





Our People, Our Community, Our Vision
MALAYSIA 2015



ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
**ANNUAL SECURITY
OUTLOOK 2015**



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MALAYSIA 2015

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
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Foreword

As Chairman of the 22nd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), it gives me great pleasure in presenting the ARF Annual Security Outlook 2015, comprising 19 contributions by members of the ARF.

First published in the year 2000, the ARF Annual Security Outlook serves as an essential instrument for the promotion of confidence building through greater transparency. The voluntary sharing of information and perspectives on political and security issues compounding the region, continues to strengthen mutual understanding among its members.

This is the essence of the ARF framework that we have been advocating since its inception in 1994. The ARF has certainly made a big contribution towards the sustained period of peace and stability, which led to greater level of prosperity in the region.

The year 2015 is a historic and a significant year for ASEAN as it is the year the ASEAN Community is to be realised. As Chairman of ASEAN and concurrently the Chairman of the ARF, we intend to work towards the promotion of regional peace and security through moderation as a shared value in addressing conflict and finding solutions to issues concerning regional peace and security.

I take this opportunity to express my deepest appreciation to all ARF Members for the sustained commitment to ensure the successful implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ARF Vision Statement as well as other related Work Plans in support of the ARF process.

Lastly, I wish to convey my sincere thanks to all members of the ARF for the support given in the publication of the ARF Annual Security Outlook 2015.

ANIFAH AMAN

Chairman of the 22nd ASEAN Regional Forum
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur, 6 August 2015



Executive **Summary**

Since the first publication of ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook (ARF ASO) back in the year 2000, the scope of publication and the depth of information shared have significantly improved. The number of annual submission has also increased.

The ARF ASO 2015 is a compilation of information and shared perspectives of 19 ARF Members highlighting political and security issues of common concerns compounding the region as well as the future development of the ARF. This publication is reflective of the role of the ARF as the primary forum to foster constructive dialogue and consultation among its 27 Members.

ARF Members shared the view that the comprehensive multilateral cooperation including through the ARF framework had directly contributed to the region's growth and prosperity. At the same time and recognising the increased interdependency of countries in dealing with security issues, ARF Members underlined the necessity to mount an effective and coherent international response to deal with the substantially more complex security challenges than ever before.

The contributions highlighted the traditional and non-traditional security threats faced by the region and called for strengthening of cooperation in order to address these challenges effectively.



Aside from maritime security and non-proliferation issues, ARF Members also highlighted the need to strengthen cooperation in the area of cyber security, understandably to counter the threat of terrorism and extremism which have become more sophisticated in recent times.

ARF Members also called for improved coordination and better management of resources to ensure complementarities of the various efforts in various regional mechanisms such as East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

The contributions are also reflective of the support of the ARF Members for this platform to be a more robust mechanism to promote regional peace and stability by becoming more strategic and action-oriented in responding to the need of the region. This would ensure that the ARF process, namely the transition from confidence building measures, to preventive diplomacy and ultimately to conflict resolution, continues to be relevant in light of the on-going discussion on regional architecture, with ASEAN at its core.



Australia



I. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A prosperous and peaceful Indo-Pacific region is core to Australia's economic and strategic interests. The best environment for the region is one which promotes strategic stability, open societies and economies, and economic integration. The region currently faces multi-faceted and evolving security challenge. These include traditional security issues relating to trust, maritime disputes, and changing power dynamics. They also include non-traditional security threats posed by terrorism, including foreign terrorist fighters, natural disasters, and human pandemics.

Constructive and forward-looking bilateral relations, particularly among major powers, are fundamental to addressing these challenges. For Australia, our alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of our strategic architecture. A strong and consistent US presence in the region will continue to be important in providing confidence in the region's changing strategic landscape as it has in the past.

Regional institutions play a complementary role in promoting a stable and resilient regional order. Australia appreciates ASEAN's leadership in establishing our existing regional frameworks.

ASEAN-centred institutions have played the key role in building trust and habits of cooperation amongst countries in the region. Given the geopolitical shifts in the region, more weight will be placed on these institutions in the future to help manage tensions and set the norms of acceptable strategic behaviour, in the region's collective interests.

Australia welcomes the work of ASEAN's 2015 High Level Task Force in looking at the future of regional architecture and its consultations with ASEAN dialogue partners. This year is the 10th anniversary of the East Asia Summit. We look forward to working with ASEAN to strengthen the EAS to help it address emerging regional challenges. We remain committed to ministerial dialogue and practical cooperation on security issues through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) process.

South China Sea

Australia has a legitimate interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Australia does not take sides on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea but is concerned that land reclamation activity by claimants raises tensions in



the region and calls on all claimant states to halt land reclamation. Australia is particularly concerned at the prospect of militarisation of artificial islands or structures. We are also concerned that all countries respect the right, under international law, to freedom of overflight in international airspace. Recent events underline the importance of states clarifying their maritime claims and resolving disputes peacefully, consistent with international law. Australia strongly opposes the use of intimidation, aggression or coercion to advance any country's claims or unilaterally alter the status quo. We urge claimants to exercise restraint, takes steps to ease tensions and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions. We call on governments to clarify and pursue territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and support the right of all states to seek to resolve disputes peacefully, including through arbitration. We encourage practical implementation of commitments under the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea and urge China and ASEAN member countries to make early progress on a substantive Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

North East Asia

With three of Australia's top four trading partners in North East Asia, Australia has a strong interest in a stable and prosperous North East Asia. It is also in our interests for our friends to cooperate constructively on areas of mutual concern. We hope to see the tensions arising from maritime disputes in the East China Sea reduced and resolved

through peaceful, non-coercive means, and in accordance with international law. We support the development of better means of military-to-military communication and preventive diplomacy amongst relevant countries, in order to build confidence and reduce the scope for misunderstandings.

Korean Peninsula

Australia is also concerned about the situation in the Korean Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to contravene UNSC resolutions in the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, posing a direct threat to international peace and security. This was highlighted by its dangerous firing of over 100 short and medium-range rockets into international waters during 2014, and its restart in late 2013 of a plutonium-producing reactor following its largest nuclear test to date in February 2013. Australia calls on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions. The DPRK needs to take sincere and concrete steps to show it is serious about denuclearisation before discussions of a lasting settlement, including the six-party talks, can resume with any prospects for success.

Ukraine

Australia is committed to preserving a rules-based approach to regional and international governance. Russia's intervention in Ukraine is a direct attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia's actions are clearly in breach of its international legal obligations including, most



fundamentally, the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force. Unilateral annexation of a neighbouring territory is not only unlawful, it threatens international peace and security, and affects our shared regional security perspectives. These are not the actions of a responsible member of the international community. Australia, together with ARF members, welcomes the 12 February Minsk II ceasefire and calls on all parties to fully implement the provisions of the agreement.

As the anniversary of the downing of MH17 approaches (17 July), the Australian Government continues to work closely with Malaysia and other affected nations to bring the perpetrators to justice. The criminal investigation being undertaken by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) is aimed at securing justice for the victims of MH17. The investigation is being completed to the highest standard, in accordance with international best practice.

Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa continue to be afflicted by political and security instability. The political situation in Libya remains very unstable, with the UN seeking to mediate political dialogue. The rise and growing presence of extremist groups like Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and Jahbat al-Nusra represents a threat to the region and the broader international community, including through terrorist fighters returning from overseas conflicts. Following attacks in 2014, Daesh gained effective control

of large areas of Iraq. It has committed a serious of abuse and atrocities against vulnerable groups, including women, children, and religious and ethnic minorities.

Australia remains deeply concerned about the nature of Iran's nuclear program. Australia supports the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran on this issue, and welcomed the announcement of a framework for a comprehensive nuclear agreement as an important step towards resolving the Iran nuclear issue peacefully. Iran must comply with relevant UNSC resolutions and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In support of broader international efforts to pressure Iran, Australia has in place UNSC sanctions, as well as additional sanctions under autonomous legislation.

Australia strongly supports the resumption of final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians aimed at establishing a just and lasting two-state solution, with Israelis and Palestinians living side-by-side in peace and security within internationally-recognised borders. Australia has repeatedly encouraged both sides to return to direct negotiations towards this goal, and to refrain from unilateral actions that are provocative and unhelpful to the prospects of resuming negotiations. Australia stands ready to assist in any way it can to support the efforts of the Palestinians and Israelis to achieve lasting peace, including supporting Palestinian development as a crucial component of a durable two-state solution.



II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

Australia's security and defence policy focuses on appropriate domestic policy settings, strong bilateral ties with countries in the region, including an alliance with the United States, and strengthening multilateral cooperation through regional and international forums. Australia's engagement in the region takes a whole-of-government approach, involving a wide range of agencies.

Supporting this approach is Australia's commitment to transparency in strategic planning. Australia will publish a new Defence White Paper in 2015, mapping out the Government's vision for Australia's defence strategy over the next two decades. It will underline Australia's continued commitment to contribute to regional security and defence capacity. Specifically, it will set out Australia's planned capability acquisitions for the coming decades, as well as planned investment in supporting infrastructure, personnel, training systems, logistics, and information and communications technology.

b. Date contribution to ARF Arms Register

Australia's 2014 fiscal year military expenditure, as provided to the UN in accordance with UN

Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures Guidelines, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL SECURITY

a. Countering Terrorism

Countering the threat from terrorist groups such as Daesh, al-Nusrah Front and other Al-Qaeda affiliates requires a unified response. Australia has taken robust steps to strengthen our counter-terrorism framework and intensify our counter-terrorism cooperation and capacity building with partner countries and international organisations.

In response to requests for assistance from the Iraqi Government, Australia has committed a military force as part of the US-led international coalition against Daesh. Our air force personnel are taking part in coalition missions in Iraq, including strikes against Daesh targets. Our defence force personnel are contributing to training in Iraq. These aim to build the capacity of Iraqi forces to reclaim and hold territory from Daesh. Australia's military contributions are in addition to air drops of relief supplies to vulnerable communities and a total of \$22 million in humanitarian support provided to Iraq since June 2014.

Australia is also working regionally with the United Office on Drugs and Crime to assist states in the implementation of UN Security Council



Resolution 2178, in response to the threat posed to international security by foreign terrorist fighters.

Countering Violent Extremism

Countering violent extremism is an essential element of efforts to deal with the foreign terrorist fighter phenomena. Australia is committed to working closely with ARF members, and through ARF mechanisms and multilateral forums such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), to strengthen our policies and capacity to prevent and respond to violent extremism. Australia participated in an ARF workshop in March on counter-radicalisation, co-chaired by Malaysia and Japan. Australia also had high-level representation at a Singaporean-hosted EAS symposium on religious rehabilitation and social reintegration in April. We are working with Malaysia on an EAS Leaders' Statement on countering violent extremism and have developed a concept paper, endorsed at the June EAS Senior Officials' Meeting. We continue to work with Indonesia to support the GCTF to focus on targeted activities addressing key challenges in the region, such as the management and custody of terrorist detainees in prisons. On 11-12 June Australia hosted a regional Countering Violent Extremism Summit exploring how countries can more effectively counter the appeal of extremist messages.

b. Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Australia is committed to comprehensive maritime security engagement

in the Indo Pacific region. We work closely with regional partners and through wider regional forums to enhance maritime security and promote habits of cooperation. Under the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Seafarers Training initiative (EAST), Australia will co-host with Vietnam in May a workshop for EAS members on trans-boundary maritime pollution. Australia is actively involved the ARF Inter-sessional meeting on maritime security and the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on maritime security. As part of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), an initiative that seeks to increase maritime cooperation amongst the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region, Australia has developed a working group structure to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information sharing and counter-piracy efforts.

Regional efforts have been effective in reducing the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea in South-East Asia. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has supported this work. After participating as an observer in ReCAAP Governing Council meetings for several years, Australia is pleased to have become the 19th Contracting Party to ReCAAP in August 2013.

Australia participates in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which supports counter-piracy efforts throughout the Indian Ocean, and in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Australia is soon to be represented on the Technical Groups being developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



(UNODC), specifically the Heroin Trafficking and the Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling Groups. The CMF Heroin Trafficking Group representative is a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officer. The RAN has also been an active member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) since its inception in 1989, which aims to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific among navies by providing a forum for discussion of maritime issues.

c. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Australia is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and regards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Australia strongly supports the three pillars of the NPT, and as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors also actively promotes the development and sharing of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Australia has long expressed concerns over the horrific consequences to humanity of a nuclear war and it is these concerns that have consistently underpinned our determination to work for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and a world without nuclear weapons. Australia believes that effective disarmament requires sustained, practical steps in a process that engages the states with nuclear weapons and addresses the security drivers behind those states' decisions to have nuclear weapons. They are the ones that ultimately will need to take the action to disarm. Australia

made these concerns clear at the Nayarit and Vienna Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in February and December 2014.

Australia and Japan co-founded the cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) in 2010 to help take forward the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcomes, in particular the 64-point Action Plan. As part of the process leading up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Australia and fellow-NPDI members have expressed concerns that the states possessing nuclear weapons must do more to meet their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT. The NPDI also submitted a comprehensive working paper to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which contained a broad range of recommendations for implementing the 2010 Action Plan.

Australia is also strongly committed to the prevention of WMD proliferation and welcomes any opportunity to collaborate with ARF participants on non-proliferation activities and to help meet commitments arising from UNSC Resolution 1540. Australia strongly supports the ARF's non-proliferation and disarmament activities and encourages countries in the region to adhere to and implement effectively the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and UNSCR 1540. This includes the application of export controls, for example Australia Group controls, as mandated by UNSCR 1540.

Australia is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which provides for the



exchange of information on and coordinated action to help prevent the transfer of materiel to WMD programs of concern. As a result, Australia welcomes increasing support both from regional states, and more generally, for the initiative to underline further the region's determination to prevent WMD proliferation, and significantly boost PSI participants' operational capacity. As a practical means of achieving this, Australia is an active participant in the PSI Asia Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER). Australia also actively engages with individual ARF partners on enhancing strategic export controls.

There is shared recognition in our region of the need for further action to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Australia's strong support for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) highlights our commitment to addressing this threat in the region and globally. Adoption of the ATT by an overwhelming majority of states at the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 was a clear demonstration of international support behind this treaty. Australia signed the Treaty on 3 June 2013 and ratified it on 3 June 2014. The ATT now has 130 signatories and 63 states parties; it entered into force on 24 December 2014. Australia urges countries in the region who have signed the Treaty to move towards ratification, and to engage actively in preparations for the First Conference of States Parties in August 2015. We urge those who have not signed to consider accession to the ATT. Australia is a major contributor to the UN Trust Facility to Support Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) to help support the treaty's

effective implementation, and remains keen to cooperate with and assist those in our region who are implementing the Treaty.

Australia is a strong supporter of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and has been a leading donor in clearance of unexploded ordnance from contaminated areas in the region, as well as risk education and assistance to the victims of landmines and other unexploded ordnance. Australia looks forward to the First Review Conference of the CCM in September 2015 and will continue to encourage the broadest possible accession to both Conventions, which now constitute established international norms with regard to these weapons. We applaud incremental steps towards compliance with the Conventions taken by some states in our region, such as suspension of production, moratoria on exports and destruction of degraded stockpiles of weapons.

d. Transnational Crime

People-smuggling

Australia remains committed to addressing people smuggling. The Australian Government has introduced new border protection measures under Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), a military-led border security initiative comprising a package of on- and off-shore activities designed to strengthen border protection and deter illegal maritime arrivals. To implement OSB, the Australian



Government has established an OSB Joint Agency Task Force, which brings together all relevant agencies under a single operational command; expanded offshore processing of asylum claims in Nauru and Papua New Guinea; and taken steps to reform Australia's refugee processes and access to permanent residency for illegal immigrants. The Australian Government has also entered into an arrangement with Cambodia for the permanent and voluntary settlement of people whom the Government of Nauru has found to be refugees. These measures combined aim to break the criminal people smuggling trade.

Australia is also co-chair of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process), and hosted the Bali Process Ad Hoc Group (AHG) Senior Officials Meeting on 6 August 2014. The meeting endorsed a forward program, focussed on practical cooperation to strengthen immigration management, refugee protection, border integrity and related legal capacity building and law enforcement measures. Practical Policy Guides to assist governments strengthen their legislation to criminalise migrant smuggling and human trafficking were also endorsed. Two new working groups have been established: Trafficking in Persons; and Disruptions of Criminal Networks Engaged in Trafficking in Persons and People Smuggling. These working groups bring together experts and agencies from member countries to identify areas for practical regional cooperation.

Organised Crime

Transnational organised crime poses a significant and increasing threat to our collective prosperity and security. The rapid pace of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region over the past few decades has presented opportunities for criminal networks to exploit, including in human trafficking, money laundering, corruption, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and wildlife trafficking. This undermines sustainable development, deprives governments of legitimate revenue sources and funnels tens of billions of dollars to criminal syndicates. The Australian Government is committed to working with its regional partners to strengthen responses to transnational organised crime, including through information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation and capacity building programs.

Australia works bilaterally with countries across the region (including Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Vietnam) as well as regionally, to strengthen legal capacity to combat transnational organized crime, including people smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, money laundering and corruption. In 2015 Australia will deliver a series of workshops in Indonesia focused on raising awareness of the use of new technologies and social media platforms by terrorist organisations and the opportunities for exploiting social media for intelligence and evidence to support terrorist investigations and prosecutions. Australia has also contributed to the establishment of the Asset Recovery Interagency Network - Asia



Pacific (ARIN-AP), a new, regional network to promote communication and cooperation on asset recovery between countries in the Asia-Pacific that will assist regional countries to 'follow the money'. Australia is chairing the ARIN-AP Steering Committee in 2015.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) engage in a range of activities off-shore to facilitate transnational crime investigations. The cornerstone of this activity is the AFP's international network, currently comprising 97 members deployed to 37 locations in 29 countries. This network collaborates with international law enforcement agencies bilaterally and multilaterally, including with EUROPOL and INTERPOL. The AFP currently has two officers seconded to the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore, respectively in the IGCI's Digital Crime Centre and its Asia and South Pacific Branch.

The AFP works closely with law enforcement partners in the Asia-Pacific region to combat transnational crime by providing support through the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, which consists of 18 Transnational Crime Units in 13 Pacific countries, and the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre in Apia, Samoa. Advisers in the AFP's Transnational Crime Units are located in the Pacific (Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands) and Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam) and focus on delivering capacity-building projects in the region. The AFP has also delivered a range of training programs in

the region, including at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Indonesia, as well as programs with the Philippine National Police and the Royal Thai Police.

Illicit Drugs

Conservative estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) put the value of the illicit drugs market in the Asia-Pacific region at over US\$30 billion. Australia is committed to working with law enforcement partners in the region to counter narcotics trafficking, including through cooperative transnational investigations and exchanges of information. In 2015 the Australian Federal Police will host two officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau in Singapore to facilitate exchange of information on transnational drug investigations and the operation of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs.

Domestically, the Australian Government continues to develop and implement measures to strengthen our approach to combating illicit drugs. According to the Australian Crime Commission's Illicit Drug Data Report (IDDR), large amounts of illicit drugs continue to be seized annually, with 19.6 tonnes seized nationally in 2012-13. The 86 918 seizures in 2012-13 were a record high, as were the 101 749 illicit drug-related arrests. In addition, 757 clandestine laboratories were detected nationally, the second highest total on record. In terms of arrests, seizures and reported use, cannabis remains the dominant illicit drug in Australia.



Cyber Security

The global challenges of cyberspace require an increased international effort to improve the security of cyberspace and to develop common understandings about the norms that apply to state behaviour in cyberspace. Australia supports the work of the 2014-2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, which is elaborating how international law (beyond the UN Charter) applies to states' behaviour in cyberspace, including on the need for peacetime norms. This is an important task, and we look forward to reviewing the Group's report when it is released in the second half of 2015. In April 2015, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Julie Bishop MP, participated in the Global Conference on CyberSpace in The Hague. Australia is committed to the current multi-stakeholder model of internet governance and to ensuring that the internet continues to be open, accessible and secure for all, and a global platform for innovation.

In the ARF, Australia is a co-lead on cyber security, together with Malaysia and the Russian Federation, within the framework of the ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. Australia worked closely with the co-leads and the ARF membership and has finalised the Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, which was presented and endorsed at the ARF Senior Officials' Meeting in June 2015. The purpose of the work plan is to

promote a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative ICT environment and to prevent conflict and crisis by developing trust and confidence between states in the ARF region. Cyber capacity building is an important element of the work plan.

The Prime Minister of Australia opened the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) on 27 November 2014. The ACSC is a multi-agency centre that provides a coordinated approach to cyber security. Australia is also in the process of conducting a whole-of-government review of our cyber security policy settings. The Cyber Security Review will also explore how industry and government can work together to make Australia's online systems more resilient against cyber attacks. The Review is expected to be completed in the second half of 2015.

The Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) is a new national policing initiative by the Commonwealth, state and territory governments. The system went live to the public in early November 2014 and the Minister for Justice officially launched ACORN on 26 November 2014. ACORN provides a national online system that allows members of the public to report instances of cybercrime and it also provides access to general and targeted educational advice to the public about cybercrime.

Since the commencement of ACORN in November 2014 through to 31 January 2015, the system had already received more than 7,500 reports



concerning incidents of cybercrime. The majority of reports relate to online scams and fraud, purchase or sale fraud, and to a lesser extent cyber bullying/stalking and attacks on computer systems. Although the majority of victims that report cybercrime are unable to identify the location or source of the activity, about 20 per cent of cybercrime is reported to originate overseas. The ACC takes a national approach to the analysis of ACORN data, and generates intelligence about nationally significant trends and threats to support the activities of its partner agencies in Australia and overseas.

e. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Large-scale disasters continue to affect the region. Working with national authorities and regional and international organisations, Australia remains committed to the continued development and coordination of effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the 9th EAS summit in Burma, EAS leaders adopted a statement on Rapid Disaster Response proposed by Australian and the Philippines, which provides practical guidelines for EAS members on best practice in disaster response.

Disaster response remains an important focus of Australian cooperation in the region. Our efforts can have a significant positive impact on the lives and livelihoods of those affected by natural disasters. Following the devastation caused by Tropical Cyclone Pam, Australian Government contributed over \$10 million in humanitarian

assistance to support Vanuatu. This includes \$5 million to Australian non-Government organisations, the Red Cross and United Nations partners. Australia deployed humanitarian relief supplies to assist more than 13,000 people, including shelter kits, water purification and family hygiene kits. Australia deployed an Australian Medical Assistance Team (AUSMAT) to supplement Vanuatu Central Hospital and undertake medical evacuations from outer islands and an Australian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team to undertake repairs to critical infrastructure. Australia will continue to work with the Government of Vanuatu as it recovers from Cyclone Pam.

In addition to assisting with emergency response, Australia will continue to support the development of regional disaster capacity through the ARF and other institutions, including the East Asia Summit. Australia remains a primary donor to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre), ASEAN's central disaster monitoring and coordination body. In 2015 Australia, Malaysia and the United States co-chaired an ARF workshop on a strategic approach to planning regional disaster exercises. Australia is working with Indonesia to develop the East Asia Summit Rapid Disaster Response Toolkit, a regional resource on arrangements for sending and receiving international disaster assistance. Australia has partnership arrangements with the World Food Programme, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for the prepositioning of relief items in the UN Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang, Malaysia.



f. Contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan

The 13-year long International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan concluded at the end of 2014, and was replaced by the NATO-led non-combat training advisory, assistance mission, Resolute Support. For the first time since the days of the Taliban, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) now have full responsibility for security across the country. Australia is contribution approximately 400 troops to Afghanistan. From 2015-17, Australia will also contribute US\$300 million towards the sustainment of the ANSF. Australia will continue to deliver development assistance in Afghanistan, specifically focused on economic growth and governance, empowering women and girls, and humanitarian assistance.

g. Space Security

All states rely on satellites for critical services such as telecommunications, air and sea navigation, electronic commerce, climate monitoring, disaster management, national security and defence. However, the space-based infrastructure at the centre of modern society can no longer be taken for granted due to its increasing vulnerability to proliferating space debris.

The sources of space debris are varied: it can be created as a by-product of routine launches of payloads into orbit by space launch vehicles, accidental collisions between satellites and debris, or deliberate acts of destruction such as anti-satellite weapons testing. Ultimately, if the creation

of space debris goes unchecked, our access to space and space-enabled services could be permanently denied.

It is for this reason that Australia continues its active support for the EU-led initiative for an *International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities*, to build norms for responsible behaviour in outer space and to address the proliferation of space debris. Following three productive Open Ended Consultations, the Code process is progressing to the formal negotiation phase. Australia will play a constructive role in these negotiations and will work to build broad international support to bring the Code to fruition. Australia welcomes ARF participants' increasing involvement in the Code process – and space security issues more broadly. This was demonstrated by the active participation of ARF members at the 2nd ARF Space Security Workshop co-hosted by Japan and US in October 2014. Australia was pleased to contribute AU\$40,000 to that workshop – and we look forward to a third ARF space security workshop in 2015.

Australia continues to engage in other regional and international efforts to promote the safety, security and sustainability of space. Australia encourages ARF participants to play their part in ushering the Code to conclusion and to have their views heard on space security issues.

h. Health Security

Australia works closely with partner governments and the private sector in partner countries to



strengthen regional response to shifting disease patterns and known and emerging health threats. Under the EAS Asia-Pacific Leaders Malaria Alliance (APLMA), Australia and Vietnam are working to develop a roadmap to eliminate malaria in the Asia Pacific by 2030, a goal agreed by leaders at the 9th EAS in Nay Pi Taw in November 2014.

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa has underscored the critical importance of local, regional and global investments in health security. The World Health Organisation (WHO) assesses the risk of Ebola reaching the Asia-Pacific region as low, but not zero. With Australian support, the WHO has developed a framework and action plan to support countries in the region to prepare for the event of an Ebola outbreak. Our support has trained more than 30 regional health officials in health surveillance and infection prevention and control, and ensured regional countries have available stocks of Personal Protective Equipment. We have also funded an epidemiological study on the risks and possible impact of an Ebola outbreak on the region.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

Australia continues to see the ARF as an important part of our engagement in the region's security architecture. Australia's engagement in the ARF supports our broader interests in preserving a stable, rules-based system that promotes conflict prevention. Australia continues to make a significant contribution cross the ARF agenda. We co-chaired with Malaysia and the United States in April this year a workshop on multi-year strategic exercise planning for disaster relief. We also worked with Malaysia and Russia on an ARF cyber work plan which was presented and endorsed at the ARF Senior Officials' Meeting in June 2015. We look forward to furthering the ARF agenda as the ARF moves from its focus on confidence-building to preventive diplomacy.

MAIN REPORT - TO BE SUBMITTED TO UN

UNITED NATIONS REPORT ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

(Actual outlays, current prices)

COUNTRY: AUSTRALIA

NATIONAL CURRENCY AND UNIT OF MEASURES: AUD \$'000

(The unit of measure should not exceed one ten thousandth of the total military expenditures.)

FISCAL YEAR: 2014

FORCE GROUPS----->	STRATEGIC FORCES	LAND FORCES	NAVAL FORCES	AIR FORCES	OTHER COMBAT FORCES	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND	UN PEACEKEEPING	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS	UNDISTRIBUTED	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
OPERATING COSTS											
1. PERSONNEL		9,128,978	4,667,724	4,935,207		3,761,401			6,226		22,499,536
1.1 CONSCRIPTS											
1.2 ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL		3,271,789	1,675,449	1,727,585		1,751,165			6,055		8,432,043
1.3 RESERVES		141,813	27,249	50,215		36			171		219,484
1.4 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL		82,710	68,098	77,980		2,010,200					2,238,988
1.5 MILITARY PENSIONS		5,632,666	2,896,928	3,079,427							11,609,021
2. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE		1,889,971	1,784,501	1,514,856		5,270,478			22,653		9,982,459
2.1 MATERIALS FOR CURRENT USE		2,368	9,609	4,346		228,420			512		245,255
2.2 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR		15,860	8,579	34,732		1,366,135			5,171		1,430,477
2.3 PURCHASED SERVICES		237,013	140,153	209,028		1,926,675			8,658		2,521,527
2.4 OTHER		1,134,730	1,626,160	1,266,750		1,749,248			8,312		5,785,200
3. PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION (INVESTMENTS)		1,073,888	1,000,150	1,245,079		1,559,587					4,878,704
3.1 PROCUREMENT		1,073,826	999,455	1,244,585		663,844					3,981,710
3.1.1 AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES											
3.1.2 MISSILES, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS											
3.1.3 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND BOMBS											
3.1.4 SHIPS AND BOATS											
3.1.5 ARMOURD VEHICLES											
3.1.6 ARTILLERY											
3.1.7 OTHER ORDNANCE AND GROUND FORCE WEAPONS		245,202	141,565	377,238		246,985					1,010,990
3.1.8 AMMUNITION											
3.1.9 ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS											
3.1.10 NON-ARMOURD VEHICLES											
3.1.11 OTHER ¹		29,001	13,021	10,799		377,440					430,261
3.1.12 SPECIALIST MILITARY EQUIPMENT ²		799,623	844,869	856,548		39,419					2,540,459
3.2 CONSTRUCTION		62	695	494		895,743					896,994
3.2.1 AIR BASES, AIRFIELDS											
3.2.2 NAVAL BASES AND FACILITIES											
3.2.3 ELECTRONICS FACILITIES											
3.2.4 PERSONNEL FACILITIES											
3.2.5 TRAINING FACILITIES											
3.2.6 OTHER ³		62	695	494		895,743					896,994
4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT		9,557	2,269	1,552		98,074					111,452
4.1 BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH											
4.2 DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION		9,557	2,269	1,552		98,074					111,452
5. TOTAL (1+2+3+4)		11,602,394	7,451,644	7,696,694		10,689,540			28,879		37,472,151

Explanatory remarks (if any):

1. All intangibles and other plant and equipment have been allocated to Other (Procurement)

2. All military procurement has been allocated to Specialist Military Equipment

3. All buildings and infrastructure have been allocated to Other (Construction)



BRUNEI DARUSSALAM



I. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

In 2004 Brunei Darussalam took an important step forward with the publication of its first Defence White Paper, "Defending the Nation's Sovereignty". The paper laid the foundations for a much more comprehensive, robust and integrated approach to protecting and promoting the nation's security.

The White Paper recognised the essential characteristics of the nation's strategic environment and how the capabilities of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces might best be developed and employed to most effectively support the national interest in a range of circumstances.

In the decade since, substantial progress has been made towards achieving those objectives. Guidance has been further refined through the 2007 Defence Update, "Shaping the Force Today", and subsequent 2011 Defence White Paper, "Defending the Nation's Sovereignty: Expanding Roles in Wider Horizons".

The 2011 White Paper outlines Brunei Darussalam's vision of how to respond effectively to the new security agenda. Those reviews ensured

that defence planning remained sensitive to changes in the security environment, identified the most immediate priorities for development, and underscored the importance of being able to work closely with other national agencies and regional partners in responding to current and prospective challenges.

Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

i. Total defence expenditure on annual basis

In the 2015/2016 fiscal year, the approved defence spending is BND\$537,490,000.00 (Five hundred and thirty seven million, four hundred and ninety thousand Brunei Dollars). This was 25.26 per cent less than the approved defence spending for 2014/2015.

ii. Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population

Brunei Darussalam's total active manpower is as follows:

Land Force Personnel: 3,200 regulars (including 200 women), plus some 500 reserves

Navy Personnel: 1,100 (target figure)

Air Force Personnel: 1,200

Conscription: None, all volunteer forces



II. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Maritime Security

Brunei Darussalam is currently co-chairing the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security alongside New Zealand for the 2014 – 2017 cycle. The ADMM-Plus EWG on MS is aimed at developing more effective defence and military response to maritime strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, with the objectives to enhance maritime cooperation, identify risks in the maritime domain, especially non-traditional threats, and widen information sharing.

The ADMM-Plus EWG on MS also aims to ensure that its agenda complements that of existing groupings, most notable the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meetings on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS); the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF); the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Plus (EAMF); the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP); and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Under the co-chairmanship of Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand, the ADMM-Plus EWG on MS have proposed Joint Exercise between the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and the ADMM-Plus Counter Terrorism, ADMM-Plus Future Leaders' Programme, development of ADMM-Plus Maritime Security FTX Standard Operating Procedures, and enhancement of AMSCIP.

The ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism Exercise, scheduled for May 2016 will be held in both Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. The exercise will enhance interoperability of the ADMM-Plus countries in responding to maritime terrorism; promote information sharing on maritime terrorism; and provide a better understanding of the capability of the ADMM-Plus countries to respond to relevant and contemporary scenarios.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Brunei Darussalam is an active contributor to the HADR operations in the region. In 2013, Brunei Darussalam deployed Royal Brunei Air Force CN235 aircraft, and Royal Brunei Navy vessels, KDB Darulaman and KDB Darussalam to the typhoon afflicted area of Tacloban, Philippines. The relief efforts consisted of contribution and delivery of necessities, such as food, water, medical goods, etc.

More recently, Brunei Darussalam joined the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel from the Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) by sending a team comprising of one RBAF medical officer, four RBAF paramedics and three personnel from the Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) to Nepal in support of the humanitarian relief assistance after the 7.8-magnitude earthquake that struck in April 2015. In this collaboration with SAF, RBAF was able to provide medical aid and other disaster relief efforts to this mission, codenamed 'OPERASI KUKRI'.



Peacekeeping

As stipulated in the Defence White Paper 2011, Brunei Darussalam looks to participate in regional and international efforts as part of its contribution to the global community.

Since October 2004, Brunei Darussalam has been participating in the peace-keeping and monitoring mission of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) led by Malaysia in the Southern Philippines. Currently, the 11th group deployed includes 9 Brunei Darussalam IMT personnel serving in Mindanao.

Similarly, Brunei Darussalam has deployed its personnel to Lebanon under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), embedded in the Malaysian Military Forces' UN peacekeeping mission since 2008. Currently, the 10th group deployed includes 30 RBAF personnel in the Malaysian Battalion 850-2 (MALBATT 850-2).

Direct Communications Link in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Process

Brunei Darussalam has undertaken the initiative of establishing a Direct Communications Link in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Process in 2013. The DCL aims to be a key confidence- and security-building measure to be established bilaterally between the ten ASEAN Defence Ministers. The establishment of a DCL at defence

minister level would complement the existing bilateral naval initiatives or procedures, and add value to the existing information-sharing mechanisms in the region, as well as enhance coordination and cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges.

The establishment of a DCL is aimed at providing a permanent, rapid, reliable and confidential means by which any two ASEAN Defence Ministers may communicate with each other to arrive at mutual decisions in handling crisis or emergency situations, in particular related to maritime security. The DCL is also aimed to prevent or defuse misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and therefore to prevent escalation; and to promote quick-response cooperation in emergency situations. The goal would not be to resolve underlying issues, but to effectively manage and contain tensions in the event of a possible military encounter, to foster de-escalation, and to provide channel for initial quick reaction and assistance in emergency situations.

The establishing of the DCL is divided into three phases, Phase 1 is the interim voice and facsimile solution, while Phase 2 and Phase 3 is the e-mail solution. The initiative has seen two technical workshops in February 2014 and August 2014, and two Ad Hoc Working Group meetings in October 2014 and May 2015, all of which were held in Brunei Darussalam.



Logistics Support Framework

The Concept Paper on the Establishment of Logistics Support Framework was adopted by the ASEAN Defence Ministers in 2013.

ASEAN regional cooperation in defence and military has flourished over the years and cooperation in logistics, in particular through a Logistics Support Framework, would contribute to enhance coordination and cooperation in upholding and defending peace, security and stability. This will help enhance ASEAN's capacity, develop further capabilities, strengthen interoperability and thus, contribute to operational effectiveness and efficiency in ASEAN militaries in addressing non-traditional security challenges.

This proposed Framework shall guide existing and future cooperation in non-traditional security challenges to include but not limited to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Search and Rescue (SAR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and anti-piracy.

The Logistics Support Framework is aimed at promoting and achieving effective cooperation among ASEAN defence and military establishments in areas of common interests.

The initiative has seen two workshops held in April 2014 and December 2014, in Brunei Darussalam.



CAMBODIA



I. CAMBODIA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Asia-Pacific region today is confronted with many non-traditional challenges, some new conditions and characteristics of the international terrorism. Generally speaking preventing and countering terrorism is still a long-term and arduous task before every country. These impacts have all become more prominent and they are getting more serious since our region are very much interdependent on each other. As interdependence increases and deepens in the Asia-Pacific region, countries are addressing security challenges by enhancing multilateral cooperation and engaging in specific collaborative efforts to solve issues, especially in the non-traditional security fields.

Terrorism remains a pre-eminent national and global security threat. Most governments have built their operational capabilities to respond to terrorism but still hard to do with prevention of ideological extreme causing radicalization. It is more likely that violent including economic security, terrorism, environmental pollution, population explosion, drug trafficking traditional crime would continue unabated into a foreseeable future.

The common issue of maritime security threats in the region that it experienced and continues

to face are such as illegal exploitation of national resources, illegal activities in protected areas, unauthorized maritime arrivals, maritime terrorism, prohibited imports and exports, compromise to bio-security and piracy, and violence and problems and restrictions in handling of maritime security challenges. These multi-faced threats do demand the strengthening maritime security cooperation, building maritime capacity and setting more responsive and effective guideline for cooperation, developing friendship and practicing the law of the Sea.

The Asia-Pacific region is the most disaster-prone area of the world and it is also the most seriously affected one. The effects of climate extremes and variation suggest that while the numbers of typhoons in Asia-Pacific are not increasing in number, more of them are stronger, making the region more susceptible to greater potential losses. This is also becomes more serious because of the human contributing factors involved, with more people being exposed to the risk of tropical cyclones.

The region has been slow to be concerned by how the growth of disaster risks has been spurred by rapid economic growth, and the means to minimize those risks while also striving for sustained economic prosperity.



The solutions to the threats would require enhancing practical international cooperation, confidence building and preventive diplomacy among the ASEAN member states. Thus, the international community is required to work together as one to address all threats. Especially filling in gaps in the existing legislative measures.

II. CAMBODIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Cambodian security priorities have been continuously redefined and revised by the Royal Government's 5th Term Political Agenda and the recently released Defense Strategy Review 2013 within the emerging of new security paradigms in region and world at large. Those include the key areas of strengthening border defense measures; PKO capability building, counter-terrorists and counter-transnational crimes capabilities, maritime security initiatives, disaster respond capability building, and others. These changes have resulted in the justification of principles more realistic features, that is, they have been aligned more closely with the situation and practical needs. To realize the national goal, specific policies and measures have been implemented as follows:

- Contribute to external security and guarantee national unity and political stability for economic growth;
- Strengthen border protection capability to prevent transnational crime and infiltration of terrorists and to increase contributions to infrastructure and community development along the border;

- Contribute to peace operation and building around the world. For instance, since April 2006, under the United Nations framework, Cambodia has sent its peacekeeping forces to several zones of conflict in Africa, the Middle East and beyond;
- Cooperate with international community and fellow countries in combating terrorism and transnational crimes and collaborating in areas of PKO, HA/DR, Maritime Security and Disaster management.

III. CAMBODIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crimes

Although Cambodia, for the time being, has not been faced with serious terror threats, we are always prepared to respond. However, our principle is to "prevent terrorist acts from happening" rather than too much reliance on response measures. This principle includes a policy of non-discrimination and measures to prevent radicalizations. Cambodia is keeping a close watch on the possible link between terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Cambodia has regularly held bilateral and multilateral consultation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. In this regard, Cambodia has been working with the US and Australia in effort at building Cambodia's counter-terrorism capabilities.



Additionally, Cambodia is committed in collaborating with other nations in fighting other transnational criminal acts such as human trafficking, money laundering, cross border terrorism etc. Close cooperation with our neighbors is essential to the promotion of border security and safety of cross-border trades.

In response to growing threats of terrorism, the Royal Government of Cambodia has taken a number of important steps, which include:

- Working with our partners on various counter-radicalization initiatives such as seminars and other educational programs;
- Initiating the plan to improve maritime security via the establishment and empowerment of National Committee for Maritime Security; and
- Implementing the measure to improve land and sea border security as well as cooperating closely with partner countries in tackling transnational criminal activities.

Humanitarian Assistant and Disaster Relief

The role of Royal Cambodia Armed Forces (RCAF) in disaster relief missions has been widely acknowledged and appreciated. Indeed, the importance of the RCAF role in disaster management is now recognized due to the nature of its manpower, organization, assets, capability

any speed. In the tremendous flood during the past few years, the RCAF in general and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmeries (RCG) in particular, in cooperation with other law enforcement agencies – including the National Committee for Disaster Management, were the first to intervene in search and rescue operation. Now, RCAF is in the process of developing its capacity for rapid response to both domestic and international natural disasters.

In addition, international cooperation on capacity building is crucial for Cambodia. For instance, recently, with the support from the United States, the RCAF is building its mobile medical and engineering capabilities. RCAF also co-hosted along with the United States as well as other regional partners, the multilateral planning augmentation team Tempest Express (MPAT 19) in March 2011, the Security Force MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation in January 2013, the Lower Mekong Initiative Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange (LMI DREE) in June 2013, the Disaster Preparedness and response Simulation Exercise in August 2013 and other activities that may help the RCAF to enhance HA/DR Capabilities include training, exercises, civil-military projects, and various civic-action programs.

As part of multilateral initiatives, counting from 2012, Cambodia has actively engaged in disaster management activities to share best practice and lesson learnt within the ADMM-Plus and ARF frameworks as follow:



- The 2nd ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in August 2012 in Hanoi;
- The ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise and 2nd AHX in June 2013 in Brunei Darussalam;
- The ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise “ARF DiREx 2013” in May 2013 in Thailand and;
- The 3rd ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in June 2014 in Nha Trang, Viet Nam.

forces, the NCMS has constructed its own Tactical Command Headquarters located in the Ream Maritime Base.

Recently, in regional maritime cooperation, Cambodia has sent mid-level officers to Changi naval base in Singapore for maritime security information-infusion as part of its contribution to regional maritime security efforts. Beginning from 2011, Cambodia has been active in creation of a sub-regional organization namely the Gulf of Thailand Maritime Law Enforcement Interoperability Initiative (GOT), involving maritime authorities from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. This organization provides a forum for frequent interactions, information exchanges and joint training on both multilateral and bilateral formats.

Maritime Security

Cambodia strongly supports continued engagement in maritime security. Cambodia have worked to develop several projects to focus on issues such as enhanced information sharing and sharing of best practices, confidence building measures based on regional and international legal frameworks, and capacity building of maritime law enforcement agencies in the region. Cambodia created the National Committee on Maritime Security (NCMS) in December 2009. The Main mission is to enhance maritime sovereignty and strengthen the enforcement of rules at sea. NCMS is also a national mechanism to facilitate relevant institutes and ministries in maintaining good order at sea. To facilitate the joint operation of the joint

Regarding international cooperation framework, Cambodia has been working closely with fellow countries such as Australia, China, Japan, and the United States to get the necessary support for the hard and soft infrastructural upgrading of Cambodia naval forces. In December 2009, US and Cambodia signed an agreement called Megaport Initiative focusing on cooperation to deter, detect, and interdict illicit smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material at the Autonomous Port of Sihanoukville. Cambodia actively participates in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Cambodia was also committed in efforts of searching for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 by dispatching naval search in its own territorial waters.



Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operation is a strong determination of the Royal Government of Cambodia. Since 2006, Cambodia has sent over 2,200 peacekeeping troops to take part in UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Lebanon, Syria, Mali and Cyprus. Peacekeeping operation is the area of cooperation that Cambodia is standing shoulder-to-shoulder with other nations committed to building peace and stability around the world.

Cambodia has been working with a number of foreign countries in building its PKO capability. In December 2013 Cambodia signed an Agreement with the Government of Japan concerning Cooperation on Education and Training in the Area of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

In the regional context, Cambodia has actively supported the establishment of ASEAN's peacekeeping center, and is ready to share experiences with others. Cambodia has asked ASEAN to support the establishment of a Regional Demining Training Center in Cambodia. From this year till 2016, Cambodia and the Republic of Korea co-chair the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operation.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Cambodia is committed and non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been actively engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of Nuclear weapons. To support the global movement on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Cambodia ratified the NPT in 1972, resumed its membership with IAEA in 2009, and ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of nuclear Material in 2006. At the regional level, Cambodia acceded to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1997. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012, Cambodia successfully convinced the five nuclear weapons states to sign the protocol the treaty. Cambodia participated in PSI exercises in 2006, endorsed the PSI statement of interdiction principles, and became the participating state of PSI in 2008.

Furthermore, in November 2012, the National Assembly of Cambodia ratified two international conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and Nuclear Safety to maintain peace, security, Safety and to prevent nuclear proliferation.



CANADA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Security and stability in Asia-Pacific are essential to the region's continuing economic dynamism and prosperity, which are in turn fundamental components of global prosperity. As an Asia-Pacific country that enjoys strong people-to-people ties and expanding commercial relationships with regional partners, Canada is invested in regional peace and stability.

Canada announced in 2014 the creation of a mission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) led by a dedicated ambassador. In Summer/Fall 2015, Canada will be opening offices in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and Vientiane, Laos.

In addition to having opened ten new offices in China and India since 2006 and appointed Canada's first-ever resident Ambassador in Yangon in March 2013, Canada has also committed to expanding trade with emerging markets in Asia through engagement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the signing and entry into force of Canada's free trade agreement with Republic of Korea, and active negotiations with Japan and India, while deepening and broadening our security relationships across Asia.

Bilateral high-level engagement between Canada and Asia-Pacific partners also serves to expand and deepen our relations. In 2014-2015, Canada welcomed the visits of Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines, President Park Geun-hye of the Republic of Korea, and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott. Governor General David Johnson completed a state visit to India and official travel to Singapore. Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper undertook visits to Australia, China and New Zealand. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Thomas J. Lawson, participated in the Pacific Command Chiefs of Defense (PACOM CHOD) Conference in Brunei, and the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Guy R. Thibault participated in the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue. Over twenty high-level ministerial visits to ARF participating states also served to reinforce ties. Recurring strategic dialogues, political-military and military-to-military talks with our Asia-Pacific neighbours, including with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, play a key role in strengthening relationships and promoting cooperation.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) plays an important role in ensuring that the Asia-Pacific region remains stable and prosperous through



promoting confidence-building measures and facilitating coordination and support for regional capacity building on issues such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, as well as maritime security.

The ARF represents an important component of Canada's engagement in the region, and Canada will continue to work with ARF partners, multilaterally and bilaterally, to address a range of traditional and non-traditional security challenges, including:

- Threats posed by pro-Russian armed forces in Ukraine, which tragically affected the Asia-Pacific region with the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17;
- North Korea's provocative and destabilizing actions, such as nuclear and missile tests and related proliferation, as well as egregious human rights abuses;
- The situation in the East and South China Seas, including any unilateral actions, such as large scale land reclamation, which change the status quo and increase tensions;
- Terrorism;
- Humanitarian crises;
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction; and
- Threats to cybersecurity and combatting cybercrime.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

a. Overview of national security and defence policy

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are committed to strengthening peace and security and enhancing their engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. From our commitment of resources towards humanitarian and relief efforts, to our participation in regional military exercises and high-level defence fora, we are proud of the steps that we have taken in recent years to bolster defence relations and increase cooperation with Canada's partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

Canadian Defence Attachés are an essential part of Canada's effort to promote international peace and security, including in the Asia-Pacific region. Defence Attachés are the Canadian Armed Forces' official representatives abroad and advise ambassadors on defence matters, provide support to Canadian Armed Forces operations, manage military bilateral assistance programs, and, in cooperation with Canada's Trade Commissioner Service, assist Canadian defence manufacturers in understanding and accessing foreign defence markets. Canada's Defence Attachés are stationed in the region as follows: Australia, cross-accredited to New Zealand; China, cross-accredited to Mongolia; India, cross-accredited to Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka; Indonesia, cross-accredited to Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Timor Leste; Japan; Republic of Korea; Pakistan; Russia,



cross-accredited to Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; Thailand, cross-accredited to Singapore; and Vietnam.

Furthermore, the Canadian Armed Forces are involved in a number of regional exercises that support multilateral defence relations. For example, more than 1,000 Canadian sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the world's premier combined and joint maritime exercise, from June 27 to August 1, 2014, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California. Canada has participated in every iteration of the exercise since RIMPAC's inception in 1971.

More broadly, the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) is the Government of Canada's foundational defence policy statement. The Strategy launched a new era of investment in the Canadian Armed Forces, providing the tools necessary to rebuild the Forces into a first-class, modern military. This strong investment – along with the dedication of our personnel – has enabled the Canadian Armed Forces to deliver impressive operational results, both at home and abroad, including in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Strategy confirms three enduring roles for the Canadian Armed Forces: excellence in the defence of Canada; a strong and reliable partnership with the US in the defence of North America; and, leadership abroad through meaningful contributions to international peace and security. Within these three roles, the Strategy commits National Defence to six core missions:

1. Conducting daily domestic and continental operations;
2. Supporting a major international event in Canada;
3. Responding to a terrorist attack;
4. Supporting civil authorities during a crisis;
5. Conducting a major international operation for an extended period; and
6. Responding to crises elsewhere in the world for a shorter period.

The CFDS is positioned within broader foreign policy and national security priorities, and the Canadian Armed Forces is a key contributor to a whole-of-government approach to defence and security issues.

National security and defence policies must be complementary in a complex security landscape in which threats transcend national borders. Cooperation with partners on shared threats is crucial to the security and well-being of populations and citizens.

Recognizing that Canadians are embracing the many advantages that cyberspace offers, Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides a roadmap to comprehensively address cyber security risks and tackle cybercrime, as well as for engaging with international partners on shared cyber security concerns. Action Plan 2010-2015 for Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides an indicative list of Canada's international efforts in this area. Canada also recognizes that international engagement



is key to making cyberspace more secure. The development and implementation of multilateral initiatives aimed at fighting cybercrime help to ensure that the internet remains free and open.

Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy, Building Resilience Against Terrorism, also articulates the importance of cooperation and coordination within and among domestic agencies and with international partners in security and intelligence communities, law enforcement agencies and civil society.

b. Data contributions to the ARF Arms Register

In keeping with the important advances in promoting transparency in conventional arms, including through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNCAR) and the instrument of Standardized Reporting on Military Matters, which includes transparency on military expenditures, Canada supports the sharing of information about national security and defence programs and policies. Information currently available is Canada's 2013-2014 fiscal year military expenditure return.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

i. Counter-Terrorism

Canada is committed to working with Asia-Pacific partners, including through the ARF, to combat terrorist activity. The security of ARF members is inextricably linked to that of the other ARF

participating countries. Southeast Asia therefore continues to be a priority region for the Government of Canada's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP). Significant investments are being made in Law Enforcement and Military Intelligence (LEMI), Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), and Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED). Aviation security is also an area of interest.

The CTCBP is currently supporting the delivery of a multiyear C-IED training program for Indonesia and the Philippines, with implementation to continue until 2017, via Canada's Department of National Defence. This project builds on the longstanding work of the CTCBP in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) incident management. From 2005-2012, the CTCBP trained approximately 4,000 first responders in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on CBRN incident response, as well as in the area of Chemical and Explosive Systems Exploitation (CESE). As a result of this initiative, local trainers in each of the four countries are now able to deliver this training independently.

In 2015, the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore became operational, and Canada is supporting cyber security work out of this centre.

On August 9, 2014, at the ASEAN-Canada Post Ministerial Conference, former Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird announced additional Canadian funding in the amount of \$14 million to help address security concerns in Southeast Asia. CTCBP



programming from this announcement includes: INTERPOL Special Notices, Foreign Fighters and Cyber Security projects; a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Foreign Fighters initiative; a Burma Security Deliverables initiative; an ASEAN Border Security Initiative with Cambodia, Burma, Laos, and Vietnam; a Public Safety-led Foreign Fighters initiative in Southeast Asia; and a United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) prison deradicalization project in Indonesia.

Aviation security remains a priority for the CTCBP given direct air links from the region to Canada. A global aviation security project with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was announced by Canada's Foreign Minister in August 2014, and a significant portion of that funding will focus on Southeast Asia.

Law Enforcement and Military Assistance programming is the primary area of focus for the CTCBP in Southeast Asia. The keystone project under this programming pillar has been a Royal Canadian Military Police (RCMP) placement at the Indonesia-based Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which has enabled extensive training at the Centre, and in the region. From 2006-2013, the JCLEC-based RCMP officer assisted in the facilitation and coordination of 45 training courses, building the skills of more than 900 law enforcement officers from throughout the region. The Program currently has four ongoing projects at JCLEC.

From a multilateral perspective, the CTCBP currently has a number of initiatives which include INTERPOL Special Notices training, as well as investigation, forensic collection skills building, and identifying and tracking foreign fighters moving to conflict areas. In addition, CTCBP is funding a UNODC-led conference that will examine challenges in the ASEAN region with regards to foreign terrorist fighters. CTCBP is also funding a multi-year port security project through INTERPOL in the Philippines.

In the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, the Program is working with both the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and the World Bank. CTCBP projects aim to strengthen the legislative frameworks of beneficiary countries, strengthen the supervisory capacity of financial sector supervisors and increase the capacity of law enforcement agents to strengthen money laundering and terrorism financing investigation, prosecution, and conviction.

The CTCBP works to align its programming with ASEAN commitments and priorities. In July 2012, Canada announced a \$10-million funding commitment dedicated to ASEAN-related projects over three years through the ASEAN-Canada Enhanced Partnership Program. As part of this enhanced engagement and cooperation, the CTCBP works closely with the ASEAN Secretariat to ensure that projects are endorsed under this partnership.



ii. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD)

Canada is committed to a step-by-step process towards non-proliferation and disarmament and the eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as to effectively control their means of delivery. To this end, Canada is an active State Party to all major international NACD treaties, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the only international treaty that prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in which the five nuclear-weapon States commit to nuclear disarmament. Canada considers each of the NPT's three main pillars - non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy - as equally important, interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Canada is highly committed to the effective implementation and improvement of the NPT. Equally, Canada remains committed to actively supporting the implementation of the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, particularly in collaboration with Australia, Japan, the Philippines and other members of the cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPD).

All countries have a stake in preserving the integrity of the NPT, which enjoys near universal adherence and membership. In this regard, Canada shares the international community's grave concern with certain nuclear proliferation challenges, namely Iran, Syria, and North Korea.

With respect to North Korea specifically, its ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programs and tests, as well as the restarting of operations at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, are a clear and present threat to regional peace and security and beyond. These also constitute flagrant violations of multiple UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and a fundamental challenge to efforts to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In this context, Canada continues to call on North Korea to resume adherence with the NPT and to fulfill its international non-proliferation obligations. Canada unequivocally condemns the launch of ballistic missiles and threats of further nuclear tests by North Korea. Canada has comprehensive economic sanctions in place against North Korea, including a prohibition on imports from, and exports to, North Korea, with certain humanitarian exemptions. In addition, Canada is committed to supporting appropriate measures in response to any further provocations by North Korea, and to working with the international community to ensure full implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions.

Controlling access is an important component of an overall strategy to address weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation challenges affecting Asia-Pacific and the international community as a whole. To this end, Canada supports regional action and cooperation to promote the full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540 by ARF partners. Canada also believes in enhanced cooperation and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative's (PSI) related information exchange, capacity-building, and practical exercises as a means to



disrupt illicit WMD trafficking across the region and to deter proliferation. Canada encourages ARF partners to endorse the PSI's *Statement of Interdiction Principles*.

Through its Global Partnership Program (GPP), Canada participates in the *Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction* (Global Partnership), a 30-country partnership aimed at addressing the threat of WMD proliferation to non-state actors and states of proliferation concern. With nine ARF members (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States) participating in the Global Partnership, the ARF can play an important role in coordinating efforts to address the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism.

Since 2012, Canada's GPP has collaborated with ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to further strengthen Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) threat mitigation in the region, and provided over \$22-million in security-related assistance.

Canada's GPP is contributing \$7-million towards enhanced physical security of nuclear and radiological facilities in ASEAN countries. It has also supported regional training on radiological source security, contributing over \$500K to INTERPOL to support its efforts to establish counter nuclear smuggling teams in ASEAN member countries, as well as to assist with the tracking of cross-border movements of known traffickers of nuclear material.

As part of this INTERPOL project, a 3-day regional Counter Nuclear Smuggling workshop was held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam in January 2015 for over 50 participants from ASEAN member countries.

In close cooperation and collaboration with the ASEAN Secretariat, the ASEAN Experts Group on Communicable Diseases (AEGCD), and ASEAN member countries, Canada's GPP is implementing a \$6.5 million initiative to mitigate biological threats across the region. As part of this initiative, progress was made in 2014-2015 to further strengthen Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens capabilities of the ASEAN Plus Three Partnership Laboratories (APL) network, and to establish an early warning and disease surveillance system in the region through introduction of the "BioDiaspora" system. Canada's GPP also organized and funded a regional conference on multi-sectoral collaboration to mitigate biological threats in the region, held in Jakarta, Indonesia in October 2014, and funded a workshop, led by INTERPOL, focused on the safety, security and surveillance of microbiological materials and emerging technologies in April 2014 in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Through the GPP, Canada has collaborated with ASEAN member states on strengthening regional UNSC resolution 1540 implementation, and contributed over \$7.5-million towards the enhancement of regional capacities for border security and container control measures, and the provision of CBRN legislative assistance and training to first responders. Canada's GPP supported UNODC's Container Control Programme



in the region, co-funding with the Philippines a UNSC resolution 1540 regional workshop in July 2014 in Manila. In support of Indonesia's 2014 Nuclear Security Summit gift basket deliverable, Canada co-funded (in partnership with the UK) the development of the National Legislation Implementation Kit.

Acknowledging the role of nuclear energy to meet the increasing energy demands of states, Canada supports the peaceful uses of nuclear power in a safe and secure manner, notably through full cooperation with the IAEA. Canada strongly believes that implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol constitute the new universal safeguards verification standard. Through signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, ARF states and dialogue partners can support transparency and confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. Canada has consistently supported efforts to assist member states to build capacity to fully implement the Protocol, and believes that the ARF can also work to promote its universal implementation in Asia-Pacific. Canada urges North Korea, Iran, and Syria to resume compliance with their IAEA obligations.

Canada is committed to working with ARF partners to develop practical measures and national instruments to universalize key international NACD treaties, norms, and instruments such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA safeguards

system, the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other arrangements such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Canada welcomes Burma as a State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and encourages Burma to submit its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary General to confirm its membership to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Canada also continues to lead international efforts toward Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, which remains a shared priority for both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Pursuant to a 2012 UN General Assembly resolution, Canada played a leadership role by chairing the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) responsible for making recommendations on possible aspects of a treaty. The GGE concluded its work on April 2, 2015, and its consensus report reflects the depth and breadth of the GGE's discussions. While important differences in perspectives remained among experts, they nevertheless agreed that the GGE's work constitutes the most in-depth assessment of a potential future FMCT carried out to date. The report was presented by the Canadian Chair to the UN Secretary General, and it is expected to be released in the summer of 2015. Canada appreciates engagement and cooperation by Asia-Pacific states with the GGE in 2014-15. Cross-regional groups like the NPDI, which includes Asia-Pacific countries (Canada, Australia and Japan), are playing an important complementary role by fostering cooperation



on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals, including with respect to an FMCT and the universalization of the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

Canada supports Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) as an important regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and as a confidence-building measure. Canada, along with its NPDI partners, welcomes efforts to resolve remaining concerns and reservations regarding certain NWFZs treaties, including the Bangkok Treaty, with a view to securing ratifications of protocols for these agreements by all Nuclear Weapon States.

Canada will continue to work actively within the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD) to support regional NACD cooperation. Canada will co-chair with Malaysia and New Zealand the 2015-2017 ARF ISMs on NPD. On 15-16 June, 2015, Canada hosted and co-chaired with Malaysia and New Zealand the Seventh ARF ISM on NPD in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

iii. Transnational Crime

Canada is committed to working with Asia-Pacific partners, including through the ARF and the Bali Process, to counter threats to governance and stability arising from the activities of transnational organized crime groups in the region, including cybercrime. Frequently linked to organized crime are trafficking networks, including illicit drugs,

migrant smuggling, and money laundering, which underscore the transnational dimension of these challenges.

Canada co-chaired with Thailand the ARF Workshop on Precursor Chemicals and Synthetic Drugs on February 12-13, 2015. The main focus of the workshop was the sharing of information about, and best practices in, interdicting the export/import of precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs. The Co-Chairs recommended a number of areas for future regional cooperation. This workshop and the February 11-12, 2015, ARF Workshop on Enhancing Regional Cooperation to Address Challenges Posed by Illicit Drugs together provided the participants with an overview of the current illicit drugs situation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as regional and global efforts to combat the production, distribution and trafficking of illicit drugs. The workshops also emphasized the importance of interagency, regional, and international cooperation on issues of border security, information exchange, law enforcement and financial investigation through existing ASEAN mechanisms such as ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD), and to help fulfill the goals of the "Drug-Free ASEAN 2015."

Migrant smuggling is a particular area of concern. Canada has worked with regional partners to address this issue, often in coordination with global organizations like the UNODC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and INTERPOL. Canada has supported efforts in Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,



Malaysia, Burma (Myanmar), Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam to combat migrant smuggling through the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program's (ACCBP) Human Smuggling Envelope (\$24 million from 2011-2015). \$16.9 million of this amount has supported a variety of projects in Southeast Asia, including support for the IOM's Document Examination Support Center, located in Bangkok, which provides real time support to regional immigration officers in the identification of fraudulent travel documents. The ACCBP also funded a UNODC project that created three interagency Port Intelligence Units (PIUs) in Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia to prevent migrant smuggling in the region. In Indonesia, Canada funded the Frontline Officers' Awareness Training on People Smuggling, a regional training initiative aimed at combating people smuggling in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the ACCBP has provided support to JCLEC for a variety of technical training courses offered to regional law enforcement to prevent migrant smuggling. Canada is very appreciative of the cooperation we have enjoyed with ASEAN countries in addressing shared concerns arising from migrant smuggling.

To further enhance efforts to increase cooperation and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force global standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing and proliferation, in July 2013 Canada became a member of the Steering Group of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (of which it has been an active member since 2006).

Canada is working with ASEAN and individual member states to improve cyber security and combat cybercrime. Communications infrastructure and increased connectivity has advanced knowledge-sharing and wealth creation among Asia Pacific countries. At the same time, greater reliance on cyberspace among countries in the region can increase vulnerabilities in cyberspace, from which Canada is not immune. Canada encourages countries in the region to take steps to foster dialogue and cooperation to tackle cyber threats and cybercrime through information sharing and capacity building. This will not only create a safer digital environment but also support efforts to maintain an open, safe and accessible Internet.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Canada continued to be an active contributor in 2014-2015 to humanitarian relief efforts in the region, by providing timely, effective, coordinated and needs-based assistance.

In response to Typhoon Hagupit which struck the Philippines on December 6th, 2014, Canada provided \$5.1-million in humanitarian assistance funding to support experienced partners in meeting the needs of typhoon-affected families. Additionally, following Tropical Cyclone Pam which struck Vanuatu as a Category 5 Cyclone on March 13, 2015, Canada contributed \$700,000 in humanitarian assistance funding to support emergency relief efforts of humanitarian partners in the areas of shelter, water, sanitation, health,



hygiene, and emergency education. In response to the earthquakes that struck Nepal in April and May 2015, Canada provided \$10 million in humanitarian assistance funding and deployed a Canadian Armed Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) of approximately 200 personnel, which provided significant support to relief efforts led by the Government of Nepal and contributed to several humanitarian activities underway by international partners. By the end of the mission (May 29, 2015), the DART had: treated more than 700 Nepalese patients; distributed 75 water filtration units and enabled access to clean, safe drinking water for approximately 3,400 people; provided 750 maps and visuals to the Nepalese and foreign militaries and to non-governmental and UN agencies; removed more than 3,000 cubic metres of rubble (approximately 720 dump-trucks-full) and cleared roads, allowing access to approximately 204,000 Nepalese isolated by the disaster; assisted with more than 300 public safety announcements; and distributed more than 355 crank radios, allowing remote communities to connect with relief efforts.

In addition to our development efforts, disaster risk reduction is a key component of Canada's advocacy work on humanitarian affairs and disaster response, both domestically and internationally. Canada strongly supports disaster risk reduction measures that aim to enhance resilience to all hazards and reduce vulnerability of individuals, communities and countries, and has advocated for the integration of risk considerations into long-term sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies.

v. Maritime Security

Canada strongly supports continued ARF engagement in maritime security, including with respect to countering WMD proliferation and illicit trafficking. Since the identification of maritime security as one of ARF's four key areas in 2008, ARF members including Canada have worked to develop projects that focus on issues such as enhanced information sharing and best practices, confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, and capacity building support to maritime law enforcement agencies in the region. ARF cooperation on maritime security issues will continue to support the region's security and prosperity objectives by ensuring the efficient and secure movement of goods and people through strategic corridors.

As noted above, Canada regularly participates in the US-hosted multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises that take place biannually, and most recently in 2014. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) assumed a substantial leadership role in the 2014 exercise, contributing both forces and platforms.

Canada views the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium's (WPNS) "Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea" (CUES) as a means by which navies may develop mutually rewarding international cooperation and transparency, and provide leadership and broad-based involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea. Canada was pleased to be involved in the development of this code.



Canada's 2014 participation in Operation ARTEMIS, a multinational maritime security and counter-terrorism operation in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, provided crucial opportunities to strengthen key relationships with our Asia Pacific partners. During HMCS Regina's transit to the Op ARTEMIS Joint Operations Area, the ship and her crew supported a number of high profile public activities and private functions in support of the DND Global Engagement Plan and the Canadian Armed Forces/Royal Canadian Navy engagement strategy in the Asia Pacific region, including a ship visit to Changi Naval Base in Singapore.

More broadly, Canada is committed to working with international organizations to meet the security challenges of a complex maritime environment and recognizes the importance of broadening international consensus when addressing these challenges. The Canadian Coast Guard is actively engaged in a number of international fora, among them, the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Canada is also an active member of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum which brings together subject matter experts from maritime safety and security agencies in Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States, all with borders on the North Pacific Ocean. The Forum acts as a venue to foster multilateral cooperation through the sharing of information on matters related to fisheries enforcement, maritime security, illegal migration, illegal drug trafficking, combined operations and information exchange.

Civil society and Track II initiatives can make a useful contribution to developing informed options

for regional partners in areas such as regional connectivity and preparedness to address incidents at sea. Canada supports initiatives to organize workshops and seminars in ARF countries, on these themes.

VI. ROLE OF THE ARF

National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

In the 2014-2015 Inter-sessional year, Canada actively participated in a wide range of ARF meetings and events. Furthermore, as noted above, Canada will continue to work actively within the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD) to support regional NACD cooperation. Canada will co-chair with Malaysia and New Zealand the 2015-2017 ARF Inter-sessional Meetings on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. On 15-16 June, 2015, Canada hosted and co-chaired with Malaysia and New Zealand the Seventh ARF ISM on NPD in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Canada also co-chaired with Thailand the ARF Workshop on Precursor Chemicals and Synthetic Drugs in February 12-13, 2015.

Future of the ARF

Regional connectivity has been identified by ASEAN as a top priority, and the ASEAN Regional Forum contributes significantly to this objective through its long-standing role as an anchor of security dialogue and cooperation in Asia-Pacific.



Canada believes that the regularity of exchange facilitated through the ARF will be increasingly important to sustaining an atmosphere of cooperation in a region of global strategic importance. In this respect, it is important for ARF member states to take stock of progress over the last 20 years and the impressive networks that have been developed among our policy makers and experts across a number of crucial domains.

Like many of our partners, Canada believes that it will be important to build on the ARF's existing work in order to bring greater focus to addressing the region's security challenges. As a mature organization and in the spirit of Preventive Diplomacy, the ARF can provide a forum for active discussion of issues and perspectives without jeopardizing the activities and exchanges that members support. The ARF has been most successful in bringing together policy practitioners and experts to address specialized security issues that require interagency cooperation across borders. Its inclusive membership highlights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and the interconnected nature of the global security environment. As such, future activities should take heed of other relevant regional and global efforts.

The ARF's success as a convener of security dialogue and cooperation among interagency communities of practitioners, experts and policy makers, is complementary to the roles of newer bodies like the East Asia Summit and the ADMM+. These fora offer positive opportunities for complementary regional dialogue and cooperation, in keeping with the spirit of ASEAN-centrality which Canada continues to support. Canada remains keenly interested in joining the East Asia Summit so that we can better contribute to advancing common approaches to shared security concerns. Canada is also interested in eventual membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), once the organization has had more time to consolidate and is ready to consider admitting new members.

Since its inception in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum has become a cornerstone of a burgeoning security community that works together to protect the region's vitality and continued economic growth. Canada believes that through the consistent efforts of its members, the ARF can continue to grow and evolve, in keeping with the determination of its members to build confidence, capacity and trust as regional security partners, in a global security environment.



CANADA (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014)

Figures reported in millions (\$CAD)

PREVIOUS YEAR EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEAR 2013-14
UN Standardized Reporting Form

FORCE GROUPS ---->	STRA- TEGIC FORCES	LAND FORCES	NAVAL FORCES	AIR FORCES	OTHER MILITARY FORCES	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRA- TION AND COMMAND	UN PEACE- KEEPING	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS	UNDISTRI- BUTED	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES
RESOURCE COSTS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1. PERSONNEL	-	2,947.6	1,404.7	1,505.4	-	3,639.3	2.0	3.4	-	-	9,502.4
1.1 CONSCRIPTS	-	-	-	..
1.2 ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL	-	1,796.2	716.3	997.4	-	1,812.7	2.0	0.1	-	-	5,324.8
1.3 RESERVES	-	318.3	133.8	80.6	-	90.5	-	-	-	-	623.2
1.4 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL	-	334.3	350.4	149.6	-	1,298.9	-	3.3	-	-	2,136.5
1.5 MILITARY PENSIONS	-	498.7	204.1	277.8	-	437.3	-	-	-	-	1,418.0
2. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE	-	1,397.1	839.8	1,667.2	-	2,322.1	3.1	12.2	-	-	6,241.4
2.1 MATERIALS FOR CURRENT USE	-	667.1	297.1	509.5	-	11.6	0.7	0.9	-	-	1,487.0
2.2 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR	-	210.8	62.3	661.7	-	66.6	0.5	-	-	-	1,001.8
2.3 PURCHASED SERVICES	-	404.4	428.7	423.9	-	1,380.1	1.3	1.2	-	-	2,639.6
2.4 OTHER	-	114.8	51.7	72.1	-	863.7	0.5	10.1	-	-	1,112.9
3. PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION (INVESTMENTS)	-	960.0	766.6	805.5	-	330.7	-	-	-	-	2,862.7
3.1 PROCUREMENT	-	817.5	628.5	642.2	-	180.3	-	-	-	-	2,268.5
3.1.1 AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES	-	-	1.6	493.5	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	495.1
3.1.2 MISSILES, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS	-	-	10.2	2.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.4
3.1.3 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND BOMBS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3.1.4 SHIPS AND BOATS	-	-	376.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	376.4
3.1.5 ARMoured VEHICLES	-	413.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	413.7
3.1.6 ARTILLERY	-	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.5
3.1.7 OTHER ORDNANCE AND GROUND FORCE WEAPONS	-	32.1	0.2	-	-	5.5	-	-	-	-	37.8



FORCE GROUPS --->	STRA- TEGIC FORCES	LAND FORCES	NAVAL FORCES	AIR FORCES	OTHER MILITARY FORCES	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRA- TION AND COMMAND	UN PEACE- KEEPING	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS	UNDISTRI- BUTED	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES
RESOURCE COSTS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
3.1.8 AMMUNITION	-	40.4	175.5	14.7	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	231.7
3.1.9 ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS	-	119.6	29.8	87.5	-	60.4	-	-	-	-	297.3
3.1.10 NON-ARMoured VEHICLES	-	101.8	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	102.0
3.1.11 OTHER	-	102.3	34.9	44.2	-	113.2	-	-	-	-	294.6
3.2 CONSTRUCTION	-	142.5	138.1	163.2	-	150.4	-	-	-	-	594.3
3.2.1 AIR BASES, AIRFIELDS	-	-	-	125.4	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	125.5
3.2.2 NAVAL BASES AND FACILITIES	-	-	86.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86.9
3.2.3 ELECTRONICS FACILITIES	-	1.1	-	3.9	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	7.0
3.2.4 PERSONNEL FACILITIES	-	27.3	4.4	0.8	-	42.2	-	-	-	-	74.8
3.2.5 TRAINING FACILITIES	-	10.5	0.3	4.2	-	20.0	-	-	-	-	34.9
3.2.6 OTHER	-	103.5	46.5	28.9	-	86.1	-	-	-	-	265.1
4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	-	-	-	-	-	157.8	-	-	-	-	157.8
4.1 BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH	-	-	-	-	-	5.4	-	-	-	-	5.4
4.2 DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION	-	-	-	-	-	152.4	-	-	-	-	152.4
5. TOTAL (1+2+3+4)	-	5,304.6	3,011.1	3,978.0	-	6,449.9	5.1	15.7	-	-	18,764.4

*Due to rounding, figures may not add up to totals shown.



CHINA



I. SECURITY SITUATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Since the beginning of 2014, the Asia-Pacific region has maintained peace, stability and development in general. The countries of the region have witnessed stable and orderly development in the political and the economic fields; the major powers have enhanced their dialogue and cooperation; the general elections in such countries as India and Indonesia were carried out smoothly; Thailand, Myanmar and other countries in transition have remained stable on the whole. The hotspot issues of the region have been kept on the track of dialogue and consultation, remaining controllable by and large. The emerging economies and developing countries in Asia have continued to lead the economy of the world and improve their status and role in international affairs. With regional cooperation deepened and the regional economic integration systems improved, the Asia-Pacific region has become the world's most dynamic region for free-trade cooperation.

On the other hand, the region has been confronted with certainties and destabilizing factors. Impacted by the external environment and internal economic restructuring, the emerging economies in Asia have experienced a slowdown, and faced greater downward pressure. Uncertain ties that could affect regional peace and stability remain unresolved. Traditional geopolitical competition as well as

regional flashpoints and tough issues flared up from time to time, and disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime interests have caused constant disturbance to the relations between relevant countries. Non-traditional security challenges like terrorism and natural disasters have become more complex and multifaceted, and have intertwined and interacted with traditional challenges to make the security issues more urgent, interrelated and comprehensive.

II. CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY

China advocates the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. It stands for peaceful settlement of international disputes and regional flashpoints and against willful use or threat of force, aggression or external expansion.

The basic elements of China's defense policy include: safeguarding state security, unity and development interests; realizing comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of national defense and the armed forces; reinforcing the performance of the armed forces with information technology application as the major criterion; implementing a military strategic guideline of active defense; following a self-defensive nuclear strategy; and creating a security environment conducive to peaceful development of the country.



Confronted with complex and fluid security challenges, China continuously expands its vision of national security and military strategy, with an aim of winning information-based regional warfare. It harnesses the armed forces in peacetime, effectively copes with different security threats and performs diversified military functions. The diversified employment of China's armed forces adheres to the following basic policies and principles: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country's peaceful development; aiming to win IT-based regional warfare and expanding and intensifying military preparedness; formulating the concept of comprehensive security and effectively conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW); deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations; acting in strict accordance with laws, policies and disciplines.

China's armed forces have advocated, promoted and participated in international security cooperation. Abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, they engage in military exchanges with foreign countries in all dimensions, develop military cooperative relations on the basis of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting at any third party, and promote the establishment of collective security mechanisms and military mutual trust mechanisms based upon fairness and effectiveness. Guided by the idea of openness, pragmatism and cooperation, China has deepened military exchanges and cooperation with foreign countries, strengthened confidence-building measures (CBMs) cooperation in border areas, advanced maritime security dialogues and cooperation, participated in UN peacekeeping

operations, international anti-terrorism cooperation, and international escort and disaster relief missions, and held joint military trainings and exercises with other countries. In 2014, China successfully held the 5th Xiangshan Forum, which was upgraded to a Track 1.5 high-end security and defense forum in the Asia-Pacific region. China organized the annual meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and pushed for the adoption of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. China participated in "Cobra Gold 2014" humanitarian relief drills, and for the first time sent its naval fleet to join the "Rim of the Pacific 2014" multinational maritime exercise. China took part in the serial activities of SCO Defense Security Cooperation, including the Peace Mission-2014 joint anti-terrorism exercise and the "Horn Peace-2014" military music festival.

China is the only major country in the world that has not realized unification. It still faces diverse security risks and challenges and the arduous task of realizing national reunification and maintaining territorial integration. China's drive for military modernization is necessitated by its legitimate security demand and pursuit of peaceful development. China's national defense expenditure is transparent, reasonable and appropriate. In 2014, China's military budget was around 132 billion USD, taking up about 1.5% of its GDP, which was less than that of other major countries and less than the world average of 2.6%.

The PLA Army (PLAA) mobile operational units have a total strength of 850,000 people, including 18 combined corps and additional independent combined operational divisions (brigades). The



PLA Navy (PLAN) has a total strength of 235,000 people, commanding three fleets, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) now has a total strength of 398,000 people, including seven Military Area Commands (MACs) and one airborne corps. Other troops include the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), the Armed Police Forces (PAPF) and the militia.

III. CHINA'S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

China is committed to promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and following the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. China develops friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and is actively involved in regional cooperation. It rises to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges and works tirelessly for an Asia-Pacific region of lasting peace and common prosperity.

Relations with Major Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region

China-US Relations

Since the beginning of 2014, the overall relations between China and the US have remained stable and made new progress. The two countries have maintained close contacts at the top and other levels. In November 2014, President Obama attended the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting held in Beijing and paid a state visit to China, during

which the heads of the two countries agreed to remain committed to building of major country relations between China and the US and had an indepth discussion on how to further promote the key areas for the relationship. The 6th China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the 5th China-US High Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, and the 25th Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade between China and the US were held successfully, and have made positive achievements. The two countries have made new progress in economy and trade, military relations, cultural exchanges, local exchanges and cooperation, law enforcement and other areas, and maintained close and effective communication and coordination on major regional as well as global issues like the North Korea nuclear issue, the Iranian nuclear issue and climate change.

The two countries have continued to keep communication and coordination through bilateral exchanges and dialogue mechanisms at all levels. During the 6th China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July, the two countries agreed to work together to promote the positive interaction in Asia-Pacific region. When President Obama visited China in November, the two heads of state reached important agreement on China-US interaction and cooperation. On multilateral occasions like APEC, East Asia Summit and the foreign ministers' meetings for East Asia cooperation, the two countries also kept close communication on regional affairs and hotspot issues and made joint efforts to advance practical cooperation in areas such as Asia-Pacific connectivity, anti-piracy, marine environment protection and cultural



and people-to-people exchanges. The trilateral cooperation in which the two countries participated in East Timor went on smoothly.

China-Russia Relations

In 2014, China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination entered a new phase, enjoying sound and steady development at a high level. The leaders of the two countries kept close interactions. President Xi Jinping made Russia the first stop of his overseas visits for two consecutive years, and the two leaders met five times in 2014. The two sides firmly supported each other on issues related to their core interests, and their cooperation in areas like energy, transportation, finance, aviation and aerospace, science and technology, high speed trains, local exchanges, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges was further deepened and expanded.

The two sides maintained close cooperation on international and regional affairs including those in the Asia-Pacific, remained committed to safeguarding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the recognized norms of international relations, the outcome of World War II and international fairness and justice, and to boosting world multipolarity and democracy of international relations. They have both advocated common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and contributed to advancing the political solution of hotspot issues, and safeguarding peace, stability and prosperity of the region and beyond.

China-India Relations. In 2014, China-India strategic partnership witnessed steady transition and positive development after India's general election. In July, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 6th BRICS Summit. In September, President Xi paid a successful state visit to India. In November, Premier Li Keqiang met with Prime Minister Modi during the East Asia Summit. Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari and Prime Minister Modi's envoy and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval visited China respectively. During President Xi Jinping's visit to India, the two leaders laid down the framework for China-India strategic cooperation for the next 5-10 years, charting the course for the deepening of China-India Strategic Partnership and fostering of a closer development partnership between the two countries in the new era.

China-Japan Relations

Due to Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni shrine, China-Japan relations experienced severe setbacks at the beginning of 2014. Bearing in mind the bigger picture of the bilateral relations and regional peace and stability, China urged Japan to carefully tackle the issue of history, the Diaoyudao and other major sensitive issues, conduct dialogue and consultation on the maritime issues, advance friendly exchanges and practical cooperation in all areas, and promote the friendship and mutual trust between the two peoples. On 7th November, after several rounds of diplomatic negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement and published four



principles on how to handle and improve China-Japan relations. The heads of the two countries met during the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, which was an important step towards improvement of China-Japan relations.

Regional Cooperation

China-ASEAN Cooperation

China takes ASEAN as a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy, and firmly supports ASEAN Community building and ASEAN's leading role in regional cooperation. The two sides uphold the principles of mutual respect, equality, good-neighborliness and win-win cooperation, constantly strengthen strategic dialogues, enhance political mutual trust, and deepen cooperation in economy and trade, connectivity, finance, security, maritime, social and cultural affairs and other fields, so as to promote further development of their relations.

On 13 November 2014, the 17th China-ASEAN Summit was held in Nay Pyi Daw, Myanmar. Building on the "2+7 Cooperation Framework", Premier Li Keqiang put forward a series of new initiatives on the development of China-ASEAN relations, such as: formulating the *Action Plan of the China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020)*, advancing the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty of Good-neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and ASEAN, exploring the establishment of a Lancang-Mekong River dialogue and cooperation mechanism, building an upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and finishing the negotiation by the end of 2015,

speeding up the building of the infrastructure connectivity network, promoting the early operation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, designating 2015 as the year of China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation, ensuring "double security" in traditional and nontraditional areas, inviting ASEAN defense ministers to attend the Informal ASEAN-China Defense Ministers' Meeting in China in 2015, deepening the cooperation in areas like law enforcement security and disaster management, and effectively exploring potential cooperation in new areas like social and cultural affairs, technology and environmental protection.

In 2014, ASEAN-China trade volume grew by 8.3%, reaching US\$480.4 billion. The two sides held a series of ministerial meetings, including the 2nd ASEAN-China Cultural Ministers' Conference, the 4th ASEAN-China Defense Ministers' Meeting, the 13th AEM-MOFCOM Consultations, the 5th ASEAN-China Health Ministers' Meeting, the 4th ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting on Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and the 13th ASEAN-China Transport Ministers' Meeting. The two sides started negotiations on FTA upgrading, China and each ASEAN member state signed the Governmental Memorandum on Establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The two sides successfully held China-ASEAN Cultural Exchange Year activities in 2014.

ASEAN and China have enjoyed smooth maritime cooperation. In 2014, the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund supported more than 10 maritime cooperation programs. The year 2015 was designated as "China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Year". The two sides plan to hold a



series of activities in areas like maritime economy, maritime connectivity, scientific research and environmental protection, maritime security and maritime culture, and create new highlights in maritime cooperation.

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Cooperation

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Cooperation remains the main channel of East Asia cooperation. The year 2014 witnessed fresh progress in such cooperation. The Amended CMIM (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) Agreement came into effect as all parties had reached consensus on the Operational Guidelines for the amended version. As a result, the decoupling ratio of CMIM foreign reserve funds application and IMF lending program was raised from 20% to 30%. ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) made a concrete step forward and became an international organization with the formal conclusion of related upgrading agreements. The ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) council appointed its first-ever general manager of the Secretariat, and approved *APTERR Administrative Regulation* and other documents. The Secretariat coordinated efforts among APT nations to provide rice and other emergency assistance to the areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

On 13 November, 2014, the 17th ASEAN plus China, Japan and ROK Summit was held in Nay Pyi Daw, Myanmar. During the Summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced China is willing to take the lead in implementing three of the recommendations put forth in the review of the *Report of the EAVGII (East Asia Vision Group II)*, that is, enhancing East Asia

connectivity, promoting trade and investment and working for poverty alleviation. He also put forward proposals on strengthening APT cooperation, which include advancing East Asia economic integration, upgrading financial cooperation in the region, achieving closer connectivity, and deepening cooperation to improve people's well-being.

In 2014, China implemented a series of cooperation programs within the 10+3 framework, including the "Asian Credit System" sub-forum, the 6th East Asia Business Forum, the 2nd 10+3 Village Leaders Exchange Program, Summit on Construction of Asian Credit System, Modern Agriculture Training Class, the 3rd International Symposium on 10+3 Connectivity Partnership, and the 7th 10+3 Media Cooperation Forum.

China-Japan-ROK Cooperation

In 2014, China-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation was affected by China-Japan and ROK-Japan political relations, which had an impact upon trilateral cooperation. The trilateral summit and trilateral foreign ministers' meeting were canceled. Nevertheless, trilateral practical cooperation continued to move forward. The three countries completed three rounds of FTA negotiations, held ministerial meetings on public health, environment, central banks, transportation and logistics, public finance, culture, and audit, and organized important events such as Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum, Seminar on the 15th Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation & the First Trilateral People-to-People Exchange Forum, Consultation on Latin American Policies, Internet Policy Dialogue, Dialogue on Air Pollution Prevention, China-Japan-ROK



Supreme Audit Institutions Leaders' Meeting, the IPR Commissioners' Policy Dialogue, Table Top Exercise on Disaster Management, and Conference of Sister Cities. Collaborative programs such as East Asia Cultural City and Campus Asia proceeded steadily. *The Agreement on Promoting, Facilitating and Protecting Investment* formally came into effect after it passed through the legal procedures in each of the three countries.

In March 2015, thanks to the efforts of the three countries, the Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which had been suspended for three years, was held in Seoul, ROK. The three countries agreed to act on the spirit of "facing the history squarely and working together for the future" to properly handle the related issues, and make joint efforts to improve bilateral relations and strengthen trilateral cooperation.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

New progress was made in EAS cooperation in 2014. The 4th EAS Foreign Ministers' Meeting adopted the *Plan of Action to Implement the Phnom Penh Declaration on EAS Development Initiative*, which systematically sorts out important areas of cooperation and puts forward a vision for future cooperation. On 13 November, 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attended the 9th EAS, which adopted the *EAS Declaration on Combating Wildlife Trafficking, the Joint Statement of the 9th EAS on Regional Response to Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease, the EAS Statement on the Rise of Violence & Brutality by Terrorist/Extremist Organization in Iraq and Syria and the EAS statement on Rapid Disaster Response*.

In 2014, China held the 1st East Asia Summit Clean Energy Forum within the framework of the East Asia Summit, jointly held the EAS Earthquake Search and Rescue Exercise in China with the US and UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) jointly held the International Symposium on Regional Economic Integration and East Asia Summit. China is also working to set up an East Asia Climate Change Research and International Cooperation Center.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

In 2014, Shanghai Cooperation Organization maintained steady development. It held a series of important meetings participated by heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, defense ministers, economic and trade ministers, culture ministers, education ministers, agriculture ministers and justice ministers as well as expert working groups in various fields. These meetings advanced the cooperation between member states in the political, security, economic, cultural, and other fields. The heads of the member states approved the amendments to the *Model Memorandum on the Obligations of Applicant States for Obtaining SCO Member State Status and the Procedure for Granting the Status of the SCO Member States*, thus finishing the major legal preparation for the expansion of SCO, and opening the gate formally for new members.

China highly values and fully participates in all the activities within the framework of SCO. In 2014, President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and



other state leaders attended relevant meetings of SCO respectively and put forth a series of major initiatives for security, cultural, people-to-people, and other practical cooperation, announced the official launch of the Sino-Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund; offered member states US\$ 5 billion of loan to finance cooperation projects; contributed US \$50 million for promotion of agricultural technologies and personnel training; organized Commodity Exhibition and Food Security Forum of SCO member states in China; offered training opportunities for officials, managerial staff and technicians of member states. All of these measures received positive response and support from various parties.

Regional Hotspot Issues

Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue

In 2014, the tension over the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula was somewhat eased. The DPRK exercised restraint by refraining from nuclear tests and long-range ballistic missile test-fires. Since May, the DPRK has taken positive moves in an attempt to improve its relations with other countries, including the Track II diplomacy with the United States, the agreement with Japan on resuming the Tokyo-Pyongyang investigation into the kidnapping of Japanese citizens, and its high-ranking party and government officials' visits to South Korea, Russia, Europe, Africa and South east Asia. On the other hand, the DPRK continued to pursue the policy of "carrying out economic construction and nuclear force building in tandem", which led to substantial disagreement between the DPRK and other parties concerned

on the threshold for resuming the Six-Party Talks. The DPRK insisted that the Talks should be resumed with no conditions attached, whereas the United States, ROK, and Japan demanded that substantive nuclear-abandoning steps be taken by DPRK. Therefore, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula remains thorny and complex, and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks was still faced with many difficulties.

China's stance on this issue is clear and consistent. China advocates denuclearization and maintenance of peace and stability on the Peninsula and settlement of the issue through dialogue and consultation. Since the beginning of 2014, China has done a great deal in facilitating the process of denuclearization on the Peninsula, upholding the overall peace and stability there and pushing for an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. By keeping close contacts with all parties concerned and adopting a multi-pronged, multi-dimensional and targeted approach, China has urged all parties to act in a way that is conducive to easing tensions and work together to create conditions for the resumption of the Talks, and put the DPRK nuclear issue on the track of sustainable, irreversible and result-oriented dialogue at an early date. China stands ready to work with the international community to strive for denuclearization on the Peninsula and the long-term peace and stability of the Peninsula and the Northeast Asia.

Afghanistan

The year 2014 marked a key transition's period for Afghanistan. The US and the NATO by and large completed troops withdrawal from Afghanistan after



the establishment of the new Afghan government. Afghanistan faced new opportunities in peaceful reconstruction and national reconciliation, but it was also confronted with many difficulties and challenges.

China has consistently supported the peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation process led by the Afghan government, and hopes to see an Afghanistan that is united, stable, prosperous and at peace with its neighboring countries. At the end of October 2014, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai paid a state visit to China. During his visit, the Chinese side announced that it would provide free aid worth 500 million RMB to Afghanistan in 2014, and 1.5 billion RMB from 2015 to 2017. China also promised to help train 3,000 professionals for Afghanistan in the next five years.

China took an active part in Afghanistan's post-war reconstruction. It assisted in the construction of a number of infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, and provided training for hundreds of Afghan professionals and technicians. China attaches great importance to trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, and encourages and supports the efforts of Chinese companies to invest in Afghanistan.

China has made constructive efforts to facilitate through various means the settlement of the Afghan issue. First, China held the fourth Foreign Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan. The conference identified 64 priority cooperation projects on confidence-building

measures under the framework of the process. This further facilitated the consensus among regional countries and the international community on the Afghan issue, and provided political support for the new Afghan government. Second, China held China-Russia-Pakistan, China-Russia-India, and China-Afghanistan-Pakistan multilateral dialogues to strengthen dialogue among countries of the region. Third, China actively mediated between Afghanistan and Pakistan to help improve the relations between the two countries. Fourth, in cooperation with the United States, China launched such projects as the joint training programs for Afghan diplomats.

Non-traditional Security Cooperation Disaster Relief

China attaches great importance to and fully supports region-wide cooperation in disaster relief. It is intensively engaged in international cooperation in disaster relief and supports establishment of mechanisms of mutual visits, information sharing, personnel training, technological exchanges, simulation exercises, scientific research cooperation, material reserves and emergency aid, in order to enhance bilateral and multilateral practical cooperation in disaster relief and jointly improve the capacity in disaster mitigation and relief.

Ever since 2014, China has hosted the 6th APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group Meeting, the 8th Senior Disaster Management Official Forum, attended the 6th Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2nd Asian Regional Partnership Conference of United Nations



International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, the Disaster Emergency Department Senior Level Expert Meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-Japan-ROK Tabletop Exercise on Disaster Relief, the 6th China-Russia-India Disaster Management Department Expert Meeting, ROK Disaster Loss Data and Disaster Relief Technology Sharing Expert Meeting, and observed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Disaster Relief Exercise in Kazakhstan. Besides, China also held the 13th ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the Disaster Relief and Emergency Management Workshop. China took an active part in the preparations for the 4th ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) that was held in Malaysia in May 2015. It also assisted ASEAN countries in strengthening disaster management capability building. China also jointly initiated the “Asia Community-Based Disaster Management Cooperation Program” with UNDP and DFID, and held Community Disaster Risk Management Training Class jointly with Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, the Symposium on the Application of Communication Technologies in Disaster Prevention and Relief Area with International Civil Defense Organization

On 4 December 2014, an accident happened at a desalination plant in Male, capital of Maldives, putting 150,000 local residents into a drinking water crisis. At the request of the Maldivian government, the Chinese government offered emergency humanitarian assistance. China’s timely and effective relief efforts won high praise from the Maldivian government and the international community. China also took immediate actions

to provide emergency humanitarian disaster relief in the form of cash and supplies when Malaysia was stricken by the worst floods of the last four decades at the end of 2014.

Counter-terrorism Cooperation.

In recent years, counter-terrorism cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries and regional organizations has been reinforced and considerable progress has been made in combating terrorism in the region. However, the root causes of terrorism are far from being eliminated. Terrorist activities have increased in some areas. Trans-border movement and collusion among terrorist forces are on the rise. Threat from cyber terrorism is becoming increasingly serious. Generally speaking, terrorist activities remain a major threat to the security of the Asia-Pacific region and counter-terrorism is still a major task for all countries in the region.

The Chinese government opposes all forms of terrorism and calls on the international community to work together on the basis of the *Charter of the United Nations* and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. China believes that dialogues among different civilizations should be boosted and the breeding ground for terrorism should be eliminated with comprehensive use of the integrated use of political, economic and diplomatic means.

China is also a victim of terrorism. It is faced with the immediate threat of the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces represented by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. “East Turkistan” terrorist forces were



behind several violent terrorist attacks that took place in China in recent years. China attaches great importance to and has been actively engaged in counter-terrorism activities in the Asia-Pacific region. China will enhance counter-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries and regional organizations to achieve new progress and safeguard peace and stability in the region. In 2014, China conducted bilateral or multilateral exchanges and consultations on counter-terrorism with the US, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, ROK and Indonesia, actively promoted cooperation under the international and regional multilateral mechanisms such as Counter-terrorism Working Group of APEC and Global Counter-terrorism Forum, co-chaired the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crimes, and hosted the Symposium on Countering Terrorists' Use of the Internet within the framework of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum and the 9th Trade Security Conference within the framework of APEC.

Cooperation Combating Transnational Crimes

China values and takes an active part in international cooperation on combating transnational organized crimes. Maintaining good cooperation with the United Nations and regional organizations, China has also taken many joint actions with some Southeast Asian countries in combating transnational organized crimes. For example, China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand have carried out joint patrol operations along the Mekong

River on many occasions. Besides, China also launched a series of activities within multilateral and bilateral frameworks to deepen cooperation on law enforcement capability building.

China has been active in building the bilateral judicial cooperation network with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. By January 2015, China had concluded extradition treaties with Thailand, ROK, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, Russia and Australia (those with Indonesia and Australia have not come into effect yet); and concluded criminal judicial assistance treaties with Japan, ROK, Indonesia, Thailand, Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand. China set up a national-level cooperation mechanism on law enforcement and security with Russia and held its first meeting in June 2014. In addition, China promoted the adoption of the *Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption* at the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the establishment of APEC Network of Anti-Corruption Authorities and Law Enforcement Agencies. China is willing to work with other Asia-Pacific countries to strengthen cooperation and communication within all kinds of frameworks including the *United Nations Convention against Corruption*, the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, the *United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* and to push forward the negotiation and conclusion of extradition treaties and criminal judicial assistance treaties with more Asia-Pacific nations, so as to reinforce the legal basis for international cooperation.



Cyber Security

In recent years, cyber security has become a comprehensive security challenge for all countries. Asia-Pacific countries have invested more into cyber security and become more active in relevant dialogue and mechanism building. China is firmly committed to maintaining cyber security. It supports and actively participates in international efforts in this regard. China advocates that all countries should reinforce international cooperation and formulate widely accepted international code of conduct on the basis of mutual respect, in order to build a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyber space and a multilateral, democratic, transparent international governance system over the Internet and prevent some individual countries from damaging the interests of other countries by taking advantage of their monopolistic position on the Internet.

In 2014, China continued to proactively promote and participate in the Internet multilateral processes and regional cooperation mechanisms on cyber security. For example, China took an active part in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security and the UN Internet Governance Forum, donated to the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber Crime, proactively pushed for an early consensus on updating the *International Code of Conduct for Information Security in the SCO Expert Group on Information Security*, advocated the establishment of BRICS Expert Group on Cyber Security, and urged the 53rd Annual Session of Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization to put “International Legal Problem

of Cyber Space” in its agenda. China also made its contribution to international cyber security by jointly holding the International Symposium on Information and Cyber Security with the UN in China and hosting the 1st World Internet Conference to build consensus. China also had extensive and in-depth exchanges of views with other parties in regional and international conferences such as the Symposium on Internet in the Asia-Pacific Region held by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Summit on Global Cyber Space Cooperation, and meetings on cyber warfare and international humanitarian law held in Beijing and Geneva by International Committee of the Red Cross.

China attaches great importance to and takes an active part in the Asia-Pacific Regional Internet Process. It has constructively participated in discussions over the ARF Cyber Security Working Plan and the process of combating cyber crimes within the ARF framework, to promote a balanced and inclusive development of regional cyber security cooperation. China has made continuous efforts in strengthening bilateral dialogue and pragmatic cooperation. For example, it held a new round of cyber security consultation with Russia, the 3rd meeting of China-Europe Working Group on Cyber Space, the 12nd meeting of China-US JLG on Law Enforcement Cooperation. It worked for the establishment of China-Japan-ROK and China-Australia Internet policy dialogue mechanisms and held their first rounds of dialogue. China held the 1st China-ASEAN Cyberspace Forum and Boao Forum for Asia Cyber Security Forum, in order to propel regional countries to achieve consensus



and deepen cooperation on important cyber issues like capability building, cyber space international regulations, Internet governance, and combating cyber terrorism and crimes.

Maritime Security

With the economic and social development in the Asia-Pacific, the importance of maintaining regional maritime security becomes more prominent, and there is a rising willingness among regional countries to achieve this goal through cooperation. A more complicated maritime security situation also calls for increased cooperation among related countries to jointly maintain maritime security and stability and provide a sound maritime environment for regional economic development. China has conducted various forms of maritime security cooperation and communication with other Asia-Pacific countries and enhanced mutual understanding and trust with them.

China took an active part in cooperation under the working mechanisms such as ARF, East Asia Summit and APEC. It made great efforts in promoting the practical maritime security cooperation. For example, it held the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting on Transportation, ASEAN-China Maritime Consultation Mechanism, China-Vietnam Consultation on Maritime Cooperation in Low-Sensitive Area, China-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation Committee meeting, ARF Seminar on the Regional Cooperation on Offshore Oil Spill, ARF Seminar on Sea Lines of Communications Security, and urged the 21st ARF Foreign Ministers' Meeting to adopt the *ARF Statement on Cooperation in Prevention, Preparedness, Response and*

Restoration Oil Spill Incidents and the ARF Statement on Strengthening Cooperation and Coordination on Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue. As a founding member of the *Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP)*, China supports the capacity building and development of the Information Sharing Center (ISC). In 2014, Chinese representatives attended the 8th Annual Council Meeting of the ReCAAP ISC, the 3rd Special Council Meeting of ISC & Senior Officials Meeting of National Liaison Points, donated US\$50,000 to the center and sent replacement staff to the its secretariat. In 2014, China put a great deal of human resources and materials into the search for Malaysian Airline flight MH370. A total of 19 vessels and ships, 8 helicopters, 5 fixed-wing aircrafts were involved in the search and 101 passing-by business ships, 20 fishing boats assisted the search in a total area of more than 1.4 million square kilometers. After Air Asia flight QZ8501 crashed, Chinese vessels and ships took part in the retrieving of its debris and the search work for its black box. From December 2008, when China sent its first naval fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, to January 2015, the Chinese fleets fulfilled 803 missions, escorting 5,863 civilian vessels, of which 3,015 were foreign vessels. There were 17 Chinese vessels escorted and rescued, 43 Chinese and foreign vessels in 32 times rescued from pirates' chasing, and 7 vessels for World Food Program escorted. The Chinese naval fleets conducted intensive exchanges and cooperation with escorting fleets from other countries and shared information with relevant countries and organizations. The Chinese government and the military officials attended



international conferences on escort cooperation like the meeting of Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) and other international mechanisms, as well as related discussions to advance international escort cooperation.

China thinks highly of the cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies, and has actively participated in the experts meeting and senior officials' meeting of North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, Asian Coast Guard Agencies' experts meeting and senior officials' meeting, as well as the related cooperation within the framework of ASEAN.

China has sufficient historical and legal evidence for its sovereignty over Nansha Islands and adjacent waters in the South China Sea. China actively advocates the principle of "shelving disputes and seeking joint development", approves and supports the "dual-track" approach to deal with South China Sea issues, according to which specific disputes are to be solved through negotiations and consultations by countries directly concerned and peace and stability in the region be jointly upheld by China and ASEAN countries working together. In 2014, China kept close communication with ASEAN countries on the issue of the South China Sea, strengthened practical maritime cooperation, with fruitful results and effectively maintained peace and stability in the South China Sea. China and ASEAN countries held two senior officials' meetings on implementing the *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)* and three joint working group meetings to exchange views

on fully and effectively implementing the DOC and strengthening pragmatic maritime cooperation. The two sides also held consultations over *Code of Conduct in South China Sea (COC)* within the framework of the DOC, whereby both agreed to conclude the COC as early as possible on the basis of consensus and arrived at important understanding over "early achievements".

Cooperation in Non-proliferation and Disarmament

Currently, regional hotspot issues, terrorism, transnational organized crimes and cyber crimes are posing serious challenges for non-proliferation efforts. Regional countries have deepened consensus on the general goal of non-proliferation, and they are deepening their practical cooperation in this regard.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China always maintains a high sense of responsibility in non-proliferation issues, firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery in the Asia-Pacific region, strictly observes its international obligation under related resolutions of the Security Council, and constantly reinforces its own non-proliferation regime and its related law enforcement capability.

China supports and takes an active part in international efforts in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China earnestly implements



the regulations of the final documents of the Eighth Review Conference of the *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, took an active part in the new round review of the NPT and the P5 Conference on Implementing the NPT. China is ready to make unremitting efforts with all parties to achieve the three goals of “nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear power” set by the NPT. China supports the early signing and coming into effect of the Protocol to the *Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone* and is ready to sign this treaty. It will urge ASEAN and the other four nuclear-weapon states to solve their disagreements through consultation and sign this Protocol and make it effective at an early date. China stands for comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of all WMD, including chemical weapons. China firmly opposed to the development, preservation and use of chemical weapons by anyone, supports the purpose and goals of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention)* and the work of the *Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*, and fully and earnestly fulfills its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. China stresses the importance of international exchanges and cooperation within the framework of the convention.

In April 2014, China and OPCW Secretariat jointly held the “International Symposium on Chemical Safety and Security” in Beijing, China, as always, insists on resolving the issue of Syrian chemical weapons through peaceful means and actively

implements the decisions and resolutions of OPCW and the United Nations. Besides, China dispatched experts to participate in the investigation, and provided necessary material assistance. In the first half of 2014, two warships sent from China participated in 20 times of multilateral joint escort missions for Syrian chemical weapons’ delivery by sea.

Since 2014, China has conducted productive cooperation with ARF members in such areas as disarmament, non-proliferation, and space security. It attended the 6th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the AFR Space Security Workshop and the Seminar on UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The Chinese government made another donation of US\$50,000 to the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific to support its relevant activities.

IV. CHINA’S PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ARF

After over 20 years of development, the ARF has become the most inclusive and influential platform for official multilateral dialogue and cooperation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. All parties have taken confidence-building measures as the core mission of the forum and have been promoting preventive diplomacy based on consensus and steadily enhanced cooperation in non-traditional security fields. Today, the ARF is in a new phase of development with both opportunities and challenges. Looking into the future of the ARF, the parties should keep the following essential points in mind:



The first is “inclusiveness”. The ARF should stick to the existing concept and principles, and advocate the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We should uphold the principles of consensus, gradualism, accommodating all parties’ comfort level, and non-interference in each others’ internal affairs. These principles are the foundation of all regional security dialogues and cooperation under the framework of the ARF. To ensure its healthy development, we should remain committed to ASEAN centrality, promote dialogue and cooperation in the “ASEAN Way” and take into account the concerns and interests of all parties. The ARF should also be open and inclusive, so as to encourage non-ASEAN member states to play a more active role. It should strengthen its overall coordination with such regimes as ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus to avoid overlap and to form a joint force to increase the ARF’s effectiveness.

The second is “trust”. The ARF should continue to enhance confidence-building measures and make it a lasting theme in the whole process of ARF development. In promoting preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, the parties should take into account the regional diversity and complexity. Due to historical and practical reasons, lack of mutual trust remains a bottleneck for Asia-Pacific security cooperation. Only when all parties have strong mutual trust can we lay a solid base for the success of preventive diplomacy. In carrying out preventive diplomacy, we should not blindly copy the experience of other regions. Instead, all parties should abide by the *ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (2001)*, stick to its principle of non-compulsory,

non-interference in domestic affairs and other basic principles and try to find ways of preventive diplomacy that apply to the real conditions of the region.

The third is “pragmatism”. ARF cooperation in non-traditional security fields should be more practical and concrete. Peace, stability, cooperation and development have become the mainstream in the Asia-Pacific region. However, enormous challenges and factors of instability also exist. Many traditional security issues remain to be addressed, while non-traditional security challenges such as natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crimes are also pronounced. To tackle the challenges is the greatest common divisor of the interests of countries in the region. The ARF should give full play to its advantages and focus the cooperation on preventing and addressing non-traditional security challenges in the region by consistently deepening cooperation in disaster prevention and relief, combating terrorism and transnational crimes, maritime security and cyber security, so as to inject new vigor and vitality into the forum’s development.

As a founding member of the ARF, China has been contributing to the development of the forum and promoting practical cooperation in all fields in the past 20 years and more. In the future, China is ready to work with all other members to advocate the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, keep the forum on the right track, and promote cooperation in all forms and in all fields, so as to make greater contribution to creating a harmonious security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.



DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In the Asia-Pacific region, serious challenges threatening regional peace and security remain as ever.

The biggest challenge comes from acceleration of arms race with continuous arms buildup and military exercises to secure domination and extend sphere of influence in the region.

Competition is being intensified for superiority in setting up missile defence, building and deployment of submarines and aircraft carriers, development of ballistic missiles and new fighter planes and so on.

It is none other than the US that invokes a dangerous arms race in the region.

From the military strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the global economic hub, the US pursues the strategy of dominating the

region through the strengthening of military alliances while deploying its military forces intensively in the region.

The US attempt to deploy Theatre High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) in south Korea, first overseas deployment following deployment in the US mainland and Guam, is related to its moves to establish Missile Defence system, an important component of its strategy to dominate the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, the US expanded to the whole world the sphere of Self-Defence Forces' activities, which had been limited only to the vicinity of Japan, by having revised and issued the new "US-Japan defence cooperation guidelines".

The strengthened US-Japan military alliance will inevitably result in destroying the stability of Northeast Asia, increasing antagonism and discord in the region and sparking off disputes and arms race.



As the US drags Japan and south Korea deep into pursuit of its ambition for regional domination, there exists a danger of conflict, which may break out at any moment in Northeast Asia.

No matter how the structure of relations among neighboring countries may change, the DPRK will invariably hold fast to the Songun politics and the line of simultaneously developing the economy and the nuclear forces and bolster up its capability for self-defence with the nuclear deterrent as a pivot in order to safeguard the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the region.

II. SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The Korean Peninsula is a touch-and-go nuclear powder-keg where the largest nuclear weapon state and the youngest nuclear weapon state of the world are sharply confronted each other in a state of war.

The US has been pursuing hostile policy toward the DPRK for 70 years since the founding of the DPRK, with intent to negate and eliminate the ideology and social system chosen by the Korean people.

It is also necessary for the US, which seeks plausible excuses for arms buildup in a bid to hold an unchallenged military edge in the Asia-Pacific region, to have "justification" for intervention by constantly straining the situation of the Korean Peninsula, which is located close to its strategic rivals in the region.

Such being the case, the US designated the DPRK, the country that differs in the political views and social system, as a target of attack and has been pushing the situation to a crisis by moving latest military hardware including strategic means of nuclear strike into the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula.

The nuclear threat of the US toward the DPRK is by no means abstract but a practical and physical matter. Strategic nuclear bombers fly non-stop from the US mainland or Guam to the Korean Peninsula and stage drills of dropping nuclear bombs several times every year. Aircraft carriers and submarines loaded with nuclear missiles constantly enter the waters around the Korean Peninsula and take part in nuclear war exercises aimed to "occupy Pyongyang".

"Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle" joint military exercises staged across south Korea from March 2 to April 24 this year were real war drills aimed at the "invasion of the north". They have more provocative nature than ever before. Unlike the past years, a US coastal warship manufactured to suit the seabed features off the Korean Peninsula was included for the first time in these war exercises with mobilization of huge US forces in south Korea, the US mainland, Japan and other overseas bases and south Korean forces and massive war means. And the launching test of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile "Minuteman-3" which had been planned for 2013 joint military exercises and then postponed was conducted twice as well.



By putting sustained pressure on the DPRK, the US seeks to prevent it from concentrating efforts on economic construction and improvement of people's living standard, and by describing those exercises as "annual and defensive", it seeks to make the DPRK get accustomed and used to its war exercises and grow lax, and then strike the DPRK by surprise.

The US is making frantic efforts to deploy Missile Defence as a part of military reinforcement pursuant to its strategy for rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. Recently the US makes much ado about "missile threat" of the DPRK. The truth is, however, that the US had already marked south Korea for Missile Defence deployment in 1990s when it pushed on with the setup of Theatre Missile Defence, long before the DPRK even possessed nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

What the US seeks in the deployment of THAAD is to round off its preparations for mounting a preemptive strike at the DPRK and create favourable conditions for containing China and Russia, its strategic rivals, pursuant to its strategy for dominating the world.

It is regarded as a dangerous manoeuvre upsetting the existing deterrence balance in the region, and is arousing serious concern and cautions of many countries as THAAD's high-performance radar with a monitoring range of 1000~4000km can closely detect and track the military movements of Eurasia further beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Surrounding countries warn that south Korea would become a target of nuclear attack from other countries since the THAAD deployment in south Korea would go beyond the "red-line".

In view of the radar capability and other technical features of THAAD, the US assertion that THAAD deployment in south Korea is necessary to "counter missile threats of the DPRK", is a far-fetched theory like trying to catch a fish with a bow instead of a hook.

One side's threat will invoke the reaction from the other.

The hostile policy of the US toward the DPRK for over half a century, not just a few years, compelled the DPRK to possess nukes. The ever-increasing military threat of the US is pushing the DPRK to bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defence.

The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is barely managed under control owing to the utmost restraint being exercised on the part of the DPRK.

Early this year the DPRK set forth bold and flexible proposals to remove the danger of war, defuse tension and create a peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula, and made sincere efforts to that end.

The DPRK clarified that in case the US temporarily discontinues joint military exercises in and around south Korea, the DPRK has the willingness to



respond to it with a moratorium on a nuclear test which the US is much concerned about, and expressed the position that the DPRK is always ready to sit with the US at a negotiating table.

However, the US totally refused the proposal and sincere efforts of the DPRK and answered with provocations such as declaration of “additional sanctions” against the DPRK, public utterance of “bringing down” of the social system of the DPRK and performance of joint military exercises to “occupy Pyongyang”.

As it becomes clear that the US cannot bring down the DPRK by means of the “nuclear issue”, the US even attempts to tarnish the prestige of the DPRK and internationalize the moves to isolate it by another means of pressure like “human rights issue”.

Now that the US has become all the more pronounced in its hostile policy toward the DPRK, bereft of reason, the DPRK cannot but take tougher counteraction of justice.

It is self-evident that no sincere dialogue is possible with one attempting by all means to eliminate the other.

The DPRK feels no need to “explore” the clear hostile policy of the US toward the DPRK any longer and the DPRK’s position that it would never give up the nukes, is well known to the US as well.

Given the grim situation and atmosphere prevailing on the Korean Peninsula, it has especially high possibility of flaring up into uncontrollable flames by any accidental little spark.

The DPRK is fully ready for any form of war which the US wants and may opt. Now the DPRK has the power of deterring the US and conducting a preemptive strike as well if necessary.

The recent DPRK’s underwater test-fire of ballistic missile from a strategic submarine is also part of its legitimate measures to bolster up the self-defensive capability to safeguard its sovereignty and dignity in order to cope with the ever-more undisguised moves of the hostile forces to stifle the DPRK by military means.

The DPRK’s response will depend on whether the US persists in its hostile policy or makes a bold switchover in its policy toward the DPRK.

This year marks the seventy years since the Korean nation was divided by the outside forces.

Fifteen years passed since the heads of the north and the south had a historic meeting, the first of its kind since the division of the country, in Pyongyang and adopted the June 15 Joint Declaration on achieving peaceful reunification of the country through united efforts on the principle of By Our Nation Itself.



In those decades the world has made a tremendous advance and the times have undergone dramatic changes but the Korean nation has not yet achieved reunification, suffering from the pain of division.

The respected leader **Kim Jong Un**, First Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK, has underscored in his new year's address that the north and the south should refrain from seeking confrontation of systems while absolutizing their own ideologies and systems but achieve great national unity true to the principle of By Our Nation Itself to satisfactorily resolve the reunification issue in conformity with the common interests of the nation.

The DPRK holds that reunification of the Korean nation should be achieved on a federation formula whereby two different systems coexist in a unified state as agreed in the June 15 Joint Declaration, not seeking confrontation of systems. The DPRK firmly believes that such formula of reunification is the only way to guarantee lasting peace, security and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula.

In case south Korea imposes a war continuing to deny the June 15 Joint Declaration and seek "unification of systems", the DPRK will achieve reunification by leading it to a great war for national reunification. The DPRK is fully ready for it.

The DPRK will continue its sincere efforts for improvement of north-south relations and realization of national reunification and build a reunified state that is prosperous and powerful by putting an end to the tragedy of national division that has continued century after century.

When Korea is reunified, it will definitely constitute a fulfillment of the national desire as well as a decisive contribution to the peace and security of not only the Korean Peninsula but also Northeast Asia where the interests of big powers clash.

III. ROLE OF ARF

The ARF, as a forum for dialogue on peace and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, contributes to promotion of confidence- building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution among its participating states.

The ARF also takes measures to effectively counter non-traditional challenges hindering the development of the region.

The DPRK makes all efforts to promote various exchange and cooperation with ASEAN countries out of its invariable position of attaching importance to ASEAN. Since its participation in the ARF in 2000, the DPRK signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2008, accredited its ambassador to ASEAN in 2011, and looks forward to ASEAN-DPRK dialogue partner in the coming years.

The DPRK will further develop friendly and cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries and other ARF participating states on the principles of respect for sovereignty, non-interference and equality and fulfill its responsibility for safeguarding peace and security of the region, in accordance with the idea of its external policy – independence, peace and friendship.



EUROPEAN UNION



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The inter-sessional year 2014 to 2015 was a year of consolidation and deepening of the EU's relations with its Asian and Pacific partners. The EU's objectives have been to reconfirm its engagement with its current strategic partners (China, India, Japan, South Korea), to enhance its engagement in and with the emerging regional security architecture and to launch policy initiatives concerning the EU's future cooperation with ASEAN.

EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on global challenges, from crisis management to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance. The EU's actions are framed by the core tenets of the Lisbon Treaty: to contribute to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights and the development of international law.

Against the background of our own experiences, we are a natural supporter of efforts aiming at building a robust multilateral and rule-based, cooperative security order in Asia. The EU accession to the

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012 has intensified engagement with the **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** and EU leaders have attended key high-level multilateral meetings on security in the region, from the Shangri-La Dialogue on Security in Asia to Annual ARF Ministerials.

From autumn 2013 to spring 2014, the EU co-chaired the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy and the related Defence Officials Dialogue, which underlined the EU's willingness to step-up co-operation with its Asian partners.

In 2014, EU-ASEAN cooperation was further strengthened, through the implementation of the Brunei Plan of Action 2013-17. Working towards a more ambitious EU-ASEAN political partnership, several high-level visits and meetings took place that confirmed the positive momentum. The 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting took place in Brussels on 23 July and in October, in the margins of the ASEM Summit in Milan, EU and ASEAN leaders had an informal meeting. Both sides agreed to work towards the upgrading of the partnership to a strategic one and tasked their Senior Officials to develop a roadmap for this goal.



In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, continued to address regional and international security issues. The HR took part in the 21st ARF Ministerial in Myanmar on 10 August 2014, setting out the EU's stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. She also reiterated the EU's ambition to take part in the East Asia Summit.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

a. Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

2014 was a decisive year for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Armed conflict, destruction and the loss of human lives in the European Union's neighbourhood called for swift and determined action and demonstrated the need for a truly united European Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Over the past year the EU used the entire range of its tools – CFSP and non-CFSP – to respond to these challenges, to tackle them in an integrated way and to alleviate their impact on the countries concerned as well as on Europe. The broader global changes driving the numerous and simultaneous crises we faced also highlight the need to forge a long-term strategy for the EU's external action.

2014 saw a new leadership take office, which dedicated itself to even greater coordination between the European External Action Service, the European Commission services and Member States to maintain a truly global reach for the EU in supporting peace, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Throughout the year, the EU coupled diplomacy with new and existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on the ground, humanitarian intervention in areas hit by crisis and development aid for those in need. We also worked closely with international, regional and local partners.

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy contributes to global peace and security in a number of ways. First, the EU is directly involved in – and in some cases leads – international peace negotiations on behalf of the international community, for example between Belgrade and Pristina and in the Iran nuclear talks. International concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme remained at the centre of EU-Iran relations. The HR/VP in her role as lead negotiator on behalf of the E3 +3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom as well as China, Russia and the United States), based on a mandate of the UN Security Council, was actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to find a lasting and comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of the negotiations remains to agree with Iran on verifiable guarantees about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In parallel, the EU will



continue to press Iran to play a constructive role in the region (as well as live up to its international obligations domestically on, among other things, human rights). In the event of a nuclear agreement, the chances for the development of an enhanced and productive EU relationship with Iran will be greatly increased.

Second, the EU can assemble a wide range of tools – political and economic – to tackle important foreign policy challenges. In a world where security challenges are becoming ever more complex, the EU's approach to external action adds particular value by addressing all dimensions of a crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation. We see the benefits of such an approach in situations as diverse as EU action to address the crisis in Ukraine and in how it has dealt with countering piracy at the Horn of Africa.

Third, the EU works closely with – and materially support – international and regional partners to deal with regional challenges where only collective efforts can deliver results, such as climate change, sustainable development, and disaster risk management and relief. 2014 was a crucial year in preparing the ground for our negotiations within the UN framework towards post-2015 Development goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To promote democracy, the European Union sent election observation teams to the Maldives, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Egypt, Kosovo¹, Mozambique and

¹ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Tunisia. The EU also intensified cooperation with its regional and strategic partners to meet global threats and challenges.

The development of the **EU Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP)** has allowed significant and increasing EU-UN civilian and military crisis management cooperation, such as off the coast of Somalia (ATALANTA), Kosovo (EULEX), Mali (EUTM Mali), Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) and continues to be an important part of our overall partnership. On 22 June 2015 the Council launched the EU naval operation against human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean called EUNAVFOR MED. Its mission is to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers.

The EU took additional steps to mainstream its human rights and gender policies in CSDP missions and operations. In line with the 2013 Crisis Management Procedures, human rights and gender considerations were addressed during the planning process for new missions and operations, and an analysis of the human rights and gender situation was integrated into planning documents, including for the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine and EUFOR Central African Republic. Furthermore, the conflict early warning system (EWS), which includes many human rights-related indicators, was gradually rolled-out at global level. In 2014, there were advisers or focal points for human rights and gender in all CSDP missions and operations.



Their tasks include both mainstreaming human rights and gender into the work of the mission or operation, and implementing specific activities. The EU continued to advance its commitment to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security both internally -via the EU Member States Informal Taskforce- and by promoting the development of National Action Plans with third countries. The Second Report on the EU-indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820 on Women, Peace and Security was published in January 2014.

In its efforts to entrench human rights issues in its **counter-terrorism activities**, the EEAS, in co-operation with other EU institutions, elaborated a Counterterrorism Guidance to be applied in the planning and implementation of counter-terrorism assistance projects with Third Countries. The Guidance, which was endorsed by MS in November, takes into account International Humanitarian Law and International Refugee Law.

A total of 16 EU CSDP missions and operations were operating on the ground in 2014; one new military operation and two new civilian missions were established: EUFOR CAR, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Ukraine. A total of around 7000 staff is deployed under CSDP.² The contribution of partners to CSDP is commendable. The EU continued close co-operation with international

² Following the events of July 2014, EUBAM Libya was evacuated from Tripoli with a limited staff operating out of Tunisia.

organisations including UN, NATO, AU, OSCE. It was key in addressing crises in Africa, Middle East, Ukraine, Afghanistan and the Balkans in a comprehensive and complementary manner. During 2014 fifteen partner countries have participated in CSDP missions and operations, some of them joining for the first time: Georgia in EUFOR RCA, Australia in EUCAP Nestor, and Republic of Moldova in EUTM Mali. The EU signed three new Framework Agreements on participation in EU crisis management operations, which are in the process of respective ratifications: with Chile, Colombia and the Republic of Korea.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

i. Counterterrorism

The EU remains fully committed to preventing and fighting terrorism, promoting the rule of law and criminal justice while respecting human rights. The EU's key objectives at global level remain to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism, including in the framework of the ARF and its ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. Political dialogues on counter-terrorism with EU partners were continued in 2014. Dedicated dialogues were held with the UN, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US.

The EU continued to support the key role of the UN in multilateral cooperation in combating and preventing terrorism. Overall, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is integral to the EU's



approach to counter-terrorism. The EU strongly supported UNSG efforts on implementation of the UN Global CT Strategy. Within this framework, the EU and its member states worked on effectively addressing the threat of the foreign fighters through concrete measures. The brutal terror of Daesh made it necessary to concentrate even more on the situation in Syria and Iraq. This has led to the elaboration of the EU Syria/Iraq CT/ Foreign Fighters strategy which was adopted by the Council on 20 October. This is a key part of the EU's comprehensive efforts to implement UNSCR 2178 on Foreign Fighters and countering violent extremism. In 2014, Member States also agreed to increase by 400% the EU's assistance to third countries earmarked for counter-terrorism in the next financial framework 2014-2020. This assistance continued its focus mainly on the following priority areas: South Asia region, in particular Pakistan, Afghanistan; Sahel, Nigeria and Maghreb; Horn of Africa/Yemen and the implementation of the UN standards on counter-terrorism.

The EU further remained a strong supporter of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and the three GCTF-inspired institutions; Hedayah, international centre of excellence on countering violent extremism, GCERF, Engagement and Resilience Fund and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law.

On terrorist financing, the EU approved a specific programme to foster Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) capacities in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. By December 2014 the EU had published 15 Implementing Regulations concerning the Al-Qaida

sanctions regime, which transposes decisions taken by the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee into EU law.

ii. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Non-proliferation and disarmament continued to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy in 2014, contributing to the effective implementation of the European Security Strategy.³ In summary, the EU in 2014 continued to support universal accession to relevant international treaties and instruments as well as their full and effective implementation, particularly with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the newly adopted Arms Trade Treaty. The EU also continued to promote the inclusion of clauses on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as on small arms and light weapons, into agreements between the EU and third states, in particular with Brunei, Japan, Kazakhstan and Malaysia.⁴ The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium

³ The EU's engagement across the spectrum of activities in this field was based on a set of strategic documents: The 2003 European Security Strategy; the 2003 EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the 2008 New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems; the 2005 EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the 2008 Common Position on conventional arms exports. For more details on conventional weapons, see below Section B.2.

⁴ For more details on conventional weapons, see below Section B.2.



organised its third International EU Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference in Brussels on 4 and 5 September 2014.

The EEAS Principal Advisor and Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Jacek Bylica represented the EU in a number of key international meetings in 2014, notably the G8/G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee (April-May), the Open-ended Consultations on the draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (May), the UNGA First Committee (October), and the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group (November). In addition, the Special Envoy intensified or initiated non-proliferation dialogues with major partners outside the EU and pursued the mainstreaming of non-proliferation issues in the EU's bilateral relations with all relevant countries, in particular through Political Dialogue meetings and more informal contacts.

With regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in 2014 the EU continued to actively pursue the implementation of the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including through its support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and reported on its efforts to the third NPT Preparatory Committee (New York, 28 April to 9 May 2014). The EU delivered, inter alia, a general statement and three specific cluster statements focused on the three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU also presented working papers on the EU's efforts to

strengthen nuclear security and nuclear safety. In the margins of the Preparatory Committee meeting, it organised a well-attended side event presenting the EU's efforts to strengthen nuclear security. The EU continued to support the Facilitator's efforts towards the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction to be convened by the UN Secretary-General, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. In this context, the EU organised, through the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium of think-tanks, a capacity-building workshop on 18-19 June 2014 in Brussels. The event targeted junior and mid-career diplomats from Middle East countries and the League of Arab States.

The EU also continued to actively promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to further support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, based on the Council Decision adopted in November 2012 providing additional financial support through the CFSP budget of around EUR 5.2 million to the CTBTO.⁵ It conducted outreach efforts towards countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, including in the framework of events such as the CTBTO Regional Conference held on 19-21 May 2014 in Jakarta for the Asian countries, co-organised by the Indonesian authorities and to

⁵ See Council Decision 2012/699/CFSP of 13 November 2012 on the Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 314, 14.11.2012, p. 27).



which the EU contributed financially, or the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament held in Tokyo on 8-9 July 2014. An EU statement was delivered by then HR/VP-designate Federica Mogherini at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting in support of the CTBT held in New York on 26 September 2014. The EU also supported financially and participated in the high-level visit to observe the on-site inspection Integrated Field Exercise 2014, which took place in Jordan on 14-17 November 2014.

Last, but not least, in 2014, the EU made considerable efforts continuing to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1673 and 1810 on the basis of a 2008 Council Joint Action. The 2008 Joint Action, as well as the recent Council Decision in support of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in July 2013, aim at strengthening the skills and capacities of third countries' state officials.⁶ As regards export control processes, the EU in 2014 continued to support partner countries to enhance the effectiveness of export control systems. The cooperation aims at updating export control legislation and procedures by promoting today's standards of export control of dual use items.

Over the last eight years, the EU outreach programme for Export Controls on Dual Use items, financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) long-term component,

⁶ See Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP of 22 July 2013 in support of the practical implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (OJ L 198, 23.7.2013, p. 40).

has promoted export control activities within 28 countries with a contribution of EUR 21 million aiming at combating the spread of WMD.

iii. Transnational Crime

Serious and organised crime represents an underestimated threat, both in the EU and in third countries. It remained on the agenda of EU political dialogues with many countries and regional and international organisations, in particular in relation to drug trafficking. This is all the more important as some regions are becoming consumption areas in addition to their "traditional" role as transit zones. West Africa is the most striking example of this new trend, just as it is also becoming a production zone for New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) for the East Asian demand.

EU-funded assistance programmes and CSDP missions contributed to translating political orientations into practice. These actions also seek to complement the outgoing EU (internal) Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime 2011-13 as well as the new Policy Cycle 2014-2017.

The 'Cocaine' and 'Heroin Route' programmes, funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), continued to build law enforcement capacities and international linkages along their respective trafficking routes. A special focus will now be given to criminal justice along the cocaine route. The production of and trafficking in falsified medicines is another threat to public health, where developing countries are particularly exposed and



vulnerable. An IcSP project raising state and public awareness in Ghana, Senegal, Jordan, Morocco and Cameroon was successful. It would now need to be opened to other benefiting countries.

The EU continued its consistent effort to address drug-related problems worldwide, inter alia through dedicated dialogues and institution & capacity building in key countries and regions (Latin America, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Central Asia and West Africa). A comprehensive and balanced approach was applied to target the overall degrading effect on the stability and security of the source and transit countries, with a focus on production, supply and demand of drugs, but also wider, i.e. anti-corruption, money-laundering and drug-related criminality. This was done while taking into consideration the respect of human rights, which represents a major added value of the EU policy in this field.

On the basis of the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020) and EU Action Plan on Drugs (2013-2016) a number of successful programmes continued to deliver. In Latin America, EU-CELAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs has taken firm ground and represents a meaningful acquis for further EU-LAC dialogue, e.g. on public health implications of drug abuse. The COPOLAD Cooperation programme continued to consolidate, among others, national drug observatories and to stimulate rural development. In Central Asia, the EU funded the renovation of border crossing points, the creation of drug profiling units, enabled inter-institutional cooperation on critical cross-border issues.

The so-called “drug routes” concept is still developing, but already making it much easier for the EU contributors (institutions and Member States) to act coherently in their fight against drugs (see also the section on organised crime).

These practical efforts were enhanced by diplomatic work and joint assistance with some international organisations: UNDP implements a border management programme of the EU in Central Asia (BOMCA). Furthermore, dialogues on drugs took place with key regions and partners like the USA, CELAC, Western Balkans, Russia (technical level).

Last but not least, in 2014 the EU started, together with its international partners, the preparations for the UNGA Special Session on Drugs (2016). Taking place for the first time in 18 years, the Session is expected to open new prospects to managing the worldwide drug problem within the framework of the existing UN Drug Conventions.

As in many other global areas, improving the link between the internal and external dimension of EU policy was subject to brainstorming and institutional action and will continue to be so in 2015.

iv. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

In 2014, the EU's commitment to supporting the development of regional capabilities in the ARF/ASEAN framework in the specific field of disaster response continued unabated.



The EU remained a significant actor in the field of international disaster relief, where it has an interest in shaping the process of fostering cooperation.

As there was not a DiREx in 2014, EU could not demonstrate its usual commitment by deploying substantial live assets as it did in DiREx 2011 and DiREx 2013. By contrast, the EU actively participated in the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief, which was held in Chengdu (China) from 26 to 28 February. The EU presence was a tangible sign of the EU's commitment towards ARF and ASEAN. The EU coherence was epitomized by the presence of one representative from the EEAS and one from DG-ECHO, thus covering the strategic-coordination as well as the strategic-operational levels.

v. Maritime Security

In 2014, maritime security became the object of greater attention. On 6 March, the Commission and the HR adopted the Joint Communication "For an Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain: Elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy". This paved the way for the adoption of the EU Maritime Security Strategy by the Council on 24 June. Member States considered that the Strategy reflecting the EU's cross-sectoral approach to maritime security should be implemented, and an Action Plan identifying five areas (external relations, information sharing, capability development, risk management and research and training), in which cooperation between various maritime players can

be enhanced, was adopted by the Council on 16 December. In 2014, the EU has also increased engagement in maritime security with key strategic partners, including international organizations and multilateral fora, such as NATO or ASEAN-ARF, and strategic partner countries, such as South Africa and Angola.

The EU has chaired the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) since January 2014. The EU Chairmanship set three main priorities: the rationalisation and regionalisation of the CGPCS, the documentation of the lessons learned from fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa and zero ships and zero seafarers in the hands of Somali pirates (abbreviated to 'zero/zero'). The EU has delivered on these priorities: the CGPCS has been reformed and regional states now take co-ownership of fight against piracy, a Lessons learned consortium has been established to document and analyse the fight against piracy, and the number of ships and seafarers in Somali hands has been brought down to zero ships and 26 seafarers in March 2015, from a peak of 736 hostages held in 2011 and 47 vessels pirated in 2010 .

Since 2009, the IcSP Critical Maritime Routes (CMR) programme has focused on the security and safety of essential maritime routes in areas affected by piracy to help to secure shipping and trading lines of communication. The long-term objective addressed by the programme is to improve maritime governance. The emphasis is on capacity building at regional and trans-regional



level for exchange of information, cooperation and subsequent implementation at national level.

Progressively linking up the actions under CMR, the programme aims to create trans-regional synergies. Three geographical areas are concerned: Gulf of Guinea, South-East Asia and the Western Indian Ocean. The programme therefore contributes to the EU overall strategies in these regions: the EU Council Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, the EU joint paper on Security and Development in the Gulf of Guinea and the Nuremberg Declaration on EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership for South-East Asia. Most recently, in 2015, the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea and its accompanying Action Plan have been adopted. For the period 2007-2014, EUR 24 million of the IcSP long term budget have been committed to maritime security.

Finally, the EU – together with Malaysia – co-organised the 2nd ASEAN-EU High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation “Developing Inter-Agency Cooperation and Regional Cooperation to Enhance Maritime Security” from 4-6 May 2015 in Kuala Lumpur.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, continued to address regional and international security issues. The HR/VP took part in the 21st ARF Ministerial in Myanmar on 10 August 2014, setting out the

EU's stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and on the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. She also reiterated the EU's ambition to take part in the East Asia Summit.

The ARF continues to be the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a long-standing and active ARF member, the EU is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules based regional security order. The ARF offers a valuable platform for the EU and its Asian partners to engage on a broad range of issues such as maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Drawing on its comprehensive approach, the EU has engaged actively with ARF partners at various levels, e.g. through Intersessional Meetings, the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) and the related Defence Officials' Dialogue, the Senior Officials' Meeting and the ARF Ministerial. The EU respects the central role of ASEAN in the emerging regional architecture and believes in the need to ensure transparency and synergy between ARF and other regional fora such as the ADDM+ meetings and the East Asia Summit.

The EU is keen to make the ARF, in line with ARF Ministerial Guidance, more 'action oriented'. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of strengthening the organizational and institutional structures of the ARF, including the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat.



The EU also believes that the ARF should enhance efforts in Preventive Diplomacy (PD), conflict prevention and conflict management, in addition to the ARF's work on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). From 7 to 10 October 2014 the EU and Brunei co-organised in Brunei a Training workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation. The training workshop was the first ever such training to be organised in the ASEAN Regional Forum some 20 years into its existence. Following the great success of this training, the EU wants to continue to contribute to the full implementation of the ARF

Preventive Diplomacy Workplan and therefore will – together with Indonesia - co-organise a follow-up 3-day mediation training for ARF participants in Bali from 5 to 8 October 2015.

In addition, the EU has organised an orientation seminar on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy in March 2014, open to all ARF Members with a special focus on EU-ASEAN security cooperation. Building on this successful event, the EU plans to host a second orientation seminar in December 2015.



INDONESIA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For several years now, Indonesia has maintained the view that the main challenges facing the region are a trust deficit among the nations, unresolved territorial and sovereignty disputes, and how to manage the impact of the shift of the world's geopolitical center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia therefore reiterates the need to ensure that these challenges are not amplified into threats and that peace and stability are sustained in the region.

In that endeavor, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the main platform for discussion of political and security issues in the region since two decades ago, has to maintain its vital role in the effort to ensure that peace and stability continues to reign in the region. The ARF must continue to help shape the region's evolving security architecture.

Indonesia believes that it is now time for the ARF process to move forward to its next stage of evolution—by imparting new momentum to the implementation of the Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan adopted in 2011. Indonesia therefore welcomes all initiatives that would accelerate this process.

Moreover, Indonesia deems it important that the norms and principles of regionalism, especially the peaceful resolution of disputes, are constantly upheld. Nations must faithfully adhere to the TAC, the Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations as well as universal norms and provisions of international law. ARF Participants must act in accordance with these principles and norms so that peace and stability can be sustained. At the same time, ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms should be continuously refined to ensure that they remain effective in addressing regional and global challenges.

Disputes as a result of overlapping claims in the South China Sea must be settled peacefully through dialogue, consultation and other ways recognized by international law, particularly the UNCLOS of 1982. ASEAN and China must ensure the full implementation of the DOC and the early conclusion of a COC.

At present, rising tensions and recent security-related developments in some parts of Asia-Pacific region are becoming a major source of concern and are exacerbating the trust deficit in the region. It is vital to ASEAN's common interest that we safeguard peace, security and stability in the region. It is therefore timely that we revisit



initiatives on a new regional architecture. In this regard, Indonesia reiterates the importance of a legally binding treaty that can be applied to the wider region.

Indonesia's view of the regional security outlook is consistent with its strategic geographical location and its being the largest archipelago in the world. It attaches the greatest importance to maritime security. Indonesia therefore urges the ARF to focus on regional cooperation that address the need for greater maritime security and pursue the battle against transnational maritime crime.

On the nuclear issue, Indonesia holds that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a deadly threat to humankind. The world will never be safe from the threat of a nuclear holocaust until nuclear weapons are totally eradicated. The national moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions cannot dispel that threat. And while it is true that the world today has a large body of treaties, commitments and forums to advance non-proliferation, there are still thousands of nuclear warheads on stockpile. Nuclear weapon states must find the political will to get rid of their nuclear arsenals. For its part, the region needs to conclude a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would totally eliminate nuclear weapons within a definite time frame, forestall an arms race in outer space, and provide for negative security assurances and fissile materials cut-off.

In 2012, Indonesia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the main international regime for nuclear disarmament

and non-proliferation. In doing so, Indonesia had hoped that its decision to ratify the CTBT would create new momentum for the remaining Annex II States to show leadership by also ratifying the Treaty.

ASEAN Member States signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty on 15 December 1995. The Treaty entered into force on 28 March 1997. It took almost one and a half decades more before negotiations toward accession by the nuclear weapon states to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty could be concluded in 2011, during Indonesia's tenure as Chair of ASEAN. Indonesia remains seized with the early accession of the NWSs to the Protocol of the Treaty and urges all concerned to settle remaining issues so that the delayed accession could finally be formalized. A case can be made for China signing the Protocol ahead of all the other NWSs since it has stated its intention to sign the Protocol without reservations. China signing first will send a strong message to the world that the Treaty is vitally important to the security of the region and the world at large.

The non-traditional security issues confronting the Asia-Pacific region are no less a matter of grave concern. Fortunately the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia has proven to be an effective Treaty. The Treaty serves the region in good stead it serves as the framework for joint efforts to address these issues. The effectiveness of the Treaty is moreover enhanced by the accession of 22 parties outside ASEAN.



As to this Annual Security Outlook (ASO), Indonesia deems it a major instrument for creating and maintaining transparency of defense policies and security perceptions of ARF-participating States. It is therefore a valuable confidence-building measure.

II. National Security And Defence Policy

As a matter of national interest, a major initiative of Indonesia is to transform itself into a Global Maritime Fulcrum. The envisioned Global Maritime Fulcrum would have five pillars, namely: rebuilding the maritime culture, managing marine resources, maritime infrastructure building, enhancing maritime diplomacy and safeguarding maritime resources as well as Indonesia's sovereignty. In this context, the active participation of Defense Forces in securing the sea-lanes is a vital component of Indonesia's agenda.

Indonesia will continue developing defense capacity and capabilities for the following purposes: First, to enhance the capacity and capabilities of the national defense force to face real and tangible threats. Second, to enhance the capacity and capabilities of its forces so that they can secure land, sea and airspace. Third, to enhance Indonesia's capacity and capabilities to contribute to world peace. Fourth, to continue to strengthen its defense industry. Finally, to continue efforts to encourage Indonesian citizens to participate in the defense of the country.

Indonesia believes that the impact of globalisation has prompted more dynamic interstate relations in

the geopolitical constellation. The consequences of this development have increased mutual and common challenges faced by many nations. Indonesia divides such threat perceptions into two kinds: (1) non-factual threat, such as a certain country's aggression, and (2) factual threats, such as: Terrorism and radicalism; Natural disasters; Sea robbery and illegal actions on natural resources; Separatism and insurgency; Cyber-attacks and information warfare; Smuggling and the abuse of narcotics/drugs.

The consequences of this geopolitical constellation have increased common interests among nations. Hence, the absence of cooperation between Indonesia and other countries will be flaws to its own security. Indonesia opens the opportunity for defense collaboration with others under its domestic as well as international laws.

Indonesia's adheres to a doctrine of national defense that was crafted on the basis of the Pancasila, the national ideology; the 1945 Constitution, existing laws; the country's history and the idea of the Archipelagic State. The doctrine is expressed in a Total-National Defense System that involves all stakeholders, territories, and other national resources. The system is integrated, focused, sustainable, and designed to protect and defend the people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.

This doctrine is also oriented to contributing to regional peace and security. It relies on the teamwork and complementation between military and non-military elements.



Beyond the region, Indonesia is also duty-bound to contribute to world peace in accordance with the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This is the rationale behind Indonesia's involvement in peacekeeping operations, as the country's contribution to the shaping of a better world of peace and social justice as well as equitable prosperity.

Indonesia's first involvement with a United Nations peacekeeping mission was in 1957, through its participation in UNEF (UN Emergency Forces), in the Sinai Peninsula. Since then Indonesia has deployed its peacekeepers to around 40 peacekeeping missions, and contributed up to 30,000 peacekeepers. To date, Indonesian peacekeepers are deployed in ten UN peacekeeping operations in nine countries, namely UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur), UNISFA (Abyei-Sudan), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNMIL (Liberia); MONUSCO (Congo), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUSCA (Central African Republic) and as Force Commander in MINURSO (Western Sahara). Having deployed 2692 personnel in these operations, Indonesia ranks twelfth among Troops/Police Contributing Countries. In accordance with the Roadmap on the Vision of 4000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019, that serves as a strategic guidance to underpin Indonesia's effort to becoming a top ten T/PCCs in 2019, Indonesia envisions deploying 4000 peacekeepers in future peacekeeping operations.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia established in West Java Province the Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in December 2011. The Center,

which also includes the Peacekeeping Training Center, serves as a venue for pre-deployment trainings, joint exercises, as well as regional and international peacekeeping workshops and seminars, to better prepare peacekeepers to cope with the increasingly complex demands and mandates of UN PKOs.

In the framework of ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Cooperation, Indonesia and Thailand organized a meeting of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network in September 2012 in Thailand. The Meeting discussed possible areas of cooperation and the work plan of Peacekeeping Centers Network 2012-2020. In 2013, Indonesia hosted the second meeting of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network from 2 to 5 September 2013 at the IPSC, Bogor, West Java Province. Indonesia also hosted the Asia Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations in July 2015, reflecting the fulfillment of the commitment and readiness as announced by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at the 2014 Peacekeeping Summit.

Indonesia considers ASEAN as central to any regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific region. Its regional defense outlook stresses international cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

As part of Indonesia's contribution to the creation of an environment that is favorable to a lasting peaceful order in the Asia-Pacific region, characterized by cooperation, transparency, and trust among governments and militaries alike, Indonesia has



regularly held an annual Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD), since 2011. This forum provides a useful opportunity for officials and experts to discuss current and evolving trends in the region, to enhance government-to-government and military-to-military confidence building, and help facilitate ongoing and new multilateral initiatives. Building upon the successes of previous dialogues, Indonesia will host the 2015 JIDD conference in August 2015, which will focus on defense and maritime diplomacy to help create a secure and stable environment, which would contribute to increased prosperity in the region.

III. National Contributions to Regional Security

Along with three other countries, Indonesia continues to secure the busiest sea passage in the region. The existing cooperation between Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in the form of the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), is one important means of diplomacy and safeguarding efforts for Indonesia. The main purpose of MSP is to conduct coordinated sea patrols and combined maritime-air patrols in order to maintain sea security within the area of operations in the related waters. It also includes intelligence and information sharing activities.

Furthermore, Indonesia is involved in the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that oversees the peace process in Southern Phillipines. In this context, Indonesia also contributes actively to conflict management by fostering conditions favorable to peace.

Indonesia as a Member State of ASEAN, together with dialogue partners, has actively cooperated in the defense sector within framework of the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus. This cooperation has been realized in six areas. It is also aimed at improving the military capacity of the participants and ensuring stability in the region.

a. Counter-terrorism

Indonesia is of the view that terrorism still remains a threat to the security of every state and its people. Therefore, we believe that strengthening national efforts and international cooperation is necessary to counter international terrorism, particularly in the region.

Indonesia views terrorism as an unconventional crime, which is politically or ideologically motivated. The complex and changing nature of terrorist methods require frequent reassessment of measures being taken and formulation of new ones as needed. Therefore, a creative and non-conventional strategy of counter-terrorism is required with respect to due process of law and human rights. Such strategy involves law enforcement, diplomacy, intelligence and military operations. To implement such a strategy, it is important to emphasize that terrorist groups cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nation, culture or social or ethnic group.

At the national level, Indonesia has a comprehensive strategy for countering terrorism, which combines hard and soft approaches. In terms of hard approach, Indonesia has issued Law No. 15 Year



2003 on Countering-Terrorism and Law No. 9 Year 2013 on the Prevention and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. In addition, to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing, Indonesia has issued a Joint Regulation on the Listing of Identity of Persons and Corporations in the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations and Freezing, Without Delay, Funds Owned by Persons or Corporations Listed in the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations.

Indonesia has implemented a soft power approach through de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs whilst increasing the effectiveness of Indonesia's law enforcement capability in combating terrorism. The de-radicalization program consists of two main elements. First, the rehabilitation program aimed at the terrorists during police detention and imprisonment to transform them into law-abiding citizens. Under this program, Indonesia has applied religious and psychological approaches. The second element is the reintegration program aimed at helping the ex-terrorist, after serving time in prison, to break ties with their old terrorist cells and join the normal community. The program is also aimed at ex-terrorist families and sympathizers to prevent them from joining terrorist and violent extremist groups.

The counter radicalization program is aimed at increasing awareness of society of the danger of violent radicalism and extremism whilst at the same time empowering communities to be more resilient against radical and extremist propaganda. Indonesia's strategy in implementing the counter radicalization program is to build close partnership

with all stakeholders and all elements of society as well as to foster coordination among government ministries and agencies to maximize the use of government's resources and capabilities for countering terrorism and violent extremism efforts.

Indonesia is aware that it will not be effective to put the burden of countering terrorism and violent extremism on only one or two institutions, such as the police and National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT). Counter-radicalization efforts need a holistic government approach where the full capabilities and resources of the government ministries and agencies are fully utilized at the maximum level.

Since the root causes of terrorism are varied and complex, the strategy for addressing them must be comprehensive. The approach to counter-terrorism must therefore be people-centered and should include inter-civilization dialogue, information sharing and exchange of intelligence, cooperation in document integrity and security, joint counter-terror action in the border areas, and measures against terrorist financing.

Promoting a People-Centered Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Indonesia believes that promoting a people-centered approach is essential for the success of countering terrorism. Indonesia is a country with a huge population spread out in thousands of islands. Therefore it will not be effective and almost impossible if it is only the government that conducts



counter terrorism. In this regard, Indonesia has maximized the involvement of members of the community in tackling violent extremism in their community through close partnership with the police at the precinct level under the community-policing program. The program is aimed at building trust and mutual understanding between the police on the ground and the members of the community in general so that intensive communication can be developed to detect early signs of terrorism in the environment of the community. The government has also organised capacity building programs at the village level involving village supervisory non-commissioned officers (Babinsa) and heads of villages to raise awareness on the threat posed by terrorists.

With the current threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the issue of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Indonesia has convened several regional workshops such as the “Southeast Asia Regional Workshop on Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, in Bali, on 16-18 March 2015 and the “Regional Workshop on Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Strengthening Legal Frameworks” in Semarang, on 27-28 May 2015. These workshops involved many countries, including Southeast Asian countries, in a sharing of information and good practices.

Indonesia has managed to reduce the incidence of terrorism by involving the community in counter-radicalization projects. And it vigorously supports counter-radicalization as one of the ARF priority programs in the Counter-Terrorism and

Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan. Indonesia suggests extending coverage of the program to include de-radicalization and re-education of terrorist inmates.

Promotion of Inter-Civilization Dialogue

The promotion of inter-faith dialogue provides an avenue for fostering tolerance and mutual understanding within pluralistic communities. This effort should be carried out in tandem with empowering moderates in support of counter-radicalism actions. Thus, Indonesia is actively promoting dialogue or exchange of views between different religious and ethnic groups at the international level. In this regard, Indonesia hosted the UN Alliance of Civilization in Bali in August 2014 with the theme “Unity in Diversity”.

In close partnership with the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)* and *Muhammadiyah*, the Government has organized seminars, workshops and training sessions to promote an understanding of Islam as a tolerant, peaceful and moderate religion. Together with other religious organizations, the Government has also conducted a series of interfaith dialogues involving leaders and members of all religions in Indonesia to prevent religious and ethnic conflict that can lead to terrorism.

Indonesia has also recognized the significant role that the civil society plays in countering terrorism in the society. It has been campaigning for peaceful,



tolerant and harmonious national life. In partnership with civil society organizations, the Government has organized a capacity building program for civil society organizations to develop a community empowerment program and other activities aimed at neutralizing terrorist propaganda.

To counter terrorist messaging, the Government has been developing an effective media campaign to foil the continuous efforts of terrorists to feed society with extremist religious doctrines and discriminative sentiments through their media campaign. For this purpose, the Government has set up a special task force to maximize the utilization of the media and developed long term-media strategies to neutralize radical media campaigns. The government has also developed two websites, damailahindonesiaku.com and jalandamai.org, as media for disseminating a counter narrative to the narrative being foisted by terrorists.

In promoting interfaith harmony based on the state ideology Pancasila, the Government has distributed books and printed materials to schools, university libraries, religious boarding schools and religious study groups across the nation. The government has also developed programs and curriculums at schools that promote critical thinking, harmonious living and tolerance.

As part of its overall efforts at battling terrorism, Indonesia has taken the following steps: the ratification of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) in April 2012 through Law

No 5 year 2012; and strengthening ASEAN cooperation to counter terrorism through various ASEAN mechanisms. In the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)/Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), Indonesia has served as the lead shepherd of the counter terrorism issue, and as chairman of the Working Group on Counter Terrorism.

Together with the United States, Indonesia serves as co-chair of the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus Expert Working Group on Counter-terrorism.

At the international level, Indonesia sees the importance of multilateral cooperation and the initiative to develop a comprehensive convention on international terrorism to fortify current international law instruments within the UN framework. In this regard, Indonesia is party to eight international legal instruments of counter-terrorism within the framework of the United Nations.

In 2014, Indonesia ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Act of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The ratification of this Convention is Indonesia's contribution to the protection of society from the misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials.

Furthermore, Indonesia has conducted robust efforts to support the measures to counter terrorism under the United Nations framework.



In this regard, Indonesia has engaged in various cooperation with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the Terrorism Prevention Branch-United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (TPB-UNODC), and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED). Furthermore, Indonesia also undertakes efforts to implement the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS).

In addition to our continuous support for the United Nations effort against terror, Indonesia also actively participates in the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as one of co-chairs of Southeast Asia Capacity Building Working Group (SEAWG) with Australia in 2011-2013. Indonesia continues to engage the GCTF as co-chair of Detention and Reintegration Working Group (DRWG) for the period of 2014-2016. The establishment of this working group was proposed by Indonesia to strengthen capacity building for stakeholders who deal with the management of violent extremist offenders in the corrective services, as well as to address the need to share information and good practices on this issue. In this regard, Indonesia hosted the Inaugural Meeting of the GCTF DRWG in Bali from 12 to 13 August 2014, which adopted the DRWG Work Plan for the period 2014-2016.

Moreover, Indonesia also contributes to capacity building for law enforcement officers on the issue of terrorism and transnational crime. In this light, Indonesia has established Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in cooperation with Australia. Since its establishment in 2004, JCLEC has become a major center of excellence in the region. Until March 2015, JCLEC has organized

718 training programs involving 17.302 participants from 71 countries and 4.101 trainers.

Indonesia is committed to the fight against international financing for terrorism. In this regard, Indonesia actively participates as a member of Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML), and is also a member of the Steering Group, representing Southeast Asia countries. Furthermore, Indonesia through the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (INTRAC) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) from 48 countries to strengthen the battle against money laundering and the terrorism financing regime.

Recently, The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in their meeting in Brisbane, Australia, 21-26 June 2015, has declared that Indonesia is no longer subject to the FATF's monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process. The FATF recognizes Indonesia's significant progress in improving its Anti Money Laundering / Countering Financing Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF also notes that Indonesia has established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies of which FATF had identified in February 2010.

Measures against Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

The successful use of CBRN weapons in a terrorist attack can be devastating and can inflict enormous human suffering and demoralize society. Indonesia therefore regards CBRN terrorism as



a serious challenge to its security. Accordingly, Indonesia has adopted a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on CBRN that guides responders in rescue and emergency treatment operations, and in controlling fires and other hazards in terrorist attack sites. Moreover, Indonesia has ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2014. On this issue, Indonesia has enacted the Law Number 15 Year 2003 on Counter-Terrorism which provides legal framework for the criminalization of the misuse of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials for terrorist purposes.

b. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Indonesia has never wavered in its support for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Indonesia believes that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For so long as even a single nuclear weapon exists, humankind is in danger of suffering a nuclear catastrophe—by design or by accident. Against the backdrop of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament obligations should be prioritized and should not be held hostage by the lack of progress on non-proliferation issues because the issue of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, they should be pursued simultaneously, not one at the cost of the other.

Indonesia deems the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as of paramount importance and calls on countries that are not yet parties to immediately accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear states. All

pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and comprehensive manner.

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference which was held in New York, Indonesia actively worked for a forward-looking outcome to the Conference, one which should build upon and strengthen the commitments of the 2010 Review Conference, while also taking into account the developments and challenges pertaining to the implementation of the action plans agreed in 2010.

Indonesia regrets that despite the assiduous efforts by all delegations, the Conference was not able to come to an agreement on such an outcome. The Review Conference was not able to seize the opportunity to make visible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, a central objective of the NPT. The lack of political will to collectively move forward sends a negative global message and further calls into question the rationale and feasibility of the NPT regime, not to mention its credibility. Indonesia calls upon states to not only exercise the necessary political will in the next Review cycle, but to also ensure that future actions and positions do not continue to contradict the object and purpose of the NPT.

Once again, Indonesia calls on the nuclear states to fulfill their commitment to discard their nuclear arsenals in compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Moreover, nuclear disarmament should be carried out in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner, with a clear time frame. At the same time, the inalienable right of non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty to make use of nuclear



energy for peaceful purposes should be firmly upheld. Indonesia strongly believes that nuclear energy can help bring about sustainable development.

As an Annex II country, Indonesia has ratified the CTBT through Law No. 1 year 2012, a very timely initiative as it was taken soon after ASEAN Member States concluded negotiations with Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) on the latter's accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011. Indonesia has also been developing a Plan of Action to globalize the CTBT. As a result of these developments, a new momentum for the ratification of the Treaty by the remaining Annex II states was generated. Indonesia will work. Indonesia is working hard with Hungary, its co-chair of the CTBT Article XIV Conference, to achieve the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty.

Indonesia, true to its commitment to nuclear security, launched the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul to serve as reference for countries that want to enhance nuclear safety and security in line with their respective legal systems and processes. The kits would be of help countries develop comprehensive national laws on nuclear security, and furnish them with insights from the provisions of various conventions, treaties and other international legal frameworks and instruments on nuclear security.

Moreover, it would also be helpful if at the regional level ASEAN-led mechanisms establish strategic cooperation with the IAEA, the PrepCom CTBT

and other relevant organizations. The synergy thus generated between global and regional mechanisms can boost the effectiveness of nuclear weapons-free zones and strengthen their nuclear security, safety, and safeguards.

Indonesia envisions a Southeast Asia that is not only a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone but also a region that is free of all other weapons of mass destruction. But first the NWS have to accede to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty. Although negotiations for this purpose have been concluded between ASEAN and the NWS, there are still outstanding issues that must be resolved to make it possible for the NWS to sign the Protocol of the Treaty. Indonesia is always prepared to take part in new consultations between ASEAN and the NWS to ensure the NWS will sign the Protocol and ratify it as soon as feasible.

So far the only NWS that has conveyed its intention to sign the Protocol without reservations is China. If China signs the Protocol this year, it will send a resounding message to the international community that ASEAN can make in the field of disarmament and that the SEANWFZ Treaty is of great value as an instrument of peace not only in the region but also in the world.

Meanwhile, within the ARF, Indonesia continues to promote the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament of biological and chemical weapons by actively taking part in the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament. In support of the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Indonesia has been urging all ARF Participants to contribute



to a world free of Weapons of Mass Destruction by ratifying the CTBT and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention.

c. Transnational Crimes

Eradication of Illegal Drug Abuse

Indonesia believes that the drug problem should be addressed by balancing supply and reduction strategies as well as advancing international cooperation. The drug problem should be seen as an ASEAN common and shared responsibility that it addresses with integrated, multidisciplinary and mutually reinforcing approaches.

When Indonesia declared last year to be “save the drug abusers” year, the Government carried out robust demand reduction measures to save drug abusers from incarceration by promoting and advancing opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation. Earlier this year, the Government of Indonesia announced a national program to rehabilitate 100,000 people through a program that covers a broad range of services, including the enhancement of hospital facilities for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug users.

On March 2014, Indonesia enacted the joint regulation on drug abuse treatment signed by seven relevant government institutions to carry out the treatment of drug abuse through integrated assessment. The measure will ensure the right of drug users to have access to treatment and rehabilitation and serves as an alternative to incarceration.

Indonesia realizes that New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) have become one of the most worrying challenges. Indonesia has carefully monitored the use and abuse of these new substances that are not listed or controlled, and is eager to learn from other countries' experiences on how to tackle this problem. Indonesia has enacted the Minister of Health Regulation number 13 Year 2014 that has included more NPS into the Classification One under the Law Number 35 Year 2009 on Narcotics. Furthermore, Indonesia has also enacted Minister of Health Regulation number 9 Year 2015 on the Changes of Psychotropic Substances Classification that put Zolpidem into Schedule IV of the 1971 Convention, as classified under the INCB Green List.

Regionally, Indonesia has been a strong supporter for joint efforts at combating illicit drug trafficking in the region. In November 2014, Indonesia hosted the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters in Jakarta. The meeting adopted a Ministerial Statement that underscores countries' commitment to strengthen collaboration, enhance cross-border action, and expand action-oriented programs in addressing the ASEAN drug problem.

In Indonesia, the number of drugs abusers had reached more than four million people, with 1.4 (one point four) million considered as regular users and nearly one million as drug addicts. Furthermore, there are more than 12,000 drug-related deaths annually, with total losses estimated to be in excess of 5 billion USD.



Cases of narcotics offences and drug convictions are unfortunately also increasing. Drug trafficking rings have spread to many places in the country, from major cities to remote villages, and penetrated all levels of society, including workers and students, men, women and children without discrimination.

In order to reduce the number of drugs abusers, Indonesia continues to develop its demand reduction strategies; inter-alia by conducting rehabilitation programs to serve 100,000 (one hundred thousand) drugs abusers and facilitate a range of services. Indonesia has directed public and military hospitals to expand their facilities for treatment and rehabilitation.

Drug treatment and rehabilitation centers in Indonesia continue to grow in number as well as in terms of their relevant resources. These centers are government-based, as well as community and NGO-based.

It is imperative for countries exposed to drug problems to engage and participate in initiatives taken by regional, interregional and international counter drug agencies. These initiatives are in the framework of ASEAN as well as the UN. Indonesia has also ratified three conventions related to drug control, namely Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 and Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988. On a bilateral basis, Indonesia has concluded bilateral treaties on mutual legal

assistance with such countries as: Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hong Kong SAR and the Republic of Korea.

Trafficking in Persons

As a party of the UNTOC and Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Indonesia is firmly committed to address the issue at all levels. Nationally, the issue of trafficking in persons is addressed under the task force on combating trafficking in persons. As an inter-ministerial coordinating body it is tasked to coordinate efforts to prevent and address trafficking in persons. Its activities include advocacy, awareness raising, training, monitoring for victim protection, rehabilitation, repatriation, and social reintegration.

Regionally, Indonesia is the Co-chair of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Organized Crime. Now with 48 members, the Bali Process has become the largest cooperation framework in the region. The Bali Process is indeed a distinctive and unique regional cooperation on migration: it is the only regional consultative process that involves countries of origin, transit and destination. The Bali Process works with a comprehensive approach based on the principles of burden sharing and shared responsibility.

During its Senior Officials Meeting in August 2014, the Bali Process adopted a comprehensive



plan of action, called “Bali Process Strategy for Cooperation: 2014 and beyond”. The Strategy lists concrete actions to be organized within the regional setting. The Bali Process has produced four sets of policy guides, including the policy guides on criminalizing trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, and the policy guides on identifying and protecting victims of trafficking. These policy guides are designed to be used by members to develop their national capabilities to fulfill their international legal obligations. Trainings are being developed based on the policy guides. In 2015, the Bali Process established two working groups: the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons and the Working Group on the Disruption of People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Networks.

On Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and protecting migrant workers, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has estimated that about 43 percent to 50 percent or nearly three to five million Indonesian migrant workers abroad were the victims of TIP. In this regard Indonesia is of the view that at the regional level, the protection of its migrant workers as well as those of other ASEAN Member States will only be effective if ASEAN agrees on a legal instrument on the protection of migrant workers. That legal instrument is being discussed in ASEAN on the basis of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.

ASEAN Leaders already anticipated the need for such an instrument when they adopted the 2004

Vientiane Action Program of the ASEAN Community. Subsequently, ASEAN Leaders adopted the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers by virtue of which they tasked ASEAN relevant bodies to develop such an instrument. Accordingly, ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 2007 established an ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW) and mandated it to spearhead the development of the instrument. Indonesia believes that the early conclusion of such a legal instrument is essential to the realization of the purposes of the ASEAN Community and to the protection of the rights and dignity of millions ASEAN migrant workers.

Indonesia views the issue of irregular movement of persons in Southeast Asia as a regional problem that requires regional solution through ASEAN. Such a solution must reflect the spirit of ASEAN solidarity based on the principles of burden-sharing and shared responsibility as well as a balanced approach between law enforcement and urgent humanitarian response.

As to the wave of irregular migrants from the Andaman Sea and the Strait of Malacca in May 2015, Indonesia has received more than 1,800 migrants in less than two weeks. This group of migrants is hosted in various temporary shelters in our provinces of Aceh and North Sumatera. These temporary shelters are actually immigration offices, detention houses, state-owned buildings, hotels, and residences. They are not suitable for long



periods of stay, as they are overcrowded. Although some of the migrants were repatriated last month, the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights reports that as of 24 June 2015, these shelters remain occupied by 1,621 migrants.

By the end of June 2015, as many as 8,000 irregular migrants might still be stranded in the high seas. There has been no report that any of them has reached Indonesian waters. However, in response to any situation of distress at sea, Indonesia is always ready to provide humanitarian assistance.

d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

As a nation that lives in the most disaster-prone area, Indonesia has learned to be vigilant and to continue strengthening its resilience to natural disasters. Disasters are a fact of life in the region and Indonesia understands that regional countries have to live and cope with disasters.

Indonesia sees these following points as of great importance to making sure that national and regional resilience is effective in the face of the many disasters that visit upon the region annually.

First, having a clear and specific regulation on disaster management is crucial. In 2007, three years after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 1994, Indonesia enacted the Law on Disaster Management. The protection of vulnerable people—women, children, older persons—is explicitly stipulated in the Law.

Last year, Indonesia issued an implementing regulation that would ensure the protection and participation of women and people with disabilities in disaster management. The Law was formulated with the active participation of representatives from every community and group.

With strong regulations in place, every relevant institution will know their part and obligations in the efforts to implement disaster risk management.

Second, having people from all walks of life help and contribute to the overall DRR efforts is also very important. The synergy of communities, NGOs, business people, mass media and the government will determine the effectiveness of DRR. A multi-stakeholder partnership can greatly prevent or reduce loss of lives and economic losses in times of disasters.

Third, having disaster risk analysis and early warning systems are of the utmost importance for disaster prone countries. In this regard, Indonesia has mapped out areas that are prone to specific disasters. Many townships and regions in 33 provinces already have their own Disaster Risk Map. The Indonesian Disaster Database (*Data dan Informasi Bencana Indonesia/ DIBI*) has been developed and will be updated from time to time. Having learned the hard way, we now have a Masterplan for Tsunami, which serves as a reference for preparedness for tsunami incidents. All this information is accessible to every community, every group and everyone, and serves as a basis for strengthening resiliency against disasters.



Next, having a center of excellence on disaster risk reduction is vital to making sure that mistakes are not repeated and progress is made. Indonesia has a facility in Sentul, West Java, that has been established as a training ground for disaster risk management. It is called the Indonesia Disaster Relief Training Ground (INA-DRTG). It is a world class training facility which also serves as a hazard monitoring centre. In this context, we wish to invite collaboration from DRR partners in enhancing our capacity to overcome disaster.

Indonesia is of the opinion that concrete activities and practical approaches in the framework of international and regional cooperation are crucial to preparations for and rapid response to natural disaster.

The Mentawai Megathrust event theme in Padang, April 2014 was “Strengthening Collaboration and Partnership in Disaster Response to Build a Resilient Region”, and included both a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a Field Training Exercise (FTX) with the participation of around 3,700 personnel from 17 countries and international organizations. This broad stakeholder engagement will help advance national preparedness goals. This is critical as the Indonesian archipelago is situated between three tectonic plates and is therefore at high risk for geological disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis. Specifically, these disaster mitigation exercises allow participating agencies to test and refine emergency protocols, especially those requiring interagency communication and coordination.

The Joint Naval Komodo Exercise in 2014 boosted cooperation among ADMM and ADMM Plus member states. Twenty-eight warships from 18 countries and around 4,500 personnel participated in the event. The objectives of the exercise were to achieve the integration of forces in facing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief issues, and to maintain joint efforts toward regional and international stability.

To enhance national capacity in disaster management and disaster risk reduction, Indonesia has been actively engaged in many forums, regionally and internationally, with special focus on ASEAN-led mechanisms and ASEAN-based forums, such as the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), the ARF, the ADMM Plus, and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

e. Maritime Security

Indonesia is of the view that the sea has an exceedingly important role in our collective future. The sea-lanes, which connect two strategic oceans –the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean –, are vital lanes for the world’s trading activities. Indonesia, situated right in the middle, is highly committed to contributing positively to the future of these areas.

It is Indonesia’s aspiration that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean remain peaceful, secure and safe for world trade, and are not used as an arena of conflict over natural resources, territories and maritime supremacy.



To serve this aspiration, Indonesia is promoting enhanced cooperation and multi-stakeholders involvement as a way of addressing maritime security challenges. To address threats properly and effectively, Indonesia consistently holds that a holistic, comprehensive and integrated approach at every level is key to a successful undertaking.

In this sense, the ASEAN Regional Forum has rightly decided on maritime security as one of its main concerns. After the adoption of the maritime security work plan in 2011, now is the right time for the ARF to reenergize its efforts in advancing regional maritime cooperation by reviewing the priority areas of the Work Plan.

We are fully aware that the Asia-Pacific region faces numerous threats and challenges that have been transformed from traditional security to non-traditional security issues in the maritime domain. That said, maritime issues represent potentially useful regional areas of cooperation.

Indonesia believes that there is a pressing need to shift the paradigm in addressing maritime issues by recognizing that potential areas of partnership are abundant and wide open to accommodate maritime cooperation. Collectively, we need to eliminate sources of conflicts at sea, such as illegal fishing, violation of sovereignty, border disputes, piracy, and sea pollution. The sea must unite and not separate the regional countries.

Indonesia acknowledges with concern the increase in maritime incidents in the region. In this regard, Indonesia is committed to further strengthening its maritime defense, among others, by revitalizing

the Indonesia Maritime Security Coordinating Board and making it the new Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (IMSA). As such it will serve as the Indonesian Coast Guard with the sole authority to command and control all maritime security operations in Indonesia's jurisdiction.

Indonesia believes that it is our responsibility as a fulcrum between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, not only to protect Indonesia's sovereignty and its maritime resources, but also to ensure the safety of shipping and navigation as well as the security of the seas.

As a way of complementing its national efforts, Indonesia has been and will continue to actively engage in various bilateral, regional and multilateral forums. Indonesia stresses the importance of sharing best practices, developing confidence building measures and capacity building programs in order to enhance our respective capabilities in dealing with maritime security issues. As safety and security at sea is a common regional interest it is also imperative that regional countries address regional maritime issues in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner.

For that purpose, to date, Indonesia has concluded a number of bilateral agreements and has been part of regional or international arrangements to managing issues of common concern, such as combating illegal activities at sea, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal fishing. Indonesia has arranged for separate coordinated patrols with almost all countries sharing maritime boundaries with Indonesia.



Indonesia also has erected surveillance posts in the Strait of Malacca and established arrangements for closer cooperation through the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to ensure security and safety of the important sea-lane.

For Indonesia, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing presents an unprecedented challenge to conventional management methods for sustainable fisheries and poses a threat to the environment. It is disconcerting to learn that the total value of IUU Fishing losses globally reaches over \$23 billion every year. Consequently, global fish stocks are being rapidly depleted, and valuable species are nearing extinction.

Indonesia observes that IUU Fishing is a crosscutting issue. It involves not only fisheries management issues but also law enforcement cooperation aspects. In many cases, IUU Fishing may be closely linked with other crimes such as people smuggling, human trafficking, forced labor, drug trafficking, and violation of sanitary and environmental protection regulations. The 2011 study by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime on Transnational Organized Crime in Fishing Industries is a preliminary study that needs to be deepened and complemented with data from regions. The ARF with its large membership can undertake such a study in collaboration with the UNODC.

Indonesia is of the view that IUU Fishing should be dealt with in a comprehensive and holistic manner, which includes responses at regional and international levels and acknowledging IUU Fishing as an emerging form of transnational crime.

In this regard, Indonesia suggests that ASEAN cooperation be enhanced in maritime connectivity; combating IUU Fishing; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Practical Cooperation; settlement of border and maritime territorial disputes; and Search and Rescue operations.

Meanwhile the structures, methods, networks and technologies used by organized criminal groups have evolved to become more complex and have caused serious difficulties to states in their efforts to combat maritime crimes. Those difficulties are multiplied due to a lack of comprehensive data and information on organized criminal groups. Therefore, Indonesia is of the view that the ARF needs to have a comprehensive collection of data and information on maritime crime in the region.

Maritime security cooperation can be greatly enhanced through capacity building. To ensure that maritime security issues are dealt with effectively in the region, the countries of the region should engage in sharing best practices and resources.

For its part, Indonesia has conducted capacity building cooperation with countries and mechanisms such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Meeting (HACGAM), ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum (AFCF), the South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), the Maritime Law Enforcement Training sponsored by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Indonesia-US Coastguard Joint Training, and the Indonesian-Korean Water Police Bilateral Annual Meeting.



IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum has over the years become very much an indispensable part of the regions' security architecture, contributing positively to the maintenance of the region's peace, stability and security. It is a unique forum where there is regular communication and dialogue between its Participants, military and civil, that is critically and fundamentally needed to build mutual trust and confidence. This forum addresses differences through dialog and diplomacy, which have been placed at the center of ARF's work.

It is only natural therefore that more is expected of the performance of the Forum now that it has been in existence for more than two decades. This is especially so after the adoption of the Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan in 2011. There is a fast-spreading view that the ARF should be more proactive. Although it is eminently successful as a forum for dialogue, consultations and exchange of views on political and security matters, it is also well known that the ARF has only a limited role in dealing with traditional security issues.

Despite its limited role in dealing with traditional security issues, the ARF has achieved its intended purpose and objective as forum for dialogue, consultations and exchange of views. However, Indonesia believes that the ARF can do more on areas where there is clear convergence of interests.


It is in this spirit that during the 2015-2016 intersessional year, Indonesia is committed to co-chairing ARF meetings namely the 'ARF Workshop on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing' with the United States of America and Timor Leste; the '2nd ARF Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Training and Conflict Prevention,' and the 'ARF Workshop on Trafficking in Persons', both with the European Union.

There are different views on what should be the role of the ARF in the evolution of the regional security architecture. In the view of Indonesia the ARF should keep strengthening its role so that it complements such other mechanisms as the ADMM Plus and the East Asia Summit. Both the ARF and these mechanisms should strive for coordination and synergy. In any case they all should maintain ASEAN centrality.

On the whole, Indonesia envisions a more robust, substantive, proactive and action-oriented ARF. Thus the ARF unit at the ASEAN Secretariat should be singled out for institutional capacity building. Moreover, Participants should renew their individual and collective commitment. In this spirit, Indonesia will continue to contribute to the realization of the ARF's potential through active participation and through initiatives and the initiation and development of innovative ideas.



JAPAN



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Rapid shifts in the global power balance after the end of the Cold War have enhanced the significance of the Asia-Pacific region, while deepening the relationships of security interdependence and providing opportunities for cooperation across the region. At the same time, they have caused problems and tensions in the region and made its security environment even more severe. Large-scale military forces remain concentrated in the areas surrounding Japan. Some actors possess nuclear weapons or continue their development. Meanwhile, the region sees the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, etc., becoming more serious. Risks that could hinder open access to and free use of global commons such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace are increasing in scope and seriousness. Also increasing are transnational threats, including international terrorism and large-scale natural disasters. Under these circumstances, no single country can any longer secure its peace and security on its own. It is essential for countries to work together to ensure the peace and security of the international community.

Against this background, the Asia-Pacific region is making progress in confidence-building and

non-traditional security cooperation through not only bilateral and trilateral frameworks but also multilateral security frameworks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Japan welcomes these developments, as they contribute to a better regional security environment. Japan must further promote and develop these multi-layered initiatives through these regional frameworks to secure the peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are major issues that can destabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF needs to continue discussing these issues.

Maritime issues including those surrounding the South China Sea are directly linked to the peace and stability of the region and the international community as a whole. The international community is highly interested in these issues in the context of through respect for the "rule of law" and securing the freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas. In his keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated the three principles of the rule of law at sea: (i) states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law; (ii) states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their



claims; and (iii) states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. These three principles gained supports from many countries, and Japan will consistently support actions based on these principles. In this context, Japan strongly hopes for full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 and an early conclusion of on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). In this regard, Japan hopes to see an acceleration of official talks on a COC that have been held between China and ASEAN since 2013, toward an early conclusion.

On the other hand, Japan has serious concerns that unilateral actions, including large scale land reclamation and its use for military and other purposes, are continuing in the South China Sea, which may alter the status quo and raise tensions in the region. Each state needs to restrain unilateral actions and act based on the principle of the “rule of law.” Japan reiterates that all the states concerned must abide by international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In particular, coastal states need to recognize that in maritime areas pending delimitation, they are obliged by international law to refrain from taking any unilateral action that would cause a permanent physical change to the marine environment, be it for military or civilian purposes.

In this regard, ARF can play an important role in ensuring the rule of law at sea, the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight of the high seas, and peaceful settlement of a conflict

based on international law. In this context, many initiatives have been made at the ARF with the aim of promoting maritime security cooperation. This is a welcome development, and Japan will proactively contribute to these efforts.

North Korea's continued nuclear and missile development is totally unacceptable, as it poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the entire international community. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013. It has been continuing further provocations such as repeated launches of ballistic missiles including from 2014 to this year. These provocations by North Korea constitute a serious destabilizing factor for security in the region including Japan.

North Korea's nuclear and missile development, including its uranium enrichment activities, violates the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks. The international community must continue to strongly urge North Korea in a concerted manner to fully comply with the relevant UNSCRs and refrain from any further provocation. To this end, it is imperative for each country to steadily implement measures against North Korea pursuant to the relevant UNSCRs. On top of these measures, Japan will also continue to steadily implement measures of its own.

It is important for the international community to remain unswayed by North Korea's provocative rhetoric and to make North Korea understand that such behavior will never be of its benefit. Through close coordination with the US, the Republic of



Korea (ROK), China, Russia, and other countries concerned, Japan will continue to urge North Korea to take concrete actions toward denuclearization and other goals.

With regard to Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will make utmost efforts toward the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, including the abduction of Japanese citizens, and nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration under the policy of “dialogue and pressure.” As a result of intergovernmental consultations between Japan and North Korea in May 2014, North Korea promised to conduct a comprehensive and full-scale investigation on all Japanese nationals, including victims of abduction, and launched the investigation in July that year. As of June 2015, however, North Korea has not reported the results of the investigation to Japan. The abductions issue is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan as well as the lives and safety of Japanese citizens. To achieve the return of all the abductees at the earliest possible time, Japan will continue to urge Pyongyang to take concrete actions.

II. JAPAN’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICIES

1. Japan’s Security Policy

Proactive Contribution to Peace

The security environment surrounding Japan has become even severer due to the dramatic change in the global power balance and the emerging

threats that extend beyond national boundaries. No nation can maintain its own peace and security by itself. Being well aware of this, and under its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will contribute even more actively to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as a control tower, and in accordance with the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will continue its path as a peace-loving nation, work in close cooperation with the US and other partners as a major global player in the international community, and implement its national security policies in a steadfast manner, thereby making a more proactive contribution to the peace and stability of the region and the world than ever.

Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security

To secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people amid an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan and contribute more proactively to the peace and stability of the region and the international community, in July 2014 the Government made the Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People. Based on the basic policies set out in this Cabinet decision, and following deliberation within the Government and consultations between the ruling coalition, in May of this year the Government made a Cabinet decision on legislation for peace and security and submitted it to the Diet.



The legislation for peace and security will enable Japan both to make seamless responses to any situation to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people and to contribute more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community; it is designed to put Japan's policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" into practice.

This legislation will allow Japan, under the Constitution, to use force, to a limited extent, based on the right of collective self-defense under international law when the strict "three new conditions"* are met. It will also allow Japan to participate more proactively in U.N.PKOs, logistics support, and other international peace cooperation activities. Thus, the legislation will make it possible for Japan to contribute more to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

Japan's basic posture and orientation as a peace-loving nation for the 70 years since WWII will remain unchanged. Japan has been explaining its Policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" initiative to the countries concerned in a transparent and sincere manner.

* Three new conditions for "Use of Force" as Measures for Self Defense

1. when an armed attack against Japan occurs, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with occurs, and as a result threatens Japan's

survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

2. when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people.
3. use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary.

2. Japan's Defense Policy

National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs) for FY2014 and beyond set forth the basic principles for Japan's national defense, explain the significance and role of its defense capabilities, and on the basis of these provide fundamental guidelines for future capability development, including the specific forces posture of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the target level for main equipment improvement. In light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan since 2010 when the previous guidelines were drawn up, the Government made a Cabinet decision on the new NDPGs in December 2013, taking the NSS into account.

The new NDPGs set out the following three points: (i) Japan's own efforts, (ii) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and (iii) the active promotion of security cooperation, as the pillars



for the essential defense of the lives and property of the Japanese people as well as the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace. The guidelines call for building a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" that will enable the JSDF to conduct a diverse range of JSDF activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand, under increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. They also call for promoting a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) is, on the other hand, the first five-year defense buildup program laid out to achieve the target level for defense capabilities set forth in the NDPGs. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately 24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately 700 billion yen will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform..

Defense-Related Expenditures

In addition to the cost of maintaining and operating the JSDF, defense-related expenditures in Japan include the cost of improving the living environment in the vicinity of defense facilities and support for US forces stationed in Japan.

As the budget based on the new NDPGs and MTDP mentioned above, the FY2015 defense-related expenditures include measures aimed at the development of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. Excluding the expenses related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa or SACO (the cost of implementing the SACO Final Report to reduce the burden imposed on people in Okinawa), the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden imposed on local communities), and the expenses for introduction of new government aircraft, the expenditure budget for FY2015 has been increased by 38.3 billion yen (or growth rate of 0.8%) from the previous fiscal year to 4,822.1 billion yen, marking the third consecutive year of growth. Major factors behind the growth include additional JSDF activity expenses needed to respond to the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, as well as personnel expenses resulting from requests relating to organizations/personnel and compensation system review, and obligatory outlay expenses relating to equipment, etc. on past contracts.

Including 4.6 billion yen in SACO-related expenses, 142.6 billion yen in the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden imposed on local communities), and 10.8 billion yen in expenses for introduction of new government aircraft, Japan's total defense-related expenditure budget for FY2015 amounts to 4,980.1 billion yen, an increase of 95.3 billion yen, or growth rate of 2.0% from the preceding fiscal year.



Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Given an increasingly severer security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, securing the forward deployment of U.S. forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance are essential not only for the security of Japan, but also for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In April 2015, Japan and the United States held the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) in New York. At the committee, the two sides had consultations on such issues as mid-to long-term Japan-US security and defense cooperation and the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in light of the close bilateral relations in recent years. They also released the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation for the first time in 18 years. The new guidelines are designed to help further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance. They also refer to the strengthening of regional and global cooperation.

In light of the recent security environment, the United States is working to realize a U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Japan welcomes this initiative and will work closely with the United States.

III. JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Japan’s Maritime Security Initiatives

Securing the safety of navigation is indispensable for the international community as a whole, and international coordination and cooperation are crucial to maintain it. “Open and Stable Seas” underpinned by a maritime order that is governed not by force or coercion but by laws and rules constitute global commons essential for peace and prosperity of the entire world. It is necessary to maintain and develop them. From this perspective, Japan has been striving to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight through various initiatives such as counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close coordination and cooperation with other countries.

As part of its efforts to secure the freedom and safety of navigation in Asia, Japan has advocated the establishment of a forum to provide EAS member countries with the opportunity to discuss maritime cooperation and maritime issues in the region, which has borne fruit in the form of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). The third EAMF was held in Viet Nam, in August 2014, where Japan underscored its position that stresses the “rule of law at sea,” while referring to the three principles of the rule of law at sea that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May that year. They are (i) states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law; (ii) states shall not use force



or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (iii) states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means.

In addition, Japan took the initiative in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). It actively contributes to the implementation of the ReCAAP through the provision of both funding and personnel, including the appointment of a Japanese national as Executive Director of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC). Japan also plays a leading role in efforts to utilize the know-how and experiences gained through actions to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery in Asian waters under the ReCAAP in order to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Furthermore, Japan serves with Malaysia as one of the lead countries for “confidence building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements, and cooperation,” which is one of the priority areas for the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on MS). In March, Japan hosted the ARF Seminar on Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia in Tokyo and co-chaired it with the US, Malaysia, and India. With the Philippines and the US, Japan has also co-chaired the ISM on MS since August 2014.

Japan's Disaster Relief Initiatives

Japan has provided active support in responding to large-scale natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. In March 2015, Japan dispatched Japan

Disaster Relief (JDR) Medical Team to Vanuatu, which was devastated by Cyclone Pam. As for the massive earthquake that struck Nepal in April, Japan sent JDR Urban Search and Rescue Team and Medical Team and JSDF Medical Unit. In addition to responses to natural disasters, in December 2014, Japan dispatched JSDF escort vessels and personnel as JDR team to conduct the search and rescue operations for the missing Air Asia plane. Furthermore, in 2014 Japan provided emergency relief goods in three cases and emergency grant aid in one case to assist affected people of major natural disasters including typhoons and floods in four ARF participants: the Philippines, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan.

Japan also co-chairs the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) together with Myanmar and China (July 2013 to summer 2016). In February 2015, it hosted the 14th ARF ISM on DR in Tokyo. The meeting was attended by foreign affairs and defense authorities and disaster relief agencies of ARF participants, including the co-chairs; i.e., China and Malaysia, as well as relevant international organizations. They discussed regional frameworks, activities, and cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from both civil and military perspectives in light of the latest initiatives taken by these countries. Japan also participated in the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise 2015 (ARF-DiREx 2015) in May 2015. A JDR Medical Team and a JSDF Medical Unit from Japan collectively joined other participants in engaging in an emergency medical operation exercise with the aim of facilitating medical activities and civil-military liaison and coordination in an



international disaster relief setting. Japan will work with other ARF participants and contribute to ARF activities in order to increase regional disaster relief cooperation and make it more practically effective.

Japan is an active player in other regional frameworks as well. For example, Japan proactively participates in EAS initiatives that address disaster risk reduction as a priority area. In the framework of Japan-China-ROK trilateral cooperation, the three countries hold a regular table top exercise on disaster management, whereby they discuss the humanitarian assistance and disaster management mechanisms of each country in order to enhance mutual understanding. In the Japan-ASEAN relation, Japan supplies communications equipment to the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) and assists it by linking it with disaster management agencies in ASEAN member countries. It also helps the center to develop a system to build emergency stockpiles and supply them in the event of disasters; relief items from such stockpiles were provided to the affected countries by ASEAN in the typhoon disaster in the Philippines in 2013 and the flood disaster in Malaysia in 2015. In this way, Japan is promoting further cooperation to ASEAN based on the Package for Strengthening ASEAN-Japan Disaster Management Cooperation, which was announced during the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit Meeting in December 2013.

In March 2015, Japan hosted the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan. The conference adopted the Sendai

Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, recognized the need to enhance disaster preparedness and “Build Back Better,” and confirmed the importance of the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction. Japan will disseminate worldwide and share with other countries its knowledge on disaster risk reduction and reconstruction that has been gained from the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and other natural disasters. In cooperation with regional frameworks, Japan will further accelerate international cooperation in the field of disaster risk reduction.

Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime

Japan has continuously held multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. Since 2011, Japan has, together with Malaysia, co-led the field of counter-radicalization, one of the priority areas of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CTTC), and co-hosted the Workshop on Counter Radicalization in Tokyo in February 2013. In March 2015, Japan and Malaysia co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Counter Radicalization that Malaysia hosted in Kuala Lumpur. To help build anti-terrorism capacity, Japan supports projects in such areas as immigration control, aviation security, maritime and port security, and law enforcement under a number of frameworks. They include the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue (AJCTD), the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), and the Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC). In



September 2013, Japan held the First ASEAN Plus Japan Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC + Japan) to contribute to strengthening measures against terrorism and organized crime in Southeast Asia. The 17th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in Myanmar in November 2014 adopted the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The participants agreed to strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism between Japan and ASEAN and expand its scope to include international organized crime.

Following the terrorist incident in January 2013 in which 40 people including 10 Japanese citizens were killed at a natural gas plant in Algeria, Japan has been stepping up efforts against international terrorism in cooperation with the countries and regional and international organizations concerned. In response to the terrorist incident regarding the murder of Japanese citizens by ISIL in Syria in January 2015, Japan decided to make comprehensive diplomatic efforts by basing its foreign diplomacy on three pillars: (i) strengthening counter-terrorism measures; (ii) enhancing diplomacy toward stability and prosperity in the Middle East; and (iii) providing assistance in creating societies resilient to radicalization.

Japan has been also stepping up its efforts to combat transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region in three major aspects. The first aspect is strengthening international legal frameworks. For example, Japan has been tackling drug problems in alliance with ARF member countries through measures such as the exchange of information on synthetic drugs, including new

psychoactive substances (NPS), and investigative cooperation in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 and other drug-related treaties. The second aspect is extending various types of support to developing countries, including capacity-building assistance in the region. Japan supports projects designed to combat illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, and corruption in Southeast Asia through the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (CPCJF) and the fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), both managed by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). As part of its efforts to combat corruption, Japan organized seminars on combating bribery of foreign public officials in Cambodia in October 2014, supporting capacity building for law enforcement agencies in the Southeast Asian countries and facilitating cooperation among them. Japan's efforts to combat cybercrime in the region include providing regional training in investigating cybercrime for regulatory authorities and regional training in handling electronic evidence for prosecutors up to 2014. The third aspect is promoting policy coordination with various countries and international organizations. Japan actively participates in regional frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering in crimes that transcend national borders in the region, and the Bali Process, which involves consultations on irregular immigrants and trafficking in persons. In the area of cybercrime, the first ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialogue was held in May 2014, and the participants agreed to continue this dialogue.



Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Japan is committed to maintaining and enhancing the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has been engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons. A case in point is Japan's contribution to each of the three pillars of the NPT; namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy at the NPT Review Conference, which is convened every five years. Other examples include a resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the UN General Assembly every year and a contribution to the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD). As a co-chair, Japan hosted the 6th ISM on NPD in Tokyo in July 2014, where nuclear disarmament was mainly discussed among other topics. Japan also leads the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPD), a cross-regional group consisting of 12 non-nuclear-weapon States set up with the purpose of making a practical contribution to steady nuclear risk reduction. The NPD has organized a total of eight ministerial meetings to date. The 8th meeting was held in Hiroshima, an A-bombed city, in April 2014. The NPD has contributed to the NPT review process through measures such as submitting working papers to the Preparatory Committees for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and proposing a standard reporting form to nuclear-weapon States. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference held in New York in April 2015, the NPD made efforts toward consensus building by proposing a draft

consensus document compiled from a total of 18 working papers it had submitted earlier. Although the Conference failed to adopt the Chair's final draft by consensus, the NPD will continue to steadily build up realistic steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

Japan is engaged in outreach activities in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of achieving three key objectives: (i) promoting the conclusion of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and reinforcing their implementation at the national level; (ii) establishing and strengthening export control systems; and (iii) raising awareness of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and enhancing related efforts. As part of these activities, Japan has been hosting a range of meetings each year, including the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and Asian Export Control Seminars.

Cyberspace and Outer Space

Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly diversified and sophisticated, as seen in attacks against SONY Pictures Entertainment last November 2014 and French TV5Monde in April 2015, as well as those that resulted in the leakage of personal information from US government agencies in June 2015. In response to such cyber-attacks, the development of systems and capabilities to protect states and the lives and property of their citizens is needed to counter with a major challenge from both national security and economic perspectives. To this end, Japan is working with other countries concerned that share a common understanding in a number



of areas. One such area is making international rules, including those on how to apply existing international law to acts in cyberspace as well as international rules of conduct. Among other areas, there are supporting capacity building and developing confidence-building measures.

Countries in Asia are discussing cyberspace issues within such frameworks as the ARF and ASEAN+3 meetings. The ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies, which will be endorsed at the 22th ARF, calls for, among other things, confidence-building measures, awareness-raising, capacity building support, and crime control regarding cybersecurity. Japan is proactively participating in international meetings on these issues to boost cyber security in the region. Going forward, Japan will increase its support for capacity building in cybersecurity with a focus on ASEAN countries. In July, it sent a study mission on cybersecurity to Viet Nam to promote cooperation in this sector.

Japan's bilateral initiatives include discussions and dialogue on cyberspace with the US, Australia, the UK, France, India, Russia, Israel, and Estonia. Japan has also been exchanging views with other countries and international organizations, including China and ROK, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Council of Europe (CoE).

In addition to continuing such initiatives, Japan will accelerate ties with ASEAN countries and public/private-sector collaboration to reinforce its efforts to address cyber security issues.

In January 2015, Japan formulated a new Basic Plan on Space Policy covering a 10-year period commencing from 2015 with the next two decades taken into account. The plan sets out "strengthening space security" as one of the three objectives of Japan's Outer Space Policy. Meanwhile, the NSS and the NDPGs which were decided by the Cabinet in December 2013 refer to the growing importance of space in the area of national security, the existence of risks against the use of space, ensuring the stable use of space, promoting Japan's utilization of space for security purposes, etc.

In order to deal with issues pertaining to increasing space congestion and dangerous space activities of other countries and to secure the safe and stable use of space, Japan is actively working to create a safe space environment and promptly develop relevant international norms. In October 2014, Japan, the US, and Indonesia co-hosted the 2nd ARF Workshop on Space Security in Tokyo. The participants actively exchanged views on the current space environment and the importance of setting international norms soon, among other issues, to promote the sharing of understanding among the participating countries. Also, Japan has actively participated in discussions toward an early formulation of a draft "International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities" proposed by the EU in 2008 to reduce the risks of satellite collision and space debris and restrict anti-satellite (ASAT) tests and activities.



Preventive Diplomacy

Japan believes that it is important for the ARF to make steady progress from the first stage of the “promotion of confidence-building measure” to the second stage of “development of preventive diplomacy” and further to the third stage of “approaches to dispute settlement.” However, it considers that although the cumulative efforts of the ARF countries have so far succeeded in facilitating confidence-building measures to a certain extent, progress toward the development of preventive diplomacy has only just begun. In this context, Japan welcomes the approach taken in the ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Training and the ARF Training Course on Preventive Diplomacy in October 2014; that is, the approach of analyzing case studies in the region while sharing the understanding of the concept and modus operandi of preventive diplomacy among the ARF participants to promote preventive diplomacy. Japan has long been committed to conflict prevention and peace building through human resources development and other modalities means. Japan will take advantage of its expertise in these areas to contribute to the ARF’s efforts to promote preventive diplomacy.

ADMM-Plus Initiatives

The ADMM-Plus provides a framework for addressing a wide range of security issues common to the region. Japan is committed to this framework with the aim of developing the forum into a key pillar of regional security cooperation.

Within the ADMM-Plus, six Expert Working Groups (EWGs) have been established to increase concrete military-to-military cooperation in handling security issues common to the region: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counter terrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian mine action. Japan is taking part in each EWG to further enhance regional security cooperation by actively exchanging views with other countries and making proposals.

Japan had helped to intensify cooperation among member countries in military medicine areas by acting as co-chair of the EWG on military medicine along with Singapore, conducting field training exercises on HA/DR and military medicine in Brunei in June 2013. Since 2014, Japan has co-chaired the EWG on HA/DR together with Laos. In August 2015, this EWG plans to carry out a table top exercise (TTX) in Laos and take steps toward the formulation of a standard operating procedure (SOP) so as to allow disaster-affected countries to accept foreign military forces smoothly in the event of natural or other disasters.

The ADMM-Plus is a vital framework providing the member countries with opportunities to conduct multilateral talks on a wide range of regional security issues in an open manner. Japan believes it is important to keep this framework open without putting any restriction on the issues to be addressed in the forum, while allowing the participating countries to discuss a wide range of issues in a candid manner.



IV. JAPAN'S FUTURE CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING ARF FUNCTIONS

As a framework for a frank dialogue on the security issues of the entire Asia-Pacific region, the ARF has steadily contributed to confidence-building in the region. In recent years, various initiatives have been put forward in a wide range of areas, including maritime security, disaster relief, counter terrorism and transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, preventive diplomacy, cyberspace, and outer space. Some of these initiatives have been translated into exercise-type activities, such as the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx). During the inter-sessional year of 2014-2015, Japan has exercised initiative in such areas as maritime security, disaster relief, outer space, and counter-terrorism and co-chaired ARF-ISG, thereby playing a leading role in lively discussions in the ARF.

To further develop the ARF as an action-oriented framework instead of making it serve merely as a forum for dialogue, ARF countries that co-organize each initiative need to establish practical agenda items and programs with the cooperation with stakeholders, including relevant


international organizations and experts. Also, they need to work more closely with one another to avoid duplications among initiatives and produce favorable outputs. In addition to these efforts to improve ARF functions, it is also important to strengthen cooperation with other regional security frameworks in pursuing effective synergy. A case in point is disaster relief. In this particular area, similar exercises are increasingly conducted under different regional frameworks while the need for regional and international cooperation is growing. At issue is how to streamline such exercises with a view to reducing personnel and financial costs for participating countries and pursuing practical initiatives.

The ARF Multi-Year Strategic Exercise Plan Workshop held in April 2015, which discussed how to optimize disaster relief exercises, is in line with this awareness. It gives a hint as to how the effectiveness of the ARF can be ensured in the future.

Japan will proactively contribute to improving ARF functions and coordination among different regional frameworks while continuing to exercise initiative in various areas.



MALAYSIA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The current geopolitical landscape remains fluid especially with the emergence of the new set of security challenges thus generating genuine interest to increase security cooperation. Exacerbation of issues such as the rise of violent extremism at a scale never seen before, the volatility of the situation in the Korean Peninsula, developments in the South China Sea, continue to challenge the preservation of regional stability at the expense of accelerated economic development.

The increased level of connectedness and interdependency among countries in the region also posed significant challenges in order to deal effectively with the compounding security threats that is more often than not transcend national borders. These security challenges - traditional and non-traditional - are becoming substantively complex with serious ramification around the world. This state of affairs is further complicated by the free and swift flow of information via the internet namely the social media which is being effectively used as a propaganda tool to justify its action and as well as for recruitment purposes.

Defence and security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), are the

kind of bridge-building exercise that needs to be sustained, in order to expand the common ground upon which mutual respect and understanding could further be strengthened. At the same time, countries in the Asia Pacific region should work together towards establishing a common policy position on important issues affecting all, based on trust, patience, sincerity and courage.

Terrorism remains one of the major security threats in Malaysia. At the time of independence, Malaysia has dealt with the insurgence of Communist Party of Malaya as well as other militant act from various home-grown deviationist groups. In 2000's, Malaysia has also dealt with much more sophisticated militant group with regional and global agenda such as the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and Jemaah Islamiah (JI). Countering extremism and terrorism as perpetrated by the so called Islamic State (IS) remains the highest priority for Malaysia. Apart from hard approaches, Malaysia calls for the international community to develop a comprehensive counter-narrative that would address the extremists' ideology, counter their violent propaganda and win the hearts and minds of the people. At the same time, Malaysia is strengthening its intelligence and security cooperation to effectively address the scourge of IS. Malaysia is also advocating the promotion of moderation to counter incitement to violence and messages of hate.



Malaysia also places much emphasis on the need to provide effective and timely response to natural disaster and calamities. At the end of 2014, Malaysia suffered the worst flooding since 1971 affecting several states including Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Kedah, and Perak with more than half a million people affected. Malaysia had also suffered from a series of earthquakes that hit the eastern part of Malaysia resulting in the loss of lives and destruction of properties. Malaysia calls for the strengthening of civilian-military coordination efforts to improve the regions' preparedness in responding to disasters. Recognising the crucial role played by the military organisations as the first responders to disasters, the proposal by Malaysia to establish an ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR, a dedicated force comprising of specialists grouped under the ASEAN banner, is therefore timely.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

The National Defence Policy is the manifestation of Malaysia's aim to defend itself and protect its areas of interests. Malaysia's Fundamental Principles of Defence are as follows:

- i. Self-Reliance – dependency on its own resources and capabilities to safeguard its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.*
- ii. Total Defence (HANRUH) - Total and integrated defence approach involving many government agencies, the private sector, NGOs and the citizenry in all circumstances.*
- iii. Commitment towards the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FDPA – Malaysia is a member of the FDPA since 1971. Besides Malaysia, the other FPDA members are Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and United Kingdom. Although it remains untested at war or conflict, the FPDA is an effective conflict management tool and has contributed towards the military's development and enhancement of its professionalism.*
- iv. Supporting The United Nations' Efforts Towards Global Peace - Malaysia fully supports the effort of the UN and the international community to preserve universal peace and security. Malaysia has adopted a proactive approach in addressing global issues in line with its foreign policy. Malaysia's involvement under the UN's banners started in 1960 in Congo. Now Malaysia is actively involved in UN Peacekeeping operations as Military Observers, Battalion Group, Headquarters Staff Group and UN Technical. Malaysian Armed Forces's involvement in UN missions is not restricted to peacekeeping only but also peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance duties. Malaysia is a party to the UN Standby Arrangements 1996 and as stipulated in the arrangement, party shall have an infantry battalion on standby for*



deployment under the UN if necessary. More than 25,000 members of the Armed Forces have been involved in the UN operations.

- v. *Counter Measures against Terrorism* - Terrorism remains a critical security issue for Malaysia. Malaysia strongly believes that comprehensive actions at all levels are important to address and counter terrorism in its infancy.
- vi. *Defence Diplomacy* - Malaysia recognizes defence diplomacy as an important effort towards conflict prevention and escalation which could undermine peace and stability. Among the steps towards this are confidence building measures, transparency and construction of positive norms and establishment of channels of communication. These efforts are implemented through joint exercises, information sharing, senior officers' visits, exchange of officers and the provision of military education and training facilities.

External Defence Relations

ASEAN is the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy. Accordingly, Malaysia attached high importance to defence relations with other ASEAN Member States through ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus (with eight dialogue partners) which are of primal importance.

Malaysia, similar to other Member States, promotes global peace and stability. We have supported the peacekeeping missions under the UN's banner

since 1960's. Malaysia believes that ASEAN as a grouping, needs to step up and project its position in international security agenda, particularly on UN's effort in peace building and peacekeeping worldwide.

Defence Funding

A defence allocation based on the country's financial capability is needed to ensure that the Malaysian Armed Forces continues to be able to meet any challenges against national interests. In order to achieve the desired effectiveness, decisions on defence allocation are made based on the principles of affordability and allocation not based on GDP. A total budget of MYR16.113 billion has been allocated to Ministry of Defence under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (10th MP) 2011-2015. The allocation has been divided into two (2) main items; development and procurement.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Counter-Terrorism

Promoting a People-Centered Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Malaysia condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism regardless of their motivation and cause that could threaten the peace and security of the nation.

Malaysia has maintained its' opposition against all forms of extremism and has never recognized the terrorist group called Islamic State (IS). Any



Malaysian citizens who are suspected as IS supporters or getting involved or associated with IS will be arrested by the Royal Malaysia Police. Malaysia's stance on this matter is clearly reflected during the Honourable Prime Minister's remarks at the 69th United Nations General Assembly in New York on 26 September 2014. Malaysia is willing to address the issue of extremism and radicalism through the moderation approach.

Malaysia's view on terrorism remains that there are fundamental principles that should be adhered to and fundamental issues that need to be addressed, namely:-

- Reject any attempt to stereotype terrorism or associate it with any religion, race, nationality or ethnicity;
- Against any use of unilateral approach/force in the name of combating the threat. Efforts in combatting terrorism should be in accordance with the United Nations Charter and international laws;
- Measures against international terrorism should not infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation;
- Implementation of measures against terrorism should always be consistent with the universally recognised principles governing international relations and international law;
- Address root causes of terrorism; and

- Universally accepted and unbiased comprehensive definition of terrorism.

Malaysia's Efforts In Addressing the Threat of Terrorism

Malaysia's effort in counter-terrorism involves two levels namely strategic level and operational level. At the strategic level, two National Security Council (NSC) Directives were formulated to deal with several security threats to Malaysia, as follows:

- NSC NO.18 – Handling and Managing Terrorist Crisis (Revised) 2002; and
- NSC No. 24 – The Policy and Mechanism in Cyber Crisis (2011).

At the operational level, the Royal Malaysia Police has the power to deny, deter and disrupt the recruitment and movement of terrorist with the assistance from relevant agencies such as the Immigration Department and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission.

Apart from strategic and operational level, the Government of Malaysia has also been using two different approaches in countering terrorism, namely hard approach and soft approach. Hard approach involves prosecution of the terrorists based on criminal laws, namely the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA), Prevention of Crimes Act 1959 (POCA) and the Penal Code. Other relevant laws include, but not limited to, Anti-Money Laundering & Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001, Arms Act 1960, Firearms



(Increased Penalties) Act 1971, Extra-Territorial Offences Act 1976 and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002.

On the other hand, soft approach involves online and offline counter narratives. As for online counter narratives, the Government of Malaysia has been using various forms of online media such as website, blog, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to counter the misconception and wrong ideology of extremist groups like IS.

For offline counter narratives, series of awareness programs were conducted to explain about the threats posed by IS, particularly on their activities in Syria and the neighbouring states. This will help the public to have a better understanding on actions that have and will be taken by the government at the later stage in order to eliminate the threat of terrorism.

International Obligation and the Need for Specific Legislation

In implementing the relevant United Nations Security Council's Resolution on terrorist acts such as Resolution 2170 and 2178 on foreign fighters, the Prime Minister of Malaysia has tabled the White Paper titled 'Addressing the Islamic State Threat' in the Parliament on 26 November 2014. The White Paper aimed at exposing the real face of IS, which used Islam as a front to achieve its aim to establish an 'Islamic State'. They also misconstrued the real concept of jihad and hijrah as they believe that war is the only way to achieve their goals. The White Paper also contained a proposal to

strengthen the existing security laws such as the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA), Prevention of Crimes Act (POCA) 2015 and the Penal Code to counter the terrorist threats particularly the foreign fighters.

Due to the nature of modern terrorism threats, it is no longer feasible to rely on the existing criminal law provisions. With information travel across the globe in a matter of minutes, evidences are getting more and more obscure and personal liberty is being misused, it is imperative for the Malaysian Government to enact a separate law to deal specifically with terrorism threats.

Generally, the need for anti-terrorism laws can be summarised as below:

- Provide legal framework for dealing with elements of extremism, violence, treachery and other actions, deemed detrimental to national security and public order;
- Empowering the Malaysian Government to undertake pre-emptive actions against perceived terrorism threats;
- Preservation of Malaysia's character as a multi-cultural and multi-religious nation, where preservation of peace is of paramount importance to ensure continued economic growth and national security;
- Existing criminal laws may impede investigation due to bureaucratic processes and procedures; and



- Provision for expanded scopes of investigation to cover intrusive surveillance, enhanced monitoring and prolonged detention.

In pursuant thereto, an anti-terrorism legislation called 'Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2015 was passed by the Parliament on 7 April 2015. The main elements of POTA 2015 are as follows:

- This Act is preventive in nature by virtue of Article 149 Federal Constitution. This Article gives power to the Parliament to pass *laws to suspend a person's fundamental rights* vested to him in Part II of the Constitution if the Parliament believes that the person is a threat to national security or public order;
- Arrests for investigation are based on Chapter VI of the Penal Code (offenses against the state) and Chapter VIA (terrorism-related offenses). Suspects arrested will be remanded for 60 days which was higher than 28 days remand under SOSMA 2012;
- Establishment of Terrorism Prevention Board, headed by the King to replace the power of the Minister. The Board is authorized to issue a Detention Order for 2 years and 5 years Restraining Order;
- Investigations and inquiries will be conducted by a legally trained officer and not a policeman;
- The detainees have the right of representation by virtue of Article 151 of the Federal Constitution; and

- The detainees can apply for judicial review of detention (habeas corpus) in the High Court but it is limited to non-compliance of procedures.

In addition to POTA 2015, another new legislation called the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) 2015 was also approved in April 2015. It aims at stopping the Malaysians travelling overseas to take part in terrorist activities. This new Act will empower the Director-General of Immigration to "suspend or revoke" the travel documents of any Malaysian if he or she is believed to be leaving the country to participate in any terrorist activities or organisations overseas. The proposed law also includes an "extra-territorial application", which will allow the authorities to order the surrender of a person's foreign travel documents for up to fourteen days even if the individual is not a Malaysian citizen. Malaysians or foreigners who do not comply with directives to surrender their travel documents can be punished with a term of imprisonment which may extend to two years.

Parallel amendments to the relevant laws were also made, namely:

- Prison Act 1995 (amendment) 2015;
- Penal Code (amendment) 2015;
- Prevention of Crimes (amendment) Act 2015;
- Criminal Procedure Code (amendment) 2015; and



- Security Offences (Special Measures) (amendment) 2015.

International Cooperation is Necessary

International cooperation is extremely necessary in addressing the threat of international terrorism and to prevent the growth of violent extremism. Malaysia is committed to work closely with the international community to address this threat. The Government of Malaysia is confident that this cooperation will contribute towards the strengthening of national security and to further enhance the government's capability to address the threats of radicalism, extremism and terrorism.

i. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes

Malaysia enacted the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) in 2012 to replace the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960. SOSMA provides special measures relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining security and public order. SOSMA works in tandem with the Penal Code, Malaysia's main criminal law. The Penal Code has been amended by including Chapter VI A (Offences Relating to Terrorism). This new chapter was specially formulated to criminalize terrorism acts as well as other related acts such as providing assistance to the terrorist, recruiting persons to be members of terrorist groups or to participate in terrorist acts and harbouring persons committing terrorist acts.

The amendment to the Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) was made and came into effect on 2 April 2014. The amendment was made in response to the organized crimes as well as serious crimes waves which had been occurred in the country since 2011. The jurisdiction of the Act is extended to include Sabah and Sarawak and at the same time provide better position for Malaysia to deal with organized and serious crimes. The SOSMA Act will complement POCA to better equip Malaysia in tackling current and future threats of serious and organized crimes including terrorism.

The Malaysian Anti Money Laundering Act (AMLA) was passed in 2001 and came into force in January 2002. The Act requires reporting institutions (especially financial institutions) to conduct customer due diligence (CDD) and provide suspicious transaction report (STR) to the relevant regulatory authority. It was amended in 2003 to include measures to combat against terrorism financing. Following the amendment, AMLA was renamed Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA). The amended legislation comprehensively provides for the freezing of terrorist funds and for the implementation of UNSCR 1267 and to a larger extent, UNSCR 1373. Malaysia has an obligation to gazette the list of terrorists under UNSCR 1267 for individuals linked to the Al-Qaeda and Taliban groups, and under UNSCR 1373 for terrorists belonging to other groups.

A White Paper on Islamic State affairs has been tabled by the Honourable Prime Minister in Parliament on 26 November 2014. The paper has illustrated the emergence of IS which has



direct effect on Malaysia Security. The paper has highlighted about the potential risk of IS influence in Malaysia which advocated the extremist Ideology and radicalization. The White Paper has also outlined the preventive measures to address the IS threat ensuring that Malaysian would not be influenced by the extremist ideology that could affect on the security and stability of the nation. The White Paper is also consistent with the UNSC Resolution 2170 and 2178 which both call for UN Members to suppress the movement, financing and recruitment of terrorist. It also reflects on Malaysia's commitment with the international community to combat terrorism threat in all forms.

Based on the recommendation from the White Paper, The Prevention of Terrorism Bill (POTA) has been introduced by the Government to tackle issues on IS and Foreign Terrorist Fighters. POTA has been tabled and approved by the parliament in April 2015. It is a preventive law which seeks to prevent the cohesion or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organization in foreign countries or any part of the countries.

Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Bill (SMATA) is another preventive law which was introduced by the Government together with POTA. The Bill provides for special measures to deal with persons who engage in the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organizations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country. This Bill will apply to any person who travels to Malaysia or intends to travel to foreign country from or through Malaysia to join or support terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organizations in foreign country.

ii. Measures Against Terrorism Financing

At the regional level, Malaysia continues to cooperate with international partners in strengthening Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) measures. In May 2000, Malaysia became a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regional-style organisation and has since strived to comply with the implementation of the 40 + 9 recommendations of the FATF. The 16th Annual Meeting of APG was held from 15-19 July 2013 in Shanghai, China. The Meeting mainly focussed on the APG's strategic direction and work programme. Malaysia presented its report and was accepted during the meeting which reflects the nation's significant progress on AML/CTF regulatory.

The Asia Pacific Group Mutual Evaluation Exercise on Money Laundering (APG MEE) would be carried out on Malaysia in August 2014. The APG MEE provides an independent assessment of Malaysia's AML/CFT programme and its compliance with the international standards. In early 2007, the second round of APG Mutual Evaluation Exercise rated Malaysia as "Largely Compliant" against the FATF recommendations.

Malaysia is currently in the midst of reviewing the AMLATFA. The new amendments intend to reflect the internal standards and domestic requirements. The amendments would enhance the investigation powers of the law enforcement agencies. The amendment will result in greater clarity on reporting obligations, greater enforcement powers and higher penalties.



Malaysia continues to promote sharing of financial intelligence as well as enhancing knowledge and upgrading skills required in financial investigations at the regional and international level with the establishment of the Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Department (FIED) under the Central Bank.

Out of the 13 international conventions and protocols on combating terrorism, Malaysia is a State Party to nine (9). The Government has agreed that Malaysia accedes to the four (4) remaining conventions and protocols, only after certain legislative and administrative adjustments/amendments are completed.

Malaysia has amended the Penal Code as well as the Criminal Procedure Code to further strengthen Malaysia's domestic counter terrorism legal framework. In addition, the Government is in the process of amending the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 to give effect to the requirements of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platform Located on the Continental Shelf.

Non-Proliferation, Counter Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

(i) *National Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540*

On 6 May 2010, the Malaysian Parliament approved the new comprehensive law on export control, known as the Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010. The new law was published in the Government gazette

on 10 June 2010. The Act enables Malaysia to effectively supervise and control the export, trans-shipment, transit and brokering of all strategic items, including arms and related material as well as other activities that will or may facilitate the design, development and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. To underline its seriousness, the punishments for transgressions under the Act are very severe. Malaysia is also active in sharing its experience in establishing this comprehensive regulatory framework on export control with other States in the region.

Malaysia does not possess chemical weapons. It has, however, a growing chemical industry. Malaysia therefore has been continuously working closely with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in ensuring that its chemical industry is for peaceful purpose and its development benefits the nation.

Malaysia's National Authority Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), which was officially established in September 2006 in conjunction with the promulgation of the CWC Act 2005, has been coordinating Malaysia's participation at various international training courses organised by the OPCW.

Malaysia, representing the Asian Group for the term 2014-2016, is currently a member of the Executive Council (EC) of the OPCW. This is the fourth time that Malaysia is serving as a member of the EC since the establishment of the OPCW in 1997. Previously, Malaysia was member of the Council for the term 2004-2006, 2007-2009 and 2011-2013.



As a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Malaysia continues to fully adhere to its obligations to the Convention. Malaysia recognizes the importance for States Parties to undertake necessary measures, including constitutional process to implement the provisions of the Convention as stipulated under Article IV of the BWC. In demonstrating Malaysia's commitment to the BWC, Malaysia is in the process of finalizing a comprehensive Biological Weapons Convention Bill, which would reinforce the existing STA 2010.

Given that the tremendous progress in the bio-sciences is increasingly more reachable through the medium of modern information technology, Malaysia strongly believes that there is a need to enhance scientific and technological cooperation between State Parties both for the social-economic progress of developing countries that are people centred and socially responsible, and for the fight against infectious diseases and the threats of bio-terrorism. Malaysia, through its Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), an Agency under the Ministry of Defence, has formed a technical cooperation programme in 2012 with the Cooperative Biological Engagement Programme (CBEP), Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the United States in the field of biosecurity. This initiative would enhance Malaysia's capacity to protect the country against biological threats and aims to prevent bio-crime through cooperation on safety working practices, accurate techniques and procedures for assessing risks of biological misuse. On 29-31 October 2014, Malaysia hosted the highly successful Sea Dragon Tabletop Exercise in collaboration with CBEP on multilasectoral regional coordination on

biothreats and biosecurity. The workshop featured three scenario-based discussions, lessons learned, plenary presentations, panel discussions, and country profile presentations to promote regional capacity and cross border, cross-sectoral coordination. The workshop provided a dynamic forum for ASEAN countries to build partnerships and share coordination on best practices for the management of biological incidents.

(ii) Non-Proliferation

Malaysia continues to pursue for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Achieving this rests on the fulfilment of the basic bargain embodied in the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Despite some progress, Malaysia remains concerned on the slow progress in the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Weapons States, the lack of transparency, the high alert status of nuclear weapons, the continuing pursuit of nuclear programmes by a few countries and the insistence of some others to remain outside the NPT.

While Malaysia was hopeful with the 2015 NPT Review Conference cycle to serve as a good foundation for all the Treaty's Nuclear-Weapon States to substantiate their unequivocal commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, Malaysia regretted that such will was not reflected, and that nuclear disarmament issues continued to be of secondary importance amongst the three pillars. Malaysia is also upset with the failure for



the Conference to reach a consensus outcome. Myanmar as the coordinator for disarmament issues in ASEAN delivered a statement regretting the lack of consensus during the Review Conference.

This notwithstanding, Malaysia will continue to play a constructive role in promoting international peace and security. Malaysia is of the view that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and the full and effective implementation of the NPT obligations, in particular by Nuclear-Weapon States, plays a crucial role in achieving a nuclear weapon-free world. In this regard, Malaysia tabled the resolution on ICJ Advisory Opinion of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons annually at the UN General Assembly. The Advisory Opinion clearly stipulates that States have a legal obligation not only to pursue in good faith, but also to bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It is unfortunate that while this resolution continues to enjoy the support of the vast majority of the UN Member States, some remain opposed to this resolution and the Advisory Opinion.

Malaysia notes that there have been significant developments in the efforts to have NWS to sign the Protocol over the course of last year, notably the proposed P4 SEANWFZ Protocol Statement. The P4 proposed to issue the Protocol Statement in lieu of making national statements at the time of signing the Protocol. Nonetheless, ASEAN Member States also note with concern that the P4 would still make national statements upon ratification. It

would be very significant if the P4 sign the treaty this year as it marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.

Malaysia has been a strong advocate for the realisation of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The Plan of Action adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, provided hope for possible movement towards the realisation of the NWFZ in the Middle East. Malaysia is however disappointed that no further development was seen in this regard following the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and in fact became the contentious issue that led to the failure of the Conference to adopt consensus.

Malaysia considers the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a primary disarmament instrument. Malaysia joins the CTBTO in calling upon the remaining Member States, especially those in the Annex 2, to immediately sign the CTBT. Malaysia looks forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty. Malaysia had ratified the CTBT on 17 January 2008.

Malaysia participates actively in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. Malaysia welcomes the NSS process as it has proved useful in paving the way for countries to work closely and effectively in strengthening global efforts on nuclear security, in particular the security of nuclear material and the prevention of these materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Following the conclusion of the recent 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, which Malaysia attended, it would



be necessary for all participating countries to take stock and assess what concrete results has the NSS process achieved and how will the legacy be continued after the final Summit in 2016.

On 8-12 June 2015, Malaysia hosted the Malaysia-Thailand Table Top and Field Exercise on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials at National Border. The table top exercise is held to apply appropriate measures and develop a practical approach in fulfilling the need to control the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in at regional and international levels, especially in the Malaysia-Thailand border. The programme is one of the activities planned by ASEANTOM in which Malaysia is a member.

With regard to arms control, Malaysia had been supportive and constructive throughout the process of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Malaysia had voted in favour of all the resolutions related to the ATT and was seen by other member states, as well as the Presidents of the July 2012 ATT Conference and March 2013 ATT Final Conference, as being a country that can bridge divides. During the July 2012 ATT Conference, Malaysia worked with a number of Asia-Pacific countries regarding the language on transshipment, and a broader cross-regional coalition on language relating to the scope of items, and the goals and objectives of the Treaty.

In addition, Malaysia had hosted, together with the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), a regional disarmament meeting entitled "Asia Regional

Meeting to Facilitate Dialogue on the Arms Trade Treaty", held in Kuala Lumpur on 26 - 27 February 2013. Malaysia was also the facilitator on the issue of transit or trans-shipment as well as a member of the Drafting Committee during the Final ATT Conference. Malaysia had signed the ATT on 26 September 2013 and is currently working on its ratification process.

The first meeting of the Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPD) of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was held in Kuala Lumpur on April 6-7, 2015. The approximately 45 participants included representatives from 13 CSCAP member committees and 12 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders. The group examined recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament, the impact of proliferation financing, biological threats, and recent Korean Peninsula developments. It examined the ARF Work Plan on NPD and discussed future study group priorities, focusing on capacity building to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

Malaysia continues to support activities by the ASEAN Regional Forum relating to non-proliferation and disarmament issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD) was hosted by the Government of Canada and held in Kuala Lumpur on 15-16 June 2015, pursuant to the decision of the 21st Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on 10 August 2014. Malaysia will also be hosting the 2016 ARF ISM on NPD.



On 23 April 2014, Malaysia decided to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and endorsed the Statement of Interdiction Principles. Malaysia is committed to upholding the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and believes that it adds value to a country's existing arrangements and efforts to curb illicit trafficking of WMDs.

The Panel of Experts (PoE) established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874 came to Kuala Lumpur in February and April in the context of counter-proliferation. Malaysia has always welcomed engagements by the UNSC Panels and assisted them in their activities.

Transnational Crime

i. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Transnational Crime

The Emergency Meeting of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (EAMMTC), Kuala Lumpur, 2 July 2015.

On 2 July 2015, an Emergency ASEAN Meeting on Transnational Crime (EAMMTC) concerning Irregular Movement of Persons in the Southeast Asia was convened in Kuala Lumpur. The objective of the EAMMTC was to find a feasible regional solution for ASEAN Member States to collectively deal with the crisis of the irregular migrants in Southeast Asia, including the issue of human trafficking and people smuggling particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The success of the Meeting

demonstrated Malaysia's leadership as the current Chairman of ASEAN in finding a regional solution to combating trafficking in persons.

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)

Malaysia participated in the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) which was held from 16-19 September 2013 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. During the meeting, ASEAN countries adopted a joint statement to further strengthen the cooperation in the fight against transnational criminals, which is a major challenge and poses a danger to the region's socio-economic development. The 9th AMMTC also adopted a new ASEAN work plan to combat transnational crime from 2013-2015 and tasked ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) to fully implement the action plan. Malaysia will host the next 10th AMMTC in 28 September – 1 October 2015.

United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ)

The United Nations Congress on CCPCJ is held every five years to bring together policy-makers and practitioners in the area of crime prevention and criminal justice, as well as parliamentarians, individual experts from academia, representatives from civil society and the media. Malaysia took part in the 13th United Nations Congress on CCPCJ that was held in Doha, Qatar from 12 – 19 April 2015.



Malaysia in its statement at the United Nations Congress on CCPCJ 2015 mentioned that crime prevention is a mammoth tasks in which no single country would be able to deal with it unilaterally. Therefore, Malaysia acknowledges the importance of international, regional and sub-regional cooperation.

At the regional level, Malaysia as a member of ASEAN has been working collectively and in solidarity with ASEAN Member Countries to combat transnational crime.

At the bilateral level, Malaysia has and will continue to conclude security arrangement in the forms of Agreements / Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with like-minded countries to forge strategic cooperation in eliminating and disrupt the commission of these crimes by criminal syndicates.

Malaysia is of the view that countries need to expand the existing international cooperation beyond the current practices. Member States need to share best practices, experience, conduct regular exchange of information and intelligence including capacity building.

ii. Promoting Collaboration on Addressing the Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants

Trafficking in persons is increasingly becoming a global scourge affecting all countries around the world and requires concerted national and

international efforts. In responding to this issue, Malaysia had ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC) on 24 September 2004 at the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Subsequently, Malaysia has acceded to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children on 26 February 2009. UNTOC is the main international instrument to counter transnational organized crime. On the domestic front, Malaysia enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act 2007.

United States Trafficking In Persons Report (July 2015)

The U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (U.S. TIP Report) for the year 2015, released on 27 July 2015, has placed Malaysia at Tier 2 Watchlist compared to Tier 3 during last year's evaluation. The Report has taken into account the progress made by 188 countries including Malaysia in addressing this crime.

The upgrading to Tier 2 Watchlist is considered as a recognition on Malaysia's ongoing efforts and commitments in combating this heinous crime. This can be seen from the establishment of a High Level Committee (HLC) on Trafficking in Persons on 3 July 2015 which is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia to address critical issues that have been raised by the Report in 2014.



Amendments of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007

Pursuant to the amendments of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007 which has been passed by both the Lower and the Upper Houses of Malaysian Parliament on 16 June 2015 and 7 July 2015, the HLC will now become a permanent structure as the highest policy level decision making body in the country on trafficking in persons.

The amendments to ATIPSOM 2007 will further strengthen the Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrant (MAPO) through the addition of several new Ministries namely Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. All these Ministries will inject their expertise and experience in their related fields to contribute effectively in tackling the said crime.

The critical components of the recent amendments would be on the aspects of victims' protection encompassing the ability for victims to move freely, to reside outside the shelter homes and the ability to take up employment. In addition, the Council will also provide allowances to trafficked persons.

Specific provisions have also been incorporated in the amendments that include compensation and payment of salary arrears to trafficked victims. These provisions are of paramount importance due to the previous legal constraint in

which trafficked victims who worked illegally in the country were not entitled for any compensation or salary arrears. Another transformational aspect concerning the recent amendments is paving the way for greater participation by NGOs in providing shelters for trafficked victims as well as to act as protection officers.

Malaysia's commitment and tireless efforts to address trafficking in persons are not merely to improve the tier ranking of the annual U.S. TIP Report but also in order to meet the countries obligations under the Universal Periodical Review (UPR) of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. For this purpose, Malaysia has shown its openness by readily accepting a visit by Ms. Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in persons especially Among Women and Children to the country from 23 to 28 February 2015.

- **Promoting Collaboration in the Addressing the Issue of Drugs Trafficking**

Malaysia has consistently called for stringent measures to be adopted to curb illicit drug-trafficking and priority should also be given to preventive programmes to curb drug abuse. Malaysia's commitment in eliminating illicit drug trafficking and abuse is reflected by it being a State Party to:

- a. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961;
- b. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971;



- c. The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988; and
- d. The ASEAN Declaration of Principles on Drug Abuse Control 1976.

A Cabinet Committee on Eradication of Drugs chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister was established in 2004 to formulate the national drug policy, to oversee its implementation, to coordinate the various machinery for law enforcement, preventive measures through education and awareness publicity, and to intensify treatment and rehabilitation for drug addicts.

Malaysia through the National Anti-Drugs Agency has taken the initiative on drug treatment measures through a medical based approach by opening its 1Malaysia Cure and Care clinic in Sungai Besi, Kuala Lumpur. This clinic provides open access services to drug abusers, drug users, co-dependent, employers and individuals with drug problems to get treatment and rehabilitation from medical specialists/psychiatrists, social workers and counsellors without having to face the possibility of being charged with prevailing laws.

The Royal Malaysia Police through its Special Tactics and Intelligence Narcotics Group (STING) has been tasked to investigate and arrest the drug kingpins and drug smuggling syndicates. The squad is part of the measures in curbing drug related activities and crimes in the country.

To date, Malaysia is offering treatment and rehabilitation services to voluntary drug addicts, through the 57 clinics and centres such as Cure & Care Clinics, Cure & Care Services Centre, Caring Community House (CCH), Cure & Care Vocational Centres (CCVC) and Cure & Care Rehabilitation Centre (CCRC).

Ketum-Dangerous Drugs Act 1952

The bill on Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Amendment) 2014 was presented for the second reading in the Dewan Rakyat on 1st April 2015, among others, to provide a new definition for ketum leaves and listed it as a dangerous drug. The proposed amendment also includes restrictions of importation, exportation, possession, cultivation, ketum business and to provide a jurisdiction in regulating the production and matters relating to the leaves. At the moment, Ketum leaves are listed under Section 30 (3) of the Table 3 of the Poison Act 1952 and actions that can be taken against those involved are limited. The amendment will enable ketum leaves to be listed in the First Schedule of the Dangerous Drugs Act, which also lists other crops like marijuana, cannabis and poppy plants.

iv. Corruption

The National Key Result Areas (NKRA) anti-graft initiatives have made an impact, with Malaysia improving its standing in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), as appear below:



No	Year	Ranked	Score
1.	2014	50	52
2.	2013	53	50
3.	2012	54	49

Under the NKRA programme, combating corruption is among the seven (7) key areas of priority of the government and the initiatives in fighting corruption is to assist in the nation's transformational program, making Malaysia into a high income nation by 2020. This is done through addressing the root causes of corruption in promoting open and transparent governance in both private and government sectors. Malaysia is now ranked 50th from 53rd place in 2013.

Towards achieving the overall objectives of the NKRA on corruption, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has identified four target areas that will specifically focus on:

1.1 Grand Corruption

- Ensure public resources are not used to fund political parties; and
- Reduce misuse of allocation of resources by Member of Parliaments and State Assembly Members.

1.2 Government Procurement

- Reduce leakage in the funds allocated for national development and operations; and
- Ensure fairness in the award of contracts.

1.3 Regulatory and Enforcement Agencies

- Regain public confidence in our enforcement agencies; and
- Enhance competitiveness of Malaysia as a place to do business.

1.4 Law and Regulations

- Implementation and revision of new and existing corruption laws in Malaysia; and
- Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 protect individual who comes forward to expose fraudulent acts in the corporate business.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The National Security Council Directive No. 20 (NSC No. 20): The Policy and Mechanism for National Disaster and Relief Management is the main guideline for disaster management in Malaysia. The directive prescribes the mechanism for the management of disasters including the responsibilities and functions of related agencies under an integrated emergency management system. Due to the high intensity, complexity and occurrences of disasters, Malaysia took the initiative to review and improve the National Security Council Directive No. 20 in 2012. The revision was done to harmonise the Directive with ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), incorporating elements such as prevention and preparedness in facing disasters.



(i) *Disaster Prevention and Mitigation*

Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

Malaysia recently announced the Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 2016-2020, the premise for the Malaysia National Development Strategy that will focus on rapid delivery of high impact outcomes to both capital and people economy. Thrust IV on Pursuing Green Growth for Sustainability and Resilience, focus area D emphasises on strengthening resilience against climate change and natural disasters. A comprehensive disaster risk management approach will be put in place to respond to the increased frequency and intensity of climate related disasters, with an important reorientation from a cost to an investment for the future.

Three (3) strategies have been introduced to reach the objectives, Strategy D1: Strengthening disaster risk management by establishing DRM policy and institutional framework, improving disaster detection and response capacity, incorporating DRM into development plans and creating community awareness; Strategy D2: Improving flood mitigation by generating new investments from flood mitigation projects, enhancing long-term planning and strengthening flood forecasting and warning systems; and Strategy D3: Enhancing climate change adaptation by developing a national adaptation plan, and strengthening resilience of infrastructure, natural buffers including water and agriculture sector as well as creating awareness on health impact.

As flood is the most significant hazard in Malaysia, flood mitigation activities are given serious attention. Since 1972, the Government of Malaysia had spent billions under the “Five Year Malaysia Plan” for flood mitigation projects to reduce flood risks. For the year 2015, the Government of Malaysia has also allocated a sum of MYR893 million in its annual budget for flood mitigation projects in flood prone states. The government will also implement Flood Mitigation Project or RTB, at Sungai Kelantan in Nenggiri and Lebir integrated through the construction of dams, RTB Sungai Kuantan, Pahang; RTB Moyog River, Sabah; RTB Perak River and rivers in Kemaman, Terengganu.

National Disaster Command Centre (NDCC)

National Disaster Command Centre (NDCC) is the national command centre responsible for managing disaster at national level: mitigation, preparedness and response at strategic and tactical level.

The setting up of the NDCC was approved during the Mid-term Review of the 9th Malaysia Five Year Plan. The Government through the National Security Council started the development of the centre in early 2011. The NDCC is the main centre at the national level in coordinating disaster management activities.

NDCC is in the pipeline to be linked to the AHA Centre to enable sharing and exchanging of information with other ASEAN Member States to the mutual benefit from all sides.



AHA Centre Executive (ACE) Programme

The AHA Centre Executive (ACE) Programme is a six (6) months capacity building programme providing on-the-job training for officers from National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO) of ASEAN Member States. This programme is conducted by ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) with support by the Government of Japan through Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF). The programme gives the officers opportunities to acquire professional knowledge, skills and experience in regional cooperation with various ASEAN dialogue partners, the United Nations and International Organisations.

The ACE Programme is planned to be implemented in three (3) batches starting from 2014. Candidates for the ACE Programme are selected on a competitive basis in which all NDMOs are expected to send two (2) officers per country per batch. The first batch of ACE Programme which started on 15th January 2014 has completed successfully with the ACE Programme Graduation Day on 27th June 2014 where 13 ACE Programme Officers including two (2) officers from Malaysia received their Graduation Certificate from the Secretary General of ASEAN.

Malaysia has continued to send officers to the second batch of ACE Programme which started on 8th February 2015.

ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT)

4th ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) Induction Course and Simulation Exercise were held from 2 to 11 June 2014 in Jakarta and Bogor, Indonesia with the participation of two (2) officers from the National Security Council.

The ASEAN-ERAT is designed to quickly respond to a major sudden on-set disaster within the ASEAN region. The ASEAN-ERAT is managed by ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) in supporting the National Disaster Management Organisation focal point of the affected country to conduct rapid assessment, coordinate mobilization and deployment of regional disaster management capacity and facilitate the incoming relief assistance.

Therefore, the ASEAN-ERAT Induction Course provided participants with understanding the roles of ERAT in ASEAN Region, as well as the guidelines to be used as the reference before and during a disaster emergency response mission. The training module on the ASEAN-ERAT guidelines has been developed by the ACDM Working Group on Preparedness and Response in cooperation with numerous actors who have gained invaluable experience in developing and response capabilities and responding to major regional and international disasters.



During the ASEAN-ERAT course, the Participants have been tested on their rapid assessment & coordination skills, as well as simulated the management of Joint Operations Centre of ASEAN (JOCA). Currently, Malaysia has six (6) ASEAN-ERAT trained officers.

Flood mitigation activities are given serious attention as floods are the most significant natural hazard in Malaysia. Flood Mitigation Projects were incorporated in the "Five Year Malaysia Plan" and a total of MYR1.79 billion (US\$56.2 million) was spent for structural flood mitigation measures for the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2001 to 2005). For structural flood control works, MYR5.81 billion (US\$18.2 million) was allocated in the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010). The Government of Malaysia has also allocated funding for the implementation of Flood Mitigation Plan in the flood-prone states in Malaysia in its 2012 annual budget.

(iii) Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response

Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART)

Following the tragedy of the collapse of the Highland Towers Condominium on 11 December 1993, the Malaysian Cabinet decided to form a mechanism under the National Security Council, Prime Minister's Department for the proper and orderly management of on scene incident (search and rescue) in major disasters on land. The Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team

(SMART) was officially formed on 1 August 1995 and its membership consists of officers from the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysia Police, and the Fire and Rescue Department.

In general, the SMART Team specializes in search and rescue of victims in catastrophic incidences on land. However, the team can also be deployed to assist in disaster incidences that require the expertise, skills, as well as specialized tools and equipment that are beyond the capability of existing rescue teams. The SMART Team will also act in events that are expected to spread into a major disaster or in circumstances that threatens the security of a large number of local residents. Apart from that, the SMART Team is also deployed for overseas search and rescue missions when there is order from the Prime Minister or minister in charge. The most recent international deployment was to Kathmandu, Nepal following the shattering earthquake on 25 April 2015.

Being an elite search and rescue team, SMART has enhanced the image of the team and Malaysia through its various involvements in efforts to overcome major crises and disasters at home and abroad.

The Malaysian Cabinet through its meeting on 11 April 2014 had agreed for the SMART Team to undergo the INSARAG External Classification (IEC) under the heavy USAR category. Being classified under the IEC will ensure that the team will continue to stay relevant and able to speak a common global USAR language. The INSARAG



secretariat had given their positive response to Malaysia's application and had slotted the team for IEC in February 2016.

(iv) *ASEAN Context*

ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance

The AADMER is proof of ASEAN's commitment towards reducing losses and improving the region's joint emergency response to disasters. It is the first of its kind agreement that binds Southeast Asian states together to address disaster risk reduction and improve their preparedness for disaster response and is the only Hyogo Framework for Action-related legally binding instrument in the world. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), being the operational engine to implement the AADMER is part of this commitment to having a disaster resilient community by the year 2015.

The Government of Malaysia will demonstrate its full commitment to the implementation of AADMER by contributing to the AHA Centre Fund and the AADMER Fund. Malaysia is determined to play its due role during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2015 to forge meaningful collaboration towards realising the vision of 'ASEAN Responding to Disasters as One'. Malaysia is also set to further strengthen the AHA Centre and ASEAN Disaster Stockpile and other regional mechanisms towards this vision.

(v) *Humanitarian Assistance*

Malaysia has always been very forthcoming in helping out countries in need. Malaysia's commitments in this regard have always been on a bilateral level rather than through United Nations' channels.

Most recently, following the 7.8 magnitude earthquake which struck Nepal on 25 April 2015, the Government of Malaysia provided humanitarian assistance in the form of search and rescue and medical aid. The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) team comprise of the SMART Team, the Armed Forces Medical Team, Malaysian Red Crescent Society and MERCY Malaysia. Apart from HADR team, the Government of Malaysia is also currently coordinating together with local NGOs to deliver humanitarian relief items consisting of blankets, food items, toiletries and essentials for infants.

Malaysia's involvement in the humanitarian and disaster relief assistance is based on a three-pronged approach i.e. Government to Government, involvement through NGOs and people-to-people participation.

Since most of Malaysia's humanitarian assistance at the international level was done in the context of bilateral relations, the assistance has been disbursed either through direct financial contribution or in kind contribution. From the year 2004 to 2014, Malaysia's bilateral humanitarian assistance to other countries amounted to US\$22.78 million.



Malaysia had also dispatched medical relief missions spearheaded by the Malaysian Army to various places such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Pakistan. The SMART Team had also taken part in various relief missions, i.e. in Indonesia, Taiwan and Turkey.

At the multilateral level, Malaysia's contributions were also channelled through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), established during the 60th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 15 December 2005. In 2006, Malaysia gave a financial contribution of US\$50,000 to CERF. Malaysia further contributed US\$100,000 to CERF from 2007 to 2011. In 2012, Malaysia contributed another US\$50,000 to CERF. Malaysia has made a commitment to contribute US\$200,000 to the WHS Secretariat of which US\$100,000 will be allocated for 2014 and 2015 respectively for the following programmes:

- North and Southeast Asia Regional Consultation in 2014; and
- WHS Secretariat's project in building a web platform to facilitate online consultation in 2015.

Malaysian NGOs have further strengthened the country's presence internationally. MERCY Malaysia, Global Peace Mission of Malaysia, AMAN Malaysia, Viva Palestine and the Malaysian Red Crescent Society are among local NGOs which are actively involved in international humanitarian efforts.

The involvement from the Malaysian public also attests to Malaysia's commitment in humanitarian assistance globally. A special fund has been established by the Government of Malaysia, known as *Tabung Bencana Kementerian Luar Negeri* (TBKLN), to manage and supervise contributions from the public. Since its establishment in 2006, the fund has disbursed more than US\$2.2 million worth of assistance in direct financial aid or through reconstruction projects for victims of natural disasters in Afghanistan, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Thailand and Somalia.

(vi) *World Humanitarian Summit*

The World Humanitarian Summit, an initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is an opportunity for governments, UN and intergovernmental agencies, regional organisations, non-profit and civil society actors, the private sector, academia as well as people affected by crises to come together, to take stock of humanitarian action, discuss the changing landscape, share knowledge and best practices. It is also expected to chart a forward looking agenda for humanitarian action.

The World Humanitarian Summit will be based on the outcome of the eight (8) regional consultations. The consultation will provide the region an opportunity to identify key issues and present recommendations for the Secretary-General's report. The World Humanitarian Summit is scheduled to be held from 26-27 May 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey. The Summit will focus on



four major themes: Humanitarian Effectiveness, Transformation through Innovation, Reducing Vulnerability & Managing Risk, and Serving the Needs of People in Conflict. Participation by Member States is foreseen at the Director-General level from respective Ministries or relevant institutions with two places reserved per Member State at the regional consultation.

(vii) *ARF Disaster Relief Exercises 2015*

Under the ARF framework, Malaysia and China co-hosted the biennial ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF DiREx) from 24-28 May 2015. The main exercise venues were in Kedah, Perlis and the waters of Northern Penang.

The main focus of ARF DiREx 2015 was to test the civilian-military coordination efforts, create synergy, and synchronize efforts towards supporting the effective implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) as the common platform for disaster management of the region.

Key Challenges

The ARF DiREx 2015 was designed to test the region's preparedness and resilience to address the following specific challenges:

- Strengthen the effective utilisation and quick deployment of the ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response, including the

ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT);

- Effective operationalisation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) and its important role as the operational engine of AADMER to enhance regional cooperation in disaster management and ensure ASEAN's collective response to disasters in the region;
- Coordination of multi-national maritime search and rescue;
- Management of mass casualties which among others would involve communication breakdown and engineering difficulties;
- Receiving of aid / humanitarian assistance as well as its effective and timely distribution, including effective coordination of international assistance from the UN, NGOs and the private sector.
- Special needs of vulnerable population i.e. women, children and people with disabilities in the disaster area. Among others this could involve the setting up of a special medical facility to cater for the needs of the vulnerable group;
- Management of consular assistance to foreign tourists in the disaster area;



- Coordination and information sharing with foreign embassies in the disaster affected country;
- Management of media officials and control of information outflow (management of information); and
- Role of international and local volunteers and their coordination with the HADR authorities.

Maritime Security

Malaysia is fully aware of its responsibilities to ensure that its maritime zones, which include the Straits of Malacca, are safe and secure for navigation. Malaysia constantly undertakes enforcement, direct protection and surveillance of its maritime zones. Regular patrols by enforcement agencies are conducted throughout Malaysia's maritime areas.

Malaysia has established the Maritime Enforcement Agency of Malaysia (MMEA) in 2005 by virtue of the Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 to maintain security of maritime zones in Malaysia. MMEA began its operation on 30 November 2005 and is empowered to enforce Malaysia's maritime acts and laws such as the Continental Shelf Act 1966 the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, Fisheries Act 1985, Environmental Quality Act 1974, and the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 (amended 2005).

In addition to physical presence, Malaysia has also incorporated electronic monitoring capabilities to enable better surveillance of maritime activities in its maritime zones, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. Two systems are currently in place. These are the Sea Surveillance System (SWASLA) manned by the MMEA and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) operated by the Marine Department Malaysia.

Malaysia and the littoral States constantly undertake coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore launched the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (MSP) in 2004. The MSP consists of two components, the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP) and the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) air patrols. With the implementation of the MSP, comprehensive arrangement for maritime security in the Straits of Malacca has been achieved.

All the efforts by Malaysia, either unilaterally or in cooperation with the other littoral States, contribute to the overall improvement of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. The successes of the efforts have been acknowledged by reports worldwide, among others the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) weekly and annual reports. The de-classification of the Straits as a high-risk zone by the Joint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association in August 2006 was another example of the fruitful outcome of the efforts by Malaysia and the other littoral States in ensuring the security of maritime navigation in the Straits of Malacca. The de-classification should be maintained.



The figures below show the number of incidents of armed robbery reported in the Malaysian waters of the Straits of Malacca and off the coast of Sabah¹:

Year	Straits of Malacca	Off the Coast of Sabah	Total number of cases
2015 (Jan-June)	-	-	-
2014	2	-	2
2013	-	1	1
2012	-	1	1
2011	2	9	11

Malaysia recognises the importance of ensuring that the Straits of Malacca is well-maintained and protected. The continued maintenance of aid to navigation remains a vital component of ensuring the safety of ships navigating through the Straits. The Aids to Navigation Fund was established to facilitate voluntary contributions in the maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits. In line with Article 43 of UNCLOS 1982 which stipulates that States bordering a strait should cooperate with user States in the establishment and maintenance in the strait of necessary aids to navigation, and for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships. User States which have actively contributed in projects on safety of navigation are Japan, China and the United States. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also made a contribution to the Navigation Fund.

¹ This statistic is obtained from the MMEA as at 5 June 2015

Littoral States – User States Cooperation

User States are States that rely heavily on the Straits of Malacca for their global trade and shipping services. In this context, user States are always concerned about the safety and security of the Straits since any hindrance would result in the distortion of global trade and shipping services. As such, it is important for the littoral States to engage these user States to avoid any unilateral undertaking by these States. Similarly, littoral States should convince user States of the importance of burden-sharing mechanisms since the well-being of the Straits would benefit all parties.

Malaysia's involvement in international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia

Malaysia's involvement in the Gulf of Aden began in August 2008 following the hijacking of two Malaysian-flagged tankers by pirates in that region. In response, Malaysia had despatched in stages, five Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) vessels (*KD Hang Tuah*, *KD Lekiu*, *KD Mahawangsa*, *KD Sri Inderapura* and *KD Sri Inderasakti*) to the Gulf of Aden to render necessary assistance to these hijacked vessels, including in efforts to seek the early release of its crew, as well as to escort and provide necessary security coverage mainly to Malaysian-flagged vessels plying the Gulf of Aden.

Malaysia had joined other States in sponsoring UNSC Resolution 1846 (2008) which was adopted unanimously on 2 December 2008 to enter



Somalia's territorial waters and use all necessary means such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft to fight piracy and armed robbery off the Coast of Somalia. The RMN had also provided security coverage as required and/or upon request to the vessels of other countries in close cooperation with Operation Atalanta and Combined Task Force One Five One (CTF 151).

Operation Atalanta is a European Union (EU) Military Mission established on 8 December 2008 in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, to contribute to the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. The CTF 151, established in January 2009, is an international task force set up in response to piracy attacks in shipping lanes operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia.

The RMN also had, on several occasions, successfully thwarted attempts by pirates to board and hijack other merchant ships, including a Chinese-flagged crane vessel (*Zhenhua 4*) in December 2008 and an Indian-flagged crude oil tanker (*MT Abul Kalam Azad*) in January 2009.

IV. ROLE OF ARF

Since its inception in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has become an increasingly important platform for dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region

characterised by security consensus decision-making and minimal institutionalisation. It has been agreed upon by participating countries that the ARF process would proceed in a three-stage evolution approach; from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and subsequently to conflict resolution.

Despite the progress made thus far, the ARF cannot be complacent with what it has achieved. The ARF has to adapt itself to the new security challenges especially in light of the evolving global and regional environment. As Chairman of ASEAN and concurrently the Chairman of the ARF, Malaysia intends to work towards the promotion of regional peace and security through moderation as a shared value in addressing conflict and finding solutions to issues concerning regional peace and security. As the primary security forum for the region, the ARF process continues to be relevant in light of the on-going discussion on regional architecture, with ASEAN at its core.

Malaysia count on the strong support of ARF members to effectively implement the ARF Work Plans as well as to exert more efforts in conducting preventive diplomacy initiative in the region. It is in this vein that Malaysia hopes to work closely with ARF Participating Countries to play a more active role in promoting confidence building measures under the framework of ARF.



MYANMAR



I. OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The issues of maximizing the strength of national defenses in the region, the territorial claim in East Asia and the relations among the super powers are regional issues which can at any time burst into flame. If these issues are not handled in a proper and peaceful way, the regional peace and security could be threatened. In addition to the afore-mentioned traditional security issues posing security threats to Asia Pacific Region, there also exist non-traditional security issues such as international terrorism, arm smuggling, trans-national crimes, manufacturing, trafficking of illicit drugs, trafficking in person, maritime security, natural disasters, environmental degradation and outbreak of communicable diseases and irregular and illegal migration. The dynamics of globalization resulting from technological advancement has contributed to the spread of non-traditional security issues in the region, thereby posing a threat to the regional and global security.

II. MYANMAR'S NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has never engaged in launching an aggressive attack to neighboring countries or any other country in the

world. Myanmar Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) is formed to safeguard its sovereignty but has no intention whatsoever to attack any country. But it will drive out any aggressors from its soil. Myanmar will never allow any foreign or alien troops to be stationed within its territory. Upholding national policy of "Our Three Main National Causes" that is non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, perpetuation of sovereignty, Myanmar Tatmadaw is invariably performing its national security and defense duties. With regard to the national defense, Myanmar Tatmadaw will act in accordance with Article 42 of the Constitution which states explicitly as follows:

- (a) Myanmar will never initiate an aggressive war against any nation; and
- (b) Myanmar will never allow any alien troops to be stationed within its territory.

As the Republic of the Union of Myanmar has been pursuing the national defense policy to protect the national interests of the country and its people, the following national defense policies have been laid down based on our historical experience, socio-economic conditions, situations of the nations within the region, geographical locations and the historical traditions of the Tatmadaw:



- (a) To safeguard “Our Three Main National Causes” which are non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty.
- (b) To build national defence with a people’s defence strategy based on the strength of the local populace
- (c) To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and to defend aggression and various forms of interferences in our domestic affairs,
- (d) To pursue amicable defence system with other countries in line with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
- (e) Not to enter into any military alliance with any foreign countries and not to allow any foreign forces to be stationed in Myanmar’s territory and
- (f) To collaborate with international community in addressing non-traditional security issues and counter-terrorism as well as to provide humanitarian assistance for countries affected by natural disasters.

Defence Expenditure

For the financial year 2015-2016, the Pyitaungsu Hluttaw (Parliament) has allocated USD 2.5 billion for national defense expenditure.

III. MYANMAR’S CONTRIBUTION TO PROMOTE REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Becoming a member of ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has enhanced its cooperation with countries in the region. In the same year, Myanmar also became a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Myanmar successfully hosted the 3rd Summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Summit (BIMSTEC) from 1st to 4th May 2014 and promoted its cooperation with countries from the South Asia region. Before becoming a member of the ASEAN, Myanmar also became a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is the most important forum for political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Since then, Myanmar has been actively participating in the ARF meetings and workshops.

Myanmar started drafting the Counter Terrorism Act in 2005 and enacted with further amendments on the provisions of terrorist financing and extradition. Myanmar signed the agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among Like-Minded ASEAN Member Countries in 2006. Moreover, Myanmar signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism-ACCT in 2007 and ratified the Convention in 2012.

In its efforts to eliminate narcotic drugs, Myanmar attended the annual meetings of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter- ASOD even before



becoming a member of ASEAN as an observer. After becoming an ASEAN member, Myanmar attended the 20th ASOD which was held in Brunei in August, 1997 and has been participating since then on in various ASEAN meetings on narcotic Drug and implementing the decision of the Meetings and the Work Plans.

Since 1999-2000, Myanmar has been implementing its 15-year Drug Elimination Plan, through five measures: elimination of drug production, elimination of drug abuse, prevention, public participation and international cooperation. Myanmar has undertaken the preventive measures in corporation with neighbouring countries.

Myanmar successfully hosted the 3rd Workshop on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration-ADIC on 24-25 April 2014, ASEAN Defence Senior Official's Meeting-ADSOM on 28 April 2014, ASEAN Political Security Community -11th APSC on 10 May 2014, the 8th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting- ADMM on 19 May 2014, ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Official's Dialogue-ARFDOD on 7 June 2014, 11th ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference-11th AACC meeting on 22-26 September 2014, 1st ASEAN Air Forces Education and Training Working Group Meeting-1st AAFET-WG on 23 September 2014, 15th General Meeting of ASEAN War Veterans Organization on 27 September 2014 and 8th ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medicine Conference- ACMMC meeting on 29 April 2015.

In promoting defense diplomacy, Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar Tatmadaw as well as Vice Commander-in-Chief of Defence

Services and Commander-in-Chief (Army), Commander-in-Chief (Navy), and Commander-in-Chief (Air) paid goodwill visits to countries in the region to promote friendship and security of the region. Likewise, Chiefs of the Armed Forces from countries in the region also visited Myanmar. Myanmar has been actively engaging in defense and security cooperation in the region through the implementation of various ASEAN related security cooperation agreements as well as participation of Chiefs of Myanmar Armed Forces, Ministers and Deputy Ministers concerned in various defence meetings, workshops, seminars. Moreover, Myanmar has been participating in the regional security trainings and exercises.

IV. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Since ASEAN is located in the Asia-Pacific region, a security threat to the Asia-Pacific region is a challenge to ASEAN. Nowadays, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, armed smuggling, transnational crimes, drugs trafficking, human trafficking, maritime safety, natural disaster, environmental degradation, communicable diseases and illegal migration are posing serious threats to the regional and international security.

Myanmar is of the opinion that ASEAN Member States should promote cooperation in order to fully build mutual trust, confidence and friendship as well as to disallow radical organizations and persons, insurgents and terrorist groups within the territories of the member states. ASEAN



member states should exchange information which may undermine regional security. ASEAN should conduct seminars to provide mutual assistance on security and information technology. ASEAN should further promote regional security through dialogue among the member states thereby providing a genuine ASEAN security review.

In conducting activities to combat terrorism, the coordination meetings should not be held in one country alone. Necessary information should be shared among respective agencies of the ASEAN Member States which has networking, mutual assistance and protection. With regard to the human security, important sectors such as disaster relief and resettlement, combating terrorism, medical care, anti-arms smuggling, anti-drugs trafficking and environmental conservation should be carried out. ASEAN should address any terrorist activities through development of human capacity and economy. In doing so, a true stability and security can be achieved and the term “terrorism” can be wiped out ultimately from the region. Moreover, a united and cohesive ASEAN Community can be materialized in the near future for the security and stability of the people through cooperation and collaboration among ASEAN nationals.

With regard to the role of ASEAN armed forces, cooperation is indispensable based on the concept of coordination and collaboration. In responding regional security challenges, the role of the armed forces should move toward establishing a more stable and secure region. Furthermore, the threats of non-traditional security issues such as natural disasters, terrorism, maritime security, transnational crimes, communicable diseases, food and energy security, cyber crime, climate change, global warming will still remain as important challenges in the region. Therefore, ASEAN armed forces should continue exchange of information, capacity building and joint trainings and exercises on these issues.

ASEAN member states should promote their cooperation in enhancing regional peace and security including stability of the South China Sea as well as denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and realization of SEANWFZ including signing of the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Protocol by Nuclear Weapon States, fighting against extreme terrorists, climate change, prevention of communicable diseases, disaster management, cyber security, illegal wildlife trafficking and drugs and human trafficking and arm smuggling.



NEW ZEALAND



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

2015 marks the 40th anniversary of New Zealand's Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN. In this commemorative year, we not only reflect on our history of close cooperation, but we look forward to enhancing the New Zealand-ASEAN partnership so that it remains a pillar of regional prosperity and stability into the future.

The Asia-Pacific region is central to New Zealand's security and future wellbeing. New Zealand values its engagement with regional processes, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which promote the common goal of a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. New Zealand plays an active part in helping these individual forums realise their objectives. Sustained commitment to bilateral and regional relationships underlines the importance that New Zealand places on partnerships within the region and the wider global security environment.

New Zealand is strongly committed to an open trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring longer term regional security and prosperity. It is committed to working toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

New Zealand attaches considerable importance to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which entered into force in 2010. New Zealand has other bilateral FTAs/Closer Economic Partnerships with China, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei. Negotiations have been concluded with the Gulf Cooperation Council (the agreement is yet to be signed or ratified). New Zealand is currently negotiating bilateral FTAs with other countries, including India. New Zealand is actively participating in negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). New Zealand is a party to the Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), with Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Chile.

New Zealand is serving as an elected member on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2015-2016 term. It is committed to being an active, fair-minded and independent member of the UNSC. New Zealand is focused on being a voice for the Asia/Pacific region in the UNSC and ensuring the views of its partners in the region are reflected in the relevant discussions. Priority issues for New Zealand at the UNSC are aligned with issues that affect the safety and security of the Asia/Pacific region. New Zealand is also focused on areas where it can contribute to making the UNSC more effective and responsive, namely in the areas of peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and the UNSC's working methods.



The rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is the most significant regional and international security threat to have emerged in the last 12 months. This extremist group now occupies large parts of northern Iraq and northern Syria and, most recently, is showing signs of gaining footholds in the wider Middle East region as well as North Africa. Despite some setbacks on the battlefield in the face of coalition airstrikes and ground offensives by local security forces, ISIL remains a potent actor. Moreover, the significant broader international security threat remains, given ISIL's ability to export its brand of terrorism through its network of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and its inspiration of 'lone wolf' attacks.

ISIL's rise has seen a marked increase in the range of regional and international fora that are now deeply engaged with counter-terrorism issues. These fora allow countries to exchange views and share information on threats such as radicalisation and Foreign Terrorist Fighters, as well as to discuss best practice approaches and concrete initiatives aimed at countering terrorist financing and violent extremism. The United Nations Security Council also plays an important role, including through a range of UN Security Council Resolutions and associated measures on counter financing of terrorists and associated legislative measures at the national level to combat the threat of foreign fighters.

Yet New Zealand knows that the threat posed by radicalisation or violent extremism cannot be addressed by security measures alone. There is a need to balance necessary security measures with greater community engagement and social

cohesion to provide support for individuals and communities to disengage with violent extremist beliefs. A key tenet of New Zealand's work to counter violent extremism is an honest, dedicated and long-term commitment to enhancing community engagement through policies and programmes based on inclusivity, respect and tolerance. This is a whole of government exercise, deploying, as the context requires, social services, health services, police, internal affairs and educational resources to identify and reduce local pressures that might marginalise and turn vulnerable individuals toward a path of radicalisation and violent extremism.

North Korea's missile tests and its continued development of nuclear weapons violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions. We continue to call on the DPRK to comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, cease provocations and engage constructively with the international community on denuclearisation, security and human rights issues. We support 6 Party Talks participants' efforts to restart those talks on denuclearisation. We welcome South Korea's efforts to build mutual trust with North Korea.

New Zealand has consistently called on all parties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine to exercise restraint and refrain from any action that could escalate tensions; and to respect and maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We call on all parties to implement fully their commitments under the Minsk Agreements.

Maritime security remains a regional concern. All ARF members have an interest in developments in the South China Sea being managed in a peaceful



manner, consistent with international law. New Zealand remains concerned about any action that could inflame the situation. It is important that parties exercise self-restraint and actively look for ways to manage difficult issues effectively, including through the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties, and negotiation of a substantive Code of Conduct.

The security threats that countries face in the region continue to evolve as a result of both internal and external factors. One consistent external catalyst for change is the rapid growth of technology, and its use by both state and criminal groups. ISIL's sophistication in use of social media has been unprecedented for a terrorist organisation and now we are seeing similar methods employed by others, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. In this new environment it is important for law enforcement to understand how criminal groups (including terrorists) are using cyberspace. States must adapt their own systems to counter the emergence of cyber offending. New Zealand endorses the current draft ARF cyber security work plan and supports its adoption.

Security has long been recognised as a vital prerequisite for the sustainable development of the Pacific Islands region. Security has accordingly become a significant area of the Pacific Islands Forum's work in recent years. New Zealand has been closely involved in responding to regional security issues, through bilateral aid programmes to build capacity, the Forum's Regional Security Committee, co-Chairing the Forum Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (PWGCT) and through working with regional law enforcement agencies.

II. NEW ZEALAND'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Overview of National Security and Defence Policy

As a founding member of the UN, respect for the rule of international law is fundamental to New Zealand's approach to promoting security, stability and peace. While New Zealand's borders are distant from direct conflict, there are fragile states within the Asia-Pacific region. The threats of terrorism, arms proliferation, transnational crime and economic and environmental degradation show no respect for international borders. Recognising this, New Zealand is highly committed to multilateral, transboundary solutions to security threats and the promotion of effective international rules. New Zealand takes a multi layered approach to security that includes strong bilateral relationships and regional partnerships.

Key relationships and partnerships are:

- New Zealand's bilateral alliance with Australia;
- the Five Power Defence Arrangements (New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom);
- close bilateral ties with Pacific Island neighbours, including those for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities;
- close and growing bilateral ties with Asia-Pacific partners and



- Pacific and Asia Pacific regional mechanisms such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus processes.

A range of foreign and security policy, management and resourcing challenges were addressed in the New Zealand Government's defence review and the subsequent Defence White Paper (www.defence.govt.nz/defence-review.html) released in 2010. The White Paper sets out a framework for the defence of New Zealand through addressing New Zealand's vital strategic interests including the security of its sovereign territory and exclusive economic zone, its special relationship with Australia, the need to build security in the South Pacific, its relationships in the wider Asia-Pacific region and its contribution to the global community.

The global strategic environment has evolved in the last five years. Some of these changes are positive, such as increasing economic interconnection. Others are increasingly challenging New Zealand's strategic interests. The 2014 Defence Assessment (www.defence.govt.nz/defence.govt.nz/defence-white-paper-2015.html) found that New Zealand's interests beyond our region are growing while the rules and values we rely on are increasingly under threat.

The Government is developing a new Defence White Paper in 2015 which will critically evaluate what these changes mean for how the Defence Force operates, with whom, and under what circumstances. The Defence White Paper will provide direction on future capability development and investment decisions.

Data Contribution to ARF Arms Register

The total appropriation for the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2015 was NZ\$3.026 billion, of which operating expenses were NZ\$2.478 billion and capital expenditure was NZ\$548 million.

III. NEW ZEALAND'S CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Counter Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime, and Cyber Threats

New Zealand is firmly committed to the international campaigns against terrorism and transnational organised crime. To counter these threats New Zealand is engaged in the development of the international counter terrorism security architecture (at the UN and regional level) and continues to adopt a comprehensive, multi layered and long-term approach to addressing these issues.

New Zealand actively engages in a number of regional fora, including in the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime (CTTC), the PWGCT (co-Chaired by New Zealand), the Forum Regional Security Committee and the ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Experts Working Group (CT EWG).

In April 2014, New Zealand co-chaired the ISM CTTC with Indonesia. The CTTC addresses terrorism and transnational criminal networks as mutually enabling threats in the ARF region. Following that meeting, New Zealand agreed to



co-lead with Thailand the Illicit Drugs work stream of the ARF CTTC Work Plan, which included a Workshop in Bangkok on Enhancing Regional Cooperation to Address Challenges Posed by Illicit Drugs, held on 11-12 February 2015.

New Zealand has co-sponsored (with Australia) a UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-produced assessment of the threat posed by trans-national organised crime in the East Asia and the Pacific region, which was published in April 2013. New Zealand and Australia have also now co-sponsored the UNODC to produce a similar standalone Threat Assessment for the Pacific to enable more strategic targeting of capacity building assistance.

In order to enable the achievement of New Zealand's global security priorities, including assisting with Capacity Building in neighbouring states, New Zealand has a number of specialised security funds, including a dedicated Global Security Fund. The specialised security funds also assist New Zealand's achievement of its Work Plan with ASEAN, namely in the area of border control; legislation; law enforcement; policy; and prevention/counter radicalisation.

New Zealand undertakes both regional and bilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia and over the past couple of years has partnered with the South East Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Indonesia. New Zealand has funded and organised a number of regional capacity building workshops for ASEAN countries on key

issues, including anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing standards, cyber-crime, terrorist prosecutions, chemical and nuclear security, major event security, and maritime and aviation security. These efforts are complemented by significant bilateral work to build individual national capability, especially within law enforcement agencies.

New Zealand works with Pacific Island countries (PICs) to help strengthen their security and resilience to terrorism and transnational organised crime. New Zealand has committed a number of initiatives through the Forum Regional Security Committee, including an assessment of cybercrime vulnerability, enhancing airport and maritime security, drafting and implementing national counter-terrorism legislation and ratifying international counter-terrorism instruments, and training for law enforcement and border agency officials. Funding is provided through the Pacific Security Fund (PSF) and the New Zealand Aid Programme.

This year, at New Zealand's initiative, the PWGCT will address the nexus between counter-terrorism and transnational organised crime, reflecting the fact that the two issues are interlinked, as efforts to build capacity in one area also grow the capacity to respond to the other.

New Zealand is also an active member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), attending annual meetings of the GCTF Coordinating Committee, South East Asia Capacity Building Working Group and regional GCTF workshops hosted by Indonesia on law enforcement capacity building. New Zealand has also provided financial



support to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), an initiative of the GCTF. The GCERF is a forum which brings practitioners and policy-makers together to share counter terrorism experiences, expertise and strategies, and to deliver sharper, focused capacity building activities.

Most recently, in the context of the international counter-ISIL campaign, New Zealand has decided to contribute troops alongside Australia in a two-year deployment to Taji, Iraq, to assist in training the Iraqi Army and to build their capacity to conduct ground operations against ISIL. At the same time, we have joined the Coalition Working Groups on Counter Terrorist Financing and Foreign Terrorist Fighters. New Zealand has also contributed \$15.5m in humanitarian assistance for those affected by conflict in Syria and Iraq.

Connectivity is a crucial driver of New Zealand's and the Asia-Pacific's economic growth, however, with increased connectivity comes increased exposure to cyber threats, including from transnational organised criminal and terrorist groups. Further, a lack of transparency and confidence in cyberspace undermines the internet's economic and social benefits and increases the risk of miscalculation in cyberspace. As such, New Zealand considers that the ARF has an important role to play in raising cyber capacity levels and share best practices. The ARF's work on transparency and confidence building measures is also valuable in building trust in cyberspace and lowering the risk of misunderstanding among states.

Not all states, particularly in the Asia-Pacific have yet experienced the full benefits of connectivity. New Zealand is therefore committed to capacity building and raising regional security online with a particular focus on our Pacific and South East Asian neighbours. To this end, New Zealand has recently joined the Global Forum of Cyber Expertise. The Forum has the potential to contribute to building trust and confidence in cyberspace and we look forward to working with our ARF partners.

Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

New Zealand is an active supporter of initiatives aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both state and non-state actors, in particular the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the G8 Global Partnership (G8GP), the Nuclear Security Summit, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which New Zealand currently sits on the Board of Governors.

The PSI has developed into an effective international counter-proliferation network of 102 countries around the globe. New Zealand's participation in PSI, including its membership of the Operational Experts Group (the PSI steering committee) and participation in exercises and capacity building initiatives, has enhanced New Zealand's capabilities to prevent proliferation activity both nationally and in collaboration with partners. New Zealand has developed and shared with PSI partners in



the Asia-Pacific and beyond a Model National Response Plan, which provides clear, easy-to-follow guidance on the range of issues that need to be considered in developing a framework for responding to PSI/proliferation situations. As part of the agreed Asia-Pacific exercise rotation, New Zealand will host a PSI table-top exercise in Wellington in November 2015. New Zealand would welcome further adherence to the PSI throughout the Asia Pacific as part of a coordinated effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.

New Zealand is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organisation, which provides the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. One of the IAEA's functions is to verify through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes. In 2014, New Zealand began a two-year role on the IAEA's Board of Governors, one of the IAEA's key decision making bodies.

New Zealand joined the GICNT in 2007, and is strongly committed alongside over 80 GICNT partners to preventing nuclear or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. New Zealand has contributed to the GICNT in the Asia Pacific by: developing a table-top exercise kit for use by other GICNT partners in testing their own national response systems; supporting radioactive source security projects in Southeast

Asia; increasing its funding for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve nuclear security in Southeast Asia; and helping its Pacific island neighbours address the risk of nuclear/radiological security.

Alongside a number of other countries from the Asia-Pacific region New Zealand has been an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process, launched in Washington in 2010. Through its engagement in this process, the nuclear security activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, New Zealand has provided significant financial and practical support to efforts to strengthen nuclear security at the national, regional and global level, including the provision of more than NZ\$3 million to nuclear security projects since 2010. New Zealand will soon also welcome an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. IPPAS assists states to strengthen their national nuclear security regime through provision of peer advice on implementing international instruments, and IAEA guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.

New Zealand also works to prevent proliferation by helping to develop and implement export controls as an active member of key multilateral regimes including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.



Given the role played by the unregulated global trade and transfers of arms in fuelling conflict, New Zealand was a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) throughout its negotiation. New Zealand was pleased to be among the first to sign the Treaty in June 2013 and ratified it in September 2014. New Zealand hopes that the ATT will contribute meaningfully to international and regional peace, security and stability. To support broader membership of the Treaty, New Zealand sponsored the development of ATT model legislation to assist countries to implement their domestic obligations under the ATT. New Zealand looks forward to working closely with its ARF partners to build a strong ATT regime.

New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to international disarmament and arms control. New Zealand has continued its active promotion of nuclear disarmament including through its membership of the New Agenda Coalition (which it will coordinate during the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference) and the De-alerting Group. At the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 2013 and 2014, New Zealand coordinated and delivered the Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons on behalf of 125 and 155 countries respectively.

Following terms in 2015 by fellow ARF members Mongolia and Myanmar, New Zealand will chair the Conference on Disarmament in August-September 2015 and will be responsible for preparing and presenting the Conference's report to the United General Assembly First Committee.

New Zealand strongly encourages all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to sign the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) without any reservations of interpretative declarations. This would be a welcome step in the development of nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms in this part of the world. New Zealand, which has also had domestic nuclear-free legislation since 1987 and is a founding party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, is a strong proponent of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a key regional measure to facilitate reinforce nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.

New Zealand supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important contributor to regional and global security. New Zealand welcomed recent ratifications of the CTBT by Annex 1 and 2 states in the region and encourages further ratifications by ARF participants.

New Zealand strongly supports and plays an active role on both the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Cluster Munitions Convention (CCM). New Zealand currently co-chairs the APMBC's Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. New Zealand is also currently the coordinator for national implementation measures in the CCM and has produced model legislation for use by small states with no history of use or contamination. New Zealand encourages other ARF participants who have not yet done so to ratify or accede to both Conventions.



Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The Asia-Pacific region continues to be afflicted by natural disasters that underline the need to continue deepening practical and effective cooperation over disaster reduction, response, relief and recovery. New Zealand has been an active participant in ARF and EAS exercises to prepare and respond to regional disasters.

New Zealand is continuing to play its part in deepening regional capacity to prepare and respond to disasters, and is committed to further cooperation and implementation of work plans in ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS contexts. Within the EAS, in particular, New Zealand will, in 2015, convene a regional workshop that draws on lessons learned from the Christchurch Earthquakes. New Zealand has been a solid proponent of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre since its inception and has contributed technical expertise to the Centre.

Maritime Security

In 2008, ARF Ministers identified maritime security as one of the ARF's four key areas. In 2009-2011 New Zealand co-chaired with Indonesia and Japan a series of ARF Intersessional Meetings on the topic. Over this period, participants developed a work plan which was approved by Ministers in 2011. New Zealand has been actively involved in the implementation of the work plan, and

in sharing its experiences on various maritime security-related issues, including Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and oil-spill response.

With support from Brunei and Malaysia, New Zealand organised an ARF workshop on ship profiling in April 2013. New Zealand and Malaysia are developing a follow-up workshop on capacity building in the ship profiling area, to be delivered in 2016.

New Zealand plays an active role on maritime security in associated fora. New Zealand is co-chairing (with Brunei Darussalam) the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Experts Working Group from 2014-2017.

IV. ROLE OF ARF

New Zealand's Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

For New Zealand, the ARF is the principal security forum within the Asia-Pacific region. It contributes to building an environment in our region of dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of regional security issues. The ARF is also contributing in an important way to the development of international norms and principles on security, which are directly relevant to this region. The large number and diversity of practical ARF projects under implementation in 2015 reflects the ARF's increasing ability to respond to contemporary security challenges facing this



part of the world. New Zealand also attaches considerable importance to working with its ARF partners to advance ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda, in line with ARF's three-stage evolution.

New Zealand is committed to working with its ASEAN partners to realise enhanced synergies between the ARF and other pieces of the regional architecture, in particular the EAS and ADMM-Plus. While the ARF and ADMM-Plus have their distinct mandates and different memberships, greater functional coordination between them on issues that straddle both forums, such as disaster relief/management and maritime security, would help to achieve streamlining and eliminate any unnecessary duplication of activities. New Zealand actively supports efforts to strengthen the EAS.

Future of ARF

At the ARF's outset it was envisaged that the Forum would move as part of its evolution from a confidence building phase to preventive

diplomacy, and finally to conflict resolution. While many confidence building measures have been undertaken, the ARF has yet to reach its potential in the field of preventive diplomacy. New Zealand supports and has contributed to the conclusion of the ARF's Work Plan on Preventive Diplomacy agreed by Ministers in July 2011.

New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, China and the US, hosted a roundtable discussion on preventive diplomacy training resources in March 2014. The roundtable recommended that ARF develop a preventive diplomacy training course, which is tailored to the needs and characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand, along with other ARF partners, was actively involved in advancing ARF's preventive diplomacy training programme over 2014, and, along with the United States and Thailand, will conduct a Track 1.5 preventive diplomacy symposium in 2015.



THE PHILIPPINES



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Asia-Pacific region is considered a distinct regional security complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003). The region is a theater for power webs and political and regional configuration among powers, a number of territorial disputes, domestic conflicts, and non-traditional challenges, to name a few. In Northeast Asia, in particular, the interplay between and among countries is also underlined by deep historical baggage which further complicates relations.

These security concerns confronting the Asia-Pacific region cannot be addressed by the national government alone. Responding to these challenges require intergovernmental and transnational cooperation as well as continuous capacity building for effective response.

Maritime Security

One of the most pressing concerns that confront the Asia-Pacific region is the ongoing territorial and maritime disputes. The competing claims in the South China Sea by the claimant parties - Philippines, Brunei, China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan; the Taiwan Strait; the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan; the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories between Japan

and Russia; the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands between Japan and South Korea; the Jeodo/Suyan Reef and Socotra Rock between South Korea and China and; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan are all potential military flashpoints that can destabilize the peace and security of the region.

Non-claimant states to these territorial and maritime disputes have also expressed their concerns about escalating tensions in the disputed area. Further, both claimants and non-claimants have called for all parties to the disputes to exercise self-restraint, not to resort to threat or use of force, and to abide by international law and instruments, such as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Southeast Asian littoral states are embarking on naval upgrades which include the acquisition of new vessels and development of submarine programs. Littoral states have also emphasized the role of maritime domain awareness in their defense and security policies.

With respect to non-traditional maritime security issues, the region continues to face piracy, poaching, marine pollution, and the use of maritime routes for unlawful activities that threaten the economic security of the states. These growing non-traditional security concerns are a challenge



to the civilian maritime authorities that have been trained to respond to traditional maritime security issues.

Potential Great Power Rivalry

The Asia-Pacific's geopolitical landscape also requires attention, especially with respect to the political and regional configuration among great powers. The United States' 'rebalance to Asia' program indicates its renewed interest and resolved to become a much visible player in the region. However, US foreign policy will be recalibrated in light of the changing geopolitical environment, i.e. relations with China, and the country's fiscal circumstances.

China will be closely monitored as the country's foreign policy, though marked by continuity, is now broader in scope and is more actively implemented. China has supplemented its growing political and economic clout with new bilateral and multilateral initiatives that is somehow interpreted as challenging the status quo. It is using its economic leverage to advance its long-term strategies and to increase other states' regional dependency on China.

Korean Peninsula Issue

The situation in the Korean Peninsula remains volatile due to the lack of progress in the denuclearization talks. Moreover, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not halted its nuclear weapons program despite several United Nations Security Council resolutions banning such program. There

are also intersecting strategic interests of regional powers in the Korean Peninsula. The involvement of China, Russia, Japan, and the US will continue to be critical in resolving the tensions in the Peninsula.

Conflict in the Middle East

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is experiencing continued instability resulting from sectarian conflicts, successions in family regimes, and the reverberations of Arab Spring in 2011. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its brand of religious extremism create serious risks not only for the Middle East but to other regions as well. ISIS has been actively recruiting fighters from different countries and has also been establishing linkages with other regional terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, economic outlook in the Middle East appears gloomy. This is brought about by high unemployment rate compared with the rest of the world. This can have political repercussions which might result in stale political climate – a precursor for unrest and instability.

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Other Hazardous Materials

With regard to non-traditional security challenges, the Philippines is concerned with the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear explosives (CBRNe) weapons and other dual items which can be used as components for improvise explosive devices. The increasing



interconnectedness brought about by globalization coupled with fluid borders inadvertently aid the rise of illegal channels that serve as conduits for the illegal transfer of these CBRNe as well as small arms and light weapons.

Small Arms Proliferation

Weapons proliferation is further complicated by the possibility that this may fall in the hands of non-state actors. Aside from the difficulty of monitoring such illicit activity, these non-state actors pose new security dilemmas as they operate with the aim to destabilize governments and societies.

Cyber Security

Cyber security is also a cause for concern due to the number of cyber-attacks on government and business portals, identity thefts, and unauthorized access to information. An unsecured cyber infrastructure compromises secure exchange of classified information between governments. It can also lead to loss of strategic advantages for defense and military establishments.

Disasters

Natural and man-made disasters are also serious concerns especially for ASEAN. Some ASEAN member states are most vulnerable to these given these countries' geographical location. The rise of these disasters and the growing severity has redefined the roles of the armed forces which are now compelled to respond to these challenges.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Priority Concerns

Recent developments in the national, regional, and global security environments continue to present defense and security challenges for regional states, including the Philippines. Along this line, the Philippine government must find more effective and efficient ways to address these security issues. To do its part, the Department of National Defense (DND) must identify the Philippines' priority concerns and second set of priority concerns to provide a direction on defense policy and enhance defense and military capabilities. The following are the parameters used to further classify the priority concerns and second set of priority concerns: (a) impact on national security and sovereignty, (b) impact on Philippine international relations, (c) urgency of the challenge and (d) level of DND-Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) involvement in addressing a security concern. The identified security challenges are the results of assessments among stakeholders to include the DND, AFP General Headquarters (GHQ), Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Navy (PN), Philippine Air Force (PAF), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), National Security Council (NSC) Secretariat, Philippine National Police (PNP), and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).

Priority concerns are very urgent security concerns with high impact on national sovereignty and Philippine strategic posture. These are the security concerns that would require the DND-AFP to



take on a lead role in addressing the issue or share responsibility with other line agencies and government offices. These include challenges to territorial integrity, maritime security, internal security, natural disasters, cyber security, and global peace and security.

On the other hand, second set of *priority concerns* are urgent security concerns that have low impact on national sovereignty and Philippine strategic posture. These security concerns necessitate the DND-AFP to provide support for other government agencies. These include food, water, and energy security and proliferation of weapons/CBRN explosives.

Major Policy Thrusts

Military Modernization

In the face of the changing and complex security environment, the Philippine government has been undertaking necessary programs and reforms to improve national security and defense. Foremost is the implementation of Republic Act 10349 or the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Act of 2012 toward the attainment of a 'credible defense posture'. This means establishing an effective force inside the Philippines and its EEZ with exhibited competence to defend the country and protect its national interests if and when the need arises. This also includes the ability to conduct wide surveillance and monitoring of developments within the country's territory, and to provide an expedient and efficient response to any untoward incidents.

The 15-year program (2013-2028) seeks to transform the AFP into a multi-mission oriented force capable of effectively addressing internal and external security threats. This will be achieved through the acquisition of major weapon and non-weapon equipment and technology, improvements and construction of necessary infrastructure, implementation of reforms in the military organization, enhancement of human resources, and updating of military doctrines.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

While the AFP modernization is primarily driven by the need to defend the Philippines from threats to its national security and territorial integrity, another key objective is developing effective responses to natural disasters. Given the Philippines location in the Pacific 'Ring of Fire', the country is highly vulnerable to typhoons and earthquakes that imperil people's lives and livelihood. This reality is highlighted by the typhoon *Haiyan/Yolanda* which hit the Central Philippines in November 2013 and is considered as the strongest typhoon in recorded history to make a landfall.

In line with this, most of AFP acquisitions are military vessels and aircraft that are multi-purpose and can perform both defense and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief functions. Other new materiel acquisitions also include C-130 Hercules transport crafts and 23 new High



Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) or “Humvee” ambulances for the Philippine Army.

The devastation caused by typhoon Haiyan led to an outpour of support from the international community, with 132 aircrafts and vessels from 29 countries arriving at the Philippines to assist in relief and humanitarian assistance. This raised the need for greater coordination of military forces in responding to natural disasters. For its part, the Philippines has adopted a cluster approach to better coordinate all relevant efforts of government departments, and agencies in disaster management. It has also been working on a framework that would guide the involvement of foreign military forces in HADR. In addition, the country actively supports the work of regional bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Humanitarian Coordination Center.

The Philippines and ASEAN co-convened the ASEAN High-Level Conference on Assistance for the Recovery of Yolanda-Affected Areas (ARYA) in August 2014. ARYA was to assist the Philippine government in implementing the country’s national and local recovery and rehabilitation plans. The high-level conference was followed by the ASEAN Community Rebuilding Technical Workshop which convened the local leaders from Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan affected areas. The workshop shared and discussed best practices and strategies in building more resilient communities.

The Philippines also participated in the multinational search efforts for Malaysian Airline MH 370 which disappeared in March 2014. The Philippine Navy deployed BRP *Gregorio del Pilar*, BRP *Emilio Jacinto* and a C-130 aircraft.

Role of Alliances/International Partnerships

While guarding the national peace and security is the main priority of the Department of National Defense (DND), it also envisions itself as a strategic partner of the international community. Integral to the realization of Philippine defense objectives is close cooperation with traditional allies and other likeminded partners in the region and beyond. In April 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to reinvigorate the longstanding alliance while increasing their individual and joint capabilities to respond to different security threats as well as natural and man-made calamities. The EDCA is not only about the rotational presence of American troops in Philippine military facilities, but covers cooperation on a wide range of areas – from interoperability to capacity building, from maritime domain awareness to humanitarian and disaster response (HADR).

With their bilateral relations upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2011, the Philippines and Japan have been working closely on a wide range of security concerns – from maritime domain awareness, to disaster prevention and climate change adaptation, to anti-piracy and anti-terrorism. The two countries are also exploring cooperation on defense equipment and technology, in light of the recent changes in Japan’s arms export policy. Meanwhile, the first of the 10 patrol boats that the Japanese government has pledged to give to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) are also expected to be delivered this year.

Apart from the US and Japan, the Philippines also engages other countries to increase cooperation on defense, maritime security, counter-terrorism,



and humanitarian assistance. Among the countries with which the Philippine government has recently held high-level talks and engagements on defense-related issues are South Korea, Germany, Singapore, Myanmar, and Australia.

At the regional level, the Philippines has been actively participating in the activities of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus with ASEAN Dialogue Partners. Among the recent exercises that the country has participated in are the ADMM-Plus Table-Top Exercise on Peacekeeping Operations held in the Philippines in February 2014, the ADMM-Plus Workshop on Military Medicine held in Russia in June 2014, and the ADMM Table-Top Exercise on Maritime Security held in Brunei in October 2014. In addition, the Philippines supports ADMM's efforts at establishing direct communications link among ASEAN militaries as a means of enhancing cooperation and minimizing tensions in the region.

The Philippines also participated in the US-led annual multilateral naval exercises. These include the 13th Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) held in August 2014 in Changi Naval Base. The exercises was participated in by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and focused on information sharing, maritime security responses, countering terrorism and piracy. The Philippines also took part in the Rim of the Pacific naval exercises hosted by the 7th Fleet of the US Navy. 49 ships from 23 navies participated in this multinational naval exercise.

The DND also hosted the first Asian Defense and Security (ADAS) conference and exhibition in July 2014. The ADAS focused on the latest issues and trends in military technology.

Internal Security, Counter-Terrorism, and Transnational Crimes

The signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014 concluded 17 years of negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which would lead to the creation of a Bangsamoro Autonomous Entity (BAE), is currently being studied in the Philippine Congress, and is hoped to bring the genuine and lasting peace that has long eluded Mindanao.

However, despite breakthroughs in the negotiations with MILF, challenges to Philippine internal security continue with different groups seeking to spoil the peace process. Encounters between the AFP and the New People's Army (NPA) continue to break out as prospects of negotiations remain dim. Radical groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) continue to pose a threat to local communities through kidnappings and violent attacks in public places

Philippine law enforcement agencies have stepped up their role in addressing insurgents, bandits, and breakaway groups. In January 2015, the Philippine National Police (PNP) were able to kill one of Southeast Asia's most wanted terrorists, Zulkifli Abdir (aka Marwan), during an operation in the southern province of Maguindanao. Malaysian Marwan was a member of Jemaah Islamiyah and was believed to be behind the 2002 Bali bombing which claimed more than 200 lives. His killing is considered a significant accomplishment in Southeast Asia's fight against terrorism; this



despite the bloody operation that led to the loss of lives of 44 Special Action Forces of the PNP.

Meanwhile, the rise of a new wave of extremism as embodied by the ISIS has also prompted the Philippine government to assess and strengthen its anti-terrorism measures. The ISIS' use of modern communications systems and social media to recruit foreign fighters, raises the danger of Filipino nationals pledging allegiance to the group. There are also concerns about the potential linkages between ISIS and groups such as the BIFF and the ASG. Thus, apart from traditional counter-terror operations, the Philippine government is augmenting its efforts in preventing the propagation of extremist ideologies. While understanding that extremism thrives in poverty-stricken and conflict-torn environments, the Philippine military places its hopes that the CAB and the proposed BBL will contribute to combatting the spread of violent radicalism in the country.

Noting the transnational and borderless nature of security threats, the Philippines has also increased its engagement with its neighbors and international partners. The Philippines has actively expressed its condemnation of ISIS and has vowed to contribute to regional and global efforts at addressing such threat.

The Philippines has also actively participated in exchanging experiences on conflict resolution and reconciliation processes. The Philippines supports the work of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) which held its first symposium in Manila in April 2014. The Philippines has also

stressed the importance of continued sharing of peace and reconciliation initiatives and practices towards the realization of the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC).

Meanwhile, despite its efforts to reorient its focus toward external defense, the AFP continues to be an important partner in addressing threats to internal security. This is captured in the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – also known as Bayanihan – which serves as the guideline for the performance of the AFP's mandate to protect the state and the people. The IPSP focuses on 'winning the peace' through a 'whole of nation approach' and people-centered security. The AFP also continues to take part in multinational initiatives on countering terrorism, human trafficking, and other transnational crimes.

Maritime Security

With the rising tensions in the South China Sea, the Philippines has been actively advocating for the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It also calls for adherence to the ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC-SCS) and the speedy conclusion of a binding Code of Conduct (COC).

The Philippines has also been raising concerns about the developments in the South China Sea, including the ongoing massive reclamation activities that pose threats to regional and stability, freedom of navigation, and the marine environment and ecology.



The Philippines also support for multilateral efforts at addressing incidents at sea. This includes Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) which was adopted during the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in April 2014.

As the co-chair the inter-sessional meeting on maritime security, the Philippines hosted in May 2014 the 2nd ARF Seminar on UNCLOS. The meeting focused on the role of UNCLOS in dispute settlement and delimitation of marine boundaries, as well as identified potential areas of cooperation. The Philippines also served as the Chair for the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment (WGCME).

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The Philippines continues its strong commitment to the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and other regimes governing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the regional level, it has also affirmed commitment to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) as an instrument for promoting nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament.

During its co-chairmanship of the ARF Inter-sessional meeting on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament in Tokyo in July 2014, the Philippines also drew attention to the humanitarian aspect of the use of nuclear weapons particularly on the humanitarian response to possible nuclear detonations.

Peacekeeping Operations

The Philippines sends personnel to peacekeeping missions as part of its contribution to maintaining international security. The country's contribution to the UN Peace Operations worldwide totals 176 personnel – 158 troops, five military experts, and 13 police officers. To date, troops are deployed in peace operations in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The Philippines also sent its first Filipina contingent commander in Haiti last year, overseeing 156 peacekeepers. It is also reported that she is the first woman to become contingent commander in the history of peacekeeping operations.

In addition to the pre-deployment training of the Philippines in Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac, the country has also engaged itself with other Troop Contributing Countries such as Australia and Bangladesh for peer-to-peer exchanges and subject matter expert exchange programs among others. The country has also other collaborative trainings programs that are coordinated with international peacekeeping organizations notably the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTTC) and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTTC).

The Philippines is also at the forefront of increasing women participation, either as part of uniformed personnel or in civilian capacity, and an increased gender perspective in UN peace operations. The country stands together with the international community in the aim to integrate gender perspective in peace operations not only for the benefit of the



peacekeepers, but also of society – to show the community that men and women can work hand in hand in peacekeeping operations.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

The ARF is a key regional platform for constructive dialogue and consultation on security issues that are of common interest and concern to the region. These dialogues and consultations have contributed to confidence building among the parties and which are necessary steps to move the ARF from confidence building measures stage to that of preventive diplomacy. The Philippines actively supports the graduation of ARF from Stage 1 to Stage 2 through the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Preventive Diplomacy and to abide by the ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy.

The ARF has conducted numerous activities, workshops, and seminars to facilitate security cooperation among the parties. These included workshops on non-proliferation nuclear forensics, measures to enhance cyber security – legal and cultural aspects, countering illicit trafficking of CBRN materials, marine environmental protection cooperation, peacekeeping experts' meeting, to name a few.

Crucial in the ARF process is ASEAN's centrality. ASEAN will be at the core and the driver of the regional process while maintaining that other stakeholders are actively engaged. Moreover, ARF will work in synergy with other regional mechanisms such as the ADMM, ADMM-Plus and other ASEAN-led mechanisms.



REPUBLIC OF KOREA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Northeast Asia still suffers from a discrepancy between the growing economic interdependence in the region and the relatively underdeveloped state of political and security cooperation. Against this backdrop, the ROK government seeks to put in place a framework for the attainment of sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia through *Trustpolitik*, by pursuing the Korean Peninsula Trust Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.

The Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula aims to safeguard peace on the basis of a firm and resolute security posture. All provocations are to result in commensurate costs. At the same time, peace will be achieved through the stable development of inter-Korean relations. And through the Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK government has approached North Korea to propose a series of feasible cooperation projects that would enable the two Koreas to build trust and lay the foundation for unification.

Over the next few years, the ways in which we cope with such geopolitical and geo-economic challenges will determine the shape and the nature of the new order in Asia. In particular, the Republic of Korea keenly recognizes that the task of building sustainable and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula is inseparable from that of fostering peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) is a key element of *Trustpolitik* at the regional level. It is a future-oriented effort by the ROK government to replace a structure of conflict and discord in the region with an order of dialogue and cooperation. The initiative aims to build trust by cultivating a habit of dialogue and cooperation on soft security issues first, and gradually expand the scope of cooperation.

The ROK also seeks to advance the goals of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia and beyond by actively participating in the ASEAN+3, EAS, ARF and ADMM-Plus. In addition to regional multilateral cooperation, the ROK seeks to bolster bilateral relations in the region. Maintaining a strong Korea-US alliance, while at the same time nurturing strategic and cooperative relations with



China, will remain the bedrock of its foreign policy. Furthermore, Korea will seek to steadfastly develop its relations with Japan by enhancing cooperation in various areas, while maintaining a principled and firm stance on historical issues.

All of these efforts are designed to sow the seeds for the eventual unification of Korea. Similar to the way in which the European integration process positively influenced the German unification process, and vice versa, lasting peace and the eventual unification of Korea will be an essential and integral part of Asia's integration and long-term stability.

North Korean Nuclear Issue

North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are a matter of grave concern for the international community. These programs seriously threaten the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and undermine the international non-proliferation regime.

North Korea, however, still continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In March, April and November of 2014, North Korea threatened to conduct its fourth nuclear test. Recently, North Korea declared its intention to launch more "satellites," and announced that it had successfully test-fired a ballistic missile from a submarine. North Korea also has been escalating tensions in the region by launching an unprecedented number (approximately 270) of missiles and rockets in 2014. As of 14 June 2015, it had fired approximately 30 missiles and

rockets on nine separate occasions. All of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programs are in clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013).

Since enshrining its nuclear-weapons status in its constitution in 2012, North Korea has repeatedly claimed itself to be a nuclear-weapons state. Not showing any sincerity towards denuclearization, the North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-Yong said at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 3 March 2015 that North Korea is the "youngest nuclear-weapons state." In addition, since March 2013 the North has been sticking to a policy of simultaneously pursuing the development of nuclear weapons and the economy.

The international community has consistently made it clear at numerous global gatherings, including the 21st ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2014, that North Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear-weapons state, and urged North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to abide by its international obligations and commitments.

To achieve the aforementioned goal, the ROK is pursuing North Korean nuclear diplomacy in three aspects: deterrence, pressure and dialogue. First, by way of deterrence, the ROK is enhancing ROK-US defense capabilities so that North Korea realizes its nuclear arsenal is useless. Second, the ROK is faithfully implementing the UNSC sanctions



and bilateral sanctions to increase the costs to North Korea of possessing nuclear weapons, thereby seeking to change its strategic calculations.

At the same time, the ROK has kept the door open for dialogue and has been striving to resume meaningful denuclearization talks. Recently, the five parties have found common ground on the pursuit of “exploratory talks” and are pursuing the talks to check North Korea’s sincerity towards denuclearization. We hope that North Korea would respond positively to our suggestion and return to meaningful Six-Party Talks, paving the way for substantial progress on the denuclearization of North Korea.

The Korean Peninsula

North Korea has shown an ambivalent attitude towards inter-Korean relations, launching a charm offensive on the one hand while at the same time posing serious threats to peace and stability in the region.

North Korea has posed serious threats to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula by continuing its provocations, including launching a long-range missile on 12 December 2012, carrying out its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, issuing hostile statements (through the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army) on 26 March 2013, and launching cyber-attacks against banks and broadcasters based in the Republic of Korea.

In February 2014, the ROK and North Korea held high-level talks (12 February) and reunions of separated families (20 February). In October 2014, high-ranking North Korean officials paid a surprise visit to South Korea on the occasion of the closing ceremony of the Incheon Asian Games. The South and North agreed to hold the second high-level talks, but these talks ultimately did not take place due to provocations by the North. In his 2015 New Year’s speech, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un indicated the North’s willingness to have inter-Korean high-level talks under certain preconditions, but no progress has been made thus far.

In tandem with the charm offensive, there were continued provocations in 2014. Starting with the launching of missiles in February immediately following the high-level talks, North Korea fired more than 270 missiles and artillery shells in 2014. It fired shots at leaflet-carrying balloons on 10 October 2014, prompting an exchange of machine-gun fire across the DMZ.

North Korea also released a statement (through the National Defense Commission) on 10 April denouncing the Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula, and continued to issue hostile statements including a threat of strikes on 8 May 2015 which threatened to directly aim at our navy vessels near the NLL in the West Sea. Moreover, North Korea also launched cyber-attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment, posing a threat to international peace and security. The ROK government responded to these provocative



threats in a calm and resolute manner after close consultations with the United States, China and other neighboring countries.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is the utmost priority of the ROK government. The ROK government will respond to any provocation from North Korea in a swift and resolute manner, and will work closely with the international community to urge North Korea to make the right choice and become a responsible member of the international community.

At the same time, the ROK government has consistently offered to engage in inter-Korean dialogue at any level of formality to relieve the pain of division and to promote peaceful unification of the Peninsula. The ROK government will also continue humanitarian aid for vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant women in North Korea. In 2014, the ROK's humanitarian aid for the North through international organizations and NGOs totaled 18 million dollars.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Overview of National Security and Defense Policy

National Defense Objectives

The National Defense Objectives are: “protecting the country from external military threats and invasions,” “supporting peaceful unification,” and “contributing to regional stability and world peace.” Those objectives can be elaborated as follows:

First, “protecting the country from external military threats and invasions” means being prepared to meet the present military threats from North Korea and at the same time being prepared to meet other potential threats to our peace and security. North Korea poses a serious threat to our security by developing and increasing its large-scale conventional arsenal, nuclear program, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. It also continues to perpetrate acts of armed provocation, such as the attack on the ROK ship the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces will remain our enemies.

Second, “supporting peaceful unification” means contributing to peaceful unification by deterring war, alleviating military tensions, and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Third, “contributing to regional stability and world peace” means contributing to world peace and stability in Northeast Asia by advancing friendly and cooperative relationships with neighboring countries on the basis of the ROK-US Alliance, as well as through active participation in international peacekeeping operations.

Tenets of the National Defense Policy

The ROK military has identified and is pursuing the following seven key Tenets of the National Defense Policy as part of a consistent policy direction to realize the National Defense Vision: (1) Establishing a robust defense posture; (2) Strengthening future-oriented self-defense capabilities; (3) Developing the ROK-US military alliance and reinforcing defense



diplomacy and cooperation; (4) Providing military measures and readiness in accordance with the changing inter-Korean relationship; (5) Bolstering innovative defense management and promoting the defense industry; (6) Creating a proud and rewarding environment for military service; and (7) Implementing defense policies with a focus on respect for the people. In accordance with these tenets, the ROK military is actively adopting a new paradigm called “creative defense.” This involves incorporating creativity, science and technology into national defense operations as a means to achieve a stronger defense.

Four Priorities in Defense Management

In line with its National Defense Vision and the seven Tenets of the National Defense Policy, the ROK military has set new goals for its defense operations: a robust foundation for defense, and a defense strategy that emphasizes preparing for the future.

“A robust foundation for defense” refers to the concept of making all troops serving in the military safe and happy. The ROK military intends to achieve this goal by tightening discipline, creating an environment in which the troops can focus on their combat missions, and building a full-spectrum national defense posture to fight off enemies through practical education and training as well as thorough combat preparation.

“Defense Preparing for the Future” refers to fostering an advanced elite military that can create favorable conditions for regional stability and world

peace utilizing a better strategic environment and stronger defense capabilities. This will enable the ROK military to take the initiative in defending and unifying the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this goal, the ROK military has identified four priorities, which it is actively pursuing: building a full-spectrum national defense posture, strengthening future-oriented defense capabilities, developing the ROK-US Alliance while at the same time strengthening external defense cooperation, and creating a happy and advanced defense environment.

Data contribution to ARF Arms Register (as of 2014)

(i) Total defense expenditures on annual basis

- 1) Defense Budget (in KRW billions): 35,705.6
- 2) Defense Budget-to-GDP Ratio: 2.38 percent

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

Counterterrorism

Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to international peace and security. Despite the relentless efforts of the international community, however, terrorism shows no signs of abating in the near future. Throughout 2014, the ROK supported the collective efforts of the international community to fight terrorism and participated in various discussions concerning prevention, antiterrorism response measures and capacity building.



With regard to cooperation with international organizations, the ROK has been fully implementing the UN resolutions on counterterrorism by imposing sanctions against individuals and entities designated by the Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee. At the UN Security Council summit in September 2014, the ROK reaffirmed that it would remain a committed partner in stemming the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremism.

In addition, the ROK took part in the first meeting of the APEC Counterterrorism Working Group in January and the 12th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crimes in April. The ROK also held bilateral consultations on counterterrorism with China in October, enhancing the progress of cooperation and information sharing in this field.

Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery continue to threaten international peace and security. North Korea's WMD and ballistic missile programs, in particular, remain serious threats to regional and international peace and security. To address the continuing threat from WMDs, the ROK made strenuous efforts throughout 2014 to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime in collaboration with other key partners.

The ROK regards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and continues

to abide by its commitments to the treaty's three pillars: disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The ROK commends the efforts of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to achieve progress on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Based on the GGE's final report, adopted in April 2015, the ROK supports the early commencement of FMCT negotiations.

The year 2014 was significant in regards to global non-proliferation efforts as it marked the 10th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, which aims to prevent WMDs from falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As Chair of the 1540 Committee during 2013 and 2014, the ROK proclaimed the year 2014 "the Year of Universality." We also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to curbing the proliferation of WMDs through a stronger implementation of the obligations set forth in Resolution 1540. In May 2014, the ROK chaired an open debate in the Security Council, in which the member states comprehensively discussed ways to strengthen the implementation of Resolution 1540, including submission of national implementation reports from all UN member states, and adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) as an outcome document.

North Korea conducted a number of ballistic missile launches in 2014 in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In close cooperation



with other UN Security Council members, in March and July the ROK facilitated the adoption by the Security Council of the UNSC President's Press Elements, which condemned North Korea's continued provocations against international peace and security. Furthermore, the ROK worked closely with other UN Security Council members to assist the UN 1718 Committee in designating additional entities and individuals for inclusion on its Sanctions List.

At the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 10th Anniversary High-Level Political Meeting in 2013, it was announced that the ROK, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore would each host a PSI exercise on a rotation basis starting from 2014 and continuing until 2019. Since the ROK endorsed the PSI in 2009, it has continually sought ways to intensify global counter-proliferation efforts. The PSI Asia-Pacific Workshop, scheduled for July 2015 in Seoul, is a part of the ROK's efforts to strengthen the region's ability to fight the proliferation of WMDs and related materials. As such, the ROK will continue to reach out to PSI partners in the region to intensify global counter-proliferation efforts.

As the host of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the ROK made renewed efforts to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. At The Hague NSS in March 2014, the ROK played a significant role in the adoption of the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. The ROK also cooperated closely with the United States and the Netherlands on the adoption of

the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. Also, the ROK ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2014.

Serving as the Coordinator for the Implementation Assessment Group (IAG) of the Global Initiative of Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) from 2013 to 2015, the ROK facilitated discussions in the GICNT. The annual IAG Meeting hosted by the ROK in June 2014 in Seoul, brought some 80 countries together to discuss concrete ways to strengthen nuclear security.

The Syrian chemical weapons issue is a glaring example of how the global non-proliferation regime can do its part in dismantling existing WMDs. The ROK, as a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), made financial contributions during the years 2013 and 2014 that amounted to 1 million dollars, and dispatched an expert to oversee the destruction work.

The Korean government annually hosts the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues (also known as the "Jeju Conference") in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). At the 13th Conference in December 2014, about 60 experts from around the world discussed the implications of and possible responses to key issues concerning disarmament and non-proliferation. Among the topics were the 2015 NPT Review Conference,



the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, as well as newly emerging concerns such as lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs).

Transnational Crime

Combating transnational crime by definition requires a transnational response. To this end, the ROK has stressed the importance of consolidating regional cooperation, with a particular focus on addressing cyber-security threats. Major cyber-attacks have targeted the Republic of Korea in recent years, and in response the ROK has formulated comprehensive measures to counter cyber-attacks and has worked to strengthen cooperation with the international community.

As part of these endeavors, in September 2012 the ROK hosted an ARF seminar titled Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace, in which participants shared their concerns about cyber-threats as potential sources of conflict. Moreover, in 2013, the ROK hosted the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace on October 17 and 18, which produced a paper titled The Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace. The paper elaborated cyber-security-related measures to stimulate economic growth and development, produce social and cultural benefits, safeguard international security, and advance capacity building in the field of cyberspace. In December 2014, the ROK Foreign Ministry and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) joined forces to tackle cyber-security threats by co-hosting the Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar on International Law and State Behavior in Cyberspace in Seoul.

While actively participating in global fora in the field of cyber-security, the ROK held a series of cyber-policy consultations with key countries in the region to raise awareness of cyber-security issues, enhance its partners' understanding of cyber-policy matters, and discuss potential cooperation steps. The ROK has also worked to strengthen sub-regional cooperation in the field of cyber-security through the Korea-Japan-China trilateral consultations, launched in 2014.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

According to the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report, published by ESCAP and UNISDR, disaster risks in the Asia-Pacific region have increased—the average number of people exposed to annual flooding in Asia has doubled to 68 million over the last 40 years. Amid these increasing risks, the Republic of Korea is actively contributing to regional and international disaster relief efforts. The ROK provides financial support to disaster- and conflict-stricken countries, supports capacity-building activities in the area of disaster management, and assists the emergency response efforts of the United Nations.

The Korean government has been actively engaged in humanitarian activities to save lives and alleviate suffering after natural and man-made disasters, as well as during protracted crises.

Considering the urgent need for assistance to minimize damage from disasters, the Korean government provided approximately 43 million dollars in response to more than 40 humanitarian



crises in 2014. This amount was more than double the corresponding figure for the previous year. By increasing assistance in this way, Korea enhanced its standing in the international community and played a part in establishing world peace and prosperity.

While the Korean government's humanitarian activities centered mainly on emergency relief, the Korean government responded to increasing humanitarian needs in conflict-ridden areas by providing assistance in protracted crises such as the Syrian civil war and the plight of refugees in Northern Iraq. Moreover, by deploying the Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) in response to the Ebola outbreak, the Korean government stood at the forefront in dealing with a new form of humanitarian disaster.

The Korean government actively joined the international community's fight against Ebola. First of all, Korea's financial contributions through various channels amounted to 12.6 million dollars. Beginning in the earlier stages of the Ebola outbreak, the Korean government provided such aid through international organizations such as the UN and the WHO.

Moreover, the government deployed its Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) in an effort to make a visible and substantial contribution in the affected countries. The government deployed 24 civilian and military healthcare workers, comprising three delegations, to an Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) in Goderich, Sierra Leone, over a period of four months (December 13, 2014 to April 12, 2015).

As a proactive supporter of region-wide disaster management arrangements, the ROK government has shown through diverse approaches its commitment to disaster relief cooperation in the region. On that note, the delegates from the ROK government attended the 13th Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) in China.

Maritime Security

The Republic of Korea has played an active role in the global fight against Somali pirates. As one of the 24 founding members of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), it assumed the Chairmanship of CGPCS Working Group 3, a position it held until May 2014. Since its inception in 2012, the Working Group has mainly discussed self-defense measures for vessels.

In addition, since 2009 the ROK has been taking part in international cooperation on maritime security by deploying the Cheonghae Anti-Piracy Unit to Somali waters. The Cheonghae Unit has conducted convoy missions to protect vessels from Somali pirates as part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under the command of the Command Maritime Forces (CMF).

Also, the ROK has made financial contributions in hopes of eradicating the root cause of Somali piracy by strengthening the judicial capacities of the government of Somalia and neighboring countries. It provided 200,000 dollars to the CGPCS Trust Fund and 100,000 dollars to the IMO Djibouti Code Trust Fund in 2014. On the Straits



of Malacca and Singapore, the ROK contributed approximately 130,000 dollars to the ReCAAP Information-Sharing Center (ISC) in 2014.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

The ROK is committed to joining the ARF in promoting confidence-building measures, fostering preventive diplomacy, and elaborating approaches to conflicts. The ROK participated in various ARF initiatives during the inter-sessional year of 2013-2014; these include Inter-Sessional Support Group meetings, other inter-sessional meetings, the meeting of ARF Experts and Eminent Persons, and other workshops and seminars. The ROK, as one of the leading countries involved in the development of the ARF EEPs (Experts and Eminent Persons) system, including drafting of its guidelines and its terms of reference, supported a study on how the system might be improved in 2014 and shared the results with other participants in 2015. Improvement of the EEPs system is expected to bring in constructive feedback from relevant experts and in this way create a virtuous cycle that will benefit ARF activities.

Future of the ARF

As a unique intergovernmental forum concerned with multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF continues to play an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has facilitated dialogue among many countries by providing opportunities to freely exchange views on various security issues. Such discussions have enabled ARF participants to become familiar with each other and reduce the potential for tension; they have also increased trust and confidence on traditional security issues.

In the meantime, the ARF has also been carrying out its own confidence-building measures in connection with new security challenges of a non-traditional and transnational nature. These include natural disasters, terrorism and transnational crime.

In the evolving defense and security structure of the region, as witnessed by the establishment of the ADMM-Plus and the expansion of the EAS, the ARF must seek to fully utilize its strengths and pursue complementary relationships with other regional operations and mechanisms.



THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION



I. SITUATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The increasing role of the Asia-Pacific region continues to be a dominant global trend. The countries of the region have been showing an impressive economic growth and extending influence on the world politics. As a result, Asia-Pacific is strengthening as an important center of emerging multi-polar system of international relations, an attractive stage for cooperation where the strategic interests of major powers intertwine.

At the same time, with no comprehensive security regulation system, Asia-Pacific is affected by the serious challenges that can hamper or even block its progressive development and destabilize the regional situation. Those include growing aspiration of certain nations to dominate solely and ensure their own security at the expense of other countries' interests, and the enhanced activity of closed-door politico-military alliances. The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and the situation in Afghanistan remain acute. Increasingly radicalized terrorism, cybercrime, illicit drug trafficking, sea piracy, natural and man-made disasters pose ever greater threat.

Russia believes that an advanced and fair architecture of equal, mutually beneficial and mutually respectful interstate relations should be built in Asia-Pacific. A reliable, transparent and open regional security system should rest on a bloc-free basis, the rule of international law, and the principles of indivisibility of security, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the non-use of force or threat of force. It is pivotal that the agreed approaches should be enshrined in a legally binding instrument on comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The multilateral dialogue with participation of foreign policy and defense officials from the Asia-Pacific countries launched within the East Asia Summit is aimed at reaching this goal. In 2014, two expert workshops on this issue took place, one held in Moscow in April and the other in Jakarta in October. It is important that all concerned countries take part in the upcoming meeting.

It looks appropriate to develop an Action Plan on elaborating security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region using the synergy between various national initiatives.



II. SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The situation on the Korean Peninsula is still a matter of grave concern. Russia disapproves of any actions which can lead to heightened tension. It is vital to understand that genuine settlement in the Northeast Asia can only be achieved by establishing reliable and effective security mechanisms based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all.

We believe that the search for possibilities to resume the Six-Party process should be continued. To that end we maintain permanent contacts with our negotiating partners. We support the settlement of the nuclear and any other problem on the Korean Peninsula on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and other international instruments. Russia has done a lot of groundwork in this area. We urge all the sub-regional players to make a sober evaluation of the current situation, shun stereotypes and undertake joint targeted efforts with a view to fostering atmosphere of peace, stability and mutually beneficial cooperation in the Northeast Asia.

We welcome the progress in the negotiations between P5+1 and Iran on the search for comprehensive final settlement of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program, especially the outcome of the round of negotiations that took place on 26 March – 2 April 2015 in Lausanne. We call on all the parties to continue active efforts aimed at solving the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means.

There remains a risk of collapse of security situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan due to the completion of the International Security Assistance Force mission and the withdrawal of most of foreign troops from the country. The intensified activity of the supporters of the Islamic State is a matter of special concern. No further exacerbation should be allowed, and the operational effectiveness of Afghan security forces should be further enhanced. Russia will continue to provide diverse assistance to the IRA, including in building capacity of its army and police.

We support the efforts made by the Afghan Government to promote national reconciliation. In this context, we insist that Kabul should play the leading role and that three principles of national reconciliation should be observed (the militants should disarm, recognize the Constitution of Afghanistan and sever their ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations).

Drugs produced in Afghanistan in enormous quantity pose major threat to stability in that country, the region and the whole world. In addition to direct harm caused by the drugs, their production is a source of considerable funds for terrorists. Therefore, we believe it necessary that the international community closely cooperate in combating the Afghan drug trafficking.

We intently monitor the developments in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. We are convinced that the parties to the territorial disputes should respect the principle of non-threat or non-use of force while continuing to search for ways



of resolving the existing problems peacefully in conformity with the international law. Negotiations should be held between those directly involved in the disputes in a format determined by themselves. We believe that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the instruments adopted by ASEAN and China – the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the Guidelines to Implement the Declaration agreed upon in 2011 – should serve as a basis for settling the differences in the South China Sea.

III. DEFENCE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The main objectives of Russia's defence policy are defined by the President of the Russian Federation taking into account the relevant federal legislation enshrined in the National Security Strategy up to 2020 and the updated Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved on 26 December 2014. It introduces the concept of non-nuclear deterrence that stands for a set of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression against Russia through non-nuclear means.

Russia ensures its national security based on the principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness, and use of military measures only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information and other non-violent means have been exhausted.

The activities of the Russian Armed Forces in Asia-Pacific are carried out in strict compliance with international norms and bilateral agreements, aimed against no one and pose no threat to peace and stability in the region.

IV. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Russia engages in active military and military-technical cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries that is based on the balance of interests and aimed at establishing a sustainable regional security system.

With a view to reducing tensions in the region and build confidence and mutual understanding between the military, Russia takes steps to reach agreements with partners on preventing dangerous military activities in the vicinity of each others' borders. Such agreements have been concluded with the United States, Canada, China and the Republic of Korea. Work is underway to agree upon similar mechanisms with the DPRK.

The Asia-Pacific nations could contribute to the strengthening of regional security by voluntarily enhancing the transparency of their military activities. The Ministry of Defence of Russia proactively provides regular information to the neighbouring countries on alert exercises carried out by the Russian Armed Forces, including in the Eastern Military District.

We set store by expanding cooperation within the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Co-chairing with Thailand the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine last year, on the sidelines of the Frontier-2014 Exercise Russia held a meeting on aiding those affected by humanitarian catastrophe. In August 2014, the International Mine Action Center was established within the Armed Forces of the Russian



Federation, which could be used together with ADMM-Plus participants and other Asia-Pacific countries.

The Ministry of Defence of Russia holds annual Moscow Conference on International Security. In April 2015, this forum was attended by delegates from over 60 countries. The Asia-Pacific countries also showed great interest in it, which confirms the importance of this forum for building mutual understanding between military agencies in the region. An international military and technical forum "ARMY 2015" held in Russia in June, as well as the International Army Games held in August could contribute to further strengthening ties with partners in defence area.

Cooperation in personnel training at Russian military universities is developing. In 2014 about 3,000 foreign servicemen were undergoing training at the institutions of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, with over half of them coming from the Asia-Pacific countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and Afghanistan.

V. COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Enhanced multifaceted bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries in combating non-traditional threats and challenges is among Russia's key priorities in maintaining comprehensive regional security.

The Russian side makes a significant contribution to strengthening counter-terrorist capacity of the Asia-Pacific region through the relevant mechanisms of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership: the Senior Officials' Meetings on Transnational Crime and the Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime. We provide assistance to ASEAN countries in training law enforcement personnel, in particular in the areas of combating extremism and terrorism, curbing human trafficking and crime investigation.

The Russian side takes a proactive approach within the ASEAN Regional Forum. Russia, jointly with Malaysia and Australia as Lead Countries on Cyber-security and Cyber Terrorism, is drafting an ARF Work Plan on Security of and in Use of Information and Communication Technologies aimed at providing a basis for practical cooperation in this field. We believe that launching a dialogue on non-traditional security threats between the ARF and the SCO Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure may have good prospects.

We gradually build-up partnership dialogue with the Asia-Pacific countries on combating money laundering and financing terrorism, including within the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the FATF-style Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), to which Russia is an observer.

We welcome plans to establish a drug-free ASEAN. We seek to expand cooperation within the Asia-Pacific institutions to suppress trafficking in heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs, production and



abuse of which is growing in the region. Russia is actively engaged as an observer in the Meetings of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA), the subsidiary body of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

We view the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a primary regional forum for the most effective implementation and promotion of specific counter-terrorist initiatives. The APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) is an efficient multilateral mechanism to exchange information on terrorist threats in the Asia-Pacific region. We have been consistently implementing the Consolidated Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2011, when Russia co-chaired the CTWG.

VI. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Practical implementation of the Russian-American START Treaty of 5 February 2011 remains the Russian Federation's priority in the field of nuclear disarmament as this Treaty contributes to strengthening international security and stability in the world and in Asia-Pacific in particular.

Further steps in the field of nuclear disarmament will depend on the whole set of factors affecting the strategic stability. Nuclear disarmament should become a multilateral process, which is especially relevant for Asia-Pacific, where the countries possessing military nuclear capabilities and actively developing missile programs are located.

Full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 as the key non-proliferation decision remains a priority, particularly with regard to the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, we call on the partners in the region to actively cooperate with the 1540 Committee, the central body coordinating international efforts to implement the Resolution. The establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is one of the most important tools to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. It effectively contributes to maintaining regional and international stability, and building mutual trust and security. In this context, we welcome the efforts of the Central Asian and the five nuclear weapon states, which facilitated the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on NWFZ in Central Asia that became a tangible practical contribution to building a world without nuclear weapons. We expect that the relevant Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone will also be signed shortly. Russia, like the other five P-5 states, is ready for that.

We are concerned over the deployment of the global missile defense system, which involves the increasing number of participants, including in Asia-Pacific. The development of anti-missile technologies can dangerously delude the countries with such capacity into believing themselves invulnerable. Increased defensive capabilities of one nation push others to develop missile systems and, as a result, trigger arms race, which will affect the future missile and nuclear disarmament and have a negative impact on regional security. We closely follow the situation in this area emphasizing the priority of political and diplomatic means of resolving missile proliferation issues.



VII. EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Asia-Pacific accounts for almost 70 % of all natural disasters in the world. In order to successfully manage emergency risks in Asia-Pacific, an effective regional emergency response system is required. It could be developed on the basis of an integrated international network incorporating national crisis management centers. The implementation of this initiative proposed by the Russian Federation in 2011, would facilitate the exchange of information and analysis of operational data both on a day-to-day basis and in responding directly to serious catastrophes, improve the quality of international aid and accelerate the decision-making process in relevant situations.

In this context, the compliance with recommendations of the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai, Japan, March 2015), as well as the development of practical cooperation within the ARF, APEC, ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership, is of special importance. Russia is determined to consistently implement the updated ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief 2015-2017. We support organizing relevant regional and international training, including the regular ARF-DiREx operational and tactical exercises. We encourage synchronizing activities of multilateral regional mechanisms responsible for preventing and mitigating natural disasters, and creating a consolidated multi-year emergency response exercise plan.

Russia continues to render practical assistance to the Asia-Pacific countries affected by disasters and catastrophes. In August 2014, humanitarian

aid was accorded to Chinese Yunnan Province struck by a devastating earthquake. In January 2015, Russian experts participated in the search and rescue operation at the crash site of the Air Asia A-320 aircraft in Indonesia. In particular, they were the only international recovery experts to perform diving job in order to lift the tail section of the Airbus in the Java Sea. In April 2015, Russia provided humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Vanuatu hit by the destructive Pam typhoon.

VIII. TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

A set of mutually reinforcing multilateral diplomacy institutions has been shaped in the Asia-Pacific region. All of them are of great importance as pillars for emerging regional architecture. The East Asia Summit provides a platform for a leaders-led strategic dialogue consolidating a partnership network between various multilateral mechanisms in Asia-Pacific. We regard the ASEAN Regional Forum as the key tool for collaboration on specific issues of peace and stability, while ADMM-Plus as the major instrument of military cooperation. It is essential that these structures are interconnected and coordinate their efforts, thus creating synergy.

We believe that setting up flexible non-bloc multilateral cooperation mechanisms and establishing a reliable partnership network of regional institutions based on equality and mutual respect for each other's interests would be the best way to promote security in Asia-Pacific.



SINGAPORE



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dynamics within the region are increasingly complex. While there has been much progress made towards greater economic integration, this progress may be hampered by the major structural shifts taking place within the geostrategic environment. The Sino-US relationship remains the core of the evolving landscape, and it continues to set the tone for the entire region. In this regard, Singapore supports the US and China's positive engagement of each other and the region for the benefit of a prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific. We believe that ASEAN must maintain its unity and centrality, in order to remain a neutral platform for the major partners to engage the region and each other. This will ensure that ASEAN stays true to its *raison d'être* of maintaining peace and stability in the region.

ASEAN has made concerted efforts over the years to deepen and broaden its relationships with major partners – for example, through its network of Dialogue Partnerships and wider regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). These efforts have helped to engender mutual confidence among countries and promote regional peace, security and stability. Nonetheless,

there remain several potential flashpoints in the region that if left unaddressed, will pose a threat to regional security.

Singapore remains concerned over the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Singapore welcomes actions to urge the DPRK to abide by its international obligations and work toward the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Singapore supports a stable Korean Peninsula, which is in the interest of all in East Asia, including ASEAN. In this regard, it is critical for all parties to exercise utmost restraint, ease tensions and resume dialogue. We will continue to work with the international community to create a conducive environment for the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. It is our hope that the DPRK will integrate itself into the region to share in our region's peace and prosperity.

We are also concerned about the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). Recent developments have the potential to escalate tensions if not properly managed. Incidents could easily spiral out of control and trigger unintended consequences. In this regard, we urge all parties to refrain from actions that could increase the temperature in the region. All countries in the region have an interest in ensuring the peace, stability and freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS. The SCS disputes should be settled peacefully



in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ASEAN continues to advocate the peaceful resolution of disputes, as espoused in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Six Point Principles on the SCS, as well as the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS between ASEAN and China.

There is also the growing threat of terrorism stemming from the developments in the Middle East and the return of foreign fighters to the region. ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific are not immune to the reach of the Islamic State (IS) and other extremist groups, which have the ability to spread their radical ideology and incite terrorist acts within our region. As a responsible member of the international community, Singapore will do what we can within our means to combat the IS threat. We support efforts to build regional capacity in countering violent extremism (CVE), and encourage greater sharing of experiences and best practices in de-radicalisation, religious rehabilitation and social integration. Terrorism is an issue that has global ramifications, and countries must continue to work together to counter this serious threat.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Singapore's defence policy is based on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy. Singapore believes in the need for a strong defence, to ensure that we enjoy peace and security, and to provide us with the political space and freedom to act in the best interests of our people. This is why Singapore

has invested steadily and prudently in defence over the years, to build up a professional and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Given our small population size and limited resources, Singapore focuses on force multipliers – technology, paired with a highly educated and technologically-savvy population – to overcome the limits of our small standing military.

III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

As a small country, Singapore's security and prosperity are greatly dependent on regional peace and stability. Singapore seeks to establish strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. Singapore also believes that regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. As such, Singapore actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including the EAS, ASEAN, the ARF, the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), and the ADMM-Plus.

The ADMM is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN and a key component of the regional security architecture. Established in 2006, the ADMM aims to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and



practical cooperation in defence and security matters with the view towards enhancing security cooperation. At the 8th ADMM in Myanmar in May 2014, the Defence Ministers agreed that while ASEAN should remain neutral on the merits of the territorial claims in the SCS, we cannot remain silent as the unfolding events affect the peace and stability of our region. In this regard, ASEAN must play a constructive role in managing the problems in the SCS. This includes working with China for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) and the expeditious conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the SCS (COC). The ASEAN Defence Ministers also agreed to implement Brunei's proposal for a Direct Communications Link (DCL) or hotlines to facilitate quick responses in emergency situations so as to prevent miscommunication and miscalculations. The ADMM has also played a key role in establishing the ADMM-Plus, a forum which was inaugurated in Hanoi in October 2010. The ADMM-Plus comprises the ten ASEAN Member States and eight "Plus" countries – namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US. The ADMM-Plus offers a useful and valuable platform for ASEAN and the "Plus" countries to have open and constructive dialogue as well as to engender practical cooperation in common areas of security interest.

Singapore is strongly encouraged by the good progress of the six ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) in the areas of maritime security (MS), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO),

counter-terrorism (CT), military medicine (MM) and humanitarian mine action (HMA). As current co-chairs of the EWG-CT, Singapore and Australia are working together to address this important area of concern through a series of workshops and meetings. We will also be working closely with the co-chairs of the EWG-MS, Brunei and New Zealand, to conduct an ADMM-Plus MS&CT Exercise in May 2016. This Exercise will help build inter-operability amongst the militaries and deepen mutual trust and understanding on security issues of common interest for the region.

The SLD, which is held annually in Singapore, has established itself as the foremost defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific region since its inception in 2002. It provides a useful opportunity for Defence Ministers, senior officials and prominent security experts of the region to meet and discuss important security issues of the day. A total of 26 Ministerial-level delegates and participants from 35 countries attended the 13th SLD that was held from 30 May to 1 June 2014. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered the keynote address at the 13th SLD, marking the sixth successive year that a foreign Head of State or Government had done so. Several hot-button security issues were discussed at SLD 2014, including the South and East China Seas, Korean Peninsula and Ukraine.

The SLD Sherpa Meeting, also organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, serves to supplement and strengthen the SLD process by providing an inter-sessional platform for senior civilian and military officials to engage in



frank discussions in current defence and security issues. The third SLD Sherpa Meeting was held from 25 to 27 January 2015, and was attended by about 60 delegates.

Counterterrorism

The threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region. Continued vigilance and cooperation by all countries will be needed to deal with the complex and long-term challenges posed by terrorism and the ideologies that perpetuate it.

Since the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime, ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts have made much progress. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in 2007, is the first region-wide and legally-binding anti-terrorism pact. Singapore was one of the first ASEAN Member States to ratify the Convention. The ACCT entered into force on 27 May 2011, and has, since January 2013, been ratified by all 10 ASEAN Member States. Singapore welcomes these significant achievements on the Convention, which enhances regional cooperation against terrorism and affirms the region's commitment to the global strategy on counter terrorism.

In support of regional capacity building, Singapore has hosted a number of counter-terrorism workshops and initiatives in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, Anti-Money Laundering/ Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios, under the

auspices of the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue. Singapore hosted a one-week ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Executive Programme under these auspices in March 2012 where ASEAN senior practitioners shared experiences and best practices with one another and with other counter-terrorism experts. Since then, Singapore hosted the 9th ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue in May 2014 and an ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Joint Incident Management in July 2014.

Singapore also organised the East Asia Summit Symposium on Religious Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration in April 2015. The platform allowed countries to share their experiences and for security practitioners, religious scholars and academics to promote moderate views to counter the radical ideology of groups like ISIS.

Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Singapore has a long history of working to combat the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), having ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1976 and concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. In more recent developments, Singapore ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and adopted the amended Small Quantities Protocol in March 2008. Singapore supports the universalisation of both the CSA and the AP. As Singapore works closely with the IAEA in the area of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we hosted two IAEA outreach seminars



on the Agency's Safeguards Systems for States in Southeast and South Asia in March 2011 and joined the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database in March 2012. Additionally, Singapore served on the Agency's Board of Governors (BOG) for a two-year term from September 2010 to September 2012, a post Singapore is expected to occupy again in 2016. We are also party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and support efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Singapore supports the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) and is a part of the NSS process. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong attended the last three Summits held in Washington, Seoul and the Hague in 2010, 2012 and March 2014, respectively. Singapore also joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in May 2010 and subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in August 2011. In September 2014, Singapore acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and accepted the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM.

Singapore welcomes the EU's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CBRN-CoE) initiative in Southeast Asia. The CBRN-CoE aims to improve national policies and international cooperation to mitigate CBRN risks in the region. Our agencies are involved in several CBRN-CoE projects and activities. For example, DSO National Laboratories hosted the Regional Expert Meeting on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Forensics for ASEAN States in November 2014 under Project 30, and the working session

on "Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on chemical and biological waste management in South East Asia" in July 2014 under Project 6.

Singapore is a firm supporter of counter-proliferation initiatives, and has actively participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2004. Singapore is a member of the PSI's Operational Experts Group (OEG) and has hosted PSI exercises, such as Exercise Deep Sabre I, was held in Singapore in 2005 and Exercise Deep Sabre II in 2009. Under the PSI OEG Asia-Pacific OEG Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation Schedule, Singapore will host Exercise Deep Sabre III in 2016. Singapore also attended the PSI OEG Meeting in Ottawa, Canada in May 2015.

With regard to chemical weapons, Singapore fully supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)'s efforts to further develop capabilities and readiness against the threat of chemical weapons. We also participated in the 19th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in December 2014. As a pledge of assistance under Article X, Singapore has been conducting the Emergency Response to Chemical Incidents training course since March 2008, and successfully concluded the fourth instalment of the course in March 2015. The course has benefitted participants from more than 25 Customs authorities in Asia. In addition to its original purpose, the course has also served as a platform for the sharing of experiences on the management of hazards caused by chemical agents. In addition, Singapore



values the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW as a participant of the Temporary Working Groups on Sampling and Analysis, as well as on Verification. In the area of biological weapons, Singapore participated in the 2014 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Singapore has also submitted returns on BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBM) annually since 2012.

In arms control, Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally-binding instrument negotiated at the UN that regulates the international transfer of conventional arms, on 5 December 2014. This reaffirmed Singapore's commitment to international efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the illicit arms trade, as well as international disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives that promote global peace and security. Singapore is currently working towards its ratification of the ATT.

As a reflection of our commitment to prevent WMD proliferation, Singapore adheres to a robust and enhanced export control regime underpinned by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act. The Act controls the transfer and brokering of goods capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, stockpile or acquire WMDs, along with strategic goods and related software and technology. The Act's control list has been regularly updated to keep abreast of technological developments and remain aligned with the four multilateral export control regimes. We also launched a Secure Trade Partnership Programme with businesses in

May 2007, which encourages companies to adopt robust security measures in their trade operations to improve the overall security of the global supply chain. Additionally, Singapore launched the Trade Facilitation & Integrated Risk-based System (TradeFIRST) in January 2011 to provide a single holistic framework to encourage a virtuous cycle of compliance. Under TradeFIRST, companies with more robust systems, internal practices and security measures are rewarded a higher level of trade facilitation.

For the clearance and screening of cargo at our checkpoints, Singapore relies on computerised cargo clearance systems. We have also implemented the Data Warehouse system to assist in collating and analysing information and risk profiling submitted through our Single Window System.

In December 2014, Singapore co-hosted the annual Joint Industry Outreach Seminar on Strategic Trade Management with the US State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) and Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Seminar keeps the industry abreast of the latest developments in export controls and best practices for improved compliance. Since 2011, Singapore has participated in the Annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in Tokyo, which address domestic industry outreach and international collaboration and cooperation. Singapore also participates regularly in the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non Proliferation in Tokyo, including the most recent Talk held in January 2015.



Transnational Crime

Regional security challenges are increasingly transnational and non-traditional in nature and cannot be adequately addressed by individual countries' domestic policies. Singapore therefore believes in a concerted regional effort in combating transnational crimes.

Under the aegis of the ASEAN Ministerial and Senior Officials' Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC & SOMTC), Singapore is the Lead Shepherd for two transnational crime areas – namely, cybercrime and international economic crime. In this capacity, the Singapore Police Force co-hosted the 1st ASEAN Cybercrime Workshop with New Zealand from 6 to 7 July 2011 and co-hosted the 2nd ASEAN Cybercrime Workshop in May 2013. Recognising the increasing need for States to counter cybercrime and its potential impact on the economic and financial landscape, Singapore will host the 3rd Senior Officials' Roundtable on Cybercrime in July 2015, where key industry leaders will conduct briefings for ASEAN's SOMTC leaders and cybercrime experts. In August 2013, Singapore co-organized an ASEAN Workshop on International Economic Crime with the Republic of Korea. Singapore also organised a Singapore-US Third Country Workshop on Cybercrime, and chaired the 2nd SOMTC Cybercrime Working Group meeting on 8 June 2015 to promote continued engagement among ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners in combating cybercrime.

Singapore takes a serious view of trafficking-in-persons (TIP) crimes. An inter-agency Taskforce co-led by Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs

and Ministry of Manpower was formed in 2010 to coordinate whole-of-government strategies to fight TIP. Since the launch of the National Plan of Action in 2012, much effort has been made to strengthen policies and systems along a four-pronged approach of Prevention, Prosecution, Protection and Partnerships. The Taskforce works closely with the law enforcement agencies and embassies of countries that victims may originate from. This close cooperation ensures that reports of trafficking are quickly and thoroughly investigated. Information sharing and upstream enforcement against human traffickers also prevent other innocent victims from being exploited.

Singapore supports regional and international efforts to combat TIP. Singapore cooperates with other ASEAN States through platforms such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), which oversees the region's effort to combat TIP, and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) and its Working Group on TIP. Beyond ASEAN, Singapore also works with partners such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as well as the Group of Friends (GoF) United Against Human Trafficking in New York and Geneva, to find better ways to combat TIP.

One international agreement that Singapore has been working closely with other ASEAN Member States on is the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) and Regional Plan of Action (RPA). Negotiations on ACTIP and RPA have concluded. Both instruments will be submitted for adoption at the upcoming SOMTC and AMMTC in 2015 before endorsement at the ASEAN Leaders' Summit.



Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Disasters can affect any country without warning. As a good neighbour and friend, Singapore provides assistance where we can, participating in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions in which we can make contributions that are meaningful and within our means.

In 2014, Singapore's overseas deployments and assistance included our contributions to the international search and locate (SAL) operations for the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 and AirAsia Flight QZ8501. Following the disappearance of MH370 in Mar 2014, the SAF supported the Malaysian authorities' SAL operations in the SCS and Malacca Strait with C-130s and a maritime patrol aircraft, one frigate with a naval helicopter embarked, a missile corvette, and a submarine support and rescue vehicle with divers on board. The Information Fusion Centre in Singapore also activated its network of military navies and civilian shipping companies to report any unusual sightings in the designated search areas.

On 28 December 2014, immediately after AirAsia Flight QZ8501 was reported missing, Singapore offered our assistance and support to the Indonesia-led search efforts. Upon Indonesia's acceptance, the SAF deployed two C-130s, one frigate, one missile corvette and one landing ship tank with two super puma helicopters embarked. Our aircraft and ships were the first foreign forces to arrive on scene. Officers from the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore were

also attached to BASARNAS, the Indonesian National Search and Rescue Authority, to assist in the overall coordination of search operations. Three days later, as the search area narrowed, the SAF further deployed vessels with specialised underwater search capabilities, including a mine countermeasure vessel, a submarine support and rescue vessel, and a REMUS autonomous underwater vehicle. Specialists from Singapore's Ministry of Transport's Air Accident Investigation Bureau and the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore were also deployed with underwater locator beacon detectors to assist in locating the flight data recorders. A Disaster Victim Identification team and forensic experts from the Singapore Police Force and the Health Sciences Authority also assisted in the identification of victims.

Beyond participating in overseas operations, Singapore seeks to build regional capacity for HADR. We recognise that foreign military assistance can make a valuable contribution to HADR efforts, particularly with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific. In September 2014, Singapore launched the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC). The Changi RHCC aims to provide a platform for military-to-military coordination in HADR operations in Asia, in support of the military of a disaster-affected State. By doing so, the Changi RHCC will complement existing disaster response institutions – such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management



(AHA Centre) – that support the disaster-affected state's government in coordinating the overall relief effort. The Changi RHCC will be able to provide the Affected State's military and other partner militaries with a comprehensive situation picture that fuses relevant information on the disaster impact, assessed needs, pledges/contributions as well as military logistical requirements. This is to minimise duplication and gaps in the provision of military assistance. The Changi RHCC can also tap on its network of International Liaison Officers and linkages to military operations centres and points of contact to enhance information sharing and operational coordination for a multinational military response. Moreover, with the consent of the Affected State, the Changi RHCC can deploy a forward team into theatre within the first 48 hours of a disaster. The team will be able to support military needs assessments or coordination efforts by the Affected State's military, such as by helping to establish a Multi-National Coordination Centre (MNCC) under the direction of the Affected State's military. Singapore is appreciative of like-minded countries that have come on board to support and partner with the RHCC thus far. These countries include Australia, Brunei, China, France, Laos, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.

Singapore strongly supports the establishment and operationalisation of the AHA Centre in Jakarta as part of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER)'s mandate. As a hub for relevant information and expertise exchange, the AHA Centre is a key coordination centre for regional disaster relief efforts to facilitate effective and

efficient ASEAN responses to disasters within the region. Singapore's Changi RHCC is working closely with the AHA Centre to ensure effective coordination between the two Centres when responding to disasters within ASEAN.

Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, Singapore has a strong interest in the security of international sea lanes of communications and takes a serious view of any threats to the freedom and safety of navigation. To this end, Singapore works with like-minded countries to uphold the sanctity of international law, including UNCLOS, and plays an active part in fostering regional maritime security cooperation and the enhancement of port security.

As a major hub port and one of the largest ship registries in the world, Singapore is committed to the security of seaborne cargo. In 2002, Singapore was the first port in Asia to sign up to the US' Container Security Initiative. As one of the first States to implement the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO's) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Singapore has contributed actively to capacity building programmes at various regional forums to assist countries in their implementation of the ISPS Code. Singapore is also a party to the IMO's International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). Since 1 January 2012, all power-driven vessels in the port of Singapore have been required to install and



maintain in operation an approved transponder which complies with SOLAS requirements for an automatic identification system.

Singapore has been closely cooperating with key partners to ensure maritime security in the region, given the existence of vital sea lanes of communication such as the SCS, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait. To this end, Singapore remains fully committed to the following three principles which have gained broad consensus amongst regional stakeholders: first, that primary responsibility for the security of the regional waterways lies with the littoral States; second, the international community, including major user States and bodies like the IMO, have an important role to play; and third, new cooperative measures should be developed in line with UNCLOS and other international conventions, with full respect for national sovereignty.

Singapore is also supportive of ASEAN's approach towards maritime issues as encapsulated in the Bali Concord II, signed in October 2003, which reiterates the transboundary nature of maritime issues and the need to address them regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive way. We also continue to participate actively in various ASEAN fora such as the ARF and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)/Expanded AMF, the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meetings, to address maritime issues.

These principles have been translated into concrete efforts at a regional level. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is a joint undertaking by the littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore

and Thailand, to enhance maritime security in the SOMS. The MSP comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" maritime air patrols and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Since its inception in July 2004, the MSP has been able to substantially reduce the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in the SOMS.

Apart from air and sea patrols, Singapore also believes in enhancing maritime domain awareness and ensuring a systematic and timely exchange of information to keep sea lanes safe. In this regard, the Republic of Singapore Navy's Changi C2 Centre was set up to advance multi-agency and international cooperation and inter-operability, to promote maritime security in the region. In particular, the Changi C2 Centre's Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which was established in 2009, provides a useful information-sharing platform for different nations to better respond to the dynamic maritime security environment. It is able to tap on its linkages to international maritime centres, operations centres and agencies around the world, as well as a network of ILOs from regional and extra-regional countries, to serve as a key maritime information-sharing node. The pooling of various information-sharing and analytical systems in one location has also enabled the IFC to facilitate cooperation on other maritime security issues beyond piracy, such as Search and Rescue, weapons proliferation or human trafficking. The ASEAN ILOs in IFC also serve as the Permanent Secretariat of the ASEAN Navy Chiefs' Meeting, helping to facilitate and monitor the development of new MARSEC initiatives among ASEAN Navies. As of Dec 2014, the IFC had links with international maritime centres and 65 operational centres and



agencies from 35 countries, and a total of 81 ILOs from 22 countries have been deployed at the IFC since its establishment.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first ever agreement among governments that promotes and enhances cooperation against piracy and armed sea robbery against ships in Asia. As of end-2014, 20 States have acceded to the ReCAAP, namely Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the UK, the US and Vietnam. The US became the latest Contracting Party when it acceded to ReCAAP in September 2014. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which was established in Singapore in November 2006 to serve as a platform for information exchange, has established itself as an authority on trends and analyses of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia for governments and industry alike. The ReCAAP ISC has also supported numerous capacity-building efforts to improve the capability of regional governments to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. In 2009, the ReCAAP was held up by the IMO as a model for the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (GoA). Since then, the ReCAAP ISC has been working closely with the IMO to contribute to the implementation of the Djibouti Code. These achievements speak volumes about the success of ReCAAP as an effective model of regional cooperation.

Beyond regional cooperation, Singapore also shares the international community's deep concern over the scourge of piracy threatening key sea-lines of communications like the GoA. To this end, Singapore has been contributing to the multinational counter-piracy efforts under the ambit of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 since 2009, to secure these sea lanes for everyone's use. In 2014, the SAF deployed a 151-strong SAF Task Group (TG), comprising a frigate with a naval helicopter, to undertake counter-piracy operations in the GoA. We had also previously deployed four TGs in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, comprising either one Landing Ship Tank and two Super Puma helicopters or a Frigate with a Naval Helicopter. At the request of the Combined Maritime Forces, Singapore has taken command of the CTF 151 thrice, from January to April 2010, March to June 2011, and from March to June 2013.

IV. ROLE OF ARF

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994 as an open and inclusive forum for Asia-Pacific nations to discuss key political and security issues. The ARF's evolution from Stage I Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to Stage II Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) mechanisms, after more than 15 years, is a significant development. It is a reflection of the ARF's success in engendering greater comfort levels among its members, fostering closer collaboration and candid dialogue as well as its ability to respond to the complexities in the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific.



The implementation of the PD agenda, in accordance with universally recognised norms and principles of international law, and in tandem with the development of CBMs, will ensure that the ARF moves ahead to address the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the region. To this end, while we should accommodate the comfort levels of all ARF participants, Singapore remains fully committed to the implementation of the PD Work Plan. We welcome and support ARF members' various proposals in this regard. The ARF should also continue its work in enhancing linkages between the complementary activities of Track I and Track II, as the latter is a useful avenue to explore ways to promote the ARF's effectiveness.

While there will inevitably be overlap among various fora such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus, these overlapping structures, with ASEAN at the core, reflect the region's diversity. A loose, overlapping

configuration will be more resilient to external shocks than an overly-neat architecture that could prove brittle. Nevertheless, to ensure their continued effectiveness, we can explore practical ways to improve coordination and information-sharing, among the fora, while respecting their various mandates. It is important that discussions on security issues in ASEAN continue to involve the relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies made up of subject matter experts who will be responsible for implementation and ensuring consistency with international standards and obligations.

Singapore remains fully supportive of the ARF process and its role as a key pillar of the Asia-Pacific security architecture. We will host the 10th ARF Eminent Expert Persons (EEP) Meeting and will co-chair the ARF Seminar on Operationalising Confidence Building Measures in the ARF in the next inter-sessional year.



THAILAND



I. OVERVIEW

The promotion of peaceful relations amongst States -- based on the pursuit of shared interests, the resolution of disputes through peaceful means, and the enhancement of mutual trust and respect -- is fundamental to regional and global peace and stability, which are in turn essential to sustained economic growth and development, social stability, and the welfare of the people.

To help achieve these goals, a comprehensive security approach is essential. As reflected in the ASEAN Charter, it underscores the importance of addressing relevant economic and social issues that can have an impact on security. A modern approach to peace and security also needs to be people-centered, focusing on the interests and needs of the people. Lastly, in this globalized world, promoting security depends increasingly on enhanced cooperation at every level -- amongst States, regional organizations and international organizations.

Regional Outlook

The global security situation in 2014-2015 remains complex. Armed conflict, confrontation and tensions persist in various regions of the world, often with significant humanitarian consequences.

Some of these conflicts have the potential to affect the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, a number of non-traditional security challenges have affected the region, including transnational crime, terrorism and extremism, pandemics and natural disasters. More and more, such issues have implications for human security.

It will be important for the Asia-Pacific region to cooperate closely with other regions and the international community to help minimize the impact of these conflicts, tensions and global challenges. It will also be important to continue to support the role of multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations and in particular the United Nations Security Council, in addressing these global security situations, challenges and issues.

Compared to other regions, the overall security situation in the Asia-Pacific region in 2014-2015 is relatively stable, despite tensions in some areas. However, if these tensions are not adequately addressed in a timely manner, there may be consequences for regional peace and stability.

In the economic sphere, the Asia-Pacific region continues to experience one of the highest economic growth rates in the world, despite some slowdown. Economic integration continues to grow apace amongst the countries of the



region. This is especially marked in Southeast Asia, with the envisaged launching of the ASEAN Community, comprising the Political-Security Community, Economic Community and Socio-Cultural Community, by the end of 2015. If these positive economic trends continue, the Asia-Pacific region should continue to enjoy rising standards of living, while remaining one of the main engines of the global economy.

In the area of geo-politics, however, the picture is more complex. The Asia-Pacific's geo-political landscape appears to be shifting. The role of major powers, the relations amongst them and their relations with other countries in the region, are all important factors in this ongoing regional transformation. The trends in the overall relations amongst the major powers in this region appear to be positive. At the same time, tensions in the region that also involve the major powers will need to be managed carefully.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense as the Six-Party Talks and other fora for dialogue remain suspended. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is critical to peace and stability, on the Peninsula and in the region, as well as to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this connection, the international community has called on parties to implement fully and remain committed to their international obligations, including those under the relevant United Nations Security Council

resolutions, and it is hoped that the DPRK will play its part. Inter-Korean dialogue needs to be supported to help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance to the people of the DPRK needs to be continued which, it is hoped, would contribute to peace and stability on and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Closer cooperation within Northeast Asia would also contribute to peace and stability in the region. Recent dialogue at the highest levels amongst countries in the region is a positive trend and should continue. Stronger momentum in the Trilateral Summit process would be an important anchor for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, while initiatives such as the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative have the potential to contribute to greater peace and stability in the region.

Maritime issues, including security, safety and other challenges, are receiving greater attention in view of the fundamental importance of maritime connectivity to regional growth and development and rising threats thereto. Piracy and armed robbery at sea, whether in the vital sea lanes in ASEAN especially in the Malacca Straits, the Asia-Pacific or other regions, need to be addressed through cooperative and collective measures. Enhanced maritime domain awareness, through improved sharing of information and exchange of intelligence, will help countries deal with transnational crime at sea, as well as help promote more effective search



and rescue in response to maritime disasters. In the meantime, protection of the marine environment and addressing the problem of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU Fishing) remain important areas for cooperation.

Peace and stability in the South China Sea is in the interests of all parties. Overlapping maritime claims and disputes should be settled peacefully amongst the claimant states through dialogue and negotiations, on the basis of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Meanwhile, discussions between ASEAN and China continue towards achieving full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and early conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC).

Recent developments on the ground have raised concerns over their potentially destabilizing effect on the region. In this connection, exercise of self-restraint, adherence to the principles of non-use or threat to use force, and enhancement of trust and confidence are all key elements to help reduce the gap between the situation on the ground and ongoing diplomatic efforts between ASEAN and China. Ultimately, all states have a stake in peace and stability in the South China Sea and deserve to enjoy freedom of navigation through safe and secure sea lines of communication. Closer cooperation on maritime security will be important for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Non-traditional security challenges continue to pose a threat to regional security as well as to human security. Growing integration between countries in ASEAN as well as enhanced connectivity amongst countries in the Asia-Pacific region can be equally exploited by criminals, possibly aggravating transnational crime and other cross-border challenges.

Trafficking in persons, especially in women and children, remain a persistent region-wide problem, with several ASEAN countries as the source, transit point, and destination. To address the humanitarian consequences, ASEAN is finalizing the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) and the ASEAN Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (APA), which is expected to be signed at the end of 2015. Moreover, irregular migration in the Indian Ocean has further complicated the situation. It is important that this issue be addressed comprehensively in the spirit of international burden-sharing. Emphasis should be given to protection of people stranded at sea, enhancing law enforcement cooperation to combat trafficking in persons, and addressing root causes and improving livelihoods in at-risk communities.

Production and trafficking of illicit drugs, including synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances, and precursor chemicals, constitute another major transnational crime. Cooperation to fight drug trafficking along the Mekong River and sub-



region has intensified through new frameworks for cooperation. Creating a drug-free ASEAN remains a priority and will be facilitated with the establishment of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters in early 2015, as proposed by Thailand.

Meanwhile, terrorism continues to evolve, taking on more violent and extreme forms. Violent extremism and radicalism are being systematically propagated through social media, attracting disaffected groups and individuals from various regions, including the Asia-Pacific. Left unchecked, this trend may undermine the principles of respect for diversity, moderation and tolerance which have long been the hallmark of Southeast Asia and ASEAN. The adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates in early 2015 is thus significant as it emphasizes for the first time at the Leaders' level that terrorism, radicalism and violent terrorism in all its forms and manifestations shall not be tolerated or condoned.

The Asia-Pacific also continues to suffer from major natural disasters, as seen with the recent earthquake in Nepal. Extreme weather events have apparently been exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation. Disaster risk reduction remains an important strategy to mitigate the impacts of disasters. This was underscored at the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March this year, which adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).

One important way to help the region address such traditional and non-traditional challenges is to strengthen the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, which is open, inclusive and multi-layered. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes all key countries with a geographical footprint in the region, remains an important arrangement for regional peace and stability. What needs to be pursued further is enhanced coordination amongst the various ASEAN-led arrangements, particularly the ARF, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), in order to develop synergies amongst these arrangements. Such coordination would facilitate concrete action and activities that can help address more effectively the multi-faceted challenges of the region.

II. INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES

With regard to Thailand's defence policies, the Ministry of Defence published a Defence White Paper in 2013 in an effort to promote transparency and share information about its role as well as to enhance trust and confidence between Thailand and ASEAN Member States and other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

According to the White Paper, the missions of Thailand's Ministry of Defence are as follows:



- To protect and uphold the independence, security of the State, institution of Monarchy, national interests and the democratic system of government with His Majesty the King as Head of State, and for national development.
- To defend and safeguard the Kingdom from internal and external threats, safeguard national interests, support national development and other duties prescribed by the law which describes the authority of the Ministry of Defence or agencies under the Ministry of Defence.
- To support missions of the State in national development, protect and solve problems of disaster, provide humanitarian assistance and perform Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) for the security of the Kingdom.

In an effort to promote military cooperation and mutual confidence and trust, the Ministry of Defence of Thailand and the Royal Thai Armed Forces regularly participate in regional cooperation frameworks such as the ARF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, Annual Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), ASEAN Military Operations Informal Meeting (AMOIM), ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM), ASEAN Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM), and ASEAN Air Chiefs

Conference (AACC). Such cooperation frameworks also provide an opportunity for the armed forces of the region to engage in practical cooperation in areas that promote the mutual interests of participating countries as well as enhance capacities for joint activities in the future. In the ADMM-Plus, Thailand and Russia are co-chairing the Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine. This has led to an agreement within the ADMM for the establishment of an ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine in Thailand to enhance cooperation in this important field.

The Royal Thai Armed Forces also have a mandate for mitigating the impact of natural disasters and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). As for MOOTW, the military supports the Government in combating challenges posed by illicit drugs, illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, and other forms of unlawful smuggling. The Royal Thai Navy, for example, has just been mandated to establish the Command Centre for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF).

Promoting transparency is an important means to promote confidence and trust in the region. In this connection, with regard to Thailand's defence budget, for the fiscal year 2015, a budget of 192,949.09 million baht (approximately 5.718 billion US dollars using nominal exchange rate) is allocated for military expenditure. This is equivalent to 1.46% of Thailand's national GDP.



National Contribution to Promoting Regional Stability

Thailand attaches great importance to dialogue and cooperation with other countries, including in the Asia-Pacific, in order to build trust and confidence, develop practical cooperation activities and contribute to addressing challenges to global and regional peace and stability. To these ends, Thailand is actively engaged in such efforts at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

As country-coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, Thailand organized an ASEAN-China Joint Working Group Meeting in Bangkok in 2014 which led to agreement on Early Harvest Measures, including the establishment of hotlines between foreign ministries on maritime emergencies and between search and rescue agencies as well as a table-top exercise on search and rescue. These Early Harvest Measures are being operationalized through meetings of the Joint Working Group, which will also continue discussions to prepare a Code of Conduct. Meanwhile, meetings of other mechanisms such as the ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Meeting on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM on DOC) are being scheduled to maintain momentum on the full and effective implementation of the DOC.

Joint exercises to build trust and confidence while strengthening response capacity to future challenges are an important part of promoting regional peace and stability. In this connection, the annual Cobra Gold exercise, the largest

multinational exercise in the region, was held in Thailand for the 34th time on 9-20 February 2015. Over ten thousand military personnel from seven countries -- Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore -- participated in the exercises. Nine other countries -- Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Mongolia, France, Italy, Nepal, the Philippines and the United Kingdom -- sent personnel to take part in the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team. Another six countries -- Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan and Viet Nam -- sent officials to the Combined Observer Liaison Team. In all, 18 ARF participating countries as well as some Member States of the European Union were involved, in one way or another, at the Cobra Gold 2015 in Thailand, leading to enhanced trust and confidence as well as improved military-to-military coordination in responding to common challenges.

Cooperation on peacekeeping is another area to which Thailand attaches importance. As of January 2015, Thai military and police officers are participating in six United Nations peacekeeping missions, from Darfur to Haiti. The Thai military has been active in promoting further cooperation within ASEAN on peacekeeping training and, in this regard, has been supporting the development of an ASEAN network of peacekeeping centres to promote training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel. Thailand recognizes the inter-linkage between women, peace and security, and therefore promotes the role of women in peace processes, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations as well as in



post-conflict reconstruction. Thailand's hosting of a seminar on "Increasing the Role of Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction—from Relief to Development", as a parallel activity to the UN ECOSOC Ministerial Meeting in July 2014, is part of its efforts to enhance the role of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Furthermore, Thailand will co-organize with the International Peace Institute in 2015 a research project on "Women in Mediation and Peace Processes" as part of the commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the adoption of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on "Women, Peace and Security".

To promote cooperation on maritime issues, Thailand continues to support the work of the International Maritime Organization as a member of the Council (Category C) from 2014 to 2015 to promote safe, secure, and environmentally sustainable shipping. In the Malacca Straits, the Royal Thai Navy participates in the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (MSCP) and the Eyes in the Sky joint air patrol with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as participates in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Thailand attaches importance to addressing the piracy threat in other regions and, in this connection, recently completed its term in command of Combined Task Force 151, which is part of the multinational counter piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Thailand continues to support the work of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime

Security, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), in developing practical cooperation measures on maritime issues and in developing synergies among these various cooperation frameworks.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remain an important security issue at the regional and global levels. They are also mutually reinforcing, underlining the need to promote both issues in tandem. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been gaining renewed attention from the international community. The momentum created by this increasing recognition represents a window of opportunity to advance in a concrete manner the goal of nuclear disarmament. This would, in turn, help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 2015, Thailand hosted an international workshop on addressing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons with a view to strengthening international standards and norms in support of a nuclear weapons-free world.

As Depositary State of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) or Bangkok Treaty, Thailand and other States Parties continue to collaborate closely to implement the Treaty and to work with the Nuclear Weapon States for their signing of the Protocol to the Treaty. ASEAN continues to promote the global nuclear non-proliferation regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including at the recent NPT Review Conference, as well as cooperation with other nuclear weapon



free zones. With regard to promoting nuclear safety, security and safeguards, ASEAN agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) as an ASEAN sectoral body under the ASEAN Political-Security Community pillar, which will play a key role on these issues in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, Thailand, with the cooperation of the United States through the United States Department of Energy, has strengthened the security of radioactive sources utilized in hospitals and the private sector.

Thailand and China co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ARF ISM on CTTC) in Nanning in May 2015 to enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism, transnational crime, cyber security, border management and transnational pursuit of criminals. Also in May, Thailand hosted a Special Meeting on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean to address this problem comprehensively in the spirit of international burden sharing. Later in August, Thailand will also co-host with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) a regional conference in Bangkok to enhance regional coordination on border management to address the possible rise in transnational crime following enhanced connectivity and integration within the region.

Thailand and New Zealand co-chaired an ARF Workshop on Enhancing Regional Cooperation to Address Challenges Posed by Illicit Drugs - Implementing the ARF CTTC Work Plan in Bangkok in February 2015. Thailand also co-chaired with Canada an ARF Workshop on Precursor Chemicals

and Synthetic Drugs in Bangkok in February 2015. The two workshops helped strengthen international cooperation against production and trafficking of drugs and psychoactive substances as well as on border management. At the sub-regional level, Thailand initiated a new framework of cooperation involving eight countries -- namely, Thailand, Cambodia, China, India, the Republic of Korea, Laos PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam -- to enhance the network of cooperation on precursor control. Within the framework of ASEAN, Thailand has established the ASEAN Narcotics Cooperation Centre (ASEAN-NARCO) as a mechanism to enhance coordination of efforts to promote a drug-free ASEAN.

On humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Thailand continues to support the work of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief and the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Disaster Relief. Thailand also hosted in 2014 the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AHEx 14) involving ASEAN Member States, other countries, various international organizations and civil society organizations. The 6th Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was convened in Thailand in 2014 which contributed to the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

Moving towards preventive diplomacy (PD) remains a key goal of the ARF. As a follow-up to the ARF Roundtable on PD Training Resources in Wellington in March 2014, co-chaired by Brunei



Darussalam, China, New Zealand, and the United States, a consensus emerged in support of PD training designed to suit the Asia-Pacific region. Thailand believes this is an important step forward in the development of PD in the ARF. To this end, Thailand co-hosted with China the pilot ARF PD training course in October 2014, and will co-chair the ARF Track 1.5 Symposium on PD with New Zealand and the United States in July 2015. The continued relevance of the ARF will depend on its capacity to satisfactorily meet the objectives set out in the ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994: (1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and (2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and PD in the Asia-Pacific region.

In conclusion, the ARF remains an important pillar of the ASEAN-centered regional security architecture. For over two decades, it has provided a platform for dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building in the region, contributing to enhanced peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The continued implementation of the ARF Vision Statement and

corresponding Hanoi Plan of Action help enhance the value of the ARF as a relevant and effective framework for cooperative action. The role of ASEAN in helping drive the ARF process forward will only assume greater importance with the launch of the ASEAN Political-Security Community, as part of the ASEAN Community, at the end of 2015.

Looking to the future, the ARF should benefit from enhanced interaction with three groups of entities, namely, (1) other ASEAN-led regional arrangements such as the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, with a view to developing greater synergies amongst them; (2) other regional organizations dealing with security matters, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with a view to exchanging best practices; and (3) Track 1.5 and Track 2 entities in the region, such as the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), in order to generate new and innovative ideas for dialogue and cooperation.



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



I. OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This is a challenging, yet pivotal time for the region. As the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) nears its goal of regional economic integration, the East Asia Summit (EAS) approaches its 10th anniversary, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) takes deliberate steps toward Preventive Diplomacy after 20 years of existence, the region is adapting to a rapidly evolving security landscape; one characterized by the emergence of new regional and global security challenges. Focused on modernizing and revitalizing our treaty alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States seeks to reassure the region of our commitment to regional stability. While these alliances have safeguarded regional peace and security and supported the region's remarkable economic growth for the past 70 years, the United States remains committed to strengthening relationships with longtime allies, enduring and new partners, and emerging powers. The United States also supports the development of ASEAN-centered fora into action-oriented bodies – focused on frank and open dialogue, tangible cooperation, and results-driven initiatives – to address common regional challenges in a collective fashion. Not only must the region work together

to handle its own security issues, but as the world becomes more interconnected and interdependent, the region must also tackle the growing number of complex global challenges that directly impact the broader Asia-Pacific. To that end, effective cooperation has never been more critical to the stability and prosperity of this region.

The U.S.-Japan treaty alliance is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance has promoted cooperation on a wide array of regional and global security issues, leveraging the presence of U.S. forces to respond to security threats. The close cooperation between the Japanese government and the United States in responding to the region's disasters demonstrate the importance of our relationship and our capability to respond promptly. We have taken steps to expand further our security cooperation by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to ensure that the bilateral alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. We are also moving forward with the Japanese government to implement the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Specifically, our base consolidation plan and progress on force realignment will help us to establish a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically



sustainable force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. These steps will also help ensure the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and promote peace and stability in the region. We continue to work closely with the Japanese government to address emerging challenges in space and cyberspace and to strengthen our missile defense capabilities to counter threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is evolving into a global partnership, while continuing to play the key role in deterring DPRK aggression. The United States remains steadfast in our commitment to the defense of the ROK; we remain committed to growing this alliance into a comprehensive strategic alliance based on our common values and mutual trust. This past year was a highly successful year for the alliance, with the conclusion of a new ROK-proposed conditions-based framework for the transition of wartime operational control; a new agreement on alliance burden sharing, and a trilateral information sharing arrangement between the United States, ROK, and Japan that will allow for a more effective response to a DPRK contingency. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks, a regular dialogue that advances trilateral security cooperation, enhances our ability to counter the DPRK nuclear and missile threat even further. The United States and the ROK are working together, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also collaborating in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia, in peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

We continue to enhance our alliance with Australia through greater cooperation on shared regional and global interests. Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, Foreign Minister Bishop, and Minister for Defence David Johnston signed the Force Posture Agreement in Sydney in August 2014. Rotations of U.S. Marines and U.S. Air Force aircraft in Australia's Northern Territory will improve interoperability and capacity through opportunities to train and exercise both bilaterally and multilaterally in the region. Our Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia also plays a positive role in enhancing regional stability and security; President Obama, Prime Minister Abbott, and Prime Minister Abe met on the margins of G20 in November 2014 in the first trilateral leaders meeting since 2007. At the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), we are able to discuss cooperative efforts in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), regional capacity development, and maritime security.

The U.S.-Philippines treaty alliance continues to promote stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Our bilateral cooperation in areas critical to regional peace and stability continues to grow, with particular focus in the areas of maritime security, disaster response, counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, and non-proliferation. The signing of the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in April 2014 will support our joint commitment to advancing our nations' mutual security interests by increasing our interoperability, supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines' defense modernization plans, and improving our ability to respond to natural disasters in the region. We will continue to advance our alliance



through high-level strategic dialogues, including the Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, and we share a common interest in expanding regional defense and security cooperation through the ADMM-Plus and other vehicles such as the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers' Training (EAST) initiative. We continue to support Philippine participation in exercises with partners in the region as well as encouraging the Philippines to invite participation by neighbors in our bilateral military exercises, such as Balikatan.

The United States has also recognized opportunities to consult and collaborate with Thailand to increase capacity and preparedness to address humanitarian and security concerns such as counterterrorism, disaster relief, nonproliferation, and maritime security— including through some of the largest multinational exercises in the world. The United States looks forward to resuming efforts to deepen our alliance as soon as Thailand returns to democratic rule.

As a Pacific nation with strong interests in regional peace and stability, the United States continues to broaden and deepen its relations in the region, through efforts to strengthen partnerships with established and emerging regional powers and enhanced engagement with regional multilateral fora and institutions.

U.S.-Indonesia ties continue to deepen in the spirit of the 2010 Comprehensive Partnership, a long-term commitment to broaden and elevate bilateral relations and to address bilateral, regional, and global challenges. The U.S. and Indonesian

militaries engage closely and conduct regular exercises to build bilateral and regional capacity to respond to common transnational security threats, such as piracy, while boosting cooperation on issues including maritime security, HA/DR, modernization, and international peacekeeping. Previously, as the inaugural co-chairs to the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Group on Counterterrorism (EWG CT), Indonesia and the United States together developed and conducted a series of activities that strengthened counterterrorism cooperation in the region. The capstone event was the first ADMM-Plus Counterterrorism Exercise (CTX), held in September 2014 in Sentul, Indonesia.

Singapore is a strong partner with the United States on regional and global security. The rotational deployment in Singapore of two United States' Littoral Combat Ships is a symbol of our deepening ties and long lasting commitment. This deployment provides a key capability to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the region. Singapore has been an active participant in global operations including Afghanistan, Iraq, the Counter-ISIL coalition, and Gulf of Aden counter-piracy where Singapore has twice commanded Combined Task Force 151. Most recently, Singapore pledged forces to the Counter-ISIS Coalition and was the first nation from SE Asia to join the multinational response effort. Our militaries have strong ties and participate in several bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. In 2012, we further broadened our relationship by signing a memorandum of understanding for the creation of the Third Country Training Program, which has already featured eight joint courses covering such



areas as healthcare management, water resource management, and trade facilitation. TCTP courses in 2014 included workshops on investment and trade facilitation, urban transport planning, HA/DR, energy efficiency and other topics. As a like-minded partner on terrorism issues and as a co-chair of the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Counterterrorism along with Australia, Singapore can play an important role in facilitating regional efforts against violent extremism in the region.

The relationship between the United States and Malaysia has reached new heights in recent years, and the U.S. is eager to continue working with our Malaysian partners to boost regional and global security. Strong U.S.-Malaysian defense cooperation is demonstrated most clearly by a robust slate of bilateral and multilateral military exercises that enhance our respective capabilities to promote regional security and respond to humanitarian disasters. The United States values Malaysia's past contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and we are working closely on CT issues, including stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL. Malaysia is also an important partner in stemming the proliferation of nuclear materials. As the 2015 ASEAN Chair and U.S.-ASEAN Country Coordinator, the United States looks forward to working closely with Malaysia in advancing our shared priorities and interests in the context of promoting regional cooperation, respect for international law, ASEAN-centrality, and maintenance of peace and stability.

Our relationship with Vietnam continues to expand and deepen, guided by the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership launched in 2013 and celebrating this year the 20th anniversary of the normalization of our relations. Through a robust set of annual dialogues spanning issues from human rights to security and defense relations, we are cooperating in areas such as security, trade, nonproliferation, health, the environment, science and technology, education, and human rights. The United States and Vietnam signed a MOU on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011. In October 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnamese Coast Guard signed Joint Minutes to provide direction for future coast guard cooperation. We continue to engage through U.S. Navy port visits – including the first ever at-sea exercise in April 2014 – and supporting reciprocal political and military leadership exchanges, and a State Partnership Program between Vietnam and the Oregon National Guard to explore further collaboration on HA/DR and SAR. We welcome the current deployment of two Vietnamese observers to Sudan, and we are helping to prepare for Vietnam's first deployments – through GPOI and PACOM engagements – in United Nations peacekeeping operations anticipated this year.

U.S.-New Zealand relations continue to follow a positive trajectory since the signing of the 2010 Wellington Declaration. In 2012, the Washington Declaration, signed by then Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman allowed greater flexibility in terms of joint military exercises and military educational exchanges. As a result, the United States and New Zealand have conducted



increased joint military exercises. The annual Strategic Dialogue is the United States' top-level regular policy discussion with New Zealand. The two sides began holding formal defense policy dialogues in 2013. New Zealand is a strong, consistent supporter of international peacekeeping operations, especially relevant as the country holds a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council through the end of 2016. New Zealand has committed to providing troops in a training role in Iraq as part of efforts to combat ISIL. The United States continues to value its partnership with New Zealand in advancing the ARF's capacity to address regional security challenges through Preventive Diplomacy; New Zealand's leadership on this issue is critical to maintaining the ARF's effectiveness and relevance as a regional security body.

President Obama and Prime Minister Modi elevated the U.S.-India relationship in January through their endorsement of the Delhi Declaration, which articulates tangible principles to guide ongoing efforts to advance mutual prosperity, a clean and healthy environment, greater economic cooperation, regional peace, security and stability for the larger benefit of humankind. They also announced a Joint Strategic Vision to guide their engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. The two leaders pledged to promote regional economic integration, oppose terrorism, piracy, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction within or from the region. Both nations have conducted joint military exercises and training of increased complexity and frequency. India conducts more joint exercises with the United States than any

other nation. A notable, and growing, component of our bilateral relationship with India is defense trade, underscored by the U.S-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. Since 2008, sales to India have surpassed \$10 billion, fostering new commercial partnerships between U.S. and Indian companies and enhancing our bilateral security relationship.

The United States is committed to pursuing a positive, cooperative, stable, and comprehensive relationship with China. We welcome a peaceful and prosperous China that plays a responsible role in global and regional challenges such as the DPRK, maritime security, piracy, and Iran. This past year, we committed to a landmark climate change agreement, completed MOUs related to confidence building for our militaries, and extended visa validity arrangements for many U.S.-Chinese travelers. This year's Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which brings together experts from dozens of agencies across both of our governments to discuss an unprecedented range of subjects, will constructively address differences that remain between us, and to build cooperation on issues of practical importance.

The United States supports a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Myanmar. In November 2012, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Myanmar and publicly spoke in support of Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition. In November 2014, he returned to attend the ninth East Asia Summit and the second U.S.-Association of South East Asian Nations Summit. Especially in this election



year, the region must remain committed to assist Myanmar in continuing its reforms to ensure a democratic, stable, and prosperous nation that can play a constructive role within the region and among the international community. We support efforts by the Government of Myanmar and armed ethnic groups to reach a sustainable ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement. We remain concerned about the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State and the increasingly marginalized Rohingya population. We are also concerned about ongoing conflicts in Kokang, Kachin State, and Shan State, as well as continued ethno-religious violence and intolerance.

The level of bilateral engagement with Brunei has increased significantly in recent years. The annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise took place in November 2014. CARAT coupled with Joint Defense Working Committee (JDWC) meeting, tentatively scheduled for this spring, continues to be mainstays of our bilateral military relations. In June 2014, the Royal Brunei Navy (RBN) joined the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise for the first time, with more than 140 officers and crew of the RBN on board two patrol vessels. In October 2014, the first member of the U.S. armed forces graduated from the Brunei Command and Staff College. An S-70i Blackhawk Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) recently arrived in Brunei to help the Royal Brunei Air Force (RBAirF) make a large generational leap from the S-70A to the new S-70i while simultaneously implementing recommendations made by the U.S. Army Investigation Team that reviewed a crash of an RBAirF Bell 212 helicopter in July 2012.

The United States values cooperation with the Royal Government of Cambodia and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in areas of mutual concern such as international peacekeeping, border and maritime security, counter-terrorism, and demining. In January 2015, U.S. Marines and the Cambodian Gendarmerie conducted Royal Preah Khan, a joint humanitarian relief and disaster response exercise designed to increase Cambodian abilities to respond to domestic and regional disasters. In March 2015, the annual Angkor Sentinel military exercise was conducted by U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Pacific Command with the RCAF, with a focus on regional security.

The United States is cooperating closely with Laos in areas such as public health, education and clearance of unexploded ordnance, and is increasing military-military relations with training and health-related assistance. We have worked with the Lao government to develop training programs, workshops, and exchanges to assist it in discharging its responsibilities as ASEAN Chair in 2016. In February, the United States co-hosted with Laos an Extraordinary Meeting of the Friends of the Lower Mekong which brought together officials from Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, along with international donors, to discuss the impact of development on water, food, and energy resources in the region.

Another way that we are engaging the nations of mainland Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, is through the regional cooperation and economic integration efforts of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI



focuses on technical capacity building for regional officials in line ministries working in the “Pillar” focus areas of Agriculture and Food Security, Connectivity, Education, Energy Security, Environment and Water and Health. LMI provides technical assistance to the region under these six Pillars, as well as cross-cutting themes, such as women’s empowerment. These areas of engagement allow the United States and primary donors in the sub-region, known as the Friends of the Lower Mekong, to engage with and support partner countries’ development of shared responses to regional challenges, including non-traditional security threats such as the water, energy, and food security nexus.

The United States and the European Union are deepening our collaboration with Asian partners to advance regional security and development, and to build regional institutions and support for the rule of law. U.S.-EU cooperation has played a critical role in supporting Myanmar’s ongoing democratic transition. We are now engaging the European Union as we explore ways to collaborate through the Lower Mekong Initiative. The United States and the EU also share common goals to promote human rights, freedom of navigation, and respect for international law in the East China Sea and South China Sea. As we rebalance our interests and investments to the East Asia-Pacific, we look forward to expanding our coordination with the European Union through the ARF and other regional fora.

While our strengthened bilateral and multilateral relationships have enhanced stability, the current regional security environment also presents

challenges such as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and the DPRK’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capability.

The tensions arising from maritime and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific are deeply concerning to us. Both the East China Sea and South China Sea are vital thoroughfares for global commerce and energy. Well over half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world’s largest economies – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China. A miscalculation or incident could touch off an escalatory cycle. Confrontations between fishermen and even law enforcement patrols are not unusual in these waters. It is important to lower tensions, turn down the rhetoric, and exercise caution and restraint in these sensitive areas. In the South China Sea, we continue to support efforts by ASEAN and China to develop a comprehensive and effective Code of Conduct and press for further clarification of claims in a manner consistent with international law. In the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the serious downturn in China-Japan relations. We support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid a miscalculation or a dangerous incident.

Multilateral cooperation remains an important tool for ensuring stability and peace in the region. The 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) provided a framework for reducing tensions in the region.



However, engagement through that process has been inconsistent, and friction over disputed claims to South China Sea territory and maritime space has further increased in the last year. The United States does not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims over land features in the South China Sea; however, we urge claimants to conform all of their claims – land and maritime – to international law, including as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States supports the DoC and a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve and peacefully manage their disputes. The United States encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolving disagreements, including the use of arbitration, multilateral fora, or other international mechanisms. We further believe that the ARF can help put in place supportive diplomatic and other structures that lower tensions and help claimant States manage these disputes peacefully. This forum needs to play an increasingly important role in reinforcing international law and practice and building practical cooperation among member states.

The DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs likewise remain a serious threat to international peace and security. The DPRK's continued failure to comply with its international obligations and commitments threatens international peace and security and seriously undermines the global nonproliferation regime. The United States has made it clear that we will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. The United States, our allies, and Six-Party partners remain committed to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, which will continue to be

the paramount focus of our joint efforts. As we have long made clear, the United States remains open to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring the DPRK into compliance with its international obligations and commitments to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We will continue to hold the DPRK to those obligations and commitments. The path to reintegration with the international community and greater security remains open to the DPRK, but the onus is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to demonstrate that it is serious about honoring the commitments it has already made and complying with its international obligations. We continue to call on all Member States to fully and transparently implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and to exercise strict vigilance against the DPRK's proliferation activities, and any other dealings with the DPRK.

Separately, we also welcomed Myanmar's ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in December 2014 and encourage Myanmar to continue to bring the Additional Protocol into force.

In addition to these challenges, other global issues – that include the fragile nature of global economic recovery, transnational crime such as drug, human, and wildlife trafficking, the situations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremists returning from the conflicts in Iran and Syria, Iran's



pursuit of nuclear weapons, and climate change – continue to threaten regional and international stability. Many of these issues are transnational in nature and require concrete multilateral and national responses from ARF Participants. Results-oriented cooperation builds on our shared interests and has proven to be the best course of action for promoting peace and prosperity in the region. The continued strengthening and growth of the ARF's institutional capacity, enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships, and burden-sharing efforts provide the best solution to these security concerns.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Throughout 2014, the United States continued its comprehensive engagement with the region through its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Within national security and defense policy, the United States is focused on five primary lines of effort: revitalizing Alliances and partnerships; enhancing defense posture; updating operational concepts and plans; investing in the capabilities needed to secure our interests; and, strengthening multilateral cooperation and engagement.

As the United States continues to pursue those five lines of effort, it will continue to work with Allies and partners to manage the challenges we see throughout the Asia-Pacific:

- The ongoing threat of the DPRK's nuclear weapons, proliferation, and missile programs and its dangerous and provocative behavior;

- Long standing disputes over territory, associated maritime zones, and resources, including in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
- The great human and economic toll of natural disasters like the November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines;
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction;
- The global threat of pandemic disease that can spread around the world;
- Environmental degradation and the threat posed by climate change;
- Disruptive and potentially destructive activities by State actors in outer space; and
- Disruptive activities by State and non-state actors in cyberspace.

Ensuring that the United States is prepared and postured to prevent conflict requires a combination of defense, diplomacy, and development. These tools of statecraft enable the United States to strengthen the capability of allies and partners and to preserve stability. The United States remains committed to retaining the capabilities to deter conflict, reassure allies, and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. These objectives require the United States to be capable of responding to a broad range of challenges that are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities.



The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided a review of the strategies and priorities for the national defense policy. The 2014 QDR can be found at:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf

a. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register

A broad range of data is publicly available from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budgetmaterials/budget2014.aspx>.

(i) Total defense expenditure on annual basis

a) Fiscal Year 2014 Total Defense Budget Request \$628.4 Billion

The FY 2014 Base Budget Request of \$560.4 billion funds the non-contingency operational costs of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but does not include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), which covers efforts in Afghanistan and support for the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq. OCO is funded separately in the FY 2014 budget request at \$88.5 billion.

Further information can be found in the DoD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2013:

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf

(ii) Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The budget for national defense was 3.7% of GDP in FY 2014. Further information can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf

(iii) Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population

a) Active

There are 1,323,300 active members in the U.S. Armed Forces. This information was obtained from the DoD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2014. Further information can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf

b) Reserve

The FY 2014 budget supports the Department of Defense's Ready Reserve totaling about 833,700 million members, and contributes 38 percent of the total military end strength. Further information can be found at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Performance_Improvement.pdf



Table 1-1
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)

Current Dollars	FY 2012	Change FY 12-13	Annualized CR FY 2013	Change FY 13-14	FY 2014
Budget Authority					
DoD - 051 (Discretionary) ^{1/}	645,494	-24,637	620,857	-94,220	526,637
DoD - 051 (Mandatory)	9,894	-3,516	6,378	+71	6,449
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					88,482
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	655,388	-28,153	627,235	-5,667	621,568
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding ^{2/}	9		-4		-15
DoE and Other ^{3/}	26,034	+1,058	27,092	+236	27,328
Total National Defense 050 ^{3/}	681,431	-27,108	654,323	-5,442	648,881
Total Obligational Authority (TOA)					
DoD - 051 ^{1/}	652,288	-29,694	622,594	-94,996	527,598
Outlays					
DoD - 051 ^{1/}	650,905	-13,460	637,445	-90,794	546,651
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					52,505
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	650,905	-13,460	637,445	-38,289	599,156
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding ^{2/}	-54		-2		-3
DoE and Other ^{3/}	27,005	-256	26,749	+2,455	29,204
Total National Defense 050 ^{3/}	677,856	-13,664	664,192	-35,835	628,357
FY 2014 Constant Dollars					
Budget Authority					
DoD - 051 (Discretionary)	669,530	-38,193	631,337	-104,700	526,637
DoD - 051 (Mandatory)	10,295	-3,815	6,480	-31	6,449
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					88,482
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	679,825	-42,008	637,817	-16,249	621,568
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding	-23		2		-15
DoE and Other	27,002	+548	27,550	-222	27,328
Total National Defense 050	706,804	-41,435	665,369	-16,488	648,881
Total Obligational Authority (TOA)					
DoD - 051	676,570	-43,483	633,087	-105,489	527,598
Outlays					
DoD - 051	675,748	-27,507	648,241	-101,590	546,651
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					52,505
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	675,748	-27,507	648,241	-49,085	599,156
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding	-31		28		-3
DoE and Other	28,036	-833	27,203	+2,001	29,204
Total National Defense 050	703,753	-28,281	675,472	-47,115	628,357

^{1/} Includes war and supplemental funding in FY 2012 and FY 2013.

^{2/} For budget authority in FY 2014, there is a scoring difference due to a \$15M VA transfer in the Defense Health Program account. For outlays in FY 2012, DoD is reporting Base Realignment and Closure account transactions that OMB is not.

^{3/} From OMB Analytical Perspectives Table 31-1 (Policy Budget Authority and Outlay by Function, Category, and Program). The totals exclude OMB adjustments for the 2013 CR versus the 2013 request.



Table 7-7 (Continued)
DEFENSE SHARES OF ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY AGGREGATES
(Percentages of Indicated Totals)

Fiscal Year*	% of Federal Budget		% of Net Public Spending		DoD as a % Public Employment				DoD as % of Total Labor Force	% of Gross Domestic Product	
	DoD	National Defense	Federal, State & Local		Military & Civilian		Civilian Only			DoD	National Defense
			DoD	National Defense	Federal	Federal, State & Local	Federal	Federal, State & Local			
2002	16.5	17.3	9.8	10.3	51.4	9.3	24.8	3.0	1.5	3.1	3.3
2003	17.9	18.7	10.8	11.3	51.1	9.3	24.3	3.0	1.5	3.5	3.7
2004	19.0	19.9	11.5	12.0	51.3	9.3	24.6	3.0	1.4	3.7	3.9
2005	19.2	20.0	11.7	12.2	51.0	9.1	24.7	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2006	18.8	19.7	11.5	12.0	51.3	9.1	25.1	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2007	19.4	20.2	11.6	12.1	50.3	8.9	24.4	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2008 Base	15.9		9.6							3.3	
2008 Total	19.9	20.7	12.1	12.5	50.6	8.9	24.5	3.0	1.4	4.1	4.3
2009 Base	14.0		9.0							3.5	
2009 Total	18.1	18.8	11.6	12.1	51.3	9.1	25.4	3.1	1.4	4.6	4.7
2010 Base	14.6		9.4							3.5	
2010 Total	19.3	20.1	12.4	12.9	51.4	9.4	26.3	3.3	1.4	4.6	4.8
2011 Base	14.6		9.4							3.5	
2011 Total	18.8	19.6	12.1	12.6	52.6	9.6	27.7	3.5	1.5	4.5	4.7
2012 Base	14.9		9.4							3.4	
2012 Total	18.4	19.2	11.6	12.1	52.6	9.6	27.9	3.5	1.4	4.2	4.4
2013 Base	14.7		9.4							3.3	
2013 Total	17.3	17.9	11.0	11.4	52.6		28.1			3.9	4.1
2014 Base	12.5		8.1							2.8	
2014 Total	14.5	16.6	9.3	10.7	52.1		27.8			3.2	3.7

* Any "Base" amounts do not include additional war funding or supplemental dollars. Any "Total" amounts include those dollars, as do all years 2007 and prior.

NOTE: Data is calculated from the OMB Historical Tables and the Economic Report of the President. Certain non-Defense data was not available past 2012.



Table 3-2
MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
(End Strength)

ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL*	FY 2012	FY 2013			FY 2014		
		Base	OCO	Total	Base	OCO	Total
Authorization Request	1,422,600	1,336,100	64,900	1,401,000	1,323,300		1,323,300
Enacted Authorization	1,422,600	1,336,660	64,900	1,401,560		TBD	
Army	550,064	502,400	49,700	552,100	490,000		490,000
Navy	318,406	322,700		322,700	323,600		323,600
Marine Corps	198,193	182,100	15,200	197,300	182,100		182,100
Air Force	332,959	329,460		329,460	327,600		327,600
Current Estimate	1,399,622	1,336,660	64,900	1,401,560	1,323,300		1,323,300

SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL

Authorization Request	847,100	837,400		837,400	833,700		833,700
Enacted Authorization	847,100	841,880		841,880		TBD	
<i>Army Reserve</i>	<i>201,166</i>	<i>205,000</i>		<i>205,000</i>	<i>205,000</i>		<i>205,000</i>
<i>Army National Guard</i>	<i>358,078</i>	<i>358,200</i>		<i>358,200</i>	<i>354,200</i>		<i>354,200</i>
Army Total	559,244	563,200		563,200	559,200		559,200
Navy Total	64,715	62,500		62,500	59,100		59,100
Marine Corps Total	39,544	39,600		39,600	39,600		39,600
<i>Air Force Reserve</i>	<i>71,428</i>	<i>70,880</i>		<i>70,880</i>	<i>70,400</i>		<i>70,400</i>
<i>Air National Guard</i>	<i>105,389</i>	<i>105,700</i>		<i>105,700</i>	<i>105,400</i>		<i>105,400</i>
Air Force Total	176,817	176,580		176,580	175,800		175,800
Current Estimate	840,320	841,880		841,880	833,700		833,700

* Does not include full-time Guard and Reserve end strength.



III. NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL SECURITY:

The United States remains committed to promoting peace and stability in the region by contributing support and participating in a broad range of security activities. The United States specifically focuses on contributing to the following regional issues:

Maritime Security

U.S. prosperity and security are increasingly linked to prosperity and security in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. maritime forces will sustain presence and engagement activities throughout the region to ensure free and open access to the maritime domain. The United States will work with Allies and partners to achieve the objectives of: supporting unimpeded lawful commerce, respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, and the rejection of coercion or the use of force to advance interests or resolve disputes. In doing so, we will collectively combat transnational threats, including but not limited to trafficking in persons, illicit drugs, and arms, piracy, and armed robbery at sea.

For more than 70 years, the United States has maintained a strong maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific in support of regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. As part of the United States' commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the first Littoral Combat Ship

(LCS), USS Freedom, deployed to Southeast Asia in April 2013. This was an important marker of an intensified effort to assure our allies and partners and to build trust and confidence in the region. Like many other ships operating in the Asia-Pacific, the USS Freedom conducted port calls throughout Southeast Asia, engaged in cooperative activities to advance interoperability, safety of navigation, and communications at sea, and supported HA/DR operations, delivering humanitarian relief supplies to areas of the Philippines hardest hit by Super Typhoon Haiyan. In November 2014, the USS Fort Worth became the second LCS deployed rotationally to Singapore, and soon after arrival in Singapore, was dispatched to the Java Sea to support search operations for AirAsia Flight 8501. The U.S. Navy will continue to provide rotational presence of these and other platforms to assure our partners that we stand ready to contribute to the security of the region.

The United States regularly conducts maritime exercises with regional partners to build confidence and to enhance regional maritime readiness. Cooperative activities such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. In RIMPAC 2014, the United States welcomed the participation of the People's Liberation Army Navy and the Royal Brunei Navy for the first time. This is one of many engagements aimed to develop cooperation, promote common seafaring practices, and enhance mutual trust.



In September 2014, the United States acceded to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), becoming the organization's 20th contracting party. The United States is also working with regional partners to improve the safety and well-being of regional mariners through the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training (EAST) program. EAST is a successor to a bilateral initiative between the United States and the Philippines to promote cooperation in the field of training and education of seafarers, primarily in counter-piracy training. The workshops incorporate the knowledge of technical experts in the maritime transport sector and regional survivors of piracy to address issues ranging from preparedness and survival to post trauma care upon returning home. Along with piracy, the United States looks forward to supporting other seafarer training topics, like environmental awareness, being addressed by other countries under the EAST program.

Counterterrorism

The United States is actively engaged in multilateral and regional efforts through programs designed to strengthen regional partners and allies and to engender continued regional cooperation on counterterrorism measures. In particular, the United States seeks to encourage and support strategic counterterrorism policies in the region. This approach places a premium on building the institutional and other capacities of states to promote the rule of law and eliminate breeding grounds for terrorism and instability, as well as addressing the drivers of violent extremism to diminish the recruitment of new terrorists.

The United States works closely with regional partners at the United Nations and in regional fora such as the ARF, ADMM-Plus, Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and APEC to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and international instruments related to terrorism. The United States also cooperates closely with many regional partners in the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF), contributes to regional security through a number of capacity building projects to combat terrorist financing, strengthen aviation security, and protect the region's food supply from deliberate contamination. The United States also serves with the Russian Federation as the Co-Chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary partnership of 85 nations and four official observers, and its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

The ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) contributes to regional security through work in its priority areas -- illicit drugs; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN); cybersecurity and terrorist use of the Internet; and countering radicalization. The United States is co-leading work on CBRN and contributing to the ARF Cyber Work Plan currently under development under the leadership of Australia, Malaysia and Russia. In 2015, the United States will co-sponsor with Singapore an ARF workshop on cyber confidence-building measures (CBMs).



The United States works bilaterally with governments in the region to pursue counterterrorism measures and has signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) arrangements with key regional partners. HSPD-6 arrangements establish institutionalized operational mechanisms for the reciprocal sharing of unclassified, biographic terrorist identities between the United States and its foreign partner. Such arrangements enhance U.S. and foreign partners' border security by helping interdict the travel of known and suspected terrorists while further strengthening our counterterrorism cooperation at a strategic policy level. The United States has also provided bilateral counterterrorism finance capacity building assistance to several nations in the region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The United States continues to support and strengthen partners and allies to enable regional actors to secure the region effectively from potential terrorist threats.

Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

The United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and pursues this goal by relying on a shared commitment to all three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways that are safe, secure, and supportive of the nonproliferation regime. While the United States continues to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, as long as such weapons exist, the United States will maintain a

safe, secure, and effective arsenal. This is done to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. treaty allies and other security partners that they can count on the commitments undertaken by the United States.

The NPT remains critical to our common security. At the April 27-May 23, 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States will pursue a balanced agenda across all three pillars. We will seek to ensure that IAEA safeguards remain effective and robust and to uphold the Treaty's integrity by addressing noncompliance. We will detail our strong record on nuclear disarmament, our commitment to pursue further steps toward that goal, and our leading role in promoting peaceful nuclear energy. The United States will work with other NPT Parties, including ARF members, before and at the Review Conference to advance realistic, achievable objections. We believe there are many areas where the conference can reach consensus on concrete measures to strengthen the NPT. The five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or "P5", meet regularly to discuss nuclear policy, promote mutual confidence, and review their progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and discuss issues related to all three pillars of the NPT.

The New START Treaty, negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation is in its fifth year of implementation. Implementation of the Treaty has been pragmatic, business-like, and productive, including inspections, exhibitions, and notifications. When implementation is complete, this agreement will bring the levels of deployed



strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to their lowest levels since the 1950s. In addition, we are currently working with many partners to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the world through implementation of the decisions and commitments made at the three Nuclear Security Summits, and we look forward to the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit in this format in the United States in 2016. We continue our close cooperation with states throughout the region to prevent transfers of WMD, their means of delivery, and related items. We call on all to implement fully and transparently UN Security Council Resolutions related to nonproliferation and disarmament and to support the international treaties that make up the global nonproliferation regime.

The United States supports the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy programs in conformity with the NPT and believes that nuclear energy (when pursued according to international standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation) can be a viable source of energy to states looking to meet increasing energy demands. We maintain, however, that such efforts must be conducted in a transparent manner, in full cooperation with the IAEA. The application of nuclear technologies via IAEA technical cooperation programs can also stimulate development in the areas of food security, hydrology, and human health. We believe that adopting the IAEA's Model Additional Protocol (AP) to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is an important step that states can take to strengthen the role of the IAEA and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. We welcomed

Lao PDR's and Cambodia's signing of the AP in 2014. These steps help to bring the ASEAN region closer to achieving universalization of the AP, as called for in the November 2013 Joint ASEAN-U.S. Leader's Statement. We call upon all ARF participants to sign and ratify the AP, and we stand ready to help states to build capacities to implement the AP fully. The ARF also can play an important role in helping states to understand the AP and to overcome any challenges to its implementation.

The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related materials threaten the security of countries in the region as well as the international community as a whole. One way that the United States has supported regional approaches to addressing this global challenge is by raising awareness of the requirements of UNSCR 1540 and by promoting full implementation of resolution 1540 in the region. We have supported efforts in the ARF toward this end, and promoted greater cooperation between the ARF and the UN Security Council 1540 Committee. We also welcomed Myanmar's ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in December 2014.

One international effort that helps states to meet the goals of UNSCR 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which to date over one hundred countries have endorsed. Many ARF participants have already endorsed the PSI, a concrete commitment to regional peace and security. The United States encourages all countries concerned with the threat that the proliferation of



WMD poses to international peace and security to endorse the PSI. Over the past decade, PSI endorsees have collaborated successfully to build the capacity of countries to conduct interdictions of WMD, related materials, and their delivery systems through information sharing, exercises, and training, as well as through the identification and development of critical interdiction capabilities and practices. An abiding strength of the PSI is the political commitment of its members. The PSI is an informal activity that complements the formal international nonproliferation framework of treaties, export control regimes, UN resolutions, and other instruments. The Asia-Pacific region has shown a strong commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles, and hosted multiple PSI activities and exercises in recent years. In 2014, the first exercise in the annual PSI Asia Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) took place in Honolulu, Hawaii, hosted by the United States. The second APER exercise will take place in New Zealand in November 2015. Other APER organized events in Singapore, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea are on the schedule for 2016-2019. These events, announced at the PSI Tenth Anniversary High Level Political Meeting in Krakow, Poland in 2013, will support the robust PSI exercise program and increase our collective ability to interdict the transfer of illicit WMD related materials.

The United States also maintains several programs to help address the proliferation threat in the ASEAN region. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program is the United States government's premier initiative to help other countries improve their export control systems.

The EXBS program takes a regional and multilateral approach, promoting harmonization of national export control systems with international standards. In addition, the United States established the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to allow the United States to respond rapidly to nonproliferation and disarmament opportunities and conditions surrounding nonproliferation that are unanticipated or unusually difficult. This fund aims to address proliferation of arms by eliminating the proliferation of WMD, destroying or neutralizing existing WMD, helping to detect WMD, and limiting the spread of advanced conventional weapons.

The United States supports the agreement among ASEAN nations to establish a zone in the region free of nuclear weapons, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ Treaty reaffirms the desire of the ASEAN State Parties to maintain peace and stability in the region and builds upon the obligations the SEANWFZ Treaty Parties undertook as non-nuclear weapon States Parties in the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons. The SEANWFZ Treaty prohibits, among other things, States Parties from allowing the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories and the dumping of radioactive material in the zone, subjects that the NPT itself does not address. The United States and the other NPT nuclear weapons states welcome the Treaty efforts of SEANWFZ States Parties to work with the P5 to resolving outstanding issues with respect to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty, and remain prepared to sign the revised Protocol in the near future.



Transnational Crime

The United States augments the capabilities of regional actors and supports the region on a broad range of transnational crime issues. The United States conducts bilateral and regional programming under the auspices of international and nonprofit organizations. These programs include, for example, training prosecutors and judges to manage terrorism and transnational crime cases, supporting the regional International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and maritime interdiction skills training, and training special anti-human trafficking units. In addition, the United States has taken steps to protect the economic interaction in the region against cybercrime and intellectual property piracy, and to disrupt the financial activities of transnational criminals and facilitators.

Narcotics production and trafficking are also challenges for all ARF member nations. There are vast networks of highly organized drug trafficking organizations that span the region and threaten regional and U.S. national security through their production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and precursor chemicals. The U.S. government supports partner nation capabilities to ensure that those countries can fight international drug trafficking and related criminal activities by funding demand reduction programs and interdiction training programs. During the 2016 ARF inter-sessional year, it is anticipated that the United States will co-chair with Thailand a concept development workshop on an ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC) to explore

the viability of establishing a center that could capitalize on existing regional mechanisms and centers to enhance information-sharing capability among ARF member countries. The initial workshop will primarily focus on options for sharing drug-related transnational crime while developing a framework that could expand the capacity of ATTIC to address other areas of mutual interests.

Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise that is now understood to be both a conservation concern and an acute security threat. The increasing involvement of organized crime in poaching and wildlife trafficking promotes corruption, threatens the peace and security of fragile regions, strengthens illicit trade routes, destabilizes economies and communities that depend on wildlife for their livelihoods and contributes to the spread of disease. The U.S. government is increasing law enforcement training and technical assistance globally to combat wildlife trafficking and build law enforcement and criminal justice capacity and cooperation. In March 2015, the United States co-chaired an ARF workshop on combatting wildlife trafficking with Malaysia in order to convene policy makers and experts from the ASEAN region to discuss the threat, address ways to mitigate demand for illegal trafficking of wildlife, and share best practices on prevention and investigation of wildlife trafficking.

The United States has also been engaged in educating the youth of ASEAN towards the risks of trafficking in persons. For example, the U.S. government has assisted in creating a partnership between ASEAN and the MTV-Exit Foundation



(MTV-EF) to educate the youth of ASEAN to raise awareness of trafficking in persons (TIP) and disseminate information about organizations that are involved in assisting victims of trafficking in persons. In 2012, the United States along with other dialogue partners supported MTV-EF events in Vietnam in May, in Indonesia in September, and in Myanmar in December. The IOM-X program takes up where MTV-EF left off and will focus on speaking directly to the youth audience in ASEAN to discuss prevention of human trafficking and exploitation in 2015.

The United States funds numerous programs aimed at combating human trafficking in all world regions. The United States currently funds 16 programs within the ASEAN region, including with Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The United States also supports two regional research projects, one focusing on human trafficking in the fishing industry, the other on data collection of trafficking cases.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

ARF Dialogue Partners experience a variety of natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, as well as manmade crises, including civil conflict, which often result in significant financial and human costs. In response to these events, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in the region, while simultaneously working to reduce communities' vulnerability to disasters in the most at risk areas. In 2013, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster

Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responded to twelve disasters in six ARF countries, including complex emergencies in two ARF countries, working with agencies from across the U.S. government to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations. Of the total responses to disasters in ARF countries, USAID/OFDA has responded to eight disasters in three ASEAN member states—Myanmar, Indonesia, and the Philippines—providing nearly \$43 million in humanitarian assistance, in addition to substantial disaster risk reduction programming throughout ASEAN member states. U.S. disaster assistance aims to meet the immediate needs of affected populations, as well as help families recover from the effects of disaster.

In the Philippines, USAID/OFDA deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team to affected areas immediately following Typhoon Haiyan's landfall in the country in November. In response to the needs resulting from the typhoon, USAID/OFDA provided funding to non-governmental organizations (NGO) and UN partners to provide emergency relief commodities and shelter materials, as well as logistical support in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense. USAID/OFDA responded to three other disasters in the Philippines in 2013, including floods in the central Philippines in August, floods in the northern Philippines in September, and a magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck Bohol Province on October 15.

In response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) contributed more than \$20 million in support of U.N. World Food Program's (WFP) Emergency Operation.



Support included in-kind food assistance, local and regional food purchases, and cash transfer programming. As part of its contribution of in-kind food, USAID/FFP provided 6,020 metric tons (MT) of U.S.-sourced rice and 55 MT of U.S.-sourced emergency food products consisting of nutritional pastes and rice and wheat bars. USAID/FFP funding also supported WFP's purchase of 2,400 MT of locally produced rice and the airlift of 40 MTs of supplemental high-energy biscuits from Dubai. Currently, USAID/FFP is supporting WFP's relief and recovery efforts through cash-based programming, including cash transfers to help affected families purchase food on local markets and cash-for-work and cash-for-assets activities. Through its contributions, USAID/FFP has provided critical life-enhancing food assistance reaching more than 3 million people affected by the typhoon.

After heavy rains triggered flooding and landslides in Indonesia's capital city of Jakarta and surrounding areas in January, USAID/OFDA worked through an NGO partner to locally procure and distribute emergency relief commodities, including materials for flood clean-up activities that enabled affected populations to return home. A USAID/OFDA regional advisor based in Indonesia conducted assessment and coordination activities for the flood response. USAID/OFDA also responded to the magnitude 6.1 earthquake that struck Indonesia's Aceh Province on July 2.

In Myanmar, USAID/FFP, through the WFP, is also distributing food to 209,000 conflict-affected people in Rakhine and to 97,000 IDPs in

Kachin and Northern Shan States. As part of its current emergency program, WFP purchases and distributes locally produced rice, pulses, salt, and blended foods, as well as vegetable oil produced in Indonesia. WFP is also engaged in helping to prevent malnutrition activities by providing children under five and pregnant and lactating women monthly rations of fortified blended foods. USAID/FFP continues to support WFP's protracted relief and recovery operation in Myanmar with \$15 million in FY 2014 and 2015 support for the local and regional purchase of food commodities. The Food Security Sector intends to provide food or cash assistance to 306,000 people in 2015, including 97,000 IDPs in Kachin and northern Shan and 209,000 conflict-affected people in Rakhine. To date in FY 2015, USAID/FFP has contributed \$5.5 million to WFP to support food assistance activities benefiting IDPs in Kachin, Rakhine, and northern Shan. In FY 2014, USAID/FFP provided \$9.5 million to support the local and regional procurement of more than 10,000 metric tons (MT) of food through WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation.

In an effort to mitigate the effects of future disasters on vulnerable populations, the United States also supports various disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs aimed at saving lives; protecting livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure before, during, and after a disaster; and increasing community resilience to natural hazards. The United States supports a number of regional and country-specific DRR programs. In partnership with the U.S. Department of State, USAID/OFDA supports the ASEAN Committee on Disaster



Management and the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), particularly with adding functionalities to the disaster monitoring and response system the United States supported in 2012. Through the early warning system, ASEAN member states share information and support decision-making processes on policymaking, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. The decision-making capabilities of partner countries are further boosted by training in the use of the incident command system through the United States Forest Service. This training has focused on building regional capacity through train the trainer courses that will continue through 2014. DRR activities in the region are further supported by the addition of a USAID DRR specialist to the regional development mission for Asia, located in Bangkok, Thailand, in October 2012. The United States dovetailed this program by training regional disaster management officers on how to coordinate and mobilize logistics through the AHA Centre in November 2013. In 2015 regional DRR support will begin to help develop ASEAN-wide training standards and curricula for disaster management training and to establish ASEAN regional risk and vulnerability assessment guidelines.

The United States sponsors and/or participates in several HA/DR-related exercises with Asian partners every year, including the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, EAS HADR, the ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX), exercise Cobra Gold with Thailand, and the Balikatan exercise with the Philippines.

The Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions enhance regional disaster preparedness capabilities. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force respectively recognize the effectiveness of establishing relationships and training before disasters. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel strengthen relationships between civilian and military specialists from countries in the region who cooperate on medical and engineering projects and practice disaster response procedures. In 2012, the U.S. Hospital Ship Mercy conducting Pacific Partnership visited Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam while Pacific Angel missions were conducted in Laos, Philippines, Nepal, and Vietnam providing humanitarian assistance; medical, optometry, and veterinary care; as well as engineering programs and other exchanges. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel also improve the ability of providers and subject matter experts from the United States working side by side with counterparts from other countries to prepare for and better respond to disasters, such as pandemic illness, typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. In 2012, Pacific Partnership included participation by 13 foreign governments and 28 NGOs. These two humanitarian missions will continue to provide assistance and enhance disaster relief in the region.

Lastly, the United States is the permanent Secretariat of the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS). PASOLS provides a congress for senior logisticians to exchange and discuss best practices and lessons learned, review regional issues and initiatives, and exchange information that strengthen



cooperation throughout the region. The majority of ARF participants attend the annual PASOLS that draws over 120 regional delegates among 26 Member Nations and 12 Observer Nations. One primary focus area of PASOLS is logistics support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. PASOLS looks to improve regional disaster response through established communication channels as well as standardized logistics procedures and best practices. The theme of PASOLS 42 in September 2013 was logistics support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. PASOLS's regional presence and logistics focus presents an ideal opportunity for ARF to continue the dialogue on disaster response to strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration.

Cyber Stability

The speed and efficiency of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are of great benefit to commerce and development, but reliance on ICTs by any nation brings vulnerabilities. This is of particular concern for national and regional security and economic prosperity – especially in Asia, where e-commerce is a significant and increasing portion of many developing countries' economic growth. In a disruptive national or international cyber incident, ICTs' scarcity of external observables and difficulty in determining the nation or entity responsible may lead states to act precipitously, with significant consequences for strategic ICT stability and international security. To reduce the risk of conflict stemming from lack of attribution, practical confidence building measures (CBMs) are needed to enhance the

predictability of state activities and reduce national security risks. This can be achieved by fostering transparency, increasing cybersecurity cooperation, and developing capacity within and among states. These practical measures in the form of CBMs can help reduce the risk of conflict.

In the interest of increasing ARF's budding preventive diplomacy role and promoting regional cyber stability, the United States supports continued ARF dialogue on enhancing international ICT stability via the ARF Work Plan on Security of and in the Use of ICTs. We support the implementation of Cyber CBMs in the ARF and continued discussion of preventive diplomacy's role in cyberspace. To support this work plan, the United States will be co-organizing and co-funding a 2015 seminar with Singapore on operationalizing cyber CBMs in the ARF.

Peacekeeping

Tragically, continued internal ethnic conflicts, border disagreements, and failed governmental institutions yields dangerous political instability and humanitarian crises in different parts of the world. The United Nations (UN) and other regional organizations frequently address these crises through peacekeeping operations. Increasing the capacity of countries to participate in such operations globally is a topic that merits ongoing discussion in the ARF. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) addresses key capability gaps through training, equipment provisioning, facilities refurbishment, deployment and readiness support.



Through GPOI, building partner capacity to train and prepare forces for deployment remains a program objective. Addressing existing or assist in the creation of partner country critical enabling capabilities such as engineering/demining, medical, and rotary-wing aviation support is another key objective. Sustaining critical UN skill sets in partner country peacekeeping training institutions, such as UN logistics, staff officer, contingent commander, observer, civ-mil, protection of civilians and gender awareness training, through national, regional or exercise training events is yet another focus area for GPOI. The United States Department of State and the United States Pacific Command, the primary implementer for GPOI programs in the region, will continue to work closely with ARF partners on a multilateral front to further build capabilities and enhance effectiveness of GPOI partner countries in order to meet the ever-increasing demand for capable international peacekeepers.

IV. ROLE OF THE ARF

National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security

The United States remains committed to building institutional capacity in the ARF and strengthening ARF's role in the regional security architecture. Besides the many projects mentioned above, the United States seeks to increase ARF's capacity to serve as a Preventive Diplomacy mechanism.

Further, in 2011, the United States established a U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, dispatching our first-ever resident Ambassador to ASEAN. With

the arrival of our second resident Ambassador in November 2014, and an across the board increase in staffing both at the Mission and on the desk, we are demonstrating to ASEAN a strong U.S. commitment to ASEAN engagement and consequently to the ARF, despite a tough fiscal climate. We will also continue to work with ASEAN to strengthen and build capacity in the ARF Unit. A strong ARF Unit will benefit ASEAN members and all ARF dialogue partners as the engine of a credible and action-oriented organization.

Future of the ARF

The ARF serves as a useful and increasingly capable venue for broad, multilateral cooperation, and dialogue on a number of security issues. The ARF's inclusiveness, maturing commitments, and growing experience position it to achieve success on a targeted agenda that addresses common issues of interest for all ARF participants. Since the ARF's inception in 1994, the confidence building measures that have characterized ARF engagement have facilitated greater trust and confidence among its participants. However, the ARF has had time to mature and its participants should take deliberate steps toward shaping the ARF into an institution that faces important security challenges head-on, with the capability to conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. Furthermore, the escalation in coercion and the use of force by ARF participant governments, in particular, highlight the urgent need for the ARF to go beyond just providing confidence building measures. In this regard, the United States supports efforts to develop the ARF's Preventive Diplomacy capability,



which would move the ARF one step closer toward its ultimate mandated goal of becoming a regional Conflict Resolution body.

ASEAN centrality and leadership are critical to the future of the ARF. As ASEAN achieves greater integration, it will play an even more influential role in regional and global political-security issues. Already demonstrating leadership on many issues, such as pandemic disease, climate change, foreign terrorist fighters, and peacekeeping operations, ASEAN, with the strong support of non-ASEAN participants like the United States, will need to continue to shape the ARF into a robust institution capable of addressing many of the region's pressing security needs.

The ARF is one element of a broader regional security architecture that includes the EAS and ADMM-Plus. The United States is committed to

continuing its engagement to help shape a robust and coherent architecture in the Asia Pacific – including a central role for the ARF in promoting stability and prosperity – through an open and inclusive process. Developing rules-based frameworks for dialogue and cooperation that will help maintain stability and economic growth, and resolve disputes through diplomacy is especially important in a region facing territorial and maritime disputes, political transformation, political and civil unrest, and the challenge of natural disasters. The United States is committed to building on our active and enduring presence in the Asia Pacific region and working with its partners to support the ARF as an effective mechanism for dealing with transnational security issues.



VIETNAM



I. REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Asia-Pacific region, with its dynamic developing economies, has taken on an increasingly important position in the world, attracting the interest and competition for influence among the major powers. The regional cooperation mechanisms in various fields have developed. However, the region also poses potential threats to defense-security.

Disputes over territory and natural resources in land and at sea have been on the rise. Non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, transnational crimes, piracy, aviation security, human trafficking, cybercrime, epidemics, climate change, natural disasters...at various levels are on increasing, causing serious consequences to many countries in the region. Maritime security, including freedom of navigation and over-flight in the East Sea (South China Sea), is currently being challenged by recent developments, including the unilateral actions of reclamation of geographical features in the disputed areas and will continue to attract concerns of countries inside and outside the region.

Vietnam believes that peace, stability, security, safety and freedom of navigation and over-flight in the East Sea are the common interests of countries both inside and outside the region.

The current instabilities and tensions can only be settled if countries, particularly those directly involved, strictly comply with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, exercise self-restraint, take no unilateral actions that may further complicate the situation, avoid the use of force and threat the use of force, fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the East Sea and work towards the Code of Conduct (COC). Vietnam maintains the country's consistent policy of settling disputes through peaceful measures on the basis of international law and norms in the region.

II. NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY OF VIETNAM

Fundamental issues of the National Defense Policy

Vietnam always regards the maintenance of peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development. Vietnam has followed a national defense policy of peace and self-defense expressed in the guideline of not using force or threatening the use the force in international relations; solving differences and disputes with other countries by peaceful means on the basis of international laws. Vietnam advocates the gradual modernization of VPA and strengthening of defense



capability only to maintain its sufficient ability for self-defense and it also opposes the arms race.

For disputes over sovereignty in the East Sea, Vietnam maintains the country's consistent policy of settling disputes through peaceful measures in accordance with international law, include 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). It is Vietnam's policy that bilateral disputes in the East Sea should be settled bilaterally and multilateral disputes should be addressed through multilateral negotiations. While continuously seeking for a long-term solution to the issue, Vietnam advocates that all parties must restrain themselves, strictly abide by DOC; strive for building and the early conclusion COC in order to turn the East Sea in to a sea of peace, friendship and development.

ARF Weapon Register of Vietnam

Total Defense Expenditure

The State of Vietnam has allocated an appropriate portion of the State budget for defense procurement in accordance with the annual demand. The major portion of the defense budget was spent on maintaining the existing equipment and facilities; however VPA has continuously reduced its active troops on planned roadmap. At present, annual average defense expenditure is about 23,000 billion VND or some USD 1.3 billion, accounting for an average of 2.1 percent of GDP.

Military Personnel

The active forces include Main Force and Local Force, about 450,000 strong active personnel. However, Vietnam advocates continuing to downsize the number of the active forces and the Viet Nam People's Army (VPA) is maintained at the level of reasonable strength, highly-skilled, yet compact, ensuring the combat readiness to meet the new requirements. The active forces consist of three services, namely Ground Forces, Air Defense-Air Force and Navy. Besides these forces, VPA maintains the Border Guard and the Militia and Self-Defense Force.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS OF VIETNAM TO THE REGIONAL SECURITY

Vietnam People's Military follows an open-door policy that is aimed at establishing relations with regional and international defense forces with a view to promote mutual understanding and respect, and to jointly addressing non-traditional security issues and humanitarian assistance. Vietnam always attaches its national security with regional and global security. Vietnam consistently advocates not joining any military alliance, but ready to take confidence building measures, to build up friendship relations with neighboring countries so as to jointly handling common threats for both national and regional interests on the basis of mutual understanding, respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries in accordance with international and national laws.



In 2014, Vietnam has successfully organized a number of important ASEAN defense and military meetings, namely the 31st ADMM Plus Expert's Working Group Meeting on HARD in Nha Trang (January 15th-18th), ADMM Plus Expert's Working Group Meeting on Humanitarian Mine Action (June 2014), the 15th ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM-15), the 24th ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet (AARM-24) and the 4th ASEAN Sergeant Majors Annual Meeting (ASMAM-4) (November 2014). The success of these meetings has shown the responsibility of Vietnam. It has been noted with significant contributions by defense and security cooperation to enhance mutual understanding and confidence-building.

Viet Nam and India co-chaired the first meeting of the Asian Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action (EWG on HMA) on June 18th 2014 in Ha Noi, Vietnam. The meeting has launched some cooperation programs to carry out the Humanitarian Mine Action initiated by Vietnam, including the upcoming bomb and mine clearance exercise. Regarding the action plan for the 2014-2017 period, ADMM Plus Member State will establish a coordination channel and mechanisms for cooperation in sharing information, experiences and legal aspects involved in humanitarian mine activities, organizing technical demonstrations on bomb, mine and unexploded ordnance clearance by applying advanced technology.

The final expert group meeting is scheduled to be held in late 2016 or in early 2017 to review activities, draw from previous experience and propose specific cooperation projects for the following years.

Vietnam actively participated in discussing the direct communications line (DCL) proposed by Brunei Darussalam and has been working closely with the Defense Agencies of ASEAN member states to set up the DCL.

In 2014, Vietnam sent two liaison officers to the UN Mission in South Sudan. The Vietnam People's Army is capable of successfully joining in UN peacekeeping activities and Viet Nam stands ready to cooperate and receive assistance from the UN and its member nations to fulfill all assigned tasks. Vietnam has sent staff officers to the Mission in the Central African Republic and officially registered to UN Standby Arrangement System to take part in future missions. In addition, Vietnam has been actively preparing for a level-two field hospital and an engineering company to be deployed in a suitable mission at the UN's request. Vietnam considers sending other forces for participating in the UN peacekeeping operations at an appropriate time.

