

MYANMAR 2014

ASEAN Regional Forum ANNUAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2014

Volume XV

Myanmar 2014



*ASEAN Regional Forum*

**ANNUAL SECURITY  
OUTLOOK 2014**

*moving forward in unity to peaceful and prosperous community*








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## TABLE OF CONTENTS



	<b>FOREWORD</b>	2
	<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	4
	<b>AUSTRALIA</b>	6
	<b>CAMBODIA</b>	15
	<b>CANADA</b>	19
	<b>CHINA</b>	33
	<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>	43
	<b>INDONESIA</b>	49
	<b>JAPAN</b>	61
	<b>MALAYSIA</b>	70
	<b>MYANMAR</b>	86
	<b>NEW ZEALAND</b>	90
	<b>THE PHILIPPINES</b>	98
	<b>REPUBLIC OF KOREA</b>	108
	<b>THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION</b>	116
	<b>SINGAPORE</b>	121
	<b>THAILAND</b>	131
	<b>THE UNITED STATES</b>	139
	<b>VIET NAM</b>	156



## FOREWORD





On the twentieth anniversary of ASEAN Regional Forum, I have the pleasure to present the 15<sup>th</sup> volume of the ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The publication, initiated in 2000 under the chairmanship of the Kingdom of Thailand, aims to promote transparency and confidence among ARF participants and is gaining momentum, and today seventeen participating countries have contributed to this volume.

In line with the practice of compiling the ARF ASO, the current volume comprises voluntary contributions from ARF participants, without editing by the ARF Chair. In order to promote transparency and confidence among ARF participants, the ARF ASO is circulated as a non-classified document. This volume of the ARF ASO follows the standardised and user friendly format and will truly benefit readers who are following the political and security issues of our region.

As the Chair of the 21<sup>st</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the ARF participants that have contributed to the publication of this 15<sup>th</sup> volume of the ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to be 'Wunna Maung Lwin', written over a light blue grid background.

**Wunna Maung Lwin**

Chairman of the 21<sup>st</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum,  
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Nay Pyi Taw  
Myanmar  
July 2014



## ARF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Providing an overview of the regional security environment, the 2014 ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO) includes contributions from 17 ARF participants. Contributions have highlighted both traditional and non-traditional security threats facing the region and acknowledged the importance of regular interaction among nations to enable candid and frank discussion, greater transparency, trust and mutual understanding. Participants noted the importance of peace and stability to the continued economic development and prosperity of the region.

Traditional security issues of concern identified by ARF participants included maritime security and territorial disputes, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and instability in the Middle East, North Africa and the Ukraine. Participants underlined that these issues continued to pose a threat to regional peace and security.

Non-traditional security threats identified included terrorism, transnational crime, natural disasters and cyber security. Contributions agreed that further strengthening of cooperation among nations was necessary to combat the growing number of non-traditional security threats facing the region.

Providing an overview of ARF participants' national defence policies, the ASO seeks to increase transparency and mutual understanding among nations. Participants recognised the need for increased cooperation among defence institutions to better manage regional issues and threats.

Contributions acknowledged the ARF's significant contribution towards confidence building measures, providing a setting for members to discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace



and security in the region. Addressing the future direction of the ARF, progression to the next stage of ARF evolution was highlighted in all submissions. Participants expressed a common desire to accelerate the implementation of the ARF Preventative Diplomacy Work Plan.

Recognising that challenges facing the region were increasingly complex, requiring greater regional coordination and cooperation, submissions called for participants to continue to strengthen synergies among regional security mechanisms.


Together with the ARF, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), the ADMM-Plus, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum and the East Asia Summit (EAS) would be critical to effectively tackling issues and promoting regional peace and stability. ARF participants agreed they must continue to work together to develop tools of preventative diplomacy and conflict management. These tools would be essential to managing not only the challenges of today, but those of the future.



# AUSTRALIA



**“Australia’s engagement in the region involves a wide range of agencies covering foreign policy, trade, development, defence, intelligence, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, law enforcement, border security and emergency management.”**



## I. Overview of Regional Security Environment

Peace and stability are vital to the continued development and prosperity of the Indian Ocean Asia Pacific region. Despite increasingly sophisticated security policies and practices, however, challenges to regional peace and security remain. These include unresolved territorial disputes, nuclear and missile proliferation, the impact of transnational crime, natural disasters, human pandemics, energy and food security and rapidly expanding military budgets.

Australia approaches these security issues through appropriate domestic policy settings, strong bilateral ties with countries of the region, including an alliance with the United States, and a commitment to working cooperatively through regional and international forums, and in accordance with international law. Australia’s engagement in the region involves a wide range of agencies covering foreign policy, trade, development, defence, intelligence, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, law enforcement, border security and emergency management.

The Australian Government, elected in September 2013, is committed to strengthening Australia’s ties with the region and to working with it to enhance shared prosperity and security. Policies such as the New Colombo Plan will deepen the links between our peoples by supporting young Australians to study and take internships in the region. And a new focus on economic diplomacy as a key platform of Australian foreign policy will ensure we unlock the mutual benefits of closer trade and investment ties, thereby complementing our diplomatic work for peace and security.



Australia's engagement in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an integral part of its contribution to regional peace and security. Throughout the ARF's twenty years, Australia has been an active contributor to its confidence building work. Australia is pleased to continue this tradition as the ARF takes on new security issues, including cyber security and counter-terrorism, and focuses on the second phase of its work, preventive diplomacy.

### South China Sea

Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation, including over flight, in the South China Sea. Approximately 60 per cent of Australia's exports and 40 per cent of Australia's imports pass through the South China Sea. Australia does not take a position on the competing claims in the South China Sea, but calls on governments to clarify and pursue their territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Australia welcomes the efforts of ASEAN and China to conclude a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. Australia encourages China and ASEAN countries to make early progress on a substantive Code of Conduct, to exercise restraint and refrain from actions that could increase tensions. It is vital for continued regional prosperity that actions undertaken in the South China Sea are in accordance with international law.

### North East Asia

With three of Australia's top four trading partners in North East Asia, Australia has a strong interest in a stable and prosperous North East Asia. It is also in our interests for our friends to cooperate constructively on areas of mutual concern.

Australia does not take a position on the merits of the various sovereignty claims in North East Asia. Australia wishes to see tensions reduced and issues resolved through peaceful means and in accordance with international law, free

from any use of force, coercion, or unilateral actions to change the status quo in ways that could increase regional tensions and the risk of unintended consequences. Australia supports the development of better means of communication and preventive diplomacy among relevant countries, in order to build confidence and reduce the scope for misunderstandings.

### Korean Peninsula

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to contravene UNSC resolutions. This was highlighted by the DPRK's dangerous firing of short-range ballistic missiles in February and March 2014 and its restart in late 2013 of a plutonium-producing reactor. These actions pose a continuing and direct threat to regional and international peace and security and pose a major challenge to global non-proliferation objectives.

Australia believes ARF members have an important role to play in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Australia calls on all ARF members, particularly the DPRK, to implement fully their obligations under UNSC resolutions, including Resolution 2094 of 7 March 2013.

Australia looks forward to the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK needs to take sincere and concrete steps to show it is serious about denuclearization before discussions of a lasting settlement, including the six-party talks, can resume with any prospects for success.

### Regional architecture

Australia continues to place priority on development of the East Asia Summit as the key regional leaders-led institution. The EAS has the right mandate and membership to foster a stable strategic environment and deeper economic integration, creating over time a genuine Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific 'strategic community'.

Australia supports leaders-level discussions on strategic issues and cooperation on political, security and economic issues, which have significant potential to promote a stable regional

strategic environment and regional prosperity. Australia welcomed leaders' reaffirmation of the EAS' importance as a key component of the regional architecture at the 8th East Asia Summit in October 2013.

Australia supports the EAS' endorsement of further cooperation in existing priority areas of finance, disaster management, ASEAN connectivity, education, global health and pandemic diseases, and environment and energy. Australia appreciated leaders' welcoming Australia's New Colombo Plan and their support for a Declaration on Food Security and the initiation of the Asia-Pacific Leaders Malaria Alliance, co-chaired by Australia and Vietnam.

Australia remains committed to ministerial dialogue and practical cooperation on security issues in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) process.

Australia supports continued regional economic integration, including through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and completed other trade agreements.

Australia will continue to advocate for closer cooperation and coordination between these ASEAN-centred groupings to encourage more effective and efficient use of resources and to avoid duplication where possible.

### Afghanistan

Australia's mission in Afghanistan substantially shifted following the withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2013. Afghanistan is taking greater responsibility for its own future, and Australia's role will be to help ensure continued stability, security and development in the coming years.

Australia's presence is now focused on transitioning to the NATO-led training advisory and assistance mission as well as continuing with our significant development assistance. In 2015-17, Australia will contribute USD 300 million towards the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces. Afghanistan remains

a key priority for Australia's term on the UNSC. As 'pen holder' on Afghanistan issues, Australia played a lead role in the 2013 ISAF and UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mandate renewals. As Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee, Australia is committed to working with other Security Council members and Afghanistan to ensure the sanctions regime can support Afghan-led reconciliation.

### Pacific

Australia has welcomed positive developments in Fiji's democratic elections preparations. These include Prime Minister Bainimarama's decision to step down as Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces in March 2014, following the earlier appointment of the Electoral Commission in January 2014 and the approval of the constitution in September 2013. Australia continues to work with Fiji and other partners to support Fiji's return to democracy.

### Ukraine

Russia's intervention in Ukraine was a direct attack on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia's actions were clearly in breach of its international legal obligations including, most fundamentally, the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force. Unilateral annexation of a neighbouring territory is not only unlawful, it threatens international peace and security, and impacts on shared regional security perspectives. These are not the actions of a responsible and senior member of the international community.

Australia is concerned to preserve a rules-based approach to regional and international governance. Australia has joined many in the international community, including ARF members, in calling on Russia to take the lead in de-escalating the crisis with Ukraine. Russia needs to take immediate steps to withdraw its military forces back to their Crimean bases and give a clear indication of its respect for international law.

### Middle East and North Africa

Three years into the Arab Spring, the Middle



East is yet to settle on a new equilibrium and faces political and security instability. Challenges across the region include weak governance, struggling economies with high unemployment, extremism, poor border security, and increased terrorist activity. Australia is encouraged by the example of Tunisia, which has recently adopted a new constitution and is preparing for elections. Elsewhere in the region, however, the transition to democracy has been uneven. Developments in Egypt since the removal of former President Morsi are a focus given Egypt's weight and influence in the Arab world. Australia wishes to see Egypt make a transition to stable democracy and to adopt an inclusive approach to its forthcoming elections. The worsening security situation in Libya, including weapons proliferation and lack of progress in disbanding militia, also has serious implications for regional security and will require continuing international attention.

The threat to regional stability and security from ongoing violence in Syria reinforces the need for sustained international action to bring about a durable, inclusive political resolution to the conflict. Australia maintains autonomous sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses in Syria. Australia has contributed \$110.8 million in aid to the Syrian people, and to support refugees in neighbouring countries. Australia worked with Jordan and Luxembourg in support of a UNSC resolution on the humanitarian situation, adopted on 22 February 2014.

Australia was deeply concerned by the use of chemical weapons in Syria in August 2013. Australia calls on Syria to meet its obligations under UNSC Resolution 2118 and decisions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council. Australia has urged Syria to cooperate fully with the OPCW-UN Joint Mission to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons and to ensure accelerated, volume-based and predictable movements of chemicals out of Syria. Australia contributed \$2 million in January 2014 to the OPCW's special trust fund to support the mission. Australia is working with other UNSC members to monitor Syria's compliance with both resolutions.

Australia fully supports resumed final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians aimed at establishing a just and lasting two-state solution, with Israelis and Palestinians living side-by-side in peace and security within internationally recognised borders. Australia stands ready to assist in any way it can to support the efforts of the Palestinians and Israelis to achieve lasting peace, including supporting Palestinian development as a crucial component of a durable two-state solution.

Australia remains deeply concerned about the nature of Iran's nuclear program and strongly believes negotiations and robust sanctions measures are the best way to seek a peaceful resolution. Australia welcomed the P5+1 'Joint Plan of Action' interim nuclear agreement with Iran as an important first step towards resolving the Iran nuclear issue peacefully, but much more remains to be done. Iran must comply with relevant UNSC resolutions and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In support of broader international efforts to pressure Iran, Australia has in place UNSC sanctions, as well as additional sanctions under autonomous legislation. Australia is also chairing the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee in 2014.

## II. National Security and Defence Policy

### *II a. Overview of national security and defence policy*

Australia will publish a Defence White Paper in 2015 which will reflect the importance of security, stability and cohesion in the Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific region, and promote a stable, rules-based global order. The White Paper will set out planned capability acquisitions in the coming decades. This includes replacement of Australia's Collins Class submarine and acquisition of F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, which will continue to meet Australia's strategic requirements into the foreseeable future. Australia aims to increase its defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP by 2023.

Priorities in the next five-to-ten years include addressing the transnational and interconnected nature of national security threats, dealing with non-traditional national security challenges,

sustaining attention on traditional national security threats and pursuing strategies for assisting fragile states.

Australia seeks to promote regional security through a range of associated policy areas. Australia's economic diplomacy agenda brings together Australia's foreign policy, trade, development and other international economic activities to unlock the productivity enhancing benefits of closer trade and investment ties in our region. Australia's development assistance program seeks to promote security and stability by improving living standards and enhancing governance arrangements. Initiatives such as the Defence Cooperation Program and Pacific Police Development Program are also aimed at building regional security capacity.

*II b. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register*

Australia's 2013 fiscal year military expenditure return, as provided to the UN under UN General Assembly Resolution 35/142 B, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

**III. National Contributions to Regional Security**

*III a. Counter-terrorism*

Significant counter-terrorism successes in recent years have diminished the Al Qaeda senior leadership's ability to plan and direct major operations. However, the nature of the terrorism threat is evolving, presenting new and sometimes more difficult challenges. Al Qaeda affiliates, and groups and individuals inspired by Al Qaeda, pose a significant global threat. Al Qaeda's narrative inspires and guides a loose, geographically diverse and largely independent network of jihadist movements and individuals around the world. One of the most worrying aspects of today's international terrorist threat is its growing unpredictability.

Australia will work with Indonesia to support the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum to focus on targeted activities addressing key challenges in the region such as the management and custody of terrorist detainees in prisons and youth radicalisation. Australia also welcomes the opportunity to co-chair the ADMM-Plus

counter-terrorism group with Singapore from April 2014.

*III b. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

Australia is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and regards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Australia participated in the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee in New York and the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague.

Australia has long expressed concerns over the horrific consequences to humanity of a nuclear war and it is these concerns that have consistently underpinned our determination to work for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and a world without nuclear weapons. Australia believes that effective disarmament requires sustained, practical steps in a process that engages the states with nuclear weapons and addresses the security drivers behind those states' decisions to have nuclear weapons. They are the ones that ultimately will need to take the action to disarm. Australia made these concerns clear at the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014.

Australia and Japan co-founded the cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) in 2010 to help take forward the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcomes, in particular the 64-point Action Plan. As part of the process leading up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Australia has made clear its concern that the states possessing nuclear weapons must do more to meet their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT.

Australia is also strongly committed to the prevention of WMD proliferation and welcomes any opportunity to collaborate with ARF participants on non-proliferation activities and to help meet commitments arising from UNSC Resolution 1540. Australia strongly supports the ARF's non-proliferation and disarmament activities and encourages countries in the region to adhere to and implement effectively the



Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and UNSCR 1540.

Australia is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which provides for the exchange of information on and coordinated action to help prevent the transfer of materiel to WMD programs of concern. As a result, Australia welcomes increasing support both from regional states, and more generally, for the initiative to underline further the region's determination to prevent WMD-proliferation, and significantly boost PSI participants' operational capacity. Australia also actively engages with individual ARF partners on enhancing strategic export controls.

There is shared recognition in our region of the need for further action to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Australia's co-authorship of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) highlights our commitment to addressing this threat in the region and globally. Adoption of the ATT by an overwhelming majority of states at the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 was a clear demonstration of international support behind this treaty. Following Australia's signature of the ATT on 3 June 2013, Australia is progressing the domestic processes required for ratification and aim to be among the first 50 countries to ratify the ATT. Australia urges other countries to do likewise to facilitate the earliest possible entry into force of this historic instrument. Australia is a major contributor to the UN Trust Facility to Support Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) to help support the treaty's earliest entry into force and effective implementation.

Australia's determination to tackle illicit SALW proliferation is further evidenced by the emphasis the Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop placed on the issue during Australia's Presidency of the UN Security Council in September 2013, culminating in UNSCR 2117 on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Australia was an early signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and ratified it in 2012. Australia will continue to encourage the broadest

possible accession to the Convention and assist parties in their clearance efforts.

### *III c. Transnational Crime*

#### *Organised crime*

The Australian Government continues to advance efforts to combat national and international organised crime through the Australian Federal Police (AFP) Crime Program, and Cyber Crime Operations with a focus on prevention and disruption. The Crime Program's structure comprises: crime operations, including a fraud and anti-corruption portfolio; serious organised crime and the International Network.

In close collaboration with government and private sectors, the Cyber Crime Operations teams investigate significant criminal acts which may compromise computer systems relied upon by the Australian critical infrastructure community and/or information systems of national and international significance. Many of these crimes are committed by off-shore organised crime groups, over the internet, making them inherently transnational in nature.

The AFP engages in a range of activities off-shore to facilitate transnational crime investigations. The cornerstone of this activity is the AFP's international network, currently comprising 98 members deployed to 35 locations in 28 countries. This network collaborates with international law enforcement agencies bilaterally and multilaterally, including with EUROPOL and INTERPOL. The AFP International Network also provides support to the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, which plays an integral role across the Pacific region by enhancing the capacity of Pacific Island Police to combat transnational crime.

Australia and New Zealand co-funded the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) inaugural regional Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA), which was launched by UNODC in Sydney on 16 April 2013. Relevant Australian agencies provided input across a range of issues for UNODC to consider in this process (as did agencies of other countries).

### *People-smuggling*

Australia remains committed to addressing people smuggling, including as co-chair of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process). Bali Process ministers agreed in 2013 to practical measures to advance the criminalisation of people smuggling and strengthen implementation of domestic people smuggling laws, including the development of a policy guide to assist policy makers and practitioners to criminalise people smuggling. The guide will promote a consistent understanding of international legal obligations and assist states in developing effective domestic legislation.

The Australian Government has also introduced new border protection measures under Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). OSB is a military-led border security initiative comprising a package of on- and off-shore activities designed to strengthen border protection and deter illegal maritime arrivals. To implement OSB, the Australian Government has established an OSB Joint Agency Task Force, which brings together all relevant agencies under a single operational command; expanded offshore processing of asylum claims in Nauru and Papua New Guinea; and taken steps to reform Australia's refugee processes and access to permanent residency for illegal immigrants. These measures aim to break the criminal people smuggling trade.

### *Illicit Drugs*

Domestically, the Australian Government continues to develop and implement measures to strengthen our approach to combating illicit drugs. According to the Australian Crime Commission's Illicit Drug Data Report (IDDR), the weight of illicit drugs seized continued to increase, with a record 23.8 tonnes of illicit drugs seized nationally in 2011–12. The number of national illicit drug related arrests also increased, with the 93,148 arrests reported in 2011–12 the highest reported in the last decade. A record 809 clandestine laboratories were detected in Australia in 2011–12, the majority of which were methylamphetamine-related. In terms of arrests, seizures and reported use, cannabis remains the dominant illicit drug in Australia.

### *Cyber Security*

The global challenges of cyberspace require an increased international effort to improve the security of cyberspace and to develop common understandings about the norms that apply to state behaviour in cyberspace. In 2012-13, Australia chaired the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, which adopted a landmark consensus report that affirmed that international law, in particular the UN Charter, applies to States' use of cyber. The report recognised that the application of norms derived from existing international law relevant to the use of information and communications technologies by states is essential to reduce risks to international peace, security and stability. The task now is to elaborate how international law applies, to cyber. In October 2013, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop, addressed the Seoul Cyberspace Conference, setting out Australian views on the key issues on the international cyber policy agenda.

In the ARF, Australia is a co-lead on cyber security, together with Malaysia and the Russian Federation, within the framework of the ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. Australia continues to lead work on a work plan on cyber security, as requested by ARF Ministers following their adoption of the ARF Statement on Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security in July 2012. In March 2014, Australia and Malaysia hosted an ARF Workshop on Cyber Confidence Building Measures. The purpose of the workshop was to look at how the region might manage and respond to a cyber incident or event of potential regional security significance. The development of a policy network, building on existing operational and technical networks, to address concerns, facilitate clarification and prevent misunderstandings was a key focus of the workshop.

Work is continuing on the establishment, announced in Australia's National Security Strategy, of the Australian Cyber Security Centre. The Centre will co-locate cyber security



capabilities from across different government agencies in one facility with a view to enhancing the integration and impact of these capabilities. The new Centre is expected to be operational by the end of 2014.

#### *III d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

Large-scale disasters continue to affect the region. Australia continues to underscore the need to continue developing and coordinating activities between and across regional organisations regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Australia contributed \$100 million in support to the Philippines following the devastation caused by typhoon Haiyan, including \$40 million in direct funding, around 550 Australian Defence Force personnel on the ground, and significant assistance for schools and small businesses to reopen. Australia has initiated discussion of practical ways to promote closer links between the ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS, while actively engaging exercises such as the ARF DiREx. As part of our work under the ARF's work plan, Australia and Indonesia are co-chairing an ARF workshop on consular contingency planning in Bali, Indonesia 20-21 May.

More broadly, Australia continues to fund the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), and provides an online disaster relief mapping service for ARF members (DRMS). Australia remains a primary donor for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre) which undertakes operational coordination of activities under AADMER.

Disaster management is a key focus for Australian cooperation in the region. Our efforts can have a significant impact on the immediate response and effect on lives and livelihoods of those affected by natural disasters. Australia will continue to develop regional disaster responses through the ARF and other institutions, including the East Asia Summit.

#### *III e. Maritime Security*

Australia is committed to comprehensive maritime security engagement in the Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific region. Australia's maritime interests are extensive and enduring. Australia is foremost a maritime trading nation and has close economic and other ties to Indian Ocean Asia-Pacific countries. Maritime security also supports other regional security activities, including countering proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and combating transnational crime.

As a maritime nation, Australia works closely with regional partners to enhance maritime security. Regional efforts have been effective in reducing the impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea in South-East Asia. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has supported this work. After participating as an observer in ReCAAP Governing Council meetings for several years, Australia is pleased to have become the 19th Contracting Party to ReCAAP on 3 August 2013.

Australia participated in the 1st Annual Expanded ASEAN Seafarer Training (EAST) Workshop in Manila in September 2013. This initiative addressed piracy challenges as they relate to seafarer safety and welfare through a collaborative exchange of analysis and information.

Australia participates in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which supports counter-piracy efforts throughout the Indian Ocean, and in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). As the incoming chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Australia hosted the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) discussions in Perth in March 2014. IONS is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian

Ocean Region. IONS provides an open and inclusive forum for discussion which aims to reach common understandings on, and find cooperative solutions to regional maritime issues.

As part of this initiative, Australia is developing a working group structure to address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information sharing and communications interoperability, smuggling, environmental issues and piracy.

Australia is increasing its engagement in ARF dialogues and workshops and is committed to understanding and cooperating on maritime security issues. Australia is pleased to be co-chairing with the Philippines the second ARF seminar on UNCLOS in Manila on 28-29 May 2014. The objective of the seminar is to strengthen ARF members' understanding of ways in which UNCLOS can contribute to regional maritime security. This seminar will build on the work of the first seminar which was held in 2011.

#### *III f. Space Security*

Once termed an 'emerging' issue, space security now sits squarely at the forefront of international attention. All states rely on satellites for critical services such as telecommunications, air and sea navigation, electronic commerce, banking, climate monitoring, disaster management, national security and defence. So the safety, security and sustainability of the space environment is a common concern and worthy of cooperation. The space-based infrastructure at the heart of modern society is particularly vulnerable to the threat from orbiting space debris and the possible testing or use of destructive anti-satellite weapons. Practical and timely steps to limit the creation of further debris warrant immediate focus.

For this reason, Australia continues its active support for the EU-led initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, to build norms for responsible behaviour in outer space, and to address the proliferation of space debris. Momentum has been building on this initiative and broad international support will now be crucial to bringing it to fruition. Australia is pleased that ARF participants have become increasingly involved in the process, including good attendance at the Second 'Open-Ended Consultations' (OEC) on the Code in Bangkok in November 2013. The

third and final OEC in May 2014 provides ARF members a valuable opportunity to confirm their support for action.

Australia continues to engage in other regional and international efforts to promote the safety, security and sustainability of space. Australia was pleased that ARF Ministers recognised in 2013 a continuing interest in the ARF considering space security, as recommended by participants at the inaugural ARF Space Security Workshop (co-chaired by Australia and Vietnam in 2012). Australia encourages ARF participants to play their part in ushering the Code to conclusion, and to have their views heard on space security issues.

#### **IV. Role of the ARF**

##### **IV.a. National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security**

Australia continues to make a significant contribution across the ARF agenda. In the 2013-2014 inter-sessional year, Australia co-chaired with Japan and the Philippines the ISM on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and co-chaired three activities (an ARF workshop on consular contingency in May 2014 in Indonesia, an ARF Workshop on Cyber Confidence Building Measures with Malaysia in March 2014 and the 2nd ARF seminar on UNCLOS with the Philippines in Manila in May 2014). Australia also continued to draft the ARF cyber work plan, in consultation with the priority co-leads Malaysia and Russia.

Australia will continue to work closely with ARF participants to strengthen further the role of regional architecture in promoting security, including through closer coordination of the work across the ARF, the EAS and ADMM-Plus.



# CAMBODIA



***“ As interdependence increases and deepens in the Asia-Pacific region, countries are addressing security challenges by enhancing multilateral cooperation and engaging in specific collaborative efforts to solve issues, especially in the non-traditional security fields.”***



## I. Cambodia's Assessment of the Regional Security Environment

The Asia-Pacific region today is confronted with many non-traditional challenge. These impacts have all become more prominent and they are getting more serious since our region are very much interdependent on each other. As interdependence increases and deepens in the Asia-Pacific region, countries are addressing security challenges by enhancing multilateral cooperation and engaging in specific collaborative efforts to solve issues, especially in the non-traditional security fields.

Terrorism remains a pre-eminent national and global security threat. Most governments have built their operational capabilities to respond to terrorism but still hard to do with prevention of ideological extreme causing radicalization. It is more likely that violent would continue unabated into a foreseeable future.

The common issue of maritime security threats in the region that it experienced and continues to face are such as illegal exploitation of national resources, illegal activities in protected areas, unauthorized maritime arrivals, maritime terrorism, prohibited imports and exports, compromise to Bio-security and piracy, and violence and problems and restrictions in handling of maritime security challenges. These multi-faced threats do demand the strengthening maritime security cooperation, building maritime capacity and setting more responsive and effective

guideline for cooperation, developing friendship and practicing the law of the Sea.

The Asia-Pacific region is the most disaster-prone area of the world and it is also the most seriously affected one. The effects of climate extremes and variation suggest that while the numbers of typhoons in Asia-Pacific are not increasing in number, more of them are stronger, making the region more susceptible to greater potential losses. This is also becomes more serious because of the human contributing factors involved, with more people being exposed to the risk of tropical cyclones. The region has been slow to be concerned by how the growth of disaster risks has been spurred by rapid economic growth, and the means to minimize those risks while also striving for sustained economic prosperity.

The solutions to the threats would require enhancing international cooperation, confidence building and preventive diplomacy among the ASEAN member states. Thus, the international community is required to work together as one to address all threats. Some positive factors are gaining the upper hand in regional security cooperation.

## II. Cambodia's National Security and Defence Policy

In response to the fast changing national, regional, and global security environment, Cambodian security and defence priorities have also been continuously redefined and revised. The Defence Strategic Review 2013 was released early this year in addition to the current Defence White Paper 2006 for Cambodia's defence policy and security strategy within these emerging new security paradigms in region and world at large, the Royal Government of Cambodia especially through the Ministry of National Defence has regularly reviewed the so-called Defence White Paper and reformed defence and security's priorities to respond to its development. Those include the key areas of strengthening border defence measures; PKO capability building, counter-terrorists and counter-transnational crimes capabilities, maritime security initiatives, disaster respond capability building, and others.

These changes have resulted in the justification of principles more realistic features, that is, they have been aligned more closely with the situation and practical needs. This has enabled the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to overcome various obstacles. To realize the national goal, specific policies and measures have been implemented as follows:

- Contribute to external security and guarantee national unity and political stability for economic growth;
- Contribute to peace operation and building around the world. For instance, since April 2006, under the United Nations framework, Cambodia has sent its peacekeeping forces to several zones of conflict in Africa;
- Strengthen border protection capability to prevent transnational crime and infiltration of terrorists and to increase contributions to infrastructure and community development along the border;
- Expand reform measures, especially demobilization, raising the living standard of the defence force, reorganizing units and restructuring training systems;
- Set up force development mechanisms as quickly as possible to ensure the sustainability and quality of the defence force;
- Increase participation in national development, especially in the field of engineering, relief operations, suppressing and elimination circulation of illegal small arms, environmental protection particularly preventing deforestation, replanting trees, and other humanitarian activities;
- Cooperate with interactional community and fellow countries in combating terrorism and transnational crimes PKO, HA/DR, Maritime Security and natural disaster management.

## III. Cambodia's Contributions to Regional Security

- iii a. Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crimes*



Cambodia is keeping a close watch on the possible link between terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Cambodia has regularly held bilateral and multilateral consultation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. In this regard, Cambodia has been working with the US and Australia in effort at building Cambodia's counter-terrorism capabilities.

Additionally, Cambodia is committed in collaborating with other nations in fighting other transnational criminal acts such as human trafficking, money laundering, cross border terrorism etc. Close cooperation with our neighbors is essential to the promotion of border security and safety of cross-border trades.

In response to growing threats of terrorism, the Royal Government of Cambodia has taken a number of important steps, which include:

- Working with our partners on various counter-radicalization initiatives such as seminars and other educational programs;
- Initiating the plan to improve maritime security via the establishment and empowerment of National Committee for Maritime Security; and
- Implementing the measure to improve land and sea border security as well as cooperating closely with partner countries in tackling transnational criminal activities.

*iii b. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)*

Cambodia is committed and non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been actively engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of Nuclear weapons. To support the global movement on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Cambodia ratified the NPT in 1972. Cambodia resumed its membership with IAEA in 2009 and ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of nuclear Material in 2006. At the regional level, Cambodia acceded to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Zone Treaty in 1997. Cambodia participated in PSI exercises in 2006, endorsed the PIS statement of interdiction principles, and became the participating state of PIS in 2008.

Furthermore, in November 2012, the National Assembly of Cambodia ratified two international conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and Nuclear Safety to maintain peace, security, Safety and to prevent nuclear proliferation.

At the regional level, Cambodia acceded to the Southeast Asia Nuclear –weapon-free Zone Treaty in 1997. During its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012, Cambodia successfully convinced the five nuclear weapons states to sign the protocol the treaty.

*iii c. Humanitarian Assistant and Disaster Relief*

The role of Royal Cambodia Armed Forces (RCAF) in disaster relief missions has been widely acknowledged and appreciated. Indeed, the importance of the RCAF role in disaster management is now recognized due to the nature of its manpower, organization, assets, capability any speed. In the tremendous flood during the past few years, the RCAF in general and the Royal Cambodian Gendarmeries (RCG) in particular was the first to intervene in search and rescue operation. Now, RCAF is in the process of developing its capacity for rapid response to both domestic and international natural disasters. In addition, international cooperation on capacity building is crucial for Cambodia. For instance, in recently, with the support from the United States, the RCAF is building its mobile medical and engineering capabilities. RCAF also co-hosted along with the United States as well as other regional partners, the multilateral planning augmentation team Tempest Express (MPAT 19) in March 2011, the Security Force MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation in January 2013, the Lower Mekong Initiative Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange (LMI DREE) in June 2013, the Disaster Preparedness and response Simulation Exercise in August 2013 and other activities that may help the RCAF to enhance HA/DR Capabilities include training, exercises,

civil-military projects, and various civic-action programs.

As part of multilateral initiatives, counting from 2012, Cambodia has actively engaged in disaster management activities to share best practice and lesson learnt within the ADMM-Plus and ARF frameworks as follow:

- The 2nd ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in August 2012 in Hanoi;
- The ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise and 2nd AHX in June 2013 in Brunei Darussalam;
- The ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise “ARF DiREx 2013” in May 2013 in Thailand and;
- The 3rd ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief in early 23014 in Nha Trang, Viet Nam.

#### IV. Maritime Security

Maritime security is regarded as one of the top security issues for Cambodia. Cambodia created the National Committee on Maritime Security (NCMS) in December 2009. The Main mission is to enhance maritime sovereignty and strengthen the enforcement of rules at sea. NCMS is also a national mechanism to facilitate relevant institutes and ministries in maintaining good order at sea. To facilitate the joint operation of the joint forces, the NCMS has constructed its own Tactical Command Headquarters located in the Ream Maritime Base. Recently, in regional maritime cooperation, Cambodia has sent mid-level officers to Changi naval base in Singapore for maritime security information-infusion as part of its contribution to regional maritime security efforts.

Apart from this national committee, the Cambodia’s Ministry of Defence is determined to:

- Strengthen the role and capacity of naval, enhance closer cooperation between involved authorities, provide security maintenance for enhancing the economic

potentiality, counter international terrorism, piracies, smuggling of drug and human, create suitable maritime environment for welcoming warships of fellow countries.

- Partner with other countries to promote an understanding of common maritime challenges and brainstorming ideas collectively to come up with appropriate measures for managing maritime security effectively.
- Safeguard territorial waters and protect resources within Cambodia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to ensure Cambodia’s maritime assets are utilized entirely for sustainable development.
- Work together with relevant ministries to develop legal procedure/framework and human resources.


Regarding international cooperation framework, Cambodia has been working closely with fellow countries such as Australia, China, Japan, and the United States to get the necessary support for the hard and soft infrastructural upgrading of Cambodia naval forces. In December 2009, US and Cambodia signed an agreement called Megaport Initiative focusing on cooperation to deter, detect, and interdict illicit smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material at the Autonomous Port of Sihanoukville. According to the agreement, in addition to providing equipment and related infrastructure, the United State will also train Cambodia officials on the use and maintenance of the equipment. Cambodia actively participates in the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).



# CANADA



***“Canada is invested in regional peace and stability and to furthering defence and security cooperation in Asia-Pacific.”***



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Canada places great value on our relationships with Pacific and Asian countries: we increased our presence on the ground with 10 new offices in China and India since 2006, appointed Canada’s first-ever resident ambassador in Yangon in March 2013, and have committed to expanding trade with emerging markets in Asia through engagement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the signing of Canada’s free trade agreement with South Korea, and active negotiations with Japan and India, while deepening and broadening our security relationships across Asia.

The ascendancy of the Asia-Pacific region depends on the efforts of its countries and partners to make the most of the region’s vitality and to mitigate the traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges that may endanger it. These range from maritime sovereignty and territorial disputes, to proliferation, and cyber crime. For Canada and Canadians who enjoy strong people-to-people ties and expanding commercial relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, there are clear dividends that derive from a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment. Canada is invested in regional peace and stability and to furthering defence and security cooperation in Asia-Pacific.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an important component of Canada’s engagement in the region, and Canada values the relationships developed among ARF countries in areas such as maritime security cooperation, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, disaster

relief, peacekeeping best practices and non-proliferation and disarmament. This role will continue, even as newer fora, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), pursues parallel work on regional security issues requiring greater cooperation between regional militaries.

ARF will also continue to advance regional contributions to key international security priorities, such as Countering Illicit Trafficking of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials. Canada co-chaired an ARF Workshop on Countering Illicit Trafficking of CBRN Materials with the Philippines in November 2013. This Canadian funded workshop served as the launch of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) Global Container Control Programme (CCP) implemented with technical support from the World Customs Organization (WCO) and with multi-year funding by Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP) to improve port security in Southeast Asia.

ARF engagement in the area of disaster relief coordination must continue to receive attention, to mitigate the region's vulnerability to a range of natural disasters. Canada was the fourth largest Asia-Pacific donor following Typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines in November 2013. Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, which included two Canadians on board, has brought into focus the importance of regional preparedness and cooperation to face any contingency, requiring an emergency response. While existing cooperation in the area of disaster relief has been constructive, Canada supports dialogue with other Asia-Pacific countries and partners to explore confidence building that could help to facilitate crucial and timely information sharing, in times of emergency. Canadian (RCAF) air force officers' participation in the search for MH370 off the west Australian coast highlights the value of training and exchanges, as crucial building blocks for effective regional disaster response and preparedness.

Canada is committed to working with ARF partners to advance regional cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy. Canada attended the ARF Round-table on Training Resources for

Preventive Diplomacy, held 20-21 March in New Zealand. Based on recommendations agreed to at the round table, which was attended by 22 members and representatives of ARF countries, Canada supports follow-up initiatives to develop an ARF training programme on Preventive Diplomacy, including pilot initiatives led by individual ARF countries and partners such as the EU, Brunei and China. The ARF can make an important contribution in the area of preventive diplomacy through knowledge of local and regional dynamics, and as a credible third party in support of peace mediation efforts. Best practices for conflict prevention and resolution from other regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), may also be informative in this context.

In view of the outcomes of the 22nd ASEAN Summit in Brunei last April (2013), Canada supports existing efforts of all parties concerned, including China, to agree to a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and we urge all parties to make concerted efforts to begin serious negotiations on the Code. The ongoing ASEAN-China consultations on a Code of Conduct are a positive step in the right direction that should continue to be pursued in support of constructive progress in this area.

A full list of Canada's participation in recent ARF meetings and events is provided under "IV (a) – National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security".

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## II. Information on Canada's National Security and Defence Policies

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### *ii a. Canada's National Security and Defence Policies*

Released in 2008, the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) is the Government of Canada's foundational defence policy statement. The Strategy launched a new era of investment in the Canadian Armed Forces, providing the tools necessary to rebuild the Forces into a first-class, modern military. This strong investment – along with the dedication of our personnel – has

enabled the Canadian Armed Forces to deliver impressive operational results, both at home and abroad.

The Strategy confirms three enduring roles for the Canadian Armed Forces: excellence in the defence of Canada, strong and reliable partnership with the US in the defence of North America, and leadership abroad through meaningful contributions to international peace and security. Within these three roles, the Strategy commits National Defence to six core missions:

- Conducting daily domestic and continental operations;
- Supporting a major international event in Canada;
- Responding to a terrorist attack;
- Supporting civil authorities during a crisis;
- Conducting a major international operation for an extended period; and
- Responding to crises elsewhere in the world for a shorter period.

The CFDS is positioned within broader foreign policy and national security priorities, and the Canadian Armed Forces is a key contributor to a whole-of-government approach to defence and security issues.

National security and defence policies must be complementary in a complex security landscape in which threats transcend national borders. Cooperation with partners on shared threats is crucial to the security and well-being of populations and citizens.

Recognizing that Canadians are embracing the many advantages that cyberspace offers, Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides a roadmap to comprehensively address cyber security risks and tackle cybercrime, as well as for engaging with international partners on shared cyber security concerns. Action Plan 2010-2015 for Canada's Cyber Security Strategy provides an indicative list of Canada's international efforts in this area. Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy, Building Resilience Against Terrorism, also articulates the importance of cooperation and coordination within and among domestic agencies and with

international partners in security and intelligence communities, law enforcement agencies and civil society.

#### *ii b. Data contributions to the ARF Arms Register*

In keeping with the important advances in promoting transparency in conventional arms, including through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNCAR) and the instrument of Standardized Reporting on Military Matters, including transparency on military expenditures, Canada supports the sharing of information about national security and defence programs and policies. Canada's 2013-2014 fiscal year military expenditure return, as provided to the UN under UN General Assembly Resolution 66/20, is attached for the purpose of this contribution.

### **III. National Contributions to Regional Security**

#### *iii a. Participation in regional exercises and training initiatives*

Canada's defence relationships in Asia-Pacific continue to benefit from bilateral and multilateral cooperation and activities. Canada regularly participates in the US-hosted multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises that take place biannually, and most recently in 2012. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) assumed a substantial leadership role in the 2012 exercise, contributing both forces and platforms. Canada welcomes opportunities for future participation in regional exercises such as RIMPAC and COBRA GOLD. Canada continues to actively pursue membership in the ADMM+, which would be commensurate with Canada's security and defence engagements and interest in furthering Asia-Pacific security and defence dialogue and initiatives.

Through the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), Canada provides training support to, and shares best practices with, ARF partners in areas such as public affairs and complex peace support operations.



*iii b. Counter-Terrorism*

Since 2005, Canada's Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) has provided counter-terrorism related training, resources and expertise to partners, including a number of ARF members. Of particular note has been Canada's engagement with four countries in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) to deliver training courses to prepare first responders in the event of a CBRN incident. This project has since provided sufficient training and expertise that each beneficiary is now able to deliver the basic training independently. Canada has continued its long-standing support of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), most recently by offering a training program for law enforcement officials from across Southeast Asia in counter-terrorism surveillance and investigation techniques. The CTCBP is also supporting an INTERPOL initiative aimed at improving counter-terrorism investigations and international collaboration in ASEAN states and a multiyear project implemented by the World Bank to combat the financing of terrorism in the region.

Canada is working with its partners in international and regional organizations to achieve the implementation of the 18 international conventions and protocols on terrorism, including the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention) and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention to the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing Protocol). With the passage of the Nuclear Terrorism Act, which came into force on November 1, 2013, Canada was able to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM Amendment). Canada has now ratified 14 of the 18 international legal instruments. Canada looks forward to the upcoming review of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, which is intended to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. Recognizing its importance, Canada and like-

minded partners regularly cite the Strategy when acting internationally on matters of counter-terrorism. Canada chaired the review process in 2012 and was pleased to provide a detailed overview of measures taken to implement the Strategy for inclusion in the Secretary-General's upcoming report.

Canada is committed to implementing the ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism and to deepening cooperation under the ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. This year, Canada undertook efforts through the ARF and with ASEAN members to deliver a workshop to enhance regional capacity to counter the illicit trafficking of CBRN materials, and to facilitate trade security. This regional CCP initiative will establish five dedicated inter-agency container profiling joint port control units in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam including the provision of equipment and specialized training for customs and other relevant law enforcement officers in close cooperation with their national authorities. The initiative will enhance national detection and interdiction capacities, which will in turn strengthen the regional capacity to respond to challenges posed by the illicit trafficking of proliferation-related strategic goods (e.g. CBRN / WMD materials) that are transhipped through the region.

In 2013, Canada's Global Partnership Program provided \$6.5 million towards an initiative with the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN member countries to mitigate Biological Threats across the region. In close cooperation and collaboration with the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Experts Group on Communicable Diseases (AEGCD), it was agreed that the following specific activities would be implemented in the period 2014-2016: strengthen the Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network (EDPLN) in Asia, in partnership with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the ASEAN Plus Three Partnership Laboratories (APL) network; establish an early warning and disease surveillance system in the region, through introduction of the "BioDiaspora" system; an

INTERPOL workshop on Safety, Security and Surveillance of Microbiological Materials and Emerging Technologies (S3OMMET), held in Hanoi, Vietnam in March 2014; an ASEAN-focussed workshop on Science & Technology (S&T) developments of relevance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); and a regional conference on multi-sectoral collaboration to mitigate biological threats in the region. Canada is also supporting the strengthening of regional capacity to understand, detect, prevent and respond to infectious biological threats in Southeast Asia, through a project co-funded by GPP and Canada's International Development Research Center (IDRC) which will enhance ties among existing regional disease research and surveillance networks. This work will strengthen regional policies and practices in outbreak investigation and response, with regard to infectious biological threats.

*iii c. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD)*

Canada is committed to a step-by-step process towards non-proliferation and disarmament and the eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as to effectively control their means of delivery. To this end, Canada is an active State Party to all major international NACD treaties, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which is the only international treaty that prohibits the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in which the five nuclear-weapon States commit to nuclear disarmament. Canada considers each of the NPT's three main pillars - non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy - as equally important, interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Canada actively supports the implementation of the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, particularly in collaboration with Australia, Japan, the Philippines and other members of the cross-regional Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI).

All countries have a stake in preserving the integrity of the NPT, which enjoys near universal

adherence and membership. In this regard, Canada shares the international community's grave concern with certain proliferation challenges, namely Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

In particular, Canada continues to have serious concerns about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program, Iran's ongoing failure to meet its safeguards obligations, and continued non-compliance inter alia with six UN Security Council resolutions. Canada has previously made clear that, for Iran to regain its place in the international community, it must resolve all non-compliance issues. Chief among these are the possible military dimensions of its past and present nuclear research.

North Korea's ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programs and tests, as well as the restarting of operations at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, are a clear and present threat to regional peace and security and beyond. These also constitute flagrant violations of multiple UN Security Council resolutions and a fundamental challenge to efforts to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In this context, Canada continues to call on North Korea to resume adherence with the NPT and to fulfil its international non-proliferation obligations. Canada unequivocally condemns the launch of ballistic missiles and threats of further nuclear tests by North Korea. Canada has comprehensive economic sanctions in place against North Korea, including a prohibition on imports from, and exports to North Korea, with certain humanitarian exemptions. In addition, Canada is committed to supporting appropriate measures in response to any further provocations by North Korea, and to working with the international community to ensure full implementation of relevant UNSCR resolutions.

Canada is concerned by repeated delays in the removal of Syria's chemical weapons and the destruction of its chemical weapons production facilities. The elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program is in the international community's interest to promote regional stability and prevent the possibility of their future use and proliferation. Canada urges Syria

to accelerate its efforts to meet its obligations under UNSCR 2118 and the decisions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council. Canada is of the view that security threats alleged by Syria should not impede progress. Rather, they should provide added impetus to accelerate removal activities. Now that Syria has joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), only six States remain non-parties to the Convention. Canada supports the universality of the CWC and calls on these remaining states to take immediate steps to ratify the CWC and eliminate these barbaric weapons.

Controlling access is an important component of an overall strategy to address WMD proliferation challenges affecting Asia-Pacific and the international community as a whole. To this end, Canada supports regional action and cooperation to promote the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by ARF partners. One example is to enhance cooperation and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative's (PSI) related information exchange, capacity-building, and practical exercises as a means to disrupt illicit WMD trafficking across the region and to deter proliferation. Canada encourages ARF partners to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction Principles.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, Canada's GPP has supported regional training on radiological source security, as well as an additional project in Vietnam to advance nuclear security. The GPP has supported the efforts of countries in the region to ratify international legal instruments related to nuclear security, including through training and assistance. GPP activities benefit all ARF members by reducing the likelihood that WMD and related materials and knowledge will be used in terrorist attacks.

Through the GPP, Canada participates in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), a 28 country partnership which seeks to reduce the global threats posed by proliferation of WMD / CBRN materials and knowledge to non-State actors and States of proliferation concern. With nine ARF members

(Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the United States) participating in the Global Partnership, the ARF can play an important role in coordinating efforts to address the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism. Other measures, to control access and limit the risk posed by WMD proliferation to non-State actors, include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Acknowledging the role of nuclear energy to meet the increasing energy demands of states, Canada supports the peaceful uses of nuclear power in a safe and secure manner, notably through full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Canada strongly believes that implementation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol now constitute the new universal safeguards verification standard. Through signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol, ARF states and dialogue partners can support transparency and confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs. Canada has consistently supported efforts to assist member states to build capacity to fully implement the Protocol, and believes that the ARF can also work to promote its universal implementation in Asia-Pacific. Canada urges North Korea and Iran to resume compliance with their IAEA obligations.

Canada is committed to working with ARF partners to develop practical measures and national instruments to universalize key international NACD treaties, norms, and instruments such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other arrangements such as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Canada also continues to lead international efforts toward Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, which remains a shared priority for both nuclear non-proliferation and



disarmament. A Canadian expert is chairing the current UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommendations on possible aspects of a treaty further to UN General Assembly resolution 67/53. Canada welcomes engagement by Asia-Pacific states with the GGE in 2014-15. Cross-regional groups like the NPDI which includes Asia-Pacific countries (Canada, Australia and Japan) are playing an important complementary role by fostering cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament goals, including with respect to an FMCT and the universalization of the IAEA's Additional Protocol.

Canada supports Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) as an important regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and as a confidence-building measure. Canada, along with its NPDI partners, welcomes the efforts to resolve remaining concerns and reservations regarding certain NWFZs treaties including the Bangkok Treaty, with a view to securing ratifications, by all Nuclear Weapon States, of protocols for these agreements.

Canada will continue to work actively within the Inter-Sessional Meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament to support regional NACD cooperation.

#### *iii d. Transnational Crime*

Canada is committed to working with Asia-Pacific partners, including through ARF and the Bali Process, to counter threats to governance and stability arising from the activities of transnational organized crime groups in the region, including cybercrime. Frequently linked to organized crime are trafficking networks, including illicit drugs, migrant smuggling and money laundering, which underscore the transnational dimension of these challenges.

Migrant smuggling is a particular area of concern. Canada has worked with regional partners to address this issue, often in coordination with global organizations like the UNODC, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and INTERPOL. Canada has led programs in

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos PDR, and Vietnam to combat migrant smuggling through the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program's (ACCBP) Human Smuggling Envelope (C\$24 million from 2011-2015). C\$15 million of this amount has supported a variety of projects in Southeast Asia, including support for the IOM's Document Examination Support Center located in Bangkok which provides real time support to regional immigration officers in the identification of fraudulent travel documents. The ACCBP also funded a UNODC project that created three inter-agency Port Intelligence Units (PIUs) in Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia to prevent migrant smuggling in the region. In Indonesia, Canada funded the Frontline Officers' Awareness Training on People Smuggling, a regional training initiative aimed at combating people smuggling in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the ACCBP has provided support to JCLEC for a variety of technical training courses offered to regional law enforcement to prevent migrant smuggling. Canada is very appreciative of the cooperation we have enjoyed with ASEAN countries to address shared concerns arising from migrant smuggling.

While the ARF already makes a useful contribution to the exchange of best practices among Asia-Pacific countries to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs, Canada encourages all Asia-Pacific countries to take steps to ratify and implement the three UN drug conventions, as well as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

To further enhance efforts to increase cooperation and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force global standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing and proliferation, in July 2013 Canada became a member of the Steering Group of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (of which it has been active member since 2006).

Canada is looking at working with individual ASEAN member countries and the ASEAN itself to

improve cyber security and combat cybercrime. Communications infrastructure and increased connectivity has advanced knowledge-sharing and wealth creation among Asia Pacific countries. At the same time, greater reliance on cyberspace among countries in the region can increase vulnerabilities in cyberspace, from which Canada is not immune. Canada encourages countries in the region to take steps to foster dialogue and cooperation to tackle cyber threats and cybercrime through information sharing and capacity building. This will not only create a safe digital environment but also maintain an open, safe and accessible Internet. Canada was pleased to field officials to the ARF Workshop on Measures to Enhance Cyber Security in Beijing, China, in September 2013, and to the ARF Workshop on Cyber Confidence Building Measures in Kuala Lumpur, in March 2014.

*iii e. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

The increasing intensity and frequency of natural disasters continues to underscore the need to deepen practical cooperation among Asia-Pacific partners on disaster preparedness and response. Canada continued to be an active contributor in 2013-2014 to humanitarian relief efforts in the region, by providing timely, effective, coordinated and needs-based assistance.

In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan which struck the Philippines on Friday, November 8, 2013, Canada provided a multifaceted humanitarian and consular response. This included over \$20 million in humanitarian assistance, a matching fund which will result in a significant increase to this amount, the deployment of emergency stockpiles, support to a Canadian Red Cross Field Hospital, deployments of technical experts and government of Canada officials, and the deployment of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).

In addition to our development efforts, disaster risk reduction is a key component of Canada's advocacy work on humanitarian affairs and disaster response, both domestically and internationally. Canada strongly supports disaster risk reduction

measures that aim to enhance resilience to all hazards and reduce vulnerability of individuals, communities and countries, and has advocated for the integration of risk considerations into long-term sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies with the support of states and the international community.

In the ARF context, Canada participates in the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief, which provides a valuable opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned in disaster management and to enhance cooperation in disaster preparedness and response. Canada also engages in the biennial ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, a key mechanism for testing ARF coordination and procedures for responding to natural disasters in the region.

*iii f. Maritime Security*

Canada strongly supports continued ARF engagement in maritime security, including with respect to countering WMD proliferation and illicit trafficking.

Since the identification of maritime security as one of ARF's four key areas in 2008, ARF members including Canada have worked to develop projects to focus on issues such as enhanced information sharing and sharing of best practices, confidence building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, and capacity building of maritime law enforcement agencies in the region.

ARF cooperation on maritime security issues will continue to support the region's security and prosperity objectives by ensuring the efficient and secure movement of goods and people through strategic corridors.

Civil society and Track II initiatives can make a useful contribution to developing informed options for regional partners in areas such as regional connectivity and preparedness to address incidents at sea. Canada supports initiatives to organize workshops and seminars in ARF countries, on these themes.

#### IV. Role of the ARF

##### *iv a. National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security*

In the 2013-2014 Inter-sessional year, Canada participated in the following ARF meetings and events:

<b>Name of Meetings and Events</b>	<b>Venues</b>	<b>Dates</b>
2nd ARF Workshop on Non-proliferation Nuclear Forensics	Bangkok	10-12 September 2013
ARF Workshop on Measures to Enhance Cyber Security - Legal and Cultural Aspects	Beijing	11-12 September 2013
6th ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting	Beijing	15-17 October 2013
17th ARF Heads of Defence Universities/ Colleges/Institutions Meeting	Bandar Seri Begawan	11-14 November 2013
ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue (DOD) / ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy	Yangon, Burma/Myanmar	8-10 December 2013
ARF Workshop on Countering Illicit Trafficking of CBRN Materials	Manila	20-21 November 2013
13th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief	Chengdu, China	26-28 February 2014
ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue (DOD) / ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy	Brussels, European Union	7-9 April 2014
ARF Workshop on Cyber Confidence-Building Measures	Kuala Lumpur	25-26 March 2014
ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue / 11th ARF Security Policy Conference / ARF Senior Officials' Meeting	Burma/Myanmar	2014
ARF Roundtable on Training Resources for Preventive Diplomacy	Wellington, New Zealand	20-21 March 2014
8th ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs) Meeting	Malaysia	February 17-18, 2014
12th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime	Indonesia	14-16 April
ARF Maritime Security Workshop on Preparedness and Response to Marine Pollution Incidents Involving Hazardous and Noxious Substances	Honolulu	4-5 March



*iv b. Future of the ARF*

Security derives from the accrued efforts of countries and peoples to identify risks, and to build the capacity to respond to threats and challenges when they arise. In the Asia-Pacific context, the ARF plays a significant role as an anchor of political and security cooperation and regional connectivity, which has been identified by ASEAN as a top priority.

Newer forums such as the East Asia Summit and the ADMM+ offer other positive opportunities for constructive dialogue and security cooperation in the region. Canada is seeking membership in both these forums as a reflection of our belief in the importance of defence and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

In a globalized strategic environment, ARF countries have an interest in international peace and security issues that transcend the immediate Asia-Pacific region. Ukraine has galvanized international attention and the Government of Canada is taking important steps to support Ukraine and to impose sanctions against those responsible for the ongoing crisis. Canada believes that regional security organizations such as, in this case, the OSCE, offer invaluable experience in helping member states to build transparency and develop confidence building measures at times of turmoil. While regional security organizations respond to their own specific issues and concerns, it is useful to consider the elements and experiences of other regional bodies that may also be applicable to Asia-Pacific countries, in the context of enhancing a future ARF.

At the July 2013 ASEAN Regional Forum and Post-Ministerial Conference in Brunei, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird, announced a variety of new projects that will support ASEAN connectivity and community building. Canada believes that the ARF is a critical component of a regional security community that will continue to evolve and adapt to better serve the needs, collective interests and responsibilities of Asia-Pacific countries and partners, in a global security environment.

CANADA (1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013)

**PREVIOUS YEAR EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEAR 2012-13**  
**UN Standardized Reporting Form**

FORCE GROUPS ---->	STRATEGIC FORCES (1)	LAND FORCES (2)	NAVAL FORCES (3)	AIR FORCES (4)	OTHER MILITARY FORCES <sup>d</sup> (5)	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND (6)	UN PEACEKEEPING <sup>e</sup> (7)	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION (8)	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS <sup>f</sup> (9)	UNDISBURTED (10)	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES (11)
<b>1. PERSONNEL g</b>	-	<b>3,343.0</b>	<b>1,471.8</b>	<b>1,719.8</b>	-	<b>3,602.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>5.9</b>	-	-	<b>10,144.7</b>
1.1 CONSCRIPTS	-	..	..	..	-	..	..	..	-	-	..
1.2 ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL	-	2,191.0	890.9	1,213.9	-	2,036.6	1.8	0.5	-	-	6,334.7
1.3 RESERVES	-	374.8	105.3	112.8	-	139.3	-	-	-	-	732.2
1.4 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL	-	296.2	278.7	125.2	-	1,004.8	-	5.4	-	-	1,710.3
1.5 MILITARY PENSIONS g	-	480.9	196.8	267.9	-	421.7	-	-	-	-	1,367.4
<b>2. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE</b>	-	<b>1,839.3</b>	<b>1,166.3</b>	<b>2,135.3</b>	-	<b>1,494.1</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>13.2</b>	-	-	<b>6,650.0</b>
2.1 MATERIALS FOR CURRENT USE h	-	511.9	324.6	594.3	-	415.8	0.5	-	-	-	1,847.2
2.2 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR i	-	336.1	213.1	390.2	-	273.0	0.3	-	-	-	1,212.7
2.3 PURCHASED SERVICES j	-	825.5	523.4	958.4	-	670.6	0.8	-	-	-	2,978.8
2.4 OTHER	-	165.8	105.1	192.5	-	134.7	0.2	13.2	-	-	611.4

FORCE GROUPS ----->	STRATEGIC FORCES (1)	LAND FORCES (2)	NAVAL FORCES (3)	AIR FORCES (4)	OTHER MILITARY FORCES <sup>d</sup> (5)	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND (6)	UN PEACEKEEPING <sup>e</sup> (7)	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION (8)	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS <sup>f</sup> (9)	UNDISBURTED (10)	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES (11)
RESOURCE COSTS	-	930.8	584.5	1,079.5	-	694.3	-	-	-	-	3,289.1
3. PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION (INVESTMENTS) k	-	746.3	466.3	979.1	-	617.6	-	-	-	-	2,809.3
3.1 PROCUREMENT	-	-	51.8	742.2	-	0.9	-	-	-	-	795.0
3.1.1 AIRCRAFT AND ENGINES	-	-	-	5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.1
3.1.2 MISSILES, INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3.1.3 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND BOMBS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3.1.4 SHIPS AND BOATS	0.0	120.6	341.2	-	-	1.9	-	-	-	-	343.1
3.1.5 ARMoured VEHICLES	-	14.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120.6
3.1.6 ARTILLERY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.6



FORCE GROUPS ---->	STRATEGIC FORCES (1)	LAND FORCES (2)	NAVAL FORCES (3)	AIR FORCES (4)	OTHER MILITARY FORCES <sup>d</sup> (5)	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND (6)	UN PEACEKEEPING <sup>e</sup> (7)	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION (8)	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS <sup>f</sup> (9)	UNDISBURTED (10)	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES (11)
3.1.7 OTHER ORDINANCE AND GROUND FORCE WEAPONS	-	143.7	0.1	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	144.0
3.1.8 AMMUNITION	-	184.4	-	32.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	216.4
3.1.9 ELECTRONICS AND COMMUNICATIONS	-	94.7	23.9	114.8	-	112.0	-	-	-	-	345.3
3.1.10 NON-ARMoured VEHICLES	-	62.2	9.8	22.5	-	17.6	-	-	-	-	112.1
3.1.11 OTHER	-	125.9	39.5	62.7	-	485.1	-	-	-	-	713.2
<b>3.2 CONSTRUCTION</b>	-	<b>184.5</b>	<b>118.1</b>	<b>100.4</b>	-	<b>76.7</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>479.8</b>
3.2.1 AIR BASES, AIRFIELDS	-	-	-	31.0	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	32.8
3.2.2 NAVAL BASES AND FACILITIES	-	-	-	82.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	82.6

FORCE GROUPS ---->	STRATEGIC FORCES (1)	LAND FORCES (2)	NAVAL FORCES (3)	AIR FORCES (4)	OTHER MILITARY FORCES <sup>d</sup> (5)	CENTRAL SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND (6)	UN PEACEKEEPING <sup>e</sup> (7)	MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION (8)	EMERGENCY AID TO CIVILIANS <sup>f</sup> (9)	UNDISTRIBUTED (10)	TOTAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES (11)
3.2.3 ELECTRONICS FACILITIES	-	0.2	1.6	2.1	-	5.8	-	-	-	-	9.7
3.2.4 PERSONNEL FACILITIES	-	6.1	0.2	4.0	-	27.1	-	-	-	-	37.3
3.2.5 TRAINING FACILITIES	-	11.4	0.1	6.4	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	18.3
3.2.6 OTHER	-	166.8	33.7	57.0	-	41.6	-	-	-	-	299.0
<b>4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>323.6</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>323.6</b>
4.1 BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2 DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION	-	-	-	-	-	323.6	-	-	-	-	323.6
<b>5. TOTAL (1+2+3+4)</b>	-	<b>6,113.1</b>	<b>3,222.5</b>	<b>4,934.5</b>	-	<b>6,114.4</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>19.0</b>	-	-	<b>20,407.3</b>

Explanatory remarks (if any):

UN REPORT

COUNTRY: CANADA; FISCAL YEAR: 2012-2013 (1 April 2012 to 31 March 2013)


ACTUAL OUTLAYS, CURRENT PRICES, NATIONAL CURRENCY AND UNIT OF MEASURES: CANADIAN DOLLAR (MILLIONS)

d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k SEE UNITED NATIONS STANDARDIZED INSTRUMENT FOR REPORTING MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON HEADING DEFINITIONS.

\* DUE TO ROUNDING, FIGURES MAY NOT ADD UP TO TOTALS SHOWN.



***“China is committed to promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and following the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up.”***



## I. Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2013, the Asia-Pacific region has generally maintained political and economic stability. The countries of the region kept frequent interactions and deepened interdependence. Peace and development remained a major trend in the region. To handle difference through friendly consultation has become a wide consensus of the countries in the region. The developing countries and emerging economies continued to lead the economy of the world and improve their status and role in the international issues. The Asia-Pacific region made further progress in economic integration, boasting the most dynamic free-trade cooperation globally.

On the other hand, the region was confronted with risks and challenges. Impacted by the external environment and internal economic restructuring, the emerging economies of Asia experienced a slow-down, and faced greater downward pressure. Uncertain factors that affect regional peace and stability, such as potential danger of local conflicts, remained unresolved. Regional flashpoints and tough issues, such as territorial and maritime disputes, flared up from time to time, frequently raised concerns, disturbing the relationship of relevant countries. Some countries of the region were going through government change or political transition, which aggravated political disquiet and social fluctuations. The non-traditional security challenges, such as transnational crimes, natural disasters and terrorism remained grim.



## II. China's Defense Policy

China upholds a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and advocates common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security and sustainable security. It stands for peaceful settlement of international disputes and regional flashpoints and against willful use or threat of force, aggression or external expansion.

The basic elements of China's defense policy include: safeguarding state security, unity and development interests; realizing comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of national defense and the armed force; reinforcing the performance of the armed forces with information technology application as the major criterion; implementing a military strategic guideline of active defense; following a self-defensive nuclear strategy; and creating a security environment conducive to peaceful development of the country.

Confronted with complex and fluid security challenges, China puts forward the concept of diversified employment of armed forces, expands vision of national security and military strategy, harnesses the armed forces in peacetime, effectively copes with different security threats and performs diversified military functions.

China's armed forces are an advocator, promoter and participant of international security cooperation. Abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, they engage in military exchanges with foreign countries in all dimensions, develop military cooperative relations on the basis of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and not targeting any third party, and promote the construction of collective security mechanisms and military mutual trust mechanisms based upon fairness and effectiveness. Guided by the idea of being open, pragmatic and cooperative, China has deepened military exchanges and cooperation with foreign countries, strengthened confidence-building measures (CBMs) cooperation in border areas, advanced maritime security dialogues and cooperation, participated in the UN peacekeeping operations, international

anti-terrorism cooperation, and international escort and disaster relief missions, and held joint military trainings and exercises. In October 2013, China hosted the Sixth ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting in Beijing.

China is the only major country in the world who has not realized unification. It still faces diverse security risks and challenges and the arduous task of realizing national reunification and maintaining territorial integration. China's drive for military modernization is a necessitated by its legitimate security demand and pursuit of peaceful development. China's national defense expenditure is transparent, reasonable and appropriate. In 2013, China's national defense budget was 720.168 billion RMB, taking up about 1.26% of its GDP.

## III. China's Efforts to Promote Security In the Asia-Pacific Region

China is committed to promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and following the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. China develops friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and is actively involved in regional cooperation. It rises to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges and works tirelessly for a harmonious Asia-Pacific region of lasting peace and common prosperity.

### —Relations with Major Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region

#### China-US relations

Since 2013, the relationship between China and the US has generally maintained momentum of stable and positive development. In June and September 2013 and in March 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama had three successful meetings respectively at Annenberg Estate in California, St. Petersburg and the Hague, and reached important consensus on pushing forward a new model of major-country relationship between China and the US. There were frequent interactions at the

top and other levels. The two countries made positive progress in trade, economic, military, cultural and local cooperation, and maintained effective communication and coordination on regional, international and global issues, such as the Korean nuclear issue, Syria, the Iranian nuclear issue, and climate change. During the Fifth China-US Asia-Pacific Consultations held in January 2014, the two sides issued for the first time a list of cooperative projects in Asia. China and the US kept close interactions at the APEC, the EAS and other multilateral occasions, and continued active dialogue and coordination on regional hotspot issues, and engaged in practical cooperation in all the areas.

### China-Russia Relations

In 2013, China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination enjoyed sound and steady development at high level. The leaders of the two countries kept close exchanges. The heads of state of the two countries had five meetings on bilateral and multilateral occasions. In March 2013, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia, the first country he visited after assuming office. In February 2014, President Xi Jinping attended the Opening Ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics. It is the second time he made Russia the first country to visit at the beginning of a year. The two countries gave each other firm supports on issues concerning the other's core interests. A series of large-scale strategic projects in energy, aviation and aerospace, and trans-boundary infrastructure construction progressed smoothly. Both the quality and scale of bilateral practical cooperation was improved. The two sides maintained close coordination and cooperation on the issues in the Asia-pacific and beyond. They agreed to designate 2014 and 2015 as Youth Friendly Exchange Years.

### China-India Relations

China-India strategic and cooperative partnership maintained the momentum of sound and steady development. The two countries deepened political mutual trust, continuously pushed forward cooperation in trade and economy as well as cultural and people-to-people exchanges,

and kept good coordination and cooperation in regional and international issues. In March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In April, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited India and in October, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited China, making the first time since 1954 that the heads of government of the two countries exchanged visits within the same year. During those meetings and visits, the leaders of two countries reached wide consensus on and pointed the direction for the future development of China-India relations.

### China-Japan Relations

Since 2013, due to the Diaoyudao issue and the issue of history, China-Japan relations have been facing serious difficulties. High-level exchanges were suspended, trade and economic cooperation declined, and people-to-people exchanges shrank. At the end of 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in breach of the principles and spirit enshrined in the four political documents between China and Japan, as well as the commitment and statements made by past Japanese governments and leaders on the issue of history. It was another serious harm to the 1.3 billion Chinese people and create a new, major political obstacle to China-Japan relations.

China attaches importance to its relations with Japan. The Chinese government has consistently called for development of bilateral relations in a spirit of taking history as the mirror and looking into the future. China urges Japan to face up to and deeply reflect on its history of aggression, handle the sensitive issues properly, and make concrete efforts to improve its relations with China.

### —Regional Cooperation

#### China-ASEAN Cooperation.

In 2013, China and ASEAN commemorated the tenth anniversary of China-ASEAN strategic partnership. During those ten year, China-ASEAN cooperation made substantial achievement in wide areas including trade and

economy, connectivity, finance, maritime, science and technology, culture and people-to-people exchanges. On 3 October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the Indonesian parliament, during which he put forth the strategic goals to fully upgrade China-ASEAN strategic partnership and build a China-ASEAN community of common destiny. On 10 October 2013, the 16th ASEAN-China Summit, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, issued a Joint Statement of the 16th ASEAN-China Summit on Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership. At the summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stressed two points of political consensus, namely mutual trust and mutual benefit, and put forward seven proposals for the establishment of a wide-ranging, in-depth, high-level, all-dimensional cooperation framework, namely to sign a China-ASEAN treaty of good neighborliness and friendship and cooperation, launch negotiations for upgrading China-ASEAN FTA, accelerate connectivity construction, strengthen regional financial cooperation and risk prevention, steadily push forward maritime cooperation, enhance exchanges and cooperation in the security field, and boost cooperation in culture, science, technology, environmental protection, and people-to-people exchanges. The two points of consensus and seven areas of cooperation, dubbed as the 2+7 cooperation framework, is a policy declaration of China's new government on developing relations with ASEAN in the next decade.

In 2013, China-ASEAN two-way trade reached US\$443.61 billion. The two sides agreed to launch negotiations to upgrade ASEAN-China FTA, and made positive progress in implementing the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), as evidenced by maritime cooperation, and consultations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC). The two sides also strengthened planning and coordination to push forward practical cooperation in finance, connectivity, science and technology, environmental protection, culture and people-to-people exchanges.

### **ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Cooperation.**

On 10 October 2013, the 16th ASEAN Plus Three Summit was held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, which issued the Chairman's Statement of the 16th ASEAN Plus Three Summit and the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2013-2017. The participants decided to complete the negotiation on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by the end of 2015 and to strengthen regional financial network construction. In March 2013, the Council of ASEAN Plus Three Emergence Rice Reserve (APTERR) held the first meeting, declaring the official establishment of the APTERR Secretariat, which is an indispensable institutional arrangement to guarantee full implementation and smooth operation of the APTERR.

### **China-Japan-ROK Cooperation.**

In 2013, due to the issue of history, China-Japan and ROK-Japan relations deteriorated, which had an impact upon trilateral cooperation. The trilateral summit and trilateral foreign ministers' meeting were not held this year. Despite this, trilateral practical cooperation continue to move forward. The three countries finished three rounds of FTA negotiations, held ministerial meetings on earthquake, environment, culture, disaster management, public health, intellectual properties and between central banks, and organized important events such as Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum and Conference of Sister Cities. Collaborative programs such as East Asia Cultural City and Campus Asia proceeded steadily.

### **East Asia Summit (EAS).**

In October 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attended the Eighth EAS. The leaders agreed that more attention should be given to the cooperation in food, energy security, natural disaster management, climate change and public health. They proposed to deepen economic cooperation by completing the negotiations on the RCEP by the end of 2015 as a reaching a comprehensive, high-quality free trade agreement. They also stress the importance to



enhance security mutual trust, push forward candid dialogues and cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security fields, and build a regional security architecture in conformity with the regional conditions and demands of all parties. The summit issued a Declaration on Food Security.

### Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In 2013, the SCO maintained momentum of sound and stable development, and made important progress in political, security, economic and cultural cooperation and external exchanges. The SCO deepened the friendship, mutual trust, and the level of practical cooperation between its member states, and enhanced its role in the international and regional affairs. On 12-13 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the 13th Meeting of Council of Heads of State of SCO Countries, during which heads of state signed the Bishkek Declaration, and adopted the Implementation Outlines 2013-2017 of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. On 28-29 November, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attended the 12th Meeting of Council of Heads of Government of SCO Countries, which made a plan for multifaceted cooperation of the next stage. In 2013, the SCO successfully held the Meeting of Secretaries of Security Councils, and meeting of foreign ministers, defence ministers, science ministers, economy ministers, culture minister, health minister as well as at the SCO Forum. The SCO held a joint disaster relief drill code named "Rescue Cooperation 2013."

#### —Regional Hotspot Issues

##### Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue.

In February 2013, the DPRK conducted the third nuclear test, to which the international society responded strongly. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 to severely condemn the test and reinforce the sanctions on the DPRK. The DPRK expressed strong dissatisfaction and took a series of measures in respond. The tension on the Korean Peninsula further escalated. Since May 2013, the situation has eased somewhat. The

DPRK reiterated its position on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and expressed its willingness to restart the Six-Party Talks. Currently, the parties still have major differences on the threshold to restart the Six-Party Talks. The DPRK stressed that the Six-Party Talks should be resumed unconditionally, while the US, the ROK and Japan opposed talks for the sake of talk, and demanded that the DPRK take substantive measures toward denuclearization. The Korean nuclear issue remained sensitive and complex.

Facing these developments, China adheres to its consistent and clear position of committing to denuclearization, peace and stability on the Peninsular, and a resolution through talks and consultation. Since 2013, China has done a lot of work for easing tension, upholding peace and stability on the Peninsula, and an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. China kept close contact and engaged relevant parties through different channels and at different levels to avoid turbulence and conflict on the Korean Peninsula. China urged relevant parties to exercise calm and restraint, speak and act cautiously, take more actions that are conducive to easing the tension, and work together to put the Korean nuclear issue on a dialogue process that is sustainable, irreversible and builds trust gradually. China will continue to work together with the international community to promote denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

##### Afghanistan.

The situation in Afghanistan was at a crucial transitional period. As the 2014 presidential election and the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force approaches, the situation in Afghanistan is changing faster. China pays great attention to the developments in Afghanistan, and respects its sovereignty, independence and territorial integration as well as Afghan people's choice of development path in light of history and culture. China supports a smooth presidential election, an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led reconciliation process, and their

security capacity-building efforts.

China took an active part in Afghanistan's post-war reconstruction. It assisted a number of infrastructure projects, and provided trainings for several hundred of professionals and technicians. China attaches great importance to trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, and encourages and supports Chinese companies to invest in Afghanistan. In September 2013, President Karzai visited China. The two countries issued the Joint Statement on Deepening Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, and signed the Extradition Treaty and Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. Besides the bilateral channels, China also made constructive efforts to promote the resolution of Afghanistan issue in the multilateral frameworks. On 29 August, 2014, China is to host the Fourth Foreign Ministers' Conference of Istanbul Process on Afghanistan in Tianjin.

### The Situation in Pakistan.

Pakistan, an important country in South Asia, is at the forefront of international counter-terrorism efforts, and has made outstanding contribution to fighting terrorism. It has maintained overall political stability and its economy is turning for the better, yet it also faces difficulties in maintaining national stability and making economic and social development. Under the precondition of respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, the international community should provide the country with support and assistance in achieving sustainable security, stability and economic development. As Pakistan's friendly neighbor and all-weather cooperation partner, China follows the developments in Pakistan and hopes to see Pakistan maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity and keep social stability and economic growth. China will continue its support and assistance to Pakistan.

During Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Pakistan in May 2013, China and Pakistan reached an important consensus on launching the construction of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The two sides kept close consultations

on this initiative. China is willing to work together with Pakistan to make full use of the economic corridor, so that it will serve as a dynamic engine for China-Pakistan cooperation and regional development.

### —Non-traditional Security Cooperation

#### Disaster-relief.

China attaches great importance to and fully supports region-wide cooperation in disaster relief. It is intensively engaged in international cooperation in disaster relief, supports establishment of mechanisms in mutual visits, information sharing, personnel training, technological exchanges, simulation exercises, collaborated studies, material reserves, emergency aid, etc. It seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral practical cooperation in disaster-relief with an aim to improve the capacity of all parties in disaster mitigation and relief.

Since 2013, China has hosted the 2nd Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Joint Exercises in Disaster Relief, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Symposium on Emergency Disaster Relief in Big Cities, East Asia Summit Symposium on Major and Extraordinary Natural Disaster Relief Management, and China-ASEAN Symposium on Disaster Relief Management Cooperation, and participated in the 1st East Asia Summit Disaster Relief Cooperation Conference, the 12th ARF Disaster Relief Meeting, the Meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Emergency Disaster Relief Agencies in border areas, China-Japan-ROK Tabletop Exercise on Disaster Relief and other international conferences and activities.

During the 2013 ARF Ministerial Meeting, China announced its decision to conduct the 4th disaster relief exercise with an ASEAN country. So far, it has been confirmed that China will conduct this exercise with Malaysia in the northern Malaysia in February 2015. China has also participated in international disaster relief cooperation in combating the serious forest fire in Australia and the super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. China provided theoretical and

practical support on space technology application to developing countries and organized with Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization an international training program on space technology application.

With the missing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 on 8 March, 2014, China has mobilized 18 vessels, 3 transport aircrafts and more than 20 satellites to join the international search efforts for the plane.

### Counter-terrorism cooperation.

Counter-terrorism cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries and regional organizations has been reinforced and considerable progress has been made in combating terrorism in the region. However, the root causes of terrorism are far from being eliminated. Terrorist activities have increased. Trans-border movement and collusions among terrorist forces are on the rise. Threat from cyber terrorism is becoming increasingly serious. Generally speaking, terrorist activities constitute a major threat to the security of the Asia-Pacific region and counter-terrorism is still a major task for all countries in the region. The Chinese government opposes all forms of terrorism and calls on the international community to work together on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. China is also a victim of terrorism. It is faced with the immediate threat of the “East Turkish” terrorist forces represented by the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. Recently, some terrorist attacks happened in China and caused massive casualties, i.e. a terrorist-driven vehicle hitting the rail of Jinshui Bridge at the Tiananmen Square and the ruthlessly killing of innocent civilians by terrorists at Kunming railway station. China attaches great importance to and has been actively engaged in counter-terrorism activities in the Asia-Pacific region. China will enhance counter-terrorism cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries and regional organizations to maintain peace and stability in the region. In 2013, China conducted bilateral exchanges and consultations on counter-terrorism with Russia, Kirgistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran,

Afghanistan, Korea, Indonesia and Mongolia and carried out cooperation with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet Nam through mutual visits and information sharing. China also promoted counter-terrorism cooperation within the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and participated in the South East Asia Working Group of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum and the Counter-terrorism Working Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

### Combating transnational crimes.

With the development of globalization, drug producing and trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, corruption and other transnational organized crimes have been increasing and are often associated with terrorist activities. They seriously undermine countries' economic development and social order, pose a threat to the regional and peace and stability, and hurt people of all countries. China values and takes an active part in international cooperation on TOC. China has had good cooperation with the United Nations and regional organizations, and taken joint actions with ASEAN countries in combating transnational organized crimes. China has carried out joint patrols on the Mekong River with Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. China has also been engaged in capacity building cooperation in law enforcement under bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

The cyber security situation in the Asia-Pacific region changes undergone fundamental changes and cyber security has become a comprehensive security challenge for all countries. The Chinese government stands for a new security concept on issues related to peace and security, which calls on all parties to seek common security through cooperation. This new concept also applies to cyber security. China is firmly committed to maintaining cyber security. It has been engaged international efforts for this purpose. China advocates that countries should reinforce cooperation on the basis of mutual respect to build a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyber space. In 2013, China worked with other Asia-Pacific countries to fight transnational



cyber crimes, bringing fugitives overseas to justice and stepped up counter-cyber terrorism cooperation. China also co-hosted with Malaysia the “ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Measures to Enhance Cyber Security—Legal and Cultural Aspects” in Beijing.

### Maritime Security.

With the economic and social development in the Asia-Pacific, maritime security situation has become more complicated. Countries need to increase international cooperation in maritime law-enforcement to jointly maintain maritime security and stability and provide a sound maritime environment for regional economic development. China has conducted various forms of maritime law-enforcement collaboration and communication with Asia-Pacific countries and enhanced their mutual understanding and trust with them.

China works hard to promote maritime cooperation under various mechanisms. As a founding member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP), China supports the capacity building and development of the Information Sharing Center (ISC), and has participated in all types of meetings, exercises and training programs held by the center. In March 2013, China participated in the 7th Annual Meeting of the Council of the Information Sharing Center, and donated contributed US\$ 50,000 to the center. In November, China held the ReCAAP Focal Point Senior Officials’ Meeting (FPSOM) in Guilin of China’s Guangxi Province. China has also participated in the North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum (NPCGF), Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) and other cooperation programs within the frameworks of ASEAN.

China hosted the Northeast Asia Maritime Safety Cooperation Project in partnership with the United States in July 2013; co-sponsored with Brunei, the USA and Japan the ARF Maritime Security Workshop on Maritime Environmental Protection Cooperation in Hawaii in March 2014; and hosted with Brunei, the USA and Singapore

the ARF Regional Cooperation Seminar on Sea Oil Spills in March 2014.

From December 2008 when China sent its first naval fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters to January 2014, the Chinese fleets fulfilled 675 missions, escorting 5494 Chinese and foreign civilian vessels. The Chinese Naval fleets conducted intensive exchanges, communication and information sharing with escorting fleets from other countries. The Chinese government and the PLA attended the meeting of UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), and the Chinese naval escort fleet joined the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) and other international escort cooperation mechanisms.

China has solid historical and legal grounds for its sovereignty over Nansha islands in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China is committed to working with relevant countries to implement the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC), and seeks to resolve disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation with parties directly concerned and advocates the principles of “shelving disputes and seeking common development”. In 2013, China and ASEAN countries maintained effective communication on the issue of the South China Sea and reached broad consensus on enhancing dialogue and communication and promoting maritime cooperation to maintain the stability in the South China Sea. In September, China and ASEAN countries held the Senior Officials’ Meeting in Suzhou to exchange views on full implementation of the DOC and practical maritime cooperation. Consultation were held on “a code of conduct in South China Sea”(COC) under the framework of the implementation of the DOC.

### Cooperation in non-proliferation and disarmament.

China supports and takes an active part in international efforts in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China played

a constructive role in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is sincerely implementing the regulations of the final documents of the Eighth NPT Review Conference held in 2010. China participated in the new round review of the NPT and the P5 Conference on Implementing the NPT. China is willing to, together with all parties, make unremitting efforts to achieve the three goals of “nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear power” set by the NPT.

China firmly supports the efforts of ASEAN countries to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. China has no problem in signing relevant protocol, and calls on all parties to step up dialogue and consultation, so as to reach agreement on outstanding issues concerning the Protocol. The Chinese government attaches great importance to the issue of nuclear security. President Xi Jinping attended the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held in the Netherlands. China has fulfilled its obligations in nuclear non-proliferation and implemented relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and made great efforts to improve domestic institutions and mechanisms for nuclear security.

China stands for comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. China firmly opposed to the development, preservation and use of chemical weapons by any country, supports the purpose and goals of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) and the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and fully and sincerely fulfils its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. China stresses the importance of international exchanges and cooperation within the framework of the convention. In April and October 2013, China attended the Regional Advanced Course on Assistance and Protection in Singapore and the Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention

and Chemical Safety and Security Management in Qatar and had thorough discussions with relevant parties on the implementation of the convention. In April 2014, in partnership with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, China hosted the International Seminar on Chemical-industry Safety and Security in Beijing. China holds the view that the issue of the Syrian chemical weapons should be resolved peacefully. China has actively implemented relevant decisions and resolutions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations. China has sent experts for the inspection of Syrian chemical weapons and provided necessary material assistance. In January 2014, China started sending naval vessels to participate in the joint international escort of the shipping of Syrian chemical weapons.

Since 2013, China has been working productively with other ARF participants on information exchange, law-enforcement and countering the non-proliferation of materials and technologies of weapons of mass destruction. In September 2013, China attended the second ARF Non-proliferation Nuclear Forensics Workshop held in Bangkok and had in-depth discussions with relevant parties on ways to improve each country’s capability in nuclear forensics through regional cooperation. China attended the ARF Workshop on Countering Illicit Trafficking of CBRN Materials held in Manila and the Tenth Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP-X) held in Tokyo in November 2013. China supports the important role of UN in the filed of non-proliferation. In 2013, China contributed another US\$ 50,000 to the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific to support its activities.

#### **IV. China’s Perspectives on the Future Development of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**

After 20 years of development, the ARF has become the most effective and influential regional security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. All parties have taken confidence-building measures as the core mission of the forum and have been promoting preventive diplomacy based on consensus and steadily enhanced cooperation

in non-traditional security fields. Today, the ARF is in a new phase of development with both opportunities and challenges. It is a mission for all to build on the purposes and successful experience of the ARF to turn it into a platform that better contributes to confidence building and construction of a more harmonious environment in the region. Looking into the future, the ARF should make greater efforts in the following three areas:

Firstly, stick to the existing concept and principles, and advocate the concept of common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security. We should uphold the principles of consensus, gradualism, accommodating all parties comfort level, and non-interference in others' internal affairs. These principles are the foundation of all regional security dialogues and cooperation under the framework of the ARF. We should remain committed to ASEAN centrality, and promote dialogue and cooperation in the "ASEAN Way" and takes into account the concerns and interests of all parties. The ARF should also encourage non-ASEAN member states to play a more active role.

Secondly, continue to enhance confidence-building measures and promote preventive diplomacy based on consensus. For historical and practical reasons, mutual trust remains to be strengthened. Confidence building is a long-term task that should be highlighted throughout the development of the forum. Now the ARF is in transition from confidence building to preventive diplomacy, where consensus on preventive diplomacy should be expanded. All parties should be fully aware of the diversity and complexity of the Asia-Pacific region and shouldn't blindly copy the experience of other regions. Instead, all parties should abide by the ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (2001), stick to its principle of non-compulsory, non-interference in domestic affairs and other basic principles and try to find ways of preventive diplomacy that apply to the real conditions of the region.

Thirdly, steadily practicalize ARF cooperation in non-traditional security fields. Peace, stability,

cooperative development have become the mainstream in the Asia-Pacific region. However, enormous challenges and factors of instability also exist. Many traditional security issues remain to be addressed, while non-traditional security challenges of natural disaster, terrorism, transnational crimes are also pronounced. The ARF should focus on cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges in the region and consistently further cooperation in disaster prevention and relief, combating transnational crimes, maritime security, cyber security, etc. Dynamism and vitality should be injected into the forum continuously.


China was a founding member of the ARF and has been contributing to the development of the forum in the past 20 years through advocating the "new security concept" with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination at its core; practicing the idea of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security and actively participating and promoting practical cooperation in all sectors.

China is willing to work with all other members to keep the forum on the right track and promote cooperation in all forms and in all fields, so as to make greater contribution to creating a harmonious security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.





**“EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on global challenges, from crisis management to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

2013 was a year of activism and consolidation of the EU's relations with its Asian and Pacific partners. The EU's objectives have been to reconfirm its engagement with the four Asian strategic partners (China, India, Japan, South Korea) and to enhance its engagement in and with the emerging regional security architecture. The EU continued to support stability and security of the region as a whole. The political dialogue and the assistance provided to Asia and Pacific, remained intensive.

EU engagement in Asia remains comprehensive in nature, ranging from political dialogues to cooperation on global challenges, from crisis management to cooperation on humanitarian and development assistance. The EU's actions are framed by the core tenets of the Lisbon Treaty: to contribute to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights and the development of international law.

In 2013, EU-ASEAN cooperation was further strengthened, through the implementation of the Brunei Plan of Action 2013-17. Working towards a more ambitious EU-ASEAN political partnership, several high-level visits and meetings took place that confirmed the positive momentum. The first ever EU-ASEAN High level Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation took place in Jakarta in November 2013. That same month, the HR/VP visited the ASEAN Secretariat. She

met with ASEAN Secretary-General Lê Lương Minh and opened the EU programme office at the ASEAN Secretariat. In June 2013, the HR/VP also participated for the first time in the Shangri-La Dialogue expressing the EU's commitment to promoting regional security based on its interests in regional peace and stability, highlighting many concrete examples of EU engagement and support.

In the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and the EU, together with other partners, have continued to address regional and international security issues of common concern. The EU has been an active contributor to various ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief, including a sizeable delegation taking part in the Disaster Relief Exercise (DIREx 2013), and the ISMs on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Maritime Security, and Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The HR/VP took part in the 20th ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial in Brunei Darussalam in July, setting out the EU's stance on the nature of the main security challenges affecting the region and the need for comprehensive and rules-based solutions. She also reiterated the EU's ambition to become an active member of the East Asia Summit.

For the Inter-Sessional year 2013-2014, Myanmar and the European Union have acted as Co-chairs of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM and PD) and the related Defense Officials' Dialogue (DOD). This Co-Chairmanship underlined the EU's commitment to the ARF as part of an overall EU engagement with the emerging security order in Asia. It also offered an excellent opportunity to support Myanmar as incoming Chair of ASEAN (2014). Negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Asian countries have seen significant progress. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Singapore was initialled on 14 October 2013, and the one with Thailand was initialled on 7 November 2013. Negotiations with Brunei – launched in 2012 – progressed well in 2013. The national ratification process of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Vietnam, Indonesia and the

Philippines moved forward. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with South-East Asia partners will give more scope for EU cooperation. In March 2013, in line with earlier agreements between EU and China at high level, the EU's European Security and Defence College (ESDC) organised a Common Security and Defence Policy Orientation Seminar in Brussels with a focus on EU-China relations. This Seminar saw the participation of a larger group of Chinese officials/mid-level military together with civilian and military participants from EU Member States. The curriculum was based on a regular Orientation Course, providing basic knowledge about the history, background and content of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, complemented with specific elements to foster an exchange on the respective security strategies with this specific audience.

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## II. EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

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In 2013, the EU reiterated its strong commitment to support and work for effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core, in search for lasting solutions to critical international peace and security challenges. Throughout the year, the EU continued to focus on the promotion of international peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Europe can be all the more effective if it does not act alone, and that is why 2013 saw increased cooperation with regional organisations, from ASEAN to the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to the African Union, and the Organisation of American States.

2013 was also an important year for the further development of the EU's engagement on security and defence matters. On 19 December 2013 the European Council – the summit of the EU Heads of State and Government – extensively discussed the EU's approach to these topics and gave clear guidance. The European Council gave an overall

positive assessment of the EU's achievements in this field. At the same time, it also indicated that a lot of work still needed to be done and that the European Council will review progress in June 2015. In this context, the EU works on three interlinked objectives:

- Operational effectiveness;
- Increase and improvement of civilian and military crisis management capabilities;
- Strengthening the European defence industry.

Through its CSDP missions and operations, the EU continued to sustain and enhance its engagement to reinforce the rule of law, in particular through EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Nestor, EUPOL COPPS in the occupied Palestinian Territories, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP SAHEL Niger, EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUPOL Afghanistan.

Looking ahead to 2014, a clear priority will be to make progress on relevant aspects of the December 2013 Council Conclusions, in particular increasing the effectiveness, impact and visibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Missions and operations will continue to be at the heart of CSDP. Outreach to partners will continue, both by actively promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations, regular security and defence dialogues, and the organisation of joint seminars with strategic partners in line with the relevant recommendations by the Political and Security Committee.

Improving the EU's rapid response capabilities to deploy the right civilian and military assets, and properly dealing with security challenges, in particular those resulting from inter-linkages between internal and external challenges, will be further goals. This will require taking forward work on, inter alia, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (with an emphasis on capacity building), an EU Maritime Security Strategy (from June 2014), and operationalising synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors to tackle horizontal issues such as illegal

migration, organised crime and terrorism.

There will be continued emphasis on reinforcing multilateral/regional partnerships including UN, NATO, the African Union, Asian partners including the ARF, and the Eastern Partnership. Tackling global factors affecting, directly or indirectly, the stability of states and international peace and security are likely to become even more pressing priorities. It will be essential to continue to strengthen the EU's early warning, conflict prevention and mediation support capacities, including the development of shared conflict analysis.

### III. Contributions to Regional Security

EU diplomatic initiatives together with civilian missions and military operations under the CSDP are firm contributions to global security. The EU has a unique range of instruments – both civilian and military - to tackle important foreign policy and security challenges comprehensively. The EU often leads consultations and negotiations aimed at safeguarding or restoring peace, notably on the Iranian nuclear issue or between Serbia and Kosovo. It works closely with – and materially supports - international and regional partners to deal with regional challenges where only collective efforts can deliver results – from asymmetric security risks to climate change, disaster relief and security sector reform. The broad cooperation in these areas is also at the core of Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU enhanced partnership (2013-2017).

#### *iii a. Terrorism and organised crime*

##### **i. Counter-terrorism**

The EU remains committed to preventing and fighting terrorism, promoting the rule of law and criminal justice while fostering respect for human rights. EU global objectives remain to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism including in the framework of the ARF and its ISM on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime. Political dialogues on counter-terrorism



with EU partners have continued in 2013. Dedicated dialogues were held with the UN, the United States, Russia (all bi-annual), Canada, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (all on annual basis).

The EU continued to promote the key role of the UN in multilateral cooperation in combating and preventing terrorism. The EU supported UN efforts to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Specifically, the EU assisted UN efforts to implement agreed regional Counter-Terrorism Action Plans in Central Asia and is financing the second phase of this UN programme. The EU remained a strong supporter of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). At the fourth GCTF Ministerial meeting in New York in September 2013 the HR/VP underlined the EU's continuing commitment to the GCTF. On terrorist financing, the EU closely worked with the Financial Action Task Force to ensure the implementation of its international standards on terrorist financing and money laundering world-wide.

## ii. Cyber security

The February 2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy calls for improved EU-wide efforts in the various policy areas of the cyber domain: cyber resilience, cybercrime, EU international cyberspace policy and cyber defence. Priorities for EU international cyberspace policy are: to preserve freedom and openness in cyberspace; to develop norms of behaviour and apply existing international law in cyberspace; to raise cyber security capacity in third countries and to foster international cooperation on cyberspace issues.

Accordingly, Council Conclusions for the strategy were adopted in June 2013; cyber consultations with the US, China and a structured dialogue with India took place; a Council Working Group on Cyber (Friends of Presidency) was set up and meets regularly; confidence-building measures were adopted in the OSCE framework; the EU played an active role in the London process on norms of behaviour; progress was made towards defining a coherent capacity building approach; and, on cyber defence, an EU Cyber defence

framework is under development.

## iii b. Maritime Security

Europe's maritime security is an integral and crucial part of its overall security. The EU has strategic maritime security interests around the globe and needs to be able to safeguard them. In 2013, the EU contributed actively to the work of the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security. It also prepared Elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy, i.e. a strategic, coherent, functional and cost-effective approach to maritime security that harnesses the ongoing EU initiatives in this realm.

As part of the EU-ASEAN Plan of Action (2013-2017), the first ever EU-ASEAN High-level Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation took place in Jakarta in November 2013. This Dialogue, co-organised by EU and Indonesia, was opened by the ASEAN Secretary General, and saw the participation of high-ranking officials and experts from all ASEAN Member States and the EU. It was convened to:

1. Contribute to the forging of common perspectives, modern policy frameworks and adequate regional capacities related to maritime cooperation;
2. Exchange experiences, best practices and lessons learnt from the EU integration process, in order to help shape regional policies and regimes in ASEAN on maritime issues and concerns;
3. Identify challenges and obstacles faced by ASEAN in the development of a comprehensive regional maritime cooperation.

The High Level Dialogue provided a platform for in-depth exchanges on different aspects of maritime security, such as counter-piracy, port security, maritime surveillance, illegal fishing and the joint development of resources (oil/gas).

## iii c. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Non-proliferation and disarmament continued

to be an integral part of the EU's foreign policy in 2013. Under the Instrument for Stability, in its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation component, the creation of CBRN Centres of Excellence in targeted regions progressed well and the first six Regional Centres were established in: North Africa (Algiers), Atlantic Façade (Rabat), Middle East (Amman), South-east Europe/Southern Caucasus/Republic of Moldova/Ukraine (Tbilisi), South-east Asia (Manila), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Nairobi). Their remit is to strengthen regional and international cooperation on all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks independent of their origin. In addition to 33 projects adding up to €26 million previously contracted, new projects amounting to around €10 million are being contracted with different consortia, including from EU Member States.

#### *iii d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

Worldwide, natural disasters are increasing in frequency, complexity and severity, and are aggravated by challenges such as climate change, rapid urbanization and under-development. Armed conflicts and protracted crises also show worrying trends across the globe. As one of the world's leading humanitarian donors, the EU has throughout 2013 responded with determination to these challenges. The relief assistance provided by the European Commission alone amounted to over €1.3 billion, helping people in more than 90 countries.

In November 2013, the tropical cyclone Haiyan hit the Philippines. The typhoon, which was among the strongest ever recorded, caused massive destruction, left thousands dead, around 4 million displaced and ultimately affected over 14 million people. Teams of EU humanitarian and civil-protection experts were deployed to the worst hit areas within hours after the disaster to support relief efforts and assess the most acute needs. To ensure coordination of the European relief efforts and facilitate logistics, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated. The EU and its Member States provided considerable humanitarian aid and in-kind assistance,

exceeding €150 million in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. The EU also committed support to medium-term rehabilitation, in view of helping the population in the reconstruction effort.

The EU is an active supporter of the ASEAN Humanitarian Action (AHA) Centre (through the Instrument for Stability) to strengthen the capacity of the AHA Centre as well as its links to national crisis rooms in Myanmar and the Philippines.

#### **IV. Role of ARF**

The ARF is the most comprehensive multilateral security forum in the region. As a long-standing and active ARF member, the EU is contributing to regional peace and stability and supporting the development of a more robust, rules-based regional security order. The ARF offers a valuable platform for the EU and its Asian partners to engage on a broad range of issues such as maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Drawing on its comprehensive approach, the EU has engaged actively with ARF partners at various levels, e.g. through Inter-sessional Meetings, the Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) and the related Defence Officials' Dialogue which it co-chaired in 2013-2014 with Myanmar, the Senior Officials' Meeting and the ARF Ministerial. As in previous years, the HR/VP participated in the 20th ARF Ministerial in Brunei Darussalam.

The EU respects the central role of ASEAN in the emerging regional architecture and believes in the need to ensure transparency and synergy between ARF and other regional fora such as the ADDM+ meetings and the East Asia Summit.

The EU also believes that the ARF should enhance efforts in Preventive Diplomacy (PD), conflict prevention and conflict management, in addition to the ARF's work on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). The EU stands ready to facilitate the exchange of best practices, through e.g. PD training. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of studying the experience of

other regional organisations, such as the OSCE, and of strengthening the organizational and institutional structures of the ARF, including the ARF Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat.

The EU is keen to make the ARF, in line with ARF Ministerial Guidance, more 'action oriented'. To that end the EU has organised an orientation seminar on the EU's CSDP in March 2014, open to all ARF Members with a special focus on EU-ASEAN security cooperation.

Moreover, to strengthen the role of the ARF in preventive diplomacy training, the EU is pleased to partner with Brunei Darussalam to conduct a 3-day PD training for all ARF members in September 2014.





***“Indonesia believes that the ARF continues to be an important forum in the evolving regional security architecture and can significantly contribute to the creation of a climate conducive to cooperation at the national, bilateral and regional levels.”***



## I. Overview of The Regional Security Environment

As the most dynamic region in the world, the Asia Pacific region is now at the center of a rapidly changing globalised international order. It is brimming with opportunities and challenges, while the nations within it strive for peace, stability and prosperity for their peoples. Indonesia is of the view that the main challenges in the region are a trust deficit among nations, long-unresolved territorial and sovereignty disputes, and the need to manage wide-ranging political and economic changes. Given the strategic importance of the region, there is a profound need to ensure that challenges do not become threats and that every opportunity to strengthen peace and stability is seized.

In this regard, the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has been the main platform for discussion of political and security issues in the region for the past two decades, plays a critical role in the common effort to ensure that a peaceful and secure environment prevails in the region. Indonesia believes that the ARF continues to be an important forum in the evolving regional security architecture and can significantly contribute to the creation of a climate conducive to cooperation at the national, bilateral and regional levels.

As it completes its second decade of work, the ARF also concludes the implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement ARF Vision Statement. Indonesia regards it as essential that the ARF process be brought forward to the next stage of its evolution—by accelerating the

implementation of the Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan adopted in 2011. In this light, Indonesia welcomes all initiatives that have been developed to advance this process, such as the ARF Round-table on Training Resources for Preventive Diplomacy, which was held on 20th and 21st of March 2014 in Wellington, New Zealand.

Indonesia has always underscored the importance of upholding the norms and principles of regionalism, in particular, the region's commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. The TAC, the Bali Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations and other existing international laws and norms should therefore be faithfully put into practice, as we respond to regional and global developments. All participants to the ARF should continue to be guided by these same principles and approaches, that peace and stability can be ensured through the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Dialogue and consultations that are the norms of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms do enhance mutual understanding and confidence. These mechanisms should therefore be continuously refined to ensure that we are effective in addressing regional and global developments.

The peaceful settlement of disputes should also be applied in the cases of overlapping claims in the South China Sea. To facilitate the parties concerned resolve their outstanding issues through dialogue, consultation and other ways recognized by international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, confidence building through the full implementation of the DOC and early conclusion of the COC should be vigorously pursued by ASEAN and China.

Due to its strategic geographical position in the region and its being the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia regards the regional security outlook as heavily determined by maritime security, especially in the Straits of Malacca and by traditional as well as non-traditional challenges and threats.

Hence, the region, including the ARF, should

focus more on efforts to advance regional cooperation that address the nexus between regional maritime security and the battle against transnational maritime crime.

At the same time, maritime security related issues provide opportunities for cooperation in the Asia Pacific region for our common benefit, including building maritime connectivity for ASEAN and beyond. It is therefore crucial for the ARF to promote more robust activities and programs in maritime security.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to humanity. Only the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the absolute guarantee against a nuclear holocaust. The continuing national moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions are by no means sufficient to remove that threat. Although the international system has a large architecture of treaties, commitments and forums to advance non-proliferation, thousands of these weapons continue to exist. For decades, lack of political will in multilateral disarmament forums stood in the way of progress. We still have the opportunity, however, to conclude a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would completely eliminate nuclear weapons within a specific time frame, prevent an arms race in outer space, and provide for negative security assurances and fissile materials cut-off.

True to its commitment to disarmament, Indonesia ratified in 2012 the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the main international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Indonesia's decision to ratify CTBT was intended to create new momentum for the remaining Annex II States to show leadership by also ratifying the Treaty.

Meanwhile negotiations toward accession by the nuclear weapon states to the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty were concluded in 2011 during Indonesia's tenure as Chair of ASEAN. Indonesia continues to work for an early accession by the NWSs, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Indonesia

urges all concerned to settle remaining issues so that the postponed accession could be carried out expeditiously.

Indonesia is just as concerned at non-traditional security issues confronting the Asia-Pacific region. The region's resolve is continuously challenged despite global and regional joint efforts to combat and address them. It greatly helps that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia has been an effective Treaty. Indonesia therefore welcomes accession to the Treaty by more than 32 countries outside ASEAN. Indonesia is confident that this development will help ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Indonesia welcomes the growing interest of ARF participants in this Annual Security Outlook (ASO). This is consistent with the stipulation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community for greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions. The ARF ASO is a means of deciphering intent and concerns of ARF participants in a way that builds mutual trust and confidence.

## II. National Security and Defence Policy

Indonesia's doctrine of National Defence is based on the nation's values manifested in a Total-National Defence System that involves all stakeholders, territories, and other national resources. The system is integrated, focused, sustainable, and designed to protect and defend the people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. This doctrine was formulated on the basis of the national ideology (Pancasila), the 1945 Constitution, legislation (Act No. 3 of 2002), Indonesian history and the concept of the Archipelagic State.

This strategic doctrine is oriented to building national defence resilience and capability which contributes to the maintenance of regional peace and security. This layers defence system and strategy rest on the combined and integrated efforts of military and non-military elements.

The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution obliges Indonesia to contribute to world peace. Indonesia is therefore duty-bound to contribute actively to maintaining international peace and security. Indonesia's involvement in peacekeeping operations reflects Indonesia's commitment to the creation of a world order based on independence, durable peace, and social justice.

Indonesia's first involvement with a United Nations peacekeeping mission was in 1957, through its participation in UNEF (UN Emergency Forces), in the Sinai Peninsula. Today Indonesian peacekeepers are deployed in eight UN peacekeeping operations, namely UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur), UNISFA (Abyei-Sudan), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNMIL (Liberia); MONUSCO (Congo), MINUSTAH (Haiti) and MINURSO (Western Sahara). Having deployed 1,703 personnel in these operations, Indonesia ranks nineteenth among Troops/Police Contributing Countries. Indonesia envisions deploying 4000 troops in future peacekeeping operations.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia established in West Java Province the Indonesian Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in December 2011. The Centre will enhance Indonesia's capacity to contribute to the efforts of maintaining international peace and security.

In the framework of ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Cooperation, Indonesia and Thailand conducted a meeting of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network in September 2012 in Thailand. The Meeting discussed possible areas of cooperation and the work plan of Peacekeeping Centers Network 2012-2020. In 2013, Indonesia hosted the second meeting of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Network on from 2 to 5 September 2013 at the IPSC, Bogor, West Java Province.

Indonesia's regional defence outlook stresses international cooperation using bilateral, regional and international approaches. It regards ASEAN as having a long-term central role in any regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific region.



### III. National Contributions to Regional Security

#### III a. Counter-terrorism

Indonesia believes that counter-terrorism efforts require addressing root causes and “conditions conducive” to terrorism. As the root causes of terrorism are varied and complex, the strategy to address them must be comprehensive. This entails a people-centered approach to counter-terrorism, promotion of inter-civilization dialogue, information sharing and intelligence exchange and document integrity and security in enhancing cooperation to combat terrorism and transnational crimes, cooperative counter-terror action in border areas, and measures against terrorist financing.

As co-chair of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CTTC) in 2013-2014 with New Zealand, Indonesia hosted the 12th ARF ISM on CTTC in Bali on 15 and 16 April 2014. The meeting assessed the situation pertaining to terrorism and transnational crimes in the region, examined regional cooperation in addressing illicit drugs, reviewed the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on CTTC, and discussed the future direction of ARF ISM on CTTC. The meeting tabled the development of the ARF CTTC Work Plan for 2014-2015 for further endorsement by the ARF SOM in June 2014.

Promoting a People-Centered Approach to Counter-Terrorism. Indonesia views terrorism as an unconventional crime, which is politically or ideologically motivated. The complex and changing nature of terrorist methods require frequent reassessment of measures being taken and formulation of new ones as needed. Therefore, a creative and non-conventional strategy of counter-terrorism is required with respect to due process of law and human rights, in line with UN Resolutions on Counter Terrorism. Such strategy involves law enforcement, diplomacy, intelligence and military operations are needed.

Indonesia’s success in reducing incidence of terrorism is the result of programs that involve the community in counter-radicalization projects.

Indonesia also supports counter-radicalization as one the ARF priority programmes in the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Work Plan. In this light, the need to extend coverage of the program to include de-radicalization and re-education of the terrorist inmates must also be considered.

Promotion of Inter-Civilization Dialogue. The promotion of inter-faith dialogue provides an avenue for promoting tolerance and mutual understanding within pluralistic communities. This effort should be carried out in tandem with empowering moderates in support of counter-radicalism actions.

Thus Indonesia is actively promoting dialogue or exchange of views between different religious and ethnic groups at the international level. An effort along this line was the cooperation between the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nahdatul Ulama, the largest Islamic group in Indonesia, in hosting the international workshop titled “Raising Awareness of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy among Civil Society in South East Asia”, in 2009. The Ministry also worked with local organizations as well as the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF) in hosting the “Regional Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy in South East Asia Workshop” in 2010.

Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes.

Indonesia’s pursuit of counter-terrorism within multilateral frameworks is extensive. Indonesia is party to seven international legal counter-terrorism frameworks in implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373. Indonesia sees the importance of multilateral cooperation and the initiative to develop a comprehensive convention on international terrorism to fortify current international law instruments within the UN framework. Indonesia is part of various mechanisms and pursues a strategy of counter-

terrorism, which consist of information and intelligence sharing as well as combating terrorism financing, such as the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (UN-GCTS), the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UN-CTITF), the Terrorism Prevention Branch-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as well as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Indonesia also the founding members of Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), officially launched on 22 September 2011. Indonesia co-chairs the Southeast Asia Regional Capacity Building Working Group of the forum with Australia, which convened two productive meetings last year. Indonesia also initiated the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter Terrorism, which groups Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore in a regional cooperation in the fields of law enforcement, counter-radicalization, combating illegal arms trafficking and mass casualty emergency response.

One major step taken by Indonesia was the ratification of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) in April 2012 through Law No 5 year 2012. Indonesia has also worked to help strengthen ASEAN cooperation to counter terrorism, through its various mechanisms. In the framework of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)/ Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), Indonesia has served as the lead shepherd of the counter terrorism issue and chairman of the Working Group on Counter Terrorism.

Within the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus, Indonesia, together with the United States, serves as co-chair of the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Counter Terrorism. Indonesia hosted the Counter Terrorism Table Top Exercise on from 9 to 13 September 2013 in Bogor, West Java Province. The Exercise was aimed at gaining insight into regional counter terrorism challenges, priorities, and capabilities, developing opportunities for regional cooperation, showing the need and benefit of close cooperation among ASEAN Plus members in counter terrorism domain, as well

as providing pertinent information on emerging regional and global threats.

At the national level, the National Counter Terrorism Agency (NCTA) was established in 2010 through Presidential Regulation No. 46/2010. The Agency collaborates with Indonesian counter-terrorism stakeholders and synergizes national counter-terrorism efforts. Indonesia has issued a number of regulations related to counter-terrorism, money laundering and terrorist financing, and has undertaken a number of measures in combating terrorism, such as Law No. 15 year 2003 on Counter Terrorism.

These efforts, including those under the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which was established in 2004, underpin Indonesia's contribution to a strategy of enhancing the region's capacity to combat terrorism. The efforts are guided by the notion that terrorism is not associated with any religion, civilization, nationality or race. They are focused on political, operational and legal cooperation to address the root causes of terrorism.

Cooperative Counter-Terror Action on Border Security. The institution responsible for maritime security issues in Indonesia is the Indonesia Maritime Security Coordinating Board (IMSCB). At the operational level, IMSCB conducts exchange of information to combat maritime security threats, particularly concerning counter terrorism, with several immediate neighbors, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia.

Measures against Terrorist Financing. Indonesia is committed to preventing and combating terrorism financing through cooperation with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in implementing the FATF standards regarding the financing of terrorism, especially 40+9 Recommendations. Cooperation with the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is also fostered.

True to its international commitments, Indonesia has ratified seven of international legal frameworks for counter terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.

At the national level, Indonesia issued a new law No 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering. Through National Law number 6 Year 2006, Indonesia has successfully thwarted the use of the financial/banking system as a means to channel funds for terrorism-related activities. Therefore, the existing mechanism will be maintained and further developed in the future.

Indonesia closely monitors financial transactions conducted by certain social/humanitarian non-governmental organizations identified as radical and violent: the money they move around could finance terrorist activities. Monitoring is also necessary for smaller transactions related to individuals and organizations identified as having a relationship with terrorist activities. It is therefore important that information and intelligence-sharing be enhanced.

Measures against Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism. Indonesia recognizes CBRN terrorism as a serious challenge to its security, as the use of these weapons in a terrorist attack can cause massive damage, extensive human suffering and social democratisation. In dealing with CBRN terrorism, Indonesia has adopted a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on CBRN that guides responders in rescuing and treating victims and in controlling fires and other hazards in the affected areas. Indonesia has ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2014.

### *III b. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

Indonesia's commitment to nuclear disarmament has never wavered. In international meetings on non-proliferation and disarmament, Indonesia emphasizes the importance of multilateralism as "the core principle" and that the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament should be achieved by lawful methods pursuant to the prevailing international law and within the framework of the United Nations.

Indonesia urges that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be given paramount importance and that

countries that are not yet parties immediately accede to the as non-nuclear states. All pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, non proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, must be implemented in a balanced, transparent and comprehensive manner.

Indonesia calls on the nuclear states to fulfill their commitment to discard their nuclear arsenals in implementation of Article VI of the NPT, with a clear time frame. Moreover, Indonesia advocates that nuclear disarmament be carried out in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner. On the other hand, it upholds the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is Indonesia's strong belief that nuclear energy can be a major component of sustainable development.

Indonesia, as an Annex II country, has ratified the CTBT through the Law No. 1 year 2012 and has been developing a Plan of Action to globalize the CTBT. This act of ratification was very timely as it came right after ASEAN Member States concluded negotiations with the Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) on the latter's accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, in November 2011. These developments created a positive momentum that could encourage the ratification of the CTBT by the remaining Annex II countries. As co-chairs of the CTBT Article XIV Conference, Indonesia and Hungary will work together to promote the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty.

On the issue of nuclear security, Indonesia deems it important that there be strong national legislation. Thus during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Indonesia launched the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security, as a useful reference for countries striving to enhance nuclear safety and security in accordance with their respective national processes and legal systems. The kits can help states develop more comprehensive national legislation on nuclear security and provide them with a reference in nuclear security gleaned from elements and provisions from different conventions/treaties, international legal instru-



ments and frameworks on nuclear security.

At the regional level, there is a need for systematic and strategic cooperation between ASEAN-led mechanisms and the IAEA, the PrepCom CTBT and other relevant organizations. The synergy between global and regional mechanisms can strengthen nuclear security, safety, and safeguards in Southeast Asia. It can enhance the effectiveness of nuclear weapons-free zones.

In line with the provisions of the ASEAN Charter and the implementation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Indonesia is strongly committed to preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone that is also free of all other weapons of mass destruction. During Indonesia's Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011, three Consultations between the States Parties and the NWSs were held: from 8 to 11 August 2011 in Geneva, from 4 to 7 October 2011 in New York and on 14 November 2011 in Bali. This ended a decade-long lull and represented significant progress toward conclusion of negotiations with the NWSs on a package deal. However, there are still outstanding issues on a number of provisions of the Protocol of the SEANWFZ that must be resolved with a view to ensuring the early signing of the Protocol of the Treaty by the NWS. Indonesia stands ready to participate in new consultations between ASEAN and NWS with a view to the signing of the relevant instruments that will enable NWS to ratify the SEANWFZ Protocol of SEANWFZ as soon as possible.

Within the ARF framework, Indonesia supports the deliberations on non-proliferation and disarmament of biological and chemical weapons through its active participation in the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament. While committed to support the implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Indonesia also encourages all ARF participants to be part of global efforts at creating a world free of Weapons of Mass Destruction through the ratification of the CTBT and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention.

### *III c. Transnational Crimes*

Indonesia deems it important to forge closer cooperation to address the threats of transnational crime at all levels effectively and in a timely manner. Regionally, Indonesia actively takes part in the AMMTC and encourages the AMMTC to strengthen the implementation of the ASEAN Work Programme which covers eight areas of cooperation.

At the national level, Indonesia sees the urgent need for all stakeholders to join hands in bringing about a Drug Free Indonesia. For guidelines in this effort, the Government established the National Policy and Strategy on the Prevention and Eradication of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Drugs for the period of 2011-2015.

Presidential Instruction No. 12 of 2011, issued in Jakarta, 27 June 2011, instructed all government officials to take necessary steps according to their respective tasks, function, and authority within the framework of the implementation of the national policy and strategy. Various government agencies are cooperating and coordinating with one another to implement the policy. The results are evaluated every six months in a process coordinated by the National Narcotics Board.

The target of the strategy is to increase the number of immune communities, reduce the prevalence of drug abuse to below 2.8 percent and improve disclosures of illicit drug trafficking by the end of 2015, using four strategies: Prevention, Community Empowerment, Rehabilitation and Eradication.

Since 2009 through the law No.35/2009, Indonesia has implemented a decree on illegal drug abuse and illegal drug trafficking. To strengthen legal frameworks in dealing with illegal drugs, the House of Representatives has also included a Bill on Seizure of the Assets and a Bill on Revision of the Law on Psychotropic Drugs in the National Legislation Program for the 2009-2014 periods.

In view of the transnational nature of drug problems, Indonesia has been deeply involved in ASEAN initiatives to participate in regional, interregional and international counter drug

activities, including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) annual sessions, the UNODC training, seminars, annual ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs (ASOD) meetings. As a UN member state, Indonesia has also ratified three conventions related to drug control, namely Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 and Convention against the illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Indonesia in particular has concluded bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance with some countries, such as:

1. Extradition treaties with Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Hongkong SAR and Republic of Korea (Treaty with Singapore has not been ratified yet);
2. Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance with ASEAN, Australia, China, Hongkong SAR and the Republic of Korea;
3. Law enforcement cooperation with the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, France, Hongkong SAR, and Belgium; Cooperation MoUs on countering drugs with Lao PDR, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In 2010, the Indonesian National Narcotics Board and the Indonesian National Police made efforts to prevent the diversion of precursors into illicit drugs. They undertook measures such as the use of techno intelligence, human intelligence, data collection, and analysis to determine operational targets. Indonesia is also working with various ARF participants to prevent the diversion of precursors into illicit drugs with the signing of various Memoranda of Understanding and conducting intensive joint operations.

As to Trafficking in Persons (TIP), Indonesia is generally categorized as an origin country of trafficked persons, although in some cases Indonesia is also considered a transit and destination country. Indonesia considers TIP as a transnational organized crime, which is complicated and requires multidimensional and comprehensive measures.

At the national level, Indonesia passed Law No 21 year 2007 on Elimination of Human Trafficking and Law No 23 year 2004 on Elimination of Violence in Household. In 2011, Indonesia enacted Law No 6 year 2011 on Immigration to strengthen government authority in dealing with human trafficking and people smuggling in terms of preventive and repressive measures and strengthen the penal sanctions on immigration crime.

At the regional level, during its chairmanship of ASEAN, Indonesia pushed for the adoption of the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on Enhancing Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons in Southeast Asia and requested relevant ASEAN bodies to accelerate the development and expedite the finalization of an ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP), a legally binding instrument to strengthen cooperation against trafficking in persons. Indonesia looks forward to its early adoption, as it is necessary for ASEAN to have a legal and comprehensive framework for cooperation in tackling the TIP in the region.

Indonesia has also played an active role in fostering cooperation to deal with trafficking in persons and people smuggling in the framework of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process). The activities in the Process include information-sharing, capacity building and exchange of knowledge gained from conferences and workshops as well as of model legislation on criminalizing people smuggling and trafficking in persons, preparation of a checklist of issues to be addressed in the return of illegal immigrants and best practice guidelines for identifying illegal immigrants. To Indonesia the Bali Process contributes greatly to the fight against irregular migration in the region, either in the form of human smuggling or trafficking in persons.

At the global level, Indonesia has ratified several international instruments, such as UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes through Law No 5 year 2009 and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children through Law No 14 year 2009. In 2012, Indonesia has also ratified the International

Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, which covers migrant workers in origin countries, transit countries and sending countries.

### *III d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

Indonesia, with its strategic and yet unique geographical position, is unfortunately prone to natural disasters. Within the last decade, more than 21 million people all over the archipelago were affected by 321 major disasters that inflicted a total economic loss of around US\$ 23 billion. For Indonesia, it is therefore imperative to strengthen disaster management. In this light, Indonesia underscores the importance of multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approaches to disaster management.

Since its inception in 2008, the National Agency for Disaster Management, in cooperation with relevant agencies, has developed approaches to and measures in pre-disaster, emergency, post-disaster and evaluation of disaster management implementation. As a result, Indonesia has adopted and implemented the Five Year National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) and the National Plan on Disaster Management (2010-2014.).

Considering the critical need to enhance preparedness and disaster management, strengthen the interoperability among stakeholders in region to deal with natural disasters as well as refine the Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction on Tsunami, Indonesia will convene series of exercises, called Mentawai Megathrust Disaster Relief Exercise 2013-2014. The series of Exercises consist of the International Table Top Exercise (TTX) which was held on 22-25 April 2013 and International Command Post Exercise (CPX), Field Training Exercise (FTX) as well as Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) which was held on 16-22 March 2014. The series of Exercise took place in Padang, West Sumatra Province.

Indonesia has strengthened its national disaster management by promulgating several additional regulations, including on the Role of International Institutions and Non-Government Foreign

Institutions in Disaster Management. Those regulations define the role of governments, communities, private sectors and international partners in disaster management. To enhance national capacity in disaster management and disaster risk reduction, Indonesia has been actively engaged in many forums, regionally and internationally with special focus on ASEAN mechanisms and ASEAN-based forums.

While working to strengthen coordination among various forums and mechanisms in the region, Indonesia has given importance to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and its projects, including the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre). Thus ASEAN has a legally binding instrument that binds its Member States to promote regional coordination and collaboration in reducing disaster losses and to intensify joint emergency response to disasters. The EAS paper on enhancing regional cooperation on disaster rapid response should be an integral part of regional approach to HADR.

Indonesia also acknowledges the achievement made so far by ASEAN-led mechanisms on disaster management cooperation such as the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), ARF, ADMM Plus, and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Hence, Indonesia encourages these mechanisms related to disaster management in ASEAN to synchronize their activities and policies using the AADMER as the main regional policy backbone and coordinating platform in disaster management.

Regionally, in the framework of the ARF, in co-chairmanship with Australia, Indonesia hosted the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ARF ISM on DR) on 12 and 13 March 2013 in Padang, West Sumatra Province. The Meeting greatly contributed to deliberations on synergy and coordination among ASEAN-led mechanisms on disaster relief, and agreed to promote AADMER as the platform to formulate a common strategy on civil-military cooperation in disaster management.



On 20 and 21 May 2014, Indonesia and Australia co-chaired the ARF Workshop on Consular Contingency and Crisis Response in Bali. The Workshop is aimed at enhancing consular crisis coordination linkages and strengthening the region's preparedness for consular emergencies during times of disaster.

At the global level, Indonesia welcomes closer cooperation with international parties, such as United Nations bodies, NGOs and private sectors to promote the Disaster Risk Reduction. For its commitment and dedication to this cause, Indonesia was awarded the first "Global Champion on Disaster Risk Reduction" during the 3rd Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in Geneva, May 2011. Indonesia believes that the ASEAN-UN Strategic Plan on Disaster Management will help the region in promoting activities related to preparedness and response. Furthermore, Indonesia has been actively engaged in discussions on the disaster risk reduction agenda as a central part of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the post-Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA2) discussions toward the formulation of a new global document on reducing fatalities in disaster situations that is both ambitious and attainable.

Indonesia has engaged in technical cooperation with international organizations in such efforts as the International Workshop on "Enhancing South-South Cooperation Roles on Disaster Risk Management In Asia-Pacific: Focusing on Climate Change Adaptation" in Jakarta, Indonesia from 14 to 17 October 2008, the International Training Program on Disaster Risk Management Focusing on Forest Rehabilitation for Timor Leste in Kupang, Indonesia, on 4 to 18 May 2009, the International Workshops on Disaster Risk Management in Jakarta and Aceh, on 23 and 28 October 2011, and the International Training on Disaster Risk Management, in Yogyakarta, Indonesia from 22 to 30 June 2013.

Indonesia is of the opinion that concrete activities and practical approaches in the framework of international and regional cooperation are crucial to preparations for and rapid response

to natural disaster. Hence, coordination should be ensured among existing arrangements and mechanisms. Harmonization of regulations and approaches will help remove bottlenecks in the flow of international assistance in the aftermath of disasters.

### *III e. Maritime Security*

In the Southeast Asian region, there are multifaceted threats to maritime security such as military threats and state sovereignty issues and non-traditional security issues, such as people smuggling, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, illegal logging, trafficking in persons, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea and maritime terrorism.

Due to its strategic geographical position and being the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia attaches great importance to the issue of maritime security and maritime cooperation. Efforts to address maritime security face a distinctive challenge as it covers both traditional and non-traditional security threats. The region should pay more attention to and promote efforts at advancing regional cooperation and activities that address the issues of maritime security and transnational maritime crimes. At the same time maritime security related issues also represent possible areas of cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

Maritime cooperation is essential to ASEAN since most of its member countries share maritime borders, and almost 80 percent of the region consists of marine domain. Maritime security and cooperation should be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. There is a pressing need for a paradigm shift in addressing maritime issues through the recognition that there is a tremendous potential for partnership.

The issue of maritime security will remain one of Indonesia's main security concerns. Bearing in mind the recent developments of and challenges to maritime security, Indonesia will continue to address these problems accordingly. Indonesia

notes with concern the increasing incidence of illegal fishing in the region, particularly in Indonesia's maritime areas. To protect and maintain security and safety at sea, Indonesia has developed an integrated approach including strengthening law enforcement measures and coastal community development and empowerment.

A milestone in the history of the region is the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in 2010. The AMF and the Expanded AMF are therefore important in promoting better understanding and dialogue on maritime issues in the region including the protection of marine resources and combating maritime crime. Indonesia is of the view that maritime connectivity, which facilitates regional economic development, should be enhanced with the focus on the safety of navigation for persons and vessels at sea. As the region is prone to disaster, the AMF is also an ideal forum for discussion of cooperative activities and arrangements in search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in maritime areas.

Indonesia is pleased to note the 2nd Expanded AMF which was held in Kuala Lumpur on 3 October 2013. The Forum offered an opportunity among EAS participating countries to address common challenges on maritime security. Indonesia deems it important that countries in the wider East Asia region engage one another to promote better understanding and dialogue on maritime issues in the region.

Indonesia is also pleased to host the 6th ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM-MS), which was held in Bali, on 22 and 23 May 2014, and co-chaired by Indonesia, the United States and Republic of Korea. The ISM on MS focused on identifying ways to ensure effective coordination among existing ASEAN-led mechanisms in maritime security. The ISM on MS will also examine regional cooperation in combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, in ensuring maritime safety in the region, and in strengthening maritime search and rescue cooperation. The ISM also reviewed the implementation of ARF Work Plan on Maritime

Security and discussed on the development of the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security 2014-2016.

As piracy has not shown any signs of abating off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa, Indonesia will work closely with the international community to address this grievous challenge in a comprehensive manner and thus prevent it from spilling over to other regions. As safety and security of navigation is critical, Indonesia has established surveillance posts in the Strait of Malacca and is closely cooperating in Malacca Straits Patrol with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

Indonesia views capacity building as an important aspect of maritime security cooperation. All countries in the region should share best practices and resources to ensure effective handling of maritime security issues throughout the region. Indonesia has initiated and is taking part in bilateral and regional arrangements such as coordinated patrol with almost all countries sharing maritime boundaries with Indonesia.

Capacity building cooperation has also been conducted with countries and mechanisms such as the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Meeting (HACGAM), ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum (AFCF), the South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), the Maritime Law Enforcement Training sponsored by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Indonesia-US Coastguard Joint Training, and the Indonesian-Korean Water Police Bilateral Annual Meeting. Furthermore, Indonesia, in cooperation with the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, conducted the Maritime Security Desktop Exercise and Law of the Sea Course in Jakarta from 28 February to 2 March 2012. This initiative was aimed at fostering greater collaboration among maritime security agencies in Indonesia, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Viet Nam. The seminar discussed practical steps to prevent transnational organized crimes,

including robbery at sea.

#### IV. Role of the ARF

Since its inception twenty years ago, the ARF has been the prime security forum in the Asia Pacific. Much The encouraging peace and stability of the region should also be attributed to the ARF. The contribution of the ARF in forging dialogue and at the same time maintaining and increasing climate conducive in the region should not be underestimated. It is a unique forum where there is regular communication and dialogue between its participants, military and civil, that is critically and fundamentally needed to build mutual trust and confidence.

After its existence for two decades, it is inevitable that there is more expectation from the forum especially after the adoption of the Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan in 2011 under the chairmanship of Indonesia. There have been calls for the ARF to be more proactive. It is no secret however that the ARF has a limited role in dealing with traditional security issues but it has achieved its intended purpose and objective as forum for dialogue, consultations and exchange of views.

That said, it should not limit what we can do and achieve within ARF especially on non-traditional security challenges and the nexus between the four main areas of cooperation of the forum. In Indonesia's view, the ARF can do more on areas where there is clear convergence of interests. Cooperation on non-traditional security issues and peacekeeping operations, for instance, have great potentials to be further promoted and strengthened.

As an inclusive forum, the ARF depends entirely on its participants. It is therefore in our interest to see a more robust, substantive, proactive and action-oriented ARF. For that purpose, all participants have to renew their individual and collective commitment. For its part, Indonesia will continue to make its contribution to the ARF through active participation, ideas and initiatives, and co-chairmanship of various ARF activities.


At present, Indonesia is committed to co-chairing ARF meetings including the ISM on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime with New Zealand, the ISM on Maritime Security with the US and the Republic of Korea, and the ARF Workshop on Consular Contingency and Crises Response with Australia.

When it was established, the ARF was the 'sole' political and security architecture in the region. Since then, this ASEAN-driven forum has to adapt to new political and security dynamics and environment of the Asia Pacific region.

Indonesia takes note of the views on where and what the role of the ARF is in evolving regional security architecture. As the main political and security forum in the region, the ARF should continue to strengthen its role and contribution in a complementary manner with other nascent mechanisms, such as the ADMM Plus and the East Asia Summit. Apart from strengthening complementarities and respective comparative advantages, each process can promote better synergy and coordination. One important ingredient that should remain in each process and mechanism is that ASEAN centrality has to be maintained.

Part and parcel of strengthening the ARF is the need to improve its institutional capacity building including the ARF Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat. More substantive interaction and linkages between Track I and Track II should be promoted in particular in complementary activities of the two tracks. Track I will benefit from Track II mechanisms on new ideas, perspectives and initiatives.





**“ It is essential for countries to work together to ensure the peace and security of the international community.”**



## I. Japan's Assessment of the Regional Security Environment

### *i a. Overview*

Rapid shifts in the global power balance after the end of the Cold War have enhanced the significance of the Asia-Pacific region, while deepening the relationships of security interdependence and providing opportunities for cooperation across the region. At the same time, they have caused problems and tensions in the region and made its security environment even more severe. Large-scale military forces remain concentrated in the areas surrounding Japan. Some actors possess nuclear weapons or continue their development. Meanwhile, the region sees the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, etc., becoming more serious; the dangers from international terrorism worsening; increasing risks that could hinder open access to and free use of global commons such as the sea, outer space and cyberspace; and the expansion of transnational threats, including large-scale natural disasters. Under these circumstances, no single country can any longer secure its peace and security on its own. It is essential for countries to work together to ensure the peace and security of the international community.

Among others, issues pertaining to the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, including the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zones”, etc., are significant problems that could develop into destabilizing factors for the Asia-Pacific region. Unilateral attempts to change the status

quo by force or “coercion” in regional affairs including in maritime affair should never be acceptable. Individual countries are required to exercise self-restraint and act in accordance with relevant international laws, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and to respect the general principles of international law such as, for example, the freedom of navigation and the freedom of overflight on the high seas. In this context, the commencement of official consultations between China and ASEAN in 2013 towards the adoption of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea is a welcome development. The consultations should be accelerated so that an effective COC can be adopted as early as possible. The Asia-Pacific region has, on the other hand, been facilitating confidence-building and cooperation in non-traditional security areas through not only bilateral and trilateral relationships, but also multilateral security frameworks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Japan must further promote and develop these multi-layered initiatives to secure the peace and stability of the region.

*i b. North Korea*

North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile development is totally, as it poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the entire international community. North Korea launched missiles in April and December 2012 and conducted a nuclear test in February 2013. North Korea’s acts of provocations have been continuing as is shown by the successive ballistic missile launches in March 2014, constituting a serious destabilizing factor for security in the region that includes Japan.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, including its uranium enrichment activities, violates the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The international community must continue to strongly urge North Korea in a concerted manner to fully comply with the relevant UNSCRs as well as the 2005 Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks, and to refrain from any further acts of provocation.

To this end, it is imperative for each country to steadily implement measures against North Korea pursuant to the relevant UNSCRs. On top of these measures, Japan will also continue to steadily implement its own sanction measures.

It is important for the international community to remain unswayed by North Korea’s provocative rhetoric and to make North Korea understand that such behavior will never be of its benefit. Through close coordination with the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, Russia and other countries concerned, Japan will continue to urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards denuclearization and other goals.

With regard to Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will make utmost efforts towards the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, including the abduction of Japanese citizens, and nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration under the policy of “dialogue and pressure”. The abductions issue is a matter of vital importance concerning Japan’s national sovereignty as well as the life and safety of Japanese citizens. Japan will, under the policy that normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea is impossible without a resolution of the abduction issues, continuously urge Pyongyang to take concrete actions to achieve the return of all the abductees at the earliest possible time.

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## II. Japan’s Security and Defense Policies

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*ii a. Japan’s Security Policy*

*(1) Proactive Contribution to Peace*

The security environment surrounding Japan has become even severer due to the dramatic change in the global power balance and the emerging threats that extend beyond national boundaries. Without the peace and stability of the international community, no nation can maintain its own peace and security. Being well aware of this, and under its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will contribute even more actively in ensuring peace, stability

and prosperity of the international community. In December 2013, Japan established a “National Security Council (NSC)”, which is expected to play a role as a control tower in the implementation of policies related to national security and developed for the first time a “National Security Strategy (NSS)” that illustrates specifically what is meant by Proactive Contribution to Peace.

## *(2) National Security Strategy*

The NSS set out the fundamental policies pertaining to national security, which has been compiled by the Government of Japan for the first time.

By establishing Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation as the fundamental principle of national security, the NSS examines Japan’s national interests and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, the NSS sketches out the security environment surrounding Japan as well as the national security challenges Japan faces, and presents the strategic national security approaches with foreign and defense policies at their core that Japan should adopt.

Japan will continue its path as a peace-loving nation, work in close cooperation with the US and other partners as a major global player in the international community, and implement its national security policies in a steadfast manner, thereby making a more proactive contribution to the peace and stability of the region and the world than ever.

### *ii b. Japan’s Defense Policy*

#### *(1) National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program*

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs) for FY2014 and beyond set forth the basic principles for Japan’s national defense, explain the significance and role of its defense capabilities, and on the basis of these provide fundamental guidelines for future capability development, including the specific forces

posture of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the target level for main equipment improvement. In light of the ongoing deterioration in Japan’s security environment since 2010 when the previous guidelines were drawn up, the Japanese government made a Cabinet decision on the new NDPGs in December 2013 taking the NSS into account.

The new NDPGs set out the following three points: 1) Japan’s own efforts, 2) strengthening of the Japan-US alliance, and 3) the active promotion of security cooperation, as the pillars for the essential defense of the lives and assets of the Japanese people as well as its territorial land, sea and airspace. Japan will build a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” that will enable the SDF to integrate and manage a wide variety of SDF activities, respond to situations seamlessly and appropriately and flexibly conduct such activities under the harsh national security environment. It will also pursue various initiatives on security cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region in a more multi-layered manner than ever before.

The Medium-Term Defense Program (MTDP) is, on the other hand, the first five-year defense build-up program laid out to achieve the target level for defense capabilities set forth in the NDPGs. The improvement of defense capabilities pursuant to the program is estimated to require roughly 24.67 trillion yen based on the FY2013 rates. Of this amount, however, around 700 billion yen is expected to accrue in real terms during the implementation of the program from efforts to improve defense capabilities in an ever-more efficient and streamlined manner such as through coordination with other government measures, procurement reform, etc.

#### *(2) Defense-Related Expenditures*

In addition to the cost of maintaining and operating the SDF, defense-related expenditures in Japan include the cost of improving the living environment in the vicinity of defense facilities and support for US forces stationed in Japan.

As the first-year budget for the new NDPGs and MTDP adopted in December 2013, the FY2014



defense-related expenditures budget includes an array of projects aimed at the establishment of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. Excluding costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and some expenses connected with the realignment of the US forces (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities), the expenditure budget for FY2014 has been increased by 103.5 billion yen (or 2.2%) from the previous fiscal year to 4,783.8 billion yen, marking the second consecutive year of growth. Major factors behind the growth are an increase in personnel expenses stemming from the forthcoming end of the cut to the remunerations of national public servants in order to fund the reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake and the consumption tax hike (from 5% to 8%; effective from April 1, 2014).

Including 12 billion yen in SACO-related expenses and 89 billion yen in the US forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities), Japan's total defense-related expenditure budget for FY2014 amounts to 4,884.8 billion yen, an increase of 131 billion yen or 2.8% from the preceding fiscal year. Since the increase of personnel expenses due to the end of the cut to the remunerations amounts to 101.8 billion yen (or 2% out of the above 2.8%), their substantial growth is only 0.8 %.

### *(3) Japan-U.S. Security Alliance*

Amid an increasingly severer security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, securing the forward deployment of U.S. forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and strengthening the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance are essential not only for the security of Japan, but also for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan and the United States held, in October 2013, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"), where both the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan's Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defense gathered Tokyo for the first time. The two

sides reaffirmed the indispensable role the two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security, and presented the medium- to long-term direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In addition, in the "2+2," the two countries affirmed that they would advance bilateral security and defense cooperation in wide-ranging areas, including the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, maritime security, ballistic missile defense, cyberspace, space, and extended deterrence.

In light of the recent security environment, the U.S. has been making efforts to realize a U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Japan welcomes the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and will cooperate closely with the U.S.

## **III. Japan's Contribution to Regional Security**

### *iii a. Japan's Maritime Security Initiatives*

Securing the safety of navigation is indispensable not only for Japan as a trading country, but also for the international community as a whole, and international coordination and cooperation are crucial to secure it. Furthermore, "Open and Stable Seas" underpinned by a maritime order that is governed not by force or coercion but by laws and rules constitute global commons essential for peace and prosperity of the entire world. Considering that it is necessary to maintain and develop "Open and Stable Seas", Japan has been striving to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight through various initiatives such as anti-piracy operations in Asia and Africa as well as close coordination and cooperation with other countries.

As part of its efforts to secure the freedom and safety of navigation in Asia, Japan has advocated the establishment of a forum to provide EAS member countries with the opportunity to discuss maritime cooperation and maritime issues in the region, which has borne fruit in the form of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). The second EAMF was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in October 2013, where Japan brought

up the importance of maritime connectivity in the Asian region through ensuring the freedom of navigation and “Open and Stable Seas”. In addition, Japan took the initiative in establishing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and actively contributes to the implementation of the ReCAAP through the provision of both funding and dispatching personnel including the Executive Director of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC). In addition, Japan plays a leading role in efforts to utilize the know-how and experiences gained through actions to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery in Asian waters under the ReCAAP in order to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Funded by the contribution of Japan, the ReCAAP ISC convened a centre-to-centre dialogue, in January 2014, gathering representatives and others from the Regional Information Sharing Centers located in the Djibouti Code of Conduct Signatory States. Furthermore, Japan serves with Malaysia as one of the lead countries for “confidence building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, arrangements and cooperation”, which is one of the priority areas for the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, and is planning to host an ARF Workshop on Maritime Security jointly with Malaysia with a view to advancing cooperation, for example, to assist the development of legal framework in the counter-piracy field in ASEAN region. Japan also acted as a co-chair of the ARF Maritime Security Workshop on Marine Environmental Protection Cooperation together with the US, Brunei and China.

### *iii b. Japan's Disaster Relief Initiatives*

Japan has provided active support in the event of large-scale natural disasters occurring in the Asia-Pacific region. In November 2013, Japan dispatched a record number of SDF units as well as civilian medical and expert teams as Japan Disaster Relief Teams to help relief efforts in the Philippines devastated by Typhoon Haiyan. In March 2014, Japan dispatched aircraft and personnel from SDF and Japan Coast Guard as Japan Disaster Relief Teams to cooperate in the

search for a missing Malaysia Airlines plane. Furthermore, in 2013 Japan provided emergency relief goods for four cases and emergency grant aid for four cases to assist victims of major natural disasters including typhoons, floods and earthquakes occurring in ARF participants such as the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar and India.

In the ARF, Japan co-chairs the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) together with Myanmar and China (July 2013 to July 2016). As one of the co-chairs, Japan will work with ARF participants and contribute to ARF activities in order to make regional disaster relief cooperation more effective. The next ISM is scheduled to be held in Japan in 2015.

As part of other multilateral initiatives, Japan actively participates in the EAS, which regards disaster prevention as a priority area, while collaborating with other countries within Japan-China-ROK, Japan-ASEAN and other frameworks to share experience. Moreover, Japan supplies communications equipment to the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) and assists it by linking it with disaster management agencies in ASEAN member countries. It also helps the center to develop a system to build emergency stockpiles and supply them in the event of disasters; relief items from such stockpiles were, for example, provided by ASEAN to the typhoon-ravaged Philippines. In addition, having proposed the strengthening of ASEAN-Japan disaster management cooperation at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit Meeting in December 2013, Japan intends to extend further cooperation to ASEAN.

In March 2015, Japan will host the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City. This is a crucial conference because it is expected to adopt a successor of Hyogo Framework for Action, which is the international guideline for disaster risk reduction. Japan will disseminate worldwide and share with other countries its knowledge on disaster risk reduction and recovery that has been gained from the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake

and other natural disasters. Japan will further accelerate international cooperation in the field of disaster risk reduction by tying up with the ARF ISM on DR and others.

*iii c. Countering Terrorism and Transnational Crimes*

Japan has continuously held multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism consultations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere, primarily with Southeast Asian countries, to enhance international counter-terrorism cooperation. Since 2011, Japan has, together with Malaysia, co-led the field of counter-radicalization, one of the priority areas the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CTTC), and co-hosted the Workshop on Counter Radicalization in Tokyo in February 2013. Meanwhile, supporting specific projects under frameworks such as the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), Japan hold the First ASEAN Plus Japan Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+Japan) in September 2013 to contribute to strengthening measures against terrorism and organized crime in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, in support of building counter-terrorism capacity in Southeast Asian countries, Japan has provided technical assistance, the necessary equipment, etc., in a variety of fields ranging from immigration control and aviation, maritime and port security, to law enforcement.

In response to the terrorist event in Algeria in January 2013, Japan has further intensified international counter-terrorism measures working in tandem with the relevant countries as well as international and regional organizations.

Japan has also reinforced its efforts to combat transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region, first by strengthening international legal frameworks. For example, in accordance with drug-related treaties including the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), Japan has been tackling drug problems in alliance with ARF member countries through measures such as the exchange of information on synthetic drugs and investigative cooperation. Meanwhile, Japan concluded the Convention on Cybercrime in July 2012 and has strived to promote international cooperation pursuant to it since November 2012, when it came into force in the country. For instance, Japan hosted a Workshop on Effective International Cooperation in the Area of Cybercrime Investigation and Prosecution for Asia-Pacific countries in May 2013. Secondly, Japan extends various types of support to developing countries including capacity-building assistance. It supports projects to combat illicit drugs, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, corruption and terrorism in Southeast Asia through the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (CPCJF) and the fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), both managed by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Thirdly, Japan actively promotes policy coordination with various countries and international organizations and participates in regional frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the aforementioned AMMTC and the Bali Process. As part of initiatives to combat cybercrime in particular, ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialogue will be launched in accordance with the agreement reached at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit Meeting in December 2013.

*iii d. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*

Japan is committed to maintaining and enhancing the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has been engaging in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons. Prime examples include adopting a resolution on nuclear disarmament (entitled “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”) submitted to the UN General Assembly every year and contributing to the adoption at the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 of a final



document containing specific, forward-looking action plans for each of the three pillars of the NPT, namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan also leads the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a cross-regional group consisting of 12 non-nuclear-weapon states set up with the purpose of making a practical contribution to steady nuclear risk reduction. With a ministerial meeting of foreign ministers held eight times thus far, the NPDI has contributed to the NPT review process through measures such as submitting working papers to the Preparatory Committees for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and proposing a standard reporting form to nuclear-weapon States. In April 2014, the NPDI held a ministerial meeting in Hiroshima and submitted to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference, which was held immediately after the ministerial meeting, six working papers on the following subjects: nuclear disarmament in the post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) era, increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, nuclear security, establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, de-alerting, and exercise of the right of withdrawal contained in article X of NPT. Through these and other initiatives, Japan will steadily build up realistic efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Japan is engaged in outreach activities in the Asia-Pacific region aimed at achieving three key objectives: 1) promoting the conclusion of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and reinforcing their implementation at the national level; 2) establishing and strengthening export control systems; and 3) raising awareness of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and enhancing related efforts. As part of these activities, Japan has been hosting a range of meetings each year including the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and Asian Export Control Seminars.

### *iii e. Cyberspace and Outer Space*

In response to increasingly diverse and sophisticated cyber-attacks, the development of

systems and capabilities to protect states and the lives and assets of their citizens is a major challenge from both national security and economic perspectives. To this end, Japan is cooperating with countries having a common understanding of the challenge on international rule-making of the application of existing international law and establishment of norms of behavior for activities using cyberspace; support for capacity-building; confidence-building measures; and so forth.

In the Asian region, cyberspace initiatives are discussed within frameworks such as the ARF and ASEAN+3. By taking part in related meetings, Japan is endeavoring to boost cyber security in the region. Japan will increase its support for ASEAN countries in their capacity-building.

Bilateral initiatives include discussions and dialogue with the US, the UK and India, focusing on cyber security matters and it has decided to launch cyber security talks with Russia and the EU. Japan has also been exchanging views with other countries, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE), etc.

In addition to continuing such initiatives, Japan will accelerate ties with ASEAN nations and public/private-sector collaboration to reinforce its efforts to address cyber security issues.

In January 2013, Japan formulated a new Basic Plan on Space Policy covering a five-year period starting from FY2013 with the next decade taken into account. The plan sets out “national security and disaster management” as one of the three priority subjects. Meanwhile, the NSS and the NDPGs which were decided by the Cabinet in December 2013 refer to the growing importance of space from the point of view of security, the existence of risks prohibiting the use of space, securing the stable use of space, promoting the use of space for security purposes, etc.

In order to ensure space security, Japan is required to deal with issues pertaining to increasing space congestion and a lack of transparency in the space activities of other countries, thereby

creating a safe space environment. It is playing an active part in developing international norms to address these points. For instance, Japan has actively participated in discussions toward the formulation of the draft “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” proposed by the EU in 2008 to reduce satellite collisions and space debris risks and curb anti-satellite (ASAT) tests and activities, while encouraging ASEAN and other countries to take part in talks on the Code of Conduct. Japan, the US and Indonesia are planning to jointly host the 2nd ARF Workshop on Space Security in Tokyo in the autumn of 2014.

*iii f. Preventive Diplomacy*

Japan believes that it is important for the ARF to make steady progress from the first stage of the “promotion of confidence-building measure” to the second stage of “development of preventive diplomacy” and further to the third stage of “approaches to dispute settlement”. However, it considers that although the cumulative efforts of the countries in the ARF have so far succeeded in facilitating confidence-building measure to a certain extent, progress toward the development of preventive diplomacy has only just begun. In this context, Japan welcomes recent attempts to promote preventive diplomacy through concrete measures such as the provision of training resources as is witnessed by the fact that ARF Round-table on Training Resources for Preventive Diplomacy was convened in March 2014. It will continue to examine how to advance preventive diplomacy in cooperation with ARF participants.

*iii g. ADMM-Plus Initiatives*

The ADMM-Plus process provides a framework for addressing a wide range of security issues common to the region. Japan is actively committed to this process with the aim of developing the forum into a key pillar of regional security cooperation.

Within the ADMM-Plus framework, six Expert Working Groups (EWGs) have been established to increase concrete cooperation

among militaries in handling security issues common to member countries: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counter terrorism, military medicine, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian mine action. Japan is taking part in each EWG to further enhance regional security cooperation by actively exchanging views with other countries and making proposals.

Japan has thus far helped to intensify cooperation among member countries in military medicine areas by acting as co-chair of the EWG on military medicine along with Singapore, holding field training exercises on HA/DR and military medicine in Brunei in June 2013 and so on. Moreover, it has been decided that Japan will co-chair the EWG on HA/DR together with Laos from this year.

The ADMM Plus is a vital framework providing member countries with the opportunity to conduct multilateral talks on a wide range of regional security issues in an open manner. Japan believes it is important for this forum to remain open without putting any restriction on the issues that it deals with, while allowing participating countries to discuss these candidly.

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#### **IV. Japan’s Future Contribution to Improving ARF Functions**

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As a framework for a frank dialogue on the security issues of the entire Asia-Pacific region, the ARF has contributed to confidence-building in the region. At the same time, as an action-oriented framework, as typified by the implementation of large-scale exercises such as the ARF-Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx), it has steadily advanced cooperation and specific initiatives in non-traditional security issues including counter-terrorism, disaster relief, non-proliferation and disarmament, maritime security, and peacekeeping operations. Demonstrating its initiative in an array of areas in concrete terms, Japan will continue to make a proactive contribution to improving the functions of the ARF itself as well as deepening its ties with other regional security frameworks.

Of particular note is the fact that although the EAS is steadily securing a foothold as a framework offering opportunities for summit-level dialogue on a broad range of subjects centering on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region, it has yet to build a foundation that is solid enough to put top-level initiatives into practice, partly because of its short history. Considering that collaboration between the EAS and the ARF, whose foundation for the implementation of concrete initiatives has been developing relatively smoothly, may open a new frontier in their activities (for example, the EAS initiatives could increase the functions of the ARF, while the ARF could turn the ideas discussed by the EAS into concrete action), Japan intends to lead discussions on regional cooperation between the two frameworks.





**“ While traditional security issues remain the principal threat to Malaysia, non-traditional threats have become a major concern for Malaysia as they have the ability to challenge national law enforcement agencies and have the potential to undermine regional security and stability.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

In the 21st Century, greater attention is given to asymmetrical threats as a new dimension in strategic defence in this region. The nature of threats and security discourses are changing and this expanding security issue has gone beyond state and military security. Against this new security environment, threats such as terrorism and trans-boundary crime have received greater focus internationally. While traditional security issues remain the principal threat to Malaysia, non-traditional threats have become a major concern for Malaysia as they have the ability to challenge national law enforcement agencies and have the potential to undermine regional security and stability.

Terrorism has emerged as a long term threat to regional and international security, especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America (US). Malaysia's current main concerns are the two actively organised militant and terrorist groups, which are the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jamaah Islamiah (JI). Apart from terrorism, armed robbery, piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking and migrant smuggling are also viewed as security challenges that need to be addressed comprehensively.

Piracy has been significantly reduced as a result of increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation and coordinated efforts by regional navies and enforcement agencies. The advent of the MALSINDO coordinated joint patrols and the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) programme in the Straits of Malacca involving Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia since 2005 has contributed to improved security in the Straits of Malacca.

Drug trafficking, involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of narcotic substance is another non-military challenge faced by the region. The Golden Triangle which infamously known for drug production is located in this region. The drugs menace is worsening as a result of the increase of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), the second most widely used drugs worldwide after cannabis.

Of increasing importance as a threat to the states and the people is the cyber threats which are also asymmetric. Cyber threats are growing and have impacted all nations due to the increasing global dependence on technology. It is paramount to develop an effective and comprehensive national/regional cyber-security strategy to counter these threats.

## II. National Security and Defence Policy

### *ii a. Overview of National Security and Defence Policy*

The National Defence Policy is the manifestation of Malaysia's aim to defend itself and protect areas of national interests. Malaysia's Fundamental Principles of Defence are as follows:

#### *(i) Self-Reliance*

Malaysia must depend on its own resources and capabilities to safeguard its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Hence, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) must possess the ability to respond to any enemy military hostility. This ability also encompasses logistics support, human resources and defence industry. Therefore the development of a viable defence industry and the presence of defence science and research institution are critical.

#### *(ii) Total Defence (HANRUH)*

Total and integrated defence involves many government agencies, the private sector, NGOs and the citizenry in all circumstances. National defence is not the sole responsibility of the MAF but the responsibility of all levels of society. All parties should know the role and contribution

that they could play in times of disaster and conflict.

National defence has to be based on self-confidence and not depending on external parties. Within this context patriotism and nationalism among Malaysians always need to be nurtured and with the realisation that national prosperity and peace override individual needs and political ideology.

#### *(iii) Commitment towards the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)*

Malaysia views the FPDA as a "safety net" should events outside the capability of the MAF occur. Besides Malaysia, the other FPDA members are Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and United Kingdom. The FPDA is the only multilateral defence cooperation which Malaysia has been a member of since 1971. Although it remains untested at war or conflict, the FPDA is an effective conflict management tool and has contributed towards MAF's development and enhancement of its professionalism.

#### *(iv) Supporting The United Nations' Efforts Towards Global Peace*

Malaysia fully supports the effort of the UN and the international community to preserve universal peace and security. Malaysia has adopted a proactive approach in addressing global issues in line with its foreign policy. Malaysia's involvement under the UN's banners started in 1960 in Congo. Now Malaysia is actively involved in UN Peacekeeping operations as Military Observers, Battalion Group, Headquarters Staff Group and UN Technical. MAF's involvement in UN missions is not restricted to peacekeeping only but also peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance duties. Malaysia is a party to the UN Standby Arrangements 1996 and as stipulated in the arrangement, party shall have an infantry battalion on standby for deployment under the UN if necessary. Up to now more than 25,000 MAF members have been involved in UN operations.

Malaysia is fully supportive of the various treaties and conventions on global arms control and disarmament regime. As a party to the NPT and CTBT Malaysia observes the ban on all forms of nuclear weapons and testing with a view for a total ban of such activities.

Malaysia's commitment is in line with the spirit of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) which came into force in March 1997.

Malaysia also supports the ban on the manufacture, development and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons in line with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1993. Additionally Malaysia has taken the steps to ban the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines upon ratifying the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling and transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) in April, 1999. Subsequently this was followed by the gazetting of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act 2000 and the total destruction of anti-personnel mines stock in 2001.

(v) *Counter Measures against Terrorism*

Terrorism remains a critical security issue for Malaysia. The trans-boundary activities of terrorist groups involve a variety of ethnic groups and nationalities. Therefore any country could potentially be the centre for terrorist activities. Malaysia is confident that comprehensive actions at all levels are important to address and counter terrorism in its infancy.

(vi) *Defence Diplomacy*

Malaysia recognizes defence diplomacy as an important effort towards conflict prevention and escalation which could undermine peace and

stability. Among the steps towards this are confidence building measures, transparency, construction of positive norms and establishment of channels of communication. These efforts are implemented through joint exercises, information sharing, senior officers' visits, exchange of officers and the provision of military education and training facilities.

Malaysia employs the defence diplomacy approach through bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation.

## EXTERNAL DEFENCE RELATIONS

As a member of ASEAN, Malaysia gives high priority to the effort to ensure regional peace and development and maintains strong defence cooperation with other ASEAN members. Malaysia recognises the significance of establishing defence cooperation with countries outside of ASEAN especially in Asia-Pacific and Europe. The defence cooperation between Malaysia and these countries is based on the interest of Malaysia's economy which is developing fast. Hence stability and prosperity in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific is beneficial to Malaysia.

## DEVELOPING DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY

The main objective of developing the nation's defence capability is to build a MAF that is integrated and balanced with the combination of assets and other resources for the purpose of national defence. Fundamentally, MAF's development has taken into consideration all the dimensions of modern warfare capabilities i.e. land, sea, air and electromagnetic spectrum as current warfare involves all four spectrums.

MAF's human resource development objective is to create personnel that is trained in basic military skills and equipped with excellent equipment to fight under any operational situation. The human resources are MAF's most important and valuable asset.

The professional development of human



resources through a combination of education and training programme is in line with the concept of a K-Force. Continuous education and training is the key to the creation of a K-Force. A variety of theoretical, practical, full and part-time as well as short and long term courses are offered to MAF personnel. To this end the National Defence University of Malaysia (NDU) was established in 2006. Improvements to the human resource management system that focuses on enhancing the quality of life of MAF personnel by providing better health and accommodation facilities is to ensure that the living environment of military personnel is holistic and integrated.

There is a need to improve management skills especially in Research and Development (R&D) and acquisition system. Hence the MAF needs to be equipped with the best affordable defence system. The acquired systems must meet the operational standards of all services and suited to operational and doctrinal concepts. The defence system will also be introduced into service following intensive tests and evaluation.

The military infrastructure is the basic platform to support military operations. Even though most infrastructure development is implemented by the public sector, the MAF still needs to improve its construction and engineering capability and skills. In addition to infrastructure specifically built for defence purposes of strategic national installations, assets and other infrastructure have to have the capability and capacity to meet future defence needs in line with the HANRUH concept.

An important consideration in national defence planning is to ensure that the MAF has access to national public resources as a way of enhancing any particular operation or mitigating a crisis. Modern warfare is no longer restricted to the military but is all-encompassing in nature. The enemy could be expected to use all possible means to achieve its objective. To address the situation Malaysia needs to aspire to and be able to strengthen its defence capability using all available public resources and policies particularly HANRUH.

The development of a highly capable force is needed for rapid deployment to any trouble spots to conduct military operations. To strengthen both defence strategies information technology capabilities need to be created, updated and applied for gathering, dominating and accurately providing information within the electronic spectrum. The operational “jointness” among the three MAF services is the key to its operational success.

### Air Superiority

Airspace command is the prerequisite for the success of land, sea and air operations. The MAF requires defensive and offensive capabilities to ensure complete air superiority at all times within all three areas of national interests.

### Maritime Operations

MAF has to be able to maintain superiority over Malaysia’s maritime territory in order to defend the nation’s maritime sovereignty. Maritime superiority also includes the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s (RMAF) and the Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) ability to repel any encroachment into Malaysian maritime realm. This includes the control of port entry points and critical choke points such as the Straits of Malacca and Straits of Singapore as well as the sea lanes of communication between Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore.

### Land Operations

The strength of land operations depends on the Malaysian Army to operate jointly with RMAF and RMN. The completion of the mission requires capable weapons systems, fire-power, mobility, protection and logistics support. Malaysia’s long borders require the MAF to possess rapid reaction capabilities as a combined force to face any threats.

### DEFENCE FUNDING

A defence allocation based on the country’s financial capability is needed to ensure that the MAF continues to be able to meet any challenges

against national interests. In order to achieve the desired effectiveness, decisions on defence allocation are made based on the following principles:

*(i) Affordability*

The Government recognises defence as an important function of governance. Notwithstanding this the defence sector is capital-intensive and meeting its requirements depends on national funding ability. The principle of affordability is the basic consideration for deciding on the types of assets to be acquired and projects to be implemented.

*(ii) Allocation not based on GDP*

The allocation for the defence sector is not based on certain fixed percentages in the national budget but on priorities and national funding availability. In the interest of transparency all details of the defence sector allocation is debated in Parliament during the tabling of the Supply Bill. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate debate the defence allocation prior to its approval.

### III. National Contributions To Regional Security

*iii a. COUNTER-TERRORISM*

*i. Promoting a People-Centered Approach to Counter-Terrorism*

Malaysia believes in a multifaceted approach in combating terrorism by addressing the underlying contributing factors that support terrorism; undertaking strict and firm enforcement measures; adopting and implementing legislative measures; enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies; and enhancing inter-agency cooperation.

Terrorism needs to be addressed in a more comprehensive manner and not through military power alone. There is a need to undertake developmental efforts that would address social and economic needs, which is, a dominant factor for people engaging in terrorism. Winning the

hearts and minds of the people is more effective than other measures combined.

Sharing of ideas and expertise in de-radicalization and counter radicalization programmes are essential in addressing the root causes of terrorism. Enhanced capacity building is required for countries to keep pace with the latest tactics of terrorist operations particularly in addressing the growing trends in the use of internet to communicate and disseminate terrorist propaganda materials.

The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) was established on 1 July 2003 to conduct research, capacity-building and public awareness programmes in countering terrorism. As of May 2014, SEARCCT has conducted 136 capacity-building programmes, attended by 4,099 local and foreign participants. SEARCCT also conducts research activities in terrorism and counter-terrorism related issues such as aviation security, youth and terrorism, the process of radicalisation and cyber security via field-work and academic exercises. SEARCCT has also published articles and monographs and is involved in delivering papers and lectures at the local, regional and international level.

SEARCCT also works closely with various countries and organisations in conducting its capacity-building programmes and research activities. Some of the Centre's main collaborating partners are New Zealand, France, Canada, United States of America and Japan, through the Japan-ASEAN Integrated Fund (JAIF). Aside from these countries, SEARCCT, in collaboration with United Nations' agencies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), have conducted several courses since 2011.

*ii. Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes*

Malaysia enacted the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) in 2012 to replace the Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960. SOSMA provides special measures relating to security offences for the purpose of maintaining security and public order. SOSMA works in tandem with the Penal Code, Malaysia's main criminal law. The Penal Code has been amended by including Chapter VI A (Offences Relating to Terrorism). This new chapter was specially formulated to criminalize terrorism acts as well as other related acts such as providing assistance to the terrorist, recruiting persons to be members of terrorist groups or to participate in terrorist acts and harbouring persons committing terrorist acts.

The Malaysian Anti Money Laundering Act (AMLA) was passed in 2001 and came into force in January 2002. The Act requires reporting institutions (especially financial institutions) to conduct customer due diligence (CDD) and provide suspicious transaction report (STR) to the relevant regulatory authority. It was amended in 2003 to include measures to combat against terrorism financing. Following the amendment, AMLA was renamed Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA). The amended legislation comprehensively provides for the freezing of terrorist funds and for the implementation of UNSCR 1267 and to a larger extent, UNSCR 1373. Malaysia has an obligation to gazette the list of terrorists under UNSCR 1267 for individuals linked to the Al-Qaeda and Taliban groups, and under UNSCR 1373 for terrorists belonging to other groups.

### *iii. Measures Against Terrorism Financing*

At the regional level, Malaysia continues to cooperate with international partners in strengthening Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) measures. In May 2000, Malaysia became a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regional-style organisation and has since strived to comply with the implementation of the 40 + 9 recommendations of the FATF. The 16th Annual Meeting of APG was held from 15-

19 July 2013 in Shanghai, China. The meeting mainly focussed on the APG's strategic direction and work programme. Malaysia presented its report and was accepted during the meeting which reflects the nation's significant progress on AML/CTF regulatory.

The Asia Pacific Group Mutual Evaluation Exercise on Money Laundering (APG MEE) would be carried out on Malaysia in August 2014. The APG MEE provides an independent assessment of Malaysia's AML/CFT programme and its compliance with the international standards. In early 2007, the second round of APG Mutual Evaluation Exercise rated Malaysia as "Largely Compliant" against the FATF recommendations.

Malaysia is currently in the midst of reviewing the AMLATFA. The new amendments intend to reflect the internal standards and domestic requirements. The amendments would enhance the investigation powers of the law enforcement agencies. The amendment will result in greater clarity on reporting obligations, greater enforcement powers and higher penalties.

Malaysia continues to promote sharing of financial intelligence as well as enhancing knowledge and upgrading skills required in financial investigations at the regional and international level with the establishment of the Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Department (FIED) under the Central Bank.

Out of the 13 international conventions and protocols on combating terrorism, Malaysia is a State Party to nine (9). The Government has agreed that Malaysia accedes to the four (4) remaining conventions and protocols, only after certain legislative and administrative adjustments/amendments are completed.

Malaysia has amended the Penal Code as well as the Criminal Procedure Code to further strengthen Malaysia's domestic counter terrorism legal framework. In addition, the Government is in the process of amending the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 to give effect to the requirements of the 1988 Convention for the



Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platform Located on the Continental Shelf.

*iii b. NON-PROLIFERATION, COUNTER PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

*(i) National Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540*

On 6 May 2010, the Malaysian Parliament approved the new comprehensive law on export control, known as the Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010. The new law was published in the Government gazette on 10 June 2010. The Act enables Malaysia to effectively supervise and control the export, trans-shipment, transit and brokering of all strategic items, including arms and related material as well as other activities that will or may facilitate the design, development and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. To underline its seriousness, the punishments for transgressions under the Act are very severe. Malaysia is ready to share its experience in establishing this comprehensive regulatory framework on export control with other States.

Malaysia does not possess chemical weapons. It has, however, a growing chemical industry. Malaysia therefore has been continuously working closely with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in ensuring that its chemical industry is for peaceful purpose and its development benefits the nation.

Malaysia's National Authority Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), which was officially established in September 2006 in conjunction with the promulgation of the CWC Act 2005, has been coordinating Malaysia's participation at various international training courses organised by the OPCW.

Throughout the year 2012, Malaysia hosted three

OPCW programmes, including the "Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention and Chemical-Safety-and-Security Management for Member States of the OPCW in the Region of Southeast and South Asia" in Kuala Lumpur, from 8 to 11 May 2012. This seminar was organized by the NACWC in collaboration with the OPCW, Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH), and Pharmaceutical Services Division (PSD).

Malaysia, representing the Asian Group for the term 2014-2016, is currently a member of the Executive Council (EC) of the OPCW. This is the fourth time that Malaysia is serving as a member of the EC since the establishment of the OPCW in 1997. Previously, Malaysia was member of the Council for the term 2004-2006, 2007-2009 and 2011-2013.

As a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Malaysia continues to fully adhere to its obligations to the Convention. Malaysia recognizes the importance for States Parties to undertake necessary measures, including constitutional process to implement the provisions of the Convention as stipulated under Article IV of the BWC. In demonstrating Malaysia's commitment to the BWC, Malaysia is in the process of formulating a comprehensive Biological Weapons Convention Bill, which would reinforce the existing STA 2010.

Given that the tremendous progress in the bio-sciences is increasingly more reachable through the medium of modern information technology, Malaysia strongly believes that there is a need to enhance scientific and technological cooperation between State Parties both for the social-economic progress of developing countries that are people centred and socially responsible, and for the fight against infectious diseases and the threats of bio-terrorism. Malaysia, through its Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), an Agency under the Ministry of Defence, has formed a technical cooperation programme in 2012 with the Cooperative Biological Engagement Programme (CBEP), Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the United States in the field of

biosecurity. This new initiative would enhance Malaysia's capacity to protect the country against the biological threats and aims to prevent bio-crime through cooperation on safety working practices, accurate techniques and procedures for assessing risks of biological misuse.

(ii) *Non-Proliferation*

Malaysia continues to pursue for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Achieving this rests on the fulfilment of the basic bargain embodied in the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Despite some progress, concerns still remain on the slow progress in the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Nuclear Weapons States, lack of transparency, the high alert status of nuclear weapons, the continuing pursuit of nuclear programmes by a few countries and the insistence of some others to remain outside the NPT. The ongoing 2015 NPT Review Conference cycle serves as a good foundation for all the Treaty's nuclear-weapon States to substantiate their unequivocal commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Malaysia continues to play a constructive role in promoting international peace and security. Malaysia is of the view that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and the full and effective implementation of the NPT obligations, in particular by Nuclear-Weapon States, plays a crucial role in achieving a nuclear weapon-free world.

Malaysia has been a strong advocate for the realisation of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The realisation of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East is of utmost urgency. The recent Plan of Action adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, provides hope for possible movement towards the realisation of the NWFZ in the Middle East.

Malaysia considers the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a primary disarmament instrument. Malaysia joins the CTBTO in calling upon the remaining Member States, especially those in the Annex 2, to immediately sign the CTBT. Malaysia looks forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty. Malaysia had ratified the CTBT on 17 January 2008.

Malaysia participates actively in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. Malaysia welcomes the NSS process as it has proved useful in paving the way for countries to work closely and effectively in strengthening global efforts on nuclear security, in particular the security of nuclear material and the prevention of these materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Following the conclusion of the recent 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, it would be necessary for all participating countries to take stock and assess what concrete results has the NSS process achieved, and what impact this will have on the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and how this assessment would affect the future of the process.

With regard to arms control, Malaysia had been supportive and constructive throughout the process of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Malaysia had voted in favour of all the resolutions related to the ATT and was seen by other member states, as well as the Presidents of the July 2012 ATT Conference and March 2013 ATT Final Conference, as being a country that can bridge divides. During the July 2012 ATT Conference, Malaysia worked with a number of Asia-Pacific countries regarding the language on trans-shipment, and a broader cross-regional coalition on language relating to the scope of items, and the goals and objectives of the Treaty.

In addition, Malaysia had hosted, together with the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), a regional disarmament meeting entitled "Asia Regional Meeting to Facilitate Dialogue on the Arms Trade Treaty", held in Kuala Lumpur on 26 - 27 February 2013. Malaysia was also the facilitator on the issue of transit or trans-shipment as well as a member of the Drafting Committee during the Final ATT Conference. Malaysia had

signed the ATT on 26 September 2013 and is currently working on its ratification process.

iii c. *TRANSNATIONAL CRIME*

i. *Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crimes*

Malaysia participated in the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) which was held from 16-19 September 2013 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. During the meeting, ASEAN countries adopted a joint statement to further strengthen the cooperation in the fight against transnational criminals, which is a major challenge and poses a danger to the region's socio-economic development. The 9th AMMTC also adopted a new ASEAN work plan to combat transnational crime from 2013-2015 and tasked ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) to fully implement the action plan. Malaysia will host the next 10th AMMTC in 2015.

Malaysia had undergone a peer review under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Implementation Review Group process, which addressed the implementation of Chapter III on Criminalization and Law Enforcement, and Chapter IV on International Cooperation. UNCAC review process was initiated in order to identify challenged and good practices as well as to consider technical assistance requirements by states parties in order to ensure effective implementation of the Convention. On 7 February 2013, UNCAC experts from Kenya and the Philippines, together with the UNODC Secretariat visited Malaysia to obtain information and further inputs on Malaysia's implementation of both chapters. Malaysia submitted the report of its review during the 4th Session of the UNCAC Implementation Review Group Meeting which was held from 21-31 May 2013 in Vienna, Austria.

ii. *Promoting Collaboration on the Prevention*

*of Diversion of Precursors into Illicit Drug Manufacture*

Malaysia had participated actively in the sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) which were held annually under the auspices of the UNODC. The CND enables member countries to discuss current situation regarding the issue and initiate new and effective measures in combating drug trafficking. During the side event of the Fifty-Sixth Session of the CND that was held in Vienna, Austria from 11-15 March 2013, Malaysia held an exhibition on the 1Malaysia Cure & Care Clinic to promote Malaysia's success story and best practices in the efforts to combat drugs abuse.

Malaysia Cure & Care Clinic is an initiative by National Anti-Drugs Agency (AADK) on drug treatment measures through a medical based approach. This clinic provides open access services to drug abusers, drug users, co-dependent, employers and individuals with drug problems, to get treatment and rehabilitation from medical specialists / psychiatrists, social workers and counsellors without having to face the possibility of being charged under the prevailing laws.

Malaysia also participated actively in the Asia-Pacific Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA) which is organised by the UNODC. During the 36th Meeting of HONLEA, which was held in Bangkok, Thailand from 30 October-2 November 2012, member countries discussed on major regional drug trafficking trends and the countermeasures. The meeting also provided a venue for practitioner and law enforcement agents to exchange expertise, share best practices and information on drug-related matters to develop a coordinated response to existing and emerging challenges. The 2012 HONLEA, Asia and the Pacific, focused on three important topics on Precursor Chemicals, Production of ATS and Undertaking Cross-Border Investigations.

Malaysia aims to become a drug-free country in by the year 2015 and this is in line with the



Government Transformation Programme (GTP) which reflects the Government's commitment towards combating drug trafficking nationally and regionally. It is also in line with the ASEAN's target to create a drug-free region by the year 2015.

*iii. Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism*

Malaysia welcomes the continued engagement of ARF participants to discuss the issue of terrorism within the ARF framework. This includes regional efforts in strengthening transportation security against international terrorism. In addition, ARF could also work on similar initiative with other forums such as the APEC framework that also promotes transportation security.

*iii d. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF*

The National Security Council Directive No. 20 (NSC No. 20): The Policy and Mechanism for National Disaster and Relief Management is the main guideline for disaster management in Malaysia. The directive prescribes the mechanism for the management of disasters including the responsibilities and functions of related agencies under an integrated emergency management system. Due to the high intensity, complexity and occurrences of disasters, Malaysia took the initiative to review and improve the National Security Council Directive No. 20 in 2012. The revision was done to harmonise the Directive with ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), incorporating elements such as prevention and preparedness in facing disasters.

*(i) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation*

Flood mitigation activities are given serious attention as floods are the most significant natural hazard in Malaysia. Flood Mitigation Projects were incorporated in the "Five Year Malaysia Plan" and a total of RM1.79 billion (USD 56.2 million) was spent for structural flood mitigation measures for the Ninth Malaysia Plan

(2001 to 2005). For structural flood control works, RM5.81 billion (USD18.2 million) was allocated in the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010). The Government of Malaysia has also allocated funding for the implementation of Flood Mitigation Plan in the flood-prone states in Malaysia in its 2012 annual budget.

### SMART Tunnel

Apart from conventional Flood Mitigation Projects, the SMART Tunnel was constructed as an innovative solution to alleviate the problem of flash flood in the Kuala Lumpur city centre. SMART is an acronym for Storm water Management and Road Tunnel, a project under the Federal Government to alleviate the flooding problem in the city centre by diverting large volumes of flood water from entering this critical stretch of traffic via a holding pond, bypass tunnel and storage reservoir, preventing spill over during heavy downpours. Although it was mooted primarily to mitigate recurring floods in the city, the dual purpose concept was born from the ingenuity of the project proponents; thus the 3km motorway tunnel was integrated into the system to relieve traffic congestion at the main southern gateway to the city centre.

The SMART project has been documented in the World Bank Publication entitled Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters – the Economics of Effective prevention which was launched during the 3rd Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction as an example of best practices for return of investment in disaster prevention. The widely acclaimed project was also selected as a recipient of the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in conjunction with the World Habitat Day 2011 on 12 September 2011 in Nairobi.

*(ii) Disaster Preparedness*

### Early Warning Systems

The Government of Malaysia has put in place flood forecasting and early warning systems in order to warn the public of disasters in a timely manner. This integrated system comprised hundreds of rainfall and water level stations,

manual sticks gauges, boards and sirens installed at strategic locations all over Malaysia.

A National Tsunami Early Warning System has been developed by the Meteorological Department after the December 2004 tsunami to forewarn the public of the possible occurrence of tsunami over the Indian Ocean, South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean.

The Fixed-Line Disaster Alert System (FLAS) is also being utilised to promote awareness and disseminate early warnings on disasters to the public. A separate system known as the Government Integrated Radio Network (GIRN) is put in place to provide radio communication between responders during emergency or disaster. Disaster reporting is centralised through the Malaysia Emergency Response System (MERS) emergency hotline: “999”. The mass media is an effective platform to disaster preparedness among the public. To fully realise this potential, the Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture has established a Disaster Unit in the Department of Broadcasting Malaysia. This is coordinated at the regional level by the Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU).

Related Government agencies in Malaysia utilise the internet as a medium to disseminate early warning and disaster situation information such as the Air Pollution Index, near real-time river level, air visibility, weather situation and forecast, alternative roads, and hotspots. Beginning from the monsoon season of 2011, the National Security Council started using social media to disseminate information on disasters, in addition to the postings on the Council’s web portal.

(iii) *Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response*

### **Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART)**

Malaysia formed its disaster assistance and rescue team in August 1995. The Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team or SMART, specializes in search and rescue of victims in catastrophic incidences on land. The team is also

deployed to assist in disaster incidences that require specialized tools and equipment that are beyond the capability of existing rescue teams. Malaysia’s SMART team was deployed for overseas search and rescue missions in Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and the Philippines. Its membership consists of 85 officers and members from the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysia Police and the Fire and Rescue Department.

Malaysia is currently seeking to have the SMART Team classified under the INSARAG External Classification (IEC). Being classified under the IEC will generate a new paradigm of a more integrated team of professionals that is able to speak a common global search and rescue language and to render assistance to disaster ridden countries in a more professional manner. United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD), Subang, Malaysia.

Malaysia is presently hosting the 5th United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) at the Subang Military Airbase. The construction of the Depot was completed on 9 April 2012. The Malaysian Government covered the cost of construction of the Depot – USD5.34 million (RM17 million), and has agreed to contribute USD1million yearly for its operations. The Depot is run by The World Food Programme (WFP).

In September 2012, 27 WFP participants from various Asian countries attended a three-day simulation and training programme held at the UNHRD in Subang. The programme was also joined by the local police, army, the Malaysia Red Crescent, St. John Ambulance Malaysia, MERCY Malaysia, the SMART Team and the National Security Council of Malaysia.

(iv) *ASEAN Context*

### **ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance**

The AADMER, in Malaysia’s view, is proof of ASEAN’s commitment towards reducing losses and improving the region’s joint emergency

response to disasters. It is the first of its kind agreement that binds Southeast Asian states together to address disaster risk reduction and improve their preparedness for disaster response and is the only Hyogo Framework for Action-related legally binding instrument in the world. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), being the operational engine to implement the AADMER is part of this commitment to having a disaster resilient community by the year 2015.

The Government of Malaysia will demonstrate its full commitment to the implementation of AADMER by contributing to the AHA Centre Fund and the AADMER Fund.

(v) *Humanitarian Assistance*

Malaysia has always been very forthcoming in helping out countries in need. Malaysia's commitments in this regard have always been on a bilateral level rather than through United Nations' channels.

On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck Central Philippines, of which the Malaysian Government contributed USD1 million, together with humanitarian assistance in the form of Armed Forces Medical Team, SMART Team, food items, equipped field hospital and other emergency relief aid. For the year 2012, Malaysia contributed a sum of USD340,000 to assist the famine crisis in Democratic People's Republic of Korea, USD25,000 to assist victims of landslide in Papua New Guinea, USD1 million for victims of the 2011 floods in Pakistan, USD 500,000 to assist drought victims in Somalia and USD1 million to assist Typhoon Sendong victims in the Philippines.

On 7 December 2012, Malaysia sent RM350,000 worth of emergency aid to victims of Typhoon Bhopa in the Southern Philippines. The humanitarian assistance aimed to ease the suffering faced by the victims affected by the Typhoon Bhopa. Another humanitarian assistance worth RM250,000 was also sent on 14 December 2012 to the Philippines.

Malaysia's involvement in the humanitarian and disaster relief assistance is based on a three-pronged approach i.e. Government to Government, involvement through NGOs and people-to-people participation.

Since most of Malaysia's humanitarian assistance at the international level was done in the context of bilateral relations, the assistance has been disbursed either through direct financial contribution or in kind contribution. From the year 2004 to the end of 2012, Malaysia's bilateral humanitarian assistance to other countries amounted to USD 21.78 million.

Malaysia had also dispatched medical relief missions spearheaded by the Malaysian Army to various places such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Pakistan. The SMART Team had also taken part in various relief missions, i.e. in Indonesia, Taiwan and Turkey.

At the multilateral level, Malaysia's contributions were also channelled through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), established during the 60th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 15 December 2005. In 2006, Malaysia gave a financial contribution of USD50,000 to CERF. Malaysia further contributed USD100,000 to CERF from 2007 to 2011. In 2012, Malaysia contributed another USD50,000 to CERF.

Malaysia's NGOs have further strengthened the country's presence internationally. MERCY Malaysia, Global Peace Mission of Malaysia, AMAN Malaysia, Viva Palestine and the Malaysian Red Crescent Society are among local NGOs which are actively involved in international humanitarian efforts.

The involvement from the Malaysian public also attests to the Malaysia's commitment in humanitarian assistance globally. A special fund has been established to manage and supervise contributions from the public. Since its establishment in 2006, the fund has disbursed more than USD2.2 million worth of assistance in direct financial aid or through reconstruction projects for victims of natural disasters in



Afghanistan, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Thailand and Somalia.

(vi) *World Humanitarian Summit*

The World Humanitarian Summit regional consultation for North and Southeast Asia will take place on 23 and 24 July 2014 in Tokyo, Japan. The consultation will provide the region an opportunity to identify key issues and present recommendations for the Secretary-General's report and the World Humanitarian Summit scheduled to be held in Istanbul, Turkey in May 2016. The Summit will focus on four major themes: Humanitarian Effectiveness, Transformation through Innovation, Reducing Vulnerability & Managing Risk, and Serving the Needs of People in Conflict. Participation by Member States is foreseen at the Director-General level from respective Ministries or relevant institutions with two places reserved per Member State at the regional consultation.

Tan Sri Dr Jemilah Mahmood, Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of Teach For Malaysia and founder and former President of MERCY Malaysia, has been appointed to head the World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat at the United Nations headquarters from 8 May 2014 in New York.

The World Humanitarian Summit, an initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is an opportunity for governments, UN and intergovernmental agencies, regional organisations, non-profits and civil society actors, the private sector, academia as well as people affected by crises to come together, to take stock of humanitarian action, discuss the changing landscape, share knowledge and best practices, and chart a forward looking agenda.

(vii) *ARF Disaster Relief Exercises 2015*

Under the ARF framework, Malaysia and China will be hosting the ARF Disaster Relief Exercises 2015 (ARF DiREx 2015) in the Northern part of Peninsular Malaysia from 1-6 February 2015.

The main focus of ARF DiREx 2015 will be to test

the civil-military coordination efforts, create synergy, and synchronize efforts towards supporting the effective implementation of the AADMER as the common platform for disaster management of the region. It will also continue the progress made by the previously held ARF DiREx and "take on" some of the recommendations made by the previous Co-Chairs.

In addition to the above, the ARF DiREx 2015 is expected to test the region's preparedness and resilience to address the following specific challenges:

- (i) Strengthen the effective utilisation and quick deployment of the ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response, including the ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT);
- (ii) Effective operationalisation of the AHA Centre and its important role as the operational engine of AADMER to enhance regional cooperation in disaster management and ensure ASEAN's collective response to disasters in the region;
- (iii) Coordination of multi-national maritime search and rescue;
- (iv) Management of mass casualties which among others would involve communication breakdown and engineering difficulties;
- (v) Receiving of aid / humanitarian assistance as well as its effective and timely distribution, including effective coordination of international assistance from the UN, NGOs and the private sector;
- (vi) Special needs of vulnerable population i.e. women, children and people with disabilities in the disaster area. Among others this could involve the setting up of a special medical facility to cater for the needs of the vulnerable group;
- (vii) Management of consular assistance to foreign tourists in the disaster area;
- (viii) Coordination and information sharing with foreign embassies in the disaster affected country;

- (ix) Management of media officials and control of information outflow (management of information); and
- (x) Role of international and local volunteers and their coordination with the HADR authorities.

### iii e. MARITIME SECURITY

Malaysia is fully aware of its responsibilities to ensure that its maritime zones, which include the Straits of Malacca, are safe and secure for navigation. Malaysia constantly undertakes enforcement, direct protection and surveillance of its maritime zones. Regular patrols by enforcement agencies are conducted throughout Malaysia's maritime areas.

Malaysia established the Maritime Enforcement Agency of Malaysia (MMEA) by virtue of the Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004. MMEA began its operation on 30 November 2005 and is empowered to enforce Malaysia's maritime acts and laws such as the Continental Shelf Act 1966 the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, Fisheries Act 1985, Environmental Quality Act 1974, and the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 (amended 2005).

In addition to physical presence, Malaysia has also incorporated electronic monitoring capabilities to enable better surveillance of maritime activities in its maritime zones, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. Two systems are currently in place. These are the Sea Surveillance System (SWASLA) manned by the MMEA and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) operated by the Marine Department Malaysia.

Malaysia and the littoral States constantly undertake coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore launched the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (MSP) in 2004. The MSP consists of two components, the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP) and the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) air patrols. With the implementation of the MSP, comprehensive arrangement for maritime security in the Straits of Malacca has been achieved.

All the efforts by Malaysia, either unilaterally or in cooperation with the other littoral States, contribute to the overall improvement of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. The successes of the efforts have been acknowledged by reports worldwide, among others the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) weekly and annual reports. The de-classification of the

Year	Straits of Malacca	Off the Coast of Sabah	Total number of cases
2014 (Jan- April)	-	-	-
2013	-	1	-
2012	1	1	2
2011	9	9	18
2010	4	13	17
2009	6	16	22
2008	2	4	6
2007	4	6	10
2006	4	8	12
2005	8	16	24

Straits as a high-risk zone by the Joint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association in August 2006 was another example of the fruitful outcome of the efforts by Malaysia and the other littoral States in ensuring the security of maritime navigation in the Straits of Malacca. The de-classification should be maintained.

The figures below show the number of incidents of armed robbery reported in the Malaysian waters of the Straits of Malacca and off the coast of Sabah.

Malaysia recognises the importance of ensuring that the Straits of Malacca is well-maintained and protected. The Aids to Navigation Fund was established to facilitate voluntary contributions in the maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits. This is in line with Article 43 of UNCLOS 1982 which stipulates that States bordering a strait should cooperate with user States in the establishment and maintenance in the strait of necessary aids to navigation, and for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships. User States which have actively contributed in projects on safety of navigation are Japan, China and the United States. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also made a contribution to the Aids to Navigation Fund. In this regard, contributions from all User States are most welcomed.

### Littoral States – User States Cooperation

User States are States that rely heavily on the Straits of Malacca for their global trade and shipping services. In this context, user States are always concerned about the safety and security of the Straits since any hindrance would result in the distortion of global trade and shipping services. As such, it is important for the littoral States to engage these user States to avoid any unilateral undertaking by these States. Similarly, littoral States should convince user States of the importance of burden-sharing mechanisms since the well-being of the Straits would benefit all parties.

### Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

Since 2005, there have been a growing number of attacks against merchant ships off the coast of Somalia. The international shipping community has expressed their concerns over the issue, and at its 25th General Assembly, the IMO adopted Resolution 1002 (25) entitled Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia on 29 November 2007. The Resolution requests the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) to take any action it deems necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships originating from within Somalia. The TFG is to ensure that its coastline cannot be used as a safe haven from which attacks can be launched, and that ships seized and brought into waters within its territory are released promptly. Furthermore, the resolution requires the TFG is to advise the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that it consents warships and military aircraft entering its territorial sea when engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates or armed robbers.

Malaysia has been involved in the global effort to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. RMN has sent, in stages, 5 war ships to the Gulf of Aden since 3 September 2008 until now with the mission of providing escort to Malaysian ships while traversing the Gulf of Aden. In the course of escorting Malaysian ships, RMN has been receiving requests from foreign flagged ships to join in the convoy or to deter piratical attacks.

The UNSC adopted Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851, 1918, 1950, 1976, 2015 and 2020 which authorise a series of measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia. The Resolutions encourage States that use the commercial routes off the coast of Somalia to increase and coordinate their efforts with the TFG to deter attacks upon vessels, and to cooperate with each other and with regional organisations and to render assistance to vessels threatened or under attacks.

In view of the high risk of piracy in the area off



the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the IMO has made explicitly clear in MSC.1/Circ.1333 that it is for each flag State, individually, to decide whether or not armed security personnel should be authorized for use on board ships flying their flag in high risk areas such as around the Gulf of Aden. If a flag State decides to permit this practice, it is up to that State to determine the conditions under which authorization will be granted. Malaysia however, does not permit the use of private armed security team on vessels flying its flag.

Continued incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia, in particular in the Gulf of Aden, is widely attributed to the inability of the coastal States to organise effective control over their maritime areas, lack of resources to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships, as well as lack of cooperation amongst the coastal States.

It is clear that cooperation amongst the littoral States, as well as cooperation between the coastal States and other States (such as user States and other interested States), have to be forged to effectively address the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia. Perhaps, one way of doing this, is to emulate efforts that have been undertaken to ensure the safety and security of the Straits of Malacca.

#### IV. Role of ARF

Since the establishment of the ARF, it has always been our aspiration to move forward from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy and eventually developing conflict resolution mechanisms. After twenty years, the role of ARF as an avenue for discussing regional peace and security issues, and in some ways as a moderator of regional peace and security situations, is seen to have grown in importance.

Despite the progress made thus far, the ARF cannot be complacent with what it has achieved. The ARF has to adapt itself to the new security challenges especially in light of the evolving global and regional environment. This would be a daunting task as these challenges are multi-

faceted and cross-dimensional in nature. However, this scenario should present the ARF Participating Countries with an opportunity to renew their individual and collective commitment in strengthening existing dialogues and practical cooperation. There is also a need for ARF to collectively decide to move forward in order to achieve its ultimate goal.

Malaysia believes that in moving towards preventive diplomacy, the progress should be at the pace comfortable to all on the basis of consensus. It goes without saying that preventive diplomacy can be carried out successfully when there is a strong foundation of trust and confidence among us. Malaysia is of the view that through years of our collective effort on confidence building measures, this has generated enough momentum for us to graduate to the next stage as envisaged in the founding document of the ARF.

In moving towards the next stage of Preventive Diplomacy, Malaysia also believes that a phased approach could be adopted while maintaining core principles, namely;

- (i) Adherence to the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference on the internal affairs of members.
- (ii) While PD is preventive in nature, rather than curative, its implementation should only be on voluntary basis, based on consultation and consensus, with clear consent of the parties involved.
- (iii) The conduct of preventive diplomacy should be in accordance with recognized international law, the UN Charter, as well as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).

# MYANMAR



***“ Countries in the region are working together within the ASEAN framework, using ASEAN-led mechanisms to promote peace, stability and development in the region.”***



## I. Regional Perspectives on Security in Asia and Pacific

With the security outlook in the Asia Pacific region becoming increasingly complex, cooperation among nations is more important than ever. In recent times, the region has witnessed both positive events as well as tensions and events of common concern. At this time, dialogue on political and security issues is essential. Countries in the region are working together within the ASEAN framework, using ASEAN-led mechanisms to promote peace, stability and development in the region.

In recent times, the region has witnessed several hotspots and sensitive issues. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea are issues of common concern in the region that issues require careful management. Regional efforts to find peaceful solutions to these issues needs to be stepped up, including through friendly consultation and constructive engagement in accordance with the universally accepted principles of international law.

In addition to traditional security issues, existing and emerging non-traditional security issues also pose a threat to the stability of the region. Issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms, transnational crimes, including drug and human trafficking, maritime security, natural disasters, environmental degradation and communicable diseases require collective regional and global efforts, due to their transnational nature. The dynamics of globalisation, including the increased interactions and growing interdependence among countries, has contributed to the rise of non-traditional and transnational security issues in the region.

Traditional and non-traditional security issues of ASEAN can be viewed as follows:

- (a) Historical and contemporary global political events have shown that the notion of security should go far beyond military objectives. Matters which can impair national and regional stability area threat to national and regional security. Therefore, in the current world, the notion of security should be comprehensive, encompassing aspects of political, economic, social, environmental and advanced science. In the post-Cold War era, non-traditional security issues have become more important, impacting not only individuals, but countries, regions and the entire world.
- (b) In the 21st century, it has become more apparent that non-traditional security issues can cause broad and deep impacts to our societies. Recognising that both traditional and non-traditional issues as they are interlinked, we should give equal emphasis to both.

### Myanmar's Outlook on Regional Security

Regional integration has brought closer socio-economic interaction and cooperation among the peoples, businesses and communities of the region that are striving for regional progress and prosperity. However, the regional integration process has also brought about risks and challenges. Both trans-national and non-traditional security threats have emerged together and the impacts of these issues can have far reaching implications, from individuals to countries, the region and even to global levels. To overcome these challenges, it is imperative that we further promote efforts to enhance common understanding and cooperative security, through confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy as well as through practical cooperation.

The existing ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meetings (ADMM) provide opportunities to enhance transparency, trust and mutual understanding among participating

countries. These mechanisms also contribute to the forging of closer practical cooperation, not only among countries of the region, but also globally.

Myanmar believes that the tensions in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula pose a threat to the peace and stability of the region if they are not properly addressed. To de-escalate tensions in the South China Sea, parties concerned need to build trust and confidence, as well as promote transparency regarding their actions. ASEAN and China must continue to work hard for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and at the same time, strive for the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

With regard to the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Myanmar believes that trust building processes need to be encouraged as a basis to prevent further tensions, which are caused by mutual suspicion and lack of trust. An environment conducive for the resumption of six-party talks must also be created.

Regional and international cooperation is important to address transnational and non-traditional security issues in the region and across the world. Cooperation should be further enhanced to combat transnational crimes, including terrorism; illegal drugs, arms and human trafficking; disaster management and communicable diseases. Myanmar is cooperating with all parties, not only within the framework of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the ARF, EAS and ADMM Plus, but also in the form of bilateral cooperation. The democratic reform process in Myanmar has contributed to regional peace and security. In addition, the realisation of the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), has also contributed to peace and stability, through the establishment of a politically cohesive, rules-based and peaceful community.

## II. Myanmar's National Defence Policy

The national defence policy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is to respect the independence,



sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries around the world, particularly the territorial integrity of its neighbouring countries. The Myanmar Armed Forces will never use force or aggression against any other countries and never allow any foreign force to use its territories to stage aggression against any other country. The Myanmar Defence Services' primary objective is to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and to protect the lives, property and well-being of Myanmar's citizens. It does this by fulfilling three main national causes, namely non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty. As outlined in article 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Union shall not commence aggression against any nation and no foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of the Union.

The successive national defence policies of Myanmar have been developed in line with the evolution of the history of the country and its armed forces, the country's current socio-economic status as well as the geo-political and geo-strategic situations of the region. To protect the national interests of the country and its citizens, Myanmar's national defence policies are aimed at fulfilling the following objectives:

- (a) To prevent any threat to efforts to maintain territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty.
- (b) To build national defence forces with a people's defence strategy which is based on the strength of the local populace.
- (c) To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and to defend aggression and various forms of interferences in our domestic affairs.
- (d) To practice amicable defence diplomacy with other countries in line with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
- (e) Not to enter into any military alliance with foreign countries and not to allow any foreign

forces in Myanmar's territory.

- (f) To collaborate with international forces to tackle non-traditional security issues such as terrorism and to assist countries affected by natural disasters.

### Defence Expenditure

For the financial year 2014-2015, USD 2.3 billion is allocated for national defence expenditure.

### III. Myanmar's Contribution to Promote Regional Peace and Security

In 1997, Myanmar became a member of ASEAN and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Myanmar believes that working closely with the countries of the region will ensure peace, stability and progress in the region. Myanmar became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005.

Myanmar's domestic legislation on counter terrorism was enacted in 2005. Since that time, amendments have been made in order to add provisions against terrorist financing and extradition. In 2006, Myanmar signed the ASEAN Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among like-minded ASEAN Member Countries. Myanmar signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) in 2007 and ratified the Convention in 2012.

Prior to joining ASEAN, Myanmar was cooperating with countries to try to eliminate narcotic drugs in the region. Myanmar attended the annual meetings of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter (ASOD) as an observer before joining the regional organization. After becoming an ASEAN member, Myanmar further increased its contribution to ASEAN's efforts to realise a drug free ASEAN in 2015, including through active participation in the implementation of the ASEAN Work Plan on Combating Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking, and Use (2009-2015).

Since 1999-2000, Myanmar has been implementing

its 15 Year Drug Elimination Plan, through undertaking the following five measures: elimination of drug production; eradication of drug abuse; prevention of drug related crimes; promotion of drug awareness among local people and the strengthening of regional and international cooperation with neighbouring countries in order to combat drugs.

Myanmar plays an active role in the ADMM process. It successfully hosted the 23rd ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet in Pyi Oo Lwin, Myanmar, the 14th ASEAN Chief of Army Multilateral Meeting and the 3rd ASEAN Senior Military Attaches' Meeting in Mandalay from 20th October to 10th November 2013. Moreover, it also successfully hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Officials' Dialogue from 8th to 9th December 2013 in Yangon. In addition, in order to enhance the friendship and cooperation among armed forces in the region, the Myanmar Defence Services organised a soccer match in July in Nay Pyi Taw.

Myanmar attaches great importance to fulfilling its responsibilities as the Chair of ASEAN in 2014, the threshold year for the establishment of the ASEAN Community 2015. In this regard, the Myanmar Defence Services successfully hosted the 11th ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal meeting, the 11th ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting and the 4th ASEAN Military Operation Informal Meeting from 3rd to 6th March 2014.

To promote friendship and cooperation among the armed forces of the region, Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Vice Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and Commander-in-Chief(Army), Commander-in-Chief(Navy), and Commander-in-Chief(Air) have paid official visits to countries in the region. In order to strengthen bilateral ties, Commanders-in-Chief from countries in the region have also been invited to Myanmar. In addition, Myanmar has been actively engaging in security cooperation in the region through the implementation of various ASEAN related security cooperation agreements as well as participating in various defence meetings, workshops, seminars and defence trainings and exercises.

#### IV. Future Perspectives of Regional Security

Encompassing all ten countries in the region, ASEAN has emerged as a force of unity in diversity. Gaining strength from its diverse histories, cultures, religions and ethnicities, ASEAN is moving forward to achieve its objectives of one vision, one identity, and one community.

Uncertainties and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region are matters of concern not only to individual ASEAN Member States, but to the whole ASEAN Community. The region needs proper frameworks to address the emerging issues of terrorism and transnational crimes, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, arms and human trafficking, environmental degradation, communicable diseases and cyber security. The existing ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus need to play greater and more defined roles to address these issues in comprehensive manner.


Though the security environment in the region remains stable, areas of concern continue to exist, particularly in the South China Sea and Korean Peninsula. The ASEAN Regional Forum needs to further advance its role in the region by stepping up, from stage one of confidence-building measures to preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention and resolution.

The role of the armed forces in the region needs to be further enhanced. This will provide increased opportunities for better coordination and greater practical cooperation through various security related fora. The region requires its armed forces to not only address conventional security concerns, but also to tackle non-traditional and transnational security issues. This should be done through the increased exchange and sharing of information in accordance with the best practices, as well as through greater cooperation in capacity building and joint training and exercises.

# NEW ZEALAND



**“ New Zealand is strongly committed to an open trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring longer term regional security and prosperity. It is committed to working toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.”**



## I. Participant's perceptions of and approaches towards the regional and global security environment

The Asia Pacific region is central to New Zealand's security and future well-being. New Zealand values its engagement with regional processes, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which promote the common goal of a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. New Zealand plays an active part in helping these individual forums realise their objectives. Sustained commitment to bilateral and regional relationships underlines the importance that New Zealand places on partnerships within the region and the wider global security environment.

New Zealand is strongly committed to an open trading regime and considers that enhanced economic integration is one of the most effective means of ensuring longer term regional security and prosperity. It is committed to working toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

New Zealand attaches considerable importance to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which entered into force in 2010. New Zealand was the first developed country to establish a Free Trade Agreement with China and has other bilateral FTAs/Closer Economic Partnerships with Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei. Negotiations have been concluded with the Gulf Cooperation Council. New Zealand is actively participating in negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which got underway in May 2013 and involves ASEAN countries and its six FTA partners. New Zealand



is a party to the Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), with Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and Chile, and is taking part in the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement with other Asia Pacific countries, which flows from P4. New Zealand is currently negotiating bilateral FTAs with other countries, including India and the Republic of Korea.

The tensions on the Korean Peninsula highlight the need for strengthened commitment to regional security cooperation. The DPRK's ballistic missile and nuclear programmes remain an on-going threat to regional peace and stability. New Zealand has consistently urged the DPRK to abide by its obligations under UNSC resolutions, cease provocations including further ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, and take steps to end its nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

New Zealand would also like to see a swift, peaceful and lawful resolution to the situation in Ukraine and for all parties involved to exercise maximum restraint and focus on dialogue as a means of resolving the crisis.

Maritime security remains a regional concern. All ARF members have an interest in developments in the South China Sea being managed in a peaceful manner, consistent with international law. It is important that parties exercise self-restraint and actively look for ways to manage difficult issues effectively, including through the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties, and negotiation of a substantive Code of Conduct.

The security threats that countries face in the region continue to evolve as a result of both internal and external factors. One consistent external catalyst for change is the rapid growth of technology, and its use by criminal groups. Transnational criminal entities are quick to adapt new technology and use it to increase their operational ability for illegal purposes. In this new environment it is important for law enforcement to understand how criminal groups (including terrorists) are using new online

capacity. States must adapt their own systems to counter the emergence of cyber offending. New Zealand supports the work currently under way to develop an ARF work plan on cyber security.

Security has long been recognised as a vital prerequisite for the sustainable development of the Pacific Islands region. Security has accordingly become a significant area of the Pacific Islands Forum's work in recent years. New Zealand has been closely involved in responding to regional security issues, through bilateral aid programmes to build capacity, the Forum's Regional Security Committee and through working with regional law enforcement agencies.

New Zealand is also committed to strengthening the global security environment through the United Nations (UN), and is standing for a non-permanent seat on the 2015-16 UN Security Council. New Zealand last served on the Council in 1993-94, and believes the time is right to serve again on the Council to enhance its contribution to global peace and security. New Zealand has a proven track record of working with partners from all regions to solve problems and achieve practical results.

## II. Participant's views on the role of the ARF in regional security.

For New Zealand, the ARF is the principal security forum within the Asia Pacific region. It contributes to building an environment in our region of dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of regional security issues. The ARF is also contributing in an important way to the development of international norms and principles on security, which are directly relevant to this region. The large number and diversity of practical ARF projects under implementation in 2014 reflects the ARF's increasing ability to respond to contemporary security challenges facing this part of the world. New Zealand also attaches considerable importance to working with its ARF partners to advance ARF's preventive diplomacy agenda, in line with ARF's three-stage evolution. New Zealand has been encouraged by the high tempo of activity on preventive

diplomacy initiatives within the ARF over the past year, including around preventive diplomacy training which New Zealand has championed.

New Zealand recognises ASEAN's central role in ARF as an anchor of stability and peace in the region. New Zealand's strong commitment to ASEAN is also reflected in the decision by the government to appoint a dedicated Ambassador to ASEAN resident in Jakarta, who will assume the role in late-2014.

New Zealand welcomes ASEAN's adoption in 2009 of a Blueprint to establish an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) embracing universal values of good governance and a determination to create a more secure, stable and peaceful future for the region.

New Zealand is committed to working with its ASEAN partners to realise enhanced synergies between the ARF and other pieces of the regional architecture, in particular the EAS and ADMM-Plus. While the ARF and ADMM-Plus have their distinct mandates and different memberships, greater functional coordination between them on issues that straddle both forums, such as disaster relief/management, would help to achieve streamlining and eliminate any unnecessary duplication of activities. The production of a joint ARF/ADMM-Plus calendar of events by the ASEAN Secretariat has been a useful initiative in this respect. It is also desirable that the ARF and ADMM-Plus activities are consistent with priority security issues identified in the EAS.

### III. New Zealand's Contributions to Peace, Security and Stability in the area covered by the ARF geographical footprint

#### *iii a. Policies and Approaches*

As a founding member of the UN, respect for the rule of international law is fundamental to New Zealand's approach to promoting security, stability and peace. While New Zealand's borders are distant from direct conflict, there are fragile states within the Asia-Pacific region. The threats of terrorism, arms proliferation, transnational

crime and economic and environmental degradation show no respect for international borders. Recognising this, New Zealand is highly committed to multilateral, trans-boundary solutions to security threats and the promotion of effective international rules. New Zealand takes a multi-layered approach to security that includes strong bilateral relationships and regional partnerships.

Key relationships and partnerships are:

- New Zealand's bilateral alliance with Australia;
- The Five Power Defence Arrangements (New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom);
- Close bilateral ties with Pacific Island neighbours, including those for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities;
- Close and growing bilateral ties with Asia Pacific partners and
- Pacific and Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus processes.

#### *iii b. Activities*

### Counter-Terrorism, Trans-national Organised Crime, and Cyber threats

New Zealand is firmly committed to the international campaigns against terrorism and transnational organised crime. To counter these threats New Zealand is engaged in the development of the international counter terrorism security architecture (at the UN and regional level) and adopts a comprehensive, multi-layered and long-term approach to addressing these issues.

New Zealand works actively in regional fora, including in the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) on CTTC and the ADMM-Plus Counter-Terrorism Experts Working Group (CT EWG). New Zealand co-chaired the 2014 ISM CTTC with Indonesia in April. The CTTC addresses terrorism and transnational criminal networks

as mutually enabling threats in the ARF region. A key focus of this year's ISM was the role of illicit drugs, which can support organised crime groups and undermine national development and interstate harmony. The meeting agreed on a range of illicit drugs-related projects planned to take place late 2014 and early 2015. New Zealand has also agreed to co-lead with Thailand the Illicit Drugs work stream of the ARF CTTC Work Plan.

New Zealand has co-sponsored (with Australia) a UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-produced assessment of the threat posed by trans-national organised crime in the Asia-Pacific region. This report was published in February 2013.

The ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration for Co-operation to Combat International Terrorism 2005 and its associated Work Plan form an important framework for New Zealand's counter-terrorism efforts in the region. There is a dedicated Asia Security Fund to support activities under the five key pillars of New Zealand's Work Plan with ASEAN: border control; legislation; law enforcement; policy; and prevention/counter-radicalisation.

New Zealand undertakes both regional and bilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia and over the past year has partnered with the South East Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Indonesia. New Zealand has funded and organised a number of regional capacity building workshops for ASEAN countries on key issues such as anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing standards, cyber-crime, terrorist prosecutions, chemical and nuclear security, major event security, and maritime and aviation security. These efforts are complemented by significant bilateral work to build individual national capability, especially within law enforcement agencies.

New Zealand works with Pacific Island countries (PICs) to help strengthen their security and resilience to terrorism and transnational

organised crime. In conjunction with partners, including Australia, UNODC and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, New Zealand has helped deliver capacity building and legislative drafting assistance to a number of PICs. Initiatives have included enhancing airport and maritime security, drafting and implementing national counter-terrorism legislation and ratifying international counter-terrorism instruments, and training for law enforcement and border agency officials. Funding is provided through the Pacific Security Fund (PSF) and the New Zealand Aid Programme.

New Zealand is also an active member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), attending annual meetings of the GCTF Coordinating Committee, South East Asia Capacity Building Working Group and regional GCTF workshops hosted by Indonesia on law enforcement capacity building. New Zealand supported Indonesia's proposal to transform the South East Asia Capacity Building Working Group to a Detention and Reintegration thematic Working Group to better coordinate counter terrorism capacity building in the region, focused on supporting the management and reintegration of terrorist detainees to their local communities. This approach reflects New Zealand's capacity building support in the corrections area, in particular with Indonesia. At the same time, New Zealand has also provided support to Indonesian NGOs working at grass roots level to build local community capacity and resilience to counter violent extremism.

### Counter-proliferation

New Zealand is an active supporter of initiatives aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both state and non-state actors, in particular the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the G8 Global Partnership (G8GP), the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Security Summit.

The PSI has developed into an effective international counter-proliferation network of



102 countries around the globe. New Zealand's participation in PSI, including its membership of the Operational Experts Group (the PSI steering committee) and participation in exercises and capacity building initiatives, has enhanced New Zealand's capabilities to prevent proliferation activity both nationally and in collaboration with partners. New Zealand has developed and shared with PSI partners in the Asia-Pacific and beyond a Model National Response Plan, which provides clear, easy-to-follow guidance on the range of issues that need to be considered in developing a framework for responding to PSI/proliferation situations. As part of the agreed Asia Pacific exercise rotation, New Zealand will host a PSI table-top exercise in Wellington in September 2015. New Zealand would welcome further expansion of the PSI in the Asia-Pacific as part of a coordinated effort to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.

New Zealand joined the GICNT in 2007, and is strongly committed alongside over 80 GICNT partners to preventing nuclear or radiological material falling into the hands of terrorists. New Zealand has contributed to the GICNT in the Asia-Pacific by: developing a table-top exercise kit for use by other GICNT partners in testing their own national response systems; supporting radioactive source security projects in Southeast Asia; increasing its funding for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve nuclear security in Southeast Asia; and helping its Pacific island neighbours address the risk of nuclear/radiological security.

Alongside a number of other countries from the Asia Pacific region New Zealand has been an active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process, launched in Washington in 2010. Through its engagement in this process, and in the nuclear security activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, New Zealand has provided significant financial and practical support to efforts to strengthen nuclear security at the national, regional and global level, including the provision of more than NZ\$7 million to nuclear security projects since 2004.

New Zealand also works to prevent proliferation by helping to develop and implement export controls as an active member of key multilateral regimes including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

## Disarmament

New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to international disarmament and arms control.

New Zealand was a strong supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) throughout its negotiation. New Zealand was pleased to be among the first to sign the Treaty in June 2013 and is working to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. New Zealand hopes that the ATT will contribute meaningfully to international and regional peace, security and stability. It intends to be an active Treaty partner, and notably has sponsored the development of ATT model implementation legislation to assist countries – including PICs - to implement their ATT obligations domestically. New Zealand looks forward to working closely with its ARF partners to build a strong ATT upon its entry into force.

New Zealand has continued its active promotion of nuclear disarmament including through its membership of the New Agenda Coalition and the De-alerting Group, and its coordination of the Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons delivered by the New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament on behalf of 117 countries at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in November 2013.

New Zealand strongly encourages all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to sign the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). This would be a welcome step in the development of nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms in this part of the world. New Zealand is a party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, and is a strong proponent of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a key regional measure to facilitate nuclear disarmament and non proliferation.

New Zealand supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important contributor to regional and global security. New Zealand welcomes recent ratifications of the CTBT by Annex 1 and 2 states in the region and encourages further ratifications by ARF participants.

New Zealand strongly supports and plays an active role on both the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Cluster Munitions Convention (CCM). New Zealand currently co-chairs the APMBC's Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. New Zealand is also currently the coordinator for national implementation measures in the CCM and has produced model legislation for use by small states with no history of use or contamination. New Zealand encourages other ARF participants who have not yet done so to ratify or accede to both Conventions.

### Peace Support

New Zealand continues to support peace and security in the Solomon Islands and currently has 17 New Zealand Police personnel working in the Solomon Islands providing support to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) on police capacity building within the RSIPF.

New Zealand supports the continued development of the Timor-Leste National Police through its Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP), to which New Zealand provides four in-country Police advisors on 12 month rotations, as well as two longer-term police advisors. The TLCPP is working with the National Police Force of Timor-Leste Training Academy and with District Commanders to develop and introduce a community policing model into Timor-Leste. The programme works in concert with the Asia Foundation's Hakohak Programme, a community policing programme which focuses on community groups engaging with police. NZDF also provide five technical advisors that work on capacity building projects with the Timor-Leste Defence Force.

2014 is an important transition year for Afghanistan

with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan ending in December 2014 and the election of a new Afghan President. Following the withdrawal of the New Zealand-led Bamyán Provincial Reconstruction Team in April 2013, New Zealand's continuing contributions to ISAF of 12 personnel to the ISAF special operations forces headquarters in intelligence and planning roles, and a small number of officers within ISAF headquarters will be withdrawn before the end of 2014. New Zealand has made two in-principle commitments to the post-2014 training, assisting and advising mission (Operation Resolute Support). These commitments include a number of NZDF trainers to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, and a financial contribution of US\$2 million per annum in funding to Afghanistan's National Security Forces from 2015. New Zealand will continue to support development projects in Bamyán, focusing on energy and agriculture.

New Zealand continues with its long-standing commitment of military observers to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in Korea, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Israel, Syria and Lebanon, and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Egypt. In addition, New Zealand contributes military liaison officers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

NZDF operates a number of Mutual Assistance Programmes (MAP) with Pacific nations, including the Cooks Islands, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Tonga and Vanuatu. These programmes complement efforts in the political, economic and development fields to encourage friendly and cooperative bilateral relationships with New Zealand's near neighbours.

New Zealand concludes its co-chairing (with the Philippines) of the ADMM-Plus Peacekeeping Operations Experts Working Group this year. In that capacity, New Zealand co-chaired a workshop held in Manila in February 2014 which focused on practical aspects concerning force generation, pre-deployment training, logistic

support and sustainment and operations for a UN peacekeeping mission. New Zealand will be co-chairing (with Brunei Darussalam) the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Experts Working Group from 2014-2017.

New Zealand hosted the inaugural Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) peacekeeping capability building coordination meeting, which GPOI and other partners attended on 20-21 February 2014. New Zealand has also committed to providing instructors for the GPOI capstone exercise in Indonesia in August / September 2014.

The NZDF will be assuming the co-chair role with Bangladesh (which is the Secretariat) of the Association of Asia-Pacific Peacekeeping Training Centres in 2015. This will be the first time New Zealand has held this position.

### Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy

At the ARF's outset it was envisaged that the Forum would move as part of its evolution from a confidence building phase to preventive diplomacy, and finally to conflict resolution. While many confidence building measures have been undertaken, the ARF has yet to reach its potential in the field of preventive diplomacy. New Zealand supports and has contributed to the conclusion of the ARF's Work Plan on Preventive Diplomacy agreed by Ministers in July 2011. New Zealand, together with Brunei Darussalam, China and the US, hosted a roundtable discussion on preventive diplomacy training resources in March 2014. The roundtable recommended that ARF develop a preventive diplomacy training course, which is tailored to the needs and characteristics of the Asia Pacific region. New Zealand, along with other ARF partners, will be actively involved in advancing ARF's preventive diplomacy training programme over 2014. New Zealand is also proposing to conduct a separate ARF Track 1.5 preventive diplomacy symposium in early 2015.

### Maritime Security

In 2008, ARF Ministers identified maritime security as one of the ARF's four key areas. In

2009-2011 New Zealand co-chaired with Indonesia and Japan a series of ARF Inter-sessional Meetings on the topic. Over this period, participants developed a work plan which was approved by Ministers in 2011. New Zealand has been actively involved in the implementation of the work plan, and in sharing its experiences on various maritime security-related issues, including New Zealand's handling of the MV Rena-grounding. At the ISM on Maritime Security held in Bali in May 2014, New Zealand presented on its approach towards Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, an issue in which New Zealand has a particular interest given its significant Exclusive Economic Zone.

With support from Brunei and Malaysia, New Zealand organised an ARF workshop on ship profiling in April 2013. New Zealand is developing a follow-up proposal on capacity building in the ship profiling area.

As mentioned above, New Zealand is currently co-chairing, with Brunei Darussalam, the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security.

### Disaster Relief

The Asia-Pacific region continues to be afflicted by natural disasters (Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda being the most devastating recent example), which underline the need to continue deepening practical and effective cooperation over disaster reduction, response, relief and recovery. New Zealand has been an active participant in ARF exercises to prepare and respond to regional disasters as well as taking part in meetings such as the ARF ISM on Disaster Relief in Chengdu, where New Zealand was represented by its Special Envoy for Disaster Risk Management (DRM). New Zealand is taking a keen role in DRM-related work across the Asia-Pacific and will attend the ARF Workshop on Consular Contingency in Bali in May 2014, where it will share its experiences in responding to the 2011 Christchurch earthquake.

New Zealand is continuing to play its part in



deepening regional capacity to prepare and respond to disasters, and is committed to further cooperation and implementation of work plans in ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS contexts. Within the EAS, in particular, New Zealand is scoping the possibility of convening a regional workshop that draws on lessons learned from the Christchurch Earthquakes. New Zealand has been a solid proponent of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre since its inception and has contributed technical expertise to the Centre.

#### **IV. New Zealand Defence Policies and Information**

##### *iv a. Defence Policies and Doctrine*

A range of foreign and security policy, management and resourcing challenges were addressed in the New Zealand Government's defence review and the subsequent Defence White Paper ([www.defence.govt.nz/defence-review.html](http://www.defence.govt.nz/defence-review.html)) released in 2010. The White Paper sets out a framework for the defence of New Zealand through addressing New Zealand's vital strategic interests including the security of its sovereign territory and exclusive economic zone, its special relationship with Australia, the need to build security in the South Pacific, its relationships in the wider Asia-Pacific region and its contribution to the global community.

Since the publication of the White Paper an exercise called the Defence Mid-Point Rebalancing Review reconsidered NZDF funding for the longer term capability intentions in light of the increasing cost of defence within a tight budget. The Government has committed to maintaining the capability of the NZDF to meet the security demands forecast in the Defence White Paper 2010. New Zealand's next Defence White Paper is notionally scheduled for 2015.

The total appropriation for the New Zealand Defence Force for the year ended 30 June 2014 was NZ\$2.874 billion, of which operating expenses were NZ\$2.279 billion and capital expenditure was NZ\$583 million.

# THE PHILIPPINES



**“The Asia-Pacific region is said to be in a state of flux as governments are faced with multiple security issues that require continuous capacity building and cooperation with regional partners.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Recent trends in the region indicate a more complex and dynamic security environment where states are confronted with both traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The Asia-Pacific region is said to be in a state of flux as governments are faced with multiple security issues that require continuous capacity building and cooperation with regional partners.

Territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific continue to be a cause of concern for regional states. While it was deemed prudent to place territorial disputes in the back-burner due to their sensitivity, the potential of such disputes becoming regional flashpoints has recently become more apparent. The situation in the South China Sea among the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Brunei, China, and Taiwan as well as the competing claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan, the Liancourt Islands between South Korea and China, the Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia, and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan have attracted much attention on the potential conflict that may ensue if restraint is not exercised. Non-claimant countries have expressed concern over the possible implications to the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce if Sea Lines of Communication are disrupted in case military means are used in enforcing claims. While the end of the Cold War has led many to assume that traditional military concerns will be a thing of the past, recent developments in the region have shown that territorial disputes and sovereignty issues continue to be primary concerns of states. In this regard, some claimant

and non-claimant countries alike have urged all Parties to the disputes to exercise self-restraint, not to resort to threat or use of force, and to resolve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

An important concern for the region is maritime security, which now includes several non-traditional security issues, such as piracy, poaching, and the use of maritime routes for smuggling and unlawful commerce that threaten the economic security of regional states. The business model used by Somali pirates is well known and may influence pirates operating in the waters of Southeast Asia. While naval vessels address traditional aspects, there is a need to enhance the capacity of civilian maritime entities in undertaking maritime law enforcement operations to respond to non-traditional maritime security concerns. Meanwhile, states continue to develop their maritime domain awareness given that several regional countries are maritime nations whose territorial integrity is closely intertwined with maritime domain awareness and maritime security.

Much attention has also been focused on the continuing changes in the geopolitical landscape of the region. The United States of America's Rebalance to Asia policy and the subsequent increase in engagements of the US in the Asia Pacific indicate the US' renewed interest in the region. Meanwhile, the rise of China in economic and military terms is also closely being monitored by observers. While several states have called for more transparency with regard to Beijing's intentions behind its military modernization, the economic rise of China has been welcomed as a major trade partner. There is a general sense that it would be more productive for regional states, including the Philippines, to sustain their engagements with China instead of letting outstanding disputes mar their overall relations.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Korean Peninsula remains volatile given the lack of progress in the denuclearization talks. Despite condemnation

from the international community, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has continued to conduct nuclear and missile tests, which indicate that it is determined to embark on a nuclear path, despite several resolutions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) banning such programs. These recent developments do not bode well for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, which is the primary platform for pursuing the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Philippines has consistently taken a firm stand against the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and supports all efforts toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, including through the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

With a significant number of Overseas Filipinos concentrated in the Middle East and Africa (MENA), the Philippines is also very concerned over the worsening security situation in the area, particularly in Syria, Libya, and most recently, Iraq. Transitional governments as well as geopolitical rivalry over new political configuration in the MENA region have led to the continuing instability. The Philippines is also closely watching, with concern, the developments in Ukraine. The unilateral declaration of independence by Crimea from Ukraine and its incorporation into the Russian Federation sets a process of self-determination not sanctioned by international law and which may set a precedent for secession other than those in accordance with due process, particularly for nations with multiple ethnic groups.

With respect to the non-traditional security issues, the Philippines is particularly concerned with the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear explosives (CBRNe) weapons and other dual use items that can potentially be used as components for improvised explosive devices. Fluid borders and the increasing interconnectedness among states made trade relations easier but have also inadvertently facilitated the rise of illicit networks that serve as conduits for illegally transferring CBRNe weapons as well as small arms and light weapons, which have fuelled much of the inter and intra-state conflict among many countries.



Along with loose illicit networks, another security challenge is the emergence of non-state actors. Aside from being more difficult to monitor and interdict, non-state actors, coupled with illicit networks, present new security dilemmas on international terrorism and transnational crime, such as trafficking of drugs, people, and weapons.

Weapons proliferation has also been complicated by the possibility that such weapons may fall in the hands of non-state actors with malicious intentions. Networks of fundamentalists and extremists continue to operate with the ultimate purpose of destabilizing governments and societies that do not conform to their beliefs.

In addition, transnational crime has also infiltrated the cyber domain with the onslaught of cyber attacks on government portals, identity thefts, and unauthorized access to information. Such cyber threats pose serious challenges for the region given the increasing reliance of people on information and communications and technology (ICT). This also compromises the exchange of classified information among governments. As a society becomes increasingly dependent on information and communication technology, it also becomes susceptible to cyber threats. While cyber security previously focused only on individual hackers, recent trends show that attacks against government cyber portals could come from organizations. Moreover, the cyber domain is now considered as an emerging arena for warfare. Unauthorized access to classified information through compromised cyber portals may undermine operations and result in the loss of strategic advantages for defense and military establishments if information or intelligence data have been intercepted.

One non-traditional security concern that has become more evident due to its impact on human lives and destruction of property are natural and man-made disasters. The geographical locations of most ASEAN countries make them vulnerable to natural disasters. This is further exacerbated by climate change, which has triggered extreme changes in weather patterns. Typhoons, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, and industrial accidents compel the armed forces to respond to

such calamities and have reinvigorated regional and global initiatives on disaster risk reduction and management and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) cooperation.

Furthermore, such calamities have long term effects on the food, water, and energy security of regional states, which present challenges for the defense and military sectors given that competition for scarce resources is a major factor for internal displacement of people and can trigger conflicts or aggravate existing ones.

These developments highlight the need for regional states to develop their capacity to address multiple challenges and utilize the current regional security architecture as a platform for cooperation to address common concerns and to defuse potential sources of conflict.

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## II. National Security and Defense Policy

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### *ii a. Major Policy Thrusts*

As part of its mandate to “maximize its effectiveness for guarding against external and internal threats to national peace and security, promote the welfare of soldiers and veterans, and provide support for social and economic development,” the Department of National Defense (DND) envisions itself as a strategic partner of the international community, capable and responsive, professional and competent, effective and efficient in meeting external and internal challenges to national security and domestic stability as well as contributing to the social and economic development of the Philippines.

Upgrading the capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is one of the primary thrusts of the Philippines. With the recent signing of the AFP Modernization Law (Republic Act 10349) in 2012, the DND and the AFP would be able to develop a minimum defense capability for the Philippines. This modernization program is not directed towards any country as its primary purpose is to enable the Philippines to respond to security challenges.

In relation to AFP modernization, the Philippines also aims to modernize and increase the production capacity of the Government Arsenal to provide a sufficient supply of Small Arms and Ammunitions and other necessary materiel not only for the basic requirements of the AFP but for additional supplies in times of emergency. In addition, the Philippines also envisions the establishment of a Government Arsenal Estate that could pave the way for the Philippines' defense industrial complex that would not only contribute to manufacturing materiel for the AFP but would also allow partnerships with investors that could help spur economic growth and promote defense industry collaboration.

While the AFP has previously been focused on internal security, it aims to hand over the role of addressing insurgency and other internal security matters to law enforcement agencies as embodied in the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan, which is anchored on a "Whole-of-Nation Approach" and "People-Centred Security/Human Security Approach" to create an environment that is conducive to peace and development. In addition, the DND and AFP remain committed to supporting the peace process, particularly after the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014.

Given the increasing gravity of disasters and national calamities, the Philippines also aims to enhance the capacity of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), which serves as the executive arm of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). While the AFP is the first respondent during disasters with military personnel being the frontliners in search and rescue operations, the OCD focuses on disaster risk reduction, mitigation, and management. Hence, supporting the training programs of the OCD for disaster preparedness, improving its operations, and strengthening linkages with non-governmental agencies and international disaster response-related institutions are imperative for a proactive approach to disaster risk reduction and management. More importantly, a capable civil defense would allow for better coordination with

regional states for HA/DR cooperation.

It is also crucial to enhance the capacity to conduct defense research and studies and administer postgraduate degrees on national security. Thus, it is a policy thrust of the Philippines to develop the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) to serve as a think tank of the Philippines for formulating related policies and programs. The NDCP also undertakes education exchanges with members of regional armed forces. Through education exchanges, AFP personnel are also able to avail of similar education opportunities in foreign defense academies, which could widen their horizons, improve their professional training, and promote confidence building as they interact with foreign armed forces.

Addressing the welfare needs of veterans or soldiers who have rendered services to the Philippines is also important. Hence, put in place are mechanisms to improve the capacity of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office in providing privileges, benefits, services, and pensions.

The DND endeavors to cultivate synergy with other government agencies, local government units, the private sector, and the citizenry as security challenges have evolved and require a more comprehensive approach beyond traditional military responses. Aside from inter-agency coordination, utilizing the Reserve Force to ensure that reservists complement the AFP and the OCD would enable the Filipino citizenry to make a meaningful contribution to the defense and security of the country.

In the interest of pursuing national, regional, and global security as well as implementing the policy thrusts mentioned above, the Philippines maintains robust engagements with its partners and allies by pursuing a two-pronged approach: enhancing bilateral engagements and undertaking multilateral engagements. The Philippines regularly conducts dialogue with its counterparts in ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific region, the US, and several European countries. It also participates in key regional security fora, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF) Defense Officials' Dialogue and the ARF Security Policy Conference, as well as other security fora to exchange views and articulate the Philippine position on certain issues as well as promote multilateralism among regional neighbors. The Philippines also continues to conclude defense arrangements, such as Memoranda of Understanding or Agreements on Defense Cooperation with other countries as such arrangements provide the framework for cooperative efforts in undertaking joint endeavors on issues of mutual concern.

*ii b. Defense Expenditure*

Defense Expenditure (2014)  
 Operating Expenses – PHP 21,606,965,000  
 Capital Outlay – PHP 5,926,456,000  
 Total: PHP 27,533,421,000  
 Population: 97,400,000  
 Defense Expenditure Per Capita: PHP 282.68  
 Defense Expenditure (2013)  
 Operating Expenses – PHP 19,848,285,000  
 Capital Outlay – PHP 5,428,110,000  
 Total: PHP 25,276,395,000  
 Population: 95,800,000  
 Defense Expenditure Per Capita: PHP 263.85

**III. National Contribution to Regional Security**

*iii a. Maritime Security*

Recognizing that maritime security includes both traditional and non-traditional security concerns, the Philippines employs a comprehensive approach towards maritime security and maritime domain awareness by building the capacity of both military and civilian agencies. To effectively integrate and synchronize the efforts of Philippine maritime agencies, the Philippines has established the National Coast Watch System (NCWS), which is envisioned to be a reliable system for information-gathering and information-sharing. It is an inter-agency monitoring, control, and response system that aims to pool existing capabilities and integrate capability development plans among Philippine maritime agencies for efficient response and

objective decision-making.

Furthermore, the Philippines recognizes the value of international cooperation on maritime security by supporting several global and regional initiatives. A Senior National Representative (SNR) has been assigned to the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Manama, Bahrain to contribute more meaningfully to counter-piracy initiatives, while a naval liaison officer is stationed in Singapore at the Information Fusion Center (IFC). In addition, the DND and AFP regularly participate in the activities under the auspices of the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group (EWG) on Maritime Security, ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Maritime Security, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP) and National Maritime Foundation Annual Sea Power Seminar (NMFASPS). Aside from multilateral cooperation, the Philippines also has bilateral border patrol arrangements with its neighboring countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, to address illegal activities along borders, namely hijacking, smuggling, theft of marine resources, human trafficking, among others.

The Philippines also consistently advocates for the crafting of a set of protocols of interaction among maritime forces to avoid accidents and untoward events at sea that could result from miscalculations. After the Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers on Exploring Cooperative Activities in the West Philippine Sea in 2012 in Cebu, where the Secretary of National Defense discussed exploring protocols of interaction at sea with the Defense Ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines also hosted a workshop on regional maritime rules of engagement under the ambit of the Network of ASEAN Defense and Security Institutions (NADI) on 07-10 May 2014 in Manila. The workshop aims to come up with regional parameters to assess success and failures of existing regional mechanisms for maritime interactions in the seas of Southeast Asia, identify a wide range of scenarios that raise the level of uncertainty and potentials for tension at



sea, and discuss possible elements or principles of regional maritime rules of engagement. In addition, the Philippines also supports the ongoing efforts of the ADMM to establish a direct communication link among the defense and military establishments of ASEAN Member States.

In September 2013, the Philippine Navy hosted the 7th ASEAN Navy Chiefs' Meeting (ANCM). The meeting reviewed current initiatives of the ANCM, such as the ANCM Naval Joint Deployment, ANCM Hotline between Navies, Coordinated Naval Patrol, and Concept Papers on Greeting Procedures among vessels and aircraft of ASEAN navies and discussed new proposals from ASEAN Member States, specifically the proposed ANCM-Plus arrangement, Joint Development of ANCM Roadmap, ANCM Permanent Secretariat, and Common Protocol on ASEAN HA/DR operations.

The Philippines also hosted the 2nd ARF Seminar on UNCLOS in Manila on 28-29 May 2014. The Seminar saw presentations from various experts on the intricacies of UNCLOS and its provisions and applications, particularly in maritime boundary delimitation, possibilities for cooperation, and dispute settlement. The participants also discussed the emerging issue of protecting marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ).

### *iii b. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)*

In light of the repercussions in the aftermath of disasters and calamities as well as the potential for international cooperation on HA/DR as demonstrated by Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in November 2013 in the Philippines, the DND, together with the OCD actively support regional and global frameworks for HA/DR cooperation, namely the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which the Philippines ratified in 2009, as well as the Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and

Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), which was endorsed by the 2nd ASEAN Military Operations Informal meeting (AMOIM) in Cambodia in 2012. During the 11th ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) in March 2014 in Myanmar, the Chief of Staff of the AFP also shared the Philippines' experience and shared lessons learned during Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan). The Philippines has also called on the need to ensure the effectiveness of regional institutions, namely the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).

The Philippines continues to uphold the principles under the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and exerts efforts to build the resilience of communities to disasters. Furthermore, the Philippines advocates for the recognition of a well-established relationship between sustainable development and disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation (DRR and CCA).

Similar to the NCWS, the Philippines also has the NDRRMC, which oversees inter-agency coordination for HA/DR and the implementation of the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management law. The Secretary of National Defense chairs the NDRRMC, while the AFP assists other agencies by prepositioning assets and relief goods at disaster prone areas, conducting information drives, and disseminating early warnings; assisting in the improvement of flood control and drainage systems and other infrastructures; providing direct assistance in the form of medical services, relief distribution, force evacuation, manpower, and security as well as indirect assistance through utilization of strategic assets and engineering services; and assisting in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructures and other establishments as well as other rehabilitation projects.

The Philippines also actively participates in the activities of the ADMM-Plus EWG on HA/DR as well as exercises, namely the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AHEX) and the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx). AFP personnel also attended the ADMM-Plus HA/DR and Military Medicine

Exercise in June 2013 in Brunei Darussalam, which is considered as a milestone in the history of defense and military cooperation under the ambit of the ADMM-Plus. Furthermore, the DND and AFP also consistently participate in various initiatives under the ADMM, including the activities on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in HA/DR, ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organizations Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security, and ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief.

During the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Manila Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management held in Manila on 4-6 June 2014, participants adopted a Post-Haiyan Tacloban Declaration, which underlined the need to strengthen collective preparedness and response to disaster and to reduce losses caused by disasters. The Declaration aimed to forge greater collaboration and coordination in disaster risk reduction and management, including through the full implementation of the Hyogo Framework, as well as contribute actively in the development of a post-2015 framework for disaster risk reduction.

### *iii c. Cyber Security*

The Philippines has been participating in various efforts on cyber security to further enhance its capacity to address cyber security concerns as well as share its experiences on the said matter. Regional and global efforts include the Budapest Conference on Cyber-security in 2012 in Hungary, the international seminar on “Cyber Warfare: A Challenge of ASEAN Cooperation in the Future” in Thailand in 2013, and the annual Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD), which was launched in 2012. The DND also sent a representative to the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue (DOD) in May 2013 in Brunei Darussalam to participate in the forum on “Regional and International Efforts Towards Enhancing CyberSecurity.” In all such fora, Philippine representatives emphasized that cyber security requires a “whole of nation” approach and cannot be under the sole domain of those who wear uniforms or serve in government.

After the conduct of the 1stSDD, points of

contact on cyber affairs were identified at the DND. A joint research team has also been formed with representatives from the DND, AFP and NDCP after the conduct of the NADI Workshop on Cyber Security in November 2013 in Singapore. In addition, the AFP hosted the Cyber Bayanihan 1.0 Conference in February 2014 among stakeholders from the public and private sectors to facilitate an exchange of best practices in securing ICT infrastructures.

Furthermore, the Philippines has recognized that cyber security has become a key area of security or military operations in addition to land, sea, and air domains given that the vulnerability of cyberspace could lead to a paralysis of the military command and control systems among others.

### *iii d. Peacekeeping Operations*

The Philippines sends personnel to peacekeeping missions as part of its contributions to maintaining international security. To date, there are Filipino troops deployed to the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and UN Military Observers’ Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The DND, through the AFP Peace Support Operations (PSO) 2020 Roadmap, envisions to have “an organization that is capable of providing an effective and efficient contribution to international peace and security by supporting high priority peace support operations.”

In view of the vision to develop its own capability while contributing to building regional capacity for peacekeeping, the Philippines co-chaired the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group (EWG) on Peacekeeping Operations with New Zealand from 2011 to 2014. Under the co-chairmanship of the Philippines and New Zealand, several seminars, workshops, and meetings were conducted to examine legal and operational issues on peacekeeping as well as take stock of the peacekeeping capabilities of regional states to provide a direction for regional cooperation, including a Table Top Exercise on Peacekeeping

Operations in 2014, which resulted in a review of the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM), identification of common logistical and operational concerns faced by ADMM-Plus TCCs, and sharing of experiences on peacekeeping operations.

Aside from remaining supportive of the endeavors of the ADMM-Plus EWG on Peacekeeping Operations, representatives from the AFP Peacekeeping Operations Center (PKOC) also attend several regional fora on peacekeeping matters, including the ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting, ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Peacekeeping, ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers' Network (APCN), Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC), and International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). Through such participation, the DND and AFP aim to realize the vision of the AFPPSO Roadmap 2020 as well as further contribute to regional initiatives on peacekeeping operations.

*iii e. Internal Security, Counter-Terrorism, and Transnational Crime*

The peace process with various belligerent groups have resulted in varying degrees of productive results. In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), agreements have been signed. However, conclusion of an agreement with the New People's Army (NPA) remains elusive. These agreements, namely the Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF and the CAB with the MILF, manifest the potential to resolve long-standing conflicts. Notwithstanding these developments, insurgents, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, could hinder the implementation of such agreements. Along this line, the AFP will continue to work with other security agencies, such as the Philippine National Police (PNP) to address security challenges brought about by insurgents, bandits, and breakaway groups. During bilateral and multilateral meetings, the Philippines also shares its experiences on conflict resolution with other countries that are confronted with similar internal security issues.

The Philippines also aims to strike a balance between shifting counter-terrorism efforts from military-led to military-supported operations while sustaining the gains from counter-terrorism initiatives in the past. A Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Committee was also established for the AFP and the PNP to collaboratively address terrorism and lawlessness in the Philippines. Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) oversees national inter-agency coordination for counter-terrorism efforts.

For its part, the AFP continues to undertake counter-terrorism operations and shares appropriate intelligence and information with other regional partners during bilateral Intelligence Exchange conferences. Furthermore, the AFP participates in the activities of the ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism, namely the regional Counter-Terrorism Exercise that was conducted in Indonesia in September 2013. The AFP was also part of the team of national experts that produced the Manual on Collaborative Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Cases. The Manual is a product of the collaborative work among Philippine agencies and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It is aimed at enhancing substantive expertise and practical skills of concerned officials of the intelligence units, law enforcement agencies, and the Prosecutor's Office to achieve results on terrorism-related cases.

While transnational crimes generally fall under the purview of other agencies in the Philippines, the DND is supportive of efforts to address such issues, including human and illicit drug trafficking given the possible repercussions of transnational crimes on the overall security environment. The Philippine defense sector also welcomes the developments under the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and supports the vision for a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015.

*iii f. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disarmament*

Given the country's concern over the proliferation of WMDs, the Philippines supports the principles



of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty as well as UNSC 1540. The Philippines also complies with several conventions under the non-proliferation regime, including the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles.

To address the issue of the possible proliferation of WMDs, particularly CBRNe weapons among terrorists, the Philippines hosted its first Global Terrorism and CBRNe Conference in March 2014. Attended by representatives from several Asia-Pacific countries, the multinational conference was designed to improve information sharing, knowledge, and networking among counter-terrorism and CBRNE professionals. Furthermore, representatives from the DND and AFP attend the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

The Philippines also recognizes that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has helped fuel armed conflicts and that access of unauthorized personnel to military equipment and dual-use goods pose potential risks to national, regional, and global stability. Along this line, the Philippines continues to support initiatives that promote effective control of transfer of arms and other military equipment. With regard to procurement, the DND keeps an inventory of all military equipment and materiel to ensure that acquisitions are with authorized end users. The AFP also has an ongoing project to establish a Weapons Ammunition Management Information System, which is a centralized electronic database system for all munitions assets of the AFP, in order to properly manage the said munitions.

The Philippines also supports the passage of the Strategic Trade Management Act (STMA), which is now being worked on by the executive branch and the Philippine Congress. This will serve as a framework in dealing with the transfer of dual-use goods. Furthermore, the Philippines supports other global efforts for disarmament, namely the Arms Trade Treaty.

With regard to de-mining, the AFP Munitions

Control Center has also been designated as the main point of contact to the ADMM-Plus EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action and ASEAN Regional Mine Control Center (ARMAC) and as well as the activities under the UN Mine Ban Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention. The AFP also regularly submits reports for the Philippines' compliance under several conventions, namely the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention.

### *iii g. Logistics and Defense Industry Collaboration*

It has been recognized that there is a need to improve interoperability in terms of logistics as well as cooperation on defense industry among ASEAN Member States and other regional countries. The DND has designated points of contact to the ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC) and its Consultative Group and sent participants to the ASEAN Logistics Support Framework Meeting in early 2014.

### *iii h. Other Forms of Participation in ASEAN Defense and Security Fora and the ASEAN Community*

In view of the shared goal to realize the ASEAN Community by 2015, the Philippines continues to actively support several ASEAN platforms on defense and security, including the ADMM, ADMM-Plus, ARF, ACDFIM, ASEAN Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM)/ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet (AARM), ASEAN Air Forces Commanders Meeting (AAFCEM), AMOIM, and ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM), which facilitate the exchange of views on current issues and promote practical defense and military cooperation among regional states. For the Philippines, multilateral fora, particularly the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus, remain to be effective platforms for cooperation and are vital components of the regional security architecture.

In addition to the supporting initiatives under the ambit of the ADMM, ADMM-Plus, and

ARF, the DND and its bureaus also participate in several other ASEAN-related endeavors that facilitate the establishment of people-to-people links among defense and military establishments as well as security think tanks, including the Junior Officers' Interaction Program, which serves as a platform for junior military officers in ASEAN; the ASEAN Defence Interaction Program (ADIP), which was established after the 7th ADMM in 2013; and the ARF Heads of Defense Universities/ Colleges/ Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM).

Furthermore, the Philippines aims to have a resident Philippine Defense and Armed Forces Attaché (PhilDAFA) in each of the nine (9) other Member States of ASEAN by 2015 in view of the establishment of the APSC. To date, a PhilDAFA has been assigned in all ASEAN countries, except Laos, which is currently covered by the PhilDAFA in Thailand.

#### IV. Role of the ARF

The ARF has established itself as a key forum where parties explore dialogue and prospects for security cooperation. Recent discussions at all levels of the ARF have emphasized the need for a more action-oriented and practical approach to the challenges confronting the region – a move from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy.

The Philippines notes that there has been considerable progress recently under various regional processes in coming up with common operational approaches, coordination mechanisms and communication protocols to serve as CBMs and to address risks of miscalculation. Examples of these are the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise co-organized by Australia and Malaysia in October 2013 and the adoption of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) by the 21-member WPNS. More recently, the ADMM adopted on 20 May 2014 the Direct Communications Link system, which will provide a permanent, rapid, reliable and confidential means by which ASEAN Defense Ministers may communicate with each other during crisis or

emergency situations, in particular related to maritime security.

The Philippines recognizes the considerable work behind these important achievements and believes the ARF can build upon these milestones to further this work. On maritime security and safety in particular, the ARF can promote good order at sea in the region through the development of regional norms which are compliant with relevant international regimes and which apply to a wide range of actors, including the military, paramilitary and maritime law enforcement agencies.

In all of these endeavors, ASEAN centrality is highly important as the ARF pursues the institutionalization of habits of cooperation and dialogue among its members and addresses important security challenges. In relation to ongoing discussions on the future shape of the regional security architecture, the Philippines sees value in working with existing instruments and ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ARF, which have served the region well in addressing regional security concerns. These mechanisms can push the frontiers of regional security cooperation by engaging more deeply in norms-building, agenda-setting, and consolidation and sharpening of best practices in the region.

# REPUBLIC OF KOREA



**“ As a unique inter-governmental forum for multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF continues to play an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

Northeast Asia still suffers from the “Asian paradox” which depicts the deepening imbalance between the increasing economic interdependence and backward political and security cooperation. Against this backdrop, the ROK government seeks to build a new order of sustainable peace and cooperation on and around the Korean Peninsula through trustpolitik, pursuing the Korean Peninsula Trust Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.

In implementing the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula, peace is to be safeguarded on the basis of a firm and resolute security posture. All provocations are to result in commensurate costs. At the same time, peace will be made along with the stable development of inter-Korean relations.

Over the next few years, the way in which we cope with such geopolitical and geo-economic challenges will determine the shape and the nature of the new order in Asia. In particular, the Republic of Korea keenly recognizes that building a sustainable and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula is very much inseparable from fostering peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The Northeast Asia Peace and cooperation Initiative is a potential roadmap for implementing trustpolitik at the regional level and transforming the existing structure of mistrust and confrontation into one of trust and cooperation. Starting from building a consensus on softer, yet equally critical issues such as climate change, environment, disaster relief and nuclear safety, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative



could yield important and meaningful results. Thus, the initiative seeks to gradually develop a habit of cooperation among regional players so that it may eventually contribute to addressing the region's thornier issues.

The ROK seeks to contribute to peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia by pursuing realistic and mutually acceptable steps that will enhance confidence building. The ROK has actively participated in the ASEAN+3, EAS, ARF, and ADMM-Plus. As for the bilateral relations of Korea in the region, maintaining the firm and strong Korea-US alliance will remain as the bedrock of its foreign policy, while further nurturing the strategic and cooperative relations with China. Furthermore, Korea will seek to stabilize its relations with Japan by enhancing cooperation in as many areas as possible, while maintain a principled and firm stance on historical and territorial issues.

All these efforts are designed to sow the ground ripe for eventual unification of Korea. Similar to the way in which the European integration process positively influenced the German unification process, and vice versa, lasting peace and the eventual unification of Korea will be an essential and integral part of Asia's integration and long-term stability.

*i a. North Korean Nuclear Issue*

North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are a matter of grave concern for the international community. They seriously threaten the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and undermine the international non-proliferation regime.

In spite of the warnings of the international community, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718(2006), 1874(2009), 2087(2013) and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

In response to the nuclear test, the international community has put forth a resolute and united message by unanimously adopting UN Security

Council resolution 2094 in March 2013. Resolution 2094 imposed strong additional sanctions on North Korea, demonstrating to the North that there will be consequences for its continued violations of international obligations.

In February and March 2014, North Korea escalated the tension on the Korean Peninsula and in the region by conducting a series of missile launches using ballistic missile technology. The UN Security Council unequivocally condemned these launches as a violation of Security Council resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094 and agreed to consult on an appropriate response. On March 30, 2014 North Korea released Foreign Ministry's statement claiming that it would not rule out a new form of nuclear test. North Korea's possible provocations including additional nuclear test have become one of the gravest concerns for the neighboring countries as well as the international community.

Even though North Korea has been offering to resume dialogue without any preconditions, its sincerity toward denuclearization is not evident as it continues to enhance its nuclear capability and insists on pushing forward with the so-called parallel pursuit of nuclear arsenal and economic development.

The international community has consistently made it clear that North Korea will never be accepted as a nuclear-weapon state, and urged North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to abide by its international obligations and commitments at numerous global gatherings including the 20th ARF Ministerial Meeting in 2013.

With strong backing of the international community, the ROK government will continue on with its "Principled and Effective Two-track Approach" toward North Korea. The ROK government keeps the door open to dialogue, which it believes should be meaningful and conducive to the substantive progress in North Korea's denuclearization. The ROK government has been making efforts with other Six-Party Talks members to create conditions for the resumption of such

dialogue. On the other hand, the ROK government has been endeavouring to create an environment in close cooperation with the international community in which North Korea cease provocations and abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.

*i b. The Korean Peninsula*

The political situation on the Korean Peninsula entered a new phase with Kim Jong-un's succession to power following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011. Many hoped that the young North Korean leader would make North Korea more open to the international community. However, contrary to such expectations, North Korea posed serious threats to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula by repeatedly carrying out provocations such as launching a long-range missile on April 13, 2012, releasing hostile statements by the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army on April 18, and jamming the Global Positioning System of aircrafts of the Republic of Korea.

North Korea threatened international peace and security by carrying out its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, citing UN Security Council resolutions 2087 and 2094 as a pretext for its action. Moreover, North Korea threatened to nullify the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement on March 5, declared a "state of war" with the ROK on March 30, warned diplomatic missions and international organizations to move out Pyongyang on April 5, and threatened foreigners in the ROK to evacuate on April 9. Furthermore, North Korea decided to suspend all operations of the Gaesong Industrial Complex (GIC) by unilaterally withdrawing North Korean workers from the complex on April 8. The ROK government responded to these provocative threats in a calm and resolute manner in close consultation with the U.S., China and other neighboring countries.

North Korea suddenly launched a charm offensive after Choi Ryong-hae's visit to China in May 2013. Pyongyang agreed to hold inter-Korean talks on June 6, proposed high-level talks with the U.S. on June 16, and agreed to the reunion of separated families on September 25. However, the inter-Korean talks were cancelled

by North Korea on June 11 over disagreement on the level of the head of delegation. North Korea also aborted the reunion of separated families only four days before the event. The inconsistent manner of North Korean authorities has inevitably increased the unpredictability of the regime, and has had negative effects on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the execution of Jang Song-taek in late 2013 surprised the world, increasing uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula.

After the Jang Song-taek's execution, North Korea launched its charm offensive again which led to South-North high-level talks and the reunion of separated families on February 12 and February 20, 2014, respectively. However, the North launched a medium-range ballistic missile on March 26, which seriously threatened international peace. Members of the Security Council condemned North Korea's violation of Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. Furthermore, North Korea held a live-fire drill near the North-western islands of the ROK in which missiles were launched in violation of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). These continuing provocations have again heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK government places top priority on maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and is working in close cooperation with concerned countries to prevent any further provocations from North Korea. The ROK government will respond to any provocation from North Korea in a swift and resolute manner, and will work closely with the international community to urge North Korea to make the right choice and become a responsible member of the international community.

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## II. National Security and Defense Policy

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*ii a. National Defense Objective*

The ROK's National Defense Objective is 'to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful reunification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.' The specific interpretation of the objective is as follows.

First, ‘protecting the country from external military threats and invasions’ means being prepared to meet North Korea’s real military threats while being poised to meet potential threats to peace and security at the same time. North Korea poses a serious threat to the ROK’s national security by developing and increasing its large scale conventional military power, nuclear program, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, and by continuing acts of armed provocation such as the armed attack against the ROK naval ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. As long as such threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces are enemies to the ROK.

Second, ‘supporting peaceful reunification’ means contributing to a peaceful reunification by deterring war, alleviating military tensions, and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Third, ‘contributing to regional stability and world peace’ means contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and world peace by advancing friendly and cooperative relationships with neighboring countries, and by actively participating in international peacekeeping efforts.

#### *ii b. Tenets of the National Defense Policy*

The ROK military has adopted the ‘Advanced Elite Military’ as its vision to achieve the national security and defense objective. To this end, the ROK military has identified the following eight policy tenets: (1) establish a defense posture for comprehensive security, (2) strengthen the ROK-US military alliance and expanding defense diplomacy and cooperation, (3) provide military support for the improvement of inter-Korean relations, (4) bolster advanced military capabilities, (5) nurture highly qualified military personnel and improving military training and education, (6) enhance efficiency in military management, (7) foster an attractive and rewarding military and (8) strive to become a defense force that serves the people.

#### *ii c. Pursuing Three Priority Policies*

North Korea poses threats to our security with direct and reckless provocations such as the

armed attack against the ROK naval ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 as well as the launching of a long-range missile in 2012. Acknowledging the reality of the national security situation, the ROK military has identified the following three priority policies: maintain an immediate and resolute retaliation posture against an enemy’s provocations, develop an elite and combat mission-oriented military, and improve the working conditions for service members.

#### *ii d. Data contribution to ARF Arms Register (as of 2013)*

- i. Total defense expenditure on annual basis
  - (1) Defense expenditure: 30.52 billion USD
  - (2) Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 2.45 %
  - (3) Defense expenditure per capita: 598 USD

### III. National Contributions to Regional Security

#### *iii a. Counter-terrorism*

Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to the international peace and security. Despite the relentless efforts of the international society, however, terrorism shows no signs of abating in the near future. Throughout 2013, the ROK supported the collective efforts of the international community to fight terrorism and participated in various discussions in the fields of prevention, response of terrorism and capacity building.

In the field of cooperation with the international organization, the ROK has been fully implementing the UN resolutions on counter-terrorism by imposing sanctions against individuals and entities designated by the Al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee, and contributed to trust funds of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTIFT) in 2013.

Moreover, the ROK held bilateral consultations on counter-terrorism with the United States, China and Russia in 2013, enhancing the cooperation and information sharing in this field.



The ROK is currently in the process of ratifying the “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” and the “Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” in addition to the twelve out of sixteen convention and protocols on counter-terrorism that it is already a party to.

*iii b. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses serious threats to international peace and security, which requires the concerted efforts of the international community. Faced with the DPRK nuclear issue, the ROK government has been a strong supporter of global efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime.

Particularly, the ROK welcomes the success of the 8th NPT Review Conference in May 2010, in which Korea contributed to the efforts to adopt the final document as the Vice-President of the Conference. The Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva from 22 April to 3 May in 2013. The ROK actively participated in the discussions to fully and effectively implement the outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to further strengthen the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime. Through the NPT Review Process, the ROK will continue to urge the DPRK to abandon all its nuclear programs, while reaffirming in accordance with the NPT that the DPRK cannot achieve the status of a nuclear-weapon state in any case.

The ROK hosted the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. Through the adoption of the Seoul Communiqué, the Seoul Summit advanced a practical vision and a set of concrete, action-oriented measures to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism. Building on the success of the Seoul Summit, Korea has been working closely with other participating States to take further tangible steps toward the shared goal of a world free of nuclear terrorism. In her address to the opening session of the Hague Nuclear Security Summit, held on 24-25 March 2014,

President Park Geun-hye stressed the shared responsibility of the international community to combat nuclear terrorism, and put forward a ‘four-point proposal’ for further advancing the global nuclear security architecture. This proposal includes the following: taking a holistic approach that promotes synergy among nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; pursuing regional dialogue mechanisms in the area of nuclear security; overcoming the capacity gap among States in implementing nuclear security; tackling the emerging threat of cyber terrorism against nuclear facilities.

The ROK has been the chair of the UN Security Council 1540 Committee since 1 January 2013. The UN Security Council resolution 1540, which was unanimously adopted in April 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obliges all states to prevent the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors such as terrorists. As the Chair of the 1540 Committee, the ROK guides the efforts of the international community towards strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and preventing WMD and related materials from falling into the wrong hands. In May 2014, Korea will be hosting a high-level open debate of the Security Council on resolution 1540 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of its adoption.

The ROK government has joined the global efforts to destroy chemical weapons in Syria in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 2118 and the Organization for the Prohibition Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decision. In particular, the ROK contributed 1million USD to OPCW Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Syria and sent an expert to the OPCW Operational Planning Group (OPG).

Since it joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2009, the ROK has actively participated in the Initiative, inter alia, by hosting the Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Seoul along with the maritime exercise in 2012. At the High Level Political Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative held in Poland in May 2013, the ROK contributed to taking stock of the achievements over the last decade and

sharing member countries' future contribution plans by chairing the first session on ensuring a robust initiative.

The ROK has served as the Coordinator of the Implementation Assessment Group (IAG) of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) for the 2013-14 term in order to play its part in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

Since 2004, the ROK government has contributed around 7 million USD to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destructions (GP), including 500 thousand USD in 2013. Korea's contributions include the dismantlement of Russian nuclear submarines, the installation of border radiation detection facilities in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the enhancement of security in Afghanistan's bio-science laboratories.

With regard to conventional weapons, the ROK actively participated in negotiating the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as Vice-President of the Asia-Pacific Group in the 2012 and 2013 conferences. The ROK signed the ATT, a first-ever legally binding document on arms transfer regulation, in June 2013 as an original signatory.

The ROK has been annually co-hosting the ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues since 2002. At the 12th Conference held in Jeju Island in November 2013, 50 disarmament and non-proliferation experts, including Angela Kane, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, exchanged their views on the topic of "Non-Proliferation Regime in the 21st Century: Challenges and the Way Forward."

### *iii c. Transnational Crime*

Combating transnational crimes by definition requires a 'transnational response'. To this end, the ROK has stressed the importance of consolidating the regional cooperation, and kept a particular interest in addressing the threats against the cyber security. Major cyber attacks have been staged against the Republic of Korea in recent years, and in response, the ROK has

formulated comprehensive measures to counter cyber attacks and contributed to strengthening the cooperation with the international community.

As part of its endeavor, the ROK hosted the ARF Seminar on 'Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace' in September 2012, providing a forum where participants shared their concerns on cyber threats as potential sources of conflict. Moreover in 2013, the ROK hosted the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace on October 17-18. The goal of this conference was simple: to seek a common ground and understanding on cyberspace, recognizing the complexities and diverse points of view on the subject.

The conference, counting with the participation of 1,600 representatives including 43 ministers and vice-ministers of 87 countries and 18 international organizations, was a smashing success, producing the "Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace," that contained measures to push ahead economic growth and development, social and cultural benefits, international security, and capacity building in the field of cyberspace.

The ROK and ASEAN are collaborating on a project on combating Narcotic Crime since 2007 under the ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund. It consists of transferring knowledge of Narcotics Crimes of Korea to ASEAN member countries as part of cooperation against transnational crimes with dispatch and training of the liaison officials, provision of investigatory equipments, hosting the workshop, co-organizing anti-narcotics campaign and joining the regional conference. As the results of these efforts, it is expected to improve the drug control system, bring motivation on forensic investigation, enhance control capacity over the border area and build multilateral and bilateral cooperation on this issue.

### *iii d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

According to the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report published by ESCAP and UNISDR, disaster risks in the Asia-Pacific region has increased, with the average number of people exposed to annual

flooding in Asia doubling to 68 million over the last 40 years. Amid these increasing risks, the Republic of Korea is actively contributing to the regional and international efforts, and provides disaster relief by financially supporting disaster- and conflict-stricken countries, assisting capacity-building activities in disaster management and assisting the emergency response efforts of the United Nations.

With the goal of providing timely and effective assistance for overseas disaster relief efforts, in 2013 the ROK contributed approximately USD 20 million to 31 natural and man-made disasters through bilateral and multilateral channels. In particular, right after Philippines was severely stricken by the typhoon, Yolanda (Haiyan) in November, 2013, the ROK government rapidly dispatched Korea Disaster Relief Team (KDRT) of 147 people in total for one month in order to help Filipinos in desperate need. Moreover, around 540 Korean Armed Forces personnel have been deployed to Tanauan, Philippines, to provide essential humanitarian assistance.

As a proactive supporter for the region-wide disaster management arrangements, the ROK government has committed to disaster relief cooperation in the region by partaking in diverse approaches. In line with such efforts, the ROK and Thailand co-hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) 2013, the civil-military joint operation designed to boost the regional capacity in dealing with disasters, in which 28 states\* and 8 international and regional organizations including ASEAN, UNOCHA, AHA Centre, WHO, WFP, IFRC/ICRC, TCS (Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat), and Mercy Malaysia participated. Furthermore, the delegates from the ROK government had attended the 13th Inter-cessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) held in China.

\* 4 individual EU member states included

The ROK has been actively engaging in humanitarian assistance at the international level.

It has been donating to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) since its inception in 2006. In 2013, it contributed USD 4 million to

the CERF, and supported the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), donating USD 3.2 million. It is currently a member of the UNOCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG) and Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The ROK will continue to join in the international efforts to stop urgent and chronic humanitarian crises.

### *iii e. Maritime Security*

The Republic of Korea has actively participated in the global fight against Somali pirates. It is one of the 24 founding members of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), and has assumed the Chairmanship of the CGPCS Working Group 3, which mainly discusses self-defense measures of vessels since 2012. In 2013, as WG3 Chair, it hosted the 7th CGPCS Working Group 3 meeting in Seoul on 6 February and the 8th CGPCS Working Group 3 meeting in London on September 9, where governments and industry representatives discussed a number of important issues, including the improvement of Best Management Practices (BMP) compliance by vessels to prevent and deter piracy more effectively, the international regime on Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) and Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), the welfare of seafarers and their families who were victimized by Somali pirates, and more joint efforts by the international community to release hostages kidnapped by Somali pirates. In particular, at the 8th meeting, the Working Group 3 completed the "Interim Guidelines on Measures Relating to the Welfare of Seafarers and their Families Affected by Piracy off the Coast of Somalia," which propose a set of recommendations, such as post-release support, financial support, and future employment, and the 15th CGPCS Plenary endorsed these guidelines in Djibouti in November 2013.

In addition, the ROK has been deploying the Cheonghae Anti-Piracy Unit to the Somali waters since 2009, thereby taking part in the international cooperation measures for maritime security. The Cheonghae Unit has conducted convoy missions in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under the command of the Command Maritime Forces



(CMF) to protect vessels from Somali pirates.

Also, the ROK has made financial contributions to solve the fundamental problems of Somali piracy by building counter-piracy and judicial capacity in Somalia and the neighboring countries. It provided 400,000 USD to the CGPCS Trust Fund and 100,000 USD to the IMO Djibouti Code Trust Fund in 2013. On the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the ROK has been contributing its annual technical cooperation fund of approximately 90,000 USD to the ReCAAP Information-Sharing Center (ISC) since April 2008.

As the co-chair of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) with the US and Indonesia for the 2012-14 term, the ROK hosted the 5th ISM-MS in Seoul in April 2013. In the meeting, participants had active discussions on the selection of lead countries in priority areas according to the Maritime Security Work Plan and shared practices and efforts regarding civil maritime law enforcement, the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code, and the protection of the maritime environment.

#### IV. Role of the ARF

##### *iv a. National contributions to enhancing the ARF and regional security*

The ROK is committed to joining the ARF's efforts in promoting confidence-building measures, developing preventive diplomacy, and elaborating approaches to conflicts. The ROK participated in various ARF initiatives during the inter-sessional year of 2013-2014, including in Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings, Inter-Sessional meetings, Experts and Eminent Persons' meetings, along with other workshops and seminars. The ROK will also host the 18th ARF HDUCIM (Heads of Defence Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting) in the latter half of 2014.

##### *iv b. Future of the ARF*

As a unique inter-governmental forum for

multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific region, the ARF continues to play an essential role in promoting peace and stability in the region. Since its establishment in 1994, the ARF has facilitated dialogue among many countries by providing them with opportunities to freely exchange their views on various security issues. Such discussions have enabled ARF participants to enhance familiarity and reduce potential tension, and reach a higher level of trust and confidence on traditional security issues.

In the meantime, the ARF has also been carrying out its own confidence-building measures over new security challenges of non-traditional and transnational nature including natural disasters, terrorism and transnational crime.

In the evolving defense and security structure of the region, as witnessed by the establishment of the ADMM-Plus and the expansion of the EAS, the ARF must seek to fully utilize its strong points and share a complementary relationship with other regional operations and mechanisms.

As the ARF faces its 20th anniversary, it should review its activities from all angles and offer a new vision for a better future for the region. In order to meet this demand, the ROK, as one of the leading countries for developing the ARF EEPs(Experts and Eminent persons) system, including drafting up the EEPs' TOR (Terms of Reference) and Guidelines, is supporting the study on the system's improvement and planning to share its outcomes with other participants of ARF meetings. By developing the existing EEPs system, constructive feedback from relevant experts is expected to contribute to creating a virtuous cycle for the ARF activities.

# THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION



***“The region firmly stands as an important economic centre and an attractive cooperation platform with intertwined strategic interests of key nations and leading multilateral institutions.”***



## I. Overview of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the context of the current global geopolitical changes the Asia-Pacific region continues to evolve as one of the key poles of the emerging poly-centric system of international relations. It is demonstrated by the enhanced economic power and political influence of the region and its overall rise in today's architecture of multi-polar world order.

Despite certain slowdown in the growth rates, many Asia-Pacific economies show positive dynamics and some of them, first of all China, remain the driving force of global progress. The region firmly stands as an important economic centre and an attractive cooperation platform with intertwined strategic interests of key nations and leading multilateral institutions.

At the same time, multidimensional security threats still persist in Asia-Pacific and potentially could trigger the growth of political and military tensions and even erupt into an open confrontation. Numerous contradictions and conflicts, namely the nuclear problem in the Korean Peninsula, the situation in Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear programme and territorial disputes are fraught with the regional destabilization. These problems are exacerbated by such threats as the risk of WMD proliferation, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trans-border-crimes, in particular cybercrimes, sea piracy, natural and man-made disasters. The absence of a comprehensive system of security is a serious drawback for the region.

In this circumstances Russia as an integral part of Asia-Pacific continues to pursue active and

constructive engagement in ensuring peace and stability in the region, vigorous participation in the integration processes, strengthening and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with the countries of the region.

Russia's foreign policy is based on recognition of vital importance of an advanced architecture of inter-state relations in Asia-Pacific that would be consistent with today's realities. Such a system should provide extensive opportunities for the promotion of multilateral trade, economy and investment cooperation, targeted neutralization of existing security challenges, prevent new threats and contribute to shaping an integrated economic and political space.

The region needs an order that would ensure equal cooperation, a true balance of power and the harmony of interests. It is necessary that each country participates on an equal footing with other partners in developing a new agenda of regional relations and in addressing urgent development tasks. Joint efforts should be aimed at establishing a non-discriminatory regional order where no nation dominates or imposes its will on others, where countries are not divided into those who lead and those who follow but build their relations upon the immutable principles of trust and mutual respect.

The multilateral consultations on establishing a comprehensive security and cooperation architecture in Asia-Pacific held last November in Brunei Darussalam in the framework of the East Asia Summit (EAS) with participation of foreign policy and defence officials were an important step in this direction.

We believe this dialogue should focus on practical security aspects, including confidence building measures in the military field, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and conventional arms, settlement of conflicts, maritime, food, energy and environmental security, financial stability, emergency response, as well as the fight against terrorism, separatism, transnational crime, ICT crimes, piracy, trafficking in persons and illicit drug trafficking.

In the view of the Russian side a prospective

goal should be conclusion of a legally binding agreement on comprehensive security in Asia-Pacific that would accommodate the interests of all nations in the region without exception, both large and small alike. We are well aware that this process can take a long time. Anyhow such work should be carried out step by step at a pace comfortable for all.

## II. Security threats and challenges in Asia-Pacific

The situation on the Korean peninsula is still the matter of grave concern. Russia disapproves of any statements and steps which can lead to heightened tension. It is crucial that all the stakeholders should cease sabre-rattling, be it reliance on development of nuclear weapons, endless military exercises or brandishing a "stick" of sanctions. It is important to understand that genuine settlement in the Northeast Asia can only be achieved by implementing reliable and effective security mechanisms based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all. We consider it necessary to continue looking for opportunities to resume the Six-Party process, and to that end we maintain permanent contacts with our partners in the negotiation. We stand for settling the nuclear and other issues on the Korean Peninsula on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and other international instruments. Russia has done a lot of groundwork in this area. We urge all the sub-regional players to make a sober evaluation of the current situation, reject stereotypes and undertake joint focused efforts with a view to fostering atmosphere of peace, stability and mutually beneficial cooperation in the Northeast Asia.

We welcome the Joint Plan of Action agreed by the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva on 24 November 2013 as well as the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation between Iran and the IAEA of 11 November 2013. Implementation of these agreements lays necessary ground for a final comprehensive settlement of the situation around Iran's nuclear program.

We urge all the stakeholders to build up efforts to achieve a final solution that would restore the international community's confidence in the



solely peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, lead to cancellation of all the sanctions against Iran and allow this country to fully exercise its rights to develop peaceful nuclear energy, including the right to enrich uranium in conformity with the NPT provisions.

The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate as more troops of the international coalition are being withdrawn while transferring security responsibility in the country to the Afghan security forces. To avoid the total collapse of the situation, the reduction in the number of the foreign military should be compensated by strengthening the combat efficiency and capability of the national law enforcement agencies. For our part we will continue to provide assistance to the Afghans in enhancing the combat efficiency of their security forces.

Russia supports the continuing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to advance countrywide peace and security and to promote Afghan-led and Afghan-owned dialogue with armed opposition groups on reconciliation and political participation, based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Together with all international community we will continue our support to the Government of Afghanistan in effectively tackling illicit drug production, which constitutes threat to peace and stability in different regions of the world.

We closely monitor the developments in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. We are convinced that parties to the territorial disputes should respect the principle of non-threat or non-use of force while continuing to search for ways of peaceful resolution of the existing problems in conformity with the international law. Negotiations should be held between those directly involved in the disputes in a format determined by themselves. We believe that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 2002 ASEAN China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the Guidelines to Implement the Declaration agreed upon in 2011 should serve as the basis for settling the differences in the South China Sea.

### III. Defence policy of the Russian Federation

The main objectives of Russia's defence policy are defined by the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the relevant federal laws, the National Security Strategy up to 2020 adopted in May 2009, and the Military Doctrine approved in February 2010. Russia maintains its national defence on the basis of the principles of rational sufficiency and effectiveness, including methods and means of non-military response.

Our defence and military-technical cooperation with the Asia-Pacific nations is based on the balance of interests and is carried out in order to establish a solid security system in the region. It also serves as a demonstration that solutions to security issues can be found collectively by regional partners alone. The Russian Federation gives priority to broadening military-diplomatic and military-educational contacts, as well as further enhancing international naval cooperation.

Russia attaches great importance to strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, establishment of practical interaction between the military agencies of the Asia-Pacific countries. We believe that the key mechanism in this context is the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which implements a broad programme of military relations development in six main areas. Russia together with Thailand co-chairs the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine, and intends to significantly contribute to this activity. We will continue to actively participate in the ARF Defence Officials' Dialogue and the ARF Security Policy Conferences.

### IV. Combating international terrorism and transnational crime in Asia-Pacific

One of Russia's key priorities in ensuring comprehensive security in Asia-Pacific is to enhance multifaceted cooperation among the countries of the region in combating terrorism, other criminal threats and challenges both in bilateral and multilateral formats.

We make a substantial contribution to

strengthening counter terrorism capacity of the region through the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership. We attach special importance to the interaction in the framework of the ASEAN-Russia Senior Officials Meetings on Transnational Crime and the Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime.

The large-scale law-enforcement cooperation is facilitated by the contacts with ASEANAPOL, such as the working visit to Russia by Pol. Lt. General Sar Moline, Executive Director of the ASEANAPOL Secretariat, in December 2013. An important role in combating terrorism belongs to ADMM-Plus.

ARF is the key instrument of the multilateral dialogue on addressing non-traditional security challenges and threats in the Asia-Pacific region. As one of the Lead Countries on Cyber-security and Cyber Terrorism Russia continues to make a constructive contribution to drafting of a relevant Working Plan designed to lay down the foundation for practical interaction among the ARF participants in this sphere. We are also aimed at further uniting efforts with our ARF partners in other priority areas, including countering illicit drugs trafficking and public radicalization.

We see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a potential forum for the promotion of specific counter-terrorism initiatives. Russia pursues a consistent implementation of the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We pay particular attention to cooperation in countering money laundering and financing terrorism, ensuring the integrated transportation security and security at major public events.

We welcome the plans to establish a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015. We seek to deepen cooperation within the Asia-Pacific institutions in countering trafficking in heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs, production and abuse of which are constantly growing in Asia-Pacific. Russia continued to be actively engaged as an observer in the work of the Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA), the subsidiary body of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

## V. Nuclear and missile disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security in Asia-Pacific

The practical implementation of the Russian-American START of 5 February 2011 remains a priority for the Russian Federation as this Treaty contributes to the strengthening of international security and stability in the world, including the Asia-Pacific region.

Further steps in the field of nuclear disarmament will depend on the whole complex of factors affecting the strategic stability. The process of nuclear disarmament has to become multilateral, which is especially significant for Asia-Pacific, where the countries possessing military nuclear capabilities and actively developing missile programmes are situated.

Russia keeps working towards establishment of a modern architecture of international cooperation in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy based on strict verification mechanisms for non-proliferation obligations as well as on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) as a well-grounded alternative to development of sensitive NFC elements by the states in their territories.

We recall that the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and its revised Protocol contribute to strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Russia welcomes the opportunity to sign the revised Protocol and look forward to its entry into force at the earliest possible opportunity.

We believe that the task of implementing of the UNSC Resolution 1540 as the key and the most detailed decision on non-proliferation remains relevant, specifically in Asia-Pacific. In this regard, we urge our partners in Asia-Pacific to actively cooperate with the UNSC 1540 Committee, which plays the central coordinating role in promoting implementation of the resolution.

The ongoing deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems in Asia-Pacific can lead to intensification of the military and political

confrontation and regional missile arms race. We closely follow the situation in this area stressing the priority of political and diplomatic methods of resolving missile proliferation issues.

## VI. Emergency response in Asia-Pacific

Managing numerous natural disasters that Asia-Pacific is exposed to requires building up national capacities for a prompt response to natural and man-made catastrophes. Close regional cooperation in preventing and mitigating consequences of emergencies is a key instrument for carrying out this task. Developing such cooperation could be facilitated by the implementation of the Russian initiative to set up crisis management centers in Asia-Pacific and to bring them together into an integrated regional network. The initiative put forward by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the 6th East Asia Summit (Bali, 19 November 2011) and furthered during Russia's 2012 APEC Chairmanship aimed at launching exchange of information and best practices both on a day-to-day basis and in case of emergency. The main goal is to increase efficiency of decision-making, in particular on providing and accepting international aid, and to upgrade at low expenses the level of national and regional crisis management systems.

Persistent steps are being taken to promote cooperation in this area within the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership. In March 2013 Ministry for Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters - EMERCOM of Russia hosted a seminar on "Methodological Support for the Development of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management based on the experience of the National Center for Crisis Management".

A major role in strengthening multilateral cooperation in this area belongs to consistent implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief for 2012-2014. We support efforts to coordinate and synchronize activities of the regional fora dealing with prevention and mitigation of natural and man-made catastrophes in Asia-Pacific, first of all the ARF, EAS, and ADMM-Plus. We are convinced that international assistance

operations should be conducted mainly by the emergency civil agencies, while military units can be involved in disaster response strictly on a voluntary basis. The Russian side supports the useful practice of holding "ARF DiREx".

Russia keeps rendering practical assistance to the Asia-Pacific countries in case of emergency. In particular, EMERCOM of Russia provided the Philippines with 56 tons of humanitarian supplies to support the victims of the Haiyan Typhoon in November 2013.

## VII. Trends in the development of multilateral diplomacy in Asia-Pacific

A number of high-profile institutions of complementary multilateral diplomacy has been established in the Asia-Pacific region, such as ASEAN, EAS, ARF, ADMM-Plus, SCO, APEC, RIC, Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), etc. All of them serve as important tools to ensure stability and overall improvement of the situation in the region.

The Russian side does not see it necessary to set up new regional security mechanisms. Today the main efforts should be focused on improving coordination and achieving synergy of activities of existing structures. The East Asia Summits as a primary platform for a strategic dialogue between the Leaders of the Asia-Pacific countries on the fundamental issues of the future regional political, security and economic arrangement, could serve as a foundation for such an architecture of the network diplomacy.



# SINGAPORE



**“The key challenge for ASEAN is to maintain its centrality in a more complex environment and to ensure that it remains a neutral platform for major partners to engage the region and each other.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

The regional geopolitical situation is becoming increasingly complex, with major structural shifts creating greater potential for strategic competition. At the core of this evolving landscape is the Sino-US relationship which sets the tone for the entire region. The relationship is now largely heading in a positive direction, based on the mutual understanding that stable relations between the US and China are paramount to their shared interest in securing a prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific. Against this backdrop, the key challenge for ASEAN is to maintain its centrality in a more complex environment and to ensure that it remains a neutral platform for major partners to engage the region and each other. This will ensure that ASEAN stays true to its *raison d'être* of maintaining peace and stability in the region. In this regard, ASEAN has made concerted efforts over the years to deepen and broaden its relationships with major partners through its network of Dialogue Partnerships and wider regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). These efforts have helped to engender mutual confidence among countries and promote regional peace, security and stability. Nonetheless, there remain several potential flashpoints in the region that if left unaddressed, will pose a threat to our individual and regional security.

While tensions following the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) satellite launch in December 2012 and nuclear test in February 2013 have abated, Singapore remains concerned over the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Singapore



welcomes actions to urge the DPRK to abide by its international obligations and work toward the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Singapore supports a stable Korean Peninsula, which is in the interest of all in East Asia, including Southeast Asia and ASEAN. In this regard, it is critical for all parties to exercise utmost restraint, ease tensions and resume dialogue. It is our hope that the DPRK will integrate itself into the region to share in our region's peace and prosperity.

We are also concerned about the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). All countries in the region have an interest in ensuring the peace, stability and freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS. The SCS disputes should be settled peacefully in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ASEAN continues to advocate the peaceful resolution of disputes, as espoused in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Six Point Principles on the SCS, as well as the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct for the SCS between ASEAN and China. This position was reaffirmed by the Leaders at the 23rd ASEAN Summit in Brunei in October 2013. Similarly, the tensions in the ECS have been rising due to the recent series of events, actions and counter-actions taken by different parties. It is in the interest of all to exercise restraint, avoid actions which might further raise tensions, and engage in dialogue to overcome differences.

The Middle East remains a region in flux, and several countries continue to face tensions both internally and externally. The Geneva II Conference has failed to produce a breakthrough in Syria. To address the dire humanitarian situation caused by the Syrian civil war, all parties will have to reach a mutually acceptable political solution. We urge the Syrian Government to ensure that all chemical weapons are destroyed according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013). We also welcome the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We hope that both sides will agree on a just and sustainable two-state solution. In addition, as a small country, we take the issue of nuclear non-

proliferation very seriously. We welcome the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran. We hope that a comprehensive agreement can be concluded, which would address the concerns of the international community over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This is an issue that has global ramifications, both in terms of security and the economy, and will affect ARF members.

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## II. National Security and Defence Policy

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Singapore's defence policy is based on the twin pillars of deterrence and diplomacy. Singapore believes in the need for a strong defence, to ensure that we enjoy peace and security, and to provide us with the political space and freedom to act in the best interests of our people. This is why Singapore has invested steadily and prudently in defence over the years, to build up a professional and capable Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Given our small population size and limited resources, Singapore focuses on force multipliers—technology, paired with a highly educated and technologically-savvy population – to overcome the limits of our small standing military.

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## III. National Contributions to Regional Security

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As a small country, Singapore's security and prosperity are greatly dependent on regional peace and stability. Singapore seeks to establish strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. Singapore also believes that regional security and stability are best served by a robust, open and inclusive security architecture that encourages countries to engage constructively in dialogue, and ensures that all stakeholders have a voice and a seat at the table. As such, Singapore actively participates in various multilateral fora and arrangements, including the EAS, ASEAN, the ARF, the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), and the ADMM-Plus.

The ADMM is a key component of the regional security architecture as the highest ministerial

defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN. Established in 2006, the ADMM aims to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security matters with the view towards enhancing security cooperation. The ADMM has made significant progress to deal with real and current security issues. At the 7th ADMM in Brunei in May 2013, the Defence Ministers agreed to put in place practical measures to reduce tensions at sea, such as the establishment of hotlines to defuse tensions at sea as well as a non-first-use of force agreement. This reflects the maturity of the ADMM as a forum. The ADMM has also played a key role in establishing the ADMM Plus, a forum which was inaugurated in Hanoi in October 2010. The ADMM-Plus comprises the ten ASEAN Member States and eight “Plus” countries, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US. The ADMM-Plus offers a useful and valuable platform for ASEAN and the “Plus” countries to have open and constructive dialogue as well as to engender practical cooperation in common areas of security interest.

Practical cooperation is a strategic thrust of the ADMM-Plus. Singapore is strongly encouraged by the good progress of the five ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) in the areas of maritime security (MS), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO), counter-terrorism (CT) and military medicine (MM). The ADMM-Plus has established itself as an action-oriented platform with the conduct of three Field Training Exercises (FTXes) in 2013. As co-chair of the EWGMM, Singapore played an active role in the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM exercise in June 2013 hosted by Brunei as the Chair of the ADMM-Plus. The exercise was a significant milestone for the ADMM-Plus as the first military exercise to be conducted under the ambit of the ADMM-Plus. The exercise involved over 3,000 troops, 6 naval ships and 15 helicopters and was a good opportunity for all 18 ADMM-Plus militaries to work together to enhance inter operability in areas of disaster management with elements of military medicine in support. The exercise also built trust and confidence amongst the militaries,

and enhanced mutual understanding. Singapore also actively participated in the ADMM-Plus MS FTX hosted by Australia in September/October 2013, as well as the ADMM-Plus CT Exercise hosted by Indonesia in September 2013.

Singapore will co-chair the EWG on CT with Australia from early 2014. We will continue to play an active role in sustaining the momentum of practical cooperation. In particular, Singapore and Australia, as EWG-CT co-chairs, will collaborate with Brunei and New Zealand, as co-chairs of the EWG on MS, to organise a combined MS/CT exercise. This exercise will allow militaries to enhance interoperability in countering maritime terrorism.

The SLD, which is held annually in Singapore, has established itself as the foremost defence and security conference in the Asia-Pacific region since its inception in 2002. It provides a useful opportunity for Defence Ministers, senior officials and prominent security experts of the region to meet and discuss important security issues of the day. 27 Ministerial-level delegates and participants from 32 countries attended the 12th SLD that was held from 31 May to 2 June 2013. Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung delivered the keynote address at the 12th SLD, marking the fifth successive year that a foreign Head of State or Government had done so. There was a robust exchange of views on key regional defence and security issues throughout the Dialogue, including cyber security, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as maritime disputes in the ECS and the SCS. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will deliver the keynote address at the 13th SLD, which will be held from 30 May to 1 June 2014.

The SLD Sherpa Meeting, which is organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, serves to supplement and strengthen the SLD process by providing an inter-sessional platform for senior civilian and military officials to engage in frank discussions in current defence and security issues. The second SLD Sherpa Meeting was held from 12 to 14 January 2014. 60 delegates participated in the event.



*iii a. Counter-terrorism*

The threat of terrorism remains a key concern for the region. While the death of Al Qaeda Leader Osama bin Laden on 1 May 2011 represented a significant milestone in the struggle against international terrorism, continued vigilance and cooperation by all countries will be needed to deal with the complex and long-term challenges posed by terrorism and the ideologies that perpetuate it.

Since the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime, ASEAN's counter-terrorism efforts have made much progress. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT), adopted at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in 2007, is the first region-wide and legally binding anti-terrorism pact. Singapore was one of the first ASEAN Member States to ratify the Convention. The ACCT entered into force on 27 May 2011, and has, since January 2013, been ratified by all 10 ASEAN Member States. Singapore welcomes these significant achievements on the Convention, which enhances regional cooperation against terrorism and affirms the region's commitment to the global strategy on counter terrorism.

In support of regional capacity building, Singapore has hosted a number of counter-terrorism workshops and initiatives in the areas of Border Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives, Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Crisis Management in Post Attack Scenarios, under the auspices of the ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue. Singapore hosted a one-week ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Executive Programme under these auspices in March 2012 where ASEAN senior practitioners shared experiences and best practices with one another and with other counter-terrorism experts. Singapore will also be hosting the 9th ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue this year.

*iii b. Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

Singapore has been a strong supporter of global efforts to combat nuclear weapons proliferation

and works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to this end. In 1976, Singapore ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A comprehensive safeguards agreement with a Small Quantities Protocol was adopted the following year. The latter was modified in March 2008 in accordance with IAEA advice. Singapore also ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) in March 2008 and supports its universalization. Singapore hosted two IAEA outreach seminars on the Agency's Safeguards Systems for states in Southeast and South Asia in March 2011 and joined the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database in March 2012. It served a two-year term on the Agency's Board of Governors (BOG) from September 2010 to September 2012 and is expected to serve on the BOG again in 2016. Singapore is also party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and supports efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Singapore is part of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong attended the last three NSS – the inaugural NSS in Washington in 2010; second NSS in Seoul in 2012; and the third NSS in The Hague in March 2014. In addition, Singapore joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in May 2010 and subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles in August 2011.

Singapore supports the EU's initiative to establish an ASEAN-EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Centre of Excellence (CBRN-CoE), to improve national policies and international cooperation to mitigate CBRN risks and welcomes the establishment of the Regional Secretariat of the CBRN-CoE in Manila in March 2013.

In the area of chemical weapons, Singapore participated in the third special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 2013. Singapore also fully supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)'s activities to develop capabilities and readiness against the threat of chemical weapons. Since March 2008, Singapore has offered the Emergency Response

to Chemical Incidents training course, as a pledge of assistance under Article X. In May 2013, Singapore hosted the third run of the course, which to date has benefited participants from more than 20 countries in Asia. It has also provided opportunities for the sharing of experiences on the management of hazards posed by chemical agents. In addition, Singapore values the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW as a participant of the Temporary Working Groups on Sampling and Analysis, as well as on Verification.

In the area of biological weapons, Singapore participated in the 2012 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Singapore has also submitted returns on BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBM) annually since 2012. Our next BWC CBM Submission will be in April 2014.

On counter-proliferation in general, Singapore has been an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2004. Singapore is a member of the PSI's Operational Experts Group (OEG) and has hosted PSI exercises. The PSI's first exercise in Southeast Asia, Exercise Deep Sabre I, was held in Singapore in 2005. In 2009, Singapore hosted Exercise Deep Sabre II which further enhanced the inter-operability and counter-proliferation capabilities of PSI partners in the region. Singapore sent an inter-agency delegation led by a Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the PSI 10th Anniversary High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw, Poland in May 2013.

Together with China and the US, Singapore co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ISM on NPD) from 2009 to 2011. This covered the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Singapore hosted the 2nd ISM on NPD in July 2010 with the theme "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".

Singapore has implemented a robust and enhanced export control regime underpinned by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act since January

2003. The Act controls the transfer and brokering of strategic goods, and related software and technology, as well as those capable of being used to develop, produce, operate, stockpile or acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). In line with Singapore's commitment to prevent WMD proliferation, the Act's control list has been updated regularly to keep abreast of technological developments and taking reference from the four multilateral export control regimes. A Secure Trade Partnership programme with businesses, launched in May 2007, encourages companies to adopt robust security measures in their trade operations, to improve the overall security of the global supply chain. Additionally, the launch of the Trade Facilitation & Integrated Risk-based System (Trade FIRS) in January 2011 provides a single holistic framework to encourage a virtuous cycle of compliance as companies with more robust systems, internal practices and security measures are rewarded with a higher level of trade facilitation.

Singapore uses computerised cargo clearance systems for the clearance/screening of cargo at our checkpoints. Singapore has also implemented the Data Warehouse system to assist in collating and analyzing information and risk profiling submitted through our Single Window system.

In May 2011, Singapore co-hosted the 12th International Export Control Conference in Singapore, with the US and the EU, under the theme of "Building a Network of Non-proliferators". The Conference served to build international relationships and examine ongoing efforts to improve trade regulation, and was attended by approximately 300 officials from 76 states and administrative regions. Singapore also attended and presented at the USS Tate Department Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) Global Transshipment Seminar in 2011 and the annual EXBS conference in 2012 in Slovenia. Singapore made presentations and moderated discussions at the Annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in February 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively in Tokyo. These topics comprised domestic industry outreach and international collaboration and cooperation. Singapore also participates regularly in the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-

Proliferation in Tokyo, including most recently in March and November 2013.

### *iii c. Transnational Crime*

Regional security challenges are increasingly becoming transnational and non-traditional in nature, and cannot be adequately addressed by individual domestic policies. Singapore therefore believes in a concerted regional effort in combating these transnational crimes.

Under the aegis of the ASEAN Ministerial and Senior Officials' Meetings on Transnational Crime (AMMTC & SOMTC), Singapore is the Lead Shepherd for two transnational crime areas—namely Cybercrime and International Economic Crime. In this capacity, the Singapore Police Force co-hosted the 1st ASEAN Cybercrime Workshop with New Zealand from 6 to 7 July 2011 and will similarly co-host the 2nd ASEAN Cybercrime Workshop in May 2013. Recognising the increasing need for ASEAN Member States to counter cybercrime and its potential impact on states' economic and financial landscape, Singapore has organised an ASEAN Senior Officials Round-table on Cybercrime where key industry leaders will conduct briefings for ASEAN's SOMTC leaders and cybercrime experts. Singapore is also co-organising an ASEAN Workshop on International Economic Crime with the Republic of Korea in August 2013. Singapore will be organising an ASEAN US Workshop on Cybercrime as well as the inaugural SOMTC Cybercrime Working Group meeting and an ASEAN-Japan Cybercrime Dialogue this year to promote continued engagement with ASEAN Member States and its Dialogue Partners in combating cybercrimes.

On Trafficking-in-Persons(TIP), the region has made significant progress since the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration against TIP, Particularly Women and Children in 2004. Singapore launched its National Plan of Action against TIP in March 2012. Singapore supports initiatives that build regional capacity against TIP, such as the 3rd ASEAN Workshop on Criminal Justice Response to TIP which we hosted in July 2011. In our capacity as SOMTC Chair in 2011/2012,

Singapore hosted the 6th and 7th ASEAN SOMTC Working Group meetings on TIP in July 2011 and April 2012. Singapore also hosted the 21st and 22nd Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Specialist Units (HSU) on Trafficking in July 2011 and April 2012, as the chair of the HSU in 2011/2012. The SOMTC Working Group on TIP meetings provided a platform for ASEAN Member States to coordinate plans and programmes to enhance regional cooperation to combat TIP, while the HSU meetings brought together the ASEAN specialist trafficking response units to discuss TIP issues and initiatives, including international law enforcement cooperation, at the operational level. Singapore's support for, and active participation in these ASEAN platforms strengthen our capacity to work in partnership with countries in the region to counter cross-border TIP. A significant development within ASEAN has been ASEAN's concurrent development of a Regional Plan of Action (RPA) to Combat Trafficking in Persons and an ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP). Both these instruments are being negotiated by experts group formed under the aegis of the SOMTC with Philippines in the role of lead shepherd.

### *iii d. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

The scale and frequency of recent natural disasters have underscored the importance of international cooperation in disaster relief. As a small country with limited resources, Singapore participates in HADR missions in which we can make contributions that are meaningful and within our means. Our last major HADR operation was for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013. Singapore was one of the first countries to render assistance on the ground to the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. The SAF deployed two RSAF C-130 aircrafts to send and distribute a substantial amount of essential relief supplies like tents, blankets and medical supplies to communities devastated by the typhoon. At the Philippines' request, one C-130 remained behind to support the Philippine government's relief efforts, ferrying relief supplies and personnel between Tacloban, one of



the worst-hit cities, and Manila. The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) had also deployed a team of communications specialists to support Philippines in the emergency planning and preparation for Typhoon Haiyan.

Singapore strongly supports the establishment and operationalisation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) in Jakarta as part of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER)'s mandate. As a hub for relevant information and expertise exchange, the AHA Centre is a key coordination centre for regional disaster relief efforts to facilitate effective and efficient ASEAN responses to disasters within the region.

Singapore participated in the 3rd ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREX) co-hosted by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Thailand from 7 to 11 May 2013 in Cha-am, Phetchaburi Province, Thailand. The multi-nation exercise involved 26 countries, including regional and international organisations such as the ASEAN Secretariat, the AHA Centre, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The exercise enhanced participants' capacity in conducting disaster relief operations by focusing on strengthening coordination between civilian and military units. The SAF contributed a planning team for the table-top exercise, as well as a C-130 for the field training exercise. The SCDF contributed to the field training exercise by deploying a Search and Rescue contingent comprising a trauma paramedic, Emergency Rescue Specialists, National Service men and members of its elite Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team. SCDF was also represented in the table-top exercise by a member of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team. Singapore looks forward to participating in the next ARF DiREX. The ARF DiREX is widely recognised as a landmark event in improving the capacity of the region's disaster response mechanism in a multinational operational context.

Singapore also participated in the 5th ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) in Vietnam in October 2013. ARDEX 2013 served as a platform for countries to practise, assess and review mechanisms under the ASEAN Stand by Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP). The exercise scenario simulated a super typhoon with wind speed of more than 200km/h impacting Hanoi, Vietnam and causing large scale flooding and large scale damage to property.

In December 2012, the SCDF deployed three officers to support the Philippines in the emergency planning and preparation for Tropical Storm Bopha under the auspices of UNOCHA. One officer was deployed with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to assess the situation and the humanitarian needs, and to put in place mechanisms to ensure information flow between the affected area and Manila, and to the international organizations involved in the relief efforts. The remaining officers, who were communications specialists, were deployed under the Asia-Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (APHP) team to provide communications support for the UNDAC teams.

### *iii e. Maritime Security*

As a maritime nation, Singapore has a strong interest in the security of international sea lanes of communications and takes a serious view of any threats to the freedom and safety of navigation. To this end, Singapore works with like-minded countries to uphold the sanctity of international law, including UNCLOS, and plays an active part in fostering regional maritime security cooperation and the enhancement of port security.

As a major hub port and one of the largest ship registries in the world, Singapore is committed to the security of seaborne cargo. In 2002, Singapore was the first port in Asia to sign up to the US' Container Security Initiative. As one of the first countries to implement the International Maritime Organisation's (IMO's) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code,

Singapore has contributed actively to capacity building programmes at various regional forums to assist countries in their implementation of the ISPS Code. Singapore is also a party to the IMO's International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. Since 1 January 2012, all power-driven vessels in the port of Singapore have been required to install and maintain in operation an approved transponder which complies with SOLAS requirements of an automatic identification system.

Singapore has been closely cooperating with key partners to ensure maritime security in the region, given the existence of vital sea lanes of communication such as the SCS, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), the Lombok Strait and the Sunda Strait. To this end, Singapore remains fully committed to the following three principles which have gained broad consensus amongst regional stakeholders: first, that primary responsibility for the security of the regional waterways lies with the littoral states; second, the international community, including the user states and bodies like the IMO, have an important role to play; and third, new cooperative measures should be developed in line with UNCLOS and other international conventions, with full respect for national sovereignty.

Singapore is also supportive of ASEAN's approach towards maritime issues as encapsulated in the Bali Concord II, signed in October 2003, which reiterates the trans-boundary nature of maritime issues and the need to address them regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive way. We also continue to participate actively in various ASEAN fora such as the ARF and the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)/Expanded AMF, the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meetings, to address maritime issues. In particular, under the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, Singapore had successfully co-hosted the ASEAN Navies Information Sharing Exercise with Indonesia at the Singapore Changi Command and Control (C2) Centre in July 2012. The exercise focused on sea robbery/piracy and maritime terrorism and also witnessed the official

launch of the ASEAN Info-Sharing Portal (AIP). Singapore also participated in the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (FTX) with a Landing Ship Tank.

These principles have been translated into concrete efforts at a regional level. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is a joint undertaking by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand which comprises the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol, the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" maritime air patrols and the Intelligence Exchange Group. Since its inception in July 2004, the MSP has been able to substantially reduce the number of piracy and armed robbery incidents occurring in the SOMS. The Republic of Singapore Navy and the Singapore Police Coast Guard have also been conducting joint coordinated patrols with their counterparts from the Indonesian Navy and Police to deter sea robberies in the Singapore Strait and the Phillip Channel under the ambit of the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol (ISCP) since 1992. The ISCP also provides both countries with direct communication channels as well as procedures for cross-border pursuit.

Apart from air and sea patrols, Singapore also believes in enhancing maritime domain awareness and ensuring a systematic and timely exchange of information to keep sea lanes safe. In this regard, the Republic of Singapore Navy's Changi C2 Centre was set up as a one-stop information and response coordination hub for maritime security. The Changi C2 Centre's Information Fusion Centre (IFC), established in 2009, provides a useful information sharing platform for different nations to better respond to the dynamic maritime security environment. As an information-sharing node, the IFC currently has links with international maritime centres and 62 operational centres and agencies from 32 countries. There are also opportunities for navies from regional and extra-regional countries to deploy International Liaison Officers at the IFC. The pooling of various information-sharing and analytical systems in one location has also enabled the IFC to facilitate cooperation on other maritime security issues beyond piracy. Since the IFC's establishment, 59 ILOs from 18 countries have been deployed there.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first ever agreement among governments that promotes and enhances cooperation against piracy and armed sea robbery against ships in Asia. By the end of 2013, 19 States have acceded to the ReCAAP, namely Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. The US has also given formal notification of its interest in acceding to the ReCAAP. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which was established in Singapore in November 2006 to serve as a platform for information exchange, has established itself as an authority on trends and analyses of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia for governments and industry alike. ReCAAP ISC has also supported numerous capacity building efforts to improve the capability of regional governments to combat piracy and armed sea robbery in the region. In 2009, the ReCAAP was held up by the IMO as a model for the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (GoA). Since then, the ReCAAP ISC has been working closely with the IMO to contribute to the implementation of the Djibouti Code. These achievements speak volumes about the success of ReCAAP as an effective model of regional cooperation.

Singapore also continues to engage stakeholders through multilateral platforms such as the International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (IMDEX). IMDEX 2013, was held from 14 to 16 May 2013 and attended by a total of 61 delegations from the navies, coast guards and maritime enforcement agencies of 48 countries. It served as a key platform for defence professionals to exchange views and enhance cooperation in the maritime domain. On the sidelines of IMDEX 2013, Singapore also hosted the Maritime Information-Sharing Exercise (MARSIX) 2013 and the 4th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Multilateral Sea Exercise (WMSX) 2 at the Changi C2 centre. These exercises allowed

participating countries to strengthen their interoperability while familiarising themselves with a common set of information-sharing procedures and best practices.

Beyond regional cooperation, Singapore also shares the international community's deep concern over the scourge of piracy threatening international sea-lines of communications like the GoA, and actively contributes to multinational anti-piracy efforts there so as to encourage a more active role for ASEAN in the GoA. To this end, Singapore has been contributing to the US-led multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 through our deployment of three SAF Task Groups (TGs) since 2009. The first three TGs each comprised one Landing Ship Tank and two Super Puma helicopters, while the fourth and fifth TG each comprised a Frigate with a Naval Helicopter. A Fokker 50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft was also deployed in 2011. At the request of the Combined Maritime Forces, Singapore has taken command of the CTF 151 thrice, from January to April 2010, March to June 2011, and from March to June 2013.

#### *iii f. Contributions to Multinational Stabilisation and Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan*

The SAF has deployed close to 500 personnel to Afghanistan since May 2007 as part of Singapore's contributions to the multinational stabilisation and reconstruction efforts there. Operating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), SAF personnel have contributed their expertise in humanitarian assistance, construction engineering, force protection, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In line with the transition of full security responsibility for Afghanistan from the ISAF to the ANSF, the SAF concluded its deployments in Afghanistan in June 2013.

#### **IV. Role of ARF**

The ARF has made good progress since its inception in 1994 as an open and inclusive forum for Asia-Pacific nations to discuss key political



and security issues. The ARF's evolution from Stage I Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to Stage II Development of Preventive Diplomacy (PD) mechanisms, after more than 15 years, is a significant development. It is a reflection of the ARF's success in engendering greater comfort levels among its members, fostering closer collaboration and candid dialogue as well as its ability to respond to the complexities in the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Asia-Pacific.

The implementation of the PD agenda, in accordance with universally recognised norms and principles of international law, and in tandem with the development of CBMs, will ensure that the ARF moves ahead to address the multi-dimensional challenges confronting the region. To this end, while we should accommodate the comfort levels of all ARF participants, Singapore remains fully committed to the implementation of the PD Work Plan. We welcome and support ARF members' various proposals in this regard. The ARF should also continue its work in enhancing linkages between the complementary activities of Track I and Track II, as the latter is a useful avenue to explore ways to promote the ARF's effectiveness.

While there will inevitably be overlap among various fora such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus, these overlapping structures, with ASEAN at the core, reflect the region's diversity. A loose, overlapping configuration will be more resilient to external shocks than an overly neat architecture that could prove brittle. Nevertheless, to ensure their continued effectiveness, we can explore practical ways to improve coordination and information-sharing, among the fora, while respecting their various mandates.

Singapore remains fully supportive of the ARF process and its role as a key pillar of the Asia Pacific security architecture. Singapore is currently the co-lead for priority area 2 (Rapid Assessment, Deployment, and Acceptance of Support) at the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (DR). We recently co-chaired the ARF Seminar on Regional Cooperation on Offshore Oil Spill held in Qingdao, China from

26 to 28 March 2014 with the US, China and Brunei.

# THAILAND



***“With the impending launch of the ASEAN Community in 2015, ASEAN has shown greater ability to act collectively on regional security challenges.”***



## I. Global Outlook

The overall global security outlook appears to be less optimistic than in 2013. While outstanding conflicts remain unresolved, new flashpoints of inter-state tensions have emerged in Europe and Asia. These have added to the increasing unpredictability of the current state of an international political order that is being characterized increasingly by major power rivalry rather than cooperation and adherence to principles of international law.

The civil war in Syria continues despite intense diplomatic efforts that culminated in the Geneva II Conference on Syria. The protracted conflict has generated a humanitarian crisis that is putting severe strains on the resources of neighboring countries that are providing shelter for the estimated 2.5 million displaced Syrians. This influx has created concerns for the stability of the entire Middle East region. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has warned of security implications of the conflict on various dimensions, including the spread of extremism as well as economic collapse of a neighboring country. Continued diplomatic efforts, support for humanitarian assistance and restraint amongst the conflicting parties are necessary to reduce the humanitarian consequences of the crisis and to lay the groundwork for a lasting political solution based on the interests of the Syrian people.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense as the Six-Party Talks and other fora for dialogue stay suspended. While there have been some positive developments, such as inter-Korean family reunions in February 2014, these advancements were set-back by recent tensions

regarding short-range missile tests. There is concern that such tensions, if unmanaged, could lead to further escalation and thereby threaten regional and international peace and stability. It is therefore essential that all parties exercise restraint, implement fully and remain committed to their international obligations under the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and continue to leave the door open to peaceful dialogue, including in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the same time, humanitarian assistance to the people of the DPRK needs to be continued which, it is hoped, would contribute to peace and stability on and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Domestic political unrest in the Ukraine have spiralled into open inter-State confrontation with significant implications not only for Europe but also for the current multilateral system based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. While full-scale military conflict has thus far been averted, the Ukraine crisis is testing confidence in political-security arrangements to preserve regional peace and security and to maintain international peace and security. The international community is therefore watching with concern the developments in Ukraine and is urging restraint and dialogue as a first step towards de-escalation of the crisis. Strong support should be given to all diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution based on the interests of the peoples of the Ukraine and in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in particular the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Terrorism is still a cause for concern and has become more complex. In many cases, transnational crime syndicates have established links with terrorist entities. Criminal groups are often involved in supplying arms, funnelling funds, and providing logistics support to terrorist groups. Transnational criminals have managed to expand their networks by becoming more adept at using legitimate businesses as fronts to conduct their illicit activities. Terrorist groups are becoming smaller and more agile, with shorter command chains, enhancing their ability to proliferate in various regions across the world.

These developments present significant challenges for counter-terrorism authorities.

The issue of cyber security is garnering much public attention due to the increasing ease of access to the internet for users across the world. Personal users, businesses, industries, as well as governments and national security agencies alike are vulnerable to cybercrimes, particularly in the form of theft of confidential information. Capacity to protect against cyber-attacks varies across countries. In some developing countries, national information infrastructure and legal systems struggle to keep up with rapidly changing technology, putting them at greater risks for cyber-threats.

The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report warns of the dire consequences that climate change pose to the security of humankind. It presents overwhelming evidence on the irreversible impact of rising temperature on the natural systems. Food security is cited as an area of significant concern, with the potential effect on migration and outbreaks of conflicts. Erratic weather patterns, including extreme floods, droughts, and super storms, have become the norm, posing problems also to water security and raising the possibilities of natural disasters. All these challenges have an impact on human security and may provide cause for disputes that may impact on peace and stability.

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## II. Regional Outlook

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The situation in the Asia-Pacific is becoming increasingly complicated. Despite extensive economic integration and deep economic interdependence, tensions and confrontation in the region appear to be on the rise. Some have characterized this as an “Asian Paradox” – a dichotomy where the positive regional economic trends have not translated into optimistic geo-political outlook. For the collective interests of the region as a whole, however, nations must work together to ensure that the intertwined geo-economic and geo-political trends go in the same direction and act in concert in order to promote long-term peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.



Rising tension and competition among the major powers, coupled with renewed nationalism and modernization of military capabilities, put the region at greater risk for destabilization. Developments in the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea and the East China Sea, for example, are contributing to a decline in trust and confidence amongst countries and have raised serious concerns in the region and the rest of the world. As global prosperity is heavily dependent on peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific, persistent and new flashpoints in the region have the potential to interrupt the region's economic rise, unless restraint and dialogue prevails over confrontation and mistrust. Such flashpoints have also called into question the effectiveness of existing regional architecture, institutions and arrangements, including the ARF, to help manage such challenges.

### ASEAN Centrality in the Context of Regional Peace and Security

ASEAN occupies the central role in regional mechanisms such as the ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), the ASEAN Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit (EAS), to name a few. These mechanisms are designed to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These fora represent an open, inclusive and multi-layered ASEAN-centered regional architecture that has led to greater cooperation enhance peace, security, and stability in the region, both internally within ASEAN as well as externally between ASEAN and its partners.

The "ASEAN Way", based on consensus decision-making and loose institutionalization, allows for flexible and creative diplomacy that can keep the informal channels of communication open. This in turn helps build trust and confidence necessary for conflict de-escalation in times of crisis and enhanced cooperation in times of progress. At the same time, timely decision-making and concrete follow-up will be critical to ensuring that ASEAN remains a proactive organization that contributes to regional peace and stability.

With the impending launch of the ASEAN

Community in 2015, ASEAN has shown greater ability to act collectively on regional security challenges. ASEAN's place in the regional architecture, its culture of trust and confidence building through informal dialogue, as well as its ability to maintain amicable relations with all countries, put it in a unique position to act as a facilitator in regional disputes.

Developments on the Korean Peninsula have a direct bearing on the interests of ASEAN as peace and stability in Southeast Asia is linked to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. While the Six Party Talks remains stalled, ASEAN can play a role to facilitate dialogue as a Third Party and encourage the parties concerned to creatively and constructively use ASEAN, as well as the ARF, to engage with one other and work for the realization of peace and stability on and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Recent developments in the South China Sea issue has shown that, when ASEAN acts in concert, it can achieve positive results in contributing to regional peace and stability. Official consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea at the senior officials' level between ASEAN and China began in 2013, with Thailand facilitating these efforts as Country-Coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations. The ASEAN-China Summit 2013 in Bandar Seri Begawan explicitly endorsed the process of developing the COC in conjunction with full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

Nevertheless, continued incidents in the South China Sea have threatened to raise tensions in the area. In this connection, overlapping maritime claims and disputes should be settled peacefully amongst the Claimant States on the basis of negotiations and international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The parties concerned should act with restraint and avoid taking actions that could jeopardize hard-won gains and the positive momentum that have come from years of trust and confidence building activities.

Peace and stability in the South China Sea is

critical to the preservation of regional and global economic vitality and hence stability. All nations have a stake in peace and stability in the South China Sea and therefore should enjoy freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication that are safe and secure in the area. This maritime connectivity is an important foundation for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Similarly, overlapping maritime claims in other maritime areas, such as the East China Sea, should be addressed and resolved by peaceful means. The parties concerned should exercise restraint and continue to use dialogue and diplomacy as the mean to settle differences. With regard to Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), it is important for all sides to give priority to the issue of safety for commercial aircraft in the area and take measured responses and avoid actions which could lead to a vicious cycle of counter-actions.

In the past years, confidence building measures (CBMs) under the ARF in the form of cooperative activities against non-traditional, transnational threats have proven to be successful exercises in establishing mutual trust and network among the relevant agencies of ARF Participants. Greater intra-regional connectivity that will follow the emergence of the ASEAN Community in 2015 will necessitate closer cooperation to combat security threats that come with freer movement of people, goods, and services. Closer regional cooperation in areas such as border management, exchange of intelligence and sharing of information, will be critical in managing effectively the inherent risks associated with enhanced regional connectivity.

Trafficking in persons remain a persistent region-wide problem. Several ASEAN countries are the source, transit point, and destination of trafficking in persons, especially in women and children. The Regional Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons (RPA) and the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP), once concluded, will help ASEAN tackle this issue in a more systematic, standardized, and holistic manner.

Production and trafficking of illicit drugs represent a major transnational crime challenge.

The commitment and political will of ASEAN to address this issue are reinforced by the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Drug Free ASEAN 2015 and the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters, initiated by Thailand in 2012. Effective cooperation at the regional and international levels to combat illicit drugs requires intelligence exchange and information sharing, as well as capacity-building.

Southeast Asia is a region that has suffered from increased frequency and severity of natural disasters. Countries must constantly work to enhance cooperation from early warning to the provision of appropriate, adequate, need-based and timely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Coordination of cooperative activities in disaster relief across frameworks such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM) Experts' Working Group on HADR, the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting (ARF ISM) on Disaster Relief, and the biannual ARF Disaster Relief Exercise is needed to improve the inter-operability of individual state's HADR capacity, and therefore their collective response when disaster occurs.

### III. Individual National Defense Policies

With regard to Thailand's defense policies, the Ministry of Defense published a Defense White Paper in 2013 in an effort to promote transparency and share information about its role under the Thai constitution, as well as to enhance trust and confidence between Thailand and ASEAN Member States and other partners within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

According to the aforementioned Defense White Paper, the missions of Thailand's Ministry of Defense are as follows:

- To protect and uphold the independence, security of the State, institution of Monarchy, national interests and the democratic system of government with His Majesty the King as Head of State, and for national development.
- To defend and safeguard the Kingdom

from internal and external threats, safeguard national interests, support national development and other duties prescribed by the law which describes the authority of the Ministry of Defense or agencies under the Ministry of Defense,

- To support missions of the State in national development, protect and solve problems of disaster, provide humanitarian assistance and perform Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) for the security of the Kingdom.

In an effort to promote military cooperation and mutual confidence and trust, the Ministry of Defense of Thailand and the Royal Thai Armed Forces regularly participate in regional cooperation frameworks such as the ARF, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, Annual Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM), ASEAN Military Operations Informal Meeting (AMOIM), and ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM). Such cooperation frameworks also provide an opportunity for the armed forces of the region to engage in practical cooperation in areas that promote the mutual interests of participating countries as well as enhance capacities for joint activities in the future. In the ADMM-Plus, for example, Thailand and Russia are co-chairing the Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine.

The Royal Thai Armed Forces attach importance to joint exercises to build trust and confidence as well as strengthen capabilities in response to challenges in the future. The Cobra Gold Exercise, the largest multinational exercise in the region, is held annually in Thailand. Approximately 13,780 servicemen and women from seven participating countries (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States) took part in the 33rd Cobra Gold Exercise in February 2014. Several observer countries also participated in the exercise, which was focused on peacekeeping operations and HADR in conflict situations. China, as an observer-plus nation, participated for the first time in the Cobra Gold in humanitarian assistance activities. Other

observer countries included Myanmar, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, South Africa, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Russia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

The Royal Thai Armed Forces also have a mandate for mitigating the impact of natural disasters and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). As for MOOTW, the military supports the Government in combating challenges posed by illicit drugs, illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, and other forms of unlawful smuggling.

Cooperation in peacekeeping is another area where the Royal Thai Armed Forces attach importance. In addition to sending personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, the Thai military has been active in promoting further cooperation within ASEAN on peacekeeping training and, in this regard, has been supporting the development of an ASEAN network of peacekeeping centres to promote training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel.

Promoting transparency is an important means to promote confidence and trust in the region. In this connection, with regard to Thailand's defense budget, for the fiscal year 2014, a budget of 183,419.97 million baht (5.73 billion US dollars using nominal exchange rate) is allocated for military expenditure. This is equivalent to 1.39% of Thailand's national GDP.

#### IV. National Contributions to Promoting Regional Stability

Thailand attaches importance to regional and global cooperation to address the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Thailand strictly adheres to all three pillars of the NPT regime and supports implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1977. Furthermore, Thailand has joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in support of international non-proliferation efforts. In August of 2013, Thailand co-hosted a PSI bilateral table top exercise with the United States in Bangkok



that focused on improving national capabilities and bilateral cooperation on maritime and air interdiction. Under the framework of the ARF, Thailand has co-chaired with the United States the 2nd ARF Confidence Building Measure Seminar on Implementation of UNSCR 1540 and, with the United States and the European Union, the 2nd ARF Workshop on Enhancing Regional Capacity-Building to Strengthen Nuclear Forensics Capabilities. Both activities were held in 2013 in Bangkok.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a threat to long term regional peace and stability. As a State Party to and the Depositary State of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), Thailand views the signing and ratification of the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty by nuclear-weapon States as a priority for ASEAN.

As a current member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Thailand places great importance on the issues of nuclear safety, security and safeguards at the international, regional and national levels. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the Thailand reaffirmed the importance of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), whose objective is to enhance regulatory activities and further strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards in ASEAN, and whose establishment was welcomed at the 23rd ASEAN Summit in 2013. This network is hoped to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. One of the first activities to engage ASEANTOM members was an Informal Consultation of ASEANTOM – EC JRC on Project 28 “Supporting Development of an Integrated Security System for Nuclear and Radioactive Materials,” which was held in Bangkok in January 2014.

Thailand and the Republic of Korea jointly organized the ARF Disaster-Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) 2013 in Cha-am, Phetchaburi Province in Thailand on 7-11 May 2013. The ARF DiREx is widely recognized as a landmark event in improving the capacity of the region’s disaster response mechanisms in a multinational operation.

ARF DiREx 2013 aimed to enhance regional and affected nation’s civilian – military (civ-mil) coordination, cooperation, effectiveness, and response to a disaster.

Thailand has continuously contributed to peacekeeping and peace building efforts around the world and in the region. Currently, 34 military and police officers, 12 of whom are women, are serving in African-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Thailand places importance to increasing female participation at all levels of UN peacekeeping operations. In March 2014, Thailand organized a side-event to the 58th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women and the 2014 Session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on Increasing Women’s Contribution to Peace and Security in New York, to examine the issue of increasing the number of female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide.

As the Co-Chair to of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance of the Mine Ban Convention, Thailand hosted the Bangkok Symposium on Enhancing Cooperation and Assistance: Building Synergy towards Effective Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation in June 2013. The three-day symposium brought together over a hundred participants who shared knowledge, experiences and views, as well as explored various possibilities to create synergy across different fora that can enhance the effectiveness of the Mine Ban Convention.

To promote cooperation on maritime issues, Thailand is currently serving as a member of the International Maritime Organization Council (Category C) for the term 2014-2015. Since 2006, this is the fifth time that Thailand has been elected to this position, which will enable Thailand to continue its work in promoting safe, secure, and environmentally sustainable shipping. In the

Malacca Straits, the Royal Thai Navy participates in the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (MSCP) and the Eyes in the Sky joint air patrol with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Royal Thai Navy joined the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in 2010 to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea in international waters of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. In 2012, Thailand for the first time assumed command of Combined Task Forces (CTF) 151, one of three task forces under control of the CMF. CTF 151 is tasked to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy, protect maritime vessels and secure freedom of navigation in international waters in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. Thailand will assume command of CTF 151 again this year from 1 September – 30 November 2014.

In preparation for the launch of the ASEAN Community in 2015, Thailand places great emphasis on suppressing transnational threats through intelligence exchange and capacity building. In September 2014, Thailand will be co-hosting with the United States a Workshop on Concept Development of the ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC). This initiative is a concrete step to put into effect the ARF Hanoi Plan of Action, which calls for “an effective network for regional law enforcement and military agencies to build regional capacity, share information, and individually and collectively respond in a timely and effective manner to the threats posed by terrorism and transnational crime in the region” by 2020.

Thailand remains committed to strengthening systematic and comprehensive regional cooperation in the fight against illicit production, distribution, trafficking, smuggling, and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. As a co-lead shepherd on the issue of illicit drugs under the ARF Inter-session Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime, Thailand will be organizing with New Zealand the ARF Workshop on Enhancing Regional Cooperation to Address Challenges Posed by Illicit Drugs – Implementing the ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime Work Plan, on 8-9 September 2014 in Bangkok, Thailand.

Trafficking in persons is a serious challenge for Thailand, a country that is situated in the middle of Southeast Asia and is an important transportation hub in the region. With regard to border control, Thailand has put in place the One Country One System measure to upgrade and standardize all immigration check-points. Every immigration station will be installed with the Personal Identification and Blacklist Immigration Control System (PIBICS) to more effectively curb illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, as well as perpetrators of crime and terrorism.

Thailand is working towards enhancing regional and international efforts to promote cyber-security. At the national level, the National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC) is responsible for drafting the national policy and blueprint for cyber security, which will also highlight a strategy on international cooperation and coordination between the government and private sector. At the regional level, the ASEAN ICT Master Plan 2015 calls for the establishment of the multi-stakeholders ASEAN Network Security Action Council to strengthen Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) cooperation, through sharing of expertise and setting up common minimum standards for network security. Thailand stands ready to support this initiative. The Electronic Transactions Development Agency (ETDA) under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology has established the Thailand Computer Emergency Response Team (ThaiCERT), with a mandate to conduct Proactive Response against Cyber-attacks (PRACTICE). Thailand also participates in the International Collaborative Exchange, a collaborative program between Japan and certain ASEAN Member States to develop and operate a worldwide monitoring system which collects and analyzes traffic data in order to make an early assessment of possible cyber threats and predict malicious attacks. On cyber warfare, Thailand’s defense community has taken steps to address this issue. In November 2013, the Ministry of Defense organized an international seminar on “Cyber Warfare”: a Challenge for ASEAN Cooperation in the Future to fortify regional partnership in intelligence exchange, early warning, protection against and timely response to cyber-attacks.

## V. Role of the ARF


Since its inception on 25 July 1994 in Bangkok, the ARF remains a primary forum for dialogue and cooperation to promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF activities under the four priority areas: maritime security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, non-proliferation and disarmament, and disaster relief, have been at the forefront of joint efforts to address new challenges of the time. The capacity of the ARF to develop regional cooperation against non-traditional, transnational threats has grown and contributed to building mutual trust and confidence in the region. But what needs to be further developed is the ability of the ARF to explore feasible means to address potential situations of threats to regional peace and stability. Such threats may take the form of a sudden security crisis or evolving situations of tension. This is to ensure that the ARF remains relevant in the regional security landscape.

To this end, ARF participants have stepped up the effort to facilitate the move toward PD at a pace comfortable to all given the diversities of ARF Participants. At the ARF Round-table on Preventive Diplomacy Training Resources in Wellington in March 2014, co-chaired by Brunei Darussalam, China, New Zealand, and the United States, a consensus emerged in support of PD training that would be designed to suit the Asia-Pacific Region. Thailand believes this is an important progress in the development of PD in the ARF. To this end, Thailand has volunteered to co-host with China the pilot ARF PD training course in October 2014, as well as the ARF Track 1.5 PD Symposium with New Zealand in 2015.

Another challenge for the ARF is the frequently overlapping programmes of activities across other ASEAN-led frameworks, in particular the EAS and ADMM Plus. There needs to be enhanced coordination among these fora, particularly in the area of agenda setting, in order to avoid exhaustion of resources and manpower, which could, in the long run, make one framework less relevant than another.

Relevance of the ARF will depend on its capacity to truly meet its objectives, as set out in by the ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994: 1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The 20th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw will be an important occasion to reaffirm ARF Participants' commitment to these original objectives and to set forth a vision for advancing our common goal of maintenance of peace and stability in the region.





**“The United States Government believes that only cooperative security efforts will strengthen regional responses to security threats.”**



## I. Overview of the Regional Security Environment

As the Asia-Pacific’s security landscape evolves, the United States remains committed to cooperation, to strengthening relationships with long time allies, and to developing partnerships with emerging powers. This year has seen mixed progress toward greater security and stability in the region. Provocative behavior and unilateral action by some states and the threat of proliferation of technology and materiel related to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems continue to challenge regional peace and stability. The United States Government believes that only cooperative security efforts will strengthen regional responses to security threats. We must work harder together to increase transparency and mutual trust and develop a regional security architecture that can address the region’s contemporary and most pressing challenges. In this regard, the EAS, ARF, and the ADMM-Plus are complementary but must move in a more synchronized and deliberate fashion to build greater foundations of regional stability and security. These institutions need to be more robust and encompass greater capabilities and power in the prevention of conflict.

Focused on modernizing and revitalizing our treaty alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the United States seeks to reassure the region and increase regional stability and assurance of our assistance. These alliances have safeguarded regional peace and security for the past half century and supported the region’s remarkable economic growth.

Our treaty alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance has promoted cooperation on a wide array of regional and global security issues, leveraging the presence of U.S. forces to respond to security threats. The close cooperation between the Japanese government and the United States in the aftermath of super-typhoon Haiyan demonstrated the importance of our relationship and our capability to respond promptly. The U.S.-Japan alliance has promoted cooperation on a wide array of regional and global security issues. We are taking steps to expand further our security cooperation and address outstanding issues by moving forward with the Japanese government to implement the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Specifically, our base consolidation plan and progress on force realignment will help us maintain a sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan with a reduced impact on Okinawa. These steps will also help ensure the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and promote peace and stability in the region. We continue to work closely with the Japanese government to strengthen our missile defense capabilities to counter threats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

A linchpin of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia, our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) has evolved into a truly global partnership, while continuing to play the key role in deterring DPRK aggression. The United States is committed to the defense of the ROK, and coordination with President Park Geun-hye and her administration on alliance issues has been excellent. Both governments fully support the modernization of our alliance, including the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. In October 2013, both governments also announced the establishment of a bilateral Tailored Deterrence Strategy Against DPRK Nuclear and Other WMD Threats, further integrating Alliance capabilities to deter the DPRK. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks, a regular dialogue that advances trilateral security cooperation, information sharing, and joint exercises, enhances our ability to counter the DPRK nuclear and missile threat even further. The United States and the ROK are working together, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also collaborating in places

such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia, in peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

We continue to strengthen our alliance with Australia by enhancing the alliance through greater cooperation on shared regional and global interests. We have initiated rotations of U.S. Marines and aircraft in Australia's Northern Territory that will improve interoperability and capacity through opportunities to train and exercise both bilaterally and in the region. Our Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia also plays a positive role in enhancing regional stability and security. At the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) we are able to discuss cooperative efforts in Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR), regional capacity development, and maritime security.

The U.S.-Philippines treaty alliance underpins our successful counter-terrorism partnership, as well as our expanding military and law enforcement cooperation in areas critical to regional peace and stability including maritime security, disaster response, and non-proliferation. We are committed to advancing our nations' mutual security interests through continuing a high-level strategic dialogue and building our armed forces' interoperability through bilateral defense exercises such as Balikatan. We also share a common interest in expanding regional security cooperation through the ADMM-Plus and other vehicles such as the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers' Training (EAST) initiative.

The United States has also recognized opportunities to consult and collaborate with our ally, Thailand, to increase capacity and preparedness to address humanitarian and security concerns such as counter-terrorism, disaster relief, non-proliferation, and maritime security. Thailand and the United States jointly host the largest annual multinational exercise in the world, Cobra Gold, as well as 40 other joint exercises. In 2012, we updated our security relationship with Thailand with a Joint Vision Statement that establishes a 21st century framework for cooperation with our oldest treaty ally in Asia.

The United States is a Pacific nation, and the



Asia-Pacific is of growing importance, therefore the United States continues to deepen its relations in the region. Beyond our alliances, the United States has developed partnerships with other established and emerging regional powers and enhanced our engagement with Asia's ASEAN-based multilateral institutions.

U.S.-Indonesia ties continue to deepen in the spirit of the 2010 Comprehensive Partnership, a long-term commitment to broaden and elevate bilateral relations and to address bilateral, regional, and global challenges. The U.S. and Indonesian militaries engage closely to build bilateral and regional capacity to respond to common security threats, such as piracy, while boosting cooperation on issues including humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, maritime security, and international peacekeeping. As the inaugural co-chairs to the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Group on Counter-terrorism (EWG CT), Indonesia and the United States together developed and conducted a series of activities that strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation in the region. The capstone event will be the first Counter-terrorism Exercise (CTX) scheduled in September in Sentul, Indonesia.

Singapore is a strong partner with the United States on regional and global security. The rotational deployment in Singapore of the United States' first Littoral Combat Ship is a symbol of our deepening ties. This deployment will provide a key capability to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the region. Singapore has been an active participant in global operations including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Gulf of Aden counter-piracy where Singapore has twice commanded Combined Task Force 151. Our militaries have strong ties and participate in several bilateral and multilateral exercises each year. In 2012, we further broadened our relationship by signing a memorandum of understanding for the creation of the Third Country Training Program, which has already featured eight joint courses covering such areas as healthcare management, water resource management, and trade facilitation. TCTP courses being planned for 2014 include workshops on investment and trade facilitation, urban transport planning, HA/DR, energy efficiency and other topics.

U.S.-Malaysian cooperation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises enhances our respective capabilities to promote regional security and respond to humanitarian disasters. The United States values Malaysia's contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Malaysia is an important partner in stemming the proliferation of nuclear materials.

The bilateral defense and security relationship with Vietnam continues to expand and deepen. Through a robust set of annual dialogues spanning issues from human rights to security and defense relations, we are working to expand and deepen our cooperation in areas such as security, trade, non-proliferation, health, the environment, science and technology, education, and human rights. On the defense side, the United States and Vietnam signed a MOU on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011. In October 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnamese Coast Guard signed Joint Minutes to provide direction for future coast guard cooperation. In December 2013, Secretary Kerry announced our intention to commit \$32.5 million in new regional and bilateral assistance to advance maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia, including \$18 million in new assistance to Vietnam to enhance the capacity of coastal patrol units to deploy rapidly for search and rescue, disaster response, and other activities. We continue to engage through U.S. Navy port visits and supporting reciprocal political and military leadership exchanges, as well as a recently launched State Partnership Program between Vietnam and the Oregon National Guard to explore further collaboration on many of these same topics. We welcome Vietnam's announcement that it intends to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations by 2014, and we are helping to prepare for first deployments.

The United States values cooperation with the Government of Cambodia and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in areas of mutual concern such as international peace keeping, border and maritime security, counter-terrorism, and de-mining.

The U.S.-New Zealand bilateral and security



relationship has seen dynamic changes over the past four years. Under the auspices of the 2010 Wellington Declaration, the United States and New Zealand have held four Strategic Dialogues on policy with New Zealand. The Washington Declaration, signed by then Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Coleman in June 2012, built on the momentum of the Wellington Declaration, allowing greater flexibility in terms of joint military exercises and military educational exchanges. As a result, the United States and New Zealand have conducted joint military exercises and began holding formal defense policy dialogues in 2013. New Zealand's contributions to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have been invaluable, and it is a strong, consistent supporter of inter-national peacekeeping operations.

During his visit to India in 2010, President Barack Obama hailed the U.S.-India relationship as "one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century," and U.S.-India security cooperation continues to grow. Both nations have conducted joint military exercises and training with increased frequency. India conducts more joint exercises with the United States than any other nation. The United States and India have expanded counter-terrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, and law enforcement exchanges. A notable, and growing, component of our bilateral relationship with India is defense trade. Since 2000, sales to India have surpassed \$8 billion, representing both an excellent commercial opportunity for U.S. companies as well as a vital component of our bilateral security relationship. We continue to develop common positions with India on export controls and non-proliferation.

The United States is committed to pursuing a positive, cooperative, stable, and comprehensive relationship with China. We welcome a peaceful and prosperous China that plays a responsible role in global and regional challenges such as the DPRK, maritime security, piracy, and Iran. The most notable example of our bilateral efforts is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which brings together experts from dozens of agencies across both of our governments to discuss an unprecedented range of subjects, to address some of the differences that remain between us, and to build cooperation on issues of practical importance.

The United States supports a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Myanmar. In November 2012, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Myanmar and publicly spoke in support of Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition. The region must remain committed to assist Myanmar in continuing its reforms to ensure a democratic, stable, and prosperous nation that can play a constructive role within the region and among the international community. We urge the Government of Myanmar and armed ethnic groups to reach a sustainable ceasefire and eventually a comprehensive peace agreement. We remain concerned about ongoing conflicts in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan States and recent outbreaks of ethno-religious violence targeting Muslim and other religious minorities in Myanmar.

One of the ways that we are engaging Myanmar and the other nations of mainland Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, is through the regional cooperation and integration efforts of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI). LMI focuses on technical capacity building for regional officials in line ministries working in the "Pillar" focus areas of Health, Education, Environment and Water, Connectivity, Agriculture and Food Security, and Energy Security. These six Pillars, as well as cross-cutting areas of engagement (such as gender inclusion), allow the United States and primary donors in the sub-region, known as the Friends of the Lower Mekong, to engage with and support partner countries' development of shared responses to regional challenges, including non-traditional security threats such as food, water, and energy security.

The New START Treaty, negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation is now in its fourth year of implementation. Implementation of the Treaty has been pragmatic, business-like, and productive, including inspections, exhibitions, and notifications. When implementation is complete, this agreement will bring the levels of deployed strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to their lowest levels since the 1950s. In addition, we are currently working with many partners to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing all vulnerable nuclear materials

around the world through implementation of the ground breaking decisions made and commitments made at the two Nuclear Security Summits, and we look forward to the third Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in 2014. We continue our close cooperation with states throughout the region to prevent transfers of WMD, their means of delivery, and related items. We call on all to implement fully and transparently UN Security Council Resolutions related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to support the international treaties that make up the global non-proliferation regime.

The United States and the European Union are deepening our collaboration with Asian partners to advance regional security and development, and to build regional institutions and support for the rule of law. U.S.-EU cooperation has played a critical role in supporting Myanmar's ongoing democratic transition. We are now engaging the European Union as we explore ways to collaborate through the Lower Mekong Initiative. The United States and the EU also share common goals to promote human rights, freedom of navigation, and respect for international law in the East China and South China Seas. As we rebalance our interests and investments to the East Asia-Pacific, we look forward to expanding our coordination with the European Union through the ARF and other regional fora.

While our strengthened bilateral and multilateral relationships have enhanced stability, the current regional security environment also presents challenges such as tensions in the East and South China Seas and the DPRK's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capability.

The tensions arising from maritime and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific are deeply concerning to us. Both the South China and East China Seas are vital thoroughfares for global commerce and energy. Well over half the world's merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Malacca last year, with most of it continuing onward through the East China Sea to three of the world's largest economies – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and China. A miscalculation or incident could touch off an escalatory cycle.

Confrontations between fishermen and even law enforcement patrols are not unusual in these waters. It is important to lower tensions, turn down the rhetoric, and exercise caution and restraint in these sensitive areas. In the South China Sea, we continue to support efforts by ASEAN and China to develop a comprehensive and effective Code of Conduct and press for further clarification of each nation's claims in a manner consistent with international law. In the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the serious downturn in China-Japan relations. We support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid a miscalculation or a dangerous incident.

Multilateral cooperation remains an important tool for ensuring stability and peace in the region. The 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) provided a framework for reducing tensions in the region. However, engagement through that process has been inconsistent, and friction over disputed claims to South China Sea territory and maritime space has further increased in the last year. The United States does not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims over land features in the South China Sea; however, we urge claimants to conform all of their claims – land and maritime – to international law, including as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States supports the DoC and a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants to resolve their disputes. The United States encourages all parties to employ diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolving disagreements, including the use of arbitration, multilateral fora, or other international mechanisms. The United States supports the early development of a comprehensive and effective Code of Conduct among the parties. We further believe that the ARF can help put in place supportive diplomatic and other structures that lower tensions and help claimant States manage these disputes peacefully. This forum needs to play an increasingly important role in reinforcing international law and practice and building practical cooperation among member states.

The DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs like wise remain a serious threat to

international peace and security. The DPRK's continued failure to comply with its international obligations and commitments threatens international peace and security and seriously undermines the global non-proliferation regime. The United States has made it clear that we will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. The United States, our allies, and Six-Party partners remain committed to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, which will continue to be the paramount focus of our joint efforts. As we have long made clear, the United States remains open to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring the DPRK into compliance with its international obligations and commitments to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We will continue to hold the DPRK to those commitments and obligations. The path to reintegration with the international community and greater security remains open to the DPRK, but the onus is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to demonstrate that it is serious about honoring the commitments it has already made and complying with its international obligations.

We continue to call on all Member States to fully and transparently implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and to exercise strict vigilance against the DPRK's proliferation activities.

It is critical that all states maintain vigilance in any dealings with the DPRK. In this regard, we welcome Myanmar's efforts to date and ongoing commitment to full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the DPRK. Separately, we also welcomed Myanmar's September 2013 signature of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Myanmar's commitment to updating its Small Quantities Protocol, both of which have involved close cooperation with the United States.

In addition to these challenges, the fragile nature of global economic recovery, transnational crime such as drug, human, and wildlife trafficking and

terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, and climate change continue to threaten regional and international stability. Many of these issues are transnational in nature and require concrete multilateral and national responses from ARF Dialogue Partners. Results-oriented cooperation builds on our shared interests and has proven to be the best course of action for promoting peace and prosperity in the region. The continued strengthening and growth of ARF's institutional capacity, enhanced bilateral and multilateral relationships, and burden-sharing efforts provide the best solution to these security concerns.

## II. National Security and Defense Policy

Throughout 2013, the United States continued to the policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, to more closely align U.S. government instruments with increasing U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Within national security and defense policy, the United States is focused on five primary lines of effort: revitalizing Alliances and partnerships; enhancing defense posture; updating operational concepts and plans; investing in the capabilities needed to secure our interests; and, strengthening multilateral cooperation and engagement.

As the United States continues to pursue those five lines of effort, it will continue to work with Allies and partners to manage the challenges we see throughout the Asia-Pacific:

- The ongoing threat of the DPRK's nuclear weapons, proliferation, and missile programs and its dangerous and provocative behavior;
- Long-standing disputes over territory, associated maritime zones, and resources, including in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
- The great human and economic toll of natural disasters like the recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines;
- Illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs, and dangerous materials including weapons of mass destruction;
- The risk of pandemic disease that can spread around the world;
- Environmental degradation and the



- threat posed by climate change; and
- Disruptive activities by State and non state actors in space and cyberspace.

Ensuring that the United States is prepared and postured to prevent conflict requires a combination of defense, diplomacy, and development. These tools of statecraft enable the United States to strengthen the capability of allies and partners and to preserve stability. The United States remains committed to retaining the capabilities to deter conflict, reassure allies, and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. These objectives require the United States to be capable of responding to a broad range of challenges that are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided a review of the strategies and priorities for the national defense policy. The 2010 QDR can be found at: <http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/>

QDR\_as\_of\_12Feb10\_1000.pdf

Additionally, the Department of Defense publishes the National Defense Strategy, which can be found at: [http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0510\\_nss/index.html](http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0510_nss/index.html)

a. *Data contribution to ARF Arms Register*

A broad range of data is publicly available from the Office of the Under secretary of Defense (Comptroller) at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budgetmaterials/budget2014.aspx>.

1. **Total defense expenditure on annual basis**

a. Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Base Budget \$703.8 Billion

The FY 2014 Base Budget Request of \$560.4 billion funds the non-contingency operational

**Table 1-1**  
**NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY**  
(Dollars in Millions)

Current Dollars	FY 2012	Change FY 12-13	Annualized CR FY 2013	Change FY 13-14	FY 2014
<b>Budget Authority</b>					
DoD - 051 (Discretionary) <sup>1/</sup>	645,494	-24,637	620,857	-94,220	526,637
DoD - 051 (Mandatory)	9,894	-3,516	6,378	+71	6,449
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					88,482
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	655,388	-28,153	627,235	-5,667	621,568
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding <sup>2/</sup>	9		-4		-15
DoE and Other <sup>3/</sup>	26,034	+1,058	27,092	+236	27,328
Total National Defense 050 <sup>3/</sup>	681,431	-27,108	654,323	-5,442	648,881
<b>Total Obligational Authority (TOA)</b>					
DoD - 051 <sup>1/</sup>	652,288	-29,694	622,594	-94,996	527,598
<b>Outlays</b>					
DoD - 051 <sup>1/</sup>	650,905	-13,460	637,445	-90,794	546,651
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					52,505
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	650,905	-13,460	637,445	-38,289	599,156
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding <sup>2/</sup>	-54		-2		-3
DoE and Other <sup>3/</sup>	27,005	-256	26,749	+2,455	29,204
Total National Defense 050 <sup>3/</sup>	677,856	-13,664	664,192	-35,835	628,357
<b>FY 2014 Constant Dollars</b>					
<b>Budget Authority</b>					
DoD - 051 (Discretionary)	669,530	-38,193	631,337	-104,700	526,637
DoD - 051 (Mandatory)	10,295	-3,815	6,480	-31	6,449
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					88,482
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	679,825	-42,008	637,817	-16,249	621,568
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding	-23		2		-15
DoE and Other	27,002	+548	27,550	-222	27,328
Total National Defense 050	706,804	-41,435	665,369	-16,488	648,881
<b>Total Obligational Authority (TOA)</b>					
DoD - 051	676,570	-43,483	633,087	-105,489	527,598
<b>Outlays</b>					
DoD - 051	675,748	-27,507	648,241	-101,590	546,651
Additional OCO Request Placeholder					52,505
Total DoD - 051 (Enacted + Requests)	675,748	-27,507	648,241	-49,085	599,156
Delta OMB Scoring and Rounding	-31		28		-3
DoE and Other	28,036	-833	27,203	+2,001	29,204
Total National Defense 050	703,753	-28,281	675,472	-47,115	628,357

1/ Includes war and supplemental funding in FY 2012 and FY 2013.

2/ For budget authority in FY 2014, there is a scoring difference due to a \$15M VA transfer in the Defense Health Program account. For outlays in FY 2012, DoD is reporting Base Realignment and Closure account transactions that OMB is not.

3/ From OMB Analytical Perspectives Table 31-1 (Policy Budget Authority and Outlay by Function, Category, and Program). The totals exclude OMB adjustments for the 2013 CR versus the 2013 request.

costs of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, but does not include Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), which covers efforts in Afghanistan and support for the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq. OCO is funded separately in the FY 2014 budget request at \$88.5 billion.

Further information can be found in the DoD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2013: [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14\\_Green\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf)

[http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014\\_Budget\\_Request\\_Overview\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf)

*b. Defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)*

The budget for national defense was 3.7% of GDP in FY 2014. Further information can be found at: [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14\\_Green\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf)

**2. Total number of personnel in national armed forces and its percentage in population**

*a. Active*

There are 1,323,300 active members in the U.S. Armed Forces. This information was obtained from the DoD National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2014. Further information can be found at: [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14\\_Green\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf)

*b. Reserve*

The FY 2014 budget supports the Department of Defense's Ready Reserve totaling about 833,700 million members, and contributes 38 percent of the total military end strength.

Further information can be found at: [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014\\_Performance\\_Improvement.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Performance_Improvement.pdf).

**Table 3-2**  
**MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS**  
(End Strength)

ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL*	FY 2012	FY 2013			FY 2014		
		Base	OCO	Total	Base	OCO	Total
Authorization Request	1,422,600	1,336,100	64,900	1,401,000	1,323,300		1,323,300
Enacted Authorization	1,422,600	1,336,660	64,900	1,401,560		TBD	
Army	550,064	502,400	49,700	552,100	490,000		490,000
Navy	318,406	322,700		322,700	323,600		323,600
Marine Corps	198,193	182,100	15,200	197,300	182,100		182,100
Air Force	332,959	329,460		329,460	327,600		327,600
<b>Current Estimate</b>	<b>1,399,622</b>	<b>1,336,660</b>	<b>64,900</b>	<b>1,401,560</b>	<b>1,323,300</b>		<b>1,323,300</b>

**SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL**

Authorization Request	847,100	837,400		837,400	833,700		833,700
Enacted Authorization	847,100	841,880		841,880		TBD	
Army Reserve	201,166	205,000		205,000	205,000		205,000
Army National Guard	358,078	358,200		358,200	354,200		354,200
Army Total	559,244	563,200		563,200	559,200		559,200
Navy Total	64,715	62,500		62,500	59,100		59,100
Marine Corps Total	39,544	39,600		39,600	39,600		39,600
Air Force Reserve	71,428	70,880		70,880	70,400		70,400
Air National Guard	103,389	105,700		105,700	105,400		105,400
Air Force Total	176,817	176,580		176,580	175,800		175,800
<b>Current Estimate</b>	<b>840,320</b>	<b>841,880</b>		<b>841,880</b>	<b>833,700</b>		<b>833,700</b>

\* Does not include full-time Guard and Reserve end strength.

**Table 7-7 (Continued)**  
**DEFENSE SHARES OF ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY AGGREGATES**  
 (Percentages of Indicated Totals)

Fiscal Year*	% of Federal Budget		% of Net Public Spending		DoD as a % Public Employment				DoD as % of Total Labor Force	% of Gross Domestic Product	
	DoD	National Defense	Federal, State & Local		Military & Civilian		Civilian Only			DoD	National Defense
			Federal	National	Federal & State	State & Local	Federal	State & Local			
2002	16.5	17.3	9.8	10.3	51.4	9.3	24.8	3.0	1.5	3.1	3.3
2003	17.9	18.7	10.8	11.3	51.1	9.3	24.3	3.0	1.5	3.5	3.7
2004	19.0	19.9	11.5	12.0	51.3	9.3	24.6	3.0	1.4	3.7	3.9
2005	19.2	20.0	11.7	12.2	51.0	9.1	24.7	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2006	18.8	19.7	11.5	12.0	51.3	9.1	25.1	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2007	19.4	20.2	11.6	12.1	50.3	8.9	24.4	3.0	1.4	3.8	4.0
2008 Base	15.9		9.6							3.3	
2008 Total	19.9	20.7	12.1	12.5	50.6	8.9	24.5	3.0	1.4	4.1	4.3
2009 Base	14.0		9.0							3.5	
2009 Total	18.1	18.8	11.6	12.1	51.3	9.1	25.4	3.1	1.4	4.6	4.7
2010 Base	14.6		9.4							3.5	
2010 Total	19.3	20.1	12.4	12.9	51.4	9.4	26.3	3.3	1.4	4.6	4.8
2011 Base	14.6		9.4							3.5	
2011 Total	18.8	19.6	12.1	12.6	52.6	9.6	27.7	3.5	1.5	4.5	4.7
2012 Base	14.9		9.4							3.4	
2012 Total	18.4	19.2	11.6	12.1	52.6	9.6	27.9	3.5	1.4	4.2	4.4
2013 Base	14.7		9.4							3.3	
2013 Total	17.3	17.9	11.0	11.4	52.6		28.1			3.9	4.1
2014 Base	12.5		8.1							2.8	
2014 Total	14.5	16.6	9.3	10.7	52.1		27.8			3.2	3.7

\* Any "Base" amounts do not include additional war funding or supplemental dollars. Any "Total" amounts include those dollars, as do all years 2007 and prior.

NOTE: Data is calculated from the OMB Historical Tables and the Economic Report of the President. Certain non-Defense data was not available past 2012.

### III. National Contributions to Regional Security:

The United States remains committed to promoting peace and stability in the region by contributing support and participating in a broad range of security activities. The United States specifically focuses on contributing to the following regional issues:

#### iii a. Maritime Security

U.S. prosperity and security are increasingly linked to security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. maritime forces will sustain presence and engagement activities throughout the region to ensure free and open access to the maritime domain. The United States will work with Allies and partners to achieve the objectives of: supporting universally recognized principles of unimpeded access to global commerce, respect for international laws and norms, freedom of navigation and overflight, and rejection of coercion or the use of force to advance interests or resolve disputes. In doing so, we will collectively combat transnational threats,

including but not limited to trafficking in persons, illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal trafficking in arms.

For more than 70 years, the United States has maintained a strong maritime presence in the Asia-Pacific in support of regional peace, cooperation, and economic prosperity. As part of the United States' commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the first Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), USS Freedom, deployed to Southeast Asia in April 2013. This was an important marker of an intensified effort to assure our allies and partners and to build trust and confidence. Like many other ships operating in the Asia-Pacific, the USS Freedom conducted port calls throughout Southeast Asia and engaged regional forces through cooperative activities to advance interoperability, safety of navigation, and communication at sea. The U.S. Navy will continue to provide rotational presence of these and other platforms to assure our partners that we stand ready to contribute to the security of the region. The United States regularly conducts maritime exercises with regional



partners to build confidence and to enhance regional maritime readiness. Cooperative activities such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. In RIMPAC 2014 the United States will welcome the participation of the People's Liberation Army Navy and the Royal Brunei Navy for the first time. This is one of many engagements aimed to develop cooperation, promote common seafaring practices, and enhance mutual trust.

The United States is taking the necessary steps to accede to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and is working with regional partners to improve the safety and well-being of regional mariners through the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training (EAST) initiative. EAST is a successor of a bilateral initiative between the United States and the Philippines to promote cooperation in the field of training and education of seafarers, primarily in counter-piracy training. The workshops incorporate the knowledge of technical experts in the maritime transport sector and regional survivors of piracy to address issues ranging from preparedness and survival to post trauma care upon returning home.

### *iii b. Counter-terrorism*

The United States is actively engaged in multi-lateral and regional efforts through programs designed to strengthen regional partners and allies and to engender continued regional cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. In particular, the United States seeks to encourage and support strategic counter-terrorism policies in the region. This approach places a premium on building the institutional and other capacities of states to promote the rule of law and eliminate breeding grounds for terrorism and instability, as well as addressing the drivers of violent extremism to diminish the recruitment of new terrorists.

The United States works closely with regional partners at the United Nations and in regional fora such as ARF, ADMM-Plus, and APEC to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities. These

include efforts to support regional implementation of the UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy and international instruments related to terrorism. The United States also cooperates closely with many regional partners in the APEC Counter-terrorism Task Force (CTTF), contributes to regional security through a number of capacity building projects to combat terrorist financing, strengthen aviation security, and protect the region's food supply from deliberate contamination. The ARF Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTF) contributes to regional security through work in its priority areas -- illicit drugs; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN); cyber-security and "cyber-terrorism"; and countering radicalization. The United States is co-leading work on CBRN and contributing to the ARF Cyber Work Plan currently under development under the leadership of Australia, Malaysia and Russia. In 2014, the United States will co-sponsor with Singapore an ARF workshop on cyber confidence-building measures (CBMs). The United States serves as the Co-Chair, along with Turkey, of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral forum devoted to strengthening civilian counter-terrorism capacity and building a network of counter-terrorism practitioners around the globe. The GCTF Southeast Asia Region Capacity-Building Working Group, one of five GCTF expert-driven working groups, is focused on the capacity-building challenges and priorities in the region in key civilian counter-terrorism areas such as prisons and victims of terrorism, and mobilizes the expertise, resources, and political will to address them. At the GCTF Southeast Asia Capacity Building Working Group meeting on September 16-18, 2013, in Bali, one of the group's co-chairs, Indonesia, hosted a training workshop that brought together a diverse group of first responders and policy-makers to discuss first response support for victims of terrorism.

The United States also serves with the Russian Federation as the Co-Chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT is a voluntary partnership of 85 nations and four official observers, and its mission is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

The Government of Malaysia recently hosted a GICNT event, Tiger Reef: Cross-Disciplinary Training Workshop and Tabletop Exercise, in Kuala Lumpur, February 4-7, 2014, with support from the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

Over 100 participants from 21 countries, primarily Southeast Asian regional partners, attended the workshop and exercise. Participants successfully explored the interfaces between the nuclear forensics and emergency response and mitigation communities and increased their awareness of international resources available to assist in developing radiological crime scene management capabilities.

In addition to these multilateral efforts, one program focused on counter-terrorism is the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA). The ATA program strengthens partner nations' law enforcement capabilities in detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorist acts through the provision of counter-terrorism-specific training and equipment. The U.S. Department of Justice complements these efforts by building regional capacity to prosecute and safely incarcerate terrorists. Security officials from several partner nations in Southeast Asia participated in a series of ATA programs.

The United States works bilaterally with governments in the region to pursue counter-terrorism measures. The United States has signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) arrangements with key regional partners. HSPD-6 arrangements establish institutionalized operational mechanisms for the reciprocal sharing of unclassified, biographic terrorist identities between the United States and its foreign partner. Such arrangements enhance U.S. and foreign partners' border security by helping interdict the travel of known and suspected terrorists while further strengthening our counter-terrorism cooperation at a strategic policy level. The United States has also provided bilateral counter-terrorism finance capacity building assistance to several nations in the region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The United States continues to support and

strengthen partners and allies to enable regional actors to secure the region effectively from potential terrorist threats.

*iii c. Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

The United States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons and pursues this goal by relying on a shared commitment to all three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways that are safe, secure, and supportive of the non-proliferation regime. While the United States continues to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, as long as such weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. This is done to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. treaty allies and other security partners that they can count on the commitments undertaken by the United States. The five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or "P5", meet regularly to review their progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and discuss issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

The United States supports the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy programs and believes that nuclear energy (when pursued according to international standards of safety, security, and non-proliferation) can be a viable source of energy to states looking to meet increasing energy demands. We maintain, however, that such efforts must be conducted in a transparent manner, in full cooperation with the IAEA. We believe that the Additional Protocol (AP) to an IAEA Safe-guards Agreement is an important step that states can take to strengthen the role of the IAEA and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We welcomed Myanmar's September 2013 signing of the AP, and welcome Lao DPR's decision to submit an AP for approval to the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2014. These steps help to bring the ASEAN region closer to achieving

universalization of the AP, as called for in the November 2013 Joint ASEAN-U.S. Leader's Statement. We call upon all ARF participants to sign and ratify the AP, and we stand ready to help states to build capacities to implement the AP fully. The ARF also can play an important role in helping states to understand the AP and to overcome any challenges to its implementation.

The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and the illicit spread of related materials threaten the security of countries in the region as well as the international community as a whole. One way that the United States has supported regional approaches to addressing this global challenge is by raising awareness of the requirements of UNSCR 1540 and by promoting full implementation of resolution 1540 in the region. We have supported efforts in the ARF toward this end, and promoted greater cooperation between the ARF and the UN Security Council 1540 Committee, including participation by the Committee in recent ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Non-proliferation and Disarmament and workshops associated with the ISM. In addition, pursuant to the decision of the 18th ARF in Bali in July 2011, the Thailand and the United States co-hosted an ARF workshop on implementing UNSCR 1540 in Bangkok in May 2013. The workshop focused on implementing nuclear security and strategic trade controls.

One international effort that helps states to meet the goals of UNSCR 1540 is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which to date over one hundred countries have endorsed. Many ARF participants have already endorsed the PSI, a concrete commitment to regional peace and security. The United States encourages all countries concerned with the threat that the proliferation of WMD poses to international peace and security to endorse the PSI. Over the past decade, PSI endorsees have collaborated successfully to build the capacity of countries to conduct interdictions of WMD, related materials, and their delivery systems through information sharing, exercises, and training, as well as through the identification and development of critical interdiction capabilities and practices. An abiding strength of the PSI is the political commitment of

its members. The PSI is an informal activity that complements the formal international non-proliferation framework of treaties, export control regimes, UN resolutions, and other instruments. The Asia-Pacific region has shown a strong commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles, and hosted multiple PSI activities and exercises in recent years. In 2014, the first exercise in the annual PSI Asia Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) will take place in Honolulu, Hawaii, hosted by the United States. APER events will be held in New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea in the following years. These events, announced at the PSI Tenth Anniversary High Level Political Meeting in 2013, will support the robust PSI exercise program and increase our collective ability to interdict the transfer of illicit WMD related materials.

The United States also maintains several programs to help address the proliferation threat in the ASEAN region. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program is the United States government's premier initiative to help other countries improve their export control systems. The EXBS program takes a regional and multilateral approach, promoting harmonization of national export control systems with international standards. In addition, the United States established the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to allow the United States to respond rapidly to non-proliferation and disarmament opportunities and conditions surrounding non-proliferation that are unanticipated or unusually difficult. This fund aims to address proliferation of arms by eliminating the proliferation of WMD, destroying or neutralizing existing WMD, helping to detect WMD, and limiting the spread of advanced conventional weapons. The United States supports the agreement among ASEAN nations to establish a zone in the region free of nuclear weapons, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The SEANWFZ Treaty reaffirms the desire of the ASEAN State Parties to maintain peace and stability in the region and reinforces the commitment the Parties made in the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons. The SEANWFZ Treaty extends the Parties' NPT commitment by prohibiting, among other things,



the stationing of such weapons on their territories and the dumping of radioactive material in the zone, subjects that the NPT itself does not specifically address. The United States and the other NPT nuclear weapons states welcome the drafting of the Protocol to the Treaty that enables P5 signature of the Protocol and remain prepared to sign on that basis.

### *iii d. Transnational Crime*

The United States augments the capabilities of regional actors and supports the region on a broad range of transnational crime issues. The United States conducts such programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh, and Nepal, as well as through regional programming under the auspices of the UN and other international organizations. These programs include, for example, training prosecutors and judges to manage terrorism and transnational crime cases, supporting the regional International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and maritime interdiction skills training. In addition, the United States has taken steps to protect the economic interaction in the region against cybercrime and intellectual property piracy, and to disrupt the financial activities of transnational criminals and facilitators.

Narcotics production and trafficking are also challenges for all ARF member nations. There are vast networks of highly organized drug trafficking organizations that span the region and threaten regional and U.S. national security through their production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and precursor chemicals. The U.S. government supports partner nation capabilities to ensure that those countries can fight international drug trafficking and related criminal activities by funding demand reduction programs and interdiction training programs. In 2014, it is anticipated that the United States will co-sponsor with Thailand a concept development workshop on an ARF Transnational Threat Information-sharing Center (ATTIC) to explore the viability of establishing a center that could capitalize on existing regional mechanisms and centers to enhance information-sharing capability among ARF member countries. The initial

workshop will primarily focus on options for sharing drug-related transnational crime while developing a framework that could expand the capacity of ATTIC to address other areas of mutual interests.

Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise that has expanded from a conservation concern to an acute security threat. The increasing involvement of organized crime in poaching and wildlife trafficking promotes corruption, threatens the peace and security of fragile regions, strengthens illicit trade routes, destabilizes economies and communities that depend on wildlife for their livelihoods and contributes to the spread of disease. The U.S. government is increasing law enforcement training and technical assistance globally to combat wildlife trafficking and build law enforcement and criminal justice capacity and cooperation.

The United States has been engaged in training IT professionals regarding cyber crime and educating the youth of ASEAN towards the risks of trafficking in persons. For example, the U.S. government has assisted in creating a partnership between ASEAN and the MTV-Exit Foundation (MTV-EF) to educate the youth of ASEAN to raise awareness of trafficking in persons and disseminate information about organizations that are involved in assisting victims of trafficking in persons. In 2012, the United States along with other dialogue partners supported MTVEF events in Vietnam in May, in Indonesia in September, and in Myanmar in December. Currently, the U.S. government is working with ASEAN to determine what events will take place in 2013 onwards. The United States also funds the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative to strengthen ASEAN's capacity to address trafficking in persons (TIP) in the region.

### *iii e. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

ARF Dialogue Partners experience a variety of natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, as well as man-made crises, including civil conflict, which often result in

significant financial and human costs. In response to these events, the United States continues to provide humanitarian assistance to populations in the region, while simultaneously working to reduce communities' disasters in the most vulnerable areas. In 2013, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responded to twelve disasters in six ARF countries, including complex emergencies in two ARF countries, working with agencies from across the U.S. government to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations.

Of the total responses to disasters in ARF countries, USAID/OFDA has responded to eight disasters in three ASEAN member states—Myanmar, Indonesia, and the Philippines—providing nearly \$43 million in humanitarian assistance, in addition to substantial disaster risk reduction programming throughout ASEAN member states. U.S. disaster assistance aims to meet the immediate needs of affected populations, as well as help families recover from the effects of disaster.

In the Philippines, USAID/OFDA deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team to affected areas immediately following Typhoon Haiyan's landfall in the country in November. In response to the needs resulting from the typhoon, USAID/OFDA provided funding to non-governmental organization (NGO) and UN partners to provide emergency relief commodities and shelter materials, as well as logistical support in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense. USAID/OFDA responded to three other disasters in the Philippines in 2013, including floods in the central Philippines in August, floods in the northern Philippines in September, and a magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck Bohol Province on October 17.

In response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) contributed more than \$20 million in support of U.N. World Food Program's (WFP) Emergency Operation. Support included in-kind food assistance, local and regional food purchases, and cash transfer programming. As part of its contribution of in-kind food, USAID/FFP

provided 6,020 metric tons (MT) of U.S.-sourced rice and 55 MT of US-sourced emergency food products consisting of nutritional pastes and rice and wheat bars. USAID/FFP funding also supported WFP's purchase of 2,400 MT of locally produced rice and the airlift of 40 MTs of supplemental high-energy biscuits from Dubai. Currently, USAID/FFP is supporting WFP's relief and recovery efforts through cash-based programming, including cash transfers to help affected families purchase food on local markets and cash-for-work and cash-for-assets activities. Through its contributions, USAID/FFP has provided critical life-enhancing food assistance reaching more than 3 million people affected by the typhoon.

After heavy rains triggered flooding and landslides in Indonesia's capital city of Jakarta and surrounding areas in January, USAID/OFDA worked through an NGO partner to locally procure and distribute emergency relief commodities, including materials for flood clean-up activities that enabled affected populations to return home. A USAID/OFDA regional advisor based in Indonesia conducted assessment and coordination activities for the flood response. USAID/OFDA also responded to the magnitude 6.1 earthquake that struck Indonesia's Aceh Province on July 2.

In Myanmar, USAID/OFDA provides ongoing humanitarian support in response to the effects of unrest in Rakhine and Kachin states, as well as in Mandalay Region. USAID/OFDA interventions in Myanmar include relief commodity distributions for populations affected by communal unrest in Mandalay and nutrition and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance for displaced populations in Rakhine and Kachin states. USAID/OFDA also conducts regular humanitarian assessments in affected areas of the country.

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In Myanmar, USAID/FFP, through the WFP, is also distributing food to 128,000 IDPs in 10 Rakhine townships and to 40,000 IDPs in Kachin and Northern Shan States. As part of its current emergency program, WFP purchases and distributes locally produced rice, pulses, salt, and blended foods, as well as vegetable oil produced in Indonesia. WFP is also engaged in helping to prevent malnutrition activities by providing children under five and pregnant and lactating women monthly rations of fortified blended foods. USAID/FFP continues to support WFP's protracted relief and recovery operation in Myanmar with \$8 million in FY 2013 support for the local and regional purchase of food commodities. Since the beginning of the emergency operation, WFP has reached more than 2.8 million beneficiaries through general food distributions, approximately 114,000 people through nutrition interventions, and more than 465,000 beneficiaries through cash transfers.

In an effort to mitigate the effects of future disasters on vulnerable populations, the United States also supports various disaster risk reduction (DRR) programs aimed at saving lives; protecting livelihoods, assets, and infrastructure before, during, and after a disaster; and increasing community resilience to natural hazards. The United States supports a number of regional and country-specific DRR programs, including the ASEAN Technical Assistance and Training Facility, which aims to enhance disaster early warning capabilities among ASEAN member countries. In partnership with the U.S. Department of State, USAID/OFDA supported the facility to provide technical support to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management Task Force and support for the development of the ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (AHA Centre), particularly with the completion of a disaster monitoring and response system in December 2012. Through the early warning system, ASEAN member states share information

and support decision-making processes on policy-making, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. The decision-making capabilities are further boosted by training in the use of the incident command system through the United States Forest Service. This training has focused on building regional capacity through train the trainer courses that will continue through 2014. DRR activities in the region are further supported by the addition of a USAID DRR specialist to the regional development mission for Asia, located in Bangkok, Thailand, in October 2012. The United States dovetailed this program by training regional disaster management officers on how to coordinate and mobilize logistics through the AHA Centre in November 2013. The program also supports the appointment of a full-time regional expert to coordinate U.S. government disaster management assistance in ASEAN.

The United States sponsors and/or participates in several Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR)-related exercises with Asian partners every year, including the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, EAS HADR, the ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX), exercise Cobra Gold with Thailand, and the Balikatan exercise with the Philippines.

The Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel missions enhance regional disaster preparedness capabilities. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force respectively recognize the effectiveness of establishing relationships and training before disasters. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel strengthen relationships between civilian and military specialists from countries in the region who cooperate on medical and engineering projects and practice disaster response procedures. In 2012, the U.S. Hospital Ship Mercy conducting Pacific Partnership visited Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam while Pacific Angel missions were conducted in Laos, Philippines, Nepal, and Vietnam providing humanitarian assistance; medical, optometry, and veterinary care; as well as engineering programs and other exchanges. Pacific Partnership and Pacific Angel also improve the ability of providers and subject matter experts from the United States



working side by side with counterparts from other countries to prepare for and better respond to disasters, such as pandemic illness, typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. In 2012, Pacific Partnership included participation by 13 foreign governments and 28 NGOs. These two humanitarian missions will continue to provide assistance and enhance disaster relief in the region.

Lastly, the United States is the permanent Secretariat of the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS). PASOLS provides a congress for senior logisticians to exchange and discuss best practices and lessons learned, review regional issues and initiatives, and exchange information that strengthen cooperation throughout the region. The majority of ARF participants attend the annual PASOLS that draws over 120 regional delegates among 26 Member Nations and 12 Observer Nations. One primary focus area of PASOLS is logistics support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. PASOLS looks to improve regional disaster response through established communication channels as well as standardized logistics procedures and best practices. The theme of PASOLS 42 in September 2013 was logistics support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. PASOLS's regional presence and logistics focus presents an ideal opportunity for ARF to continue the dialogue on disaster response to strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration.

#### IV. Role of ARF

##### *iv a. National Contributions to Enhancing the ARF and Regional Security*

The United States remains committed to building institutional capacity in the ASEAN Regional Forum and strengthening ARF's role in the region's architecture. Besides the many projects mentioned above, the United States seeks to increase ARF's ability to develop Preventive Diplomacy mechanisms.

Further, in 2011, the United States established a U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and dispatched

Ambassador David Carden as our first-ever resident Ambassador to ASEAN. We continue to increase the mission and desk's resources despite a tough fiscal climate. This demonstrates our commitment to the region and to ASEAN as the institutional leader of ARF.

Finally, we will continue to work with ASEAN to strengthen and build capacity in the ARF Unit. A strong ARF Unit will benefit ASEAN members and all ARF dialogue partners as the engine of a credible and action-oriented organization.

##### *iv b. Future of ARF*

ARF serves as a useful and increasingly capable venue for broad, multilateral cooperation, and dialogue on a number of security issues. ARF's inclusiveness, maturing commitments, and growing experience positions it to achieve success on a targeted agenda that addresses the common issues that affect all ARF Dialogue Partners. These include transnational security threats such as proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, disasters, maritime threats, and regional stability. ARF should seek to build capacity and develop interoperability to counter these transnational threats and aspire to achieve results-oriented cooperation through concerted, pragmatic, and common action at the multilateral level. At the same time, discussion among senior officials and ministers on key traditional security topics – such as those outlined in the Annual Security Outlook – help build confidence, share views among key countries, and lay the groundwork for traditional security cooperation in ARF and elsewhere.

Improving ARF's institutional capacity is a key objective for the future. The institution should synchronize disaster relief and humanitarian operations. The United States looks forward to cooperating with Malaysia to support ARF in this effort by becoming the chairs of Priority Area 3 of the ARF Work Plan for Disaster Relief: Promote Interoperability and Coordination in HADR Operations.

As ARF's agenda and efforts increase, so must its institutional capacity. Building on twenty years

of confidence building measures, ARF Dialogue Partners should actively foster ARF's development and advance the organization into its second phase, preventive diplomacy. In fact, ARF is already accomplishing some preventive diplomacy objectives through concrete cooperation in transnational security areas. All states must share in the burden of achieving ARF's collective goals. ARF Dialogue Partners should engage on its various work plans, help resource major initiatives, and promote tangible projects that can be expanded to other areas.

# VIET NAM



**“The consistent objective of Viet Nam’s defence policy is to maintain a peaceful and stable environment for the country’s development.”**



## I. Overview of Regional Security:

South East Asia continues to maintain its growth momentum and its position as a center of gravity of attention from most major powers in the world. ASEAN-led multilateral security mechanisms have been vigorously expanded and promoted. Nevertheless, latent defence and security risks continue to exist in the region. The intertwined traditional and non-traditional security threats are creating new challenges for all ASEAN Member States.

Disputes over territory and natural resources on land and at sea are on the rise. Non-traditional security threats including terrorism, transnational crimes, piracy, aviation security, human trafficking, cybercrimes, pandemics, climate change, and natural disasters at various levels have been increasing, causing more severe consequences to the countries in the region. Maritime security, including freedom of navigation on the East Sea, continues to be of special interest to countries within and outside the region.

## II. Viet Nam’s defence-security policies:

ii a. Highlights of Viet Nam’s defence-security policy:

The consistent objective of Viet Nam’s defence policy is to maintain a peaceful and stable environment for the country’s development. Viet Nam consistently pursues the defence policy of peace and national protection, non-use or threat of use of force in international relations, and settlement of disagreements and disputes by peaceful means on the basis of international



laws. Viet Nam gradually modernises its armed forces and enhances defence capacity with a view to sustaining sufficient military power to defend the country. We oppose arms race.

Regarding territorial disputes in the East Sea, Viet Nam consistently supports peaceful negotiations to settle the disputes in accordance with international laws, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). While continuing to seek a long-term solution to the issue, Viet Nam calls on the parties concerned to exercise self-restraint, strictly observe the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), move toward the development and early adoption of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC), contributing to maintaining peace, friendship and development in the East Sea.

*ii b. Data on UN register of arms of Viet Nam:*

*ii b. i. Total defence expenditure:*

Viet Nam's defence expenditure is approved by the Government depending on economic capacity and annual demand. It is mostly spent for the maintenance of existing weapons and equipment. The number of troops has been declining as a result of the approved scheme for military personnel cut-down. At present, Viet Nam's defence expenditure accounts for VND 23,000 billion, equivalent to over USD 1 billion or 2.1% of GDP.

*ii b. ii. Personnel, organisation and branches of the People's Army of Viet Nam:*

The permanent forces include: regular army and local army totalling about 450,000. However, the number of troops is being cut down towards a small, quality army to meet the demand for national protection in the current conditions. The regular army is divided into three major service branches including Ground Force, Air Defence-Air Force and Navy. In addition, the People's Army of Viet Nam includes Border Defence Force, Coast Guard and Civil Defences Force.

### III. Viet Nam's contributions to regional defence and security:

*iii a. Viet Nam's contributions to regional security in 2013:*

Viet Nam always maintains a positive position toward and supports the initiatives of other countries in line with ASEAN's common objective for an environment of peace, stability and development in the region. In 2013, Viet Nam participated in a proactively and positive manner in all cooperation activities within the Political-Security Community of ASEAN, as well as in regional security forums from working level to the highest level. Most notably, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung attended the 12th Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2013 and delivered important opening remarks, calling for countries to take specific actions and join hands in building and strengthening strategic trust in the Asia-Pacific region. The Prime Minister's remarks indicated Viet Nam's viewpoints, position and policy towards regional issues. He also urged countries to stay firm on their position on making joint efforts to build a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.

Viet Nam participated in all activities of the Experts' Working Group (EWG) within the ADMM+ and co-chaired the ADMM+ Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) with China for 2011-2013. In June 2013, the Vietnamese army participated in the HADR simulation exercise on the field in collaboration with Brunei's Military Medicine Force. It was the first time the ADMM+ conducted a coordinated action on the field and the first time Viet Nam sent troops abroad for such a multilateral simulation exercise. In October 2013, Viet Nam hosted the ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) joined by more than 2,500 persons and hundreds of vehicles of ASEAN Member States and observers from many other countries and international organisations.

In January 2014, Viet Nam worked with China to successfully hold the Third Working Session of ADMM+ on HADR in Nha Trang City, Khanh

Hoa Province. This was the last meeting of the Working Group to evaluate its operation during the co-chairmanship of Viet Nam and China (2011-2013). Laos and Japan will be the Co-chairs for 2014-2016.

Apart from five initial cooperation areas, Viet Nam made efforts along with other ASEAN Member States to establish a new cooperation area in the ADMM+, which is the ADMM+ EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), thus forming the 6th cooperation area under the ADMM+. Viet Nam's initiative was approved at the 7th ADMM (May 2013) and the 2nd ADMM+ (June 2013) in Brunei. Besides, Viet Nam has always been active in working with other countries to promote cooperation in specific areas and army services.

*iii b. Viet Nam's policy for defence and security in the coming period:*

In 2014, Viet Nam continues to participate fully in regional cooperation activities with focus on the promotion of some activities, including:

- Work with India to actively implement the ADMM+ EWG on HMA initiative, including the holding of two conferences in Viet Nam and India in June 2014 and at the end of 2014 respectively. These meetings aim to evaluate the situation, challenges and potential risks faced by the region on post-war unexploded ordnances, and overview of regional capacity as well as identifying possible areas of cooperation that benefit and conform to the capacity and conditions of the members.
- Promote the adoption of and implement the proposal on Commitment to non-use of pre-emptive force in settling disputes among ASEAN Defence Ministers, including those in the East Sea.
- Dispatch ships to ASEAN Multilateral Joint Exercise (KOMODO) in Indonesia in March 2014.

- Host the 15th ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM-15), the 4th ASEAN Sergeant Major Annual Meeting (ASMAM-4) and the 24th ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet (AARM-24) in Ha Noi in November 2014.
- Viet Nam is fully prepared for sending its forces to join the UN PKO in 2014.