This supplements an LOA on maritime security signed by both parties in 2013.

Under an ambitious strategic partnership, the United States seeks to support India's rise as a responsible regional and global partner and the bilateral relationship has witnessed a dramatic surge since the inauguration of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May, 2014. Through an intensified series of leader-level summits and cabinet-level visits, an annual Secretary-of-State-led Dialogue, and more than 30 additional high-level dialogues and working groups ranging from defense, regional security, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping to trade, the ocean, health, cyber, and energy, the United States and India are collaborating to enhance livelihoods and sustain the rules-based global order. In recent years, U.S.-India defense cooperation has undergone a rapid expansion as part of a deepening strategic partnership. In 2015, India and the United States renewed a ten-year Defense Framework Agreement and in 2016 concluded the politically significant Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) to facilitate closer logistics cooperation. The U.S. Congress in 2016 designated India a Major Defense Partner. Bilateral defense trade has risen from near zero to \$15 billion since 2005. The 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region continues to provide a framework for joint efforts spanning the political, security, and economic

fronts, including maritime engagement, counterterrorism and piracy efforts. The two sides also held the first annual U.S.-India Maritime Security Dialogue in May 2016. MALABAR, our annual naval exercise, is now a trilateral engagement with Japan and has, in recent years, featured joint maritime reconnaissance, carrier operations, and anti-submarine warfare exercises. In 2016, the three countries launched a working group on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. India has twice participated in the Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. For the first time since 2009, the Indian Air Force and U.S. Air Force exercised together in the 2016 RED FLAG-Alaska Exercise and our annual Army exercise YUDH ABHYAS continues to increase in size and scope.

The United States is committed to pursuing a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China. We are the world's two largest economies, and share a responsibility to promote stability and growth. Our two countries should have a trading relationship that is fair and pays dividends both ways. U.S. President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in the United States April 6-7, 2017. The two presidents agreed to expand areas of cooperation while effectively and candidly addressing differences. The two sides noted the urgency of the threat of North Korea's weapons programs, reaffirmed their commitment to a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and committed to fully implement UN Security Council resolutions. They agreed to increase cooperation and work with the international community to press North Korea to dismantle its illegal nuclear and missile programs. Underscoring the need for high-level engagement to make concrete progress on key issues, the two sides established a Comprehensive Dialogue. It will be overseen by the two presidents and have four cabinet-level pillars: the Diplomatic and Security

Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue.

The United States remains committed to supporting Myanmar's transition to democracy. The National League for Democracy party's victory in the November 2015 election and the subsequent transition to the democratically elected parliament and government, which assumed office on February 1 and March 30, 2016 respectively, were historic diplomatic milestones. We support efforts by the Government of Myanmar and ethnic armed groups to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. We remain concerned about the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State and the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, including the Rohingya population. We are also concerned about ongoing clashes in Kokang, Kachin State, and Shan State, and support the peaceful resolution of these conflicts. With regards to security cooperation, the USNS Fall River visited Yangon in March 2017, marking the first U.S. Navy ship visit to Myanmar since World War II.

United States defense engagement with Brunei deepened recent years. In November 2016, the United States and Brunei participated in the 22nd CARAT exercise. The exercise featured shore-based and at-sea training events designed to strengthen maritime partnerships between the U.S. and Royal Brunei navies and armed forces. Scenarios focused on shared maritime security priorities, such as counter-piracy, counter-smuggling, maritime interception operations, and port security. In the past few years, Brunei has also co-hosted multilateral conferences with PACOM, including the 2014 Chiefs of Defense Conference, the 2015 Intelligence Chiefs Conference, and the 2015 Senior Officers Logistics Symposium (PASOLS). Relying on diplomatic and defense cooperation, the

U.S.-Brunei relationship aims to promote mutual security interests in Southeast Asia.

The United States has cooperated with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in areas of mutual concern ranging from international peacekeeping, defense reform and professionalization to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. In September 2016, the Cambodian government hosted a Bilateral Defense Dialogue with United States Pacific Command, and followed up with a Mid-Term Review in February 2017. The Royal Cambodian Government recently requested that joint exercises and English language exchanges, as well as some humanitarian assistance, be suspended until after elections in 2018.

Laos' 2016 chairmanship of ASEAN, and the concurrent signing of a Comprehensive Partnership between the United States and the Lao PDR, provided new opportunities for engagement. While we continue to address legacy issues, like the important Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) accounting mission and helping Laos manage contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO), we are building a new relationship for the 21st century. The many facets of our cooperation—which include health, law enforcement, trade, education, environmental protection, military issues, cultural preservation, disaster preparedness, trafficking-in-persons and illegal drugs, entrepreneurship, energy, rule of law programs, and more—address the country's most critical and systemic needs.

We are also engaging the nations of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam through the regional cooperation and economic integration efforts of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI focuses on technical capacity building for regional officials in line ministries working in the focus

areas of Education; Energy Security; Environment and Water; and Health. The United States also chairs a grouping of like-minded countries and international financial institutions operating in the sub-region, the Friends of the Lower Mekong, to engage with and support regional development. We do this primarily through our work together on a joint training platform designed at addressing the Lower Mekong countries' infrastructure policy needs. The goal is to strengthen ASEAN by raising the development level of the Lower Mekong countries and providing a venue for transboundary cooperation on their most pressing challenges.

The United States values defense cooperation with Timor-Leste in areas of mutual concern ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster response to maritime and border security to defense reform and professionalization. We held our annual Bilateral Defense Discussion in Dili in October 2016. In February 2017, the United States supported a Maritime Security Seminar in Timor-Leste with PACOM to help the Government of Timor-Leste define the missions of its military and police maritime forces to counter trafficking and the considerable losses from illegal fishing in its waters and enhance Timor-Leste's ability to play a role in regional military cooperation. In April 2016, Timor-Leste co-chaired an ARF Workshop on IUU Fishing in Bali with the United States and Indonesia. The workshop discussed efforts to eradicate IUU fishing, particularly by taking into account its cross-border nature and its close link to transnational organized crime. A Navy Seabees detachment in Timor-Leste works with Timor-Leste's armed forces on humanitarian assistance and education projects to support the country's development infrastructure needs.

The United States and the European Union are deepening collaboration with Asian partners to advance regional security and development, and to build regional institutions and support for the rule of law. We share common goals: promoting human rights, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and safeguarding respect for international law in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We are working together to encourage China to deepen its engagement with the international community, act in accordance with international law and standards, and participate responsibly in the global economic order. We are also coordinating our messages to condemn dangerous and unlawful DPRK provocations, uphold UNSC resolutions, and pressure the regime to address its egregious human rights abuses. U.S.-EU cooperation has also played a critical role in supporting Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition, for example, through joint sponsorship in March 2017 of a UNHRC resolution calling for the creation of a fact-finding mission. As we assess our interests and investments in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region, we look forward to expanding our coordination with the EU through the ARF and other regional fora.

Additional global security issues, such as transnational crime (drug, human, and wildlife trafficking), the security situations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremists returning from the conflicts in Iran and Syria, and global climate change, all continue to threaten regional and international stability. Many of these issues are transnational in nature and require concrete multilateral and national responses from ARF Participants. Results-oriented cooperation has proven to be the best

course of action for promoting peace and prosperity in the region. The continued strengthening and growth of the ARF's institutional capacity, enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships, and burden-sharing efforts provide the best solution to these security concerns.

II. National Security and Defense Policy

Throughout 2016, the United States continued its comprehensive engagement with the region through its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. As stated in the 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States focuses on eight primary lines of effort within national security and defense policy:

1. Strengthen our national defense
2. Reinforce homeland security
3. Combat the persistent threat of terrorism
4. Build capacity to prevent conflict
5. Prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction
6. Confront climate change
7. Assure access to shared spaces
8. Increase global health security

As the United States continues to pursue those eight lines of effort, it will continue to work with allies and partners to manage the challenges we see throughout the Asia-Pacific:

- The ongoing threat of the DPRK's nuclear weapons, proliferation, and missile programs and its defiant and dangerously provocative behavior;

- Longstanding disputes over territory, associated maritime zones, and resources, including in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
- The menace of terrorism and its transregional networks – including foreign fighters returning from and departing to conflict zones away from the Asian-Pacific region, terrorist financing, and violent extremist messaging. Addressing the problem of terrorist radicalization and recruitment is a fundamental component of a holistic strategy;
- To limit the spread of both homegrown and international terrorist groups;
- The great human and economic toll of natural disasters like the April 2015 Earthquake in Nepal, the 2015 flooding in Myanmar, and the 2016 Aceh earthquake in Indonesia.
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction;
- The global threat of pandemic disease that can spread around the world;
- Environmental degradation and the threat posed by climate change;
- Disruptive and potentially destructive activities by State actors in outer space; and
- Malicious activities by state and non-state actors in cyberspace.

Ensuring that the United States is prepared to prevent conflict requires a combination of defense, diplomacy, and development. These tools of statecraft enable the United States to strengthen the capability of its allies and partners to help preserve stability. The United States remains committed to retaining security capabilities to deter conflict, reassure allies, and if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. These objectives require the United States to be capable of responding to a broad range of challenges that are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities.

Resources:

The 2015 National Security Strategy: <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>

A. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

A broad range of data is publicly available from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/Budget2017/>

i. Total defense expenditure on annual basis

- a. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Total Defense Budget Request was \$582.7 billion, which is \$2.4 billion (about 0.4 percent) more than the FY 2016 enacted level of \$580.3 billion, to finance base and overseas contingency operations.

Figure 1-1.
Department of Defense Budget

\$ in billions	FY 2015 Actual	FY 2016 Enacted	FY 2017 Request	FY16-FY17 Change
Base	497.3	521.7	523.9	+2.2
OCO	63.1	58.6	58.8	+0.2
Total	560.4	580.3	582.7	+2.4

Discretionary budget authority Numbers may not add due to rounding

- b. The FY 2017 budget request is designed to protect capabilities that are most closely aligned with the defense strategy’s objectives to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The budget also maintains a ready force, continues to take care of service members and their families, extends enterprise reforms that control costs, and seizes opportunities to build the future force by developing new and innovative operational concepts and dominating technological frontiers including undersea, cyber, space, electronic warfare, and other advanced capabilities. In developing the FY 2017 budget and planning for future years, the Department supports progress toward achieving and maintaining full-spectrum combat readiness by all four Military Departments.

Further information regarding the DoD National Defense Budget can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf

ii. Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The budget for national defense was 3.2% of GDP in FY 2017.

Table 7-7: DEFENSE SHARES OF ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY AGGREGATES (Continued)
(Percentages of Indicated Totals)

Fiscal Year	% of Federal Spending		% of Net Public Spending (Federal, State & Local)		DoD as % of Public Employment			DoD as % of Total Labor Force		% of Gross Domestic Product	
	DoD	National Defense	Military & Civilian		Federal	Civilian Only		Federal	DoD	DoD	National Defense
			Federal	Federal, State & Local		Federal	Federal, State & Local				
2009 Base ...	14.0	18.8	9.0	9.1	25.4	3.1	3.1	1.4	3.4	4.6	
2009 Total	18.1	18.8	11.6	9.1	25.4	3.1	3.1	1.4	4.4	4.6	
2010 Base ...	14.6	20.1	9.4	9.4	26.3	3.3	3.3	1.4	3.4	4.7	
2010 Total	19.3	20.1	12.4	9.4	26.3	3.3	3.3	1.4	4.5	4.7	
2011 Base ...	14.6	19.6	9.4	9.6	27.7	3.5	3.5	1.5	3.4	4.6	
2011 Total	18.8	19.6	12.1	9.6	27.7	3.5	3.5	1.5	4.4	4.6	
2012 Base ...	14.9	19.2	9.4	9.6	27.9	3.5	3.5	1.4	3.3	4.2	
2012 Total	18.4	19.2	11.7	9.6	27.9	3.5	3.5	1.4	4.1	4.2	
2013 Base ...	14.7	18.3	9.2	9.4	27.4	3.4	3.4	1.4	3.1	3.8	
2013 Total	17.6	18.3	10.9	9.4	27.4	3.4	3.4	1.4	3.7	3.8	
2014 Base ...	14.3	17.2	8.9	9.2	27.2	3.3	3.3	1.4	2.9	3.5	
2014 Total	16.5	17.2	10.3	9.2	27.2	3.3	3.3	1.4	3.4	3.5	
2015 Base ...	13.2	16.0	8.4	9.1	27.1	3.3	3.3	1.3	2.7	3.3	
2015 Total	15.3	16.0	9.7	9.1	27.1	3.3	3.3	1.3	3.2	3.3	
2016 Base ...	13.3	15.3	8.6	9.9	27.1	3.3	3.3	1.3	2.8	3.3	
2016 Total	14.6	15.3	9.5	9.9	27.1	3.3	3.3	1.3	3.1	3.3	
2017 Base ...	12.7	14.9	8.4	9.8	26.7	3.2	3.2	1.3	2.7	3.2	
2017 Total	14.2	14.9	9.3	9.8	26.7	3.2	3.2	1.3	3.0	3.2	

NOTES:

Beginning in FY 2001, some labor force data are not strictly compatible with earlier data, due to population adjustments and other changes.

These figures are calculated from data in the OMB Historical Tables and the Economic Report of the President. Certain non-Defense data were not available past 2015.

All fiscal years 2007 and prior include any enacted war or supplemental funding.

Further information can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17Green_Book.pdf.

iii. Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population

Table 3-2: MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
(End Strength)

	FY 2015		FY 2016			FY 2017		
			Base	OCO	Total	Base	OCO	Total
Active Military Personnel*								
Authorization Request	1,314,110		1,305,200		1,305,200	1,281,900		1,281,900
Enacted Authorization	1,314,110		1,308,915		1,308,915		To Be Determined	
Current Estimate								
Army	491,365		475,000		475,000	460,000		460,000
Navy	327,862		327,300		327,300	322,900		322,900
Marine Corps	183,526		182,000		182,000	182,000		182,000
Air Force	311,357		317,000		317,000	317,000		317,000
Total Active Military	1,314,110		1,301,300		1,301,300	1,281,900		1,281,900
Selected Reserve Personnel								
Authorization Request	820,800		811,000		811,000	801,200		801,200
Enacted Authorization	820,800		811,000		811,000		To Be Determined	
Current Estimate								
Army								
Army Reserve	198,552		198,000		198,000	195,000		195,000
Army National Guard	350,023		342,000		342,000	335,000		335,000
Total Army	548,575		540,000		540,000	530,000		530,000
Navy	57,359		57,400		57,400	58,000		58,000
Marine Corps	38,906		38,900		38,900	38,500		38,500
Air Force								
Air Force Reserve	68,494		69,200		69,200	69,000		69,000
Air National Guard	105,728		105,500		105,500	105,700		105,700
Total Air Force	174,222		174,700		174,700	174,700		174,700
Total Selected Reserve	819,062		811,000		811,000	801,200		801,200
Total Current Estimate of Military Personnel Authorizations	2,133,172		2,112,300		2,112,300	2,083,100		2,083,100

* Does not include full-time Guard or Reserve end strength.

Further information can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_Green_Book.pdf.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

The United States remains committed to promoting peace, stability, and consensus in the region by supporting and participating in a broad range of activities, with a focus on the following regional issues:

A. Counterterrorism

The United States is actively engaged in multilateral and regional efforts to strengthen regional partners and allies and to promote continued cooperation on counterterrorism measures. The human atrocities and extreme acts of violence committed by ISIS are not isolated to the Middle East. ISIS has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to direct and inspire attacks in Europe and Asia, including the horrific attacks in France, Belgium and Bangladesh. It is critical that U.S. and coalition partners cooperate purposefully to counter ISIS and its violent extremist outgrowths. Southeast Asia is not immune to violent extremist influence either; therefore, the United States seeks to encourage and support strategic counterterrorism policies in the region. This approach places a premium on building the institutional capacities of states to promote the rule of law and eliminate the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

The U.S. is deeply concerned about ISIS's continued influence in recruiting followers from Southeast Asia, and the terrorist group's ability to inspire attacks in the region. We encourage ASEAN to increase information sharing on suspected terrorists, particularly by requiring the provision of advance passenger information and passenger name record (API/PNR) data on all airline passengers and by connecting all points of entry to INTERPOL's I-24/7 global police

communications system (I-24/7). To help prevent the use of fraudulent passports, the United States is prepared to assist ASEAN member states to automate reporting of stolen and lost travel documents to INTERPOL as part of a program President Obama announced at the Special U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Sunnylands, California in February 2016.

The United States encourages states to implement the UN Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, including developing national action plans to take a whole-of-society approach to combating this security threat. The United States works closely with regional partners at the United Nations and in regional fora such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and APEC to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and international instruments related to countering terrorism. The United States also cooperates closely with many regional partners in the APEC Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), which contributes to regional security by conducting capacity-building projects on issues including countering foreign terrorist fighter travel, strengthening border security, protecting critical infrastructure, and countering the financing of terrorism.

The United States also serves with the Russian Federation as the Co-Chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary partnership of 86 nations and five official observers, and its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. To advance its mission, the GICNT has conducted 10 senior-level meetings and more than 80 other multilateral activities, including workshops and tabletop exercises, across the GICNT focus areas

of nuclear detection, forensics, and response and mitigation. Japan hosted the 10th Plenary Meeting of the GICNT on June 1-2, 2017 in Tokyo, where the partners considered the outcomes of the 10th Anniversary Meeting, hosted by the Netherlands in 2016, and proposals to implement both new and enduring priorities of the GICNT community.

The ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan contributes to regional security through work in its priority areas – Illicit Drugs; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN); Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs); and Counter Radicalization. The United States is co-leading efforts to combat illicit drugs and CBRN, and we have been an active contributor to the 2015 ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs developed by Australia, Malaysia and Russia, and its cyber workshops. In 2015, the United States and Singapore co-sponsored an ARF workshop on cyber confidence-building measures (CBMs). In February 2017, the United States partnered with the Philippines to sponsor an ARF workshop on medium and long-term support for victims of terrorism. We aspire to see the progress made at both of these workshops continue in the future. Additionally, the United States is proposing two CTTC-related workshops; one on the topic of CBRN risk mitigation and another on aviation security and information sharing. In March 2017, we joined international governmental and non-governmental experts in studying cyber threats to the Asia-Pacific region and recommending to ARF actions to address these threats at the track 1.5 Cyber Workshop sponsored by The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

The U.S. Department of State works closely with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support its mission in protecting the United States by promoting effective aviation and border security screening with our foreign partners through enhanced information sharing. For example, an important effort in our counterterrorism work is Homeland Security Presidential Directive Six (HSPD-6), a Presidential initiative following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Through HSPD-6, the State Department works with the Terrorist Screening Center to negotiate the exchange of identities of known or suspected terrorists with foreign partners to enhance our mutual border screening efforts. HSPD-6 arrangements establish institutionalized operational mechanisms for the reciprocal sharing of unclassified, biographic terrorist identities between the United States and its foreign partners. Such arrangements enhance U.S. and foreign partners' border security by helping interdict the travel of known and suspected terrorists while further strengthening our counterterrorism cooperation at a strategic policy level.

The Terrorist Screening Center implements these arrangements with foreign partners. These agreements allow partners to namecheck incoming flights to their countries, which helps deter terrorist travel by creating an extra layer of security. HSPD-6 arrangements are a pre-requisite to participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). To date, the United States has over 60 such arrangements in place. The U.S. Department of State also works closely with its partners at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to strengthen global aviation security by engaging foreign partners in bolstering aviation screening at last point of departure (LPD) airports with direct flights to the United States to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding

commercial flights. The United States has also provided bilateral counterterrorism financing for capacity building assistance to several nations in the region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The United States continues to support the enabling of its partners and allies to secure the region effectively from potential terrorist threats.

B. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The United States seeks to create conditions that could allow for a world without nuclear weapons. We pursue this goal by relying on a shared commitment to uphold and strengthen the objectives and obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in all its aspects including disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in ways that are safe, secure, and supportive of the nonproliferation regime. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter potential adversaries and assures U.S. treaty allies and other security partners that they can count on the extended deterrence commitments undertaken by the United States.

The NPT remains critical to our common security. Although the April 27-May 23, 2015 NPT Review Conference concluded without adopting a substantive final document, NPT Parties uniformly expressed strong support for the Treaty and its role in international security. We sought consensus to ensure that IAEA safeguards remain effective and robust and to uphold the Treaty's integrity by addressing noncompliance. We also detailed our strong record on nuclear disarmament and our leading role in promoting peaceful nuclear energy. At the first meeting of the Preparatory

Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, which was held May 2-12, 2017, the United States and many other NPT Parties focused on the threat the UN-proscribed nuclear and missile programs of the DPRK pose to international peace and security and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The five NPT nuclear-weapon states (P5) have met regularly to discuss nuclear policy, promote mutual confidence, and discuss issues related to the fulfillment of the NPT.

The United States supports the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy programs in conformity with the NPT and believes that nuclear energy (when pursued according to international standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation) can be a viable source of energy to states looking to meet increasing energy demands. We maintain, however, that such efforts must be conducted in a transparent manner and in full cooperation with the IAEA. The application of nuclear technologies via IAEA technical cooperation programs can also stimulate development in the areas of food security, hydrology, and human health. We believe that adopting the IAEA's Additional Protocol (AP) to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is an important step that states can take to strengthen IAEA safeguards and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. We call upon all ARF participants who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the AP and, where appropriate, bring into force a Small Quantities Protocol based on the IAEA's modified model. We stand ready to help states build capacities to fully implement the AP. As noted in the November 2013 Joint ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Statement, the ARF also can play an important role in helping states comprehend the AP and overcome any challenges to its implementation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, as well as illicit spread of related materials, threaten the security of the entire international community. One way that the United States has supported regional approaches to addressing this global challenge is by raising awareness of the requirements of UNSCR 1540 and by promoting its full implementation in the region. The United States has taken measures to meet all of its obligations under UNSCR 1540, measures it continues to improve as witnessed in its submissions to the 1540 Committee. The United States has also supported efforts in the ARF toward this end and has promoted greater cooperation between the ARF and the UN Security Council 1540 Committee. In that regard, the U.S. was an active participant in the 1540 Committee's second comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540, which served as the basis for follow-on resolution 2325 (2016). The United States encouraged all ARF participants and the forum itself to contribute to the review and was pleased that a number of states participated in the process.

One international effort that helps states to meet the goals of UNSCR 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which, to date, 105 countries have endorsed. Many ARF participants have already endorsed the PSI, profiling their concrete commitment to regional peace and security to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials in the region. In a statement delivered to the 2016 PSI Mid-Level Political Meeting (MLPM) hosted by the United States in Washington, D.C. the U.S. noted that "PSI remains at the heart of efforts to achieve broader non-proliferation goals, constantly innovating to overcome new challenges and leading the international community in stopping WMD-related trafficking." Australia will

host the next event in the PSI Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER), Exercise Pacific Protector, in September 2017. This exercise plans to build on the momentum from the Singapore PSI APER Exercise Deep Sabre, the January 2016 MLPM and lead up to the 2018 PSI High Level Political Meeting in France, marking the 15th anniversary of the PSI. The United States encourages all countries concerned with the threat WMD proliferation poses to international peace and security to endorse the PSI.

Lastly, the United States supports the agreement among ASEAN nations to establish a zone in the region free of nuclear weapons, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ Treaty reaffirms the desire of the ASEAN State Parties to maintain peace and stability in the region and builds upon the obligations the SEANWFZ Treaty Parties undertook as non-nuclear weapon States Parties in the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other things, the SEANWFZ Treaty prohibits States Parties from allowing the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and the dumping of radioactive material in the zone, subjects that the NPT itself does not address. The United States and the other NPT nuclear weapon states welcome the efforts of SEANWFZ States Parties to work with the P5 to resolving outstanding issues with respect to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty, and remain prepared to sign the revised Protocol.

C. Transnational Crime

The United States augments the capabilities of regional actors and supports the region on a broad range of transnational crime issues. The United States conducts bilateral and regional programming to combat transnational crime under the auspices of international

and nonprofit organizations. For example, these programs include training prosecutors and judges to manage terrorism and transnational crime cases, instructing maritime interdiction skills, and training special anti-human trafficking units. Further, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand continues to deliver regional courses to ASEAN member states that trains law enforcement officials on key topics related to combatting transnational organized crime and criminal organizations such as counternarcotics, border security, and wildlife trafficking. In addition, the United States has taken steps to protect the economic interaction in the region against cybercrime and intellectual property piracy, and to disrupt the financial activities of transnational criminals and facilitators.

Narcotics production and trafficking are also challenges for all ARF member nations. There are vast networks of highly organized drug trafficking organizations that span the region and threaten regional and U.S. national security through their production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and precursor chemicals. The U.S. government supports partner nation capabilities by funding demand reduction programs and interdiction-training programs to ensure those countries can fight international drug trafficking and related criminal activities. In March 2017, the United States co-chaired a concept development workshop with Thailand on the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC) to explore the viability of establishing such a platform. The workshop underscored the growing need for information sharing and intelligence exchange among law enforcement agencies and other relevant agencies to combat transnational crime and agreed to next steps to 1) assess and strengthen existing

mechanisms for information sharing and intelligence exchange at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels and 2) to further explore the concept of a more comprehensive platform or center of information sharing and intelligence exchange such as the ATTIC.

Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion-dollar criminal enterprise that is a conservation concern and an acute security threat. The involvement of transnational organized crime in poaching and wildlife trafficking promotes corruption, threatens peace and security, strengthens illicit trade, destabilizes economies and communities that depend on wildlife for their livelihoods and contributes to the spread of disease. The U.S. government works to build law enforcement and criminal justice capacity to combat wildlife trafficking, reduce demand for these illegal wildlife products, and facilitate international cooperation to stop the organized criminal networks that traffic wildlife. In March 2015, the United States co-chaired an ARF workshop on combatting wildlife trafficking with Malaysia. This workshop convened policy makers and experts from the ASEAN region to discuss the threats from wildlife trafficking, address ways to reduce demand, and share best practices on the prevention and investigation of wildlife trafficking. We encourage the Ministers to endorse the establishment of a working group for wildlife trafficking. Once the group is formally established we look forward to exploring how we might engage in this effort.

IUU fishing has direct food, economic, and environmental security impacts on coastal communities and their nations' rule of law, which is particularly relevant in the Asia-Pacific region. IUU fishing is also a potential trigger for conflict in the East and South China Seas. To further the fight against IUU fishing, the United States is working with international partners to advance the Safe Ocean Network,

a global initiative launched in 2015 to improve global fisheries enforcement by strengthening efforts to detect, identify, interdict, and adjudicate illegal fishing activity and the illicit networks that support it through enhanced cooperation and information-sharing. A model of this type of effort and component of the Safe Ocean Network is the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI), a partnership between the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and local law enforcement agencies in Oceania. OMSI bolsters maritime domain awareness, increases law enforcement presence, and expands at-sea law enforcement capabilities by matching available Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement expertise and local enforcement authorities. The Safe Ocean Network supports the implementation of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' umbrella capacity-building program. The Safe Ocean Network mutually reinforces the U.S. Department of State's Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative and the Department of Defense's Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI).

The United States commends progress on the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), which entered into force on March 8 following ratification by the Philippines. With ACTIP in force, we urge all member states to follow the lead of those who have already ratified and promptly deposit instruments of ratification. We also encourage all countries to ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States and ASEAN enjoy a strong partnership on combating trafficking in persons – a partnership that we look

forward to continuing, including through proposals for future collaboration which we have presented to the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime. We are still committed to assisting member states in developing and implementing victim compensation schemes and funds, as prescribed under ACTIP.

In March 2016, ARF Participants that are members of the Bali Process took part in the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crime. The United States welcomed the Bali Declaration, which provided a new consultation mechanism to enable member countries to convene expeditiously in response to crises.

In June 2016, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative culminated in the launch of “Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster” in New York and Geneva. The MICIC Initiative was co-chaired by the United States and the Philippines, assisted by a working group of countries and stakeholders, including, among others, Australia, Bangladesh, and the European Commission. The Guidelines are the product of extensive consultations in 2015 and 2016 with a wide range of governments, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector; they are a voluntary tool that States and others can follow in situations where migrants become stranded because of conflict or a serious natural disaster. After the launch in 2016, the U.S. continued to support a MICIC Secretariat and capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia (as well as Central America) implemented by IOM Headquarters in Geneva.

The speed and efficiency of ICTs are of great benefit to commerce and development, but reliance on ICTs by any nation brings vulnerabilities. This

is of particular concern for national and regional security and economic prosperity – especially in Asia, where e-commerce is a significant and increasing portion of many developing countries' economic growth. In a disruptive national or international cyber incident, the lack of external observables of ICTs and the difficulty in determining the nation or entity responsible may lead states to act precipitously, with significant consequences for strategic ICT stability and international security. To reduce the risk of conflict stemming from lack of attribution, practical confidence-building measures are needed to enhance the predictability of state activities and reduce national security risks. This can be achieved by fostering transparency, increasing cybersecurity cooperation, and developing capacity within and among states. These practical measures in the form of CBMs can help reduce the risk of conflict.

In the interest of increasing ARF's budding Preventive Diplomacy role and promoting regional cyber stability, the United States supports continued ARF dialogue on enhancing international ICT stability via the 2015 ARF Work Plan on Security of and on the Use of ICTs. We support further institutionalization of cyber work within the ARF, the development and implementation of Cyber CBMs in the ARF and continued ARF discussion on preventive diplomacy's role in cyberspace. The United States will be cooperating with other ARF Participants on the development of relevant cyber workshops and projects in 2017 to support the ARF Work Plan.

D. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

ARF Dialogue Partners experience a variety of natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, as

well as manmade crises, including civil conflict, which often result in significant financial and human costs. In response to these events, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance to affected populations in the region, while simultaneously working to reduce disaster vulnerability in communities and building national response capacities. In FY 2015, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responded to seven disasters in five ARF countries, including complex emergencies in two ARF countries, Myanmar and Pakistan, and worked with agencies from across the U.S. government to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations.

In Pakistan, USAID/Food For Peace (USAID/FFP) provided \$57 million to World Food Programme (WFP) for food assistance activities in Pakistan. Out of this total, WFP used \$13.5 million to support the local and regional procurement and distribution of food and \$43.5 million for 'twinning'—the milling, fortifying, and distribution of GoP-provided wheat. WFP assisted over 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees in northwestern Pakistan, including highly sensitive and volatile areas along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The U.S. Department of State provided more than \$22 million to support health and protection programs for conflict-affected Pakistanis. USAID/OFDA provided nearly \$14 million in FY 2015 for emergency relief in Pakistan, an ARF participant since 2004. Furthermore, USAID/OFDA provided \$5.7 million of funding for Responding to Pakistan's Internally Displaced (RAPID)—a response fund used countrywide to respond to disaster and conflict-related displacement. USAID/OFDA supported livelihoods, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance to drought and flood-affected people. USAID/OFDA also provided

logistics, shelter, and WASH assistance to IDPs and refugee returnee populations.

In Myanmar, USAID/FFP supports WFP to distribute locally and regionally purchased food or cash based-transfers to approximately 172,000 conflict-displaced persons and other vulnerable communities in Rakhine, Kachin, and Northern Shan States. 146,000 beneficiaries are targeted with general food distribution and 26,000 beneficiaries will receive relief cash-based transfers in the areas with accessible markets and functioning cash infrastructure. USAID/FFP's support through WFP includes targeted distribution of fortified blended foods to children under five and pregnant and lactating women. In FY 2016 and 2017, USAID/FFP contributed \$13.4 million to WFP to support food assistance activities benefiting IDPs and vulnerable communities – including those affected by the Summer 2016 floods.

Since 2013, USAID/OFDA has provided technical support to the Government of Myanmar's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to improve center operations disaster response coordination and assist the Government of Myanmar's leadership with implementing a national disaster management system, which officially began operations in 2015. As a result, Myanmar's EOC has improved the quality and speed of disaster response in the country. When flooding and landslides struck Myanmar in July 2015, EOC staff implemented its newly developed disaster management system for the first time. The EOC enabled 24-hour emergency assistance, facilitated greater inter-governmental coordination than in any previous disaster, produced comprehensive and transparent situation reports, and expedited travel authorizations that afforded relief actors unprecedented humanitarian access. Additionally, the EOC pioneered the coordination of Myanmar government activities with the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance (ASEAN AHA Centre), the Myanmar Red Cross Society, and UN agencies.

To mitigate the effects of future disasters on vulnerable populations, the United States supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs aimed at saving lives; protecting livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure before, during, and after a disaster; and increasing community resilience to natural hazards. The United States supports regional and country-specific DRR programs. The U.S. Department of State and USAID/OFDA collaborate on the support the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management and the ASEAN AHA Centre by adding functionalities to the disaster monitoring and response system. Through the early warning system, ASEAN member states share information and support decision-making processes on policymaking, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. Instruction on the implementation of the incident command system by the United States Forest Service strengthens the decision-making capabilities of partner countries. Supported by USAID Regional Advisors in the Regional Development Mission for Asia, located in Bangkok, Thailand, this training focuses on building regional capacity through train-the-trainer courses that continued through 2016. In 2016, regional DRR support continued to help develop ASEAN-wide training standards and curriculum for disaster management training and convene a working group for disaster management training.

The United States sponsors and/or participates in numerous HA/DR-related exercises with regional partners every year, including the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, EAS HADR Exercise, the ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX), exercise

Cobra Gold with Thailand, exercise Balikatan with the Philippines, Gema Bhakti with Indonesia, and Angkor Opening with Cambodia. In addition, the United States sponsored Disaster Relief Exercise and Exchanges (DREEs) such as the Lower Mekong Initiative, which works to enhance multi-lateral coordination, communication, and cooperation among the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam to ensure flood response readiness in the Lower Mekong region.

The United States remains committed to developing ASEAN HA/DR capabilities and streamlining the ASEAN response mechanism. We believe developing and testing an ASEAN Military Ready Group (AMRG) SOP during this cycle as an important step in that direction. As part of the U.S. commitment to advancing civil – military coordination in ASEAN and throughout the Asia Pacific region, we recognize the need to further synchronize the defense efforts of the ADMM / ADMM-Plus with the civilian-led efforts in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and by the AHA Centre. We see this as a critical step toward realizing the vision of ‘One ASEAN, One Response,’ and we look forward to furthering these efforts during the next three years.

The Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions enhance regional disaster preparedness capabilities. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel strengthen relationships between civilian and military specialists from countries in the region to cooperate on medical and engineering projects and practice disaster response procedures. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force respectively recognize the effectiveness of establishing relationships and training before disasters. In 2015, the U.S. Hospital Ship Mercy conducting the Pacific Partnership mission visited Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Federated

States of Micronesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and Vietnam. Pacific Angel missions were conducted in Taglibaran, Philippines; Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam; and Goroko, Papua New Guinea providing humanitarian assistance; medical, optometry, and veterinary care; as well as engineering programs and other exchanges. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions also improve the ability of providers and subject matter experts from the United States working side-by-side with counterparts from other countries to prepare for and better respond to disasters, such as pandemic illness, typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. In 2015, Pacific Partnership supporting partners included Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Canada, Timor-Leste, Fiji, and France. Non-governmental organizations participating in Pacific Partnership include Project Hope, Operation Smile, Latter Day Saints Charities, University of California San Diego, University of Hawaii, Project Handclasp, and World Vets. Pacific Angel missions involve military personnel from New Zealand, Australia, France, the Philippines, Indonesia and Tonga. These two humanitarian missions underscore the United States’ efforts in the Pacific region to provide assistance and enhance disaster relief capacity.

Lastly, the United States is the permanent Secretariat of the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS). PASOLS provides a congress for senior logisticians to exchange and discuss best practices and lessons learned, review regional issues and initiatives, and exchange information that strengthen cooperation throughout the region. The majority of ARF participants attend the annual PASOLS Seminar. Heads and representatives of military logistics organizations from 28 countries took part in the 2015 PASOLS conference, including Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei,

Cambodia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. PASOLS aims to promote open dialogue for military logistics chiefs in the Asia-Pacific region to further build Supply Chain networks and enhance cooperation towards a more consolidated response to common security challenges, particularly peacekeeping missions. PASOLS' regional presence and logistics focus is an ideal platform for ARF Participants to continue dialogue and strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration of disaster response efforts.

E. Maritime Security

The Asia-Pacific region and its maritime waterways are critical to U.S. security and regional and global stability. Together with regional allies and partners, the United States strives to ensure that maritime Asia will remain open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. The United States focuses on three objectives: safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards.

The United States has, throughout its history, advocated for the freedom of the seas and sky. Freedom of the seas includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to transit through international waterways. It also includes all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace for military ships and aircraft as set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces currently do all around the world.

For 70 years, U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region has played a vital role in undergirding regional peace, stability, and security. We note several continuing trends, including rapid military modernization, growing resource demands, and territorial and maritime disputes, that have the potential to create instability in this region. Many countries across the region are significantly enhancing their naval and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capabilities. Although most nations are using these capabilities in a responsible manner, ongoing provocative actions continue to heighten tensions in the region and raise concerns. Actions such as the use of MLE vessels to coerce rival claimants, and unsafe air and maritime behavior, raise the risk of miscalculation or conflict.

The tensions arising from maritime and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific are deeply concerning to the United States. The Indian Ocean, East China Sea and South China Sea are all vital thoroughfares for global commerce and energy. Well over half the world's merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world's largest economies – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China. A miscalculation of an intended action, an unintended action, or incident could touch off an escalatory cycle. Escalatory actions, such as the landing of military and civilian aircraft or surface vessels at a disputed feature, greatly increase the possibility of these miscalculations and further destabilize the region. Additionally, confrontations between fishers and even law enforcement patrols are not unusual in these waters. Through all of this, it is important to lower tensions, turn down the rhetoric, and exercise caution and restraint in these sensitive areas. In the South China

Sea, we encourage ASEAN and China to implement the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), complete negotiations on a meaningful and effective Code of Conduct, and press for further clarification of claims in a manner consistent with international law, particularly, for maritime claims, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. In the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the degradation in China-Japan maritime security relations. We support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid a miscalculation or a dangerous incident.

Multilateral cooperation remains an important tool for ensuring stability and peace in the region. The 2002 DoC provided a framework for reducing tensions in the region. However, engagement through that process has been inconsistent, and friction over disputed claims to South China Sea territory and maritime space has further increased in the last few years. Although the United States takes no position on sovereignty over disputed land features, we take a position around the world that disputes should be resolved peacefully, without the use of force or coercion, and in accordance with international law. To that end, we urge claimant countries to conform all of their maritime claims to international law as reflected in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. As noted above, the United States supports the DoC and its collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve and peacefully manage their disputes. The United States encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolving disagreements, including the use of third party dispute settlement, such as arbitration, negotiation, multilateral fora, or other

peaceful international mechanisms. We further believe the ARF can help put in-place supportive diplomatic structures that lower tensions and help claimant States manage these disputes peacefully. This forum needs to play an increasingly important role in reinforcing international law and practice and in building practical cooperation among member states.

The U.S. is not standing still in light of the challenges in the maritime domain. There should be no doubt that the United States will maintain the military presence and capabilities to protect our interests and those of our allies and partners against potential threats in the maritime domain.

The U.S. Navy is pursuing a comprehensive strategy focused on four lines of effort:

1. Strengthen U.S. Naval capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed.
 - The U.S. Navy is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.
 - The U.S. Navy will increase the size of Pacific Fleet's overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent over the next five years to maintain a higher tempo of routine and persistent maritime presence activities across the Pacific region.
2. Work together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity.

- The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are building greater interoperability and developing more integrated operations, actions and activities with our regional allies and partners.
 - The U.S. Pacific Fleet is increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of their regional exercise program, with a particular focus on increasing the operational difficulty with Southeast Asian partners and expanding the multilateral exercise program.
 - The U.S. Navy has also implemented a Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2015. The initiative increases training and exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain awareness capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia.
3. Leverage defense diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road.
- The U.S. Navy is actively seeking to mitigate risks in maritime Asia, both through bilateral efforts with China, as well as region-wide risk reduction measures.
 - Recently, the U.S. Navy and China's Ministry of National Defense concluded an historic Memorandum of Understanding on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. This MOU currently includes
- annexes on ship-to-ship and air-to-air encounters.
- U.S. Navy and PLA Navy vessels have also successfully employed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) during recent interactions, which reduce risk in the region and demonstrate cooperativeness on the seas.
4. Strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture.
- The U.S. is enhancing its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, EAMF, and the EAS. The United States promotes candid conversations about ongoing challenges in the maritime domain, and encourages greater information sharing and cooperative solutions.
- In addition to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard lines of efforts on the seas, the United States regularly conducts maritime exercises with regional partners to build confidence and to enhance regional maritime readiness. Cooperative activities such as CARAT and RIMPAC foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. In February 2017, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) participated in the aforementioned OMSI with the U.S. Coast Guard's 14th District in the western Pacific Ocean. During the exercise, sailors had the privilege of working side by side with an elite Coast Guard Law Enforcement team. The team provided invaluable training to Murphy's Visual Board Search and Seizure team to include tactical team movements, tactical combat casualty care, and safe

boarding techniques. These are just a few of several engagements aimed to develop cooperation, promote common seafaring practices, and enhance mutual trust.

Additionally, the United States participated in its third Governors' Council meeting with the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) since becoming the organization's 20th contracting party (member) in 2014. The U.S. has been proactive in assisting the development of a ten-year strategy plan for the future of ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) to become a Centre of Excellence by 2020. The United States is also working with regional partners to improve the safety and well-being of mariners through the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training on Counter-Piracy (EAST-CP) program. The United States is enhancing the capacity of the coast guards, navies, and law enforcement and judicial sectors of partner nations to address not only piracy, but also the broad scope of illicit maritime activity ranging from illegal fishing to the trafficking of arms, narcotics, and people. Training and technical expertise is delivered through a variety of cooperative training programs supported by the U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, USAID and, as well as the Safe Ocean Network initiative to counter IUU fishing. The workshops incorporate the knowledge of technical experts in the maritime transport sector and regional survivors of piracy to address issues ranging from preparedness and survival, ransom negotiations, to post trauma care upon returning home.

IV. Role of the ARF

A. National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

The United States remains committed to building institutional capacity in the ARF and strengthening its role in the regional security architecture. Besides the many projects mentioned above, the United States seeks to increase the ARF's capacity to serve as a Preventive Diplomacy mechanism and action-oriented forum aimed to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The United States will also continue to work with ASEAN to strengthen and build capacity in the ARF Unit – a critical element of process sustainment and administrative protocol. A reinforced ARF Unit will benefit ASEAN members and all ARF dialogue partners as the engine of a credible and results-oriented organization.

Demonstrating U.S. commitment to ASEAN and to the ARF, the United States established a U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2011, and was the first ASEAN Dialogue Partner to create a dedicated mission to better assist and support this important security platform. The elevation of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship to a strategic partnership in 2015 and the Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summit in California in 2016 further demonstrate the strong U.S. pledge to advancing engagement with ASEAN and the ARF. Vice President Pence's April 2017 visit to the ASEAN Secretariat and announcement that President Trump would attend the East Asia Summit in November 2017 also make evident the new administration's commitment to growing and deepening the United States' relationship with the nations and institutions of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.

B. Future of the ARF

The ARF serves as a useful and increasingly capable venue for broad, multilateral cooperation and dialogue on a number of security issues. The ARF's inclusiveness, maturing commitments, and growing experience position it to achieve success on a targeted agenda that addresses common issues of interest for all participants. Since the ARF's inception in 1994, the confidence-building measures that have characterized ARF engagement have facilitated greater trust among its participants. However, participants now should take deliberate steps toward shaping the ARF into an institution that faces important security challenges head-on, with the capability to conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Furthermore, the escalation in coercion and the militarization by ARF participant governments highlight the urgent need for the ARF to go beyond just providing confidence-building measures. In this regard, the United States supports efforts to develop the ARF's Preventive Diplomacy capability together with the AIPR, which would move the ARF one step closer toward its ultimate goal of becoming a regional Conflict Resolution body.

As stated in the opening paragraph, ASEAN centrality and leadership are critical to the future of the ARF. As ASEAN achieves greater integration, it will play an even more influential role in addressing regional and global political-security issues. Although ASEAN already demonstrates leadership on many issues, such as pandemic disease, climate change, IUU fishing, foreign terrorist fighters, and peacekeeping operations, it will need to continue to shape the ARF into a robust institution.

It is important to highlight the context of the ARF as one element of a broader regional security architecture that includes the EAS, ADMM-Plus, and EAMF. The United States is committed to continuing its engagement to help shape a robust and coherent architecture in the Asia-Pacific region – including a key role for the ARF in promoting stability and prosperity – through a transparent and inclusive process. Developing rules-based frameworks for dialogue and cooperation will help maintain stability and economic growth while resolving disputes through diplomacy are especially important in a region facing territorial and maritime disputes, political transformation, political and civil unrest, the challenges of climate change, and natural disasters. The United States is committed to building on its active and enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific region and working with its partners to support the ARF as an effective mechanism for confronting transnational security issues troubling the region today.



VIET NAM

I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

It is evident that the Asia-Pacific region remains still a bright spot in the world economy. The regional security environment, nonetheless, has witnessed complicated developments and encountered a number of potential traditional and non-traditional security threats.

Competition among major powers in Asia-Pacific has been increasing. Besides the heightened US-China strategic power competition, other countries such as Australia, India, and Japan have also stepped up their engagement in the region. The engagement of major powers, on one hand, could facilitate regional cooperation to address common security challenges. On the other hand, this could lead to possible confrontation among major powers and unwanted consequences for the regional security architecture. Furthermore, political unrest has spurred in some countries. Non-traditional security issues such as natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes, food security, and climate change on the rise at an unprecedented level are threatening the regional security.

The situation in Northeast Asia continues to be complex and unpredictable with the conduct of various nuclear and missile tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; tension between

China and Japan related to sovereignty disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island; and the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) of the US in the Republic of Korea.

Generally, Southeast Asia remains peaceful and stable. Countries in the region continue their efforts to maintain political and social stability in order to facilitate national economic growth as well as regional integration. The year 2017 marks the 2nd year of the ASEAN Community. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia is also facing various security problems, especially non-traditional ones. Remarkably, the rise of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia has further complicated the regional security environment. Besides, territorial disputes in the East Sea/South China Sea remains a regional flashpoint that entails potential risks of conflict.

Against this context, it is essential for ASEAN as a Community to enhance its capability and responsibility in maintaining regional peace, security, and stability. The key task of ASEAN at present is strengthening its unity and centrality. In addition, ASEAN also needs to advance efforts to develop a rules-based regional architecture on the basis of respect for international law and norms as well as the basic principles of ASEAN. Among others, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) remains a primary ASEAN-led regional forum to promote confidence-building,

preventive diplomacy and cooperation to address regional security challenges.

Although the international community has made important joint efforts in preventing and combating terrorism in the past years, the world has continued to witness complicated developments related to terrorism and radical violence and separatism. Terrorism has spread to all continents, posing imminent threats to peace and stability and causing serious consequences.

South East Asia is becoming a terrorist belt and witnessing signs of outbreaks as a terrorist hotspot. Reasons for increasing terrorism in South East Asia include the following: (1) The IS is facing difficulties in the Middle East due to attacks launched by Russia and US-led alliance. The IS, therefore, is seeking to spread activities to other regions. (2) Ideology of secession and autonomy in ethnic minorities, together with contradictions and religious, sectarian conflicts and historical problems in some countries have led to the establishment of many terrorist organizations in the region. (3) Policy on religious freedom and equality among ethnic minorities adopted by governments of some countries has been insufficient. Consequently, they are highly prone to influence and instigation by radical terrorists. (4) International globalization and integration, together with scientific and technical development, have created favorable conditions for terrorists to propagandize radical Islamic ideology.

In the coming time, international terrorism and radical violence and separatism will continue to see complicated developments. Ethnic and religious issues, income disparity, economic crisis, coups d'état, rebellions and overthrowing may also incite outbreaks of terrorist and separatist movements at certain times. Rapid IT advancements will also

create favorable conditions for terrorist, extremist and separatist groups to recruit members, build forces and propagandize extremist ideology, messages and orders to stage terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, international and regional cooperation against terrorism and violence will face difficulties due to differences among countries in terms of perceptions and approaches.

The situation in the South China Sea has undergone complex developments recently with the increase of activities to reinforce maritime claims in disputed areas and the escalation of militarization, which have threatened to undermine regional peace and stability. Particularly, massive land reclamation have changed the status-quo, affected the marine environment, and threatened maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation and overflight in the area. These activities have seriously violated the territorial integrity, sovereign rights and national jurisdiction of other countries in the South China Sea, as well as the relevant principles and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), lowering the level of political trust and having negative impacts on the relations among countries in the region.

Regarding the South China Sea issue, Viet Nam's consistent position is to respect the sovereign rights and national jurisdiction of coastal states over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Viet Nam supports the resolution of disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful means in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS 1982, full and effective implementation of the DOC and early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) in order to maintain regional peace and stability.

II. National Security and Defence Policy of Viet Nam

A. Overview of Defence Policy

Viet Nam always gives the highest priority to the maintenance of a peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development. As such, Viet Nam has pursued a national defense policy of peace and self-defense that is guided by the principle of not using force or threatening to use of force in international relations, and resolving differences and disputes with other countries through peaceful means in accordance with international law. In this regard, Viet Nam advocates the gradual modernization of the Viet Nam People's Army (VPA) and enhancement of defence capability at a level sufficient for self-defense and is opposed to any arms race.

B. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

Viet Nam has allocated a necessary portion of the State budget for defense requirements and for maintaining the existing equipment and facilities. At present, annual average defence expenditure account for 2.1% of the GDP.

The total strength of the VPA, including regular forces and local forces, is about 450,000 person. The regular forces consist of three services: Ground Forces, Air Defence – Air Force, and Navy. Besides these forces, the VPA maintains the Border Guard and the Militia and Self-defence Force.

III. Viet Nam's contribution to Regional Security

A. Counterterrorism

Although there have been no international terrorist attacks in Viet Nam, Viet Nam's counter-terrorism forces have been active in preventing possible terrorist activities as well as in enhancing international cooperation.

Viet Nam has actively taken part in multilateral and regional efforts to develop and strengthen regional cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. In addition, Viet Nameese counter-terrorism forces have strengthened their bilateral cooperation with ARF member countries to share information on terrorism threats and strengthen the capacity of counter-terrorism officers. Viet Nam cooperated with the United States to organize: (1) Southeast Asia Regional Counter Terrorism Conference in March 2017 in Viet Nam, and (2) two training courses on prevention and reduction of weapons of mass destruction for law enforcement officers in Viet Nam.

In 2016, Viet Nam, together with some other ASEAN Member States, participated in operations launched by the INTERPOL such as Project WATCHMAKER, SUNBIRD which aimed to detect and arrest terrorists at border gates. In the coming time, Viet Nam will pursue the initiative in establishing a data bank on international terrorists and hope that it will enjoy the support of other ASEAN Member States and other partners.

B. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Viet Nam's consistent policy is to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, while ensuring nuclear safety and security, and in a responsible manner. Viet Nam supports the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful uses, as well as efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Viet Nam's Prime Minister attended the First Nuclear Security Summit held in the United States in 2010, the Second in the Republic of Korea in 2012 and the Third in the Netherlands in 2014. To fulfill its commitments, Viet Nam has actively engaged in and made every effort to implement the provisions of the Communiqués of the Summits. Since the Third Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, Viet Nam has enhanced its actions to ensure nuclear security and contributed to the global nuclear security architecture.

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Viet Nam participated in the programme of nuclear fuel conversion for Da Lat research reactor from using highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Viet Nam has successfully completed this task for its sole nuclear research reactor. All HEU have been returned to Russia. Viet Nam is completely HEU-free.

C. Transnational crime

Enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries in combating traditional crime is one of Viet Nam's key priorities in ensuring national security. In particular, Viet Nam is actively engaged in multilateral and regional efforts through platforms designed to strengthen continued regional cooperation on illicit drugs through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug

Matters (AMMD), ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters (ASOD), ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference (ASEANAPOL).

In addition, Viet Nam has made contributions to initiatives to create a positive momentum for cooperation in combating drug in the region, such as the new regional tagline "Securing ASEAN Communities against illicit drugs", actively cooperated with ASEAN countries to study and develop "the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing ASEAN Communities against illicit drugs 2016-2025". This Work Plan was adopted at the 5th AMMD in Singapore in October 2016.

Viet Nam successfully hosted the 6th AAITF Working Group Meeting in May 2016 in Hanoi. Viet Nam will organize the 38th ASOD Meeting in 2017 and the 6th AMMD in 2018. The hosting of these events indicates Viet Nam's commitment to preventing and combating illicit drugs for a Drug-free- ASEAN Community.

Trafficking in persons, especially women and children, is a major threat to countries in the region. Viet Nam has worked closely with the authorities of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and China to strengthen information exchange mechanisms, organize annual conferences and review implementation of bilateral cooperation agreements. Besides, Viet Nam has continued to implement the Australia-Asia Program on Trafficking in Persons for the period of 2014-2018 (AAPTIP). Viet Nam has ratified the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children and its Plan of Action, and is now working with other ASEAN Member States to ensure its effective implementation.

In order to enhance international cooperation in combating transnational crime in the region, Viet Nam is developing project proposals under the SOMTC framework, such as the proposed ASEAN Workshop on Asset Recovery and the ASEAN Workshop on combating cyber terrorism. These initiatives will be tabled at the 17th SOMTC in Lao PDR in May 2017 for comments and will be submitted to the AMMTC in September 2017 for adoption.

D. Maritime security

For inter-sessional year 2016–2017, Viet Nam, together with Australia and the EU, proposed the ARF Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, which was adopted by the Foreign Ministers in July 2016. As a follow up, Viet Nam will co-host with Australia and the EU an ARF Workshop on this topic in late 2017 or early 2018 in Viet Nam. Together with these two partners, Viet Nam will also co-chair the ARF ISM on Maritime Security for the cycle of 2018–2020.

IV. Role of ARF

A. Viet Nam’s contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security

As one of the founding members of the ARF, Viet Nam has actively contributed to the work of the ASEAN Regional Forum over the years. One of the most notable contributions by Viet Nam is through the development of the Hanoi Plan of Action to implement the ARF Vision Statement. Viet Nam has also co-chaired and participated in many ARF activities in the areas of preventive diplomacy, maritime security, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and

transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, and peacekeeping operations.

As a contribution to the work of the Track 1.5. ARF Eminent Persons and Experts (EEPs), Viet Nam co-chaired with Australia the 11th EEPs Meeting in Canberra, Australia. Among its key outcomes, the Meeting adopted the final report of the EEPs Working Group on Managing Incidents at Sea and recommended the establishment of an EEPs Working Group to examine possible cyber confidence-building measures. Viet Nam will continue to co-chair the EEPs with Japan and will host the 12th EEPs Meeting in 2018.

In an effort to revitalise ARF cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Viet Nam has proposed to host an “ARF Workshop on Peacekeeping Operations: Cooperation in Capacity Building and Developing Partnership with the UN” in late 2017. The proposal has been supported by all ARF participating countries and will be submitted to the 24th ARF Ministerial Meeting in August 2017 for adoption.

Viet Nam has been advocating close coordination and synergy between the ARF and other ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) to enhance their complementarities and efficiency.

B. Future of ARF

Over the years, the ARF has been a primary regional forum for dialogue and cooperation on security issues of common interest and concern. Through promoting confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy and forging cooperation to address security challenges, the ARF has made

important contributions and become a major component of the regional security architecture with ASEAN centrality at its core.

In order to maintain the ARF as an effective regional security forum, efforts should be focused on making it more action-oriented. While strengthening the confidence-building measures, ARF should continue developing common perceptions, building capacity and exploring concrete measures to implement preventive diplomacy, thus reducing tension and the risk of conflict in the region. It is important for the ARF to take on new and emerging areas such as maritime law enforcement cooperation, inter-operable activities to combat transnational crimes, and cooperation to address the emerging cyber security threats. In doing so, the ARF also needs to strike a good balance between both traditional and non-traditional security issues.

In defense–military cooperation, the ARF Defence official Dialogues (ARF DoD) has proved to be an interactive channel which provides effective support and promotes the above-mentioned measures. In 2016, ARF DoD focused on discussing Civilian–Military cooperation in HADR, Peacekeeping operations and cyber security. The ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) remains a platform for ARF Participating Countries to exchange views on regional security issue, clarify their defense policy and share experiences in dealing with security challenges.

There is also a need to rationalize ARF activities, especially with regard to HADR and Maritime Security etc. to avoid

duplication with ongoing activities under other frameworks such as the ADMM, ADMM Plus, ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).

In addition, information sharing on combating terrorism in ARF has become a demanding issue, which cannot be tackled by any single country. Viet Nam supports the work of the ARF ISM on CTTC in this regard and looks forward to working with other ARF participating countries in sharing information in the following areas:

- Updates on international and regional terrorist situation and new development trends of international terrorist groups;
- Money laundering and terrorist financing;
- Experience and best practices in preventing and countering terrorism;
- Terrorist and sabotage activities targeting diplomatic missions and citizens of Viet Nam in foreign countries and those of other countries in Viet Nam;
- Mechanisms for effective and practical cooperation against terrorism; and
- Lists of terrorists and suspected terrorists and their movement routes, to help ARF countries detect, monitor and combat them effectively.





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