

Pacific Forum CSIS
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Joint Study on
Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Preventive Diplomacy

Executive Summary

The Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore undertook this joint study on behalf of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to evaluate how selected international and regional organizations have incorporated preventive diplomacy (PD) into their institutional framework. To provide a context for understanding the best practices and lessons learned by these organizations, the study begins with a brief review of the concept of preventive diplomacy as it has developed over the years and how it has evolved within the ARF. The study also includes recommendations from earlier work, including case study analysis by both organizations as respective chairs of a PD Study Group under the auspices of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

PD has been a contentious subject within the ARF from its inception as the second of a three-stage process whereby the ARF would move from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy measures to becoming a force for conflict resolution. The divergence among member countries has centered on concerns over the erosion of sovereignty as well as how PD would affect their security interests. ARF members have shown varying degrees of willingness and preparedness in regard to the development of PD measures and in moving the ARF toward the PD stage in its evolution.

In its initial stages, some member countries were active advocates for developing specific PD mechanisms while others were reluctant to move the ARF beyond confidence-building. The activist countries stressed the need to implement concrete PD measures such as early warning systems, fact-finding missions, and an enhanced good offices role of the ARF chair that would have an active role in mediating disputes. Over the years they have sought out opportunities to create momentum for increased PD activity by broadening the scope of preventive action in a variety of ways. Most recently, some have promoted the idea of invigorating the organization through increased cooperation in the areas of disaster management and humanitarian assistance. Those less enthusiastic have focused on developing a narrow definition of PD that seeks to limit its application to conflicts between states. The primary concern expressed has been the need to ensure noninterference in the internal affairs of member countries and the preservation of state sovereignty. The result has been an impasse (that may be more perceived than real) on how best to move toward PD.

As shown in Chapter 2, the ARF has made progress in forming the basis for implementing PD as a mechanism for dealing with conflict prevention. There has been a significant amount of confidence building that has led to an increased willingness by most member states to accept the basic norm of being responsible to the larger group to engage in activities that serve to create a sense of trust and goodwill among member states. This is seen in the willingness to increase transparency in a variety of strategic issue areas such as military force composition and to cooperate in issues such as transnational crime, illegal trafficking, maritime security, and trade. The region also has made dramatic movement toward recognizing the value of collective action in response to a crisis. This has manifested in the adoption by most states of ASEAN's Treaty on Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and in increasing willingness to provide assistance, especially in the area of disaster management and other nontraditional security issues.

Equally important, the groundwork for the eventual implementation of specific PD mechanisms has been laid. For example, the establishment of an Expert and Eminent Person's Group (EEPG), Friends of ARF Chair (FOC), and the ARF Unit form the basis of a capability to engage in mediational activities and independent assessments. The Treaty on Amity and Cooperation and the establishment of voluntary reporting requirements such as the Annual Security Outlook (ASO) demonstrate an increased willingness to recognize the value of peaceful resolution of disputes and early identification of potential conflicts. The adoption in 2001 of a working definition and principles of PD by the ARF, based on a draft provided by the CSCAP PD Study Group, provides the foundation upon which to build a PD capability within the ARF.

This study examines the practice of preventive diplomacy in a wide variety of multilateral organizations including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for American States (OAS), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the European Union (EU). It included interviews with experts and officials representing these organizations to determine how they developed charters, organizational structures, and normative frameworks as part of their efforts to engage in preventive diplomacy. The researchers focused on identifying what the member states and organizational representatives viewed as best practices and lessons learned from their involvement in institutionalizing PD. A separate examination of the European Union's involvement in Aceh was undertaken to provide an analysis of PD in the context of peace building.

Chapter 3 highlights the wide variation in these institutionalization processes. What becomes readily apparent is that in most cases success is driven both by specific historical circumstances along with the creation of a normative and institutional framework that supports the organizations' pursuit of specific goals associated with preventing conflict for the purpose of creating a mutually constituted "desirable future." This combination has created an environment that

has fostered the political will to act, which is critical to success. Having the right tools and knowing how to use them are important and this study helps to identify those tools and how they are (or can best be) used. But the tools are of little value absent a commitment – the political will – to use them.

The same general concerns of ARF members are a source of controversy in other organizations. Specifically, the issue of sovereignty and intervention in internal affairs of the state are ongoing concerns within all the organizations examined. The best practice that emerges from our examination is that successful organizations recognize what member states consider to be interference in internal affairs and avoid specific criteria for determining circumstances in which involvement in internal affairs might be allowed. Instead, collective responsibility (the “responsibility to protect”) has emerged as a norm that is recognized by the majority of organizations examined in the study.

Because the norms associated with preventive action are not binding and typically are based on an abstract ideal of desirable relations, the ability of an organization to engage in PD depends on several factors. They include the willingness of the disputants to accept outside involvement, the egregiousness of the action by the aggrieving party, the impact of the action on both the aggrieved party and the organization, the historical circumstances surrounding the dispute, the international context, the degree of consensus among members of the organization, etc. The lesson learned in several of the organizations where PD is most institutionalized centers on the need to maintain flexibility and the willingness to be prepared to engage in PD when the political opportunity for preventive action presents itself.

A second definitional issue is how broad or narrow to define PD both in terms of location in the conflict cycle and the scope of activity. The problem is similar to the one faced by the ARF in attempting to confine the concept of PD to specific actions taken to prevent violence, even though PD examples reveal a tendency for external involvement in disputes to come after the conflict has turned violent. The definition provided by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* is prescient; it defines PD as being a useful mechanism throughout the conflict cycle to prevent hostilities from emerging and to limit the escalation, spread, or spillover effect and otherwise manage conflict once it has begun.

Other organizations have struggled with the “scope of activity” issue. Successful adaptations have developed separate approaches to what some refer to as structural vs. operational PD. While this distinction is a useful conceptual device for categorizing activity, in practice the two blend into a continuum of responses to potential violence. In a counter-intuitive twist, several organizations, especially the UN, OSCE, and OAS, originally developed their capacity for engaging in PD in the context of the post-violence stage of the conflict cycle through activity such as peacekeeping and peace-building. They have gradually moved back through the cycle to engage in conflict mitigation activity through mechanisms such as good

offices, special envoys, mediation, and even preventive deployment. Subsequently, as these organizations matured they have become more active in the pre-violence stage of the conflict cycle by engaging in longer-term structural activity such as poverty alleviation, protection of minority rights, security sector reform, and promotion of democracy. The organizations have also developed additional PD capacities designed to monitor goal achievement in capacity building and to provide better early warning of potential conflict. While these long-term, structural approaches offer less visibility for specific PD mechanisms than do the more immediate conflict mitigation mechanisms, interviewees readily acknowledged the linkage with creating an environment that encourages non-violent resolution of disputes.

It should be emphasized that PD is neither the first nor the last resort in the settlement of disputes or resolution of conflict. The first resort, or preferred alternative, is for the parties involved to peacefully resolve the situation directly between or among themselves. The last resort, all too frequently, is the use of violent means to resolve the problem. PD provides a middle alternative when and if the parties cannot directly resolve the issue. A common characteristic of those organizations that most successfully pursue or promote PD as a dispute resolution mechanism is a firm, if not binding, commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes as one of its organizing principles.

Each organization is unique in how it has adopted PD. The differences stem from a variety of factors including the degree of unanimity in commitment to the principles articulated in the organizational charters, longevity of the organization, organizational structure, resources, and the historical circumstances of both the member states and the organization itself. Chapter 3 of this study provides a detailed description of the way in which PD evolved in the various organizations, the organizing principles, and a description of what interviewees felt were the best practices and lessons learned in the process of institutionalizing the concept within the organization. Finding the right balance between noninterference and protection of sovereign rights on the one hand and the collective responsibility to protect and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes on the other was a central theme in developing organizing principles. Additional information on charter documents, mission and principles statements, agreements and documents used to institutionalize PD, organizational information, and a list of key officials with responsibilities for implementing PD is provided in Annex A. Below is a brief summary of each organization:

United Nations (UN). The primary focus for the examination of the UN in this study was its role in operational PD, specifically through the Secretary General and the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs. Best practices highlighted during interviews included successful responses to outbreaks of violence, election monitoring initiatives, and the creation of regional capacity for engaging in "good office" diplomacy, and improving interagency coordination with other UN organizations such as the UN Development Program.

Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has the most institutionalized approach to PD of all the organizations examined and provides both a useful model and potential training opportunities. With its unique focus on the humanitarian dimension, the organization has established an elaborate set of binding commitments along with monitoring and reporting mechanisms to promote good governance and respect for human rights for the purpose of preventing conflict. Specific institutional aspects that were highlighted during interviews included its commitment to the protection of minority populations, the establishment of field offices in conflict-prone regions, effective coordination between the Chairman-in-Office and the Conflict Prevention Centre, and an elaborate election monitoring mechanism.

Organization of American States (OAS). The promotion of representative democracy is the central focus of the OAS. Its PD activity is focused on collective maintenance of “democratic peace” to ensure regional security. Specifically, election monitoring teams are regularly employed and the OAS Secretary General has appointed special envoys or special missions in response to perceived challenges to the strength of democratic institutions in member states. Additionally, the OAS has engaged in longer-term efforts to promote democratic institutions and norms in the region.

Pacific Island Forum (PIF). PD within the PIF has emerged in the context of a comprehensive approach to regional security. While most PD activity has been an ad hoc response to political conflict within smaller states, there has been some institutionalization of PD based on lessons learned from these activities. As a result, the PIF has started engaging in more systematic activities such as the implementation of eminent persons groups to evaluate conflicts and election monitoring. There also has been growing enthusiasm within the organization for improved reporting and monitoring of potential conflict situations.

African Union (AU). The AU has a comprehensive framework of agreements and an elaborate organizational structure to deal with preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Several protocols and mechanisms have been implemented to respond to political crises in the region. The Peace and Security Council established in 2003 has wide-ranging authority to engage in a variety of PD activities including intervention in crises deemed to threaten regional peace. The organization has successfully employed operational PD mechanisms such as special envoys, regional and international ostracism, humanitarian assistance, and observer missions in several member states.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). While lacking a formally documented approach to conflict prevention and PD, the OIC has engaged in a variety of PD activities based on the general principle of its commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes. Specifically, it has engaged in providing “good offices” services to disputants in Mindanao and has been active in promoting the rights of Muslim minorities in several regions of the world. In a more recent development,

the OIC endorsed its Enlightened Moderation Agenda. Several goals of this new vision statement for the organization focus on the importance of structural approaches to PD.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO lacks specific commitments to PD in formal agreements. However, its charter does highlight the importance of cooperative efforts to combat transnational security issues, specifically terrorism. The organization has also engaged in a variety of confidence building measures in the region. These two developments suggest further articulation of a region-wide approach to PD as this organization matures.

European Union (EU). The EU has been actively engaged in a variety of PD-related activity throughout the world. The specific application of interest for this study is its extensive involvement in the Aceh peace-building process, which underscores the importance of perseverance.

One difficulty with isolating lessons learned and developing recommendations for the ARF is the fact that implementation in each organization has been based on a unique set of circumstances. The ARF also faces a unique set of conditions that will determine the path to improve regional capacity to deal with preventing violent conflict between and within member states. Further, despite the conceptual characterization in the early 1990s of mechanically moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution, in practice organizations move between these so-called stages in jumps and starts as events dictate. Unfortunately, as this study shows, there is no universal formula and no specific time-focused event that triggers implementation of PD. Instead, successful institutionalization of PD seems to cluster around three principle areas: the establishment of a normative framework and operational principles, the development of specific PD mechanisms, and capacity building and institutionalization of a PD role.

First, and fundamentally, the success of PD is based on the ability of the organization to *establish a normative framework* that provides the basis for preventive action generally and PD specifically. Although it is difficult to generalize, the one critical core value that appears to form the basis for organizational success is the recognition that collective responses by member states are necessary in some circumstances to prevent violence. Beyond that core value, each organization has developed other norms associated with the modalities of collective response, regional and local governance, inter-group interaction, and the protection of human rights. In most cases, these values were articulated in a vision statement or document that established goals and standards for successful accomplishment. It should also be noted that these norms are incorporated alongside norms of nonintervention and respect for sovereignty into agreements among member countries. An examination of charter documents included in Annex A shows that the ASEAN Charter, which was signed at the November 2007 ASEAN Summit, uses similar language in articulating its core values.

Ideally, a broad, all-encompassing vision statement should articulate the desirable conditions for preventing destructive conflict within the region. An important first step for the ARF will be to isolate key objectives to form the basis for developing a broader vision for conflict prevention. These objectives should focus on the importance of promoting good governance and the need to be responsive to the needs of people in crises. While the former creates the conditions for peaceful resolution of conflicts, the latter underwrites the recognition of the universal responsibility to protect the vulnerable, regardless of the cause of that vulnerability. As with all norms, there will always be a range of responses from individual members of the community of states and a range of perspectives on the appropriateness and adequacy of the collective response.

A second cluster of lessons learned and recommendations centers on the *development of specific mechanisms* that promote preventive diplomacy. There is near universal acceptance of the value of operational PD mechanisms such as the provision of good offices, special envoys, and mediation among organizations examined. The significant lesson learned regarding the use of these mechanisms is the importance of ensuring that individuals engaged in these activities have both individual and institutional credibility. In the narrowest sense of PD as a response to imminent violence, personal credibility is enhanced through the establishment of a cadre of eminent persons who have developed and are empowered to use the appropriate skills.

Institutional credibility is more difficult to assess and is often dependent on the local acceptance of the norms associated with the regional organization. As organizations broaden their definition of PD to include interaction at the local level by individuals involved in peacekeeping, peace-building, poverty alleviation, democracy building, and security-sector reform activities, effective training programs become more important to the ultimate success of PD activity. In practice, as organizations move beyond these conflict mitigation mechanisms toward conflict prevention and structural PD activities, the line between PD mechanisms and the creation of a capacity for conflict resolution becomes blurred.

Equally important has been the increased involvement in structural PD activities that focus on improving material conditions of vulnerable populations and institutionalizing norms of behavior that encourage nonviolent resolution of conflicts. While most of the organizations examined in this study initially focused their PD efforts on operational activities in response to violent conflict, most have increasingly recognized the value of long-term structural activity in setting the conditions for more effective responses during crises and the acceptance of outside assistance in resolving local security challenges.

Several key components of an effective PD program have been established by the ARF or by ASEAN. Although they are at various levels of institutionalization, these components, which are summarized below, can serve as the building blocks

for full program implementation. Similar components can be found in many of the organizations examined in this study. Their roles have also been examined by the ARF and by the CSCAP PD Study Group.

ASEAN Troika. The ASEAN Troika is comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the present, past, and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), which would rotate in accordance with the ASC Chairmanship. However, if the situation warrants, the composition of the ASEAN Troika could be adjusted upon the consensus of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. The ASEAN Troika enables ASEAN to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues and situations of common concern likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. This standing PD mechanism could serve as a model for the ARF or even expand its mandate to help perform an ARF PD function.

Friends of the Chair. The Friends of the ARF Chair (FOC) assists the ARF Chair. The FOC is an ad-hoc group, constituted for a specific task by the ARF Chair as and when the situation warrants, including instances where emergencies and crisis situations arise that have the likelihood of disturbing regional peace and stability. The Friends of the Chair is a troika composed of: (a) Foreign Minister of the incoming ARF chairing country; (b) the Foreign Minister of a non-ASEAN ARF Country; and, (c) the Foreign Minister of the immediate past ARF chairing country. The membership overlap with the ASEAN Troika should facilitate close cooperation and interaction between the two groups. The PD role of the FOC remains to be fully developed and articulated.

Expert and Eminent Persons Group. The experts and eminent persons are nominated and registered by each ARF participant country. The EEPs provide non-binding and professional views or policy recommendations to the ARF through the ARF Chair, or to serve as resource persons to the ARF on issues of relevance to their expertise. EEPs focus on issues and subjects that are relevant to the interests and concerns of the ARF that are not being adequately addressed elsewhere, and to which their expertise is directly applicable. EEPs would not only be available for fact-finding missions but could also play a more active “good offices” role by assisting in mediating disputes and offering practical solutions. The EEPG could also play an early warning role in advising the ARF of potential conflicts that might merit PD measures.

ARF Unit. The ARF Unit’s role and functions are: to support the enhanced role of the ARF Chair, including interaction with other regional and international organizations, defense officials dialogue and Track-two organizations; to function as depository of ARF documents/papers; to manage database/registry; and to provide secretarial works and administrative support, including serving as the ARF’s institutional memory. The current manning level makes even these tasks difficult. An expanded ARF Unit seems essential if the ARF is to transition into a PD role.

Annual Security Outlook (ASO). The ASO is a voluntarily produced document that lays out security concerns of ARF members. It is compiled without editing by the ARF Chair. There is no standard format and reporting is inconsistent. There is also no review process and no opportunity to follow up or gain insight into the thinking that goes into these reports. This severely limits the current utility of the ASO as a PD or early warning mechanism.

Regional Risk Reduction Center (RRRC). Although it has not been established, several concept papers produced for the ARF have recommended this type of center to monitor crises and provide an early warning system. While some of its functions could initially be accomplished by the other above-referenced PD mechanisms or could initially be outsourced to track-two mechanisms such as CSCAP, a serious PD effort by the ARF will eventually require some type of adequately staffed, funded, and empowered RRRC.

ARF Secretariat and Secretary General. At some point, an expanded ARF Unit could become a more institutionalized and more broadly manned Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General whose duties should mirror those of the ASEAN Secretary General, but with greater PD focus and authority.

From the experience of the organizations examined in this study, a key aspect of developing effective operational PD mechanisms that can be used in response to crises is the empowerment of a strong, recognizable focal point for implementing PD-related activity. In the case of the ARF, this leadership could be organized around the ASEAN Troika, FOC, EEPG, and the leadership of the ARF Unit. Given the centrality of ASEAN within the ARF, it should remain at the center of the organization's efforts to expand its role in PD, although its "driver's seat" role should be more clearly articulated and the support role of other members should be welcomed and more clearly defined.

Capacity building and institutionalization mechanisms form the third cluster of recommendations. The focus is on structural solutions centered on the underlying motivation for collective action within the specific organization. For example, in the OSCE, the focus is on creating a capacity for election monitoring and early warning mechanisms to detect human rights violations against minority populations. In the OAS, the focus is on creating the capacity for sustaining and monitoring democratic institutions through election monitoring and early warning mechanisms. The UN has begun to focus on using the UN Development Program and peacekeeping missions to develop local capacity to reduce violence. More generally, a key lesson is that local capacity for monitoring and identifying sources of potential conflict was critical to effective coordinated response that contributed to conflict prevention. The promotion of good governance and the peaceful resolution of conflict are potential areas of focus for the ARF.

One area where several regional organizations have established a basis for institutionalizing structural PD in the Asia-Pacific region is in nontraditional security

challenges. As highlighted in Annex C, there are a wide range of PD mechanisms that have been established in the region to improve both local and regional capacity to deal with nontraditional security concerns such as financial crises, infectious disease and pandemics, natural disasters, transnational crime and terrorism, and poverty alleviation. What is striking, however, is that there is a significant degree of overlapping activity and a general lack of effective partnering among the organizations involved in these efforts. Here, the ARF could take a leading role in establishing and institutionalizing norms of behavior for organizations and states involved in these activities and serve as the focal point for effective coordination of effort.

As evidenced in the examples of the OAS and OSCE, the institutionalization and organizational structure associated with confidence building measures could serve as a starting point for creating additional capacity for PD. The ARF Unit could serve as the initial organizational focal point for this expansion in anticipation of creating an ARF Secretariat. Given its current roles as the depository for ARF documents, database/registry manager, and institutional memory, its mandate could be expanded to include analysis of this information and the establishment of reporting requirements to support early warning and monitoring progress reports on PD initiatives. Additionally, its established role of supporting the enhanced role of the ARF Chair positions it to serve as the focal point for the development of an effective vision statement for the ARF. Specific recommendations for the time-phased expansion of ARF Unit responsibilities are summarized in Annex D.

It is worth noting that most of the organizations examined acknowledge that they have experienced some level of failure in their PD efforts. The recent rejection by Russia of election monitors from the OSCE, the refusal of Venezuela to accommodate democratic reforms, and Fiji's reluctance to move toward democracy all serve as reminders that even if an institutionalized PD program is in place, its success ultimately depends on the willingness of the parties involved in the dispute to cooperate with the regional organization. But, one lesson learned from the CSCAP examination of PD case studies is that "failure is never final." Even unsuccessful efforts lay the groundwork upon which future success can be built – witness the Aceh example. (Other general observations can be found in the Annex B listing of CSCAP Key Findings.)

An analysis of the institutions studied and the work done by CSCAP leads to the general conclusion that PD's effectiveness, depends on an expressed commitment on the part of the organization and its members to peaceful settlement of disputes and an acknowledgment that the organization has a legitimate role to play in bringing this about. Ultimately, preventing conflict emerges from the political will to assist people in the face of a perceived wrong. The challenge for all regional organizations is to create a normative framework to define those perceived wrongs, establish mechanisms to respond to violators of those norms, and create local capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully.

Based on an assessment of the evolution of PD within the ARF, examination of the various organizations included in this study, and the collective assessment drawn from the CSCAP Study Group on PD (See Annex B), the study offers the following additional specific recommendations for advancing the implementation of a successful PD program within the ARF:

- Create an organizational vision statement that articulates ARF goals and aspirations for promoting peace and serving as an institution for preventing, mitigating, and resolving conflict in the region. Specific PD-related objectives should be included in this document. This effort should eventually include benchmarks for specified goals and capacities. Developing an ARF mission statement or statement of objectives could serve as a useful first step in this process.
- Broaden the current working definition and statement of principles of PD to acknowledge that PD mechanisms can be applied within as well as between and among states, provided there is mutual consent of all the directly involved parties.
- Clearly define the scope of the ARF's PD effort: will internal ASEAN disputes be addressed by the ARF or only by ASEAN?; will the focus be on East Asia or will the inclusion of South Asia states in the ARF broaden its PD mandate?; will ARF good offices be offered or extended beyond its membership or extra-regionally?
- Create an institutional capacity for early warning and monitoring of emerging security challenges. Over the long term, the establishment of a permanent center (RRRC) that serves as a clearinghouse for existing confidence building mechanisms with expanded responsibilities to gather, store, analyze, and disseminate information and issue warnings of impending crises can provide a basis for establishing a credible and reliable source of information. The center could also play an important role in organizing and providing a regional response capability for disaster assistance.
- Enhance and articulate the PD role of the Expert and Eminent Persons Group and the Friends of the ARF Chair. Cataloguing qualifications, creating an advisory council, and encouraging the use of these resources by member countries can be the first step to creating a credible and respected group of individuals that can be relied on to lead fact-finding and goodwill missions and provide timely and accurate assistance to the ARF in response to emerging crises.
- Standardize the ASO and create a review and feedback mechanism, possibly involving the EEPG, to enhance its role as an early warning tool.

- Strengthen and expand the ARF Unit with an eye to the creation of an ARF Secretariat to include a General Secretary with a clearly defined role and mission. While the organizations examined in this study provide a variety of mechanisms for filling the Secretarial role, having a senior official who is generally recognized as having both institutional and personal credibility among the leaders of the member states has proven critical to the success of special envoy and operational PD activities. In the interim, develop a mutually supportive relationship between the ARF Unit and ASEAN Secretary General.
- Identify nontraditional security challenges that might lend themselves to the application of PD. These could include transnational environmental issues (Southeast Asia haze and Northeast Asia yellow dust), health issues (combating bird flu), and history issues (development of common textbooks), etc. The pursuit of nontraditional security issues should not be used as an excuse for ignoring traditional concerns, such as conflicting territorial claims, which could benefit from outside mediation.
- Develop procedures and mechanisms that can allow the ARF and/or its various PD mechanisms to be more responsive to impending or actual emergency situations in order to perform its PD role in a timely and effective manner.

A time-phased near (2008-2009), mid (2010-2012) and long-term (2012-2015) summary of the recommendations for expanding the ARF role in PD is provided in Annex D.