

## Co-Chairs' Summary Report

### ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Legal and Practical Aspects

Brussels, 19-20 November 2009

#### Introduction

1. Pursuant to the decision of the 16<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Phuket, Thailand on 23 July 2009, the ARF Seminar on Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Legal and Practical Aspects was held in Brussels, Belgium on 19-20 November 2009. The Meeting was co-chaired by Ambassador Tomasz Kozlowski from the EU and Ambassador T.M. Hamzah Thayeb from Indonesia.
2. The Track I Seminar was attended by representatives from 21 ARF participating countries. The DPR of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka were not in attendance. The Seminar was also attended by Prof. Robert Beckman (*Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore*), Ms. Kristiina Kangaspunta (*The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute/UNICRI*), Mr. Peter Hinchliffe (*International Chamber of Shipping*), and Prof. Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (World Maritime University and Cdr. R.N. David Lintern (Operation ATLANTA) as presenters. The list of delegates is attached as **Annex 1**. The Seminar's programme and agenda are attached as **Annex 2** and **Annex 3**, respectively.

#### Opening Session

3. At the opening session the Indonesian Co-Chair delivered his opening addresses. This was followed by an address from Mr. Karl-Olof Andersson representing the EU Presidency (Sweden). The addresses are attached as **Annex 4 and 5**, respectively.
4. Mr. Staffan Widlert, Director General of the Swedish Transport Agency, delivered the keynote speech during the opening session. The speech is attached as **Annex 6**.

#### Session 1: Common understanding on definitions of key maritime security concepts

5. Mr Dimitrios Theologitis of the Directorate General for Transport and Energy of the European Commission gave a presentation on the instruments that the European Community has at its disposal to contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation. While highlighting the magnitude of the European Union interests in the global maritime industry, he put into focus the International and European regulatory and monitoring instruments that contribute preventively to safety and security of navigation. The freedom of commercial exchange is crucial worldwide and any unjustified limitation to maritime transport is not tolerable. The freedom of navigation can not be taken for granted. Effectiveness requires a continuous collective commitment by all stakeholders, including ship owners and operators. It also demands strong national administrations to effectively implement relevant legal instruments. He also highlighted the coherent approach of the Community's legislation, which encompasses ship and port security as well as information sharing and traffic monitoring systems. **Annex 7**.
6. Professor Robert Beckman from the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore discussed traditional and non-traditional threats to maritime security. He underlined the different interpretations of the concept of maritime security, arguing that it is preferable to focus efforts in addressing threats that affect the security and safety of

shipping. Traditional threats to maritime security, in the form of inter-state disputes, are known and there are mechanisms in place to respond to these challenges. However, the non-traditional threats that affect international maritime security pose a challenge. Examples of non-traditional threats are: piracy, armed robbery, hijacking, hostage taking, maritime terrorism, transport of terrorists and proliferation of WMD. Existing international legislation on maritime security does not comprehensively address all of these threats, although steps are being taken to address some of these limitations (2005 *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation/SUA Protocol*). This leaves some offences exempt of criminalization. The situation is further complicated by the uneven adherence and application of international legislation. Existing national legislation is also found to constrain the ability of state authorities to respond effectively. The major issue is national implementation as states have not ratified conventions that are necessary under the 1988 SUA Convention. The ratification and effective implementation of international legislation is an important step to be taken. It is also important to adapt existing legislation to meet the challenges faced. In addition, some threats to maritime security are unregulated. An example is the intentional destruction of submarine cables outside territorial waters. This is not an offence under international or national law of any state. This gap should be addressed in law. Professor Robert Beckman's presentation appears as **Annex 8**.

7. Deputy Director and Executive Officer of the Applied Research Programme at UNICRI, Ms Kriistina Kangaspunta, gave a presentation on organized crime and its implications towards activities at sea, underlining the nexus between piracy and organized crime and highlighting the importance of well informed responses and measures. Piracy is connected to other criminal activities and networks on land, which must be addressed. To this end, the use of instruments used against organized crime can be used to curb piracy. But measures must be more than repressive. Some causal factors are known, such as the presence of criminal networks, weak government, ongoing insurgencies and the availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Other factors, such as the purported connection between piracy and terrorism, lack conclusive supporting evidence. There are also other factors for which there is little or no confirmed evidence, such as the reasons why certain coastal populations engage in piracy. An effective approach to tackling the myriad of factors underlying maritime piracy requires the use of applied comparative research and analysis. It can provide valuable information of the situation and suggest evidence based responses. It will require the involvement of all maritime security stakeholders, as well as engagement with civil society and coastal communities. Her presentation is attached as **Annex 9**.
8. Mr Peter Hinchcliffe, Marine Director of the International Chamber of Shipping presented the views of the shipping industry on threats to maritime security. He pointed out the need for a global regulatory framework (United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea/UNCLOS and International Maritime Organisation/IMO) to create a level platform for the implementation of international maritime security measures and legislation. The current framework does not provide full coverage. Legislation is either too specific or constraining to be effective, or is only adhered to by a few states (SUA 2005), rendering it ineffective. National legislation is also found to be inadequate. Bilateral arrangements such as those found in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, are not always viable. Intervention off the Horn of Africa has decreased the incidence of successful attacks, but has not deterred pirates. The current legal framework does not provide the necessary means to arrest, prosecute and punish pirates, and bilateral arrangements, such as with Kenya, are not very effective. Mr Hinchcliffe argued for the institution of an international piracy tribunal. Effective long term solutions rely on the determination of governments to adhere and implement international legislation, to address pending legislative limitations and to ensure that piracy is deprived of legal safe havens. A willingness to act and commit funding to relevant initiatives (Djibouti Code of Conduct/CoC, Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia) will be necessary. The industry will continue its efforts in

the domain of awareness, prevention and training, but will require the cooperation of Flag States to implement the measures laid down by the IMO and other bodies, to be effective. His presentation is attached as **Annex 10**.

9. In the open discussion, Canada lauded the leadership of the ASEAN Regional Forum on maritime security issues, specifically piracy, and saluted nations in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore region for successfully dealing with the issue over so many years. Their success has seen the problem shift to the South China Sea, and elsewhere. Action needs to be taken in other regions. Canada is part of the ATALANTA mission conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy affects commercial interests and shipping industries. However, the humanitarian aspect in the region must not be forgotten and the root causes need to be addressed (lack of government, overfishing, dumping of toxic materials, etc.). Although the 2005 SUA Protocol may be a tool against piracy, few countries have ratified the Protocol. Canada suggested that this issue might be an excellent topic for a future seminar. Somalia can be seen as a case-study to look at the challenges the international community is facing with regards to piracy. Canada is open for a discussion on a piracy chamber within an existing criminal justice system of one or more States in the region, but disagreed with the idea of an International Piracy Tribunal.
10. Indonesia stated that maritime security is an important challenge to be tackled. Also, it would like to see more concrete efforts on how to provide legal capacity within national capacity. More capacity building is needed. According to the Indonesian delegate, illegal fishing and the degradation of marine resources constitute more serious crime than piracy and should fall under the legislation of the UN Convention. On the Somali issue, Indonesia played down the usefulness of an international tribunal, focusing instead on the need for practical legal solutions and capacity building assistance to coastal states in the region. The ensuing discussion covered the need to address the security of submarine cables, the importance of addressing preventively the root causes of piracy on land through development assistance, and the evaluation of response to determine their effectiveness. The need for information gathering and sharing was discussed.

## **Session 2: Improving legal regimes and enhancing inter-agency cooperation**

### ***Sub session A: Improving legal regimes***

11. Professor Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. of the World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden presented an overview of the existing international legal framework. He focused on the narrow definition of maritime security as protection against threats in the context of maritime transport (piracy, robbery, and hijacking) rather than security in a geopolitical context. He outlined the relevant articles contained in the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982*, the SUA Convention, the *International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code* together with the *International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)* amendments, and finally maritime security *par-adroit* (soft law). He stated that the international legal framework was not perfect by citing examples that there was no obligation for states to act under UNCLOS; SUA did not define terrorism and its accession rate has been low; and ISPS/SOLAS did not identify the crime. He recommended that rather than create new conventions, it was better to review the basket of international treaty instruments, fully translate them into national law and review the utility of *par-adroit*. He concluded that problems of maritime security could only be resolved through political and socio-economic measures on-shore. Mr. Mejia's presentation is attached as **Annex 11**.
12. Mr Henry S Bensusanto presented the experience of the Philippines in implementing international law domestically. The Philippines faced a number of MS challenges, ranging from territorial challenges, the protection of marine diversity, combating transnational crimes, and protecting its nationals. Mr Bensusanto noted that, while the

Philippines was one of the first countries to ratify UNCLOS in 1982, it *only agreed to implement it into national law in March 2009*. Since 2007, the Philippines has had an effective structural and institutional framework with the creation of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CMOA). CMOA meets strategically at the *inter-Ministerial* level, uniting relevant Secretaries. A series of interagency technical working groups are given the task of reaching agreement, and the Secretary-General of CMOA manages the process.

13. The representatives from the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Pakistan as discussants provided their observations to the presentations. ROK shared on the cooperation on maritime security the ROK has with its Northeast Asian neighbors and major powers. It argued that UNCLOS is unlikely to facilitate cooperation between states. First because UNCLOS has innate flaws – primarily its lack of compulsory regulations for conflict resolution among participants. Second, mutual mistrust between nations has been built up. Pakistan raised the *issue of conflicting legal principles*, such as in the case where an EU navy vessel did not cooperate in the apprehension of traffickers who would face the death penalty in Pakistan. Japan also presented a translation of its new law on maritime security which criminalizes acts of piracy and sets out punishment measures. In the ensuing discussion, participants focused on the impact of the current situation in Somalia in relation to the development of legal thinking on maritime security and the extent to which the existing legal framework can address the situation. It was suggested that a wide-ranging analysis of the coverage, gaps, and the overlaps be undertaken. It was also agreed that national implementation was a priority and that discussion of the issue in international fora could enhance this process. It was suggested that a body of accepted legal practice would facilitate in the implementation of this analysis.

#### **Sub session B: Enhancing inter-agency cooperation**

14. Commander Penny Campbell of Australia's Border Protection Command (BPC) spoke on successful interagency cooperation. The BPC included Defence, Customs, Fisheries Management, Quarantine Inspection and other agencies as needed. The key factors in its success were strong political and public support for its operation, dedicated staff, assignment of physical assets (eg. aircraft and ships) and the continuing agreement of participating state departments and agencies. Weaknesses include operating from many different legislative bases, and the competing agendas of the participating departments. Her presentation appears as **Annex 12**.
15. Mr Triyuswoyo of the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Board (IMSCB) presented its experience of interagency coordination. The IMSCB coordinates the policy and operations of 12 ministerial level agencies. He stressed the need for suitable information and communication policy, hardware and implementation; the importance of capacity building; and, an active process of exchanging experience and Best Practices with international counterparts. The presentation is attached as **Annex 13**.
16. The two key discussants came from the European Union. Mr Christian Dupont of the European Commission presented the fruits of cooperation between the 27 EU Member States and focused on the still pending (IMO, Maritime Safety Committee) Community proposal on the development of model legislation on maritime security. Such a model stressed the importance of building up mutual confidence by setting out structures and responsibilities, criteria for selecting port facilities to be protected, the standards for assessments and plans to be established, the criteria to be followed for recourse to recognized security organizations, efficient documentation, supervision, control and compliance, training, drills etc. Mr Dupont stressed the need to enhance inter-agencies / interministerial cooperation at national level to allow an adequate and comprehensive implementation of those maritime security measures. According to the experience gathered within the EU but also in the framework of assistance programs this is key to

ensure that every governmental department will be involved in accordance to its own field of competence and will then contribute to a collective success. **Annex 14**

17. Mr. Denis Trioulaire of the European Defence Agency presented current work strands in the Agency on Maritime Surveillance, one addressing networking issues and a second one aimed at producing a European Security and Defence Policy Think Piece. Stressing that technology would not be an obstacle, the study underlines, amongst others, the need for EU effective cross pillar coordination, a common terminology, and a better information sharing. A step by step approach has to be conducted, establishing standards and best practice, encouraging removal of barriers and promoting co-operation. **Annex 15.**
18. In the open discussion, attention was given to the Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. As this working group is examining legal implementation issues, and there may be merit in bringing it into the conversation that was being held in ARF. The importance, in interagency cooperation, of looking at the medium and long-term was emphasized. It was also stated that the private sector was a key stakeholder in this area, and should be consulted. India noted that it had good interagency cooperation built around standard operating procedures that were regularly being reviewed.

### **Session 3: overview of current solutions and best practice sharing**

19. The Session 3 focused on what the international community is doing regarding maritime security and how it is reacting towards threats. The mechanisms that are in place were discussed as well as the lessons learned on threats to maritime security.

#### ***Subsession A***

20. Mr. Federico Biorcchi from the European Commission gave a presentation on the critical maritime routes programme and in this respect the regional cooperation and synergies with IMO. The instrument used for long-term stability is assistance that is aimed at threats to security or safety. It is of a trans regional nature and complements what the European Commission is doing on a national and regional level. Safeguarding the safety of maritime routes through EU engagement is crucial as 90% of the EU trading is transported via sea.. The Instrument for Stability programming for 2009-2011 caters for long-term approach and a potentially global program initially singling out two regions: Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
21. The overall objective of the Critical Maritime Routes programme from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden is to contribute to the security and safety of navigation. In this regard, it contributes to better safety of navigation, supports regional co-operation and capacity-building and supports risk analysis. Main elements are to contribute to the Co-operative Mechanism for Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore whilst respecting sovereignty of host states and within the overall international framework (IMO) including the IMO's (Djibouti Code of Conduct). **Annex 16**
22. In the same vein, the EU Co-Chair stressed that EU support and contribution in Southeast Asia would also be based on the principle of consent by and request from the countries concerned. He further added that EU presence in the region is broader than Operation ATALANTA.
23. Cdr RN David Lintern, Liaison Officer to the EU for Operation ATALANTA, presented the EU anti-piracy activities in the framework of Operation ATALANTA. Cdr Rn David Lintern reiterated that military forces cannot stop piracy and that the operation is only one element of a wider approach of the EU. The EU operation, with 9/10 ships in theater in

2009, is larger than NATO and other forces combined and is as such a significant military contribution. The priority task of the operation is to protect World Food Program shipping and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) vessels. In this regard, the operation has not failed to protect these ships and protection of the food deliveries has thus been achieved. The operation is dedicated to protect every vessel and is not clearly focused on EU matters. What is important is that military teams are put on the vessels. However, this is a difficult issue because of the position of the flag states in this regard. ATALANTA is addressing these issues.

24. ATALANTA has set up a website for the industry to protect its vessels. On this website, ship owners can learn about self protection measures and can register their vessel. ATALANTA can then give, through a vulnerability matrix, the level of protection that is needed. There are around 30,000 movements of ships of which 70% is taken up by Maritime Security Center - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). However, the remaining registration gap of 30% is a concern. Regarding military cooperation Mercury and SHADE are important.
25. At this moment, there exists an unprecedented level of cooperation with states who are not participating in any existing initiatives ('non-aligned nations'). The expectation was that these nations would have a national focus and that the different Rules of Engagement (RoE) profiles would cause difficulties. However, this has not happened. To ensure further cooperation, there are monthly meetings, coordinated by SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction). The sharing of information is of great importance and this can be done through an unclassified but secure chat room system in which real-time chat is possible to achieve tactical operations. The operation is effective; there has not been a successful attack since June 2009. The vessels that were previously captured did not follow the advice of the EU. When all goes well, pirates can be prosecuted whether it be in Kenya or in Member States. The presentation of Cdr. Lintern is attached as **Annex 17**.
26. In the open discussion, India made the remark that there is a lot of cooperation on the issue; however there are still a lot of gaps, which need to be addressed for better synergy between the participating navies.
27. The representative of Japan underlined that the EU was taking leading steps in the fight against piracy. He informed that the policy of Japan in this respect was the "multi-faceted approach," which is to address immediate threats by utilizing naval assets and at the same time to support capacity building efforts of surrounding countries. He also said that it was important to tackle the root causes of the problems in Somalia to ultimately solve the issue of piracy. The lessons learned that Japan acquired from its role in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be used for the case of Somalia. As to the issue of international cooperation, he said that ARF could play a useful role in this regard.
28. The representative of Singapore expressed appreciation to the EC for its pledged contribution of 400,000 to 500,000 Euros to the Co-operative Mechanism during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Co-operation Forum held in Singapore in October 2009. The Singapore delegation looked forward to working further with the European Commission, Malaysia and Indonesia to materialise this contribution. While the primary responsibility for security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore laid with the littoral states as shown in the military co-operation through the Malacca Straits Patrols, the international community and user states can also play a role through the Co-operative Mechanism. In the Gulf of Aden, Singapore had also contributed to the fight against piracy with its naval deployment in April to July 2009.
29. The EU Co-Chair informed the participants on the EU assistance given to Somalia. In the period 2008-2013 the aid amounts to €215 million ranging in the field of governance, education and rural development. In addition, €45 million in humanitarian assistance is

given to Somalia every year. Therefore, the issue of piracy is not being solved by military instruments only.

30. Further to Cdr. Lintern's comments, Canada suggested that agreements for the transfer and prosecution of suspected pirates by regional States may be an option for States with patrols in the Horn of Africa.
31. In response to the comments made by the Indian delegation, Cdr. David Lintern reiterated that Operation ATALANTA gives no national or EU escorts and provides universal protection for all. Challenges that lay ahead are the continuing attacks that occur in Somalia. More needs to be done to deter act of piracy. In reaction to the question raised by the EU Co-Chair, Cdr. Lintern commented that UNCLOS works. The international legal instruments that are at hand work, however the problem lays with the implementation by nations. On the issue of the 30% of ships that are not registered, Cdr. Lintern stated that this was due partly to ignorance but also because not every ship owner was informed. Also, some ship owners fear that by registration their position on sea would be known to pirates.
32. Mr. Hinchiffe underlined the importance from the industry perspective of the mechanism. Important that the flag states implement the international conventions as they have promised.

### **Subsession B**

33. Mr Bebeb Djundjuran of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia talked about co-operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have a longstanding recognition of the need for co-operation. The three countries have developed structures under tripartite Ministerial control, to develop safety of navigation and environmental protection (burden sharing and a "Co-operative Mechanism") and maritime security. The Co-operative Mechanism, is a first and unique mechanism under Article 43 of UNCLOS. It provides a venue for co-operation among the Littoral States (LS) and users. It was designed to promote dialogue and facilitate closer collaboration, between the 3 LS and other partners. Responsibility for security measures primarily lies within the sovereignty of the littoral states. In practice, there is substantial co-operation with other users. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore has moved from being one of the most dangerous areas to one of the safest. Future thinking about a more comprehensive solution involves priority setting, enhancing co-operation (interagency and intergovernmental), enhancing terrestrial intelligence and enforcement, maritime domain awareness. Mr. Bebeb's presentation appears as **Annex 18**.
34. Mr Yoshiaki Ito of the Information Sharing Centre of ReCAAP made a presentation on ReCAAP, the first regional government-to-government initiative to promote and enhance co-operation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. Incidence of piracy and armed robbery affecting shipping in Asia has fallen significantly, partly through ReCAAP. It is based on a system of focal points which coordinates with all stakeholders; exchanging information and sharing best practices, publishing regular reports on the piracy and armed robbery situation in the Asian region and conducting capacity building workshops. ReCAAP is currently sharing its experiences with other trouble spots, notably in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. His presentation appears as **Annex 19**.
35. Mr Michael Brown of the United States Coast Guard's International Port Security Program made a presentation on the USA's work with other countries on the ISPS Code in relation to ports. Cooperation visits suggest that physical security is generally good as is awareness of ISPS Code requirements. Some countries, however, are facing problems with sustainability, oversight, drills and exercises, training, port state control

activities, and cargo pre-entry documentation. USA has published best practices observed during its visits on its website (homeport.uscg.mil). The USA is also working with the IMO, OAS, and APEC to conduct capacity building activities. The USA noted that while the ISPS Code is an extremely valuable and useful instrument, it is only a minimum standard. The USA believes that improvement in maritime governance, which involves the use of institutions, structures of authority, and sovereign capabilities to oversee maritime activities and safeguard national maritime interests will serve to further strengthen port security for all countries. The USA looks forward to further engagement with its maritime trading partners in this area. His presentation appears as **Annex 20**.

36. In the open discussion, India noted its naval involvement in the Gulf of Aden and looked to the United Nations to take the leading role. Japan informed that it is preparing a questionnaire to help it to compile best practices. In the discussion, Australia said it wanted to become an observer in ReCAAP, as information sharing was seen as an important best practice.

### **Closing session**

37. The Co-Chairs drew the following main conclusions and outlined potential next steps:
- a) Maritime Security is of strategic importance for many member states of the ARF. The freedom of navigation can not be taken for granted. It requires a consistent and coordinated commitment of efforts by all stake holders, as well as their input and acceptance, to be effective. The growing importance of non-traditional security issues was signalled and much of the discussion focused on piracy, in particular in the Gulf of Aden. It was agreed that there was a lack of consensus on definitions of key maritime concepts. Therefore, ARF would have to continue discussing and deliberating further on the issue in the future.
  - b) Existing international legislation on maritime security does not comprehensively address all maritime security threats. Difficulties in enacting international legislation domestically need to be addressed.
  - c) The seminar heard of success in overcoming difficulties of interagency cooperation and best-practice sharing. It also noted the effective action in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and in current efforts in the Gulf of Aden. The high level of political support amongst different states regarding piracy is an important value for all in bringing a solution to the problem. Piracy, as well as other threats to maritime security, needs to be tackled effectively and in a sustainable fashion. Responses should consider both short-term, immediate responses (punishment), as well as long term structural solutions (development and governance) to address the root causes.
  - d) A useful first step would be to undertake a review involving the full range of stakeholders. The aim of such a review would be to develop a comprehensive picture covering all ARF participants of the key issues that arise from the lack of comprehensive international legislative framework (eg. the intentional destruction of submarine cables).
  - e) National implementation of international law was progressing at different speeds. It would seem useful that attention be given to exchange of Best Practices. Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia is examining legal implementation issues, and there may be merit in bringing it into the conversation that was being held in ARF. In addition, the issue of implementation of international conventions can be used as a discussion topic in future ARF seminars.
  - f) ASEAN Regional Forum participants can also look at how the expertise gained in its striking success in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore can be put to use in the Gulf



of Aden. The approach, however, has to be different from the one in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as there is no effective Somali government in place.

- g) Cooperation is an area where ASEAN Regional Forum participants have built up substantial experience of Best Practices, and where substantial challenges remain (eg. developing a culture of trust and knowledge sharing). It would be useful to see how a network could be developed to share Best Practices.
- h) ASEAN Regional Forum is a good platform for deepening and enhancing a dialogue on maritime security.
- i) Outcomes and conclusions of the seminar will be reported to the ARF SOM in Hanoi in May 2010. Prior to that, the Co-Chairs will also brief the 2nd Inter-Sessional Group Meeting on Maritime Security in Auckland, New Zealand, in March 2010.

38. The Co-Chairs thanked the participants for their active participation, noting that views expressed during the discussions would further contribute to deepening deliberations and cooperation in the field of maritime security in the ARF framework.

39. The participants expressed their gratitude to Indonesia and the European Union for their effective co-chairmanship.